]>
Commit | Line | Data |
---|---|---|
0c18794e | 1 | /** @file\r |
3cd2484e | 2 | Implement image verification services for secure boot service\r |
0c18794e | 3 | \r |
dc204d5a JY |
4 | Caution: This file requires additional review when modified.\r |
5 | This library will have external input - PE/COFF image.\r | |
6 | This external input must be validated carefully to avoid security issue like\r | |
7 | buffer overflow, integer overflow.\r | |
8 | \r | |
9 | DxeImageVerificationLibImageRead() function will make sure the PE/COFF image content\r | |
10 | read is within the image buffer.\r | |
11 | \r | |
12 | DxeImageVerificationHandler(), HashPeImageByType(), HashPeImage() function will accept\r | |
13 | untrusted PE/COFF image and validate its data structure within this image buffer before use.\r | |
14 | \r | |
5b196b06 | 15 | Copyright (c) 2009 - 2017, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>\r |
531c89a1 | 16 | (C) Copyright 2016 Hewlett Packard Enterprise Development LP<BR>\r |
45bf2c47 | 17 | This program and the accompanying materials\r |
18 | are licensed and made available under the terms and conditions of the BSD License\r | |
19 | which accompanies this distribution. The full text of the license may be found at\r | |
0c18794e | 20 | http://opensource.org/licenses/bsd-license.php\r |
21 | \r | |
45bf2c47 | 22 | THE PROGRAM IS DISTRIBUTED UNDER THE BSD LICENSE ON AN "AS IS" BASIS,\r |
0c18794e | 23 | WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR REPRESENTATIONS OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED.\r |
24 | \r | |
25 | **/\r | |
26 | \r | |
27 | #include "DxeImageVerificationLib.h"\r | |
28 | \r | |
dc204d5a JY |
29 | //\r |
30 | // Caution: This is used by a function which may receive untrusted input.\r | |
31 | // These global variables hold PE/COFF image data, and they should be validated before use.\r | |
32 | //\r | |
0c18794e | 33 | EFI_IMAGE_OPTIONAL_HEADER_PTR_UNION mNtHeader;\r |
45bf2c47 | 34 | UINT32 mPeCoffHeaderOffset;\r |
0c18794e | 35 | EFI_GUID mCertType;\r |
36 | \r | |
dc204d5a JY |
37 | //\r |
38 | // Information on current PE/COFF image\r | |
39 | //\r | |
40 | UINTN mImageSize;\r | |
41 | UINT8 *mImageBase = NULL;\r | |
42 | UINT8 mImageDigest[MAX_DIGEST_SIZE];\r | |
43 | UINTN mImageDigestSize;\r | |
44 | \r | |
0c18794e | 45 | //\r |
46 | // Notify string for authorization UI.\r | |
47 | //\r | |
48 | CHAR16 mNotifyString1[MAX_NOTIFY_STRING_LEN] = L"Image verification pass but not found in authorized database!";\r | |
49 | CHAR16 mNotifyString2[MAX_NOTIFY_STRING_LEN] = L"Launch this image anyway? (Yes/Defer/No)";\r | |
50 | //\r | |
51 | // Public Exponent of RSA Key.\r | |
52 | //\r | |
53 | CONST UINT8 mRsaE[] = { 0x01, 0x00, 0x01 };\r | |
54 | \r | |
55 | \r | |
56 | //\r | |
57 | // OID ASN.1 Value for Hash Algorithms\r | |
58 | //\r | |
59 | UINT8 mHashOidValue[] = {\r | |
0c18794e | 60 | 0x2B, 0x0E, 0x03, 0x02, 0x1A, // OBJ_sha1\r |
61 | 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x04, // OBJ_sha224\r | |
62 | 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x01, // OBJ_sha256\r | |
63 | 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x02, // OBJ_sha384\r | |
64 | 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x03, // OBJ_sha512\r | |
65 | };\r | |
66 | \r | |
67 | HASH_TABLE mHash[] = {\r | |
20333c6d QL |
68 | { L"SHA1", 20, &mHashOidValue[0], 5, Sha1GetContextSize, Sha1Init, Sha1Update, Sha1Final },\r |
69 | { L"SHA224", 28, &mHashOidValue[5], 9, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL },\r | |
70 | { L"SHA256", 32, &mHashOidValue[14], 9, Sha256GetContextSize, Sha256Init, Sha256Update, Sha256Final},\r | |
71 | { L"SHA384", 48, &mHashOidValue[23], 9, Sha384GetContextSize, Sha384Init, Sha384Update, Sha384Final},\r | |
72 | { L"SHA512", 64, &mHashOidValue[32], 9, Sha512GetContextSize, Sha512Init, Sha512Update, Sha512Final}\r | |
0c18794e | 73 | };\r |
74 | \r | |
531c89a1 CS |
75 | EFI_STRING mHashTypeStr;\r |
76 | \r | |
c1d93242 JY |
77 | /**\r |
78 | SecureBoot Hook for processing image verification.\r | |
79 | \r | |
80 | @param[in] VariableName Name of Variable to be found.\r | |
81 | @param[in] VendorGuid Variable vendor GUID.\r | |
82 | @param[in] DataSize Size of Data found. If size is less than the\r | |
83 | data, this value contains the required size.\r | |
84 | @param[in] Data Data pointer.\r | |
85 | \r | |
86 | **/\r | |
87 | VOID\r | |
88 | EFIAPI\r | |
89 | SecureBootHook (\r | |
90 | IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r | |
91 | IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r | |
92 | IN UINTN DataSize,\r | |
93 | IN VOID *Data\r | |
94 | );\r | |
95 | \r | |
28186d45 ED |
96 | /**\r |
97 | Reads contents of a PE/COFF image in memory buffer.\r | |
98 | \r | |
dc204d5a JY |
99 | Caution: This function may receive untrusted input.\r |
100 | PE/COFF image is external input, so this function will make sure the PE/COFF image content\r | |
101 | read is within the image buffer.\r | |
102 | \r | |
28186d45 ED |
103 | @param FileHandle Pointer to the file handle to read the PE/COFF image.\r |
104 | @param FileOffset Offset into the PE/COFF image to begin the read operation.\r | |
20333c6d | 105 | @param ReadSize On input, the size in bytes of the requested read operation.\r |
28186d45 ED |
106 | On output, the number of bytes actually read.\r |
107 | @param Buffer Output buffer that contains the data read from the PE/COFF image.\r | |
20333c6d QL |
108 | \r |
109 | @retval EFI_SUCCESS The specified portion of the PE/COFF image was read and the size\r | |
28186d45 ED |
110 | **/\r |
111 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
112 | EFIAPI\r | |
e0192326 | 113 | DxeImageVerificationLibImageRead (\r |
28186d45 ED |
114 | IN VOID *FileHandle,\r |
115 | IN UINTN FileOffset,\r | |
116 | IN OUT UINTN *ReadSize,\r | |
117 | OUT VOID *Buffer\r | |
118 | )\r | |
119 | {\r | |
120 | UINTN EndPosition;\r | |
121 | \r | |
122 | if (FileHandle == NULL || ReadSize == NULL || Buffer == NULL) {\r | |
20333c6d | 123 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r |
28186d45 ED |
124 | }\r |
125 | \r | |
126 | if (MAX_ADDRESS - FileOffset < *ReadSize) {\r | |
127 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r | |
128 | }\r | |
129 | \r | |
130 | EndPosition = FileOffset + *ReadSize;\r | |
131 | if (EndPosition > mImageSize) {\r | |
132 | *ReadSize = (UINT32)(mImageSize - FileOffset);\r | |
133 | }\r | |
134 | \r | |
135 | if (FileOffset >= mImageSize) {\r | |
136 | *ReadSize = 0;\r | |
137 | }\r | |
138 | \r | |
139 | CopyMem (Buffer, (UINT8 *)((UINTN) FileHandle + FileOffset), *ReadSize);\r | |
140 | \r | |
141 | return EFI_SUCCESS;\r | |
142 | }\r | |
143 | \r | |
0c18794e | 144 | \r |
145 | /**\r | |
146 | Get the image type.\r | |
147 | \r | |
148 | @param[in] File This is a pointer to the device path of the file that is\r | |
45bf2c47 | 149 | being dispatched.\r |
0c18794e | 150 | \r |
45bf2c47 | 151 | @return UINT32 Image Type\r |
0c18794e | 152 | \r |
153 | **/\r | |
154 | UINT32\r | |
155 | GetImageType (\r | |
156 | IN CONST EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *File\r | |
157 | )\r | |
158 | {\r | |
159 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r | |
45bf2c47 | 160 | EFI_HANDLE DeviceHandle;\r |
0c18794e | 161 | EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *TempDevicePath;\r |
162 | EFI_BLOCK_IO_PROTOCOL *BlockIo;\r | |
163 | \r | |
5db28a67 LG |
164 | if (File == NULL) {\r |
165 | return IMAGE_UNKNOWN;\r | |
166 | }\r | |
167 | \r | |
0c18794e | 168 | //\r |
169 | // First check to see if File is from a Firmware Volume\r | |
170 | //\r | |
171 | DeviceHandle = NULL;\r | |
45bf2c47 | 172 | TempDevicePath = (EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *) File;\r |
0c18794e | 173 | Status = gBS->LocateDevicePath (\r |
174 | &gEfiFirmwareVolume2ProtocolGuid,\r | |
175 | &TempDevicePath,\r | |
176 | &DeviceHandle\r | |
177 | );\r | |
178 | if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
179 | Status = gBS->OpenProtocol (\r | |
180 | DeviceHandle,\r | |
181 | &gEfiFirmwareVolume2ProtocolGuid,\r | |
182 | NULL,\r | |
183 | NULL,\r | |
184 | NULL,\r | |
185 | EFI_OPEN_PROTOCOL_TEST_PROTOCOL\r | |
186 | );\r | |
187 | if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
188 | return IMAGE_FROM_FV;\r | |
189 | }\r | |
190 | }\r | |
191 | \r | |
192 | //\r | |
193 | // Next check to see if File is from a Block I/O device\r | |
194 | //\r | |
195 | DeviceHandle = NULL;\r | |
45bf2c47 | 196 | TempDevicePath = (EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *) File;\r |
0c18794e | 197 | Status = gBS->LocateDevicePath (\r |
198 | &gEfiBlockIoProtocolGuid,\r | |
199 | &TempDevicePath,\r | |
200 | &DeviceHandle\r | |
201 | );\r | |
202 | if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
203 | BlockIo = NULL;\r | |
204 | Status = gBS->OpenProtocol (\r | |
205 | DeviceHandle,\r | |
206 | &gEfiBlockIoProtocolGuid,\r | |
207 | (VOID **) &BlockIo,\r | |
208 | NULL,\r | |
209 | NULL,\r | |
210 | EFI_OPEN_PROTOCOL_GET_PROTOCOL\r | |
211 | );\r | |
212 | if (!EFI_ERROR (Status) && BlockIo != NULL) {\r | |
213 | if (BlockIo->Media != NULL) {\r | |
214 | if (BlockIo->Media->RemovableMedia) {\r | |
215 | //\r | |
216 | // Block I/O is present and specifies the media is removable\r | |
217 | //\r | |
218 | return IMAGE_FROM_REMOVABLE_MEDIA;\r | |
219 | } else {\r | |
220 | //\r | |
221 | // Block I/O is present and specifies the media is not removable\r | |
222 | //\r | |
223 | return IMAGE_FROM_FIXED_MEDIA;\r | |
224 | }\r | |
225 | }\r | |
226 | }\r | |
227 | }\r | |
228 | \r | |
229 | //\r | |
45bf2c47 | 230 | // File is not in a Firmware Volume or on a Block I/O device, so check to see if\r |
0c18794e | 231 | // the device path supports the Simple File System Protocol.\r |
232 | //\r | |
233 | DeviceHandle = NULL;\r | |
45bf2c47 | 234 | TempDevicePath = (EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *) File;\r |
0c18794e | 235 | Status = gBS->LocateDevicePath (\r |
236 | &gEfiSimpleFileSystemProtocolGuid,\r | |
237 | &TempDevicePath,\r | |
238 | &DeviceHandle\r | |
239 | );\r | |
240 | if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
241 | //\r | |
242 | // Simple File System is present without Block I/O, so assume media is fixed.\r | |
243 | //\r | |
244 | return IMAGE_FROM_FIXED_MEDIA;\r | |
245 | }\r | |
246 | \r | |
247 | //\r | |
248 | // File is not from an FV, Block I/O or Simple File System, so the only options\r | |
45bf2c47 | 249 | // left are a PCI Option ROM and a Load File Protocol such as a PXE Boot from a NIC.\r |
0c18794e | 250 | //\r |
45bf2c47 | 251 | TempDevicePath = (EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *) File;\r |
0c18794e | 252 | while (!IsDevicePathEndType (TempDevicePath)) {\r |
253 | switch (DevicePathType (TempDevicePath)) {\r | |
45bf2c47 | 254 | \r |
0c18794e | 255 | case MEDIA_DEVICE_PATH:\r |
256 | if (DevicePathSubType (TempDevicePath) == MEDIA_RELATIVE_OFFSET_RANGE_DP) {\r | |
257 | return IMAGE_FROM_OPTION_ROM;\r | |
258 | }\r | |
259 | break;\r | |
260 | \r | |
261 | case MESSAGING_DEVICE_PATH:\r | |
262 | if (DevicePathSubType(TempDevicePath) == MSG_MAC_ADDR_DP) {\r | |
263 | return IMAGE_FROM_REMOVABLE_MEDIA;\r | |
45bf2c47 | 264 | }\r |
0c18794e | 265 | break;\r |
