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85c8721f | 1 | /* auditsc.c -- System-call auditing support |
1da177e4 LT |
2 | * Handles all system-call specific auditing features. |
3 | * | |
4 | * Copyright 2003-2004 Red Hat Inc., Durham, North Carolina. | |
5 | * All Rights Reserved. | |
6 | * | |
7 | * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify | |
8 | * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by | |
9 | * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or | |
10 | * (at your option) any later version. | |
11 | * | |
12 | * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, | |
13 | * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of | |
14 | * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the | |
15 | * GNU General Public License for more details. | |
16 | * | |
17 | * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License | |
18 | * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software | |
19 | * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA | |
20 | * | |
21 | * Written by Rickard E. (Rik) Faith <faith@redhat.com> | |
22 | * | |
23 | * Many of the ideas implemented here are from Stephen C. Tweedie, | |
24 | * especially the idea of avoiding a copy by using getname. | |
25 | * | |
26 | * The method for actual interception of syscall entry and exit (not in | |
27 | * this file -- see entry.S) is based on a GPL'd patch written by | |
28 | * okir@suse.de and Copyright 2003 SuSE Linux AG. | |
29 | * | |
30 | */ | |
31 | ||
32 | #include <linux/init.h> | |
33 | #include <asm/atomic.h> | |
34 | #include <asm/types.h> | |
35 | #include <linux/mm.h> | |
36 | #include <linux/module.h> | |
01116105 | 37 | #include <linux/mount.h> |
3ec3b2fb | 38 | #include <linux/socket.h> |
1da177e4 LT |
39 | #include <linux/audit.h> |
40 | #include <linux/personality.h> | |
41 | #include <linux/time.h> | |
42 | #include <asm/unistd.h> | |
43 | ||
44 | /* 0 = no checking | |
45 | 1 = put_count checking | |
46 | 2 = verbose put_count checking | |
47 | */ | |
48 | #define AUDIT_DEBUG 0 | |
49 | ||
50 | /* No syscall auditing will take place unless audit_enabled != 0. */ | |
51 | extern int audit_enabled; | |
52 | ||
53 | /* AUDIT_NAMES is the number of slots we reserve in the audit_context | |
54 | * for saving names from getname(). */ | |
55 | #define AUDIT_NAMES 20 | |
56 | ||
57 | /* AUDIT_NAMES_RESERVED is the number of slots we reserve in the | |
58 | * audit_context from being used for nameless inodes from | |
59 | * path_lookup. */ | |
60 | #define AUDIT_NAMES_RESERVED 7 | |
61 | ||
62 | /* At task start time, the audit_state is set in the audit_context using | |
63 | a per-task filter. At syscall entry, the audit_state is augmented by | |
64 | the syscall filter. */ | |
65 | enum audit_state { | |
66 | AUDIT_DISABLED, /* Do not create per-task audit_context. | |
67 | * No syscall-specific audit records can | |
68 | * be generated. */ | |
69 | AUDIT_SETUP_CONTEXT, /* Create the per-task audit_context, | |
70 | * but don't necessarily fill it in at | |
71 | * syscall entry time (i.e., filter | |
72 | * instead). */ | |
73 | AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT, /* Create the per-task audit_context, | |
74 | * and always fill it in at syscall | |
75 | * entry time. This makes a full | |
76 | * syscall record available if some | |
77 | * other part of the kernel decides it | |
78 | * should be recorded. */ | |
79 | AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT /* Create the per-task audit_context, | |
80 | * always fill it in at syscall entry | |
81 | * time, and always write out the audit | |
82 | * record at syscall exit time. */ | |
83 | }; | |
84 | ||
85 | /* When fs/namei.c:getname() is called, we store the pointer in name and | |
86 | * we don't let putname() free it (instead we free all of the saved | |
87 | * pointers at syscall exit time). | |
88 | * | |
89 | * Further, in fs/namei.c:path_lookup() we store the inode and device. */ | |
90 | struct audit_names { | |
91 | const char *name; | |
92 | unsigned long ino; | |
93 | dev_t dev; | |
94 | umode_t mode; | |
95 | uid_t uid; | |
96 | gid_t gid; | |
97 | dev_t rdev; | |
98 | }; | |
99 | ||
100 | struct audit_aux_data { | |
101 | struct audit_aux_data *next; | |
102 | int type; | |
103 | }; | |
104 | ||
105 | #define AUDIT_AUX_IPCPERM 0 | |
106 | ||
107 | struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl { | |
108 | struct audit_aux_data d; | |
109 | struct ipc_perm p; | |
110 | unsigned long qbytes; | |
111 | uid_t uid; | |
112 | gid_t gid; | |
113 | mode_t mode; | |
114 | }; | |
115 | ||
3ec3b2fb DW |
116 | struct audit_aux_data_socketcall { |
117 | struct audit_aux_data d; | |
118 | int nargs; | |
119 | unsigned long args[0]; | |
120 | }; | |
121 | ||
122 | struct audit_aux_data_sockaddr { | |
123 | struct audit_aux_data d; | |
124 | int len; | |
125 | char a[0]; | |
126 | }; | |
127 | ||
01116105 SS |
128 | struct audit_aux_data_path { |
129 | struct audit_aux_data d; | |
130 | struct dentry *dentry; | |
131 | struct vfsmount *mnt; | |
132 | }; | |
1da177e4 LT |
133 | |
134 | /* The per-task audit context. */ | |
135 | struct audit_context { | |
136 | int in_syscall; /* 1 if task is in a syscall */ | |
137 | enum audit_state state; | |
138 | unsigned int serial; /* serial number for record */ | |
