]>
Commit | Line | Data |
---|---|---|
8c71ec8f | 1 | /** @file\r |
2 | HII Config Access protocol implementation of SecureBoot configuration module.\r | |
3 | \r | |
4 | Copyright (c) 2011 - 2012, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>\r | |
5 | This program and the accompanying materials\r | |
6 | are licensed and made available under the terms and conditions of the BSD License\r | |
7 | which accompanies this distribution. The full text of the license may be found at\r | |
8 | http://opensource.org/licenses/bsd-license.php\r | |
9 | \r | |
10 | THE PROGRAM IS DISTRIBUTED UNDER THE BSD LICENSE ON AN "AS IS" BASIS,\r | |
11 | WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR REPRESENTATIONS OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED.\r | |
12 | \r | |
13 | **/\r | |
14 | \r | |
15 | #include "SecureBootConfigImpl.h"\r | |
16 | \r | |
17 | CHAR16 mSecureBootStorageName[] = L"SECUREBOOT_CONFIGURATION";\r | |
18 | \r | |
19 | SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_DATA mSecureBootConfigPrivateDateTemplate = {\r | |
20 | SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_DATA_SIGNATURE, \r | |
21 | {\r | |
22 | SecureBootExtractConfig,\r | |
23 | SecureBootRouteConfig,\r | |
24 | SecureBootCallback\r | |
25 | }\r | |
26 | };\r | |
27 | \r | |
28 | HII_VENDOR_DEVICE_PATH mSecureBootHiiVendorDevicePath = {\r | |
29 | {\r | |
30 | {\r | |
31 | HARDWARE_DEVICE_PATH,\r | |
32 | HW_VENDOR_DP,\r | |
33 | {\r | |
34 | (UINT8) (sizeof (VENDOR_DEVICE_PATH)),\r | |
35 | (UINT8) ((sizeof (VENDOR_DEVICE_PATH)) >> 8)\r | |
36 | }\r | |
37 | },\r | |
38 | SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_FORM_SET_GUID\r | |
39 | },\r | |
40 | {\r | |
41 | END_DEVICE_PATH_TYPE,\r | |
42 | END_ENTIRE_DEVICE_PATH_SUBTYPE,\r | |
43 | {\r | |
44 | (UINT8) (END_DEVICE_PATH_LENGTH),\r | |
45 | (UINT8) ((END_DEVICE_PATH_LENGTH) >> 8)\r | |
46 | }\r | |
47 | }\r | |
48 | };\r | |
49 | \r | |
50 | \r | |
51 | //\r | |
52 | // OID ASN.1 Value for Hash Algorithms\r | |
53 | //\r | |
54 | UINT8 mHashOidValue[] = {\r | |
55 | 0x2A, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xF7, 0x0D, 0x02, 0x05, // OBJ_md5\r | |
56 | 0x2B, 0x0E, 0x03, 0x02, 0x1A, // OBJ_sha1\r | |
57 | 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x04, // OBJ_sha224\r | |
58 | 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x01, // OBJ_sha256\r | |
59 | 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x02, // OBJ_sha384\r | |
60 | 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x03, // OBJ_sha512\r | |
61 | };\r | |
62 | \r | |
63 | HASH_TABLE mHash[] = {\r | |
64 | { L"SHA1", 20, &mHashOidValue[8], 5, Sha1GetContextSize, Sha1Init, Sha1Update, Sha1Final },\r | |
65 | { L"SHA224", 28, &mHashOidValue[13], 9, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL },\r | |
66 | { L"SHA256", 32, &mHashOidValue[22], 9, Sha256GetContextSize,Sha256Init, Sha256Update, Sha256Final},\r | |
67 | { L"SHA384", 48, &mHashOidValue[31], 9, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL },\r | |
68 | { L"SHA512", 64, &mHashOidValue[40], 9, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL }\r | |
69 | };\r | |
70 | \r | |
71 | //\r | |
72 | // Variable Definitions \r | |
73 | // \r | |
74 | UINT32 mPeCoffHeaderOffset = 0;\r | |
75 | WIN_CERTIFICATE *mCertificate = NULL;\r | |
76 | IMAGE_TYPE mImageType;\r | |
77 | UINT8 *mImageBase = NULL;\r | |
78 | UINTN mImageSize = 0;\r | |
79 | UINT8 mImageDigest[MAX_DIGEST_SIZE];\r | |
80 | UINTN mImageDigestSize;\r | |
81 | EFI_GUID mCertType;\r | |
82 | EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATA_DIRECTORY *mSecDataDir = NULL;\r | |
83 | EFI_IMAGE_OPTIONAL_HEADER_PTR_UNION mNtHeader;\r | |
84 | \r | |
85 | //\r | |
86 | // Possible DER-encoded certificate file suffixes, end with NULL pointer.\r | |
87 | //\r | |
88 | CHAR16* mDerEncodedSuffix[] = {\r | |
89 | L".cer",\r | |
90 | L".der",\r | |
91 | L".crt",\r | |
92 | NULL\r | |
93 | };\r | |
94 | CHAR16* mSupportX509Suffix = L"*.cer/der/crt";\r | |
95 | \r | |
96 | /**\r | |
97 | This code checks if the FileSuffix is one of the possible DER-encoded certificate suffix.\r | |
98 | \r | |
99 | @param[in] FileSuffix The suffix of the input certificate file\r | |
100 | \r | |
101 | @retval TRUE It's a DER-encoded certificate.\r | |
102 | @retval FALSE It's NOT a DER-encoded certificate.\r | |
103 | \r | |
104 | **/\r | |
105 | BOOLEAN\r | |
106 | IsDerEncodeCertificate (\r | |
107 | IN CONST CHAR16 *FileSuffix\r | |
108 | )\r | |
109 | {\r | |
110 | UINTN Index; \r | |
111 | for (Index = 0; mDerEncodedSuffix[Index] != NULL; Index++) {\r | |
112 | if (StrCmp (FileSuffix, mDerEncodedSuffix[Index]) == 0) {\r | |
113 | return TRUE;\r | |
114 | }\r | |
115 | }\r | |
116 | return FALSE;\r | |
117 | }\r | |
118 | \r | |
119 | /**\r | |
120 | Set Secure Boot option into variable space.\r | |
121 | \r | |
122 | @param[in] VarValue The option of Secure Boot.\r | |
123 | \r | |
124 | @retval EFI_SUCCESS The operation is finished successfully.\r | |
125 | @retval Others Other errors as indicated.\r | |
126 | \r | |
127 | **/\r | |
128 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
129 | SaveSecureBootVariable (\r | |
130 | IN UINT8 VarValue\r | |
131 | )\r | |
132 | {\r | |
133 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r | |
134 | \r | |
135 | Status = gRT->SetVariable (\r | |
136 | EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME,\r | |
137 | &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid,\r | |
138 | EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS,\r | |
139 | sizeof (UINT8),\r | |
140 | &VarValue\r | |
141 | );\r | |
142 | return Status;\r | |
143 | }\r | |
144 | \r | |
145 | /**\r | |
146 | Create a time based data payload by concatenating the EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2\r | |
147 | descriptor with the input data. NO authentication is required in this function.\r | |
148 | \r | |
149 | @param[in, out] DataSize On input, the size of Data buffer in bytes.\r | |
150 | On output, the size of data returned in Data\r | |
151 | buffer in bytes.\r | |
152 | @param[in, out] Data On input, Pointer to data buffer to be wrapped or \r | |
153 | pointer to NULL to wrap an empty payload.\r | |
154 | On output, Pointer to the new payload date buffer allocated from pool,\r | |
155 | it's caller's responsibility to free the memory when finish using it. \r | |
156 | \r | |
157 | @retval EFI_SUCCESS Create time based payload successfully.\r | |
158 | @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES There are not enough memory resourses to create time based payload.\r | |
159 | @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER The parameter is invalid.\r | |
160 | @retval Others Unexpected error happens.\r | |
161 | \r | |
162 | **/\r | |
163 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
164 | CreateTimeBasedPayload (\r | |
165 | IN OUT UINTN *DataSize,\r | |
166 | IN OUT UINT8 **Data\r | |
167 | )\r | |
168 | {\r | |
169 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r | |
170 | UINT8 *NewData;\r | |
171 | UINT8 *Payload;\r | |
172 | UINTN PayloadSize;\r | |
173 | EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 *DescriptorData;\r | |
174 | UINTN DescriptorSize;\r | |
175 | EFI_TIME Time;\r | |
176 | \r | |
177 | if (Data == NULL || DataSize == NULL) {\r | |
178 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r | |
179 | }\r | |
180 | \r | |
181 | //\r | |
182 | // In Setup mode or Custom mode, the variable does not need to be signed but the \r | |
183 | // parameters to the SetVariable() call still need to be prepared as authenticated\r | |
184 | // variable. So we create EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_2 descriptor without certificate\r | |
185 | // data in it.\r | |
186 | //\r | |
187 | Payload = *Data;\r | |
188 | PayloadSize = *DataSize;\r | |
189 | \r | |
190 | DescriptorSize = OFFSET_OF (EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2, AuthInfo) + OFFSET_OF (WIN_CERTIFICATE_UEFI_GUID, CertData);\r | |
191 | NewData = (UINT8*) AllocateZeroPool (DescriptorSize + PayloadSize);\r | |
192 | if (NewData == NULL) {\r | |
193 | return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r | |
194 | }\r | |
195 | \r | |
196 | if ((Payload != NULL) && (PayloadSize != 0)) {\r | |
197 | CopyMem (NewData + DescriptorSize, Payload, PayloadSize);\r | |
198 | }\r | |
199 | \r | |
200 | DescriptorData = (EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 *) (NewData);\r | |
201 | \r | |
202 | ZeroMem (&Time, sizeof (EFI_TIME));\r | |
203 | Status = gRT->GetTime (&Time, NULL);\r | |
204 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
205 | FreePool(NewData);\r | |
206 | return Status;\r | |
207 | }\r | |
208 | Time.Pad1 = 0;\r | |
209 | Time.Nanosecond = 0;\r | |
210 | Time.TimeZone = 0;\r | |
211 | Time.Daylight = 0;\r | |
212 | Time.Pad2 = 0;\r | |
213 | CopyMem (&DescriptorData->TimeStamp, &Time, sizeof (EFI_TIME));\r | |
214 | \r | |
215 | DescriptorData->AuthInfo.Hdr.dwLength = OFFSET_OF (WIN_CERTIFICATE_UEFI_GUID, CertData);\r | |
216 | DescriptorData->AuthInfo.Hdr.wRevision = 0x0200;\r | |
217 | DescriptorData->AuthInfo.Hdr.wCertificateType = WIN_CERT_TYPE_EFI_GUID;\r | |
218 | CopyGuid (&DescriptorData->AuthInfo.CertType, &gEfiCertPkcs7Guid);\r | |
219 | \r | |
220 | if (Payload != NULL) {\r | |
221 | FreePool(Payload);\r | |
222 | }\r | |
223 | \r | |
224 | *DataSize = DescriptorSize + PayloadSize;\r | |
225 | *Data = NewData;\r | |
226 | return EFI_SUCCESS;\r | |
227 | }\r | |
228 | \r | |
229 | /**\r | |
230 | Internal helper function to delete a Variable given its name and GUID, NO authentication\r | |
231 | required.\r | |
232 | \r | |
233 | @param[in] VariableName Name of the Variable.\r | |
234 | @param[in] VendorGuid GUID of the Variable.\r | |
235 | \r | |
236 | @retval EFI_SUCCESS Variable deleted successfully.\r | |
237 | @retval Others The driver failed to start the device.\r | |
238 | \r | |
239 | **/\r | |
240 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
241 | DeleteVariable (\r | |
242 | IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r | |
243 | IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid\r | |
244 | )\r | |
245 | {\r | |
246 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r | |
247 | VOID* Variable;\r | |
248 | UINT8 *Data;\r | |
249 | UINTN DataSize;\r | |
250 | UINT32 Attr;\r | |
251 | \r | |
252 | GetVariable2 (VariableName, VendorGuid, &Variable, NULL);\r | |
253 | if (Variable == NULL) {\r | |
254 | return EFI_SUCCESS;\r | |
255 | }\r | |
256 | \r | |
257 | Data = NULL;\r | |
258 | DataSize = 0;\r | |
259 | Attr = EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS\r | |
260 | | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS;\r | |
261 | \r | |
262 | Status = CreateTimeBasedPayload (&DataSize, &Data);\r | |
263 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
264 | DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Fail to create time-based data payload: %r", Status));\r | |
265 | return Status;\r | |
266 | }\r | |
267 | \r | |
268 | Status = gRT->SetVariable (\r | |
269 | VariableName,\r | |
270 | VendorGuid,\r | |
271 | Attr,\r | |
272 | DataSize,\r | |
273 | Data\r | |
274 | );\r | |
275 | if (Data != NULL) {\r | |
276 | FreePool (Data);\r | |
277 | }\r | |
278 | return Status;\r | |
279 | }\r | |
280 | \r | |
281 | /**\r | |
282 | Generate the PK signature list from the X509 Certificate storing file (.cer)\r | |
283 | \r | |
284 | @param[in] X509File FileHandle of X509 Certificate storing file.\r | |
285 | @param[out] PkCert Point to the data buffer to store the signature list.\r | |
286 | \r | |
287 | @return EFI_UNSUPPORTED Unsupported Key Length.\r | |
288 | @return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES There are not enough memory resourses to form the signature list.\r | |
289 | \r | |
290 | **/\r | |
291 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
292 | CreatePkX509SignatureList (\r | |
293 | IN EFI_FILE_HANDLE X509File, \r | |
294 | OUT EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST **PkCert \r | |
295 | )\r | |
296 | {\r | |
297 | EFI_STATUS Status; \r | |
298 | UINT8 *X509Data;\r | |
299 | UINTN X509DataSize;\r | |
300 | EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *PkCertData;\r | |
301 | \r | |
302 | X509Data = NULL;\r | |
303 | PkCertData = NULL;\r | |
304 | X509DataSize = 0; \r | |
305 | \r | |
306 | Status = ReadFileContent (X509File, (VOID**) &X509Data, &X509DataSize, 0);\r | |
307 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
308 | goto ON_EXIT;\r | |
309 | }\r | |
310 | ASSERT (X509Data != NULL);\r | |
311 | \r | |
312 | //\r | |
313 | // Allocate space for PK certificate list and initialize it.\r | |
314 | // Create PK database entry with SignatureHeaderSize equals 0.\r | |
315 | //\r | |
316 | *PkCert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST*) AllocateZeroPool (\r | |
317 | sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1\r | |
318 | + X509DataSize\r | |
319 | );\r | |
320 | if (*PkCert == NULL) {\r | |
321 | Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r | |
322 | goto ON_EXIT;\r | |
323 | }\r | |
324 | \r | |
325 | (*PkCert)->SignatureListSize = (UINT32) (sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) \r | |
326 | + sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1\r | |
327 | + X509DataSize);\r | |
328 | (*PkCert)->SignatureSize = (UINT32) (sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1 + X509DataSize);\r | |
329 | (*PkCert)->SignatureHeaderSize = 0;\r | |
330 | CopyGuid (&(*PkCert)->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Guid);\r | |
331 | PkCertData = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA*) ((UINTN)(*PkCert) \r | |
332 | + sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST)\r | |
333 | + (*PkCert)->SignatureHeaderSize);\r | |
334 | CopyGuid (&PkCertData->SignatureOwner, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid); \r | |
335 | //\r | |
336 | // Fill the PK database with PKpub data from X509 certificate file.\r | |
337 | // \r | |
338 | CopyMem (&(PkCertData->SignatureData[0]), X509Data, X509DataSize);\r | |
339 | \r | |
340 | ON_EXIT:\r | |
341 | \r | |
342 | if (X509Data != NULL) {\r | |
343 | FreePool (X509Data);\r | |
344 | }\r | |
345 | \r | |
346 | if (EFI_ERROR(Status) && *PkCert != NULL) {\r | |