266 | \r | |
267 | default:\r | |
268 | break;\r | |
269 | }\r | |
270 | TempDevicePath = NextDevicePathNode (TempDevicePath);\r | |
271 | }\r | |
45bf2c47 | 272 | return IMAGE_UNKNOWN;\r |
0c18794e | 273 | }\r |
274 | \r | |
275 | /**\r | |
69f8bb52 | 276 | Calculate hash of Pe/Coff image based on the authenticode image hashing in\r |
0c18794e | 277 | PE/COFF Specification 8.0 Appendix A\r |
89fb5aef | 278 | \r |
dc204d5a JY |
279 | Caution: This function may receive untrusted input.\r |
280 | PE/COFF image is external input, so this function will validate its data structure\r | |
281 | within this image buffer before use.\r | |
282 | \r | |
89fb5aef LG |
283 | Notes: PE/COFF image has been checked by BasePeCoffLib PeCoffLoaderGetImageInfo() in \r |
284 | its caller function DxeImageVerificationHandler().\r | |
285 | \r | |
0c18794e | 286 | @param[in] HashAlg Hash algorithm type.\r |
45bf2c47 | 287 | \r |
0c18794e | 288 | @retval TRUE Successfully hash image.\r |
289 | @retval FALSE Fail in hash image.\r | |
290 | \r | |
291 | **/\r | |
45bf2c47 | 292 | BOOLEAN\r |
0c18794e | 293 | HashPeImage (\r |
294 | IN UINT32 HashAlg\r | |
295 | )\r | |
296 | {\r | |
297 | BOOLEAN Status;\r | |
298 | UINT16 Magic;\r | |
299 | EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER *Section;\r | |
300 | VOID *HashCtx;\r | |
301 | UINTN CtxSize;\r | |
302 | UINT8 *HashBase;\r | |
303 | UINTN HashSize;\r | |
304 | UINTN SumOfBytesHashed;\r | |
305 | EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER *SectionHeader;\r | |
306 | UINTN Index;\r | |
307 | UINTN Pos;\r | |
551d8081 | 308 | UINT32 CertSize;\r |
309 | UINT32 NumberOfRvaAndSizes;\r | |
45bf2c47 | 310 | \r |
0c18794e | 311 | HashCtx = NULL;\r |
312 | SectionHeader = NULL;\r | |
313 | Status = FALSE;\r | |
314 | \r | |
20333c6d | 315 | if ((HashAlg >= HASHALG_MAX)) {\r |
0c18794e | 316 | return FALSE;\r |
317 | }\r | |
45bf2c47 | 318 | \r |
0c18794e | 319 | //\r |
320 | // Initialize context of hash.\r | |
321 | //\r | |
322 | ZeroMem (mImageDigest, MAX_DIGEST_SIZE);\r | |
323 | \r | |
20333c6d QL |
324 | switch (HashAlg) {\r |
325 | case HASHALG_SHA1:\r | |
326 | mImageDigestSize = SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE;\r | |
327 | mCertType = gEfiCertSha1Guid;\r | |
328 | break;\r | |
329 | \r | |
330 | case HASHALG_SHA256:\r | |
331 | mImageDigestSize = SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE;\r | |
332 | mCertType = gEfiCertSha256Guid;\r | |
333 | break;\r | |
334 | \r | |
335 | case HASHALG_SHA384:\r | |
336 | mImageDigestSize = SHA384_DIGEST_SIZE;\r | |
337 | mCertType = gEfiCertSha384Guid;\r | |
338 | break;\r | |
339 | \r | |
340 | case HASHALG_SHA512:\r | |
341 | mImageDigestSize = SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE;\r | |
342 | mCertType = gEfiCertSha512Guid;\r | |
343 | break;\r | |
344 | \r | |
345 | default:\r | |
0c18794e | 346 | return FALSE;\r |
347 | }\r | |
348 | \r | |
531c89a1 | 349 | mHashTypeStr = mHash[HashAlg].Name;\r |
0c18794e | 350 | CtxSize = mHash[HashAlg].GetContextSize();\r |
45bf2c47 | 351 | \r |
0c18794e | 352 | HashCtx = AllocatePool (CtxSize);\r |
570b3d1a | 353 | if (HashCtx == NULL) {\r |
354 | return FALSE;\r | |
355 | }\r | |
0c18794e | 356 | \r |
357 | // 1. Load the image header into memory.\r | |
358 | \r | |
359 | // 2. Initialize a SHA hash context.\r | |
360 | Status = mHash[HashAlg].HashInit(HashCtx);\r | |
45bf2c47 | 361 | \r |
0c18794e | 362 | if (!Status) {\r |
363 | goto Done;\r | |
364 | }\r | |
551d8081 | 365 | \r |
0c18794e | 366 | //\r |
367 | // Measuring PE/COFF Image Header;\r | |
368 | // But CheckSum field and SECURITY data directory (certificate) are excluded\r | |
369 | //\r | |
de2447dd | 370 | if (mNtHeader.Pe32->FileHeader.Machine == IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_IA64 && mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {\r |
371 | //\r | |
20333c6d QL |
372 | // NOTE: Some versions of Linux ELILO for Itanium have an incorrect magic value\r |
373 | // in the PE/COFF Header. If the MachineType is Itanium(IA64) and the\r | |
de2447dd | 374 | // Magic value in the OptionalHeader is EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC\r |
375 | // then override the magic value to EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR64_MAGIC\r | |
376 | //\r | |
377 | Magic = EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR64_MAGIC;\r | |
378 | } else {\r | |
379 | //\r | |
380 | // Get the magic value from the PE/COFF Optional Header\r | |
381 | //\r | |
382 | Magic = mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.Magic;\r | |
383 | }\r | |
20333c6d | 384 | \r |
0c18794e | 385 | //\r |
386 | // 3. Calculate the distance from the base of the image header to the image checksum address.\r | |
387 | // 4. Hash the image header from its base to beginning of the image checksum.\r | |
388 | //\r | |
389 | HashBase = mImageBase;\r | |
390 | if (Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {\r | |
391 | //\r | |
392 | // Use PE32 offset.\r | |
393 | //\r | |
4333b99d | 394 | HashSize = (UINTN) (&mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.CheckSum) - (UINTN) HashBase;\r |
551d8081 | 395 | NumberOfRvaAndSizes = mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.NumberOfRvaAndSizes;\r |
570b3d1a | 396 | } else if (Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR64_MAGIC) {\r |
0c18794e | 397 | //\r |
398 | // Use PE32+ offset.\r | |
399 | //\r | |
4333b99d | 400 | HashSize = (UINTN) (&mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.CheckSum) - (UINTN) HashBase;\r |
551d8081 | 401 | NumberOfRvaAndSizes = mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.NumberOfRvaAndSizes;\r |
570b3d1a | 402 | } else {\r |
403 | //\r | |
404 | // Invalid header magic number.\r | |
405 | //\r | |
406 | Status = FALSE;\r | |
407 | goto Done;\r | |
0c18794e | 408 | }\r |
409 | \r | |
410 | Status = mHash[HashAlg].HashUpdate(HashCtx, HashBase, HashSize);\r | |
411 | if (!Status) {\r | |
412 | goto Done;\r | |
413 | }\r | |
551d8081 | 414 | \r |
0c18794e | 415 | //\r |
416 | // 5. Skip over the image checksum (it occupies a single ULONG).\r | |
0c18794e | 417 | //\r |
551d8081 | 418 | if (NumberOfRvaAndSizes <= EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY) {\r |
0c18794e | 419 | //\r |
551d8081 | 420 | // 6. Since there is no Cert Directory in optional header, hash everything\r |
421 | // from the end of the checksum to the end of image header.\r | |
0c18794e | 422 | //\r |
551d8081 | 423 | if (Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {\r |
424 | //\r | |
425 | // Use PE32 offset.\r | |
426 | //\r | |
427 | HashBase = (UINT8 *) &mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.CheckSum + sizeof (UINT32);\r | |
4333b99d | 428 | HashSize = mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.SizeOfHeaders - ((UINTN) HashBase - (UINTN) mImageBase);\r |
551d8081 | 429 | } else {\r |
430 | //\r | |
431 | // Use PE32+ offset.\r | |
432 | //\r | |
433 | HashBase = (UINT8 *) &mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.CheckSum + sizeof (UINT32);\r | |
4333b99d | 434 | HashSize = mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.SizeOfHeaders - ((UINTN) HashBase - (UINTN) mImageBase);\r |
551d8081 | 435 | }\r |
436 | \r | |
437 | if (HashSize != 0) {\r | |
438 | Status = mHash[HashAlg].HashUpdate(HashCtx, HashBase, HashSize);\r | |
439 | if (!Status) {\r | |
440 | goto Done;\r | |
441 | }\r | |
442 | }\r | |
0c18794e | 443 | } else {\r |
444 | //\r | |
551d8081 | 445 | // 7. Hash everything from the end of the checksum to the start of the Cert Directory.\r |
45bf2c47 | 446 | //\r |
551d8081 | 447 | if (Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {\r |
448 | //\r | |
449 | // Use PE32 offset.\r | |
450 | //\r | |
451 | HashBase = (UINT8 *) &mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.CheckSum + sizeof (UINT32);\r | |
4333b99d | 452 | HashSize = (UINTN) (&mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY]) - (UINTN) HashBase;\r |
551d8081 | 453 | } else {\r |
454 | //\r | |
455 | // Use PE32+ offset.\r | |
456 | //\r | |
457 | HashBase = (UINT8 *) &mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.CheckSum + sizeof (UINT32);\r | |
4333b99d | 458 | HashSize = (UINTN) (&mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY]) - (UINTN) HashBase;\r |
551d8081 | 459 | }\r |
460 | \r | |
461 | if (HashSize != 0) {\r | |
462 | Status = mHash[HashAlg].HashUpdate(HashCtx, HashBase, HashSize);\r | |
463 | if (!Status) {\r | |
464 | goto Done;\r | |
465 | }\r | |
466 | }\r | |
0c18794e | 467 | \r |
0c18794e | 468 | //\r |
551d8081 | 469 | // 8. Skip over the Cert Directory. (It is sizeof(IMAGE_DATA_DIRECTORY) bytes.)\r |
470 | // 9. Hash everything from the end of the Cert Directory to the end of image header.\r | |
0c18794e | 471 | //\r |
551d8081 | 472 | if (Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {\r |
473 | //\r | |
474 | // Use PE32 offset\r | |
475 | //\r | |
476 | HashBase = (UINT8 *) &mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY + 1];\r | |
4333b99d | 477 | HashSize = mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.SizeOfHeaders - ((UINTN) HashBase - (UINTN) mImageBase);\r |
551d8081 | 478 | } else {\r |
479 | //\r | |
480 | // Use PE32+ offset.\r | |
481 | //\r | |
482 | HashBase = (UINT8 *) &mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY + 1];\r | |
4333b99d | 483 | HashSize = mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.SizeOfHeaders - ((UINTN) HashBase - (UINTN) mImageBase);\r |
551d8081 | 484 | }\r |
0c18794e | 485 | \r |
551d8081 | 486 | if (HashSize != 0) {\r |
487 | Status = mHash[HashAlg].HashUpdate(HashCtx, HashBase, HashSize);\r | |
488 | if (!Status) {\r | |
489 | goto Done;\r | |
490 | }\r | |
20333c6d | 491 | }\r |
0c18794e | 492 | }\r |
551d8081 | 493 | \r |
0c18794e | 494 | //\r |
495 | // 10. Set the SUM_OF_BYTES_HASHED to the size of the header.\r | |
496 | //\r | |
497 | if (Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {\r | |
498 | //\r | |
499 | // Use PE32 offset.\r | |
500 | //\r | |
501 | SumOfBytesHashed = mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.SizeOfHeaders;\r | |
502 | } else {\r | |
503 | //\r | |
504 | // Use PE32+ offset\r | |
505 | //\r | |
506 | SumOfBytesHashed = mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.SizeOfHeaders;\r | |
507 | }\r | |
508 | \r | |
570b3d1a | 509 | \r |
510 | Section = (EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER *) (\r | |
511 | mImageBase +\r | |
512 | mPeCoffHeaderOffset +\r | |
513 | sizeof (UINT32) +\r | |
514 | sizeof (EFI_IMAGE_FILE_HEADER) +\r | |
515 | mNtHeader.Pe32->FileHeader.SizeOfOptionalHeader\r | |
516 | );\r | |
517 | \r | |
0c18794e | 518 | //\r |
519 | // 11. Build a temporary table of pointers to all the IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER\r | |
520 | // structures in the image. The 'NumberOfSections' field of the image\r | |
521 | // header indicates how big the table should be. Do not include any\r | |
522 | // IMAGE_SECTION_HEADERs in the table whose 'SizeOfRawData' field is zero.\r | |
523 | //\r | |
524 | SectionHeader = (EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER *) AllocateZeroPool (sizeof (EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER) * mNtHeader.Pe32->FileHeader.NumberOfSections);\r | |