139 | struct timespec ctime; /* time of syscall entry */ | |
140 | uid_t loginuid; /* login uid (identity) */ | |
141 | int major; /* syscall number */ | |
142 | unsigned long argv[4]; /* syscall arguments */ | |
143 | int return_valid; /* return code is valid */ | |
2fd6f58b | 144 | long return_code;/* syscall return code */ |
1da177e4 LT |
145 | int auditable; /* 1 if record should be written */ |
146 | int name_count; | |
147 | struct audit_names names[AUDIT_NAMES]; | |
8f37d47c DW |
148 | struct dentry * pwd; |
149 | struct vfsmount * pwdmnt; | |
1da177e4 LT |
150 | struct audit_context *previous; /* For nested syscalls */ |
151 | struct audit_aux_data *aux; | |
152 | ||
153 | /* Save things to print about task_struct */ | |
154 | pid_t pid; | |
155 | uid_t uid, euid, suid, fsuid; | |
156 | gid_t gid, egid, sgid, fsgid; | |
157 | unsigned long personality; | |
2fd6f58b | 158 | int arch; |
1da177e4 LT |
159 | |
160 | #if AUDIT_DEBUG | |
161 | int put_count; | |
162 | int ino_count; | |
163 | #endif | |
164 | }; | |
165 | ||
166 | /* Public API */ | |
167 | /* There are three lists of rules -- one to search at task creation | |
168 | * time, one to search at syscall entry time, and another to search at | |
169 | * syscall exit time. */ | |
170 | static LIST_HEAD(audit_tsklist); | |
171 | static LIST_HEAD(audit_entlist); | |
172 | static LIST_HEAD(audit_extlist); | |
173 | ||
174 | struct audit_entry { | |
175 | struct list_head list; | |
176 | struct rcu_head rcu; | |
177 | struct audit_rule rule; | |
178 | }; | |
179 | ||
7ca00264 DW |
180 | extern int audit_pid; |
181 | ||
1da177e4 LT |
182 | /* Check to see if two rules are identical. It is called from |
183 | * audit_del_rule during AUDIT_DEL. */ | |
184 | static int audit_compare_rule(struct audit_rule *a, struct audit_rule *b) | |
185 | { | |
186 | int i; | |
187 | ||
188 | if (a->flags != b->flags) | |
189 | return 1; | |
190 | ||
191 | if (a->action != b->action) | |
192 | return 1; | |
193 | ||
194 | if (a->field_count != b->field_count) | |
195 | return 1; | |
196 | ||
197 | for (i = 0; i < a->field_count; i++) { | |
198 | if (a->fields[i] != b->fields[i] | |
199 | || a->values[i] != b->values[i]) | |
200 | return 1; | |
201 | } | |
202 | ||
203 | for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE; i++) | |
204 | if (a->mask[i] != b->mask[i]) | |
205 | return 1; | |
206 | ||
207 | return 0; | |
208 | } | |
209 | ||
210 | /* Note that audit_add_rule and audit_del_rule are called via | |
211 | * audit_receive() in audit.c, and are protected by | |
212 | * audit_netlink_sem. */ | |
213 | static inline int audit_add_rule(struct audit_entry *entry, | |
214 | struct list_head *list) | |
215 | { | |
216 | if (entry->rule.flags & AUDIT_PREPEND) { | |
217 | entry->rule.flags &= ~AUDIT_PREPEND; | |
218 | list_add_rcu(&entry->list, list); | |
219 | } else { | |
220 | list_add_tail_rcu(&entry->list, list); | |
221 | } | |
222 | return 0; | |
223 | } | |
224 | ||
225 | static void audit_free_rule(struct rcu_head *head) | |
226 | { | |
227 | struct audit_entry *e = container_of(head, struct audit_entry, rcu); | |
228 | kfree(e); | |
229 | } | |
230 | ||
231 | /* Note that audit_add_rule and audit_del_rule are called via | |
232 | * audit_receive() in audit.c, and are protected by | |
233 | * audit_netlink_sem. */ | |
234 | static inline int audit_del_rule(struct audit_rule *rule, | |
235 | struct list_head *list) | |
236 | { | |
237 | struct audit_entry *e; | |
238 | ||
239 | /* Do not use the _rcu iterator here, since this is the only | |
240 | * deletion routine. */ | |
241 | list_for_each_entry(e, list, list) { | |
242 | if (!audit_compare_rule(rule, &e->rule)) { | |
243 | list_del_rcu(&e->list); | |
244 | call_rcu(&e->rcu, audit_free_rule); | |
245 | return 0; | |
246 | } | |
247 | } | |
248 | return -EFAULT; /* No matching rule */ | |
249 | } | |
250 | ||
1da177e4 LT |
251 | /* Copy rule from user-space to kernel-space. Called during |
252 | * AUDIT_ADD. */ | |
253 | static int audit_copy_rule(struct audit_rule *d, struct audit_rule *s) | |
254 | { | |
255 | int i; | |
256 | ||
257 | if (s->action != AUDIT_NEVER | |
258 | && s->action != AUDIT_POSSIBLE | |
259 | && s->action != AUDIT_ALWAYS) | |
260 | return -1; | |
261 | if (s->field_count < 0 || s->field_count > AUDIT_MAX_FIELDS) | |
262 | return -1; | |
263 | ||
264 | d->flags = s->flags; | |
265 | d->action = s->action; | |
266 | d->field_count = s->field_count; | |
267 | for (i = 0; i < d->field_count; i++) { | |
268 | d->fields[i] = s->fields[i]; | |
269 | d->values[i] = s->values[i]; | |
270 | } | |
271 | for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE; i++) d->mask[i] = s->mask[i]; | |
272 | return 0; | |
273 | } | |
274 | ||
c94c257c SH |
275 | int audit_receive_filter(int type, int pid, int uid, int seq, void *data, |
276 | uid_t loginuid) | |
1da177e4 LT |
277 | { |
278 | u32 flags; | |
279 | struct audit_entry *entry; | |
280 | int err = 0; | |
281 | ||
282 | switch (type) { | |
283 | case AUDIT_LIST: | |
284 | /* The *_rcu iterators not needed here because we are | |
285 | always called with audit_netlink_sem held. */ | |
286 | list_for_each_entry(entry, &audit_tsklist, list) | |
287 | audit_send_reply(pid, seq, AUDIT_LIST, 0, 1, | |
288 | &entry->rule, sizeof(entry->rule)); | |
289 | list_for_each_entry(entry, &audit_entlist, list) | |
