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0c18794e | 1 | ## @file SecurityPkg.dec\r |
606d38a5 DG |
2 | # Provides security features that conform to TCG/UEFI industry standards\r |
3 | #\r | |
4 | # The security features include secure boot, measured boot and user identification.\r | |
5 | # It also provides the definitions(including PPIs/PROTOCOLs/GUIDs and library classes)\r | |
6 | # and libraries instances, which are used for those features.\r | |
0c18794e | 7 | #\r |
7527b53d | 8 | # Copyright (c) 2009 - 2014, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>\r |
0c18794e | 9 | # This program and the accompanying materials are licensed and made available under\r |
10 | # the terms and conditions of the BSD License which accompanies this distribution.\r | |
11 | # The full text of the license may be found at\r | |
12 | # http://opensource.org/licenses/bsd-license.php\r | |
13 | #\r | |
14 | # THE PROGRAM IS DISTRIBUTED UNDER THE BSD LICENSE ON AN "AS IS" BASIS,\r | |
15 | # WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR REPRESENTATIONS OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED.\r | |
16 | #\r | |
17 | ##\r | |
18 | \r | |
19 | [Defines]\r | |
20 | DEC_SPECIFICATION = 0x00010005\r | |
21 | PACKAGE_NAME = SecurityPkg\r | |
606d38a5 | 22 | PACKAGE_UNI_FILE = SecurityPkg.uni\r |
0c18794e | 23 | PACKAGE_GUID = 24369CAC-6AA6-4fb8-88DB-90BF061668AD\r |
8fcdb5d4 | 24 | PACKAGE_VERSION = 0.94\r |
0c18794e | 25 | \r |
26 | [Includes]\r | |
27 | Include\r | |
28 | \r | |
29 | [LibraryClasses]\r | |
c2fcbc85 DG |
30 | ## @libraryclass Provides hash interfaces from different implementations.\r |
31 | # \r | |
22f89647 | 32 | HashLib|Include/Library/HashLib.h\r |
c2fcbc85 DG |
33 | \r |
34 | ## @libraryclass Provides a platform specific interface to detect physically present user.\r | |
35 | #\r | |
22f89647 | 36 | PlatformSecureLib|Include/Library/PlatformSecureLib.h\r |
c2fcbc85 DG |
37 | \r |
38 | ## @libraryclass Provides interfaces to handle TPM 1.2 request.\r | |
39 | #\r | |
22f89647 | 40 | TcgPhysicalPresenceLib|Include/Library/TcgPhysicalPresenceLib.h\r |
c2fcbc85 DG |
41 | \r |
42 | ## @libraryclass Provides interfaces for other modules to send TPM 2.0 command.\r | |
43 | #\r | |
c1d93242 | 44 | Tpm2CommandLib|Include/Library/Tpm2CommandLib.h\r |
c2fcbc85 DG |
45 | \r |
46 | ## @libraryclass Provides interfaces on how to access TPM 2.0 hardware device.\r | |
47 | #\r | |
c1d93242 | 48 | Tpm2DeviceLib|Include/Library/Tpm2DeviceLib.h\r |
c2fcbc85 DG |
49 | \r |
50 | ## @libraryclass Provides interfaces for other modules to send TPM 1.2 command.\r | |
51 | #\r | |
22f89647 | 52 | Tpm12CommandLib|Include/Library/Tpm12CommandLib.h\r |
c2fcbc85 DG |
53 | \r |
54 | ## @libraryclass Provides interfaces on how to access TPM 1.2 hardware device.\r | |
55 | #\r | |
22f89647 | 56 | Tpm12DeviceLib|Include/Library/Tpm12DeviceLib.h\r |
c2fcbc85 DG |
57 | \r |
58 | ## @libraryclass Provides TPM Interface Specification (TIS) interfaces for TPM command.\r | |
59 | #\r | |
22f89647 | 60 | TpmCommLib|Include/Library/TpmCommLib.h\r |