570b3d1a | 525 | if (SectionHeader == NULL) {\r |
526 | Status = FALSE;\r | |
527 | goto Done;\r | |
528 | }\r | |
0c18794e | 529 | //\r |
530 | // 12. Using the 'PointerToRawData' in the referenced section headers as\r | |
531 | // a key, arrange the elements in the table in ascending order. In other\r | |
532 | // words, sort the section headers according to the disk-file offset of\r | |
533 | // the section.\r | |
534 | //\r | |
0c18794e | 535 | for (Index = 0; Index < mNtHeader.Pe32->FileHeader.NumberOfSections; Index++) {\r |
536 | Pos = Index;\r | |
537 | while ((Pos > 0) && (Section->PointerToRawData < SectionHeader[Pos - 1].PointerToRawData)) {\r | |
538 | CopyMem (&SectionHeader[Pos], &SectionHeader[Pos - 1], sizeof (EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER));\r | |
539 | Pos--;\r | |
540 | }\r | |
541 | CopyMem (&SectionHeader[Pos], Section, sizeof (EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER));\r | |
542 | Section += 1;\r | |
543 | }\r | |
544 | \r | |
545 | //\r | |
546 | // 13. Walk through the sorted table, bring the corresponding section\r | |
547 | // into memory, and hash the entire section (using the 'SizeOfRawData'\r | |
548 | // field in the section header to determine the amount of data to hash).\r | |
549 | // 14. Add the section's 'SizeOfRawData' to SUM_OF_BYTES_HASHED .\r | |
550 | // 15. Repeat steps 13 and 14 for all the sections in the sorted table.\r | |
551 | //\r | |
552 | for (Index = 0; Index < mNtHeader.Pe32->FileHeader.NumberOfSections; Index++) {\r | |
553 | Section = &SectionHeader[Index];\r | |
554 | if (Section->SizeOfRawData == 0) {\r | |
555 | continue;\r | |
556 | }\r | |
557 | HashBase = mImageBase + Section->PointerToRawData;\r | |
558 | HashSize = (UINTN) Section->SizeOfRawData;\r | |
559 | \r | |
560 | Status = mHash[HashAlg].HashUpdate(HashCtx, HashBase, HashSize);\r | |
561 | if (!Status) {\r | |
562 | goto Done;\r | |
563 | }\r | |
564 | \r | |
565 | SumOfBytesHashed += HashSize;\r | |
566 | }\r | |
567 | \r | |
568 | //\r | |
569 | // 16. If the file size is greater than SUM_OF_BYTES_HASHED, there is extra\r | |
570 | // data in the file that needs to be added to the hash. This data begins\r | |
571 | // at file offset SUM_OF_BYTES_HASHED and its length is:\r | |
572 | // FileSize - (CertDirectory->Size)\r | |
573 | //\r | |
574 | if (mImageSize > SumOfBytesHashed) {\r | |
575 | HashBase = mImageBase + SumOfBytesHashed;\r | |
551d8081 | 576 | \r |
577 | if (NumberOfRvaAndSizes <= EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY) {\r | |
578 | CertSize = 0;\r | |
0c18794e | 579 | } else {\r |
551d8081 | 580 | if (Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {\r |
581 | //\r | |
582 | // Use PE32 offset.\r | |
583 | //\r | |
584 | CertSize = mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY].Size;\r | |
585 | } else {\r | |
586 | //\r | |
587 | // Use PE32+ offset.\r | |
588 | //\r | |
589 | CertSize = mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY].Size;\r | |
28186d45 | 590 | }\r |
0c18794e | 591 | }\r |
592 | \r | |
551d8081 | 593 | if (mImageSize > CertSize + SumOfBytesHashed) {\r |
594 | HashSize = (UINTN) (mImageSize - CertSize - SumOfBytesHashed);\r | |
595 | \r | |
596 | Status = mHash[HashAlg].HashUpdate(HashCtx, HashBase, HashSize);\r | |
597 | if (!Status) {\r | |
598 | goto Done;\r | |
599 | }\r | |
600 | } else if (mImageSize < CertSize + SumOfBytesHashed) {\r | |
601 | Status = FALSE;\r | |
0c18794e | 602 | goto Done;\r |
603 | }\r | |
604 | }\r | |
551d8081 | 605 | \r |
0c18794e | 606 | Status = mHash[HashAlg].HashFinal(HashCtx, mImageDigest);\r |
607 | \r | |
608 | Done:\r | |
609 | if (HashCtx != NULL) {\r | |
610 | FreePool (HashCtx);\r | |
611 | }\r | |
612 | if (SectionHeader != NULL) {\r | |
613 | FreePool (SectionHeader);\r | |
614 | }\r | |
615 | return Status;\r | |
616 | }\r | |
617 | \r | |
618 | /**\r | |
69f8bb52 | 619 | Recognize the Hash algorithm in PE/COFF Authenticode and calculate hash of\r |
45bf2c47 | 620 | Pe/Coff image based on the authenticode image hashing in PE/COFF Specification\r |
0c18794e | 621 | 8.0 Appendix A\r |
622 | \r | |
dc204d5a JY |
623 | Caution: This function may receive untrusted input.\r |
624 | PE/COFF image is external input, so this function will validate its data structure\r | |
625 | within this image buffer before use.\r | |
626 | \r | |
f6f9031f | 627 | @param[in] AuthData Pointer to the Authenticode Signature retrieved from signed image.\r |
628 | @param[in] AuthDataSize Size of the Authenticode Signature in bytes.\r | |
20333c6d | 629 | \r |
0c18794e | 630 | @retval EFI_UNSUPPORTED Hash algorithm is not supported.\r |
631 | @retval EFI_SUCCESS Hash successfully.\r | |
632 | \r | |
633 | **/\r | |
45bf2c47 | 634 | EFI_STATUS\r |
0c18794e | 635 | HashPeImageByType (\r |
f6f9031f | 636 | IN UINT8 *AuthData,\r |
637 | IN UINTN AuthDataSize\r | |
0c18794e | 638 | )\r |
639 | {\r | |
640 | UINT8 Index;\r | |
badd40f9 | 641 | \r |
45bf2c47 | 642 | for (Index = 0; Index < HASHALG_MAX; Index++) {\r |
0c18794e | 643 | //\r |
644 | // Check the Hash algorithm in PE/COFF Authenticode.\r | |
45bf2c47 | 645 | // According to PKCS#7 Definition:\r |
0c18794e | 646 | // SignedData ::= SEQUENCE {\r |
647 | // version Version,\r | |
648 | // digestAlgorithms DigestAlgorithmIdentifiers,\r | |
649 | // contentInfo ContentInfo,\r | |
650 | // .... }\r | |
651 | // The DigestAlgorithmIdentifiers can be used to determine the hash algorithm in PE/COFF hashing\r | |
652 | // This field has the fixed offset (+32) in final Authenticode ASN.1 data.\r | |
bd0de396 | 653 | // Fixed offset (+32) is calculated based on two bytes of length encoding.\r |
45bf2c47 | 654 | //\r |
f6f9031f | 655 | if ((*(AuthData + 1) & TWO_BYTE_ENCODE) != TWO_BYTE_ENCODE) {\r |
bd0de396 | 656 | //\r |
657 | // Only support two bytes of Long Form of Length Encoding.\r | |
658 | //\r | |
659 | continue;\r | |
660 | }\r | |
661 | \r | |
f6f9031f | 662 | if (AuthDataSize < 32 + mHash[Index].OidLength) {\r |
badd40f9 | 663 | return EFI_UNSUPPORTED;\r |
664 | }\r | |
665 | \r | |
f6f9031f | 666 | if (CompareMem (AuthData + 32, mHash[Index].OidValue, mHash[Index].OidLength) == 0) {\r |
0c18794e | 667 | break;\r |
668 | }\r | |
669 | }\r | |
670 | \r | |
671 | if (Index == HASHALG_MAX) {\r | |
672 | return EFI_UNSUPPORTED;\r | |
673 | }\r | |
674 | \r | |
675 | //\r | |
676 | // HASH PE Image based on Hash algorithm in PE/COFF Authenticode.\r | |
677 | //\r | |
678 | if (!HashPeImage(Index)) {\r | |
679 | return EFI_UNSUPPORTED;\r | |
680 | }\r | |
681 | \r | |
682 | return EFI_SUCCESS;\r | |
683 | }\r | |
684 | \r | |
685 | \r | |
686 | /**\r | |
687 | Returns the size of a given image execution info table in bytes.\r | |
688 | \r | |
689 | This function returns the size, in bytes, of the image execution info table specified by\r | |
690 | ImageExeInfoTable. If ImageExeInfoTable is NULL, then 0 is returned.\r | |
691 | \r | |
692 | @param ImageExeInfoTable A pointer to a image execution info table structure.\r | |
45bf2c47 | 693 | \r |
0c18794e | 694 | @retval 0 If ImageExeInfoTable is NULL.\r |
695 | @retval Others The size of a image execution info table in bytes.\r | |
696 | \r | |
697 | **/\r | |
698 | UINTN\r | |
699 | GetImageExeInfoTableSize (\r | |
700 | EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO_TABLE *ImageExeInfoTable\r | |
701 | )\r | |
702 | {\r | |
703 | UINTN Index;\r | |
704 | EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO *ImageExeInfoItem;\r | |
705 | UINTN TotalSize;\r | |
706 | \r | |
707 | if (ImageExeInfoTable == NULL) {\r | |
708 | return 0;\r | |
709 | }\r | |
710 | \r | |
711 | ImageExeInfoItem = (EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO *) ((UINT8 *) ImageExeInfoTable + sizeof (EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO_TABLE));\r | |
712 | TotalSize = sizeof (EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO_TABLE);\r | |
713 | for (Index = 0; Index < ImageExeInfoTable->NumberOfImages; Index++) {\r | |
714 | TotalSize += ReadUnaligned32 ((UINT32 *) &ImageExeInfoItem->InfoSize);\r | |
715 | ImageExeInfoItem = (EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO *) ((UINT8 *) ImageExeInfoItem + ReadUnaligned32 ((UINT32 *) &ImageExeInfoItem->InfoSize));\r | |
716 | }\r | |
717 | \r | |
718 | return TotalSize;\r | |
719 | }\r | |
720 | \r | |
721 | /**\r | |
722 | Create an Image Execution Information Table entry and add it to system configuration table.\r | |
723 | \r | |
724 | @param[in] Action Describes the action taken by the firmware regarding this image.\r | |
725 | @param[in] Name Input a null-terminated, user-friendly name.\r | |
726 | @param[in] DevicePath Input device path pointer.\r | |
727 | @param[in] Signature Input signature info in EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST data structure.\r | |
728 | @param[in] SignatureSize Size of signature.\r | |
45bf2c47 | 729 | \r |
0c18794e | 730 | **/\r |
731 | VOID\r | |
732 | AddImageExeInfo (\r | |
45bf2c47 | 733 | IN EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_ACTION Action,\r |
734 | IN CHAR16 *Name OPTIONAL,\r | |
0c18794e | 735 | IN CONST EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *DevicePath,\r |
736 | IN EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *Signature OPTIONAL,\r | |
737 | IN UINTN SignatureSize\r | |
738 | )\r | |
739 | {\r | |
0c18794e | 740 | EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO_TABLE *ImageExeInfoTable;\r |
741 | EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO_TABLE *NewImageExeInfoTable;\r | |
742 | EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO *ImageExeInfoEntry;\r | |
743 | UINTN ImageExeInfoTableSize;\r | |
744 | UINTN NewImageExeInfoEntrySize;\r | |
745 | UINTN NameStringLen;\r | |
746 | UINTN DevicePathSize;\r | |
4fc08e8d | 747 | CHAR16 *NameStr;\r |
0c18794e | 748 | \r |
0c18794e | 749 | ImageExeInfoTable = NULL;\r |
750 | NewImageExeInfoTable = NULL;\r | |
751 | ImageExeInfoEntry = NULL;\r | |
752 | NameStringLen = 0;\r | |
4fc08e8d | 753 | NameStr = NULL;\r |
0c18794e | 754 | \r |
570b3d1a | 755 | if (DevicePath == NULL) {\r |
756 | return ;\r | |
757 | }\r | |
45bf2c47 | 758 | \r |
0c18794e | 759 | if (Name != NULL) {\r |
760 | NameStringLen = StrSize (Name);\r | |
b3d42170 | 761 | } else {\r |
762 | NameStringLen = sizeof (CHAR16);\r | |
0c18794e | 763 | }\r |
764 | \r | |
45bf2c47 | 765 | EfiGetSystemConfigurationTable (&gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, (VOID **) &ImageExeInfoTable);\r |
0c18794e | 766 | if (ImageExeInfoTable != NULL) {\r |
767 | //\r | |
768 | // The table has been found!\r | |
b3d42170 | 769 | // We must enlarge the table to accomodate the new exe info entry.\r |
0c18794e | 770 | //\r |
771 | ImageExeInfoTableSize = GetImageExeInfoTableSize (ImageExeInfoTable);\r | |
772 | } else {\r | |
773 | //\r | |
774 | // Not Found!\r | |
775 | // We should create a new table to append to the configuration table.\r | |
776 | //\r | |
777 | ImageExeInfoTableSize = sizeof (EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO_TABLE);\r | |
778 | }\r | |
779 | \r | |
780 | DevicePathSize = GetDevicePathSize (DevicePath);\r | |
4fc08e8d CZ |
781 | \r |
782 | //\r | |