290 | audit_send_reply(pid, seq, AUDIT_LIST, 0, 1, | |
291 | &entry->rule, sizeof(entry->rule)); | |
292 | list_for_each_entry(entry, &audit_extlist, list) | |
293 | audit_send_reply(pid, seq, AUDIT_LIST, 0, 1, | |
294 | &entry->rule, sizeof(entry->rule)); | |
295 | audit_send_reply(pid, seq, AUDIT_LIST, 1, 1, NULL, 0); | |
296 | break; | |
297 | case AUDIT_ADD: | |
298 | if (!(entry = kmalloc(sizeof(*entry), GFP_KERNEL))) | |
299 | return -ENOMEM; | |
300 | if (audit_copy_rule(&entry->rule, data)) { | |
301 | kfree(entry); | |
302 | return -EINVAL; | |
303 | } | |
304 | flags = entry->rule.flags; | |
305 | if (!err && (flags & AUDIT_PER_TASK)) | |
306 | err = audit_add_rule(entry, &audit_tsklist); | |
307 | if (!err && (flags & AUDIT_AT_ENTRY)) | |
308 | err = audit_add_rule(entry, &audit_entlist); | |
309 | if (!err && (flags & AUDIT_AT_EXIT)) | |
310 | err = audit_add_rule(entry, &audit_extlist); | |
c0404993 | 311 | audit_log(NULL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE, |
bccf6ae0 | 312 | "auid=%u added an audit rule\n", loginuid); |
1da177e4 LT |
313 | break; |
314 | case AUDIT_DEL: | |
315 | flags =((struct audit_rule *)data)->flags; | |
316 | if (!err && (flags & AUDIT_PER_TASK)) | |
317 | err = audit_del_rule(data, &audit_tsklist); | |
318 | if (!err && (flags & AUDIT_AT_ENTRY)) | |
319 | err = audit_del_rule(data, &audit_entlist); | |
320 | if (!err && (flags & AUDIT_AT_EXIT)) | |
321 | err = audit_del_rule(data, &audit_extlist); | |
c0404993 | 322 | audit_log(NULL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE, |
bccf6ae0 | 323 | "auid=%u removed an audit rule\n", loginuid); |
1da177e4 LT |
324 | break; |
325 | default: | |
326 | return -EINVAL; | |
327 | } | |
328 | ||
329 | return err; | |
330 | } | |
1da177e4 LT |
331 | |
332 | /* Compare a task_struct with an audit_rule. Return 1 on match, 0 | |
333 | * otherwise. */ | |
334 | static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk, | |
335 | struct audit_rule *rule, | |
336 | struct audit_context *ctx, | |
337 | enum audit_state *state) | |
338 | { | |
339 | int i, j; | |
340 | ||
341 | for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) { | |
342 | u32 field = rule->fields[i] & ~AUDIT_NEGATE; | |
343 | u32 value = rule->values[i]; | |
344 | int result = 0; | |
345 | ||
346 | switch (field) { | |
347 | case AUDIT_PID: | |
348 | result = (tsk->pid == value); | |
349 | break; | |
350 | case AUDIT_UID: | |
351 | result = (tsk->uid == value); | |
352 | break; | |
353 | case AUDIT_EUID: | |
354 | result = (tsk->euid == value); | |
355 | break; | |
356 | case AUDIT_SUID: | |
357 | result = (tsk->suid == value); | |
358 | break; | |
359 | case AUDIT_FSUID: | |
360 | result = (tsk->fsuid == value); | |
361 | break; | |
362 | case AUDIT_GID: | |
363 | result = (tsk->gid == value); | |
364 | break; | |
365 | case AUDIT_EGID: | |
366 | result = (tsk->egid == value); | |
367 | break; | |
368 | case AUDIT_SGID: | |
369 | result = (tsk->sgid == value); | |
370 | break; | |
371 | case AUDIT_FSGID: | |
372 | result = (tsk->fsgid == value); | |
373 | break; | |
374 | case AUDIT_PERS: | |
375 | result = (tsk->personality == value); | |
376 | break; | |
2fd6f58b DW |
377 | case AUDIT_ARCH: |
378 | if (ctx) | |
379 | result = (ctx->arch == value); | |
380 | break; | |
1da177e4 LT |
381 | |
382 | case AUDIT_EXIT: | |
383 | if (ctx && ctx->return_valid) | |
384 | result = (ctx->return_code == value); | |
385 | break; | |
386 | case AUDIT_SUCCESS: | |
387 | if (ctx && ctx->return_valid) | |
2fd6f58b | 388 | result = (ctx->return_valid == AUDITSC_SUCCESS); |
1da177e4 LT |
389 | break; |
390 | case AUDIT_DEVMAJOR: | |
391 | if (ctx) { | |
392 | for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) { | |
393 | if (MAJOR(ctx->names[j].dev)==value) { | |
394 | ++result; | |
395 | break; | |
396 | } | |
397 | } | |
398 | } | |
399 | break; | |
400 | case AUDIT_DEVMINOR: | |
401 | if (ctx) { | |
402 | for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) { | |
403 | if (MINOR(ctx->names[j].dev)==value) { | |
404 | ++result; | |
405 | break; | |
406 | } | |
407 | } | |
408 | } | |
409 | break; | |
410 | case AUDIT_INODE: | |
411 | if (ctx) { | |
412 | for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) { | |
413 | if (ctx->names[j].ino == value) { | |
414 | ++result; | |
415 | break; | |
416 | } | |
417 | } | |
418 | } | |
419 | break; | |
420 | case AUDIT_LOGINUID: | |
421 | result = 0; | |
422 | if (ctx) | |
423 | result = (ctx->loginuid == value); | |
424 | break; | |
425 | case AUDIT_ARG0: | |
426 | case AUDIT_ARG1: | |
427 | case AUDIT_ARG2: | |
428 | case AUDIT_ARG3: | |
429 | if (ctx) | |
430 | result = (ctx->argv[field-AUDIT_ARG0]==value); | |
431 | break; | |
432 | } | |
433 | ||
434 | if (rule->fields[i] & AUDIT_NEGATE) | |
435 | result = !result; | |
436 | if (!result) | |
437 | return 0; | |
438 | } | |
439 | switch (rule->action) { | |
440 | case AUDIT_NEVER: *state = AUDIT_DISABLED; break; | |
441 | case AUDIT_POSSIBLE: *state = AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT; break; | |
442 | case AUDIT_ALWAYS: *state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT; break; | |
443 | } | |
444 | return 1; | |
445 | } | |
446 | ||
447 | /* At process creation time, we can determine if system-call auditing is | |
448 | * completely disabled for this task. Since we only have the task | |