c2fcbc85 DG |
61 | \r |
62 | ## @libraryclass Provides common interfaces about TPM measurement for other modules.\r | |
63 | #\r | |
c1d93242 | 64 | TpmMeasurementLib|Include/Library/TpmMeasurementLib.h\r |
c2fcbc85 DG |
65 | \r |
66 | ## @libraryclass Provides interfaces to handle TPM 2.0 request.\r | |
67 | #\r | |
22f89647 | 68 | TrEEPhysicalPresenceLib|Include/Library/TrEEPhysicalPresenceLib.h\r |
0c18794e | 69 | \r |
70 | [Guids]\r | |
606d38a5 | 71 | ## Security package token space guid.\r |
0c18794e | 72 | # Include/Guid/SecurityPkgTokenSpace.h\r |
ed47ae02 | 73 | gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid = { 0xd3fb176, 0x9569, 0x4d51, { 0xa3, 0xef, 0x7d, 0x61, 0xc6, 0x4f, 0xea, 0xba }}\r |
606d38a5 | 74 | \r |
0c18794e | 75 | ## Guid acted as the authenticated variable store header's signature, and to specify the variable list entries put in the EFI system table.\r |
76 | # Include/Guid/AuthenticatedVariableFormat.h\r | |
ed47ae02 | 77 | gEfiAuthenticatedVariableGuid = { 0xaaf32c78, 0x947b, 0x439a, { 0xa1, 0x80, 0x2e, 0x14, 0x4e, 0xc3, 0x77, 0x92 } }\r |
0c18794e | 78 | \r |
c2fcbc85 DG |
79 | ## GUID used to "SecureBootEnable" variable for the Secure Boot feature enable/disable.\r |
80 | # This variable is used for allowing a physically present user to disable Secure Boot via firmware setup without the possession of PKpriv.\r | |
beda2356 | 81 | # Include/Guid/AuthenticatedVariableFormat.h\r |
ed47ae02 | 82 | gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid = { 0xf0a30bc7, 0xaf08, 0x4556, { 0x99, 0xc4, 0x0, 0x10, 0x9, 0xc9, 0x3a, 0x44 } }\r |
ecc722ad | 83 | \r |
c2fcbc85 DG |
84 | ## GUID used to "CustomMode" variable for two Secure Boot modes feature: "Custom" and "Standard".\r |
85 | # Standard Secure Boot mode is the default mode as UEFI Spec's description.\r | |
86 | # Custom Secure Boot mode allows for more flexibility as specified in the following:\r | |
87 | # Can enroll or delete PK without existing PK's private key.\r | |
88 | # Can enroll or delete KEK without existing PK's private key.\r | |
89 | # Can enroll or delete signature from DB/DBX without KEK's private key.\r | |
ecc722ad | 90 | # Include/Guid/AuthenticatedVariableFormat.h\r |
91 | gEfiCustomModeEnableGuid = { 0xc076ec0c, 0x7028, 0x4399, { 0xa0, 0x72, 0x71, 0xee, 0x5c, 0x44, 0x8b, 0x9f } }\r | |
ed47ae02 | 92 | \r |
c2fcbc85 | 93 | ## GUID used to "VendorKeysNv" variable to record the out of band secure boot keys modification.\r |
606d38a5 | 94 | # This variable is a read-only NV variable that indicates whether someone other than the platform vendor has used a \r |
c2fcbc85 | 95 | # mechanism not defined by the UEFI Specification to transition the system to setup mode or to update secure boot keys.\r |
a555940b FS |
96 | # Include/Guid/AuthenticatedVariableFormat.h\r |
97 | gEfiVendorKeysNvGuid = { 0x9073e4e0, 0x60ec, 0x4b6e, { 0x99, 0x3, 0x4c, 0x22, 0x3c, 0x26, 0xf, 0x3c } }\r | |
98 | \r | |
c2fcbc85 | 99 | ## GUID used to "certdb" variable to store the signer's certificates for common variables with EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS attribute.\r |