783 | // Signature size can be odd. Pad after signature to ensure next EXECUTION_INFO entry align\r | |
784 | //\r | |
785 | NewImageExeInfoEntrySize = sizeof (EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO) + NameStringLen + DevicePathSize + SignatureSize;\r | |
786 | \r | |
0c18794e | 787 | NewImageExeInfoTable = (EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO_TABLE *) AllocateRuntimePool (ImageExeInfoTableSize + NewImageExeInfoEntrySize);\r |
570b3d1a | 788 | if (NewImageExeInfoTable == NULL) {\r |
789 | return ;\r | |
790 | }\r | |
0c18794e | 791 | \r |
792 | if (ImageExeInfoTable != NULL) {\r | |
793 | CopyMem (NewImageExeInfoTable, ImageExeInfoTable, ImageExeInfoTableSize);\r | |
794 | } else {\r | |
795 | NewImageExeInfoTable->NumberOfImages = 0;\r | |
796 | }\r | |
797 | NewImageExeInfoTable->NumberOfImages++;\r | |
798 | ImageExeInfoEntry = (EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO *) ((UINT8 *) NewImageExeInfoTable + ImageExeInfoTableSize);\r | |
799 | //\r | |
ffccb935 | 800 | // Update new item's information.\r |
0c18794e | 801 | //\r |
1fee5304 ED |
802 | WriteUnaligned32 ((UINT32 *) ImageExeInfoEntry, Action);\r |
803 | WriteUnaligned32 ((UINT32 *) ((UINT8 *) ImageExeInfoEntry + sizeof (EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_ACTION)), (UINT32) NewImageExeInfoEntrySize);\r | |
0c18794e | 804 | \r |
4fc08e8d | 805 | NameStr = (CHAR16 *)(ImageExeInfoEntry + 1);\r |
0c18794e | 806 | if (Name != NULL) {\r |
4fc08e8d | 807 | CopyMem ((UINT8 *) NameStr, Name, NameStringLen);\r |
b3d42170 | 808 | } else {\r |
4fc08e8d | 809 | ZeroMem ((UINT8 *) NameStr, sizeof (CHAR16));\r |
0c18794e | 810 | }\r |
4fc08e8d | 811 | \r |
0c18794e | 812 | CopyMem (\r |
4fc08e8d | 813 | (UINT8 *) NameStr + NameStringLen,\r |
0c18794e | 814 | DevicePath,\r |
815 | DevicePathSize\r | |
816 | );\r | |
817 | if (Signature != NULL) {\r | |
818 | CopyMem (\r | |
4fc08e8d | 819 | (UINT8 *) NameStr + NameStringLen + DevicePathSize,\r |
0c18794e | 820 | Signature,\r |
821 | SignatureSize\r | |
822 | );\r | |
823 | }\r | |
824 | //\r | |
825 | // Update/replace the image execution table.\r | |
826 | //\r | |
570b3d1a | 827 | gBS->InstallConfigurationTable (&gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, (VOID *) NewImageExeInfoTable);\r |
45bf2c47 | 828 | \r |
0c18794e | 829 | //\r |
830 | // Free Old table data!\r | |
831 | //\r | |
832 | if (ImageExeInfoTable != NULL) {\r | |
833 | FreePool (ImageExeInfoTable);\r | |
834 | }\r | |
835 | }\r | |
836 | \r | |
20333c6d QL |
837 | /**\r |
838 | Check whether the hash of an given X.509 certificate is in forbidden database (DBX).\r | |
839 | \r | |
840 | @param[in] Certificate Pointer to X.509 Certificate that is searched for.\r | |
841 | @param[in] CertSize Size of X.509 Certificate.\r | |
842 | @param[in] SignatureList Pointer to the Signature List in forbidden database.\r | |
843 | @param[in] SignatureListSize Size of Signature List.\r | |
844 | @param[out] RevocationTime Return the time that the certificate was revoked.\r | |
845 | \r | |
846 | @return TRUE The certificate hash is found in the forbidden database.\r | |
847 | @return FALSE The certificate hash is not found in the forbidden database.\r | |
848 | \r | |
849 | **/\r | |
850 | BOOLEAN\r | |
851 | IsCertHashFoundInDatabase (\r | |
852 | IN UINT8 *Certificate,\r | |
853 | IN UINTN CertSize,\r | |
854 | IN EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *SignatureList,\r | |
855 | IN UINTN SignatureListSize,\r | |
856 | OUT EFI_TIME *RevocationTime\r | |
857 | )\r | |
858 | {\r | |
859 | BOOLEAN IsFound;\r | |
5789fe35 | 860 | BOOLEAN Status;\r |
20333c6d QL |
861 | EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *DbxList;\r |
862 | UINTN DbxSize;\r | |
863 | EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *CertHash;\r | |
864 | UINTN CertHashCount;\r | |
865 | UINTN Index;\r | |
866 | UINT32 HashAlg;\r | |
867 | VOID *HashCtx;\r | |
868 | UINT8 CertDigest[MAX_DIGEST_SIZE];\r | |
869 | UINT8 *DbxCertHash;\r | |
870 | UINTN SiglistHeaderSize;\r | |
12d95665 LQ |
871 | UINT8 *TBSCert;\r |
872 | UINTN TBSCertSize;\r | |
20333c6d QL |
873 | \r |
874 | IsFound = FALSE;\r | |
875 | DbxList = SignatureList;\r | |
876 | DbxSize = SignatureListSize;\r | |
877 | HashCtx = NULL;\r | |
878 | HashAlg = HASHALG_MAX;\r | |
879 | \r | |
12d95665 LQ |
880 | if ((RevocationTime == NULL) || (DbxList == NULL)) {\r |
881 | return FALSE;\r | |
882 | }\r | |
883 | \r | |
884 | //\r | |
885 | // Retrieve the TBSCertificate from the X.509 Certificate.\r | |
886 | //\r | |
887 | if (!X509GetTBSCert (Certificate, CertSize, &TBSCert, &TBSCertSize)) {\r | |
888 | return FALSE;\r | |
889 | }\r | |
20333c6d QL |
890 | \r |
891 | while ((DbxSize > 0) && (SignatureListSize >= DbxList->SignatureListSize)) {\r | |
892 | //\r | |
893 | // Determine Hash Algorithm of Certificate in the forbidden database.\r | |
894 | //\r | |
895 | if (CompareGuid (&DbxList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Sha256Guid)) {\r | |
896 | HashAlg = HASHALG_SHA256;\r | |
897 | } else if (CompareGuid (&DbxList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Sha384Guid)) {\r | |
898 | HashAlg = HASHALG_SHA384;\r | |
899 | } else if (CompareGuid (&DbxList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Sha512Guid)) {\r | |
900 | HashAlg = HASHALG_SHA512;\r | |
901 | } else {\r | |
902 | DbxSize -= DbxList->SignatureListSize;\r | |
903 | DbxList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) DbxList + DbxList->SignatureListSize);\r | |
904 | continue;\r | |
905 | }\r | |
906 | \r | |
907 | //\r | |
12d95665 | 908 | // Calculate the hash value of current TBSCertificate for comparision.\r |
20333c6d QL |
909 | //\r |
910 | if (mHash[HashAlg].GetContextSize == NULL) {\r | |
911 | goto Done;\r | |
912 | }\r | |
913 | ZeroMem (CertDigest, MAX_DIGEST_SIZE);\r | |
914 | HashCtx = AllocatePool (mHash[HashAlg].GetContextSize ());\r | |
915 | if (HashCtx == NULL) {\r | |
916 | goto Done;\r | |
917 | }\r | |
918 | Status = mHash[HashAlg].HashInit (HashCtx);\r | |
919 | if (!Status) {\r | |
920 | goto Done;\r | |
921 | }\r | |
12d95665 | 922 | Status = mHash[HashAlg].HashUpdate (HashCtx, TBSCert, TBSCertSize);\r |
20333c6d QL |
923 | if (!Status) {\r |
924 | goto Done;\r | |
925 | }\r | |
926 | Status = mHash[HashAlg].HashFinal (HashCtx, CertDigest);\r | |
927 | if (!Status) {\r | |
928 | goto Done;\r | |
929 | }\r | |
930 | \r | |
931 | SiglistHeaderSize = sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + DbxList->SignatureHeaderSize;\r | |
932 | CertHash = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) DbxList + SiglistHeaderSize);\r | |
933 | CertHashCount = (DbxList->SignatureListSize - SiglistHeaderSize) / DbxList->SignatureSize;\r | |
934 | for (Index = 0; Index < CertHashCount; Index++) {\r | |
935 | //\r | |
936 | // Iterate each Signature Data Node within this CertList for verify.\r | |
937 | //\r | |
938 | DbxCertHash = CertHash->SignatureData;\r | |
939 | if (CompareMem (DbxCertHash, CertDigest, mHash[HashAlg].DigestLength) == 0) {\r | |
940 | //\r | |
941 | // Hash of Certificate is found in forbidden database.\r | |
942 | //\r | |
943 | IsFound = TRUE;\r | |
944 | \r | |
945 | //\r | |
946 | // Return the revocation time.\r | |
947 | //\r | |
948 | CopyMem (RevocationTime, (EFI_TIME *)(DbxCertHash + mHash[HashAlg].DigestLength), sizeof (EFI_TIME));\r | |
949 | goto Done;\r | |
950 | }\r | |
951 | CertHash = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertHash + DbxList->SignatureSize);\r | |
952 | }\r | |
953 | \r | |
954 | DbxSize -= DbxList->SignatureListSize;\r | |
955 | DbxList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) DbxList + DbxList->SignatureListSize);\r | |
956 | }\r | |
957 | \r | |
958 | Done:\r | |
959 | if (HashCtx != NULL) {\r | |
960 | FreePool (HashCtx);\r | |
961 | }\r | |
962 | \r | |
963 | return IsFound;\r | |
964 | }\r | |
965 | \r | |
0c18794e | 966 | /**\r |
967 | Check whether signature is in specified database.\r | |
968 | \r | |
969 | @param[in] VariableName Name of database variable that is searched in.\r | |
970 | @param[in] Signature Pointer to signature that is searched for.\r | |
971 | @param[in] CertType Pointer to hash algrithom.\r | |
972 | @param[in] SignatureSize Size of Signature.\r | |
973 | \r | |
974 | @return TRUE Found the signature in the variable database.\r | |
975 | @return FALSE Not found the signature in the variable database.\r | |
976 | \r | |
977 | **/\r | |
978 | BOOLEAN\r | |
979 | IsSignatureFoundInDatabase (\r | |
980 | IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r | |
45bf2c47 | 981 | IN UINT8 *Signature,\r |
0c18794e | 982 | IN EFI_GUID *CertType,\r |
983 | IN UINTN SignatureSize\r | |
984 | )\r | |
985 | {\r | |
986 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r | |
987 | EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *CertList;\r | |
988 | EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *Cert;\r | |
989 | UINTN DataSize;\r | |
990 | UINT8 *Data;\r | |
991 | UINTN Index;\r | |
992 | UINTN CertCount;\r | |
993 | BOOLEAN IsFound;\r | |
20333c6d | 994 | \r |
0c18794e | 995 | //\r |
996 | // Read signature database variable.\r | |
997 | //\r | |
998 | IsFound = FALSE;\r | |
999 | Data = NULL;\r | |
1000 | DataSize = 0;\r | |
1001 | Status = gRT->GetVariable (VariableName, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, NULL, &DataSize, NULL);\r | |
1002 | if (Status != EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {\r | |
1003 | return FALSE;\r | |
1004 | }\r | |
1005 | \r | |
1006 | Data = (UINT8 *) AllocateZeroPool (DataSize);\r | |
570b3d1a | 1007 | if (Data == NULL) {\r |
1008 | return FALSE;\r | |
1009 | }\r | |
0c18794e | 1010 | \r |
1011 | Status = gRT->GetVariable (VariableName, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, NULL, &DataSize, Data);\r | |
1012 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
1013 | goto Done;\r | |
1014 | }\r | |
1015 | //\r | |
1016 | // Enumerate all signature data in SigDB to check if executable's signature exists.\r | |
1017 | //\r | |
1018 | CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) Data;\r | |
1019 | while ((DataSize > 0) && (DataSize >= CertList->SignatureListSize)) {\r | |
7403ff5b | 1020 | CertCount = (CertList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - CertList->SignatureHeaderSize) / CertList->SignatureSize;\r |
0c18794e | 1021 | Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r |
1022 | if ((CertList->SignatureSize == sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1 + SignatureSize) && (CompareGuid(&CertList->SignatureType, CertType))) {\r | |
1023 | for (Index = 0; Index < CertCount; Index++) {\r | |
1024 | if (CompareMem (Cert->SignatureData, Signature, SignatureSize) == 0) {\r | |
1025 | //\r | |
1026 | // Find the signature in database.\r | |
1027 | //\r | |
1028 | IsFound = TRUE;\r | |
5b196b06 ZC |
1029 | //\r |
1030 | // Entries in UEFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE that are used to validate image should be measured\r | |
1031 | //\r | |
1032 | if (StrCmp(VariableName, EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE) == 0) {\r | |
1033 | SecureBootHook (VariableName, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, CertList->SignatureSize, Cert);\r | |
1034 | }\r | |