347 | FreePool (*PkCert);\r | |
348 | *PkCert = NULL;\r | |
349 | }\r | |
350 | \r | |
351 | return Status;\r | |
352 | }\r | |
353 | \r | |
354 | /**\r | |
355 | Enroll new PK into the System without original PK's authentication.\r | |
356 | \r | |
357 | The SignatureOwner GUID will be the same with PK's vendorguid.\r | |
358 | \r | |
359 | @param[in] PrivateData The module's private data.\r | |
360 | \r | |
361 | @retval EFI_SUCCESS New PK enrolled successfully.\r | |
362 | @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER The parameter is invalid.\r | |
363 | @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES Could not allocate needed resources.\r | |
364 | \r | |
365 | **/\r | |
366 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
367 | EnrollPlatformKey (\r | |
368 | IN SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_DATA* Private\r | |
369 | ) \r | |
370 | {\r | |
371 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r | |
372 | UINT32 Attr;\r | |
373 | UINTN DataSize;\r | |
374 | EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *PkCert;\r | |
375 | UINT16* FilePostFix;\r | |
376 | \r | |
377 | if (Private->FileContext->FileName == NULL) {\r | |
378 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r | |
379 | }\r | |
380 | \r | |
381 | PkCert = NULL;\r | |
382 | \r | |
383 | //\r | |
384 | // Parse the file's postfix. Only support DER encoded X.509 certificate files.\r | |
385 | //\r | |
386 | FilePostFix = Private->FileContext->FileName + StrLen (Private->FileContext->FileName) - 4;\r | |
387 | if (!IsDerEncodeCertificate(FilePostFix)) {\r | |
388 | DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Unsupported file type, only DER encoded certificate (%s) is supported.", mSupportX509Suffix));\r | |
389 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r | |
390 | }\r | |
391 | DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "FileName= %s\n", Private->FileContext->FileName));\r | |
392 | DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "FilePostFix = %s\n", FilePostFix));\r | |
393 | \r | |
394 | //\r | |
395 | // Prase the selected PK file and generature PK certificate list.\r | |
396 | //\r | |
397 | Status = CreatePkX509SignatureList (\r | |
398 | Private->FileContext->FHandle, \r | |
399 | &PkCert \r | |
400 | );\r | |
401 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
402 | goto ON_EXIT;\r | |
403 | }\r | |
404 | ASSERT (PkCert != NULL);\r | |
405 | \r | |
406 | //\r | |
407 | // Set Platform Key variable.\r | |
408 | // \r | |
409 | Attr = EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS \r | |
410 | | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS;\r | |
411 | DataSize = PkCert->SignatureListSize;\r | |
412 | Status = CreateTimeBasedPayload (&DataSize, (UINT8**) &PkCert);\r | |
413 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
414 | DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Fail to create time-based data payload: %r", Status));\r | |
415 | goto ON_EXIT;\r | |
416 | }\r | |
417 | \r | |
418 | Status = gRT->SetVariable(\r | |
419 | EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME, \r | |
420 | &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, \r | |
421 | Attr, \r | |
422 | DataSize, \r | |
423 | PkCert\r | |
424 | );\r | |
425 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
426 | if (Status == EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES) {\r | |
427 | DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Enroll PK failed with out of resource.\n"));\r | |
428 | }\r | |
429 | goto ON_EXIT;\r | |
430 | }\r | |
431 | \r | |
432 | ON_EXIT:\r | |
433 | \r | |
434 | if (PkCert != NULL) {\r | |
435 | FreePool(PkCert);\r | |
436 | }\r | |
437 | \r | |
438 | if (Private->FileContext->FHandle != NULL) {\r | |
439 | CloseFile (Private->FileContext->FHandle);\r | |
440 | Private->FileContext->FHandle = NULL;\r | |
441 | }\r | |
442 | \r | |
443 | return Status;\r | |
444 | }\r | |
445 | \r | |
446 | /**\r | |
447 | Remove the PK variable.\r | |
448 | \r | |
449 | @retval EFI_SUCCESS Delete PK successfully.\r | |
450 | @retval Others Could not allow to delete PK.\r | |
451 | \r | |
452 | **/\r | |
453 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
454 | DeletePlatformKey (\r | |
455 | VOID\r | |
456 | )\r | |
457 | {\r | |
458 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r | |
459 | \r | |
460 | Status = DeleteVariable (\r | |
461 | EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME,\r | |
462 | &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid\r | |
463 | );\r | |
464 | return Status;\r | |
465 | }\r | |
466 | \r | |
467 | /**\r | |
468 | Enroll a new KEK item from public key storing file (*.pbk).\r | |
469 | \r | |
470 | @param[in] PrivateData The module's private data.\r | |
471 | \r | |
472 | @retval EFI_SUCCESS New KEK enrolled successfully.\r | |
473 | @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER The parameter is invalid.\r | |
474 | @retval EFI_UNSUPPORTED Unsupported command.\r | |
475 | @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES Could not allocate needed resources.\r | |
476 | \r | |
477 | **/\r | |
478 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
479 | EnrollRsa2048ToKek (\r | |
480 | IN SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_DATA *Private\r | |
481 | )\r | |
482 | {\r | |
483 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r | |
484 | UINT32 Attr;\r | |
485 | UINTN DataSize;\r | |
486 | EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *KekSigList;\r | |
487 | UINTN KeyBlobSize;\r | |
488 | UINT8 *KeyBlob;\r | |
489 | CPL_KEY_INFO *KeyInfo;\r | |
490 | EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *KEKSigData;\r | |
491 | UINTN KekSigListSize;\r | |
492 | UINT8 *KeyBuffer; \r | |
493 | UINTN KeyLenInBytes;\r | |
494 | \r | |
495 | Attr = 0;\r | |
496 | DataSize = 0;\r | |
497 | KeyBuffer = NULL;\r | |
498 | KeyBlobSize = 0;\r | |
499 | KeyBlob = NULL;\r | |
500 | KeyInfo = NULL;\r | |
501 | KEKSigData = NULL;\r | |
502 | KekSigList = NULL;\r | |
503 | KekSigListSize = 0;\r | |
504 | \r | |
505 | //\r | |
506 | // Form the KeKpub certificate list into EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST type.\r | |
507 | // First, We have to parse out public key data from the pbk key file.\r | |
508 | // \r | |
509 | Status = ReadFileContent (\r | |
510 | Private->FileContext->FHandle,\r | |
511 | (VOID**) &KeyBlob,\r | |
512 | &KeyBlobSize,\r | |
513 | 0\r | |
514 | );\r | |
515 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
516 | goto ON_EXIT;\r | |
517 | }\r | |
518 | ASSERT (KeyBlob != NULL);\r | |
519 | KeyInfo = (CPL_KEY_INFO *) KeyBlob;\r | |
520 | if (KeyInfo->KeyLengthInBits / 8 != WIN_CERT_UEFI_RSA2048_SIZE) {\r | |
521 | DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Unsupported key length, Only RSA2048 is supported.\n"));\r | |
522 | Status = EFI_UNSUPPORTED;\r | |
523 | goto ON_EXIT;\r | |
524 | }\r | |
525 | \r | |
526 | //\r | |
527 | // Convert the Public key to fix octet string format represented in RSA PKCS#1.\r | |
528 | // \r | |
529 | KeyLenInBytes = KeyInfo->KeyLengthInBits / 8;\r | |
530 | KeyBuffer = AllocateZeroPool (KeyLenInBytes);\r | |
531 | if (KeyBuffer == NULL) {\r | |
532 | Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r | |
533 | goto ON_EXIT;\r | |
534 | }\r | |
535 | Int2OctStr (\r | |
536 | (UINTN*) (KeyBlob + sizeof (CPL_KEY_INFO)), \r | |
537 | KeyLenInBytes / sizeof (UINTN), \r | |
538 | KeyBuffer, \r | |
539 | KeyLenInBytes\r | |
540 | );\r | |
541 | CopyMem(KeyBlob + sizeof(CPL_KEY_INFO), KeyBuffer, KeyLenInBytes);\r | |
542 | \r | |
543 | //\r | |
544 | // Form an new EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST.\r | |
545 | //\r | |
546 | KekSigListSize = sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST)\r | |
547 | + sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1\r | |
548 | + WIN_CERT_UEFI_RSA2048_SIZE;\r | |
549 | \r | |
550 | KekSigList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST*) AllocateZeroPool (KekSigListSize);\r | |
551 | if (KekSigList == NULL) {\r | |
552 | Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r | |
553 | goto ON_EXIT;\r | |
554 | }\r | |
555 | \r | |
556 | KekSigList->SignatureListSize = sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST)\r | |
557 | + sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1\r | |
558 | + WIN_CERT_UEFI_RSA2048_SIZE;\r | |
559 | KekSigList->SignatureHeaderSize = 0;\r | |
560 | KekSigList->SignatureSize = sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1 + WIN_CERT_UEFI_RSA2048_SIZE;\r | |
561 | CopyGuid (&KekSigList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertRsa2048Guid);\r | |
562 | \r | |
563 | KEKSigData = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA*)((UINT8*)KekSigList + sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST));\r | |
564 | CopyGuid (&KEKSigData->SignatureOwner, Private->SignatureGUID);\r | |
565 | CopyMem (\r | |
566 | KEKSigData->SignatureData,\r | |
567 | KeyBlob + sizeof(CPL_KEY_INFO),\r | |
568 | WIN_CERT_UEFI_RSA2048_SIZE\r | |
569 | );\r | |
570 | \r | |
571 | //\r | |
572 | // Check if KEK entry has been already existed. \r | |
573 | // If true, use EFI_VARIABLE_APPEND_WRITE attribute to append the \r | |
574 | // new KEK to original variable.\r | |
575 | // \r | |
576 | Attr = EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS \r | |
577 | | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS;\r | |
578 | Status = CreateTimeBasedPayload (&KekSigListSize, (UINT8**) &KekSigList);\r | |
579 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
580 | DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Fail to create time-based data payload: %r", Status));\r | |
581 | goto ON_EXIT;\r | |
582 | }\r | |
583 | \r | |
584 | Status = gRT->GetVariable(\r | |
585 | EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME, \r | |
586 | &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, \r | |
587 | NULL, \r | |
588 | &DataSize, \r | |
589 | NULL\r | |
590 | );\r | |
591 | if (Status == EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {\r | |
592 | Attr |= EFI_VARIABLE_APPEND_WRITE;\r | |
593 | } else if (Status != EFI_NOT_FOUND) {\r | |
594 | goto ON_EXIT;\r | |
595 | }\r | |
596 | \r | |
597 | //\r | |
598 | // Done. Now we have formed the correct KEKpub database item, just set it into variable storage,\r | |
599 | // \r | |
600 | Status = gRT->SetVariable(\r | |
601 | EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME, \r | |
602 | &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, \r | |
603 | Attr, \r | |
604 | KekSigListSize, \r | |
605 | KekSigList\r | |
606 | );\r | |
607 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
608 | goto ON_EXIT;\r | |
609 | }\r | |
610 | \r | |
611 | ON_EXIT:\r | |
612 | \r | |
613 | CloseFile (Private->FileContext->FHandle);\r | |
614 | Private->FileContext->FHandle = NULL;\r | |
615 | Private->FileContext->FileName = NULL;\r | |
616 | \r | |
617 | if (Private->SignatureGUID != NULL) {\r | |
618 | FreePool (Private->SignatureGUID);\r | |
619 | Private->SignatureGUID = NULL;\r | |
620 | }\r | |
621 | \r | |
622 | if (KeyBlob != NULL) {\r | |
623 | FreePool (KeyBlob);\r | |
624 | }\r | |
625 | if (KeyBuffer != NULL) {\r | |
626 | FreePool (KeyBuffer);\r | |
627 | }\r | |
628 | if (KekSigList != NULL) {\r | |
629 | FreePool (KekSigList);\r | |
630 | }\r | |
631 | \r | |
632 | return Status;\r | |
633 | }\r | |
634 | \r | |
635 | /**\r | |
636 | Enroll a new KEK item from X509 certificate file.\r | |
637 | \r | |
638 | @param[in] PrivateData The module's private data.\r | |
639 | \r | |
640 | @retval EFI_SUCCESS New X509 is enrolled successfully.\r | |
641 | @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER The parameter is invalid.\r | |
642 | @retval EFI_UNSUPPORTED Unsupported command.\r | |
643 | @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES Could not allocate needed resources.\r | |
644 | \r | |
645 | **/\r | |
646 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
647 | EnrollX509ToKek (\r | |
648 | IN SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_DATA *Private\r | |
649 | ) \r | |
650 | {\r | |
651 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r | |
652 | UINTN X509DataSize;\r | |
653 | VOID *X509Data;\r | |
654 | EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *KEKSigData;\r | |
655 | EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *KekSigList;\r | |
656 | UINTN DataSize;\r | |
657 | UINTN KekSigListSize;\r | |
658 | UINT32 Attr;\r | |
659 | \r | |
660 | X509Data = NULL;\r | |
661 | X509DataSize = 0;\r | |
662 | KekSigList = NULL;\r | |
663 | KekSigListSize = 0;\r | |
664 | DataSize = 0;\r | |
665 | KEKSigData = NULL;\r | |
666 | \r | |
667 | Status = ReadFileContent (\r | |
668 | Private->FileContext->FHandle,\r | |
669 | &X509Data,\r | |
670 | &X509DataSize,\r | |
671 | 0\r | |
672 | );\r | |
673 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
674 | goto ON_EXIT;\r | |
675 | }\r | |
676 | ASSERT (X509Data != NULL);\r | |
677 | \r | |
678 | KekSigListSize = sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1 + X509DataSize;\r | |
679 | KekSigList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST*) AllocateZeroPool (KekSigListSize);\r | |
680 | if (KekSigList == NULL) {\r | |
681 | Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r | |
682 | goto ON_EXIT;\r | |
683 | }\r | |
684 | \r | |
685 | //\r | |
686 | // Fill Certificate Database parameters.\r | |
687 | // \r | |
688 | KekSigList->SignatureListSize = (UINT32) KekSigListSize;\r | |
689 | KekSigList->SignatureHeaderSize = 0;\r | |
690 | KekSigList->SignatureSize = (UINT32) (sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1 + X509DataSize);\r | |
691 | CopyGuid (&KekSigList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Guid);\r | |
692 | \r | |
693 | KEKSigData = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA*) ((UINT8*) KekSigList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST));\r | |
694 | CopyGuid (&KEKSigData->SignatureOwner, Private->SignatureGUID);\r | |
695 | CopyMem (KEKSigData->SignatureData, X509Data, X509DataSize);\r | |
696 | \r | |
697 | //\r | |
698 | // Check if KEK been already existed. \r | |
699 | // If true, use EFI_VARIABLE_APPEND_WRITE attribute to append the \r | |