ed47ae02 | 100 | # Include/Guid/AuthenticatedVariableFormat.h\r |
101 | gEfiCertDbGuid = { 0xd9bee56e, 0x75dc, 0x49d9, { 0xb4, 0xd7, 0xb5, 0x34, 0x21, 0xf, 0x63, 0x7a } }\r | |
beda2356 | 102 | \r |
c2fcbc85 DG |
103 | ## Hob GUID used to pass a TCG_PCR_EVENT from a TPM PEIM to a TPM DXE Driver.\r |
104 | # Include/Guid/TcgEventHob.h\r | |
301c867b | 105 | gTcgEventEntryHobGuid = { 0x2b9ffb52, 0x1b13, 0x416f, { 0xa8, 0x7b, 0xbc, 0x93, 0xd, 0xef, 0x92, 0xa8 }}\r |
0c18794e | 106 | \r |
c2fcbc85 DG |
107 | ## HOB GUID used to pass all PEI measured FV info to DXE Driver.\r |
108 | # Include/Guid/MeasuredFvHob.h\r | |
0758c830 | 109 | gMeasuredFvHobGuid = { 0xb2360b42, 0x7173, 0x420a, { 0x86, 0x96, 0x46, 0xca, 0x6b, 0xab, 0x10, 0x60 }}\r |
2aadc920 | 110 | \r |
c2fcbc85 DG |
111 | ## GUID used to "PhysicalPresence" variable and "PhysicalPresenceFlags" variable for TPM request and response.\r |
112 | # Include/Guid/PhysicalPresenceData.h\r | |
0c18794e | 113 | gEfiPhysicalPresenceGuid = { 0xf6499b1, 0xe9ad, 0x493d, { 0xb9, 0xc2, 0x2f, 0x90, 0x81, 0x5c, 0x6c, 0xbc }}\r |
a0c56a82 | 114 | \r |
c2fcbc85 DG |
115 | ## GUID used for form browser, password credential and provider identifier.\r |
116 | # Include/Guid/PwdCredentialProviderHii.h\r | |
a0c56a82 LG |
117 | gPwdCredentialProviderGuid = { 0x78b9ec8b, 0xc000, 0x46c5, { 0xac, 0x93, 0x24, 0xa0, 0xc1, 0xbb, 0x0, 0xce }}\r |
118 | \r | |
c2fcbc85 DG |
119 | ## GUID used for form browser, USB credential and provider identifier.\r |
120 | # Include/Guid/UsbCredentialProviderHii.h\r | |
a0c56a82 LG |
121 | gUsbCredentialProviderGuid = { 0xd0849ed1, 0xa88c, 0x4ba6, { 0xb1, 0xd6, 0xab, 0x50, 0xe2, 0x80, 0xb7, 0xa9 }}\r |
122 | \r | |
c2fcbc85 DG |
123 | ## GUID used for FormSet guid and user profile variable.\r |
124 | # Include/Guid/UserIdentifyManagerHii.h\r | |
a0c56a82 LG |
125 | gUserIdentifyManagerGuid = { 0x3ccd3dd8, 0x8d45, 0x4fed, { 0x96, 0x2d, 0x2b, 0x38, 0xcd, 0x82, 0xb3, 0xc4 }}\r |
126 | \r | |
c2fcbc85 DG |
127 | ## GUID used for FormSet.\r |
128 | # Include/Guid/UserProfileManagerHii.h\r | |
a0c56a82 LG |
129 | gUserProfileManagerGuid = { 0xc35f272c, 0x97c2, 0x465a, { 0xa2, 0x16, 0x69, 0x6b, 0x66, 0x8a, 0x8c, 0xfe }}\r |
130 | \r | |
c2fcbc85 DG |
131 | ## GUID used for FormSet.\r |
132 | # Include/Guid/TcgConfigHii.h\r | |
a0c56a82 | 133 | gTcgConfigFormSetGuid = { 0xb0f901e4, 0xc424, 0x45de, { 0x90, 0x81, 0x95, 0xe2, 0xb, 0xde, 0x6f, 0xb5 }}\r |
beda2356 | 134 | \r |
c2fcbc85 DG |
135 | ## GUID used for FormSet.\r |
136 | # Include/Guid/SecureBootConfigHii.h\r | |
beda2356 | 137 | gSecureBootConfigFormSetGuid = { 0x5daf50a5, 0xea81, 0x4de2, {0x8f, 0x9b, 0xca, 0xbd, 0xa9, 0xcf, 0x5c, 0x14}}\r |
c2fcbc85 DG |
138 | \r |
139 | ## GUID used to "TrEEPhysicalPresence" variable and "TrEEPhysicalPresenceFlags" variable for TPM2 request and response.\r | |
140 | # Include/Guid/TrEEPhysicalPresenceData.h\r | |
c1d93242 JY |
141 | gEfiTrEEPhysicalPresenceGuid = { 0xf24643c2, 0xc622, 0x494e, { 0x8a, 0xd, 0x46, 0x32, 0x57, 0x9c, 0x2d, 0x5b }}\r |
142 | \r | |
c2fcbc85 DG |