0c18794e | 1035 | break;\r |
1036 | }\r | |
1037 | \r | |
1038 | Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) Cert + CertList->SignatureSize);\r | |
1039 | }\r | |
1040 | \r | |
1041 | if (IsFound) {\r | |
1042 | break;\r | |
1043 | }\r | |
1044 | }\r | |
1045 | \r | |
1046 | DataSize -= CertList->SignatureListSize;\r | |
1047 | CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + CertList->SignatureListSize);\r | |
1048 | }\r | |
1049 | \r | |
1050 | Done:\r | |
1051 | if (Data != NULL) {\r | |
1052 | FreePool (Data);\r | |
1053 | }\r | |
1054 | \r | |
1055 | return IsFound;\r | |
1056 | }\r | |
1057 | \r | |
1058 | /**\r | |
20333c6d | 1059 | Check whether the timestamp is valid by comparing the signing time and the revocation time.\r |
0c18794e | 1060 | \r |
20333c6d QL |
1061 | @param SigningTime A pointer to the signing time.\r |
1062 | @param RevocationTime A pointer to the revocation time.\r | |
45bf2c47 | 1063 | \r |
20333c6d QL |
1064 | @retval TRUE The SigningTime is not later than the RevocationTime.\r |
1065 | @retval FALSE The SigningTime is later than the RevocationTime.\r | |
0c18794e | 1066 | \r |
1067 | **/\r | |
45bf2c47 | 1068 | BOOLEAN\r |
20333c6d QL |
1069 | IsValidSignatureByTimestamp (\r |
1070 | IN EFI_TIME *SigningTime,\r | |
1071 | IN EFI_TIME *RevocationTime\r | |
1072 | )\r | |
1073 | {\r | |
1074 | if (SigningTime->Year != RevocationTime->Year) {\r | |
1075 | return (BOOLEAN) (SigningTime->Year < RevocationTime->Year);\r | |
1076 | } else if (SigningTime->Month != RevocationTime->Month) {\r | |
1077 | return (BOOLEAN) (SigningTime->Month < RevocationTime->Month);\r | |
1078 | } else if (SigningTime->Day != RevocationTime->Day) {\r | |
1079 | return (BOOLEAN) (SigningTime->Day < RevocationTime->Day);\r | |
1080 | } else if (SigningTime->Hour != RevocationTime->Hour) {\r | |
1081 | return (BOOLEAN) (SigningTime->Hour < RevocationTime->Hour);\r | |
1082 | } else if (SigningTime->Minute != RevocationTime->Minute) {\r | |
1083 | return (BOOLEAN) (SigningTime->Minute < RevocationTime->Minute);\r | |
1084 | }\r | |
1085 | \r | |
1086 | return (BOOLEAN) (SigningTime->Second <= RevocationTime->Second);\r | |
1087 | }\r | |
1088 | \r | |
1089 | /**\r | |
1090 | Check if the given time value is zero.\r | |
1091 | \r | |
1092 | @param[in] Time Pointer of a time value.\r | |
1093 | \r | |
1094 | @retval TRUE The Time is Zero.\r | |
1095 | @retval FALSE The Time is not Zero.\r | |
1096 | \r | |
1097 | **/\r | |
1098 | BOOLEAN\r | |
1099 | IsTimeZero (\r | |
1100 | IN EFI_TIME *Time\r | |
1101 | )\r | |
1102 | {\r | |
1103 | if ((Time->Year == 0) && (Time->Month == 0) && (Time->Day == 0) &&\r | |
1104 | (Time->Hour == 0) && (Time->Minute == 0) && (Time->Second == 0)) {\r | |
1105 | return TRUE;\r | |
1106 | }\r | |
1107 | \r | |
1108 | return FALSE;\r | |
1109 | }\r | |
1110 | \r | |
1111 | /**\r | |
1112 | Check whether the timestamp signature is valid and the signing time is also earlier than \r | |
1113 | the revocation time.\r | |
1114 | \r | |
1115 | @param[in] AuthData Pointer to the Authenticode signature retrieved from signed image.\r | |
1116 | @param[in] AuthDataSize Size of the Authenticode signature in bytes.\r | |
1117 | @param[in] RevocationTime The time that the certificate was revoked.\r | |
1118 | \r | |
1119 | @retval TRUE Timestamp signature is valid and signing time is no later than the \r | |
1120 | revocation time.\r | |
1121 | @retval FALSE Timestamp signature is not valid or the signing time is later than the\r | |
1122 | revocation time.\r | |
1123 | \r | |
1124 | **/\r | |
1125 | BOOLEAN\r | |
1126 | PassTimestampCheck (\r | |
1127 | IN UINT8 *AuthData,\r | |
1128 | IN UINTN AuthDataSize,\r | |
1129 | IN EFI_TIME *RevocationTime\r | |
1130 | )\r | |
1131 | {\r | |
1132 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r | |
1133 | BOOLEAN VerifyStatus;\r | |
1134 | EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *CertList;\r | |
1135 | EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *Cert;\r | |
1136 | UINT8 *DbtData;\r | |
1137 | UINTN DbtDataSize;\r | |
1138 | UINT8 *RootCert;\r | |
1139 | UINTN RootCertSize;\r | |
1140 | UINTN Index;\r | |
1141 | UINTN CertCount;\r | |
1142 | EFI_TIME SigningTime;\r | |
1143 | \r | |
1144 | //\r | |
1145 | // Variable Initialization\r | |
1146 | //\r | |
1147 | VerifyStatus = FALSE;\r | |
1148 | DbtData = NULL;\r | |
1149 | CertList = NULL;\r | |
1150 | Cert = NULL;\r | |
1151 | RootCert = NULL;\r | |
1152 | RootCertSize = 0;\r | |
1153 | \r | |
1154 | //\r | |
1155 | // If RevocationTime is zero, the certificate shall be considered to always be revoked.\r | |
1156 | //\r | |
1157 | if (IsTimeZero (RevocationTime)) {\r | |
1158 | return FALSE;\r | |
1159 | }\r | |
1160 | \r | |
1161 | //\r | |
1162 | // RevocationTime is non-zero, the certificate should be considered to be revoked from that time and onwards.\r | |
1163 | // Using the dbt to get the trusted TSA certificates.\r | |
1164 | //\r | |
1165 | DbtDataSize = 0;\r | |
1166 | Status = gRT->GetVariable (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE2, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, NULL, &DbtDataSize, NULL);\r | |
7e0699c0 QL |
1167 | if (Status != EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {\r |
1168 | goto Done;\r | |
1169 | }\r | |
1170 | DbtData = (UINT8 *) AllocateZeroPool (DbtDataSize);\r | |
1171 | if (DbtData == NULL) {\r | |
1172 | goto Done;\r | |
1173 | }\r | |
1174 | Status = gRT->GetVariable (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE2, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, NULL, &DbtDataSize, (VOID *) DbtData);\r | |
1175 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
1176 | goto Done;\r | |
20333c6d QL |
1177 | }\r |
1178 | \r | |
1179 | CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) DbtData;\r | |
1180 | while ((DbtDataSize > 0) && (DbtDataSize >= CertList->SignatureListSize)) {\r | |
1181 | if (CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Guid)) {\r | |
1182 | Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r | |
1183 | CertCount = (CertList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - CertList->SignatureHeaderSize) / CertList->SignatureSize;\r | |
1184 | for (Index = 0; Index < CertCount; Index++) {\r | |
1185 | //\r | |
1186 | // Iterate each Signature Data Node within this CertList for verify.\r | |
1187 | //\r | |
1188 | RootCert = Cert->SignatureData;\r | |
1189 | RootCertSize = CertList->SignatureSize - sizeof (EFI_GUID);\r | |
1190 | //\r | |
1191 | // Get the signing time if the timestamp signature is valid.\r | |
1192 | //\r | |
1193 | if (ImageTimestampVerify (AuthData, AuthDataSize, RootCert, RootCertSize, &SigningTime)) {\r | |
1194 | //\r | |
1195 | // The signer signature is valid only when the signing time is earlier than revocation time.\r | |
1196 | //\r | |
1197 | if (IsValidSignatureByTimestamp (&SigningTime, RevocationTime)) {\r | |
1198 | VerifyStatus = TRUE;\r | |
1199 | goto Done;\r | |
1200 | }\r | |
1201 | }\r | |
1202 | Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) Cert + CertList->SignatureSize);\r | |
1203 | }\r | |
1204 | }\r | |
1205 | DbtDataSize -= CertList->SignatureListSize;\r | |
1206 | CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + CertList->SignatureListSize);\r | |
1207 | }\r | |
1208 | \r | |
1209 | Done:\r | |
1210 | if (DbtData != NULL) {\r | |
1211 | FreePool (DbtData);\r | |
1212 | }\r | |
1213 | \r | |
1214 | return VerifyStatus;\r | |
1215 | }\r | |
1216 | \r | |
1217 | /**\r | |
1218 | Check whether the image signature is forbidden by the forbidden database (dbx).\r | |
1219 | The image is forbidden to load if any certificates for signing are revoked before signing time.\r | |
1220 | \r | |
560ac77e ZC |
1221 | @param[in] AuthData Pointer to the Authenticode signature retrieved from the signed image.\r |
1222 | @param[in] AuthDataSize Size of the Authenticode signature in bytes.\r | |
20333c6d QL |
1223 | \r |
1224 | @retval TRUE Image is forbidden by dbx.\r | |
1225 | @retval FALSE Image is not forbidden by dbx.\r | |
1226 | \r | |
1227 | **/\r | |
1228 | BOOLEAN\r | |
560ac77e ZC |
1229 | IsForbiddenByDbx ( \r |
1230 | IN UINT8 *AuthData,\r | |
1231 | IN UINTN AuthDataSize \r | |
20333c6d QL |
1232 | )\r |
1233 | {\r | |
1234 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r | |
1235 | BOOLEAN IsForbidden;\r | |
1236 | UINT8 *Data;\r | |
1237 | UINTN DataSize;\r | |
27c93c06 LQ |
1238 | EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *CertList;\r |
1239 | UINTN CertListSize;\r | |
1240 | EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *CertData;\r | |
1241 | UINT8 *RootCert;\r | |
1242 | UINTN RootCertSize;\r | |
1243 | UINTN CertCount;\r | |
20333c6d QL |
1244 | UINTN Index;\r |
1245 | UINT8 *CertBuffer;\r | |
1246 | UINTN BufferLength;\r | |
1247 | UINT8 *TrustedCert;\r | |
1248 | UINTN TrustedCertLength;\r | |
1249 | UINT8 CertNumber;\r | |
1250 | UINT8 *CertPtr;\r | |
1251 | UINT8 *Cert;\r | |
1252 | UINTN CertSize;\r | |
1253 | EFI_TIME RevocationTime;\r | |
20333c6d QL |
1254 | //\r |
1255 | // Variable Initialization\r | |
1256 | //\r | |
1257 | IsForbidden = FALSE;\r | |
1258 | Data = NULL;\r | |
27c93c06 LQ |
1259 | CertList = NULL;\r |
1260 | CertData = NULL;\r | |
1261 | RootCert = NULL;\r | |
1262 | RootCertSize = 0;\r | |
20333c6d QL |
1263 | Cert = NULL;\r |
1264 | CertBuffer = NULL;\r | |
1265 | BufferLength = 0;\r | |
1266 | TrustedCert = NULL;\r | |
1267 | TrustedCertLength = 0;\r | |
1268 | \r | |
1269 | //\r | |
1270 | // The image will not be forbidden if dbx can't be got.\r | |
1271 | //\r | |
1272 | DataSize = 0;\r | |
1273 | Status = gRT->GetVariable (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, NULL, &DataSize, NULL);\r | |
7e0699c0 QL |
1274 | if (Status != EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {\r |
1275 | return IsForbidden;\r | |
20333c6d | 1276 | }\r |
7e0699c0 QL |
1277 | Data = (UINT8 *) AllocateZeroPool (DataSize);\r |
1278 | if (Data == NULL) {\r | |
1279 | return IsForbidden;\r | |
1280 | }\r | |
1281 | \r | |
1282 | Status = gRT->GetVariable (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, NULL, &DataSize, (VOID *) Data);\r | |
20333c6d QL |
1283 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r |
1284 | return IsForbidden;\r | |
1285 | }\r | |
1286 | \r | |
27c93c06 LQ |
1287 | //\r |
1288 | // Verify image signature with RAW X509 certificates in DBX database.\r | |
1289 | // If passed, the image will be forbidden.\r | |
1290 | //\r | |
1291 | CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) Data;\r | |
1292 | CertListSize = DataSize;\r | |
1293 | while ((CertListSize > 0) && (CertListSize >= CertList->SignatureListSize)) {\r | |
1294 | if (CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Guid)) {\r | |
1295 | CertData = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r | |
1296 | CertCount = (CertList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - CertList->SignatureHeaderSize) / CertList->SignatureSize;\r | |
1297 | \r | |
1298 | for (Index = 0; Index < CertCount; Index++) {\r | |
1299 | //\r | |
1300 | // Iterate each Signature Data Node within this CertList for verify.\r | |
1301 | //\r | |
1302 | RootCert = CertData->SignatureData;\r | |
1303 | RootCertSize = CertList->SignatureSize - sizeof (EFI_GUID);\r | |