700 | // new kek to original variable\r | |
701 | // \r | |
702 | Attr = EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS \r | |
703 | | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS;\r | |
704 | Status = CreateTimeBasedPayload (&KekSigListSize, (UINT8**) &KekSigList);\r | |
705 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
706 | DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Fail to create time-based data payload: %r", Status));\r | |
707 | goto ON_EXIT;\r | |
708 | }\r | |
709 | \r | |
710 | Status = gRT->GetVariable(\r | |
711 | EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME, \r | |
712 | &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, \r | |
713 | NULL, \r | |
714 | &DataSize, \r | |
715 | NULL\r | |
716 | );\r | |
717 | if (Status == EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {\r | |
718 | Attr |= EFI_VARIABLE_APPEND_WRITE;\r | |
719 | } else if (Status != EFI_NOT_FOUND) {\r | |
720 | goto ON_EXIT;\r | |
721 | } \r | |
722 | \r | |
723 | Status = gRT->SetVariable(\r | |
724 | EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME, \r | |
725 | &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, \r | |
726 | Attr, \r | |
727 | KekSigListSize,\r | |
728 | KekSigList\r | |
729 | );\r | |
730 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
731 | goto ON_EXIT;\r | |
732 | }\r | |
733 | \r | |
734 | ON_EXIT:\r | |
735 | \r | |
736 | CloseFile (Private->FileContext->FHandle);\r | |
737 | Private->FileContext->FileName = NULL;\r | |
738 | Private->FileContext->FHandle = NULL;\r | |
739 | \r | |
740 | if (Private->SignatureGUID != NULL) {\r | |
741 | FreePool (Private->SignatureGUID);\r | |
742 | Private->SignatureGUID = NULL;\r | |
743 | }\r | |
744 | \r | |
745 | if (KekSigList != NULL) {\r | |
746 | FreePool (KekSigList);\r | |
747 | }\r | |
748 | \r | |
749 | return Status;\r | |
750 | }\r | |
751 | \r | |
752 | /**\r | |
753 | Enroll new KEK into the System without PK's authentication.\r | |
754 | The SignatureOwner GUID will be Private->SignatureGUID.\r | |
755 | \r | |
756 | @param[in] PrivateData The module's private data.\r | |
757 | \r | |
758 | @retval EFI_SUCCESS New KEK enrolled successful.\r | |
759 | @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER The parameter is invalid.\r | |
760 | @retval others Fail to enroll KEK data.\r | |
761 | \r | |
762 | **/\r | |
763 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
764 | EnrollKeyExchangeKey (\r | |
765 | IN SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_DATA *Private\r | |
766 | ) \r | |
767 | {\r | |
768 | UINT16* FilePostFix;\r | |
769 | \r | |
770 | if ((Private->FileContext->FileName == NULL) || (Private->SignatureGUID == NULL)) {\r | |
771 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r | |
772 | }\r | |
773 | \r | |
774 | //\r | |
775 | // Parse the file's postfix. Supports DER-encoded X509 certificate, \r | |
776 | // and .pbk as RSA public key file.\r | |
777 | //\r | |
778 | FilePostFix = Private->FileContext->FileName + StrLen (Private->FileContext->FileName) - 4;\r | |
779 | if (IsDerEncodeCertificate(FilePostFix)) {\r | |
780 | return EnrollX509ToKek (Private);\r | |
781 | } else if (CompareMem (FilePostFix, L".pbk",4) == 0) {\r | |
782 | return EnrollRsa2048ToKek (Private);\r | |
783 | } else {\r | |
784 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r | |
785 | }\r | |
786 | }\r | |
787 | \r | |
788 | /**\r | |
789 | Enroll a new X509 certificate into Signature Database (DB or DBX) without\r | |
790 | KEK's authentication.\r | |
791 | \r | |
792 | @param[in] PrivateData The module's private data.\r | |
793 | @param[in] VariableName Variable name of signature database, must be \r | |
794 | EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE or EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1.\r | |
795 | \r | |
796 | @retval EFI_SUCCESS New X509 is enrolled successfully.\r | |
797 | @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES Could not allocate needed resources.\r | |
798 | \r | |
799 | **/\r | |
800 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
801 | EnrollX509toSigDB (\r | |
802 | IN SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_DATA *Private,\r | |
803 | IN CHAR16 *VariableName\r | |
804 | ) \r | |
805 | {\r | |
806 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r | |
807 | UINTN X509DataSize;\r | |
808 | VOID *X509Data;\r | |
809 | EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *SigDBCert;\r | |
810 | EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *SigDBCertData;\r | |
811 | VOID *Data;\r | |
812 | UINTN DataSize;\r | |
813 | UINTN SigDBSize;\r | |
814 | UINT32 Attr;\r | |
815 | \r | |
816 | X509DataSize = 0;\r | |
817 | SigDBSize = 0;\r | |
818 | DataSize = 0;\r | |
819 | X509Data = NULL;\r | |
820 | SigDBCert = NULL;\r | |
821 | SigDBCertData = NULL;\r | |
822 | Data = NULL;\r | |
823 | \r | |
824 | Status = ReadFileContent (\r | |
825 | Private->FileContext->FHandle,\r | |
826 | &X509Data,\r | |
827 | &X509DataSize,\r | |
828 | 0\r | |
829 | );\r | |
830 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
831 | goto ON_EXIT;\r | |
832 | }\r | |
833 | ASSERT (X509Data != NULL);\r | |
834 | \r | |
835 | SigDBSize = sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1 + X509DataSize;\r | |
836 | \r | |
837 | Data = AllocateZeroPool (SigDBSize);\r | |
838 | if (Data == NULL) {\r | |
839 | Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r | |
840 | goto ON_EXIT;\r | |
841 | }\r | |
842 | \r | |
843 | //\r | |
844 | // Fill Certificate Database parameters.\r | |
845 | // \r | |
846 | SigDBCert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST*) Data;\r | |
847 | SigDBCert->SignatureListSize = (UINT32) SigDBSize;\r | |
848 | SigDBCert->SignatureHeaderSize = 0;\r | |
849 | SigDBCert->SignatureSize = (UINT32) (sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1 + X509DataSize);\r | |
850 | CopyGuid (&SigDBCert->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Guid);\r | |
851 | \r | |
852 | SigDBCertData = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA*) ((UINT8* ) SigDBCert + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST));\r | |
853 | CopyGuid (&SigDBCertData->SignatureOwner, Private->SignatureGUID);\r | |
854 | CopyMem ((UINT8* ) (SigDBCertData->SignatureData), X509Data, X509DataSize);\r | |
855 | \r | |
856 | //\r | |
857 | // Check if signature database entry has been already existed. \r | |
858 | // If true, use EFI_VARIABLE_APPEND_WRITE attribute to append the \r | |
859 | // new signature data to original variable\r | |
860 | // \r | |
861 | Attr = EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS \r | |
862 | | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS;\r | |
863 | Status = CreateTimeBasedPayload (&SigDBSize, (UINT8**) &Data);\r | |
864 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
865 | DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Fail to create time-based data payload: %r", Status));\r | |
866 | goto ON_EXIT;\r | |
867 | }\r | |
868 | \r | |
869 | Status = gRT->GetVariable(\r | |
870 | VariableName, \r | |
871 | &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, \r | |
872 | NULL, \r | |
873 | &DataSize, \r | |
874 | NULL\r | |
875 | );\r | |
876 | if (Status == EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {\r | |
877 | Attr |= EFI_VARIABLE_APPEND_WRITE;\r | |
878 | } else if (Status != EFI_NOT_FOUND) {\r | |
879 | goto ON_EXIT;\r | |
880 | } \r | |
881 | \r | |
882 | Status = gRT->SetVariable(\r | |
883 | VariableName, \r | |
884 | &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, \r | |
885 | Attr, \r | |
886 | SigDBSize,\r | |
887 | Data\r | |
888 | );\r | |
889 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
890 | goto ON_EXIT;\r | |
891 | }\r | |
892 | \r | |
893 | ON_EXIT:\r | |
894 | \r | |
895 | CloseFile (Private->FileContext->FHandle);\r | |
896 | Private->FileContext->FileName = NULL;\r | |
897 | Private->FileContext->FHandle = NULL;\r | |
898 | \r | |
899 | if (Private->SignatureGUID != NULL) {\r | |
900 | FreePool (Private->SignatureGUID);\r | |
901 | Private->SignatureGUID = NULL;\r | |
902 | }\r | |
903 | \r | |
904 | if (Data != NULL) {\r | |
905 | FreePool (Data);\r | |
906 | }\r | |
907 | \r | |
908 | if (X509Data != NULL) {\r | |
909 | FreePool (X509Data);\r | |
910 | }\r | |
911 | \r | |
912 | return Status;\r | |
913 | }\r | |
914 | \r | |
915 | /**\r | |
916 | Load PE/COFF image information into internal buffer and check its validity.\r | |
917 | \r | |
918 | @retval EFI_SUCCESS Successful\r | |
919 | @retval EFI_UNSUPPORTED Invalid PE/COFF file\r | |
920 | @retval EFI_ABORTED Serious error occurs, like file I/O error etc.\r | |
921 | \r | |
922 | **/\r | |
923 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
924 | LoadPeImage (\r | |
925 | VOID \r | |
926 | ) \r | |
927 | {\r | |
928 | EFI_IMAGE_DOS_HEADER *DosHdr;\r | |
929 | EFI_IMAGE_NT_HEADERS32 *NtHeader32;\r | |
930 | EFI_IMAGE_NT_HEADERS64 *NtHeader64;\r | |
931 | \r | |
932 | NtHeader32 = NULL;\r | |
933 | NtHeader64 = NULL;\r | |
934 | //\r | |
935 | // Read the Dos header\r | |
936 | //\r | |
937 | DosHdr = (EFI_IMAGE_DOS_HEADER*)(mImageBase);\r | |
938 | if (DosHdr->e_magic == EFI_IMAGE_DOS_SIGNATURE)\r | |
939 | {\r | |
940 | //\r | |
941 | // DOS image header is present, \r | |
942 | // So read the PE header after the DOS image header\r | |
943 | //\r | |
944 | mPeCoffHeaderOffset = DosHdr->e_lfanew;\r | |
945 | }\r | |
946 | else\r | |
947 | {\r | |
948 | mPeCoffHeaderOffset = 0;\r | |
949 | }\r | |
950 | \r | |
951 | //\r | |
952 | // Read PE header and check the signature validity and machine compatibility\r | |
953 | //\r | |
954 | NtHeader32 = (EFI_IMAGE_NT_HEADERS32*) (mImageBase + mPeCoffHeaderOffset);\r | |
955 | if (NtHeader32->Signature != EFI_IMAGE_NT_SIGNATURE)\r | |
956 | {\r | |
957 | return EFI_UNSUPPORTED;\r | |
958 | }\r | |
959 | \r | |
960 | mNtHeader.Pe32 = NtHeader32;\r | |
961 | \r | |
962 | //\r | |
963 | // Check the architecture field of PE header and get the Certificate Data Directory data\r | |
964 | // Note the size of FileHeader field is constant for both IA32 and X64 arch\r | |
965 | //\r | |
966 | if ((NtHeader32->FileHeader.Machine == EFI_IMAGE_MACHINE_IA32) \r | |
967 | || (NtHeader32->FileHeader.Machine == EFI_IMAGE_MACHINE_EBC)) {\r | |
968 | //\r | |
969 | // IA-32 Architecture\r | |
970 | //\r | |
971 | mImageType = ImageType_IA32;\r | |
972 | mSecDataDir = (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATA_DIRECTORY*) &(NtHeader32->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY]);\r | |
973 | }\r | |
974 | else if ((NtHeader32->FileHeader.Machine == EFI_IMAGE_MACHINE_IA64)\r | |
975 | || (NtHeader32->FileHeader.Machine == EFI_IMAGE_MACHINE_X64)) {\r | |
976 | //\r | |
977 | // 64-bits Architecture\r | |
978 | //\r | |
979 | mImageType = ImageType_X64;\r | |
980 | NtHeader64 = (EFI_IMAGE_NT_HEADERS64 *) (mImageBase + mPeCoffHeaderOffset);\r | |
981 | mSecDataDir = (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATA_DIRECTORY*) &(NtHeader64->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY]);\r | |
982 | } else {\r | |
983 | return EFI_UNSUPPORTED;\r | |
984 | }\r | |
985 | \r | |
986 | return EFI_SUCCESS;\r | |
987 | }\r | |
988 | \r | |
989 | /**\r | |
990 | Calculate hash of Pe/Coff image based on the authenticode image hashing in\r | |
991 | PE/COFF Specification 8.0 Appendix A\r | |
992 | \r | |
993 | @param[in] HashAlg Hash algorithm type.\r | |
994 | \r | |
995 | @retval TRUE Successfully hash image.\r | |
996 | @retval FALSE Fail in hash image.\r | |
997 | \r | |
998 | **/\r | |
999 | BOOLEAN \r | |
1000 | HashPeImage (\r | |
1001 | IN UINT32 HashAlg\r | |
1002 | )\r | |
1003 | {\r | |
1004 | BOOLEAN Status;\r | |
1005 | UINT16 Magic;\r | |
1006 | EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER *Section;\r | |
1007 | VOID *HashCtx;\r | |
1008 | UINTN CtxSize;\r | |
1009 | UINT8 *HashBase;\r | |
1010 | UINTN HashSize;\r | |
1011 | UINTN SumOfBytesHashed;\r | |
1012 | EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER *SectionHeader;\r | |
1013 | UINTN Index;\r | |
1014 | UINTN Pos;\r | |
1015 | \r | |
1016 | HashCtx = NULL;\r | |
1017 | SectionHeader = NULL;\r | |
1018 | Status = FALSE;\r | |
1019 | \r | |
1020 | if ((HashAlg != HASHALG_SHA1) && (HashAlg != HASHALG_SHA256)) {\r | |
1021 | return FALSE;\r | |
1022 | }\r | |
1023 | \r | |
1024 | //\r | |
1025 | // Initialize context of hash.\r | |
1026 | //\r | |
1027 | ZeroMem (mImageDigest, MAX_DIGEST_SIZE);\r | |
1028 | \r | |
1029 | if (HashAlg == HASHALG_SHA1) {\r | |
1030 | mImageDigestSize = SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE;\r | |
1031 | mCertType = gEfiCertSha1Guid; \r | |
1032 | } else if (HashAlg == HASHALG_SHA256) {\r | |
1033 | mImageDigestSize = SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE;\r | |
1034 | mCertType = gEfiCertSha256Guid;\r | |
1035 | }\r | |
1036 | \r | |
1037 | CtxSize = mHash[HashAlg].GetContextSize();\r | |
1038 | \r | |
1039 | HashCtx = AllocatePool (CtxSize);\r | |
1040 | ASSERT (HashCtx != NULL);\r | |
1041 | \r | |
1042 | // 1. Load the image header into memory.\r | |
1043 | \r | |
1044 | // 2. Initialize a SHA hash context.\r | |
1045 | Status = mHash[HashAlg].HashInit(HashCtx);\r | |
1046 | if (!Status) {\r | |
1047 | goto Done;\r | |
1048 | }\r | |
1049 | //\r | |
1050 | // Measuring PE/COFF Image Header;\r | |
1051 | // But CheckSum field and SECURITY data directory (certificate) are excluded\r | |
1052 | //\r | |
1053 | if (mNtHeader.Pe32->FileHeader.Machine == IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_IA64 && mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {\r | |
1054 | //\r | |
1055 | // NOTE: Some versions of Linux ELILO for Itanium have an incorrect magic value \r | |
1056 | // in the PE/COFF Header. If the MachineType is Itanium(IA64) and the \r | |
1057 | // Magic value in the OptionalHeader is EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC\r | |
1058 | // then override the magic value to EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR64_MAGIC\r | |
1059 | //\r | |
1060 | Magic = EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR64_MAGIC;\r | |
1061 | } else {\r | |
1062 | //\r | |
1063 | // Get the magic value from the PE/COFF Optional Header\r | |
1064 | //\r | |
