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1 | /** @file\r | |
2 | The operations for IKEv2 SA.\r | |
3 | \r | |
4 | Copyright (c) 2010 - 2011, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>\r | |
5 | \r | |
6 | This program and the accompanying materials\r | |
7 | are licensed and made available under the terms and conditions of the BSD License\r | |
8 | which accompanies this distribution. The full text of the license may be found at\r | |
9 | http://opensource.org/licenses/bsd-license.php.\r | |
10 | \r | |
11 | THE PROGRAM IS DISTRIBUTED UNDER THE BSD LICENSE ON AN "AS IS" BASIS,\r | |
12 | WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR REPRESENTATIONS OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED.\r | |
13 | \r | |
14 | **/\r | |
15 | \r | |
16 | #include "Utility.h"\r | |
17 | #include "IpSecDebug.h"\r | |
18 | #include "IkeService.h"\r | |
19 | #include "Ikev2.h"\r | |
20 | \r | |
21 | /**\r | |
22 | Generates the DH Key.\r | |
23 | \r | |
24 | This generates the DH local public key and store it in the IKEv2 SA Session's GxBuffer.\r | |
25 | \r | |
26 | @param[in] IkeSaSession Pointer to related IKE SA Session.\r | |
27 | \r | |
28 | @retval EFI_SUCCESS The operation succeeded.\r | |
29 | @retval Others The operation failed.\r | |
30 | \r | |
31 | **/\r | |
32 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
33 | Ikev2GenerateSaDhPublicKey (\r | |
34 | IN IKEV2_SA_SESSION *IkeSaSession\r | |
35 | );\r | |
36 | \r | |
37 | /**\r | |
38 | Generates the IKEv2 SA key for the furthure IKEv2 exchange.\r | |
39 | \r | |
40 | @param[in] IkeSaSession Pointer to IKEv2 SA Session.\r | |
41 | @param[in] KePayload Pointer to Key payload used to generate the Key.\r | |
42 | \r | |
43 | @retval EFI_UNSUPPORTED If the Algorithm Id is not supported.\r | |
44 | @retval EFI_SUCCESS The operation succeeded.\r | |
45 | \r | |
46 | **/\r | |
47 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
48 | Ikev2GenerateSaKeys (\r | |
49 | IN IKEV2_SA_SESSION *IkeSaSession,\r | |
50 | IN IKE_PAYLOAD *KePayload\r | |
51 | );\r | |
52 | \r | |
53 | /**\r | |
54 | Generates the Keys for the furthure IPsec Protocol.\r | |
55 | \r | |
56 | @param[in] ChildSaSession Pointer to IKE Child SA Session.\r | |
57 | @param[in] KePayload Pointer to Key payload used to generate the Key.\r | |
58 | \r | |
59 | @retval EFI_UNSUPPORTED If one or more Algorithm Id is unsupported.\r | |
60 | @retval EFI_SUCCESS The operation succeeded.\r | |
61 | \r | |
62 | **/\r | |
63 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
64 | Ikev2GenerateChildSaKeys (\r | |
65 | IN IKEV2_CHILD_SA_SESSION *ChildSaSession,\r | |
66 | IN IKE_PAYLOAD *KePayload\r | |
67 | );\r | |
68 | \r | |
69 | /**\r | |
70 | Gernerates IKEv2 packet for IKE_SA_INIT exchange.\r | |
71 | \r | |
72 | @param[in] SaSession Pointer to IKEV2_SA_SESSION related to the exchange.\r | |
73 | @param[in] Context Context Data passed by caller.\r | |
74 | \r | |
75 | @retval EFI_SUCCESS The IKEv2 packet generation succeeded.\r | |
76 | @retval Others The IKEv2 packet generation failed.\r | |
77 | \r | |
78 | **/\r | |
79 | IKE_PACKET *\r | |
80 | Ikev2InitPskGenerator (\r | |
81 | IN UINT8 *SaSession,\r | |
82 | IN VOID *Context\r | |
83 | )\r | |
84 | {\r | |
85 | IKE_PACKET *IkePacket;\r | |
86 | IKEV2_SA_SESSION *IkeSaSession;\r | |
87 | IKE_PAYLOAD *SaPayload;\r | |
88 | IKE_PAYLOAD *KePayload;\r | |
89 | IKE_PAYLOAD *NoncePayload;\r | |
90 | IKE_PAYLOAD *NotifyPayload;\r | |
91 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r | |
92 | \r | |
93 | SaPayload = NULL;\r | |
94 | KePayload = NULL;\r | |
95 | NoncePayload = NULL;\r | |
96 | NotifyPayload = NULL;\r | |
97 | \r | |
98 | IkeSaSession = (IKEV2_SA_SESSION *) SaSession;\r | |