449 | * structure at this point, we can only check uid and gid. | |
450 | */ | |
451 | static enum audit_state audit_filter_task(struct task_struct *tsk) | |
452 | { | |
453 | struct audit_entry *e; | |
454 | enum audit_state state; | |
455 | ||
456 | rcu_read_lock(); | |
457 | list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, &audit_tsklist, list) { | |
458 | if (audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, NULL, &state)) { | |
459 | rcu_read_unlock(); | |
460 | return state; | |
461 | } | |
462 | } | |
463 | rcu_read_unlock(); | |
464 | return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT; | |
465 | } | |
466 | ||
467 | /* At syscall entry and exit time, this filter is called if the | |
468 | * audit_state is not low enough that auditing cannot take place, but is | |
23f32d18 | 469 | * also not high enough that we already know we have to write an audit |
1da177e4 LT |
470 | * record (i.e., the state is AUDIT_SETUP_CONTEXT or AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT). |
471 | */ | |
472 | static enum audit_state audit_filter_syscall(struct task_struct *tsk, | |
473 | struct audit_context *ctx, | |
474 | struct list_head *list) | |
475 | { | |
476 | struct audit_entry *e; | |
477 | enum audit_state state; | |
478 | int word = AUDIT_WORD(ctx->major); | |
479 | int bit = AUDIT_BIT(ctx->major); | |
480 | ||
481 | rcu_read_lock(); | |
482 | list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) { | |
483 | if ((e->rule.mask[word] & bit) == bit | |
484 | && audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, &state)) { | |
485 | rcu_read_unlock(); | |
486 | return state; | |
487 | } | |
488 | } | |
489 | rcu_read_unlock(); | |
490 | return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT; | |
491 | } | |
492 | ||
493 | /* This should be called with task_lock() held. */ | |
494 | static inline struct audit_context *audit_get_context(struct task_struct *tsk, | |
495 | int return_valid, | |
496 | int return_code) | |
497 | { | |
498 | struct audit_context *context = tsk->audit_context; | |
499 | ||
500 | if (likely(!context)) | |
501 | return NULL; | |
502 | context->return_valid = return_valid; | |
503 | context->return_code = return_code; | |
504 | ||
505 | if (context->in_syscall && !context->auditable) { | |
506 | enum audit_state state; | |
507 | state = audit_filter_syscall(tsk, context, &audit_extlist); | |
508 | if (state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT) | |
509 | context->auditable = 1; | |
510 | } | |
511 | ||
512 | context->pid = tsk->pid; | |
513 | context->uid = tsk->uid; | |
514 | context->gid = tsk->gid; | |
515 | context->euid = tsk->euid; | |
516 | context->suid = tsk->suid; | |
517 | context->fsuid = tsk->fsuid; | |
518 | context->egid = tsk->egid; | |
519 | context->sgid = tsk->sgid; | |
520 | context->fsgid = tsk->fsgid; | |
521 | context->personality = tsk->personality; | |
522 | tsk->audit_context = NULL; | |
523 | return context; | |
524 | } | |
525 | ||
526 | static inline void audit_free_names(struct audit_context *context) | |
527 | { | |
528 | int i; | |
529 | ||
530 | #if AUDIT_DEBUG == 2 | |
531 | if (context->auditable | |
532 | ||context->put_count + context->ino_count != context->name_count) { | |
533 | printk(KERN_ERR "audit.c:%d(:%d): major=%d in_syscall=%d" | |
534 | " name_count=%d put_count=%d" | |
535 | " ino_count=%d [NOT freeing]\n", | |
536 | __LINE__, | |
537 | context->serial, context->major, context->in_syscall, | |
538 | context->name_count, context->put_count, | |
539 | context->ino_count); | |
540 | for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++) | |
541 | printk(KERN_ERR "names[%d] = %p = %s\n", i, | |
542 | context->names[i].name, | |
543 | context->names[i].name); | |
544 | dump_stack(); | |
545 | return; | |
546 | } | |
547 | #endif | |
548 | #if AUDIT_DEBUG | |
549 | context->put_count = 0; | |
550 | context->ino_count = 0; | |
551 | #endif | |
552 | ||
553 | for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++) | |
554 | if (context->names[i].name) | |
555 | __putname(context->names[i].name); | |
556 | context->name_count = 0; | |
8f37d47c DW |
557 | if (context->pwd) |
558 | dput(context->pwd); | |
559 | if (context->pwdmnt) | |
560 | mntput(context->pwdmnt); | |
561 | context->pwd = NULL; | |
562 | context->pwdmnt = NULL; | |
1da177e4 LT |
563 | } |
564 | ||
565 | static inline void audit_free_aux(struct audit_context *context) | |
566 | { | |
567 | struct audit_aux_data *aux; | |
568 | ||
569 | while ((aux = context->aux)) { | |
01116105 SS |
570 | if (aux->type == AUDIT_AVC_PATH) { |
571 | struct audit_aux_data_path *axi = (void *)aux; | |
572 | dput(axi->dentry); | |
573 | mntput(axi->mnt); | |
574 | } | |
1da177e4 LT |
575 | context->aux = aux->next; |
576 | kfree(aux); | |
577 | } | |
578 | } | |
579 | ||
580 | static inline void audit_zero_context(struct audit_context *context, | |
581 | enum audit_state state) | |
582 | { | |
583 | uid_t loginuid = context->loginuid; | |
584 | ||
585 | memset(context, 0, sizeof(*context)); | |
586 | context->state = state; | |
587 | context->loginuid = loginuid; | |
588 | } | |
589 | ||
590 | static inline struct audit_context *audit_alloc_context(enum audit_state state) | |
591 | { | |
592 | struct audit_context *context; | |
593 | ||
594 | if (!(context = kmalloc(sizeof(*context), GFP_KERNEL))) | |