1065 | Magic = mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.Magic;\r | |
1066 | }\r | |
1067 | \r | |
1068 | //\r | |
1069 | // 3. Calculate the distance from the base of the image header to the image checksum address.\r | |
1070 | // 4. Hash the image header from its base to beginning of the image checksum.\r | |
1071 | //\r | |
1072 | HashBase = mImageBase;\r | |
1073 | if (Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {\r | |
1074 | //\r | |
1075 | // Use PE32 offset.\r | |
1076 | //\r | |
1077 | HashSize = (UINTN) ((UINT8 *) (&mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.CheckSum) - HashBase);\r | |
1078 | } else {\r | |
1079 | //\r | |
1080 | // Use PE32+ offset.\r | |
1081 | //\r | |
1082 | HashSize = (UINTN) ((UINT8 *) (&mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.CheckSum) - HashBase);\r | |
1083 | }\r | |
1084 | \r | |
1085 | Status = mHash[HashAlg].HashUpdate(HashCtx, HashBase, HashSize);\r | |
1086 | if (!Status) {\r | |
1087 | goto Done;\r | |
1088 | }\r | |
1089 | //\r | |
1090 | // 5. Skip over the image checksum (it occupies a single ULONG).\r | |
1091 | // 6. Get the address of the beginning of the Cert Directory.\r | |
1092 | // 7. Hash everything from the end of the checksum to the start of the Cert Directory.\r | |
1093 | //\r | |
1094 | if (Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {\r | |
1095 | //\r | |
1096 | // Use PE32 offset.\r | |
1097 | //\r | |
1098 | HashBase = (UINT8 *) &mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.CheckSum + sizeof (UINT32);\r | |
1099 | HashSize = (UINTN) ((UINT8 *) (&mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY]) - HashBase);\r | |
1100 | } else {\r | |
1101 | //\r | |
1102 | // Use PE32+ offset.\r | |
1103 | // \r | |
1104 | HashBase = (UINT8 *) &mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.CheckSum + sizeof (UINT32);\r | |
1105 | HashSize = (UINTN) ((UINT8 *) (&mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY]) - HashBase);\r | |
1106 | }\r | |
1107 | \r | |
1108 | Status = mHash[HashAlg].HashUpdate(HashCtx, HashBase, HashSize);\r | |
1109 | if (!Status) {\r | |
1110 | goto Done;\r | |
1111 | }\r | |
1112 | //\r | |
1113 | // 8. Skip over the Cert Directory. (It is sizeof(IMAGE_DATA_DIRECTORY) bytes.)\r | |
1114 | // 9. Hash everything from the end of the Cert Directory to the end of image header.\r | |
1115 | //\r | |
1116 | if (Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {\r | |
1117 | //\r | |
1118 | // Use PE32 offset\r | |
1119 | //\r | |
1120 | HashBase = (UINT8 *) &mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY + 1];\r | |
1121 | HashSize = mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.SizeOfHeaders - (UINTN) ((UINT8 *) (&mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY + 1]) - mImageBase);\r | |
1122 | } else {\r | |
1123 | //\r | |
1124 | // Use PE32+ offset.\r | |
1125 | //\r | |
1126 | HashBase = (UINT8 *) &mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY + 1];\r | |
1127 | HashSize = mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.SizeOfHeaders - (UINTN) ((UINT8 *) (&mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY + 1]) - mImageBase);\r | |
1128 | }\r | |
1129 | \r | |
1130 | Status = mHash[HashAlg].HashUpdate(HashCtx, HashBase, HashSize);\r | |
1131 | if (!Status) {\r | |
1132 | goto Done;\r | |
1133 | }\r | |
1134 | //\r | |
1135 | // 10. Set the SUM_OF_BYTES_HASHED to the size of the header.\r | |
1136 | //\r | |
1137 | if (Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {\r | |
1138 | //\r | |
1139 | // Use PE32 offset.\r | |
1140 | //\r | |
1141 | SumOfBytesHashed = mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.SizeOfHeaders;\r | |
1142 | } else {\r | |
1143 | //\r | |
1144 | // Use PE32+ offset\r | |
1145 | //\r | |
1146 | SumOfBytesHashed = mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.SizeOfHeaders;\r | |
1147 | }\r | |
1148 | \r | |
1149 | //\r | |
1150 | // 11. Build a temporary table of pointers to all the IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER\r | |
1151 | // structures in the image. The 'NumberOfSections' field of the image\r | |
1152 | // header indicates how big the table should be. Do not include any\r | |
1153 | // IMAGE_SECTION_HEADERs in the table whose 'SizeOfRawData' field is zero.\r | |
1154 | //\r | |
1155 | SectionHeader = (EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER *) AllocateZeroPool (sizeof (EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER) * mNtHeader.Pe32->FileHeader.NumberOfSections);\r | |
1156 | ASSERT (SectionHeader != NULL);\r | |
1157 | //\r | |
1158 | // 12. Using the 'PointerToRawData' in the referenced section headers as\r | |
1159 | // a key, arrange the elements in the table in ascending order. In other\r | |
1160 | // words, sort the section headers according to the disk-file offset of\r | |
1161 | // the section.\r | |
1162 | //\r | |
1163 | Section = (EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER *) (\r | |
1164 | mImageBase +\r | |
1165 | mPeCoffHeaderOffset +\r | |
1166 | sizeof (UINT32) +\r | |
1167 | sizeof (EFI_IMAGE_FILE_HEADER) +\r | |
1168 | mNtHeader.Pe32->FileHeader.SizeOfOptionalHeader\r | |
1169 | );\r | |
1170 | for (Index = 0; Index < mNtHeader.Pe32->FileHeader.NumberOfSections; Index++) {\r | |
1171 | Pos = Index;\r | |
1172 | while ((Pos > 0) && (Section->PointerToRawData < SectionHeader[Pos - 1].PointerToRawData)) {\r | |
1173 | CopyMem (&SectionHeader[Pos], &SectionHeader[Pos - 1], sizeof (EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER));\r | |
1174 | Pos--;\r | |
1175 | }\r | |
1176 | CopyMem (&SectionHeader[Pos], Section, sizeof (EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER));\r | |
1177 | Section += 1;\r | |
1178 | }\r | |
1179 | \r | |
1180 | //\r | |
1181 | // 13. Walk through the sorted table, bring the corresponding section\r | |
1182 | // into memory, and hash the entire section (using the 'SizeOfRawData'\r | |
1183 | // field in the section header to determine the amount of data to hash).\r | |
1184 | // 14. Add the section's 'SizeOfRawData' to SUM_OF_BYTES_HASHED .\r | |
1185 | // 15. Repeat steps 13 and 14 for all the sections in the sorted table.\r | |
1186 | //\r | |
1187 | for (Index = 0; Index < mNtHeader.Pe32->FileHeader.NumberOfSections; Index++) {\r | |
1188 | Section = &SectionHeader[Index];\r | |
1189 | if (Section->SizeOfRawData == 0) {\r | |
1190 | continue;\r | |
1191 | }\r | |
1192 | HashBase = mImageBase + Section->PointerToRawData;\r | |
1193 | HashSize = (UINTN) Section->SizeOfRawData;\r | |
1194 | \r | |
1195 | Status = mHash[HashAlg].HashUpdate(HashCtx, HashBase, HashSize);\r | |
1196 | if (!Status) {\r | |
1197 | goto Done;\r | |
1198 | }\r | |
1199 | \r | |
1200 | SumOfBytesHashed += HashSize;\r | |
1201 | }\r | |
1202 | \r | |
1203 | //\r | |
1204 | // 16. If the file size is greater than SUM_OF_BYTES_HASHED, there is extra\r | |
1205 | // data in the file that needs to be added to the hash. This data begins\r | |
1206 | // at file offset SUM_OF_BYTES_HASHED and its length is:\r | |
1207 | // FileSize - (CertDirectory->Size)\r | |
1208 | //\r | |
1209 | if (mImageSize > SumOfBytesHashed) {\r | |
1210 | HashBase = mImageBase + SumOfBytesHashed;\r | |
1211 | if (Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {\r | |
1212 | //\r | |
1213 | // Use PE32 offset.\r | |
1214 | //\r | |
1215 | HashSize = (UINTN)(\r | |
1216 | mImageSize -\r | |
1217 | mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY].Size -\r | |
1218 | SumOfBytesHashed);\r | |
1219 | } else {\r | |
1220 | //\r | |
1221 | // Use PE32+ offset.\r | |
1222 | //\r | |
1223 | HashSize = (UINTN)(\r | |
1224 | mImageSize -\r | |
1225 | mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY].Size -\r | |
1226 | SumOfBytesHashed); \r | |
1227 | }\r | |
1228 | \r | |
1229 | Status = mHash[HashAlg].HashUpdate(HashCtx, HashBase, HashSize);\r | |
1230 | if (!Status) {\r | |
1231 | goto Done;\r | |
1232 | }\r | |
1233 | }\r | |
1234 | \r | |
1235 | Status = mHash[HashAlg].HashFinal(HashCtx, mImageDigest);\r | |
1236 | \r | |
1237 | Done:\r | |
1238 | if (HashCtx != NULL) {\r | |
1239 | FreePool (HashCtx);\r | |
1240 | }\r | |
1241 | if (SectionHeader != NULL) {\r | |
1242 | FreePool (SectionHeader);\r | |
1243 | }\r | |
1244 | return Status;\r | |
1245 | }\r | |
1246 | \r | |
1247 | /**\r | |
1248 | Recognize the Hash algorithm in PE/COFF Authenticode and caculate hash of \r | |
1249 | Pe/Coff image based on the authenticated image hashing in PE/COFF Specification \r | |
1250 | 8.0 Appendix A\r | |
1251 | \r | |
1252 | @retval EFI_UNSUPPORTED Hash algorithm is not supported.\r | |
1253 | @retval EFI_SUCCESS Hash successfully.\r | |
1254 | \r | |
1255 | **/\r | |
1256 | EFI_STATUS \r | |
1257 | HashPeImageByType (\r | |
1258 | VOID\r | |
1259 | )\r | |
1260 | {\r | |
1261 | UINT8 Index;\r | |
1262 | WIN_CERTIFICATE_EFI_PKCS *PkcsCertData;\r | |
1263 | \r | |
1264 | PkcsCertData = (WIN_CERTIFICATE_EFI_PKCS *) (mImageBase + mSecDataDir->Offset);\r | |
1265 | \r | |
1266 | for (Index = 0; Index < HASHALG_MAX; Index++) { \r | |
1267 | //\r | |
1268 | // Check the Hash algorithm in PE/COFF Authenticode.\r | |
1269 | // According to PKCS#7 Definition: \r | |
1270 | // SignedData ::= SEQUENCE {\r | |
1271 | // version Version,\r | |
1272 | // digestAlgorithms DigestAlgorithmIdentifiers,\r | |
1273 | // contentInfo ContentInfo,\r | |
1274 | // .... }\r | |
1275 | // The DigestAlgorithmIdentifiers can be used to determine the hash algorithm in PE/COFF hashing\r | |
1276 | // This field has the fixed offset (+32) in final Authenticode ASN.1 data.\r | |
1277 | // Fixed offset (+32) is calculated based on two bytes of length encoding.\r | |
1278 | //\r | |
1279 | if ((*(PkcsCertData->CertData + 1) & TWO_BYTE_ENCODE) != TWO_BYTE_ENCODE) {\r | |
1280 | //\r | |
1281 | // Only support two bytes of Long Form of Length Encoding.\r | |
1282 | //\r | |
1283 | continue;\r | |
1284 | }\r | |
1285 | \r | |
1286 | // \r | |
1287 | if (CompareMem (PkcsCertData->CertData + 32, mHash[Index].OidValue, mHash[Index].OidLength) == 0) {\r | |
1288 | break;\r | |
1289 | }\r | |
1290 | }\r | |
1291 | \r | |
1292 | if (Index == HASHALG_MAX) {\r | |
1293 | return EFI_UNSUPPORTED;\r | |
1294 | }\r | |
1295 | \r | |
1296 | //\r | |
1297 | // HASH PE Image based on Hash algorithm in PE/COFF Authenticode.\r | |
1298 | //\r | |
1299 | if (!HashPeImage(Index)) {\r | |
1300 | return EFI_UNSUPPORTED;\r | |
1301 | }\r | |
1302 | \r | |
1303 | return EFI_SUCCESS;\r | |
1304 | }\r | |
1305 | \r | |
1306 | /**\r | |
1307 | Enroll a new executable's signature into Signature Database. \r | |
1308 | \r | |
1309 | @param[in] PrivateData The module's private data.\r | |
1310 | @param[in] VariableName Variable name of signature database, must be \r | |
1311 | EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE or EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1.\r | |
1312 | \r | |
1313 | @retval EFI_SUCCESS New signature is enrolled successfully.\r | |
1314 | @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER The parameter is invalid.\r | |
1315 | @retval EFI_UNSUPPORTED Unsupported command.\r | |
1316 | @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES Could not allocate needed resources.\r | |
1317 | \r | |
1318 | **/\r | |
1319 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
1320 | EnrollImageSignatureToSigDB (\r | |
1321 | IN SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_DATA *Private,\r | |
1322 | IN CHAR16 *VariableName\r | |
1323 | )\r | |
1324 | {\r | |
1325 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r | |
1326 | EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *SigDBCert;\r | |
1327 | EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *SigDBCertData;\r | |
1328 | VOID *Data;\r | |
1329 | UINTN DataSize;\r | |
1330 | UINTN SigDBSize;\r | |
1331 | UINT32 Attr;\r | |
1332 | WIN_CERTIFICATE_UEFI_GUID *GuidCertData;\r | |
1333 | \r | |
1334 | Data = NULL;\r | |
1335 | GuidCertData = NULL;\r | |
1336 | \r | |
1337 | //\r | |
1338 | // Form the SigDB certificate list.\r | |
1339 | // Format the data item into EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST type.\r | |
1340 | //\r | |
1341 | // We need to parse executable's signature data from specified signed executable file.\r | |
1342 | // In current implementation, we simply trust the pass-in signed executable file.\r | |
1343 | // In reality, it's OS's responsibility to verify the signed executable file.\r | |
1344 | //\r | |
1345 | \r | |
1346 | //\r | |
1347 | // Read the whole file content\r | |
1348 | //\r | |
1349 | Status = ReadFileContent(\r | |
1350 | Private->FileContext->FHandle,\r | |
1351 | (VOID **) &mImageBase, \r | |
1352 | &mImageSize, \r | |
1353 | 0\r | |
1354 | );\r | |
1355 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
1356 | goto ON_EXIT;\r | |
1357 | } \r | |
1358 | ASSERT (mImageBase != NULL);\r | |
1359 | \r | |
1360 | Status = LoadPeImage ();\r | |
1361 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
1362 | goto ON_EXIT;\r | |
1363 | }\r | |
1364 | \r | |
1365 | if (mSecDataDir->SizeOfCert == 0) {\r | |
1366 | if (!HashPeImage (HASHALG_SHA256)) {\r | |
1367 | Status = EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r | |
1368 | goto ON_EXIT;\r | |
1369 | }\r | |
1370 | } else {\r | |
1371 | \r | |
1372 | //\r | |
1373 | // Read the certificate data\r | |
1374 | //\r | |
1375 | mCertificate = (WIN_CERTIFICATE *)(mImageBase + mSecDataDir->Offset);\r | |
1376 | \r | |
1377 | if (mCertificate->wCertificateType == WIN_CERT_TYPE_EFI_GUID) {\r | |
1378 | GuidCertData = (WIN_CERTIFICATE_UEFI_GUID*) mCertificate;\r | |
1379 | if (CompareMem (&GuidCertData->CertType, &gEfiCertTypeRsa2048Sha256Guid, sizeof(EFI_GUID)) != 0) {\r | |
1380 | Status = EFI_ABORTED;\r | |
1381 | goto ON_EXIT;\r | |
1382 | }\r | |
1383 | \r | |
1384 | if (!HashPeImage (HASHALG_SHA256)) {\r | |
1385 | Status = EFI_ABORTED;\r | |
1386 | goto ON_EXIT;;\r | |
1387 | }\r | |
1388 | \r | |
1389 | } else if (mCertificate->wCertificateType == WIN_CERT_TYPE_PKCS_SIGNED_DATA) {\r | |
1390 | \r | |
1391 | Status = HashPeImageByType ();\r | |
1392 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
1393 | goto ON_EXIT;;\r | |
1394 | }\r | |
1395 | } else {\r | |
1396 | Status = EFI_ABORTED;\r | |
1397 | goto ON_EXIT;\r | |
1398 | }\r | |
1399 | }\r | |
1400 | \r | |
1401 | //\r | |