1304 | \r | |
1305 | //\r | |
1306 | // Call AuthenticodeVerify library to Verify Authenticode struct.\r | |
1307 | //\r | |
1308 | IsForbidden = AuthenticodeVerify (\r | |
1309 | AuthData,\r | |
1310 | AuthDataSize,\r | |
1311 | RootCert,\r | |
1312 | RootCertSize,\r | |
1313 | mImageDigest,\r | |
1314 | mImageDigestSize\r | |
1315 | );\r | |
1316 | if (IsForbidden) {\r | |
531c89a1 | 1317 | DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "DxeImageVerificationLib: Image is signed but signature is forbidden by DBX.\n"));\r |
27c93c06 LQ |
1318 | goto Done;\r |
1319 | }\r | |
1320 | \r | |
1321 | CertData = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertData + CertList->SignatureSize);\r | |
1322 | }\r | |
1323 | }\r | |
1324 | \r | |
1325 | CertListSize -= CertList->SignatureListSize;\r | |
1326 | CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + CertList->SignatureListSize);\r | |
1327 | }\r | |
1328 | \r | |
1329 | //\r | |
1330 | // Check X.509 Certificate Hash & Possible Timestamp.\r | |
1331 | //\r | |
1332 | \r | |
20333c6d QL |
1333 | //\r |
1334 | // Retrieve the certificate stack from AuthData\r | |
1335 | // The output CertStack format will be:\r | |
1336 | // UINT8 CertNumber;\r | |
1337 | // UINT32 Cert1Length;\r | |
1338 | // UINT8 Cert1[];\r | |
1339 | // UINT32 Cert2Length;\r | |
1340 | // UINT8 Cert2[];\r | |
1341 | // ...\r | |
1342 | // UINT32 CertnLength;\r | |
1343 | // UINT8 Certn[];\r | |
1344 | //\r | |
1345 | Pkcs7GetSigners (AuthData, AuthDataSize, &CertBuffer, &BufferLength, &TrustedCert, &TrustedCertLength);\r | |
7e0699c0 | 1346 | if ((BufferLength == 0) || (CertBuffer == NULL)) {\r |
20333c6d QL |
1347 | IsForbidden = TRUE;\r |
1348 | goto Done;\r | |
1349 | }\r | |
1350 | \r | |
1351 | //\r | |
27c93c06 | 1352 | // Check if any hash of certificates embedded in AuthData is in the forbidden database.\r |
20333c6d QL |
1353 | //\r |
1354 | CertNumber = (UINT8) (*CertBuffer);\r | |
1355 | CertPtr = CertBuffer + 1;\r | |
1356 | for (Index = 0; Index < CertNumber; Index++) {\r | |
1357 | CertSize = (UINTN) ReadUnaligned32 ((UINT32 *)CertPtr);\r | |
1358 | Cert = (UINT8 *)CertPtr + sizeof (UINT32);\r | |
91422384 ZC |
1359 | //\r |
1360 | // Advance CertPtr to the next cert in image signer's cert list\r | |
1361 | //\r | |
1362 | CertPtr = CertPtr + sizeof (UINT32) + CertSize;\r | |
20333c6d QL |
1363 | \r |
1364 | if (IsCertHashFoundInDatabase (Cert, CertSize, (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *)Data, DataSize, &RevocationTime)) {\r | |
1365 | //\r | |
1366 | // Check the timestamp signature and signing time to determine if the image can be trusted.\r | |
1367 | //\r | |
1368 | IsForbidden = TRUE;\r | |
1369 | if (PassTimestampCheck (AuthData, AuthDataSize, &RevocationTime)) {\r | |
1370 | IsForbidden = FALSE;\r | |
91422384 ZC |
1371 | //\r |
1372 | // Pass DBT check. Continue to check other certs in image signer's cert list against DBX, DBT\r | |
1373 | //\r | |
1374 | continue;\r | |
20333c6d | 1375 | }\r |
531c89a1 | 1376 | DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "DxeImageVerificationLib: Image is signed but signature failed the timestamp check.\n"));\r |
20333c6d QL |
1377 | goto Done;\r |
1378 | }\r | |
1379 | \r | |
20333c6d QL |
1380 | }\r |
1381 | \r | |
1382 | Done:\r | |
1383 | if (Data != NULL) {\r | |
1384 | FreePool (Data);\r | |
1385 | }\r | |
1386 | \r | |
1387 | Pkcs7FreeSigners (CertBuffer);\r | |
1388 | Pkcs7FreeSigners (TrustedCert);\r | |
1389 | \r | |
1390 | return IsForbidden;\r | |
1391 | }\r | |
1392 | \r | |
4fc08e8d | 1393 | \r |
20333c6d QL |
1394 | /**\r |
1395 | Check whether the image signature can be verified by the trusted certificates in DB database.\r | |
1396 | \r | |
560ac77e ZC |
1397 | @param[in] AuthData Pointer to the Authenticode signature retrieved from signed image.\r |
1398 | @param[in] AuthDataSize Size of the Authenticode signature in bytes.\r | |
20333c6d QL |
1399 | \r |
1400 | @retval TRUE Image passed verification using certificate in db.\r | |
1401 | @retval FALSE Image didn't pass verification using certificate in db.\r | |
1402 | \r | |
1403 | **/\r | |
1404 | BOOLEAN\r | |
1405 | IsAllowedByDb (\r | |
560ac77e ZC |
1406 | IN UINT8 *AuthData,\r |
1407 | IN UINTN AuthDataSize\r | |
0c18794e | 1408 | )\r |
1409 | {\r | |
1410 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r | |
1411 | BOOLEAN VerifyStatus;\r | |
0c18794e | 1412 | EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *CertList;\r |
4fc08e8d | 1413 | EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *CertData;\r |
0c18794e | 1414 | UINTN DataSize;\r |
45bf2c47 | 1415 | UINT8 *Data;\r |
0c18794e | 1416 | UINT8 *RootCert;\r |
1417 | UINTN RootCertSize;\r | |
1418 | UINTN Index;\r | |
1419 | UINTN CertCount;\r | |
27c93c06 LQ |
1420 | UINTN DbxDataSize;\r |
1421 | UINT8 *DbxData;\r | |
1422 | EFI_TIME RevocationTime;\r | |
0c18794e | 1423 | \r |
4fc08e8d CZ |
1424 | Data = NULL;\r |
1425 | CertList = NULL;\r | |
1426 | CertData = NULL;\r | |
1427 | RootCert = NULL;\r | |
1428 | DbxData = NULL;\r | |
1429 | RootCertSize = 0;\r | |
1430 | VerifyStatus = FALSE;\r | |
0c18794e | 1431 | \r |
0c18794e | 1432 | DataSize = 0;\r |
20333c6d | 1433 | Status = gRT->GetVariable (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, NULL, &DataSize, NULL);\r |
0c18794e | 1434 | if (Status == EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {\r |
45bf2c47 | 1435 | Data = (UINT8 *) AllocateZeroPool (DataSize);\r |
1436 | if (Data == NULL) {\r | |
1437 | return VerifyStatus;\r | |
570b3d1a | 1438 | }\r |
0c18794e | 1439 | \r |
20333c6d | 1440 | Status = gRT->GetVariable (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, NULL, &DataSize, (VOID *) Data);\r |
0c18794e | 1441 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r |
1442 | goto Done;\r | |
1443 | }\r | |
45bf2c47 | 1444 | \r |
1445 | //\r | |
1446 | // Find X509 certificate in Signature List to verify the signature in pkcs7 signed data.\r | |
0c18794e | 1447 | //\r |
45bf2c47 | 1448 | CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) Data;\r |
0c18794e | 1449 | while ((DataSize > 0) && (DataSize >= CertList->SignatureListSize)) {\r |
1450 | if (CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Guid)) {\r | |
4fc08e8d CZ |
1451 | CertData = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r |
1452 | CertCount = (CertList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - CertList->SignatureHeaderSize) / CertList->SignatureSize;\r | |
20333c6d | 1453 | \r |
0c18794e | 1454 | for (Index = 0; Index < CertCount; Index++) {\r |
1455 | //\r | |
45bf2c47 | 1456 | // Iterate each Signature Data Node within this CertList for verify.\r |
1457 | //\r | |
4fc08e8d | 1458 | RootCert = CertData->SignatureData;\r |
20333c6d | 1459 | RootCertSize = CertList->SignatureSize - sizeof (EFI_GUID);\r |
45bf2c47 | 1460 | \r |
0c18794e | 1461 | //\r |
45bf2c47 | 1462 | // Call AuthenticodeVerify library to Verify Authenticode struct.\r |
0c18794e | 1463 | //\r |
1464 | VerifyStatus = AuthenticodeVerify (\r | |
f6f9031f | 1465 | AuthData,\r |
1466 | AuthDataSize,\r | |
0c18794e | 1467 | RootCert,\r |
1468 | RootCertSize,\r | |
1469 | mImageDigest,\r | |
1470 | mImageDigestSize\r | |
1471 | );\r | |
0c18794e | 1472 | if (VerifyStatus) {\r |
27c93c06 LQ |
1473 | //\r |
1474 | // Here We still need to check if this RootCert's Hash is revoked\r | |
1475 | //\r | |
1476 | Status = gRT->GetVariable (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, NULL, &DbxDataSize, NULL);\r | |
1477 | if (Status == EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {\r | |
1478 | goto Done;\r | |
1479 | }\r | |
1ca3a099 | 1480 | DbxData = (UINT8 *) AllocateZeroPool (DbxDataSize);\r |
27c93c06 LQ |
1481 | if (DbxData == NULL) {\r |
1482 | goto Done;\r | |
1483 | }\r | |
1484 | \r | |
1485 | Status = gRT->GetVariable (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, NULL, &DbxDataSize, (VOID *) DbxData);\r | |
1486 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
1487 | goto Done;\r | |
1488 | }\r | |
1489 | \r | |
1490 | if (IsCertHashFoundInDatabase (RootCert, RootCertSize, (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *)DbxData, DbxDataSize, &RevocationTime)) {\r | |
1491 | //\r | |
531c89a1 | 1492 | // Check the timestamp signature and signing time to determine if the RootCert can be trusted.\r |
27c93c06 LQ |
1493 | //\r |
1494 | VerifyStatus = PassTimestampCheck (AuthData, AuthDataSize, &RevocationTime);\r | |
531c89a1 CS |
1495 | if (!VerifyStatus) {\r |
1496 | DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "DxeImageVerificationLib: Image is signed and signature is accepted by DB, but its root cert failed the timestamp check.\n"));\r | |
1497 | }\r | |
27c93c06 LQ |
1498 | }\r |
1499 | \r | |
0c18794e | 1500 | goto Done;\r |
1501 | }\r | |
20333c6d | 1502 | \r |
4fc08e8d | 1503 | CertData = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertData + CertList->SignatureSize);\r |
45bf2c47 | 1504 | }\r |
0c18794e | 1505 | }\r |
20333c6d | 1506 | \r |
0c18794e | 1507 | DataSize -= CertList->SignatureListSize;\r |
1508 | CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + CertList->SignatureListSize);\r | |
1509 | }\r | |
1510 | }\r | |
1511 | \r | |
45bf2c47 | 1512 | Done:\r |
4fc08e8d | 1513 | \r |
27c93c06 | 1514 | if (VerifyStatus) {\r |
4fc08e8d | 1515 | SecureBootHook (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, CertList->SignatureSize, CertData);\r |
27c93c06 LQ |
1516 | }\r |
1517 | \r | |
45bf2c47 | 1518 | if (Data != NULL) {\r |
1519 | FreePool (Data);\r | |
1520 | }\r | |
27c93c06 LQ |
1521 | if (DbxData != NULL) {\r |
1522 | FreePool (DbxData);\r | |
1523 | }\r | |
0c18794e | 1524 | \r |
45bf2c47 | 1525 | return VerifyStatus;\r |
1526 | }\r | |
0c18794e | 1527 | \r |
0c18794e | 1528 | /**\r |
1529 | Provide verification service for signed images, which include both signature validation\r | |
45bf2c47 | 1530 | and platform policy control. For signature types, both UEFI WIN_CERTIFICATE_UEFI_GUID and\r |
0c18794e | 1531 | MSFT Authenticode type signatures are supported.\r |
0c18794e | 1532 | \r |
45bf2c47 | 1533 | In this implementation, only verify external executables when in USER MODE.\r |
1534 | Executables from FV is bypass, so pass in AuthenticationStatus is ignored.\r | |
1535 | \r | |
6de4c35f | 1536 | The image verification policy is:\r |
50fe73a1 | 1537 | If the image is signed,\r |
6de4c35f | 1538 | At least one valid signature or at least one hash value of the image must match a record\r |
1539 | in the security database "db", and no valid signature nor any hash value of the image may\r | |
1540 | be reflected in the security database "dbx".\r | |
50fe73a1 | 1541 | Otherwise, the image is not signed,\r |
6de4c35f | 1542 | The SHA256 hash value of the image must match a record in the security database "db", and\r |
1543 | not be reflected in the security data base "dbx".\r | |
45bf2c47 | 1544 | \r |
dc204d5a JY |
1545 | Caution: This function may receive untrusted input.\r |
1546 | PE/COFF image is external input, so this function will validate its data structure\r | |
1547 | within this image buffer before use.\r | |
1548 | \r | |
45bf2c47 | 1549 | @param[in] AuthenticationStatus\r |