595 | return NULL; | |
596 | audit_zero_context(context, state); | |
597 | return context; | |
598 | } | |
599 | ||
600 | /* Filter on the task information and allocate a per-task audit context | |
601 | * if necessary. Doing so turns on system call auditing for the | |
602 | * specified task. This is called from copy_process, so no lock is | |
603 | * needed. */ | |
604 | int audit_alloc(struct task_struct *tsk) | |
605 | { | |
606 | struct audit_context *context; | |
607 | enum audit_state state; | |
608 | ||
609 | if (likely(!audit_enabled)) | |
610 | return 0; /* Return if not auditing. */ | |
611 | ||
612 | state = audit_filter_task(tsk); | |
613 | if (likely(state == AUDIT_DISABLED)) | |
614 | return 0; | |
615 | ||
616 | if (!(context = audit_alloc_context(state))) { | |
617 | audit_log_lost("out of memory in audit_alloc"); | |
618 | return -ENOMEM; | |
619 | } | |
620 | ||
621 | /* Preserve login uid */ | |
622 | context->loginuid = -1; | |
623 | if (current->audit_context) | |
624 | context->loginuid = current->audit_context->loginuid; | |
625 | ||
626 | tsk->audit_context = context; | |
627 | set_tsk_thread_flag(tsk, TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT); | |
628 | return 0; | |
629 | } | |
630 | ||
631 | static inline void audit_free_context(struct audit_context *context) | |
632 | { | |
633 | struct audit_context *previous; | |
634 | int count = 0; | |
635 | ||
636 | do { | |
637 | previous = context->previous; | |
638 | if (previous || (count && count < 10)) { | |
639 | ++count; | |
640 | printk(KERN_ERR "audit(:%d): major=%d name_count=%d:" | |
641 | " freeing multiple contexts (%d)\n", | |
642 | context->serial, context->major, | |
643 | context->name_count, count); | |
644 | } | |
645 | audit_free_names(context); | |
646 | audit_free_aux(context); | |
647 | kfree(context); | |
648 | context = previous; | |
649 | } while (context); | |
650 | if (count >= 10) | |
651 | printk(KERN_ERR "audit: freed %d contexts\n", count); | |
652 | } | |
653 | ||
219f0817 SS |
654 | static void audit_log_task_info(struct audit_buffer *ab) |
655 | { | |
656 | char name[sizeof(current->comm)]; | |
657 | struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm; | |
658 | struct vm_area_struct *vma; | |
659 | ||
660 | get_task_comm(name, current); | |
99e45eea DW |
661 | audit_log_format(ab, " comm="); |
662 | audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, name); | |
219f0817 SS |
663 | |
664 | if (!mm) | |
665 | return; | |
666 | ||
667 | down_read(&mm->mmap_sem); | |
668 | vma = mm->mmap; | |
669 | while (vma) { | |
670 | if ((vma->vm_flags & VM_EXECUTABLE) && | |
671 | vma->vm_file) { | |
672 | audit_log_d_path(ab, "exe=", | |
673 | vma->vm_file->f_dentry, | |
674 | vma->vm_file->f_vfsmnt); | |
675 | break; | |
676 | } | |
677 | vma = vma->vm_next; | |
678 | } | |
679 | up_read(&mm->mmap_sem); | |
680 | } | |
681 | ||
1da177e4 LT |
682 | static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context) |
683 | { | |
684 | int i; | |
685 | struct audit_buffer *ab; | |
7551ced3 | 686 | struct audit_aux_data *aux; |
1da177e4 | 687 | |
c0404993 | 688 | ab = audit_log_start(context, AUDIT_SYSCALL); |
1da177e4 LT |
689 | if (!ab) |
690 | return; /* audit_panic has been called */ | |
bccf6ae0 DW |
691 | audit_log_format(ab, "arch=%x syscall=%d", |
692 | context->arch, context->major); | |
1da177e4 LT |
693 | if (context->personality != PER_LINUX) |
694 | audit_log_format(ab, " per=%lx", context->personality); | |
695 | if (context->return_valid) | |
2fd6f58b DW |
696 | audit_log_format(ab, " success=%s exit=%ld", |
697 | (context->return_valid==AUDITSC_SUCCESS)?"yes":"no", | |
698 | context->return_code); | |
1da177e4 LT |
699 | audit_log_format(ab, |
700 | " a0=%lx a1=%lx a2=%lx a3=%lx items=%d" | |
326e9c8b SG |
701 | " pid=%d auid=%u uid=%u gid=%u" |
702 | " euid=%u suid=%u fsuid=%u" | |
703 | " egid=%u sgid=%u fsgid=%u", | |
1da177e4 LT |
704 | context->argv[0], |
705 | context->argv[1], | |
706 | context->argv[2], | |
707 | context->argv[3], | |
708 | context->name_count, | |
709 | context->pid, | |
710 | context->loginuid, | |
711 | context->uid, | |
712 | context->gid, | |
713 | context->euid, context->suid, context->fsuid, | |
714 | context->egid, context->sgid, context->fsgid); | |
219f0817 | 715 | audit_log_task_info(ab); |
1da177e4 | 716 | audit_log_end(ab); |
1da177e4 | 717 | |
7551ced3 | 718 | for (aux = context->aux; aux; aux = aux->next) { |
c0404993 SG |
719 | |
720 | ab = audit_log_start(context, aux->type); | |
1da177e4 LT |
721 | if (!ab) |
722 | continue; /* audit_panic has been called */ | |
723 | ||
1da177e4 | 724 | switch (aux->type) { |
c0404993 | 725 | case AUDIT_IPC: { |
1da177e4 LT |
726 | struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *axi = (void *)aux; |
727 | audit_log_format(ab, | |
326e9c8b | 728 | " qbytes=%lx iuid=%u igid=%u mode=%x", |
1da177e4 | 729 | axi->qbytes, axi->uid, axi->gid, axi->mode); |
3ec3b2fb DW |
730 | break; } |
731 | ||
732 | case AUDIT_SOCKETCALL: { | |
733 | int i; | |
734 | struct audit_aux_data_socketcall *axs = (void *)aux; | |
735 | audit_log_format(ab, "nargs=%d", axs->nargs); | |
736 | for (i=0; i<axs->nargs; i++) | |
737 | audit_log_format(ab, " a%d=%lx", i, axs->args[i]); | |
738 | break; } | |
739 | ||
740 | case AUDIT_SOCKADDR: { | |