1402 | // Create a new SigDB entry.\r | |
1403 | //\r | |
1404 | SigDBSize = sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) \r | |
1405 | + sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1\r | |
1406 | + (UINT32) mImageDigestSize;\r | |
1407 | \r | |
1408 | Data = (UINT8*) AllocateZeroPool (SigDBSize);\r | |
1409 | if (Data == NULL) {\r | |
1410 | Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r | |
1411 | goto ON_EXIT;\r | |
1412 | }\r | |
1413 | \r | |
1414 | //\r | |
1415 | // Adjust the Certificate Database parameters.\r | |
1416 | // \r | |
1417 | SigDBCert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST*) Data;\r | |
1418 | SigDBCert->SignatureListSize = (UINT32) SigDBSize;\r | |
1419 | SigDBCert->SignatureHeaderSize = 0;\r | |
1420 | SigDBCert->SignatureSize = sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1 + (UINT32) mImageDigestSize;\r | |
1421 | CopyGuid (&SigDBCert->SignatureType, &mCertType);\r | |
1422 | \r | |
1423 | SigDBCertData = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA*)((UINT8*)SigDBCert + sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST));\r | |
1424 | CopyGuid (&SigDBCertData->SignatureOwner, Private->SignatureGUID);\r | |
1425 | CopyMem (SigDBCertData->SignatureData, mImageDigest, mImageDigestSize);\r | |
1426 | \r | |
1427 | Attr = EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS \r | |
1428 | | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS;\r | |
1429 | Status = CreateTimeBasedPayload (&SigDBSize, (UINT8**) &Data);\r | |
1430 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
1431 | DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Fail to create time-based data payload: %r", Status));\r | |
1432 | goto ON_EXIT;\r | |
1433 | }\r | |
1434 | \r | |
1435 | //\r | |
1436 | // Check if SigDB variable has been already existed. \r | |
1437 | // If true, use EFI_VARIABLE_APPEND_WRITE attribute to append the \r | |
1438 | // new signature data to original variable\r | |
1439 | // \r | |
1440 | DataSize = 0;\r | |
1441 | Status = gRT->GetVariable(\r | |
1442 | VariableName, \r | |
1443 | &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, \r | |
1444 | NULL, \r | |
1445 | &DataSize, \r | |
1446 | NULL\r | |
1447 | );\r | |
1448 | if (Status == EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {\r | |
1449 | Attr |= EFI_VARIABLE_APPEND_WRITE;\r | |
1450 | } else if (Status != EFI_NOT_FOUND) {\r | |
1451 | goto ON_EXIT;\r | |
1452 | } \r | |
1453 | \r | |
1454 | //\r | |
1455 | // Enroll the variable.\r | |
1456 | //\r | |
1457 | Status = gRT->SetVariable(\r | |
1458 | VariableName, \r | |
1459 | &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, \r | |
1460 | Attr, \r | |
1461 | SigDBSize, \r | |
1462 | Data\r | |
1463 | );\r | |
1464 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
1465 | goto ON_EXIT;\r | |
1466 | }\r | |
1467 | \r | |
1468 | ON_EXIT:\r | |
1469 | \r | |
1470 | CloseFile (Private->FileContext->FHandle);\r | |
1471 | Private->FileContext->FHandle = NULL;\r | |
1472 | Private->FileContext->FileName = NULL;\r | |
1473 | \r | |
1474 | if (Private->SignatureGUID != NULL) {\r | |
1475 | FreePool (Private->SignatureGUID);\r | |
1476 | Private->SignatureGUID = NULL;\r | |
1477 | }\r | |
1478 | \r | |
1479 | if (Data != NULL) {\r | |
1480 | FreePool (Data);\r | |
1481 | }\r | |
1482 | \r | |
1483 | if (mImageBase != NULL) {\r | |
1484 | FreePool (mImageBase);\r | |
1485 | mImageBase = NULL;\r | |
1486 | }\r | |
1487 | \r | |
1488 | return Status;\r | |
1489 | }\r | |
1490 | \r | |
1491 | /**\r | |
1492 | Enroll signature into DB/DBX without KEK's authentication.\r | |
1493 | The SignatureOwner GUID will be Private->SignatureGUID.\r | |
1494 | \r | |
1495 | @param[in] PrivateData The module's private data.\r | |
1496 | @param[in] VariableName Variable name of signature database, must be \r | |
1497 | EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE or EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1.\r | |
1498 | \r | |
1499 | @retval EFI_SUCCESS New signature enrolled successfully.\r | |
1500 | @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER The parameter is invalid.\r | |
1501 | @retval others Fail to enroll signature data.\r | |
1502 | \r | |
1503 | **/\r | |
1504 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
1505 | EnrollSignatureDatabase (\r | |
1506 | IN SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_DATA *Private,\r | |
1507 | IN CHAR16 *VariableName\r | |
1508 | ) \r | |
1509 | {\r | |
1510 | UINT16* FilePostFix;\r | |
1511 | \r | |
1512 | if ((Private->FileContext->FileName == NULL) || (Private->FileContext->FHandle == NULL) || (Private->SignatureGUID == NULL)) {\r | |
1513 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r | |
1514 | }\r | |
1515 | \r | |
1516 | //\r | |
1517 | // Parse the file's postfix. \r | |
1518 | //\r | |
1519 | FilePostFix = Private->FileContext->FileName + StrLen (Private->FileContext->FileName) - 4;\r | |
1520 | if (IsDerEncodeCertificate(FilePostFix)) {\r | |
1521 | //\r | |
1522 | // Supports DER-encoded X509 certificate.\r | |
1523 | //\r | |
1524 | return EnrollX509toSigDB (Private, VariableName);\r | |
1525 | }\r | |
1526 | \r | |
1527 | return EnrollImageSignatureToSigDB (Private, VariableName);\r | |
1528 | }\r | |
1529 | \r | |
1530 | /**\r | |
1531 | List all signatures in specified signature database (e.g. KEK/DB/DBX)\r | |
1532 | by GUID in the page for user to select and delete as needed.\r | |
1533 | \r | |
1534 | @param[in] PrivateData Module's private data.\r | |
1535 | @param[in] VariableName The variable name of the vendor's signature database.\r | |
1536 | @param[in] VendorGuid A unique identifier for the vendor.\r | |
1537 | @param[in] LabelNumber Label number to insert opcodes.\r | |
1538 | @param[in] FormId Form ID of current page.\r | |
1539 | @param[in] QuestionIdBase Base question id of the signature list.\r | |
1540 | \r | |
1541 | @retval EFI_SUCCESS Success to update the signature list page\r | |
1542 | @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES Unable to allocate required resources.\r | |
1543 | \r | |
1544 | **/\r | |
1545 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
1546 | UpdateDeletePage (\r | |
1547 | IN SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_DATA *PrivateData,\r | |
1548 | IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r | |
1549 | IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r | |
1550 | IN UINT16 LabelNumber,\r | |
1551 | IN EFI_FORM_ID FormId,\r | |
1552 | IN EFI_QUESTION_ID QuestionIdBase\r | |
1553 | )\r | |
1554 | {\r | |
1555 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r | |
1556 | UINT32 Index;\r | |
1557 | UINTN CertCount;\r | |
1558 | UINTN GuidIndex;\r | |
1559 | VOID *StartOpCodeHandle;\r | |
1560 | VOID *EndOpCodeHandle;\r | |
1561 | EFI_IFR_GUID_LABEL *StartLabel;\r | |
1562 | EFI_IFR_GUID_LABEL *EndLabel; \r | |
1563 | UINTN DataSize;\r | |
1564 | UINT8 *Data;\r | |
1565 | EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *CertList;\r | |
1566 | EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *Cert;\r | |
1567 | UINT32 ItemDataSize;\r | |
1568 | CHAR16 *GuidStr;\r | |
1569 | EFI_STRING_ID GuidID;\r | |
1570 | EFI_STRING_ID Help;\r | |
1571 | \r | |
1572 | Data = NULL;\r | |
1573 | CertList = NULL;\r | |
1574 | Cert = NULL;\r | |
1575 | GuidStr = NULL;\r | |
1576 | StartOpCodeHandle = NULL;\r | |
1577 | EndOpCodeHandle = NULL;\r | |
1578 | \r | |
1579 | //\r | |
1580 | // Initialize the container for dynamic opcodes.\r | |
1581 | //\r | |
1582 | StartOpCodeHandle = HiiAllocateOpCodeHandle ();\r | |
1583 | if (StartOpCodeHandle == NULL) {\r | |
1584 | Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r | |
1585 | goto ON_EXIT; \r | |
1586 | }\r | |
1587 | \r | |
1588 | EndOpCodeHandle = HiiAllocateOpCodeHandle ();\r | |
1589 | if (EndOpCodeHandle == NULL) {\r | |
1590 | Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r | |
1591 | goto ON_EXIT; \r | |
1592 | }\r | |
1593 | \r | |
1594 | //\r | |
1595 | // Create Hii Extend Label OpCode.\r | |
1596 | //\r | |
1597 | StartLabel = (EFI_IFR_GUID_LABEL *) HiiCreateGuidOpCode (\r | |
1598 | StartOpCodeHandle,\r | |
1599 | &gEfiIfrTianoGuid,\r | |
1600 | NULL,\r | |
1601 | sizeof (EFI_IFR_GUID_LABEL)\r | |
1602 | );\r | |
1603 | StartLabel->ExtendOpCode = EFI_IFR_EXTEND_OP_LABEL;\r | |
1604 | StartLabel->Number = LabelNumber;\r | |
1605 | \r | |
1606 | EndLabel = (EFI_IFR_GUID_LABEL *) HiiCreateGuidOpCode (\r | |
1607 | EndOpCodeHandle,\r | |
1608 | &gEfiIfrTianoGuid,\r | |
1609 | NULL,\r | |
1610 | sizeof (EFI_IFR_GUID_LABEL)\r | |
1611 | );\r | |
1612 | EndLabel->ExtendOpCode = EFI_IFR_EXTEND_OP_LABEL;\r | |
1613 | EndLabel->Number = LABEL_END;\r | |
1614 | \r | |
1615 | //\r | |
1616 | // Read Variable.\r | |
1617 | //\r | |
1618 | DataSize = 0;\r | |
1619 | Status = gRT->GetVariable (VariableName, VendorGuid, NULL, &DataSize, Data); \r | |
1620 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status) && Status != EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {\r | |
1621 | goto ON_EXIT;\r | |
1622 | }\r | |
1623 | \r | |
1624 | Data = (UINT8 *) AllocateZeroPool (DataSize);\r | |
1625 | if (Data == NULL) {\r | |
1626 | Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r | |
1627 | goto ON_EXIT;\r | |
1628 | }\r | |
1629 | \r | |
1630 | Status = gRT->GetVariable (VariableName, VendorGuid, NULL, &DataSize, Data);\r | |
1631 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
1632 | goto ON_EXIT;\r | |
1633 | }\r | |
1634 | \r | |
1635 | GuidStr = AllocateZeroPool (100);\r | |
1636 | if (GuidStr == NULL) {\r | |
1637 | Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r | |
1638 | goto ON_EXIT;\r | |
1639 | }\r | |
1640 | \r | |
1641 | //\r | |
1642 | // Enumerate all KEK pub data.\r | |
1643 | //\r | |
1644 | ItemDataSize = (UINT32) DataSize;\r | |
1645 | CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) Data;\r | |
1646 | GuidIndex = 0;\r | |
1647 | \r | |
1648 | while ((ItemDataSize > 0) && (ItemDataSize >= CertList->SignatureListSize)) {\r | |
1649 | \r | |
1650 | if (CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertRsa2048Guid)) {\r | |
1651 | Help = STRING_TOKEN (STR_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SHA256_GUID);\r | |
1652 | } else if (CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Guid)) {\r | |
1653 | Help = STRING_TOKEN (STR_CERT_TYPE_PCKS7_GUID);\r | |
1654 | } else if (CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertSha1Guid)) {\r | |
1655 | Help = STRING_TOKEN (STR_CERT_TYPE_SHA1_GUID);\r | |
1656 | } else if (CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertSha256Guid)) {\r | |
1657 | Help = STRING_TOKEN (STR_CERT_TYPE_SHA256_GUID);\r | |
1658 | } else {\r | |
1659 | //\r | |
1660 | // The signature type is not supported in current implementation.\r | |
1661 | //\r | |
1662 | continue;\r | |
1663 | }\r | |
1664 | \r | |
1665 | CertCount = (CertList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - CertList->SignatureHeaderSize) / CertList->SignatureSize;\r | |
1666 | for (Index = 0; Index < CertCount; Index++) {\r | |
1667 | Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertList \r | |
1668 | + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) \r | |
1669 | + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize \r | |
1670 | + Index * CertList->SignatureSize);\r | |
1671 | //\r | |
1672 | // Display GUID and help \r | |
1673 | //\r | |
1674 | GuidToString (&Cert->SignatureOwner, GuidStr, 100);\r | |
1675 | GuidID = HiiSetString (PrivateData->HiiHandle, 0, GuidStr, NULL);\r | |
1676 | HiiCreateCheckBoxOpCode (\r | |
1677 | StartOpCodeHandle,\r | |
1678 | (EFI_QUESTION_ID) (QuestionIdBase + GuidIndex++),\r | |
1679 | 0, \r | |
1680 | 0, \r | |
1681 | GuidID, \r | |
1682 | Help,\r | |
1683 | EFI_IFR_FLAG_CALLBACK,\r | |
1684 | 0,\r | |
1685 | NULL\r | |
1686 | ); \r | |
1687 | }\r | |
1688 | \r | |
1689 | ItemDataSize -= CertList->SignatureListSize;\r | |
1690 | CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + CertList->SignatureListSize);\r | |
1691 | }\r | |
1692 | \r | |
1693 | ON_EXIT:\r | |
1694 | HiiUpdateForm (\r | |
1695 | PrivateData->HiiHandle,\r | |
1696 | &gSecureBootConfigFormSetGuid,\r | |
1697 | FormId,\r | |
1698 | StartOpCodeHandle,\r | |
1699 | EndOpCodeHandle\r | |
1700 | );\r | |
1701 | \r | |
1702 | if (StartOpCodeHandle != NULL) {\r | |
1703 | HiiFreeOpCodeHandle (StartOpCodeHandle);\r | |
1704 | }\r | |
1705 | \r | |
1706 | if (EndOpCodeHandle != NULL) {\r | |
1707 | HiiFreeOpCodeHandle (EndOpCodeHandle);\r | |
1708 | }\r | |
1709 | \r | |
1710 | if (Data != NULL) {\r | |
1711 | FreePool (Data);\r | |
1712 | }\r | |
1713 | \r | |
1714 | if (GuidStr != NULL) {\r | |
1715 | FreePool (GuidStr);\r | |
1716 | }\r | |
1717 | \r | |
1718 | return EFI_SUCCESS;\r | |
1719 | }\r | |
1720 | \r | |
1721 | /**\r | |
1722 | Delete a KEK entry from KEK database. \r | |
1723 | \r | |
1724 | @param[in] PrivateData Module's private data.\r | |
1725 | @param[in] QuestionId Question id of the KEK item to delete.\r | |
1726 | \r | |
1727 | @retval EFI_SUCCESS Delete kek item successfully.\r | |
1728 | @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES Could not allocate needed resources.\r | |
1729 | \r | |
1730 | **/\r | |
1731 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
1732 | DeleteKeyExchangeKey (\r | |
1733 | IN SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_DATA *PrivateData,\r | |
1734 | IN EFI_QUESTION_ID QuestionId\r | |
1735 | )\r | |
1736 | {\r | |
1737 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r | |
1738 | UINTN DataSize;\r | |
1739 | UINT8 *Data;\r | |
1740 | UINT8 *OldData;\r | |
1741 | UINT32 Attr;\r | |
1742 | UINT32 Index;\r | |
1743 | EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *CertList;\r | |
1744 | EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *NewCertList;\r | |
1745 | EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *Cert;\r | |
1746 | UINTN CertCount;\r | |
1747 | UINT32 Offset;\r | |
1748 | BOOLEAN IsKEKItemFound;\r | |
1749 | UINT32 KekDataSize;\r | |
1750 | UINTN DeleteKekIndex;\r | |
1751 | UINTN GuidIndex;\r | |
1752 | \r | |
1753 | Data = NULL;\r | |
1754 | OldData = NULL;\r | |
1755 | CertList = NULL;\r | |
1756 | Cert = NULL;\r | |
1757 | Attr = 0; \r | |
1758 | DeleteKekIndex = QuestionId - OPTION_DEL_KEK_QUESTION_ID;\r | |