0c18794e | 1550 | This is the authentication status returned from the security\r |
1551 | measurement services for the input file.\r | |
1552 | @param[in] File This is a pointer to the device path of the file that is\r | |
1553 | being dispatched. This will optionally be used for logging.\r | |
1554 | @param[in] FileBuffer File buffer matches the input file device path.\r | |
1555 | @param[in] FileSize Size of File buffer matches the input file device path.\r | |
5db28a67 LG |
1556 | @param[in] BootPolicy A boot policy that was used to call LoadImage() UEFI service.\r |
1557 | \r | |
1558 | @retval EFI_SUCCESS The file specified by DevicePath and non-NULL\r | |
1559 | FileBuffer did authenticate, and the platform policy dictates\r | |
1560 | that the DXE Foundation may use the file.\r | |
1561 | @retval EFI_SUCCESS The device path specified by NULL device path DevicePath\r | |
1562 | and non-NULL FileBuffer did authenticate, and the platform\r | |
1563 | policy dictates that the DXE Foundation may execute the image in\r | |
1564 | FileBuffer.\r | |
570b3d1a | 1565 | @retval EFI_OUT_RESOURCE Fail to allocate memory.\r |
0c18794e | 1566 | @retval EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION The file specified by File did not authenticate, and\r |
1567 | the platform policy dictates that File should be placed\r | |
5db28a67 LG |
1568 | in the untrusted state. The image has been added to the file\r |
1569 | execution table.\r | |
1570 | @retval EFI_ACCESS_DENIED The file specified by File and FileBuffer did not\r | |
1571 | authenticate, and the platform policy dictates that the DXE\r | |
1572 | Foundation many not use File.\r | |
0c18794e | 1573 | \r |
1574 | **/\r | |
1575 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
1576 | EFIAPI\r | |
1577 | DxeImageVerificationHandler (\r | |
1578 | IN UINT32 AuthenticationStatus,\r | |
1579 | IN CONST EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *File,\r | |
1580 | IN VOID *FileBuffer,\r | |
5db28a67 LG |
1581 | IN UINTN FileSize,\r |
1582 | IN BOOLEAN BootPolicy\r | |
0c18794e | 1583 | )\r |
0c18794e | 1584 | {\r |
551d8081 | 1585 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r |
1586 | UINT16 Magic;\r | |
1587 | EFI_IMAGE_DOS_HEADER *DosHdr;\r | |
1588 | EFI_STATUS VerifyStatus;\r | |
551d8081 | 1589 | EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *SignatureList;\r |
1590 | UINTN SignatureListSize;\r | |
1591 | EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *Signature;\r | |
1592 | EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_ACTION Action;\r | |
1593 | WIN_CERTIFICATE *WinCertificate;\r | |
1594 | UINT32 Policy;\r | |
560ac77e | 1595 | UINT8 *SecureBoot;\r |
551d8081 | 1596 | PE_COFF_LOADER_IMAGE_CONTEXT ImageContext;\r |
1597 | UINT32 NumberOfRvaAndSizes;\r | |
f6f9031f | 1598 | WIN_CERTIFICATE_EFI_PKCS *PkcsCertData;\r |
1599 | WIN_CERTIFICATE_UEFI_GUID *WinCertUefiGuid;\r | |
1600 | UINT8 *AuthData;\r | |
1601 | UINTN AuthDataSize;\r | |
1602 | EFI_IMAGE_DATA_DIRECTORY *SecDataDir;\r | |
6de4c35f | 1603 | UINT32 OffSet;\r |
213cc100 | 1604 | CHAR16 *NameStr;\r |
0c18794e | 1605 | \r |
0c18794e | 1606 | SignatureList = NULL;\r |
1607 | SignatureListSize = 0;\r | |
1608 | WinCertificate = NULL;\r | |
f6f9031f | 1609 | SecDataDir = NULL;\r |
1610 | PkcsCertData = NULL;\r | |
0c18794e | 1611 | Action = EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_AUTH_UNTESTED;\r |
1612 | Status = EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;\r | |
6de4c35f | 1613 | VerifyStatus = EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;\r |
1614 | \r | |
4fc08e8d | 1615 | \r |
0c18794e | 1616 | //\r |
1617 | // Check the image type and get policy setting.\r | |
1618 | //\r | |
1619 | switch (GetImageType (File)) {\r | |
45bf2c47 | 1620 | \r |
0c18794e | 1621 | case IMAGE_FROM_FV:\r |
1622 | Policy = ALWAYS_EXECUTE;\r | |
1623 | break;\r | |
1624 | \r | |
1625 | case IMAGE_FROM_OPTION_ROM:\r | |
1626 | Policy = PcdGet32 (PcdOptionRomImageVerificationPolicy);\r | |
1627 | break;\r | |
1628 | \r | |
1629 | case IMAGE_FROM_REMOVABLE_MEDIA:\r | |
1630 | Policy = PcdGet32 (PcdRemovableMediaImageVerificationPolicy);\r | |
1631 | break;\r | |
1632 | \r | |
1633 | case IMAGE_FROM_FIXED_MEDIA:\r | |
1634 | Policy = PcdGet32 (PcdFixedMediaImageVerificationPolicy);\r | |
1635 | break;\r | |
1636 | \r | |
1637 | default:\r | |
45bf2c47 | 1638 | Policy = DENY_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r |
0c18794e | 1639 | break;\r |
1640 | }\r | |
1641 | //\r | |
1642 | // If policy is always/never execute, return directly.\r | |
1643 | //\r | |
1644 | if (Policy == ALWAYS_EXECUTE) {\r | |
1645 | return EFI_SUCCESS;\r | |
1646 | } else if (Policy == NEVER_EXECUTE) {\r | |
1647 | return EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;\r | |
1648 | }\r | |
beda2356 | 1649 | \r |
db44ea6c | 1650 | //\r |
20333c6d | 1651 | // The policy QUERY_USER_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION and ALLOW_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION\r |
68fc0c73 | 1652 | // violates the UEFI spec and has been removed.\r |
db44ea6c | 1653 | //\r |
68fc0c73 FS |
1654 | ASSERT (Policy != QUERY_USER_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION && Policy != ALLOW_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION);\r |
1655 | if (Policy == QUERY_USER_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION || Policy == ALLOW_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION) {\r | |
db44ea6c FS |
1656 | CpuDeadLoop ();\r |
1657 | }\r | |
1658 | \r | |
560ac77e | 1659 | GetEfiGlobalVariable2 (EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME, (VOID**)&SecureBoot, NULL);\r |
beda2356 | 1660 | //\r |
8f8ca22e | 1661 | // Skip verification if SecureBoot variable doesn't exist.\r |
beda2356 | 1662 | //\r |
560ac77e | 1663 | if (SecureBoot == NULL) {\r |
beda2356 | 1664 | return EFI_SUCCESS;\r |
1665 | }\r | |
1666 | \r | |
1667 | //\r | |
4fc08e8d | 1668 | // Skip verification if SecureBoot is disabled but not AuditMode\r |
beda2356 | 1669 | //\r |
560ac77e ZC |
1670 | if (*SecureBoot == SECURE_BOOT_MODE_DISABLE) {\r |
1671 | FreePool (SecureBoot);\r | |
beda2356 | 1672 | return EFI_SUCCESS;\r |
45bf2c47 | 1673 | }\r |
560ac77e | 1674 | FreePool (SecureBoot);\r |
551d8081 | 1675 | \r |
0c18794e | 1676 | //\r |
1677 | // Read the Dos header.\r | |
1678 | //\r | |
570b3d1a | 1679 | if (FileBuffer == NULL) {\r |
570b3d1a | 1680 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r |
1681 | }\r | |
551d8081 | 1682 | \r |
0c18794e | 1683 | mImageBase = (UINT8 *) FileBuffer;\r |
1684 | mImageSize = FileSize;\r | |
28186d45 ED |
1685 | \r |
1686 | ZeroMem (&ImageContext, sizeof (ImageContext));\r | |
1687 | ImageContext.Handle = (VOID *) FileBuffer;\r | |
e0192326 | 1688 | ImageContext.ImageRead = (PE_COFF_LOADER_READ_FILE) DxeImageVerificationLibImageRead;\r |
28186d45 ED |
1689 | \r |
1690 | //\r | |
1691 | // Get information about the image being loaded\r | |
1692 | //\r | |
1693 | Status = PeCoffLoaderGetImageInfo (&ImageContext);\r | |
1694 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
1695 | //\r | |
1696 | // The information can't be got from the invalid PeImage\r | |
1697 | //\r | |
531c89a1 | 1698 | DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "DxeImageVerificationLib: PeImage invalid. Cannot retrieve image information.\n"));\r |
28186d45 ED |
1699 | goto Done;\r |
1700 | }\r | |
1701 | \r | |
badd40f9 | 1702 | Status = EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;\r |
1703 | \r | |
1704 | DosHdr = (EFI_IMAGE_DOS_HEADER *) mImageBase;\r | |
0c18794e | 1705 | if (DosHdr->e_magic == EFI_IMAGE_DOS_SIGNATURE) {\r |
1706 | //\r | |
45bf2c47 | 1707 | // DOS image header is present,\r |
0c18794e | 1708 | // so read the PE header after the DOS image header.\r |
1709 | //\r | |
1710 | mPeCoffHeaderOffset = DosHdr->e_lfanew;\r | |
1711 | } else {\r | |
1712 | mPeCoffHeaderOffset = 0;\r | |
1713 | }\r | |
1714 | //\r | |
1715 | // Check PE/COFF image.\r | |
1716 | //\r | |
1717 | mNtHeader.Pe32 = (EFI_IMAGE_NT_HEADERS32 *) (mImageBase + mPeCoffHeaderOffset);\r | |
1718 | if (mNtHeader.Pe32->Signature != EFI_IMAGE_NT_SIGNATURE) {\r | |
1719 | //\r | |
1720 | // It is not a valid Pe/Coff file.\r | |
1721 | //\r | |
531c89a1 | 1722 | DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "DxeImageVerificationLib: Not a valid PE/COFF image.\n"));\r |
551d8081 | 1723 | goto Done;\r |
0c18794e | 1724 | }\r |
1725 | \r | |
de2447dd | 1726 | if (mNtHeader.Pe32->FileHeader.Machine == IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_IA64 && mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {\r |
1727 | //\r | |
20333c6d QL |
1728 | // NOTE: Some versions of Linux ELILO for Itanium have an incorrect magic value\r |
1729 | // in the PE/COFF Header. If the MachineType is Itanium(IA64) and the\r | |
de2447dd | 1730 | // Magic value in the OptionalHeader is EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC\r |
1731 | // then override the magic value to EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR64_MAGIC\r | |
1732 | //\r | |
1733 | Magic = EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR64_MAGIC;\r | |
1734 | } else {\r | |
1735 | //\r | |
1736 | // Get the magic value from the PE/COFF Optional Header\r | |
1737 | //\r | |
1738 | Magic = mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.Magic;\r | |
1739 | }\r | |
20333c6d | 1740 | \r |
0c18794e | 1741 | if (Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {\r |
1742 | //\r | |
1743 | // Use PE32 offset.\r | |
1744 | //\r | |
551d8081 | 1745 | NumberOfRvaAndSizes = mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.NumberOfRvaAndSizes;\r |
1746 | if (NumberOfRvaAndSizes > EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY) {\r | |
f6f9031f | 1747 | SecDataDir = (EFI_IMAGE_DATA_DIRECTORY *) &mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY];\r |
20333c6d | 1748 | }\r |
570b3d1a | 1749 | } else {\r |
1750 | //\r | |
551d8081 | 1751 | // Use PE32+ offset.\r |
570b3d1a | 1752 | //\r |
551d8081 | 1753 | NumberOfRvaAndSizes = mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.NumberOfRvaAndSizes;\r |
1754 | if (NumberOfRvaAndSizes > EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY) {\r | |
f6f9031f | 1755 | SecDataDir = (EFI_IMAGE_DATA_DIRECTORY *) &mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY];\r |
551d8081 | 1756 | }\r |
0c18794e | 1757 | }\r |
1758 | \r | |
6de4c35f | 1759 | //\r |
1760 | // Start Image Validation.\r | |
1761 | //\r | |
1762 | if (SecDataDir == NULL || SecDataDir->Size == 0) {\r | |
0c18794e | 1763 | //\r |
20333c6d | 1764 | // This image is not signed. The SHA256 hash value of the image must match a record in the security database "db",\r |
6de4c35f | 1765 | // and not be reflected in the security data base "dbx".\r |
0c18794e | 1766 | //\r |
45bf2c47 | 1767 | if (!HashPeImage (HASHALG_SHA256)) {\r |
531c89a1 | 1768 | DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "DxeImageVerificationLib: Failed to hash this image using %s.\n", mHashTypeStr));\r |
45bf2c47 | 1769 | goto Done;\r |
1770 | }\r | |
1771 | \r | |
1772 | if (IsSignatureFoundInDatabase (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1, mImageDigest, &mCertType, mImageDigestSize)) {\r | |
1773 | //\r | |