143 | ## GUID value used for PcdTpmInstanceGuid to indicate TPM is disabled.\r |
144 | # Include/Guid/TpmInstance.h\r | |
c1d93242 | 145 | gEfiTpmDeviceInstanceNoneGuid = { 0x00000000, 0x0000, 0x0000, { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 } }\r |
c2fcbc85 DG |
146 | \r |
147 | ## GUID value used for PcdTpmInstanceGuid to indicate TPM 1.2 device is selected to support.\r | |
148 | # Include/Guid/TpmInstance.h\r | |
c1d93242 | 149 | gEfiTpmDeviceInstanceTpm12Guid = { 0x8b01e5b6, 0x4f19, 0x46e8, { 0xab, 0x93, 0x1c, 0x53, 0x67, 0x1b, 0x90, 0xcc } }\r |
c2fcbc85 DG |
150 | \r |
151 | ## GUID value used for PcdTpmInstanceGuid to indicate discrete TPM 2.0 device is selected to support.\r | |
152 | # Include/Guid/TpmInstance.h\r | |
c1d93242 | 153 | gEfiTpmDeviceInstanceTpm20DtpmGuid = { 0x286bf25a, 0xc2c3, 0x408c, { 0xb3, 0xb4, 0x25, 0xe6, 0x75, 0x8b, 0x73, 0x17 } }\r |
c2fcbc85 DG |
154 | \r |
155 | ## GUID used to select supported TPM instance from UI.\r | |
156 | # Include/Guid/TpmInstance.h\r | |
c1d93242 JY |
157 | gEfiTpmDeviceSelectedGuid = { 0x7f4158d3, 0x74d, 0x456d, { 0x8c, 0xb2, 0x1, 0xf9, 0xc8, 0xf7, 0x9d, 0xaa } }\r |
158 | \r | |
c2fcbc85 DG |
159 | ## GUID used for FormSet and config variable.\r |
160 | # Include/Guid/TrEEConfigHii.h\r | |
c1d93242 JY |
161 | gTrEEConfigFormSetGuid = {0xc54b425f, 0xaa79, 0x48b4, { 0x98, 0x1f, 0x99, 0x8b, 0x3c, 0x4b, 0x64, 0x1c }}\r |
162 | \r | |
0c18794e | 163 | [Ppis]\r |
606d38a5 DG |
164 | ## The PPI GUID for that TPM physical presence should be locked.\r |
165 | # Include/Ppi/LockPhysicalPresence.h\r | |
0c18794e | 166 | gPeiLockPhysicalPresencePpiGuid = { 0xef9aefe5, 0x2bd3, 0x4031, { 0xaf, 0x7d, 0x5e, 0xfe, 0x5a, 0xbb, 0x9a, 0xd } }\r |
167 | \r | |
606d38a5 DG |
168 | ## The PPI GUID for that TPM is initialized.\r |
169 | # Include/Ppi/TpmInitialized.h\r | |
0c18794e | 170 | gPeiTpmInitializedPpiGuid = { 0xe9db0d58, 0xd48d, 0x47f6, { 0x9c, 0x6e, 0x6f, 0x40, 0xe8, 0x6c, 0x7b, 0x41 }}\r |
171 | \r | |
c1d93242 JY |
172 | ## Include/Ppi/FirmwareVolumeInfoMeasurementExcluded.h\r |
173 | gEfiPeiFirmwareVolumeInfoMeasurementExcludedPpiGuid = { 0x6e056ff9, 0xc695, 0x4364, { 0x9e, 0x2c, 0x61, 0x26, 0xf5, 0xce, 0xea, 0xae } }\r | |
174 | \r | |
606d38a5 DG |
175 | #\r |
176 | # [Error.gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid]\r | |
177 | # 0x80000001 | Invalid value provided.\r | |
178 | # 0x80000002 | Reserved bits must be set to zero.\r | |
179 | #\r | |
180 | \r | |
181 | [PcdsFixedAtBuild, PcdsPatchableInModule]\r | |
182 | ## Image verification policy for OptionRom. Only following values are valid:<BR><BR>\r | |
183 | # NOTE: Do NOT use 0x5 and 0x2 since it violates the UEFI specification and has been removed.<BR>\r | |
184 | # 0x00000000 Always trust the image.<BR>\r | |
185 | # 0x00000001 Never trust the image.<BR>\r | |
186 | # 0x00000002 Allow execution when there is security violation.<BR>\r | |
187 | # 0x00000003 Defer execution when there is security violation.<BR>\r | |
188 | # 0x00000004 Deny execution when there is security violation.<BR>\r | |