1759 | \r | |
1760 | //\r | |
1761 | // Get original KEK variable.\r | |
1762 | // \r | |
1763 | DataSize = 0; \r | |
1764 | Status = gRT->GetVariable (EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, NULL, &DataSize, NULL);\r | |
1765 | if (EFI_ERROR(Status) && Status != EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {\r | |
1766 | goto ON_EXIT;\r | |
1767 | }\r | |
1768 | \r | |
1769 | OldData = (UINT8*)AllocateZeroPool(DataSize);\r | |
1770 | if (OldData == NULL) {\r | |
1771 | Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES; \r | |
1772 | goto ON_EXIT;\r | |
1773 | }\r | |
1774 | \r | |
1775 | Status = gRT->GetVariable (EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, &Attr, &DataSize, OldData);\r | |
1776 | if (EFI_ERROR(Status)) {\r | |
1777 | goto ON_EXIT;\r | |
1778 | }\r | |
1779 | \r | |
1780 | //\r | |
1781 | // Allocate space for new variable. \r | |
1782 | //\r | |
1783 | Data = (UINT8*) AllocateZeroPool (DataSize);\r | |
1784 | if (Data == NULL) {\r | |
1785 | Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r | |
1786 | goto ON_EXIT;\r | |
1787 | }\r | |
1788 | \r | |
1789 | //\r | |
1790 | // Enumerate all KEK pub data and erasing the target item.\r | |
1791 | //\r | |
1792 | IsKEKItemFound = FALSE;\r | |
1793 | KekDataSize = (UINT32) DataSize;\r | |
1794 | CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) OldData;\r | |
1795 | Offset = 0;\r | |
1796 | GuidIndex = 0;\r | |
1797 | while ((KekDataSize > 0) && (KekDataSize >= CertList->SignatureListSize)) {\r | |
1798 | if (CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertRsa2048Guid) ||\r | |
1799 | CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Guid)) {\r | |
1800 | CopyMem (Data + Offset, CertList, (sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize));\r | |
1801 | NewCertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *)(Data + Offset);\r | |
1802 | Offset += (sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r | |
1803 | Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r | |
1804 | CertCount = (CertList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - CertList->SignatureHeaderSize) / CertList->SignatureSize;\r | |
1805 | for (Index = 0; Index < CertCount; Index++) {\r | |
1806 | if (GuidIndex == DeleteKekIndex ) {\r | |
1807 | //\r | |
1808 | // Find it! Skip it!\r | |
1809 | //\r | |
1810 | NewCertList->SignatureListSize -= CertList->SignatureSize;\r | |
1811 | IsKEKItemFound = TRUE; \r | |
1812 | } else {\r | |
1813 | //\r | |
1814 | // This item doesn't match. Copy it to the Data buffer.\r | |
1815 | //\r | |
1816 | CopyMem (Data + Offset, Cert, CertList->SignatureSize);\r | |
1817 | Offset += CertList->SignatureSize;\r | |
1818 | }\r | |
1819 | GuidIndex++;\r | |
1820 | Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8*) Cert + CertList->SignatureSize);\r | |
1821 | }\r | |
1822 | } else {\r | |
1823 | //\r | |
1824 | // This List doesn't match. Copy it to the Data buffer.\r | |
1825 | //\r | |
1826 | CopyMem (Data + Offset, CertList, CertList->SignatureListSize);\r | |
1827 | Offset += CertList->SignatureListSize;\r | |
1828 | }\r | |
1829 | \r | |
1830 | KekDataSize -= CertList->SignatureListSize;\r | |
1831 | CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST*) ((UINT8*) CertList + CertList->SignatureListSize);\r | |
1832 | }\r | |
1833 | \r | |
1834 | if (!IsKEKItemFound) {\r | |
1835 | //\r | |
1836 | // Doesn't find the Kek Item!\r | |
1837 | //\r | |
1838 | Status = EFI_NOT_FOUND;\r | |
1839 | goto ON_EXIT;\r | |
1840 | }\r | |
1841 | \r | |
1842 | //\r | |
1843 | // Delete the Signature header if there is no signature in the list.\r | |
1844 | //\r | |
1845 | KekDataSize = Offset;\r | |
1846 | CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST*) Data;\r | |
1847 | Offset = 0;\r | |
1848 | ZeroMem (OldData, KekDataSize);\r | |
1849 | while ((KekDataSize > 0) && (KekDataSize >= CertList->SignatureListSize)) {\r | |
1850 | CertCount = (CertList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - CertList->SignatureHeaderSize) / CertList->SignatureSize;\r | |
1851 | DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, " CertCount = %x\n", CertCount));\r | |
1852 | if (CertCount != 0) {\r | |
1853 | CopyMem (OldData + Offset, CertList, CertList->SignatureListSize);\r | |
1854 | Offset += CertList->SignatureListSize;\r | |
1855 | } \r | |
1856 | KekDataSize -= CertList->SignatureListSize;\r | |
1857 | CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + CertList->SignatureListSize);\r | |
1858 | }\r | |
1859 | \r | |
1860 | DataSize = Offset;\r | |
1861 | if ((Attr & EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0) {\r | |
1862 | Status = CreateTimeBasedPayload (&DataSize, &OldData);\r | |
1863 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
1864 | DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Fail to create time-based data payload: %r", Status));\r | |
1865 | goto ON_EXIT;\r | |
1866 | }\r | |
1867 | }\r | |
1868 | \r | |
1869 | Status = gRT->SetVariable(\r | |
1870 | EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME, \r | |
1871 | &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, \r | |
1872 | Attr, \r | |
1873 | DataSize, \r | |
1874 | OldData\r | |
1875 | );\r | |
1876 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
1877 | DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Failed to set variable, Status = %r\n", Status));\r | |
1878 | goto ON_EXIT;\r | |
1879 | }\r | |
1880 | \r | |
1881 | ON_EXIT:\r | |
1882 | if (Data != NULL) {\r | |
1883 | FreePool(Data);\r | |
1884 | }\r | |
1885 | \r | |
1886 | if (OldData != NULL) {\r | |
1887 | FreePool(OldData);\r | |
1888 | }\r | |
1889 | \r | |
1890 | return UpdateDeletePage (\r | |
1891 | PrivateData, \r | |
1892 | EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME,\r | |
1893 | &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r | |
1894 | LABEL_KEK_DELETE,\r | |
1895 | FORMID_DELETE_KEK_FORM,\r | |
1896 | OPTION_DEL_KEK_QUESTION_ID\r | |
1897 | );\r | |
1898 | }\r | |
1899 | \r | |
1900 | /**\r | |
1901 | Delete a signature entry from siganture database.\r | |
1902 | \r | |
1903 | @param[in] PrivateData Module's private data.\r | |
1904 | @param[in] VariableName The variable name of the vendor's signature database.\r | |
1905 | @param[in] VendorGuid A unique identifier for the vendor.\r | |
1906 | @param[in] LabelNumber Label number to insert opcodes.\r | |
1907 | @param[in] FormId Form ID of current page.\r | |
1908 | @param[in] QuestionIdBase Base question id of the signature list.\r | |
1909 | @param[in] DeleteIndex Signature index to delete.\r | |
1910 | \r | |
1911 | @retval EFI_SUCCESS Delete siganture successfully.\r | |
1912 | @retval EFI_NOT_FOUND Can't find the signature item,\r | |
1913 | @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES Could not allocate needed resources.\r | |
1914 | **/\r | |
1915 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
1916 | DeleteSignature (\r | |
1917 | IN SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_DATA *PrivateData,\r | |
1918 | IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r | |
1919 | IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r | |
1920 | IN UINT16 LabelNumber,\r | |
1921 | IN EFI_FORM_ID FormId,\r | |
1922 | IN EFI_QUESTION_ID QuestionIdBase,\r | |
1923 | IN UINTN DeleteIndex\r | |
1924 | )\r | |
1925 | {\r | |
1926 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r | |
1927 | UINTN DataSize;\r | |
1928 | UINT8 *Data;\r | |
1929 | UINT8 *OldData;\r | |
1930 | UINT32 Attr;\r | |
1931 | UINT32 Index;\r | |
1932 | EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *CertList;\r | |
1933 | EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *NewCertList;\r | |
1934 | EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *Cert;\r | |
1935 | UINTN CertCount;\r | |
1936 | UINT32 Offset;\r | |
1937 | BOOLEAN IsItemFound;\r | |
1938 | UINT32 ItemDataSize;\r | |
1939 | UINTN GuidIndex;\r | |
1940 | \r | |
1941 | Data = NULL;\r | |
1942 | OldData = NULL;\r | |
1943 | CertList = NULL;\r | |
1944 | Cert = NULL;\r | |
1945 | Attr = 0; \r | |
1946 | \r | |
1947 | //\r | |
1948 | // Get original signature list data.\r | |
1949 | // \r | |
1950 | DataSize = 0;\r | |
1951 | Status = gRT->GetVariable (VariableName, VendorGuid, NULL, &DataSize, NULL);\r | |
1952 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status) && Status != EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {\r | |
1953 | goto ON_EXIT;\r | |
1954 | }\r | |
1955 | \r | |
1956 | OldData = (UINT8 *) AllocateZeroPool (DataSize);\r | |
1957 | if (OldData == NULL) {\r | |
1958 | Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES; \r | |
1959 | goto ON_EXIT;\r | |
1960 | }\r | |
1961 | \r | |
1962 | Status = gRT->GetVariable (VariableName, VendorGuid, &Attr, &DataSize, OldData);\r | |
1963 | if (EFI_ERROR(Status)) {\r | |
1964 | goto ON_EXIT;\r | |
1965 | } \r | |
1966 | \r | |
1967 | //\r | |
1968 | // Allocate space for new variable. \r | |
1969 | //\r | |
1970 | Data = (UINT8*) AllocateZeroPool (DataSize);\r | |
1971 | if (Data == NULL) {\r | |
1972 | Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r | |
1973 | goto ON_EXIT;\r | |
1974 | }\r | |
1975 | \r | |
1976 | //\r | |
1977 | // Enumerate all signature data and erasing the target item.\r | |
1978 | //\r | |
1979 | IsItemFound = FALSE;\r | |
1980 | ItemDataSize = (UINT32) DataSize;\r | |
1981 | CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) OldData;\r | |
1982 | Offset = 0;\r | |
1983 | GuidIndex = 0;\r | |
1984 | while ((ItemDataSize > 0) && (ItemDataSize >= CertList->SignatureListSize)) {\r | |
1985 | if (CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertRsa2048Guid) ||\r | |
1986 | CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Guid) ||\r | |
1987 | CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertSha1Guid) ||\r | |
1988 | CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertSha256Guid)\r | |
1989 | ) {\r | |
1990 | //\r | |
1991 | // Copy EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST header then calculate the signature count in this list.\r | |
1992 | //\r | |
1993 | CopyMem (Data + Offset, CertList, (sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize));\r | |
1994 | NewCertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST*) (Data + Offset);\r | |
1995 | Offset += (sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r | |
1996 | Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r | |
1997 | CertCount = (CertList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - CertList->SignatureHeaderSize) / CertList->SignatureSize;\r | |
1998 | for (Index = 0; Index < CertCount; Index++) {\r | |
1999 | if (GuidIndex == DeleteIndex) {\r | |
2000 | //\r | |
2001 | // Find it! Skip it!\r | |
2002 | //\r | |
2003 | NewCertList->SignatureListSize -= CertList->SignatureSize;\r | |
2004 | IsItemFound = TRUE; \r | |
2005 | } else {\r | |
2006 | //\r | |
2007 | // This item doesn't match. Copy it to the Data buffer.\r | |
2008 | //\r | |
2009 | CopyMem (Data + Offset, (UINT8*)(Cert), CertList->SignatureSize);\r | |
2010 | Offset += CertList->SignatureSize;\r | |
2011 | }\r | |
2012 | GuidIndex++;\r | |
2013 | Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) Cert + CertList->SignatureSize);\r | |
2014 | }\r | |
2015 | } else {\r | |
2016 | //\r | |
2017 | // This List doesn't match. Just copy it to the Data buffer.\r | |
2018 | //\r | |
2019 | CopyMem (Data + Offset, (UINT8*)(CertList), CertList->SignatureListSize);\r | |
2020 | Offset += CertList->SignatureListSize;\r | |
2021 | }\r | |
2022 | \r | |
2023 | ItemDataSize -= CertList->SignatureListSize;\r | |
2024 | CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + CertList->SignatureListSize);\r | |
2025 | }\r | |
2026 | \r | |
2027 | if (!IsItemFound) {\r | |
2028 | //\r | |
2029 | // Doesn't find the signature Item!\r | |
2030 | //\r | |
2031 | Status = EFI_NOT_FOUND;\r | |
2032 | goto ON_EXIT;\r | |
2033 | }\r | |
2034 | \r | |
2035 | //\r | |
2036 | // Delete the EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST header if there is no signature in the list.\r | |
2037 | //\r | |
2038 | ItemDataSize = Offset;\r | |
2039 | CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) Data;\r | |
2040 | Offset = 0;\r | |
2041 | ZeroMem (OldData, ItemDataSize);\r | |
2042 | while ((ItemDataSize > 0) && (ItemDataSize >= CertList->SignatureListSize)) {\r | |
2043 | CertCount = (CertList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - CertList->SignatureHeaderSize) / CertList->SignatureSize;\r | |
2044 | DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, " CertCount = %x\n", CertCount));\r | |
2045 | if (CertCount != 0) {\r | |
2046 | CopyMem (OldData + Offset, (UINT8*)(CertList), CertList->SignatureListSize);\r | |
2047 | Offset += CertList->SignatureListSize;\r | |
2048 | } \r | |
2049 | ItemDataSize -= CertList->SignatureListSize;\r | |
2050 | CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + CertList->SignatureListSize);\r | |
2051 | }\r | |
2052 | \r | |
2053 | DataSize = Offset;\r | |
2054 | if ((Attr & EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0) {\r | |
2055 | Status = CreateTimeBasedPayload (&DataSize, &OldData);\r | |
2056 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
2057 | DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Fail to create time-based data payload: %r", Status));\r | |
2058 | goto ON_EXIT;\r | |
2059 | }\r | |
2060 | }\r | |
2061 | \r | |
2062 | Status = gRT->SetVariable(\r | |
2063 | VariableName, \r | |
2064 | VendorGuid, \r | |
2065 | Attr, \r | |
2066 | DataSize, \r | |
2067 | OldData\r | |
2068 | );\r | |
2069 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
2070 | DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Failed to set variable, Status = %r\n", Status));\r | |
2071 | goto ON_EXIT;\r | |
2072 | }\r | |
2073 | \r | |
2074 | ON_EXIT:\r | |
2075 | if (Data != NULL) {\r | |
2076 | FreePool(Data);\r | |
2077 | }\r | |
2078 | \r | |
2079 | if (OldData != NULL) {\r | |
2080 | FreePool(OldData);\r | |
2081 | }\r | |
2082 | \r | |
2083 | return UpdateDeletePage (\r | |
2084 | PrivateData, \r | |
2085 | VariableName,\r | |
2086 | VendorGuid,\r | |
2087 | LabelNumber,\r | |
2088 | FormId,\r | |
2089 | QuestionIdBase\r | |
2090 | );\r | |
2091 | }\r | |
2092 | \r | |
2093 | /**\r | |