741 | struct audit_aux_data_sockaddr *axs = (void *)aux; | |
742 | ||
743 | audit_log_format(ab, "saddr="); | |
744 | audit_log_hex(ab, axs->a, axs->len); | |
745 | break; } | |
01116105 SS |
746 | |
747 | case AUDIT_AVC_PATH: { | |
748 | struct audit_aux_data_path *axi = (void *)aux; | |
749 | audit_log_d_path(ab, "path=", axi->dentry, axi->mnt); | |
01116105 SS |
750 | break; } |
751 | ||
1da177e4 LT |
752 | } |
753 | audit_log_end(ab); | |
1da177e4 LT |
754 | } |
755 | ||
8f37d47c DW |
756 | if (context->pwd && context->pwdmnt) { |
757 | ab = audit_log_start(context, AUDIT_CWD); | |
758 | if (ab) { | |
759 | audit_log_d_path(ab, "cwd=", context->pwd, context->pwdmnt); | |
760 | audit_log_end(ab); | |
761 | } | |
762 | } | |
1da177e4 | 763 | for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++) { |
c0404993 | 764 | ab = audit_log_start(context, AUDIT_PATH); |
1da177e4 LT |
765 | if (!ab) |
766 | continue; /* audit_panic has been called */ | |
8f37d47c | 767 | |
1da177e4 | 768 | audit_log_format(ab, "item=%d", i); |
83c7d091 DW |
769 | if (context->names[i].name) { |
770 | audit_log_format(ab, " name="); | |
771 | audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, context->names[i].name); | |
772 | } | |
1da177e4 LT |
773 | if (context->names[i].ino != (unsigned long)-1) |
774 | audit_log_format(ab, " inode=%lu dev=%02x:%02x mode=%#o" | |
326e9c8b | 775 | " ouid=%u ogid=%u rdev=%02x:%02x", |
1da177e4 LT |
776 | context->names[i].ino, |
777 | MAJOR(context->names[i].dev), | |
778 | MINOR(context->names[i].dev), | |
779 | context->names[i].mode, | |
780 | context->names[i].uid, | |
781 | context->names[i].gid, | |
782 | MAJOR(context->names[i].rdev), | |
783 | MINOR(context->names[i].rdev)); | |
784 | audit_log_end(ab); | |
785 | } | |
786 | } | |
787 | ||
788 | /* Free a per-task audit context. Called from copy_process and | |
789 | * __put_task_struct. */ | |
790 | void audit_free(struct task_struct *tsk) | |
791 | { | |
792 | struct audit_context *context; | |
793 | ||
794 | task_lock(tsk); | |
795 | context = audit_get_context(tsk, 0, 0); | |
796 | task_unlock(tsk); | |
797 | ||
798 | if (likely(!context)) | |
799 | return; | |
800 | ||
801 | /* Check for system calls that do not go through the exit | |
802 | * function (e.g., exit_group), then free context block. */ | |
7ca00264 | 803 | if (context->in_syscall && context->auditable && context->pid != audit_pid) |
1da177e4 LT |
804 | audit_log_exit(context); |
805 | ||
806 | audit_free_context(context); | |
807 | } | |
808 | ||
1da177e4 LT |
809 | /* Fill in audit context at syscall entry. This only happens if the |
810 | * audit context was created when the task was created and the state or | |
811 | * filters demand the audit context be built. If the state from the | |
812 | * per-task filter or from the per-syscall filter is AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT, | |
813 | * then the record will be written at syscall exit time (otherwise, it | |
814 | * will only be written if another part of the kernel requests that it | |
815 | * be written). */ | |
2fd6f58b | 816 | void audit_syscall_entry(struct task_struct *tsk, int arch, int major, |
1da177e4 LT |
817 | unsigned long a1, unsigned long a2, |
818 | unsigned long a3, unsigned long a4) | |
819 | { | |
820 | struct audit_context *context = tsk->audit_context; | |
821 | enum audit_state state; | |
822 | ||
823 | BUG_ON(!context); | |
824 | ||
825 | /* This happens only on certain architectures that make system | |
826 | * calls in kernel_thread via the entry.S interface, instead of | |
827 | * with direct calls. (If you are porting to a new | |
828 | * architecture, hitting this condition can indicate that you | |
829 | * got the _exit/_leave calls backward in entry.S.) | |
830 | * | |
831 | * i386 no | |
832 | * x86_64 no | |
833 | * ppc64 yes (see arch/ppc64/kernel/misc.S) | |
834 | * | |
835 | * This also happens with vm86 emulation in a non-nested manner | |
836 | * (entries without exits), so this case must be caught. | |
837 | */ | |
838 | if (context->in_syscall) { | |
839 | struct audit_context *newctx; | |
840 | ||
841 | #if defined(__NR_vm86) && defined(__NR_vm86old) | |
842 | /* vm86 mode should only be entered once */ | |
843 | if (major == __NR_vm86 || major == __NR_vm86old) | |
844 | return; | |
845 | #endif | |
846 | #if AUDIT_DEBUG | |
847 | printk(KERN_ERR | |
848 | "audit(:%d) pid=%d in syscall=%d;" | |
849 | " entering syscall=%d\n", | |
850 | context->serial, tsk->pid, context->major, major); | |
851 | #endif | |
852 | newctx = audit_alloc_context(context->state); | |
853 | if (newctx) { | |
854 | newctx->previous = context; | |
855 | context = newctx; | |
856 | tsk->audit_context = newctx; | |
857 | } else { | |
858 | /* If we can't alloc a new context, the best we | |
859 | * can do is to leak memory (any pending putname | |
860 | * will be lost). The only other alternative is | |
861 | * to abandon auditing. */ | |
862 | audit_zero_context(context, context->state); | |
863 | } | |
864 | } | |
865 | BUG_ON(context->in_syscall || context->name_count); | |
866 | ||
867 | if (!audit_enabled) | |
868 | return; | |
869 | ||
2fd6f58b | 870 | context->arch = arch; |
1da177e4 LT |
871 | context->major = major; |
872 | context->argv[0] = a1; | |
873 | context->argv[1] = a2; | |
874 | context->argv[2] = a3; | |
875 | context->argv[3] = a4; | |