189 | # 0x00000005 Query user when there is security violation.<BR>\r | |
190 | # @Prompt Set policy for the image from OptionRom.\r | |
191 | # @ValidRange 0x80000001 | 0x00000000 - 0x00000005\r | |
db44ea6c | 192 | gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOptionRomImageVerificationPolicy|0x04|UINT32|0x00000001\r |
606d38a5 DG |
193 | \r |
194 | ## Image verification policy for removable media which includes CD-ROM, Floppy, USB and network.\r | |
195 | # Only following values are valid:<BR><BR>\r | |
196 | # NOTE: Do NOT use 0x5 and 0x2 since it violates the UEFI specification and has been removed.<BR>\r | |
197 | # 0x00000000 Always trust the image.<BR>\r | |
198 | # 0x00000001 Never trust the image.<BR>\r | |
199 | # 0x00000002 Allow execution when there is security violation.<BR>\r | |
200 | # 0x00000003 Defer execution when there is security violation.<BR>\r | |
201 | # 0x00000004 Deny execution when there is security violation.<BR>\r | |
202 | # 0x00000005 Query user when there is security violation.<BR>\r | |
203 | # @Prompt Set policy for the image from removable media.\r | |
204 | # @ValidRange 0x80000001 | 0x00000000 - 0x00000005\r | |
db44ea6c | 205 | gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdRemovableMediaImageVerificationPolicy|0x04|UINT32|0x00000002\r |
606d38a5 DG |
206 | \r |
207 | ## Image verification policy for fixed media which includes hard disk.\r | |
208 | # Only following values are valid:<BR><BR>\r | |
209 | # NOTE: Do NOT use 0x5 and 0x2 since it violates the UEFI specification and has been removed.<BR>\r | |
210 | # 0x00000000 Always trust the image.<BR>\r | |
211 | # 0x00000001 Never trust the image.<BR>\r | |
212 | # 0x00000002 Allow execution when there is security violation.<BR>\r | |
213 | # 0x00000003 Defer execution when there is security violation.<BR>\r | |
214 | # 0x00000004 Deny execution when there is security violation.<BR>\r | |
215 | # 0x00000005 Query user when there is security violation.<BR>\r | |
216 | # @Prompt Set policy for the image from fixed media.\r | |
217 | # @ValidRange 0x80000001 | 0x00000000 - 0x00000005 \r | |
db44ea6c | 218 | gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdFixedMediaImageVerificationPolicy|0x04|UINT32|0x00000003\r |
0c18794e | 219 | \r |
606d38a5 DG |
220 | ## Defer Image Load policy settings. The policy is bitwise. \r |
221 | # If a bit is set, the image from corresponding device will be trusted when loading. Or \r | |
222 | # the image will be deferred. The deferred image will be checked after user is identified.<BR><BR>\r | |
223 | # BIT0 - Image from unknown device. <BR>\r | |
224 | # BIT1 - Image from firmware volume.<BR>\r | |
225 | # BIT2 - Image from OptionRom.<BR>\r | |
226 | # BIT3 - Image from removable media which includes CD-ROM, Floppy, USB and network.<BR>\r | |
227 | # BIT4 - Image from fixed media device which includes hard disk.<BR>\r | |
228 | # @Prompt Set policy whether trust image before user identification.\r | |
229 | # @ValidRange 0x80000002 | 0x00000000 - 0x0000001F \r | |