1774 | // Image Hash is in forbidden database (DBX).\r | |
1775 | //\r | |
531c89a1 | 1776 | DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "DxeImageVerificationLib: Image is not signed and %s hash of image is forbidden by DBX.\n", mHashTypeStr));\r |
45bf2c47 | 1777 | goto Done;\r |
1778 | }\r | |
1779 | \r | |
1780 | if (IsSignatureFoundInDatabase (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE, mImageDigest, &mCertType, mImageDigestSize)) {\r | |
1781 | //\r | |
1782 | // Image Hash is in allowed database (DB).\r | |
1783 | //\r | |
1784 | return EFI_SUCCESS;\r | |
1785 | }\r | |
1786 | \r | |
1787 | //\r | |
1788 | // Image Hash is not found in both forbidden and allowed database.\r | |
1789 | //\r | |
531c89a1 | 1790 | DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "DxeImageVerificationLib: Image is not signed and %s hash of image is not found in DB/DBX.\n", mHashTypeStr));\r |
45bf2c47 | 1791 | goto Done;\r |
0c18794e | 1792 | }\r |
45bf2c47 | 1793 | \r |
0c18794e | 1794 | //\r |
20333c6d | 1795 | // Verify the signature of the image, multiple signatures are allowed as per PE/COFF Section 4.7\r |
6de4c35f | 1796 | // "Attribute Certificate Table".\r |
1797 | // The first certificate starts at offset (SecDataDir->VirtualAddress) from the start of the file.\r | |
0c18794e | 1798 | //\r |
6de4c35f | 1799 | for (OffSet = SecDataDir->VirtualAddress;\r |
1800 | OffSet < (SecDataDir->VirtualAddress + SecDataDir->Size);\r | |
2bf41ed7 | 1801 | OffSet += (WinCertificate->dwLength + ALIGN_SIZE (WinCertificate->dwLength))) {\r |
6de4c35f | 1802 | WinCertificate = (WIN_CERTIFICATE *) (mImageBase + OffSet);\r |
1803 | if ((SecDataDir->VirtualAddress + SecDataDir->Size - OffSet) <= sizeof (WIN_CERTIFICATE) ||\r | |
1804 | (SecDataDir->VirtualAddress + SecDataDir->Size - OffSet) < WinCertificate->dwLength) {\r | |
1805 | break;\r | |
1806 | }\r | |
20333c6d | 1807 | \r |
0c18794e | 1808 | //\r |
6de4c35f | 1809 | // Verify the image's Authenticode signature, only DER-encoded PKCS#7 signed data is supported.\r |
0c18794e | 1810 | //\r |
6de4c35f | 1811 | if (WinCertificate->wCertificateType == WIN_CERT_TYPE_PKCS_SIGNED_DATA) {\r |
1812 | //\r | |
20333c6d | 1813 | // The certificate is formatted as WIN_CERTIFICATE_EFI_PKCS which is described in the\r |
6de4c35f | 1814 | // Authenticode specification.\r |
1815 | //\r | |
1816 | PkcsCertData = (WIN_CERTIFICATE_EFI_PKCS *) WinCertificate;\r | |
1817 | if (PkcsCertData->Hdr.dwLength <= sizeof (PkcsCertData->Hdr)) {\r | |
1818 | break;\r | |
1819 | }\r | |
1820 | AuthData = PkcsCertData->CertData;\r | |
1821 | AuthDataSize = PkcsCertData->Hdr.dwLength - sizeof(PkcsCertData->Hdr);\r | |
1822 | } else if (WinCertificate->wCertificateType == WIN_CERT_TYPE_EFI_GUID) {\r | |
1823 | //\r | |
1824 | // The certificate is formatted as WIN_CERTIFICATE_UEFI_GUID which is described in UEFI Spec.\r | |
1825 | //\r | |
1826 | WinCertUefiGuid = (WIN_CERTIFICATE_UEFI_GUID *) WinCertificate;\r | |
1827 | if (WinCertUefiGuid->Hdr.dwLength <= OFFSET_OF(WIN_CERTIFICATE_UEFI_GUID, CertData)) {\r | |
1828 | break;\r | |
1829 | }\r | |
1830 | if (!CompareGuid (&WinCertUefiGuid->CertType, &gEfiCertPkcs7Guid)) {\r | |
1831 | continue;\r | |
1832 | }\r | |
1833 | AuthData = WinCertUefiGuid->CertData;\r | |
1834 | AuthDataSize = WinCertUefiGuid->Hdr.dwLength - OFFSET_OF(WIN_CERTIFICATE_UEFI_GUID, CertData);\r | |
1835 | } else {\r | |
1836 | if (WinCertificate->dwLength < sizeof (WIN_CERTIFICATE)) {\r | |
1837 | break;\r | |
1838 | }\r | |
1839 | continue;\r | |
84bce75b | 1840 | }\r |
6de4c35f | 1841 | \r |
f6f9031f | 1842 | Status = HashPeImageByType (AuthData, AuthDataSize);\r |
45bf2c47 | 1843 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r |
6de4c35f | 1844 | continue;\r |
0c18794e | 1845 | }\r |
20333c6d | 1846 | \r |
f6f9031f | 1847 | //\r |
6de4c35f | 1848 | // Check the digital signature against the revoked certificate in forbidden database (dbx).\r |
f6f9031f | 1849 | //\r |
560ac77e | 1850 | if (IsForbiddenByDbx (AuthData, AuthDataSize)) {\r |
6de4c35f | 1851 | Action = EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_AUTH_SIG_FAILED;\r |
1852 | VerifyStatus = EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;\r | |
1853 | break;\r | |
f6f9031f | 1854 | }\r |
0c18794e | 1855 | \r |
1856 | //\r | |
6de4c35f | 1857 | // Check the digital signature against the valid certificate in allowed database (db).\r |
0c18794e | 1858 | //\r |
6de4c35f | 1859 | if (EFI_ERROR (VerifyStatus)) {\r |
560ac77e | 1860 | if (IsAllowedByDb (AuthData, AuthDataSize)) {\r |
6de4c35f | 1861 | VerifyStatus = EFI_SUCCESS;\r |
1862 | }\r | |
0c18794e | 1863 | }\r |
6de4c35f | 1864 | \r |
0c18794e | 1865 | //\r |
6de4c35f | 1866 | // Check the image's hash value.\r |
0c18794e | 1867 | //\r |
6de4c35f | 1868 | if (IsSignatureFoundInDatabase (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1, mImageDigest, &mCertType, mImageDigestSize)) {\r |
1869 | Action = EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_AUTH_SIG_FOUND;\r | |
531c89a1 | 1870 | DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "DxeImageVerificationLib: Image is signed but %s hash of image is found in DBX.\n", mHashTypeStr));\r |
6de4c35f | 1871 | VerifyStatus = EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;\r |
1872 | break;\r | |
1873 | } else if (EFI_ERROR (VerifyStatus)) {\r | |
1874 | if (IsSignatureFoundInDatabase (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE, mImageDigest, &mCertType, mImageDigestSize)) {\r | |
1875 | VerifyStatus = EFI_SUCCESS;\r | |
531c89a1 CS |
1876 | } else {\r |
1877 | DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "DxeImageVerificationLib: Image is signed but signature is not allowed by DB and %s hash of image is not found in DB/DBX.\n", mHashTypeStr));\r | |
6de4c35f | 1878 | }\r |
45bf2c47 | 1879 | }\r |
50fe73a1 | 1880 | }\r |
1881 | \r | |
6de4c35f | 1882 | if (OffSet != (SecDataDir->VirtualAddress + SecDataDir->Size)) {\r |
0c18794e | 1883 | //\r |
6de4c35f | 1884 | // The Size in Certificate Table or the attribute certicate table is corrupted.\r |
0c18794e | 1885 | //\r |
6de4c35f | 1886 | VerifyStatus = EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;\r |
1887 | }\r | |
20333c6d | 1888 | \r |
6de4c35f | 1889 | if (!EFI_ERROR (VerifyStatus)) {\r |
1890 | return EFI_SUCCESS;\r | |
1891 | } else {\r | |
1892 | Status = EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;\r | |
1893 | if (Action == EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_AUTH_SIG_FAILED || Action == EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_AUTH_SIG_FOUND) {\r | |
1894 | //\r | |
1895 | // Get image hash value as executable's signature.\r | |
1896 | //\r | |
1897 | SignatureListSize = sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1 + mImageDigestSize;\r | |
1898 | SignatureList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) AllocateZeroPool (SignatureListSize);\r | |
1899 | if (SignatureList == NULL) {\r | |
1900 | Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r | |
1901 | goto Done;\r | |
1902 | }\r | |
1903 | SignatureList->SignatureHeaderSize = 0;\r | |
1904 | SignatureList->SignatureListSize = (UINT32) SignatureListSize;\r | |
13a220a9 | 1905 | SignatureList->SignatureSize = (UINT32) (sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1 + mImageDigestSize);\r |
6de4c35f | 1906 | CopyMem (&SignatureList->SignatureType, &mCertType, sizeof (EFI_GUID));\r |
1907 | Signature = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) SignatureList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST));\r | |
1908 | CopyMem (Signature->SignatureData, mImageDigest, mImageDigestSize);\r | |
50fe73a1 | 1909 | }\r |
0c18794e | 1910 | }\r |
1911 | \r | |
1912 | Done:\r | |
1913 | if (Status != EFI_SUCCESS) {\r | |
1914 | //\r | |
1915 | // Policy decides to defer or reject the image; add its information in image executable information table.\r | |
1916 | //\r | |
213cc100 DG |
1917 | NameStr = ConvertDevicePathToText (File, FALSE, TRUE);\r |
1918 | AddImageExeInfo (Action, NameStr, File, SignatureList, SignatureListSize);\r | |
1919 | if (NameStr != NULL) {\r | |
1920 | DEBUG((EFI_D_INFO, "The image doesn't pass verification: %s\n", NameStr));\r | |
1921 | FreePool(NameStr);\r | |
1922 | }\r | |
5db28a67 | 1923 | Status = EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r |
0c18794e | 1924 | }\r |
1925 | \r | |
1926 | if (SignatureList != NULL) {\r | |
1927 | FreePool (SignatureList);\r | |
1928 | }\r | |
1929 | \r | |
0c18794e | 1930 | return Status;\r |
1931 | }\r | |
1932 | \r | |
ffccb935 DG |
1933 | /**\r |
1934 | On Ready To Boot Services Event notification handler.\r | |
1935 | \r | |
1936 | Add the image execution information table if it is not in system configuration table.\r | |
1937 | \r | |
1938 | @param[in] Event Event whose notification function is being invoked\r | |
1939 | @param[in] Context Pointer to the notification function's context\r | |
1940 | \r | |
1941 | **/\r | |
1942 | VOID\r | |
1943 | EFIAPI\r | |
1944 | OnReadyToBoot (\r | |
1945 | IN EFI_EVENT Event,\r | |
1946 | IN VOID *Context\r | |
1947 | )\r | |
1948 | {\r | |
1949 | EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO_TABLE *ImageExeInfoTable;\r | |
1950 | UINTN ImageExeInfoTableSize;\r | |
1951 | \r | |
1952 | EfiGetSystemConfigurationTable (&gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, (VOID **) &ImageExeInfoTable);\r | |
1953 | if (ImageExeInfoTable != NULL) {\r | |
1954 | return;\r | |
1955 | }\r | |
1956 | \r | |
1957 | ImageExeInfoTableSize = sizeof (EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO_TABLE);\r | |
1958 | ImageExeInfoTable = (EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO_TABLE *) AllocateRuntimePool (ImageExeInfoTableSize);\r | |
1959 | if (ImageExeInfoTable == NULL) {\r | |
1960 | return ;\r | |
1961 | }\r | |
1962 | \r | |
20333c6d | 1963 | ImageExeInfoTable->NumberOfImages = 0;\r |
ffccb935 DG |
1964 | gBS->InstallConfigurationTable (&gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, (VOID *) ImageExeInfoTable);\r |
1965 | \r | |
1966 | }\r | |
1967 | \r | |
0c18794e | 1968 | /**\r |
1969 | Register security measurement handler.\r | |
1970 | \r | |
1971 | @param ImageHandle ImageHandle of the loaded driver.\r | |
1972 | @param SystemTable Pointer to the EFI System Table.\r | |
1973 | \r | |
1974 | @retval EFI_SUCCESS The handlers were registered successfully.\r | |
1975 | **/\r | |
1976 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
1977 | EFIAPI\r | |
1978 | DxeImageVerificationLibConstructor (\r | |
1979 | IN EFI_HANDLE ImageHandle,\r | |
1980 | IN EFI_SYSTEM_TABLE *SystemTable\r | |
1981 | )\r | |
1982 | {\r | |
ffccb935 DG |
1983 | EFI_EVENT Event;\r |
1984 | \r | |
1985 | //\r | |
1986 | // Register the event to publish the image execution table.\r | |
1987 | //\r | |
1988 | EfiCreateEventReadyToBootEx (\r | |
1989 | TPL_CALLBACK,\r | |
20333c6d QL |
1990 | OnReadyToBoot,\r |
1991 | NULL,\r | |
ffccb935 | 1992 | &Event\r |
20333c6d | 1993 | );\r |
ffccb935 | 1994 | \r |
5db28a67 | 1995 | return RegisterSecurity2Handler (\r |
0c18794e | 1996 | DxeImageVerificationHandler,\r |
1997 | EFI_AUTH_OPERATION_VERIFY_IMAGE | EFI_AUTH_OPERATION_IMAGE_REQUIRED\r | |
45bf2c47 | 1998 | );\r |
0c18794e | 1999 | }\r |