876 | ||
877 | state = context->state; | |
878 | if (state == AUDIT_SETUP_CONTEXT || state == AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT) | |
879 | state = audit_filter_syscall(tsk, context, &audit_entlist); | |
880 | if (likely(state == AUDIT_DISABLED)) | |
881 | return; | |
882 | ||
883 | context->serial = audit_serial(); | |
884 | context->ctime = CURRENT_TIME; | |
885 | context->in_syscall = 1; | |
886 | context->auditable = !!(state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT); | |
887 | } | |
888 | ||
889 | /* Tear down after system call. If the audit context has been marked as | |
890 | * auditable (either because of the AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT state from | |
891 | * filtering, or because some other part of the kernel write an audit | |
892 | * message), then write out the syscall information. In call cases, | |
893 | * free the names stored from getname(). */ | |
2fd6f58b | 894 | void audit_syscall_exit(struct task_struct *tsk, int valid, long return_code) |
1da177e4 LT |
895 | { |
896 | struct audit_context *context; | |
897 | ||
898 | get_task_struct(tsk); | |
899 | task_lock(tsk); | |
2fd6f58b | 900 | context = audit_get_context(tsk, valid, return_code); |
1da177e4 LT |
901 | task_unlock(tsk); |
902 | ||
903 | /* Not having a context here is ok, since the parent may have | |
904 | * called __put_task_struct. */ | |
905 | if (likely(!context)) | |
906 | return; | |
907 | ||
7ca00264 | 908 | if (context->in_syscall && context->auditable && context->pid != audit_pid) |
1da177e4 LT |
909 | audit_log_exit(context); |
910 | ||
911 | context->in_syscall = 0; | |
912 | context->auditable = 0; | |
2fd6f58b | 913 | |
1da177e4 LT |
914 | if (context->previous) { |
915 | struct audit_context *new_context = context->previous; | |
916 | context->previous = NULL; | |
917 | audit_free_context(context); | |
918 | tsk->audit_context = new_context; | |
919 | } else { | |
920 | audit_free_names(context); | |
921 | audit_free_aux(context); | |
922 | audit_zero_context(context, context->state); | |
923 | tsk->audit_context = context; | |
924 | } | |
925 | put_task_struct(tsk); | |
926 | } | |
927 | ||
928 | /* Add a name to the list. Called from fs/namei.c:getname(). */ | |
929 | void audit_getname(const char *name) | |
930 | { | |
931 | struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; | |
932 | ||
933 | if (!context || IS_ERR(name) || !name) | |
934 | return; | |
935 | ||
936 | if (!context->in_syscall) { | |
937 | #if AUDIT_DEBUG == 2 | |
938 | printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): ignoring getname(%p)\n", | |
939 | __FILE__, __LINE__, context->serial, name); | |
940 | dump_stack(); | |
941 | #endif | |
942 | return; | |
943 | } | |
944 | BUG_ON(context->name_count >= AUDIT_NAMES); | |
945 | context->names[context->name_count].name = name; | |
946 | context->names[context->name_count].ino = (unsigned long)-1; | |
947 | ++context->name_count; | |
8f37d47c DW |
948 | if (!context->pwd) { |
949 | read_lock(¤t->fs->lock); | |
950 | context->pwd = dget(current->fs->pwd); | |
951 | context->pwdmnt = mntget(current->fs->pwdmnt); | |
952 | read_unlock(¤t->fs->lock); | |
953 | } | |
954 | ||
1da177e4 LT |
955 | } |
956 | ||
957 | /* Intercept a putname request. Called from | |
958 | * include/linux/fs.h:putname(). If we have stored the name from | |
959 | * getname in the audit context, then we delay the putname until syscall | |
960 | * exit. */ | |
961 | void audit_putname(const char *name) | |
962 | { | |
963 | struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; | |
964 | ||
965 | BUG_ON(!context); | |
966 | if (!context->in_syscall) { | |
967 | #if AUDIT_DEBUG == 2 | |
968 | printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): __putname(%p)\n", | |
969 | __FILE__, __LINE__, context->serial, name); | |
970 | if (context->name_count) { | |
971 | int i; | |
972 | for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++) | |
973 | printk(KERN_ERR "name[%d] = %p = %s\n", i, | |
974 | context->names[i].name, | |
975 | context->names[i].name); | |
976 | } | |
977 | #endif | |
978 | __putname(name); | |
979 | } | |
980 | #if AUDIT_DEBUG | |
981 | else { | |
982 | ++context->put_count; | |
983 | if (context->put_count > context->name_count) { | |
984 | printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): major=%d" | |
985 | " in_syscall=%d putname(%p) name_count=%d" | |
986 | " put_count=%d\n", | |
987 | __FILE__, __LINE__, | |
988 | context->serial, context->major, | |
989 | context->in_syscall, name, context->name_count, | |
990 | context->put_count); | |
991 | dump_stack(); | |
992 | } | |
993 | } | |
994 | #endif | |
995 | } | |
996 | ||
997 | /* Store the inode and device from a lookup. Called from | |
998 | * fs/namei.c:path_lookup(). */ | |
999 | void audit_inode(const char *name, const struct inode *inode) | |
1000 | { | |
1001 | int idx; | |
1002 | struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; | |
1003 | ||
1004 | if (!context->in_syscall) | |
1005 | return; | |
1006 | if (context->name_count | |
1007 | && context->names[context->name_count-1].name | |
1008 | && context->names[context->name_count-1].name == name) | |
1009 | idx = context->name_count - 1; | |
1010 | else if (context->name_count > 1 | |
1011 | && context->names[context->name_count-2].name | |