230 | gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdDeferImageLoadPolicy|0x0000001F|UINT32|0x0000004\r | |
0c18794e | 231 | \r |
4ccef561 DG |
232 | ## Null-terminated Unicode string of the file name that is the default name to save USB credential.\r |
233 | # The specified file should be saved at the root directory of USB storage disk.\r | |
234 | # @Prompt File name to save credential.\r | |
235 | gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdFixedUsbCredentialProviderTokenFileName|L"Token.bin"|VOID*|0x00000005\r | |
606d38a5 DG |
236 | \r |
237 | ## The size of Append variable buffer. This buffer is reserved for runtime use, OS can append data into one existing variable.\r | |
238 | # Note: This PCD is not been used.\r | |
239 | # @Prompt Max variable size for append operation.\r | |
240 | gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdMaxAppendVariableSize|0x2000|UINT32|0x30000005 \r | |
241 | \r | |
242 | ## Specifies the type of TCG platform that contains TPM chip.<BR><BR>\r | |
243 | # If 0, TCG platform type is PC client.<BR>\r | |
244 | # If 1, TCG platform type is PC server.<BR>\r | |
245 | # @Prompt Select platform type.\r | |
246 | # @ValidRange 0x80000001 | 0x00 - 0x1 \r | |
247 | gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTpmPlatformClass|0|UINT8|0x00000006\r | |
248 | \r | |
0c18794e | 249 | [PcdsFixedAtBuild, PcdsPatchableInModule, PcdsDynamic, PcdsDynamicEx]\r |
606d38a5 DG |
250 | ## Indicates the presence or absence of the platform operator during firmware booting.\r |
251 | # If platform operator is not physical presence during boot. TPM will be locked and the TPM commands \r | |
252 | # that required operator physical presence can not run.<BR><BR>\r | |
253 | # TRUE - The platform operator is physically present.<BR>\r | |
254 | # FALSE - The platform operator is not physically present.<BR>\r | |
255 | # @Prompt Physical presence of the platform operator.\r | |
0c18794e | 256 | gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTpmPhysicalPresence|TRUE|BOOLEAN|0x00010001\r |
257 | \r | |
5a500332 | 258 | [PcdsFixedAtBuild, PcdsPatchableInModule, PcdsDynamic, PcdsDynamicEx]\r |
606d38a5 DG |
259 | ## Indicates whether TPM physical presence is locked during platform initialization. \r |
260 | # Once it is locked, it can not be unlocked for TPM life time.<BR><BR>\r | |
261 | # TRUE - Lock TPM physical presence asserting method.<BR>\r | |
262 | # FALSE - Not lock TPM physical presence asserting method.<BR>\r | |
263 | # @Prompt Lock TPM physical presence asserting method.\r | |
5a500332 | 264 | gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdPhysicalPresenceLifetimeLock|FALSE|BOOLEAN|0x00010003\r |
606d38a5 | 265 | \r |
5a500332 | 266 | [PcdsFixedAtBuild, PcdsPatchableInModule, PcdsDynamic, PcdsDynamicEx]\r |
606d38a5 DG |
267 | ## Indicates whether the platform supports the software method of asserting physical presence.<BR><BR>\r |
268 | # TRUE - Supports the software method of asserting physical presence.<BR>\r | |
269 | # FALSE - Does not support the software method of asserting physical presence.<BR>\r | |