2094 | This function extracts configuration from variable.\r | |
2095 | \r | |
2096 | @param[in, out] ConfigData Point to SecureBoot configuration private data.\r | |
2097 | \r | |
2098 | **/\r | |
2099 | VOID\r | |
2100 | SecureBootExtractConfigFromVariable (\r | |
2101 | IN OUT SECUREBOOT_CONFIGURATION *ConfigData\r | |
2102 | ) \r | |
2103 | {\r | |
2104 | UINT8 *SecureBootEnable;\r | |
2105 | UINT8 *SetupMode;\r | |
2106 | UINT8 *SecureBoot;\r | |
2107 | UINT8 *SecureBootMode;\r | |
2108 | \r | |
2109 | SecureBootEnable = NULL;\r | |
2110 | SetupMode = NULL;\r | |
2111 | SecureBoot = NULL;\r | |
2112 | SecureBootMode = NULL;\r | |
2113 | \r | |
2114 | //\r | |
2115 | // If the SecureBootEnable Variable doesn't exist, hide the SecureBoot Enable/Disable\r | |
2116 | // Checkbox.\r | |
2117 | //\r | |
2118 | GetVariable2 (EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME, &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid, (VOID**)&SecureBootEnable, NULL);\r | |
2119 | if (SecureBootEnable == NULL) {\r | |
2120 | ConfigData->HideSecureBoot = TRUE;\r | |
2121 | } else {\r | |
2122 | ConfigData->HideSecureBoot = FALSE;\r | |
2123 | }\r | |
2124 | \r | |
2125 | //\r | |
2126 | // If it is Physical Presence User, set the PhysicalPresent to true.\r | |
2127 | //\r | |
2128 | if (UserPhysicalPresent()) {\r | |
2129 | ConfigData->PhysicalPresent = TRUE;\r | |
2130 | } else {\r | |
2131 | ConfigData->PhysicalPresent = FALSE;\r | |
2132 | }\r | |
2133 | \r | |
2134 | //\r | |
2135 | // If there is no PK then the Delete Pk button will be gray.\r | |
2136 | //\r | |
2137 | GetVariable2 (EFI_SETUP_MODE_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, (VOID**)&SetupMode, NULL);\r | |
2138 | if (SetupMode == NULL || (*SetupMode) == SETUP_MODE) {\r | |
2139 | ConfigData->HasPk = FALSE;\r | |
2140 | } else {\r | |
2141 | ConfigData->HasPk = TRUE;\r | |
2142 | }\r | |
2143 | \r | |
2144 | //\r | |
2145 | // If the value of SecureBoot variable is 1, the platform is operating in secure boot mode.\r | |
2146 | //\r | |
2147 | GetVariable2 (EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, (VOID**)&SecureBoot, NULL);\r | |
2148 | if (SecureBoot != NULL && *SecureBoot == SECURE_BOOT_MODE_ENABLE) {\r | |
2149 | ConfigData->SecureBootState = TRUE;\r | |
2150 | } else {\r | |
2151 | ConfigData->SecureBootState = FALSE;\r | |
2152 | }\r | |
2153 | \r | |
2154 | //\r | |
2155 | // Get the SecureBootMode from CustomMode variable.\r | |
2156 | //\r | |
2157 | GetVariable2 (EFI_CUSTOM_MODE_NAME, &gEfiCustomModeEnableGuid, (VOID**)&SecureBootMode, NULL);\r | |
2158 | if (SecureBootMode == NULL) {\r | |
2159 | ConfigData->SecureBootMode = STANDARD_SECURE_BOOT_MODE;\r | |
2160 | } else {\r | |
2161 | ConfigData->SecureBootMode = *(SecureBootMode);\r | |
2162 | }\r | |
2163 | \r | |
2164 | }\r | |
2165 | \r | |
2166 | /**\r | |
2167 | This function allows a caller to extract the current configuration for one\r | |
2168 | or more named elements from the target driver.\r | |
2169 | \r | |
2170 | @param[in] This Points to the EFI_HII_CONFIG_ACCESS_PROTOCOL.\r | |
2171 | @param[in] Request A null-terminated Unicode string in\r | |
2172 | <ConfigRequest> format.\r | |
2173 | @param[out] Progress On return, points to a character in the Request\r | |
2174 | string. Points to the string's null terminator if\r | |
2175 | request was successful. Points to the most recent\r | |
2176 | '&' before the first failing name/value pair (or\r | |
2177 | the beginning of the string if the failure is in\r | |
2178 | the first name/value pair) if the request was not\r | |
2179 | successful.\r | |
2180 | @param[out] Results A null-terminated Unicode string in\r | |
2181 | <ConfigAltResp> format which has all values filled\r | |
2182 | in for the names in the Request string. String to\r | |
2183 | be allocated by the called function.\r | |
2184 | \r | |
2185 | @retval EFI_SUCCESS The Results is filled with the requested values.\r | |
2186 | @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES Not enough memory to store the results.\r | |
2187 | @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Request is illegal syntax, or unknown name.\r | |
2188 | @retval EFI_NOT_FOUND Routing data doesn't match any storage in this\r | |
2189 | driver.\r | |
2190 | \r | |
2191 | **/\r | |
2192 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
2193 | EFIAPI\r | |
2194 | SecureBootExtractConfig (\r | |
2195 | IN CONST EFI_HII_CONFIG_ACCESS_PROTOCOL *This,\r | |
2196 | IN CONST EFI_STRING Request,\r | |
2197 | OUT EFI_STRING *Progress,\r | |
2198 | OUT EFI_STRING *Results\r | |
2199 | )\r | |
2200 | {\r | |
2201 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r | |
2202 | UINTN BufferSize;\r | |
2203 | UINTN Size;\r | |
2204 | SECUREBOOT_CONFIGURATION Configuration;\r | |
2205 | EFI_STRING ConfigRequest;\r | |
2206 | EFI_STRING ConfigRequestHdr;\r | |
2207 | SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_DATA *PrivateData;\r | |
2208 | BOOLEAN AllocatedRequest;\r | |
2209 | \r | |
2210 | if (Progress == NULL || Results == NULL) {\r | |
2211 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r | |
2212 | }\r | |
2213 | \r | |
2214 | AllocatedRequest = FALSE;\r | |
2215 | ConfigRequestHdr = NULL;\r | |
2216 | ConfigRequest = NULL;\r | |
2217 | Size = 0;\r | |
2218 | \r | |
2219 | ZeroMem (&Configuration, sizeof (Configuration));\r | |
2220 | PrivateData = SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_FROM_THIS (This);\r | |
2221 | *Progress = Request;\r | |
2222 | \r | |
2223 | if ((Request != NULL) && !HiiIsConfigHdrMatch (Request, &gSecureBootConfigFormSetGuid, mSecureBootStorageName)) {\r | |
2224 | return EFI_NOT_FOUND;\r | |
2225 | }\r | |
2226 | \r | |
2227 | //\r | |
2228 | // Get Configuration from Variable.\r | |
2229 | //\r | |
2230 | SecureBootExtractConfigFromVariable (&Configuration);\r | |
2231 | \r | |
2232 | BufferSize = sizeof (SECUREBOOT_CONFIGURATION);\r | |
2233 | ConfigRequest = Request;\r | |
2234 | if ((Request == NULL) || (StrStr (Request, L"OFFSET") == NULL)) {\r | |
2235 | //\r | |
2236 | // Request is set to NULL or OFFSET is NULL, construct full request string.\r | |
2237 | //\r | |
2238 | // Allocate and fill a buffer large enough to hold the <ConfigHdr> template\r | |
2239 | // followed by "&OFFSET=0&WIDTH=WWWWWWWWWWWWWWWW" followed by a Null-terminator\r | |
2240 | //\r | |
2241 | ConfigRequestHdr = HiiConstructConfigHdr (&gSecureBootConfigFormSetGuid, mSecureBootStorageName, PrivateData->DriverHandle);\r | |
2242 | Size = (StrLen (ConfigRequestHdr) + 32 + 1) * sizeof (CHAR16);\r | |
2243 | ConfigRequest = AllocateZeroPool (Size);\r | |
2244 | ASSERT (ConfigRequest != NULL);\r | |
2245 | AllocatedRequest = TRUE;\r | |
2246 | UnicodeSPrint (ConfigRequest, Size, L"%s&OFFSET=0&WIDTH=%016LX", ConfigRequestHdr, (UINT64)BufferSize);\r | |
2247 | FreePool (ConfigRequestHdr);\r | |
2248 | ConfigRequestHdr = NULL;\r | |
2249 | }\r | |
2250 | \r | |
2251 | Status = gHiiConfigRouting->BlockToConfig (\r | |
2252 | gHiiConfigRouting,\r | |
2253 | ConfigRequest,\r | |
2254 | (UINT8 *) &Configuration,\r | |
2255 | BufferSize,\r | |
2256 | Results,\r | |
2257 | Progress\r | |
2258 | );\r | |
2259 | \r | |
2260 | //\r | |
2261 | // Free the allocated config request string.\r | |
2262 | //\r | |
2263 | if (AllocatedRequest) {\r | |
2264 | FreePool (ConfigRequest);\r | |
2265 | }\r | |
2266 | \r | |
2267 | //\r | |
2268 | // Set Progress string to the original request string.\r | |
2269 | //\r | |
2270 | if (Request == NULL) {\r | |
2271 | *Progress = NULL;\r | |
2272 | } else if (StrStr (Request, L"OFFSET") == NULL) {\r | |
2273 | *Progress = Request + StrLen (Request);\r | |
2274 | }\r | |
2275 | \r | |
2276 | return Status;\r | |
2277 | }\r | |
2278 | \r | |
2279 | /**\r | |
2280 | This function processes the results of changes in configuration.\r | |
2281 | \r | |
2282 | @param[in] This Points to the EFI_HII_CONFIG_ACCESS_PROTOCOL.\r | |
2283 | @param[in] Configuration A null-terminated Unicode string in <ConfigResp>\r | |
2284 | format.\r | |
2285 | @param[out] Progress A pointer to a string filled in with the offset of\r | |
2286 | the most recent '&' before the first failing\r | |
2287 | name/value pair (or the beginning of the string if\r | |
2288 | the failure is in the first name/value pair) or\r | |
2289 | the terminating NULL if all was successful.\r | |
2290 | \r | |
2291 | @retval EFI_SUCCESS The Results is processed successfully.\r | |
2292 | @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Configuration is NULL.\r | |
2293 | @retval EFI_NOT_FOUND Routing data doesn't match any storage in this\r | |
2294 | driver.\r | |
2295 | \r | |
2296 | **/\r | |
2297 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
2298 | EFIAPI\r | |
2299 | SecureBootRouteConfig (\r | |
2300 | IN CONST EFI_HII_CONFIG_ACCESS_PROTOCOL *This,\r | |
2301 | IN CONST EFI_STRING Configuration,\r | |
2302 | OUT EFI_STRING *Progress\r | |
2303 | )\r | |
2304 | {\r | |
2305 | if (Configuration == NULL || Progress == NULL) {\r | |
2306 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r | |
2307 | }\r | |
2308 | \r | |
2309 | *Progress = Configuration;\r | |
2310 | if (!HiiIsConfigHdrMatch (Configuration, &gSecureBootConfigFormSetGuid, mSecureBootStorageName)) {\r | |
2311 | return EFI_NOT_FOUND;\r | |
2312 | }\r | |
2313 | \r | |
2314 | *Progress = Configuration + StrLen (Configuration);\r | |
2315 | return EFI_SUCCESS;\r | |
2316 | }\r | |
2317 | \r | |
2318 | /**\r | |
2319 | This function is called to provide results data to the driver.\r | |
2320 | \r | |
2321 | @param[in] This Points to the EFI_HII_CONFIG_ACCESS_PROTOCOL.\r | |
2322 | @param[in] Action Specifies the type of action taken by the browser.\r | |
2323 | @param[in] QuestionId A unique value which is sent to the original\r | |
2324 | exporting driver so that it can identify the type\r | |
2325 | of data to expect.\r | |
2326 | @param[in] Type The type of value for the question.\r | |
2327 | @param[in] Value A pointer to the data being sent to the original\r | |
2328 | exporting driver.\r | |
2329 | @param[out] ActionRequest On return, points to the action requested by the\r | |
2330 | callback function.\r | |
2331 | \r | |
2332 | @retval EFI_SUCCESS The callback successfully handled the action.\r | |
2333 | @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES Not enough storage is available to hold the\r | |
2334 | variable and its data.\r | |
2335 | @retval EFI_DEVICE_ERROR The variable could not be saved.\r | |
2336 | @retval EFI_UNSUPPORTED The specified Action is not supported by the\r | |
2337 | callback.\r | |
2338 | \r | |
2339 | **/\r | |
2340 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
2341 | EFIAPI\r | |
2342 | SecureBootCallback (\r | |
2343 | IN CONST EFI_HII_CONFIG_ACCESS_PROTOCOL *This,\r | |
2344 | IN EFI_BROWSER_ACTION Action,\r | |
2345 | IN EFI_QUESTION_ID QuestionId,\r | |
2346 | IN UINT8 Type,\r | |
2347 | IN EFI_IFR_TYPE_VALUE *Value,\r | |
2348 | OUT EFI_BROWSER_ACTION_REQUEST *ActionRequest\r | |
2349 | )\r | |
2350 | {\r | |
2351 | EFI_INPUT_KEY Key;\r | |
2352 | EFI_STATUS Status; \r | |
2353 | SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_DATA *Private;\r | |
2354 | UINTN BufferSize;\r | |
2355 | SECUREBOOT_CONFIGURATION *IfrNvData;\r | |
2356 | UINT16 LabelId;\r | |
2357 | UINT8 *SecureBootEnable;\r | |
2358 | CHAR16 PromptString[100];\r | |
2359 | \r | |
2360 | SecureBootEnable = NULL;\r | |
2361 | \r | |
2362 | if ((This == NULL) || (Value == NULL) || (ActionRequest == NULL)) {\r | |
2363 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r | |
2364 | }\r | |
2365 | \r | |
2366 | if ((Action != EFI_BROWSER_ACTION_CHANGED) && (Action != EFI_BROWSER_ACTION_CHANGING)) {\r | |
2367 | return EFI_UNSUPPORTED;\r | |
2368 | }\r | |
2369 | \r | |
2370 | Private = SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_FROM_THIS (This);\r | |
2371 | \r | |
2372 | //\r | |
2373 | // Retrieve uncommitted data from Browser\r | |
2374 | //\r | |
2375 | BufferSize = sizeof (SECUREBOOT_CONFIGURATION);\r | |
2376 | IfrNvData = AllocateZeroPool (BufferSize);\r | |
2377 | if (IfrNvData == NULL) {\r | |
2378 | return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r | |
2379 | }\r | |
2380 | \r | |
2381 | Status = EFI_SUCCESS;\r | |
2382 | \r | |
2383 | HiiGetBrowserData (NULL, NULL, BufferSize, (UINT8 *) IfrNvData);\r | |
2384 | \r | |
2385 | if (Action == EFI_BROWSER_ACTION_CHANGING) {\r | |
2386 | \r | |
2387 | switch (QuestionId) {\r | |
2388 | case KEY_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE:\r | |
2389 | GetVariable2 (EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME, &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid, (VOID**)&SecureBootEnable, NULL);\r | |
2390 | if (NULL != SecureBootEnable) {\r | |
2391 | if (EFI_ERROR (SaveSecureBootVariable (Value->u8))) {\r | |
2392 | CreatePopUp (\r | |
2393 | EFI_LIGHTGRAY | EFI_BACKGROUND_BLUE,\r | |
2394 | &Key,\r | |
2395 | L"Only Physical Presence User could disable secure boot!",\r | |
2396 | NULL\r | |
2397 | );\r | |
2398 | Status = EFI_UNSUPPORTED;\r | |
2399 | }\r | |
2400 | *ActionRequest = EFI_BROWSER_ACTION_REQUEST_FORM_APPLY; \r | |
2401 | }\r | |
2402 | break;\r | |
2403 | \r | |
2404 | case KEY_SECURE_BOOT_OPTION:\r | |
2405 | FreeMenu (&DirectoryMenu);\r | |
2406 | FreeMenu (&FsOptionMenu);\r | |
2407 | break;\r | |
2408 | \r | |
2409 | case KEY_SECURE_BOOT_KEK_OPTION:\r | |
2410 | case KEY_SECURE_BOOT_DB_OPTION:\r | |
2411 | case KEY_SECURE_BOOT_DBX_OPTION:\r | |
2412 | //\r | |
2413 | // Clear Signature GUID.\r | |
2414 | //\r | |
2415 | ZeroMem (IfrNvData->SignatureGuid, sizeof (IfrNvData->SignatureGuid));\r | |
2416 | if (Private->SignatureGUID == NULL) {\r | |
2417 | Private->SignatureGUID = (EFI_GUID *) AllocateZeroPool (sizeof (EFI_GUID));\r | |
2418 | if (Private->SignatureGUID == NULL) {\r | |
2419 | return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r | |
2420 | }\r | |
2421 | }\r | |
2422 | \r | |
2423 | if (QuestionId == KEY_SECURE_BOOT_DB_OPTION) {\r | |
2424 | LabelId = SECUREBOOT_ENROLL_SIGNATURE_TO_DB;\r | |
2425 | } else if (QuestionId == KEY_SECURE_BOOT_DBX_OPTION) {\r | |
2426 | LabelId = SECUREBOOT_ENROLL_SIGNATURE_TO_DBX;\r | |
2427 | } else {\r | |
2428 | LabelId = FORMID_ENROLL_KEK_FORM;\r | |
2429 | }\r | |
2430 | \r | |
2431 | //\r | |
2432 | // Refresh selected file.\r | |