1012 | && context->names[context->name_count-2].name == name) | |
1013 | idx = context->name_count - 2; | |
1014 | else { | |
1015 | /* FIXME: how much do we care about inodes that have no | |
1016 | * associated name? */ | |
1017 | if (context->name_count >= AUDIT_NAMES - AUDIT_NAMES_RESERVED) | |
1018 | return; | |
1019 | idx = context->name_count++; | |
1020 | context->names[idx].name = NULL; | |
1021 | #if AUDIT_DEBUG | |
1022 | ++context->ino_count; | |
1023 | #endif | |
1024 | } | |
1025 | context->names[idx].ino = inode->i_ino; | |
1026 | context->names[idx].dev = inode->i_sb->s_dev; | |
1027 | context->names[idx].mode = inode->i_mode; | |
1028 | context->names[idx].uid = inode->i_uid; | |
1029 | context->names[idx].gid = inode->i_gid; | |
1030 | context->names[idx].rdev = inode->i_rdev; | |
1031 | } | |
1032 | ||
bfb4496e DW |
1033 | void auditsc_get_stamp(struct audit_context *ctx, |
1034 | struct timespec *t, unsigned int *serial) | |
1da177e4 | 1035 | { |
bfb4496e DW |
1036 | t->tv_sec = ctx->ctime.tv_sec; |
1037 | t->tv_nsec = ctx->ctime.tv_nsec; | |
1038 | *serial = ctx->serial; | |
1039 | ctx->auditable = 1; | |
1da177e4 LT |
1040 | } |
1041 | ||
456be6cd | 1042 | int audit_set_loginuid(struct task_struct *task, uid_t loginuid) |
1da177e4 | 1043 | { |
456be6cd | 1044 | if (task->audit_context) { |
c0404993 SG |
1045 | struct audit_buffer *ab; |
1046 | ||
1047 | ab = audit_log_start(NULL, AUDIT_LOGIN); | |
1048 | if (ab) { | |
1049 | audit_log_format(ab, "login pid=%d uid=%u " | |
326e9c8b | 1050 | "old auid=%u new auid=%u", |
c0404993 SG |
1051 | task->pid, task->uid, |
1052 | task->audit_context->loginuid, loginuid); | |
1053 | audit_log_end(ab); | |
1054 | } | |
456be6cd | 1055 | task->audit_context->loginuid = loginuid; |
1da177e4 LT |
1056 | } |
1057 | return 0; | |
1058 | } | |
1059 | ||
1060 | uid_t audit_get_loginuid(struct audit_context *ctx) | |
1061 | { | |
1062 | return ctx ? ctx->loginuid : -1; | |
1063 | } | |
1064 | ||
1065 | int audit_ipc_perms(unsigned long qbytes, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, mode_t mode) | |
1066 | { | |
1067 | struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *ax; | |
1068 | struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; | |
1069 | ||
1070 | if (likely(!context)) | |
1071 | return 0; | |
1072 | ||
1073 | ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_KERNEL); | |
1074 | if (!ax) | |
1075 | return -ENOMEM; | |
1076 | ||
1077 | ax->qbytes = qbytes; | |
1078 | ax->uid = uid; | |
1079 | ax->gid = gid; | |
1080 | ax->mode = mode; | |
1081 | ||
c0404993 | 1082 | ax->d.type = AUDIT_IPC; |
1da177e4 LT |
1083 | ax->d.next = context->aux; |
1084 | context->aux = (void *)ax; | |
1085 | return 0; | |
1086 | } | |
c2f0c7c3 | 1087 | |
3ec3b2fb DW |
1088 | int audit_socketcall(int nargs, unsigned long *args) |
1089 | { | |
1090 | struct audit_aux_data_socketcall *ax; | |
1091 | struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; | |
1092 | ||
1093 | if (likely(!context)) | |
1094 | return 0; | |
1095 | ||
1096 | ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax) + nargs * sizeof(unsigned long), GFP_KERNEL); | |
1097 | if (!ax) | |
1098 | return -ENOMEM; | |
1099 | ||
1100 | ax->nargs = nargs; | |
1101 | memcpy(ax->args, args, nargs * sizeof(unsigned long)); | |
1102 | ||
1103 | ax->d.type = AUDIT_SOCKETCALL; | |
1104 | ax->d.next = context->aux; | |
1105 | context->aux = (void *)ax; | |
1106 | return 0; | |
1107 | } | |
1108 | ||
1109 | int audit_sockaddr(int len, void *a) | |
1110 | { | |
1111 | struct audit_aux_data_sockaddr *ax; | |
1112 | struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; | |
1113 | ||
1114 | if (likely(!context)) | |
1115 | return 0; | |
1116 | ||
1117 | ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax) + len, GFP_KERNEL); | |
1118 | if (!ax) | |
1119 | return -ENOMEM; | |
1120 | ||
1121 | ax->len = len; | |
1122 | memcpy(ax->a, a, len); | |
1123 | ||
1124 | ax->d.type = AUDIT_SOCKADDR; | |
1125 | ax->d.next = context->aux; | |
1126 | context->aux = (void *)ax; | |
1127 | return 0; | |
1128 | } | |
1129 | ||
01116105 SS |
1130 | int audit_avc_path(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt) |
1131 | { | |
1132 | struct audit_aux_data_path *ax; | |
1133 | struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; | |
1134 | ||
1135 | if (likely(!context)) | |
1136 | return 0; | |
1137 | ||
1138 | ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_ATOMIC); | |
1139 | if (!ax) | |
1140 | return -ENOMEM; | |
1141 | ||
1142 | ax->dentry = dget(dentry); | |
1143 | ax->mnt = mntget(mnt); | |
1144 | ||
1145 | ax->d.type = AUDIT_AVC_PATH; | |
1146 | ax->d.next = context->aux; | |
1147 | context->aux = (void *)ax; | |
1148 | return 0; | |
1149 | } | |
1150 | ||
c2f0c7c3 SG |
1151 | void audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t) |
1152 | { | |
1153 | extern pid_t audit_sig_pid; | |
1154 | extern uid_t audit_sig_uid; | |
c2f0c7c3 SG |
1155 | |
1156 | if (unlikely(audit_pid && t->pid == audit_pid)) { | |
1157 | if (sig == SIGTERM || sig == SIGHUP) { | |
1158 | struct audit_context *ctx = current->audit_context; | |
1159 | audit_sig_pid = current->pid; | |
1160 | if (ctx) | |
1161 | audit_sig_uid = ctx->loginuid; | |
1162 | else | |
1163 | audit_sig_uid = current->uid; | |
1164 | } | |
1165 | } | |
1166 | } | |
1167 |