270 | # @Prompt Enable software method of asserting physical presence.\r | |
5a500332 | 271 | gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdPhysicalPresenceCmdEnable|TRUE|BOOLEAN|0x00010004\r |
606d38a5 | 272 | \r |
5a500332 | 273 | [PcdsFixedAtBuild, PcdsPatchableInModule, PcdsDynamic, PcdsDynamicEx]\r |
606d38a5 DG |
274 | ## Indicates whether the platform supports the hardware method of asserting physical presence.<BR><BR>\r |
275 | # TRUE - Supports the hardware method of asserting physical presence.<BR>\r | |
276 | # FALSE - Does not support the hardware method of asserting physical presence.<BR>\r | |
277 | # @Prompt Enable hardware method of asserting physical presence.\r | |
5a500332 | 278 | gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdPhysicalPresenceHwEnable|TRUE|BOOLEAN|0x00010005\r |
c1d93242 JY |
279 | \r |
280 | [PcdsFixedAtBuild, PcdsPatchableInModule, PcdsDynamic, PcdsDynamicEx]\r | |
606d38a5 DG |
281 | ## This PCD indicates if debugger exists. <BR><BR>\r |
282 | # TRUE - Firmware debugger exists.<BR>\r | |
283 | # FALSE - Firmware debugger doesn't exist.<BR>\r | |
284 | # @Prompt Firmware debugger status.\r | |
c1d93242 JY |
285 | gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdFirmwareDebuggerInitialized|FALSE|BOOLEAN|0x00010009\r |
286 | \r | |
606d38a5 DG |
287 | ## This PCD indicates the initialization policy for TPM 2.0.<BR><BR>\r |
288 | # If 0, no initialization needed - most likely used for chipset SRTM solution, in which TPM is already initialized.<BR>\r | |
289 | # If 1, initialization needed.<BR>\r | |
290 | # @Prompt TPM 2.0 device initialization policy.<BR>\r | |
291 | # @ValidRange 0x80000001 | 0x00 - 0x1 \r | |
c1d93242 JY |
292 | gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTpm2InitializationPolicy|1|UINT8|0x0001000A\r |
293 | \r | |
606d38a5 DG |
294 | ## This PCD indicates the initialization policy for TPM 1.2.<BR><BR>\r |
295 | # If 0, no initialization needed - most likely used for chipset SRTM solution, in which TPM is already initialized.<BR>\r | |
296 | # If 1, initialization needed.<BR>\r | |
297 | # @Prompt TPM 1.2 device initialization policy.\r | |
298 | # @ValidRange 0x80000001 | 0x00 - 0x1 \r | |
c1d93242 JY |
299 | gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTpmInitializationPolicy|1|UINT8|0x0001000B\r |
300 | \r | |
606d38a5 DG |
301 | ## This PCD indicates the TPM 2.0 SelfTest policy.<BR><BR>\r |
302 | # if 0, no SelfTest needed - most likely used for fTPM, because it might already be tested.<BR>\r | |
303 | # if 1, SelfTest needed.<BR>\r | |
304 | # @Prompt TPM 2.0 device selftest.\r | |
305 | # @ValidRange 0x80000001 | 0x00 - 0x1 \r | |
c1d93242 JY |
306 | gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTpm2SelfTestPolicy|1|UINT8|0x0001000C\r |
307 | \r | |
606d38a5 DG |
308 | ## This PCD indicates Static Core Root of Trust for Measurement (SCRTM) policy using TPM 2.0.<BR><BR>\r |
309 | # if 0, no SCRTM measurement needed - In this case, it is already done.<BR>\r | |
310 | # if 1, SCRTM measurement done by BIOS.<BR>\r | |
311 | # @Prompt SCRTM policy setting for TPM 2.0 device.\r | |