99 | \r | |
100 | //\r | |
101 | // 1. Allocate IKE packet\r | |
102 | //\r | |
103 | IkePacket = IkePacketAlloc ();\r | |
104 | ASSERT (IkePacket != NULL);\r | |
105 | \r | |
106 | //\r | |
107 | // 1.a Fill the IkePacket->Hdr\r | |
108 | //\r | |
109 | IkePacket->Header->ExchangeType = IKEV2_EXCHANGE_TYPE_INIT;\r | |
110 | IkePacket->Header->InitiatorCookie = IkeSaSession->InitiatorCookie;\r | |
111 | IkePacket->Header->ResponderCookie = IkeSaSession->ResponderCookie;\r | |
112 | IkePacket->Header->Version = (UINT8) (2 << 4);\r | |
113 | IkePacket->Header->MessageId = 0;\r | |
114 | \r | |
115 | if (IkeSaSession->SessionCommon.IsInitiator) {\r | |
116 | IkePacket->Header->Flags = IKE_HEADER_FLAGS_INIT;\r | |
117 | } else {\r | |
118 | IkePacket->Header->Flags = IKE_HEADER_FLAGS_RESPOND;\r | |
119 | }\r | |
120 | \r | |
121 | //\r | |
122 | // If the NCookie is not NULL, this IKE_SA_INIT packet is resent by the NCookie\r | |
123 | // and the NCookie payload should be the first payload in this packet.\r | |
124 | //\r | |
125 | if (IkeSaSession->NCookie != NULL) {\r | |
126 | IkePacket->Header->NextPayload = IKEV2_PAYLOAD_TYPE_NOTIFY;\r | |
127 | NotifyPayload = Ikev2GenerateNotifyPayload (\r | |
128 | IPSEC_PROTO_ISAKMP,\r | |
129 | IKEV2_PAYLOAD_TYPE_SA,\r | |
130 | 0,\r | |
131 | IKEV2_NOTIFICATION_COOKIE,\r | |
132 | NULL,\r | |
133 | IkeSaSession->NCookie,\r | |
134 | IkeSaSession->NCookieSize\r | |
135 | );\r | |
136 | } else {\r | |
137 | IkePacket->Header->NextPayload = IKEV2_PAYLOAD_TYPE_SA;\r | |
138 | }\r | |
139 | \r | |
140 | //\r | |
141 | // 2. Generate SA Payload according to the SaData & SaParams\r | |
142 | //\r | |
143 | SaPayload = Ikev2GenerateSaPayload (\r | |
144 | IkeSaSession->SaData,\r | |
145 | IKEV2_PAYLOAD_TYPE_KE,\r | |
146 | IkeSessionTypeIkeSa\r | |
147 | );\r | |
148 | \r | |
149 | //\r | |
150 | // 3. Generate DH public key.\r | |
151 | // The DhPrivate Key has been generated in Ikev2InitPskParser, if the\r | |
152 | // IkeSaSession is responder. If resending IKE_SA_INIT with Cookie Notify\r | |
153 | // No need to recompute the Public key.\r | |
154 | //\r | |
155 | if ((IkeSaSession->SessionCommon.IsInitiator) && (IkeSaSession->NCookie == NULL)) { \r | |
156 | Status = Ikev2GenerateSaDhPublicKey (IkeSaSession);\r | |
157 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
158 | goto CheckError;\r | |
159 | }\r | |
160 | }\r | |
161 | \r | |
162 | //\r | |
163 | // 4. Generate KE Payload according to SaParams->DhGroup\r | |
164 | //\r | |
165 | KePayload = Ikev2GenerateKePayload (\r | |
166 | IkeSaSession, \r | |
167 | IKEV2_PAYLOAD_TYPE_NONCE\r | |
168 | );\r | |
169 | \r | |
170 | //\r | |
171 | // 5. Generate Nonce Payload\r | |
172 | // If resending IKE_SA_INIT with Cookie Notify paylaod, no need to regenerate\r | |
173 | // the Nonce Payload.\r | |
174 | //\r | |
175 | if ((IkeSaSession->SessionCommon.IsInitiator) && (IkeSaSession->NCookie == NULL)) {\r | |
176 | IkeSaSession->NiBlkSize = IKE_NONCE_SIZE;\r | |
177 | IkeSaSession->NiBlock = IkeGenerateNonce (IKE_NONCE_SIZE);\r | |
178 | ASSERT (IkeSaSession->NiBlock != NULL);\r | |
179 | }\r | |
180 | \r | |
181 | if (IkeSaSession->SessionCommon.IsInitiator) {\r | |
182 | NoncePayload = Ikev2GenerateNoncePayload (\r | |
183 | IkeSaSession->NiBlock,\r | |
184 | IkeSaSession->NiBlkSize,\r | |
185 | IKEV2_PAYLOAD_TYPE_NONE\r | |
186 | );\r | |
187 | } else {\r | |
188 | //\r | |
189 | // The Nonce Payload has been created in Ikev2PskParser if the IkeSaSession is\r | |
190 | // responder.\r | |
191 | //\r | |
192 | NoncePayload = Ikev2GenerateNoncePayload (\r | |
193 | IkeSaSession->NrBlock,\r | |
194 | IkeSaSession->NrBlkSize,\r | |
195 | IKEV2_PAYLOAD_TYPE_NONE\r | |