2433 | //\r | |
2434 | CleanUpPage (LabelId, Private); \r | |
2435 | break;\r | |
2436 | \r | |
2437 | case SECUREBOOT_ADD_PK_FILE_FORM_ID:\r | |
2438 | case FORMID_ENROLL_KEK_FORM:\r | |
2439 | case SECUREBOOT_ENROLL_SIGNATURE_TO_DB:\r | |
2440 | case SECUREBOOT_ENROLL_SIGNATURE_TO_DBX:\r | |
2441 | if (QuestionId == SECUREBOOT_ADD_PK_FILE_FORM_ID) {\r | |
2442 | Private->FeCurrentState = FileExplorerStateEnrollPkFile;\r | |
2443 | } else if (QuestionId == FORMID_ENROLL_KEK_FORM) {\r | |
2444 | Private->FeCurrentState = FileExplorerStateEnrollKekFile;\r | |
2445 | } else if (QuestionId == SECUREBOOT_ENROLL_SIGNATURE_TO_DB) {\r | |
2446 | Private->FeCurrentState = FileExplorerStateEnrollSignatureFileToDb;\r | |
2447 | } else {\r | |
2448 | Private->FeCurrentState = FileExplorerStateEnrollSignatureFileToDbx;\r | |
2449 | }\r | |
2450 | \r | |
2451 | Private->FeDisplayContext = FileExplorerDisplayUnknown;\r | |
2452 | CleanUpPage (FORM_FILE_EXPLORER_ID, Private);\r | |
2453 | UpdateFileExplorer (Private, 0);\r | |
2454 | break;\r | |
2455 | \r | |
2456 | case KEY_SECURE_BOOT_DELETE_PK: \r | |
2457 | if (Value->u8) {\r | |
2458 | Status = DeletePlatformKey ();\r | |
2459 | *ActionRequest = EFI_BROWSER_ACTION_REQUEST_FORM_APPLY;\r | |
2460 | }\r | |
2461 | break;\r | |
2462 | \r | |
2463 | case KEY_DELETE_KEK:\r | |
2464 | UpdateDeletePage (\r | |
2465 | Private, \r | |
2466 | EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME,\r | |
2467 | &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r | |
2468 | LABEL_KEK_DELETE,\r | |
2469 | FORMID_DELETE_KEK_FORM,\r | |
2470 | OPTION_DEL_KEK_QUESTION_ID \r | |
2471 | );\r | |
2472 | break;\r | |
2473 | \r | |
2474 | case SECUREBOOT_DELETE_SIGNATURE_FROM_DB: \r | |
2475 | UpdateDeletePage (\r | |
2476 | Private,\r | |
2477 | EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE,\r | |
2478 | &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid,\r | |
2479 | LABEL_DB_DELETE,\r | |
2480 | SECUREBOOT_DELETE_SIGNATURE_FROM_DB,\r | |
2481 | OPTION_DEL_DB_QUESTION_ID\r | |
2482 | );\r | |
2483 | break;\r | |
2484 | \r | |
2485 | case SECUREBOOT_DELETE_SIGNATURE_FROM_DBX:\r | |
2486 | UpdateDeletePage (\r | |
2487 | Private,\r | |
2488 | EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1,\r | |
2489 | &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid,\r | |
2490 | LABEL_DBX_DELETE,\r | |
2491 | SECUREBOOT_DELETE_SIGNATURE_FROM_DBX,\r | |
2492 | OPTION_DEL_DBX_QUESTION_ID\r | |
2493 | );\r | |
2494 | \r | |
2495 | break;\r | |
2496 | \r | |
2497 | case KEY_VALUE_SAVE_AND_EXIT_KEK:\r | |
2498 | Status = EnrollKeyExchangeKey (Private);\r | |
2499 | break;\r | |
2500 | \r | |
2501 | case KEY_VALUE_SAVE_AND_EXIT_DB:\r | |
2502 | Status = EnrollSignatureDatabase (Private, EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE);\r | |
2503 | break;\r | |
2504 | \r | |
2505 | case KEY_VALUE_SAVE_AND_EXIT_DBX:\r | |
2506 | Status = EnrollSignatureDatabase (Private, EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1);\r | |
2507 | break;\r | |
2508 | \r | |
2509 | default:\r | |
2510 | if (QuestionId >= FILE_OPTION_OFFSET) {\r | |
2511 | UpdateFileExplorer (Private, QuestionId);\r | |
2512 | } else if ((QuestionId >= OPTION_DEL_KEK_QUESTION_ID) &&\r | |
2513 | (QuestionId < (OPTION_DEL_KEK_QUESTION_ID + OPTION_CONFIG_RANGE))) {\r | |
2514 | DeleteKeyExchangeKey (Private, QuestionId);\r | |
2515 | } else if ((QuestionId >= OPTION_DEL_DB_QUESTION_ID) &&\r | |
2516 | (QuestionId < (OPTION_DEL_DB_QUESTION_ID + OPTION_CONFIG_RANGE))) {\r | |
2517 | DeleteSignature (\r | |
2518 | Private,\r | |
2519 | EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE,\r | |
2520 | &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid,\r | |
2521 | LABEL_DB_DELETE, \r | |
2522 | SECUREBOOT_DELETE_SIGNATURE_FROM_DB,\r | |
2523 | OPTION_DEL_DB_QUESTION_ID,\r | |
2524 | QuestionId - OPTION_DEL_DB_QUESTION_ID\r | |
2525 | );\r | |
2526 | } else if ((QuestionId >= OPTION_DEL_DBX_QUESTION_ID) &&\r | |
2527 | (QuestionId < (OPTION_DEL_DBX_QUESTION_ID + OPTION_CONFIG_RANGE))) {\r | |
2528 | DeleteSignature (\r | |
2529 | Private,\r | |
2530 | EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1,\r | |
2531 | &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid,\r | |
2532 | LABEL_DBX_DELETE, \r | |
2533 | SECUREBOOT_DELETE_SIGNATURE_FROM_DBX,\r | |
2534 | OPTION_DEL_DBX_QUESTION_ID,\r | |
2535 | QuestionId - OPTION_DEL_DBX_QUESTION_ID\r | |
2536 | );\r | |
2537 | }\r | |
2538 | break;\r | |
2539 | }\r | |
2540 | } else if (Action == EFI_BROWSER_ACTION_CHANGED) {\r | |
2541 | switch (QuestionId) {\r | |
2542 | case KEY_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE:\r | |
2543 | *ActionRequest = EFI_BROWSER_ACTION_REQUEST_SUBMIT; \r | |
2544 | break; \r | |
2545 | case KEY_VALUE_SAVE_AND_EXIT_PK:\r | |
2546 | Status = EnrollPlatformKey (Private);\r | |
2547 | UnicodeSPrint (\r | |
2548 | PromptString,\r | |
2549 | sizeof (PromptString),\r | |
2550 | L"Only DER encoded certificate file (%s) is supported.",\r | |
2551 | mSupportX509Suffix\r | |
2552 | );\r | |
2553 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
2554 | CreatePopUp (\r | |
2555 | EFI_LIGHTGRAY | EFI_BACKGROUND_BLUE,\r | |
2556 | &Key,\r | |
2557 | L"ERROR: Unsupported file type!",\r | |
2558 | PromptString,\r | |
2559 | NULL\r | |
2560 | );\r | |
2561 | } else {\r | |
2562 | *ActionRequest = EFI_BROWSER_ACTION_REQUEST_SUBMIT;\r | |
2563 | } \r | |
2564 | break;\r | |
2565 | \r | |
2566 | case KEY_VALUE_NO_SAVE_AND_EXIT_PK:\r | |
2567 | case KEY_VALUE_NO_SAVE_AND_EXIT_KEK:\r | |
2568 | case KEY_VALUE_NO_SAVE_AND_EXIT_DB:\r | |
2569 | case KEY_VALUE_NO_SAVE_AND_EXIT_DBX:\r | |
2570 | if (Private->FileContext->FHandle != NULL) {\r | |
2571 | CloseFile (Private->FileContext->FHandle);\r | |
2572 | Private->FileContext->FHandle = NULL;\r | |
2573 | Private->FileContext->FileName = NULL;\r | |
2574 | }\r | |
2575 | \r | |
2576 | if (Private->SignatureGUID != NULL) {\r | |
2577 | FreePool (Private->SignatureGUID);\r | |
2578 | Private->SignatureGUID = NULL;\r | |
2579 | }\r | |
2580 | *ActionRequest = EFI_BROWSER_ACTION_REQUEST_EXIT;\r | |
2581 | break;\r | |
2582 | \r | |
2583 | case KEY_SECURE_BOOT_MODE:\r | |
2584 | GetVariable2 (EFI_CUSTOM_MODE_NAME, &gEfiCustomModeEnableGuid, (VOID**)&SecureBootEnable, NULL);\r | |
2585 | if (NULL != SecureBootEnable) {\r | |
2586 | Status = gRT->SetVariable ( \r | |
2587 | EFI_CUSTOM_MODE_NAME,\r | |
2588 | &gEfiCustomModeEnableGuid,\r | |
2589 | EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS,\r | |
2590 | sizeof (UINT8),\r | |
2591 | &Value->u8\r | |
2592 | );\r | |
2593 | *ActionRequest = EFI_BROWSER_ACTION_REQUEST_FORM_APPLY;\r | |
2594 | IfrNvData->SecureBootMode = Value->u8;\r | |
2595 | } \r | |
2596 | break;\r | |
2597 | \r | |
2598 | case KEY_SECURE_BOOT_KEK_GUID:\r | |
2599 | case KEY_SECURE_BOOT_SIGNATURE_GUID_DB:\r | |
2600 | case KEY_SECURE_BOOT_SIGNATURE_GUID_DBX:\r | |
2601 | ASSERT (Private->SignatureGUID != NULL);\r | |
2602 | Status = StringToGuid (\r | |
2603 | IfrNvData->SignatureGuid,\r | |
2604 | StrLen (IfrNvData->SignatureGuid),\r | |
2605 | Private->SignatureGUID\r | |
2606 | );\r | |
2607 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
2608 | break;\r | |
2609 | }\r | |
2610 | \r | |
2611 | *ActionRequest = EFI_BROWSER_ACTION_REQUEST_FORM_APPLY;\r | |
2612 | break;\r | |
2613 | \r | |
2614 | case KEY_SECURE_BOOT_DELETE_PK:\r | |
2615 | if (Value->u8) {\r | |
2616 | *ActionRequest = EFI_BROWSER_ACTION_REQUEST_SUBMIT;\r | |
2617 | }\r | |
2618 | break; \r | |
2619 | }\r | |
2620 | }\r | |
2621 | \r | |
2622 | if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
2623 | BufferSize = sizeof (SECUREBOOT_CONFIGURATION);\r | |
2624 | HiiSetBrowserData (NULL, NULL, BufferSize, (UINT8*) IfrNvData, NULL);\r | |
2625 | }\r | |
2626 | FreePool (IfrNvData);\r | |
2627 | \r | |
2628 | return EFI_SUCCESS;\r | |
2629 | }\r | |
2630 | \r | |
2631 | /**\r | |
2632 | This function publish the SecureBoot configuration Form.\r | |
2633 | \r | |
2634 | @param[in, out] PrivateData Points to SecureBoot configuration private data.\r | |
2635 | \r | |
2636 | @retval EFI_SUCCESS HII Form is installed successfully.\r | |
2637 | @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES Not enough resource for HII Form installation.\r | |
2638 | @retval Others Other errors as indicated.\r | |
2639 | \r | |
2640 | **/\r | |
2641 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
2642 | InstallSecureBootConfigForm (\r | |
2643 | IN OUT SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_DATA *PrivateData\r | |
2644 | )\r | |
2645 | {\r | |
2646 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r | |
2647 | EFI_HII_HANDLE HiiHandle;\r | |
2648 | EFI_HANDLE DriverHandle;\r | |
2649 | EFI_HII_CONFIG_ACCESS_PROTOCOL *ConfigAccess;\r | |
2650 | \r | |
2651 | DriverHandle = NULL;\r | |
2652 | ConfigAccess = &PrivateData->ConfigAccess;\r | |
2653 | Status = gBS->InstallMultipleProtocolInterfaces (\r | |
2654 | &DriverHandle,\r | |
2655 | &gEfiDevicePathProtocolGuid,\r | |
2656 | &mSecureBootHiiVendorDevicePath,\r | |
2657 | &gEfiHiiConfigAccessProtocolGuid,\r | |
2658 | ConfigAccess,\r | |
2659 | NULL\r | |
2660 | );\r | |
2661 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
2662 | return Status;\r | |
2663 | }\r | |
2664 | \r | |
2665 | PrivateData->DriverHandle = DriverHandle;\r | |
2666 | \r | |
2667 | //\r | |
2668 | // Publish the HII package list\r | |
2669 | //\r | |
2670 | HiiHandle = HiiAddPackages (\r | |
2671 | &gSecureBootConfigFormSetGuid,\r | |
2672 | DriverHandle,\r | |
2673 | SecureBootConfigDxeStrings,\r | |
2674 | SecureBootConfigBin,\r | |
2675 | NULL\r | |
2676 | );\r | |
2677 | if (HiiHandle == NULL) {\r | |
2678 | gBS->UninstallMultipleProtocolInterfaces (\r | |
2679 | DriverHandle,\r | |
2680 | &gEfiDevicePathProtocolGuid,\r | |
2681 | &mSecureBootHiiVendorDevicePath,\r | |
2682 | &gEfiHiiConfigAccessProtocolGuid,\r | |
2683 | ConfigAccess,\r | |
2684 | NULL\r | |
2685 | );\r | |
2686 | return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r | |
2687 | }\r | |
2688 | \r | |
2689 | PrivateData->HiiHandle = HiiHandle;\r | |
2690 | \r | |
2691 | PrivateData->FileContext = AllocateZeroPool (sizeof (SECUREBOOT_FILE_CONTEXT));\r | |
2692 | PrivateData->MenuEntry = AllocateZeroPool (sizeof (SECUREBOOT_MENU_ENTRY));\r | |
2693 | \r | |
2694 | if (PrivateData->FileContext == NULL || PrivateData->MenuEntry == NULL) {\r | |
2695 | UninstallSecureBootConfigForm (PrivateData);\r | |
2696 | return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r | |
2697 | }\r | |
2698 | \r | |
2699 | PrivateData->FeCurrentState = FileExplorerStateInActive;\r | |
2700 | PrivateData->FeDisplayContext = FileExplorerDisplayUnknown;\r | |
2701 | \r | |
2702 | InitializeListHead (&FsOptionMenu.Head);\r | |
2703 | InitializeListHead (&DirectoryMenu.Head);\r | |
2704 | \r | |
2705 | //\r | |
2706 | // Init OpCode Handle and Allocate space for creation of Buffer\r | |
2707 | //\r | |
2708 | mStartOpCodeHandle = HiiAllocateOpCodeHandle ();\r | |
2709 | if (mStartOpCodeHandle == NULL) {\r | |
2710 | UninstallSecureBootConfigForm (PrivateData);\r | |
2711 | return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r | |
2712 | }\r | |
2713 | \r | |
2714 | mEndOpCodeHandle = HiiAllocateOpCodeHandle ();\r | |
2715 | if (mEndOpCodeHandle == NULL) {\r | |
2716 | UninstallSecureBootConfigForm (PrivateData);\r | |
2717 | return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r | |
2718 | }\r | |
2719 | \r | |
2720 | //\r | |
2721 | // Create Hii Extend Label OpCode as the start opcode\r | |
2722 | //\r | |
2723 | mStartLabel = (EFI_IFR_GUID_LABEL *) HiiCreateGuidOpCode (\r | |
2724 | mStartOpCodeHandle,\r | |
2725 | &gEfiIfrTianoGuid,\r | |
2726 | NULL,\r | |
2727 | sizeof (EFI_IFR_GUID_LABEL)\r | |
2728 | );\r | |
2729 | mStartLabel->ExtendOpCode = EFI_IFR_EXTEND_OP_LABEL;\r | |
2730 | \r | |
2731 | //\r | |
2732 | // Create Hii Extend Label OpCode as the end opcode\r | |
2733 | //\r | |
2734 | mEndLabel = (EFI_IFR_GUID_LABEL *) HiiCreateGuidOpCode (\r | |
2735 | mEndOpCodeHandle,\r | |
2736 | &gEfiIfrTianoGuid,\r | |
2737 | NULL,\r | |
2738 | sizeof (EFI_IFR_GUID_LABEL)\r | |
2739 | );\r | |
2740 | mEndLabel->ExtendOpCode = EFI_IFR_EXTEND_OP_LABEL;\r | |
2741 | mEndLabel->Number = LABEL_END;\r | |
2742 | \r | |
2743 | return EFI_SUCCESS;\r | |
2744 | }\r | |
2745 | \r | |
2746 | /**\r | |
2747 | This function removes SecureBoot configuration Form.\r | |
2748 | \r | |
2749 | @param[in, out] PrivateData Points to SecureBoot configuration private data.\r | |
2750 | \r | |
2751 | **/\r | |
2752 | VOID\r | |
2753 | UninstallSecureBootConfigForm (\r | |
2754 | IN OUT SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_DATA *PrivateData\r | |
2755 | )\r | |
2756 | {\r | |
2757 | //\r | |
2758 | // Uninstall HII package list\r | |
2759 | //\r | |
2760 | if (PrivateData->HiiHandle != NULL) {\r | |
2761 | HiiRemovePackages (PrivateData->HiiHandle);\r | |
2762 | PrivateData->HiiHandle = NULL;\r | |
2763 | }\r | |
2764 | \r | |
2765 | //\r | |
2766 | // Uninstall HII Config Access Protocol\r | |
2767 | //\r | |
2768 | if (PrivateData->DriverHandle != NULL) {\r | |
2769 | gBS->UninstallMultipleProtocolInterfaces (\r | |
2770 | PrivateData->DriverHandle,\r | |
2771 | &gEfiDevicePathProtocolGuid,\r | |
2772 | &mSecureBootHiiVendorDevicePath,\r | |
2773 | &gEfiHiiConfigAccessProtocolGuid,\r | |
2774 | &PrivateData->ConfigAccess,\r | |
2775 | NULL\r | |
2776 | );\r | |
2777 | PrivateData->DriverHandle = NULL;\r | |
2778 | }\r | |
2779 | \r | |
2780 | if (PrivateData->SignatureGUID != NULL) {\r | |
2781 | FreePool (PrivateData->SignatureGUID);\r | |
2782 | }\r | |
2783 | \r | |
2784 | if (PrivateData->MenuEntry != NULL) {\r | |
2785 | FreePool (PrivateData->MenuEntry);\r | |
2786 | }\r | |
2787 | \r | |
2788 | if (PrivateData->FileContext != NULL) {\r | |
2789 | FreePool (PrivateData->FileContext);\r | |
2790 | }\r | |
2791 | \r | |
2792 | FreePool (PrivateData);\r | |
2793 | \r | |
2794 | FreeMenu (&DirectoryMenu);\r | |
2795 | FreeMenu (&FsOptionMenu);\r | |
2796 | \r | |
2797 | if (mStartOpCodeHandle != NULL) {\r | |
2798 | HiiFreeOpCodeHandle (mStartOpCodeHandle);\r | |
2799 | }\r | |
2800 | \r | |
2801 | if (mEndOpCodeHandle != NULL) {\r | |
2802 | HiiFreeOpCodeHandle (mEndOpCodeHandle);\r | |
2803 | }\r | |
2804 | }\r |