312 | # @ValidRange 0x80000001 | 0x00 - 0x1 \r | |
c1d93242 JY |
313 | gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTpm2ScrtmPolicy|1|UINT8|0x0001000D\r |
314 | \r | |
606d38a5 DG |
315 | ## This PCD indicates Static Core Root of Trust for Measurement (SCRTM) policy using TPM 1.2.<BR><BR>\r |
316 | # if 0, no SCRTM measurement needed - In this case, it is already done.<BR>\r | |
317 | # if 1, SCRTM measurement done by BIOS.<BR>\r | |
318 | # @Prompt SCRTM policy setting for TPM 1.2 device\r | |
319 | # @ValidRange 0x80000001 | 0x00 - 0x1 \r | |
c1d93242 JY |
320 | gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTpmScrtmPolicy|1|UINT8|0x0001000E\r |
321 | \r | |
606d38a5 DG |
322 | ## Guid name to identify TPM instance.<BR><BR>\r |
323 | # TPM_DEVICE_INTERFACE_NONE means disable.<BR>\r | |
324 | # TPM_DEVICE_INTERFACE_TPM12 means TPM 1.2 DTPM.<BR>\r | |
325 | # TPM_DEVICE_INTERFACE_DTPM2 means TPM 2.0 DTPM.<BR>\r | |
326 | # @Prompt TPM device type identifier\r | |
c1d93242 JY |
327 | gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTpmInstanceGuid |{ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 }|VOID*|0x0001000F\r |
328 | \r | |
606d38a5 DG |
329 | ## This PCD indicates Hash mask for TPM 2.0.<BR><BR>\r |
330 | # If this bit is set, that means this algorithm is needed to extend to PCR.<BR>\r | |
331 | # If this bit is clear, that means this algorithm is NOT needed to extend to PCR.<BR>\r | |
332 | # BIT0 - SHA1.<BR>\r | |
333 | # BIT1 - SHA256.<BR>\r | |
334 | # BIT2 - SHA384.<BR>\r | |
335 | # BIT3 - SHA512.<BR>\r | |
336 | # @Prompt Hash mask for TPM 2.0\r | |
337 | # @ValidRange 0x80000001 | 0x00000000 - 0x0000000F \r | |
338 | gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTpm2HashMask|0x0000000F|UINT32|0x00010010\r | |
339 | \r | |
340 | ## This PCD indicates if BIOS auto detect TPM1.2 or dTPM2.0.<BR><BR>\r | |
341 | # FALSE - No auto detection.<BR>\r | |
342 | # TRUE - Auto detection.<BR>\r | |
343 | # @Prompt TPM type detection.\r | |
c1d93242 JY |
344 | gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTpmAutoDetection|TRUE|BOOLEAN|0x00010011\r |
345 | \r | |
606d38a5 DG |
346 | ## This PCD indicates TPM base address.<BR><BR>\r |
347 | # @Prompt TPM device address.\r | |
c1d93242 | 348 | gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTpmBaseAddress|0xFED40000|UINT64|0x00010012\r |
1a53a034 MK |
349 | \r |
350 | ## Provides one or more SHA 256 Hashes of the RSA 2048 public keys used to verify Recovery and Capsule Update images\r | |
351 | #\r | |
352 | # @Prompt One or more SHA 256 Hashes of RSA 2048 bit public keys used to verify Recovery and Capsule Update images\r | |
353 | #\r | |
354 | gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdRsa2048Sha256PublicKeyBuffer|{0x91, 0x29, 0xc4, 0xbd, 0xea, 0x6d, 0xda, 0xb3, 0xaa, 0x6f, 0x50, 0x16, 0xfc, 0xdb, 0x4b, 0x7e, 0x3c, 0xd6, 0xdc, 0xa4, 0x7a, 0x0e, 0xdd, 0xe6, 0x15, 0x8c, 0x73, 0x96, 0xa2, 0xd4, 0xa6, 0x4d}|VOID*|0x00010013\r | |
606d38a5 DG |
355 | \r |
356 | [UserExtensions.TianoCore."ExtraFiles"]\r | |
357 | SecurityPkgExtra.uni\r |