196 | );\r | |
197 | }\r | |
198 | \r | |
199 | if (NotifyPayload != NULL) {\r | |
200 | IKE_PACKET_APPEND_PAYLOAD (IkePacket, NotifyPayload);\r | |
201 | }\r | |
202 | if (SaPayload != NULL) {\r | |
203 | IKE_PACKET_APPEND_PAYLOAD (IkePacket, SaPayload);\r | |
204 | }\r | |
205 | if (KePayload != NULL) {\r | |
206 | IKE_PACKET_APPEND_PAYLOAD (IkePacket, KePayload);\r | |
207 | }\r | |
208 | if (NoncePayload != NULL) {\r | |
209 | IKE_PACKET_APPEND_PAYLOAD (IkePacket, NoncePayload);\r | |
210 | }\r | |
211 | \r | |
212 | return IkePacket;\r | |
213 | \r | |
214 | CheckError:\r | |
215 | if (IkePacket != NULL) {\r | |
216 | IkePacketFree (IkePacket);\r | |
217 | }\r | |
218 | if (SaPayload != NULL) {\r | |
219 | IkePayloadFree (SaPayload);\r | |
220 | }\r | |
221 | return NULL; \r | |
222 | }\r | |
223 | \r | |
224 | /**\r | |
225 | Parses the IKEv2 packet for IKE_SA_INIT exchange.\r | |
226 | \r | |
227 | @param[in] SaSession Pointer to IKEV2_SA_SESSION related to the exchange.\r | |
228 | @param[in] IkePacket The received IKE packet to be parsed.\r | |
229 | \r | |
230 | @retval EFI_SUCCESS The IKEv2 packet is acceptable and the relative data is\r | |
231 | saved for furthure communication.\r | |
232 | @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER The IKEv2 packet is malformed or the SA proposal is unacceptable.\r | |
233 | \r | |
234 | **/\r | |
235 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
236 | Ikev2InitPskParser (\r | |
237 | IN UINT8 *SaSession,\r | |
238 | IN IKE_PACKET *IkePacket\r | |
239 | ) \r | |
240 | {\r | |
241 | IKEV2_SA_SESSION *IkeSaSession;\r | |
242 | IKE_PAYLOAD *SaPayload;\r | |
243 | IKE_PAYLOAD *KeyPayload;\r | |
244 | IKE_PAYLOAD *IkePayload;\r | |
245 | IKE_PAYLOAD *NoncePayload;\r | |
246 | IKE_PAYLOAD *NotifyPayload;\r | |
247 | UINT8 *NonceBuffer;\r | |
248 | UINTN NonceSize;\r | |
249 | LIST_ENTRY *Entry;\r | |
250 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r | |
251 | \r | |
252 | IkeSaSession = (IKEV2_SA_SESSION *) SaSession;\r | |
253 | KeyPayload = NULL;\r | |
254 | SaPayload = NULL;\r | |
255 | NoncePayload = NULL;\r | |
256 | IkePayload = NULL;\r | |
257 | NotifyPayload = NULL;\r | |
258 | \r | |
259 | //\r | |
260 | // Iterate payloads to find the SaPayload and KeyPayload.\r | |
261 | //\r | |
262 | NET_LIST_FOR_EACH (Entry, &(IkePacket)->PayloadList) {\r | |
263 | IkePayload = IKE_PAYLOAD_BY_PACKET (Entry);\r | |
264 | if (IkePayload->PayloadType == IKEV2_PAYLOAD_TYPE_SA) {\r | |
265 | SaPayload = IkePayload;\r | |
266 | }\r | |
267 | if (IkePayload->PayloadType == IKEV2_PAYLOAD_TYPE_KE) {\r | |
268 | KeyPayload = IkePayload;\r | |
269 | }\r | |
270 | if (IkePayload->PayloadType == IKEV2_PAYLOAD_TYPE_NONCE) {\r | |
271 | NoncePayload = IkePayload;\r | |
272 | }\r | |
273 | if (IkePayload->PayloadType == IKEV2_PAYLOAD_TYPE_NOTIFY) {\r | |
274 | NotifyPayload = IkePayload;\r | |
275 | }\r | |
276 | }\r | |
277 | \r | |
278 | //\r | |
279 | // According to RFC 4306 - 2.6. If the responder responds with the COOKIE Notify\r | |
280 | // payload with the cookie data, initiator MUST retry the IKE_SA_INIT with a\r | |
281 | // Notify payload of type COOKIE containing the responder suppplied cookie data\r | |
282 | // as first payload and all other payloads unchanged.\r | |
283 | //\r | |
284 | if (IkeSaSession->SessionCommon.IsInitiator) {\r | |
285 | if (NotifyPayload != NULL) {\r | |
286 | Status = Ikev2ParserNotifyCookiePayload (NotifyPayload, IkeSaSession);\r | |
287 | return Status;\r | |
288 | }\r | |
289 | }\r | |
290 | \r | |
291 | if ((KeyPayload == NULL) || (SaPayload == NULL) || (NoncePayload == NULL)) {\r | |
292 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r | |
293 | }\r | |
294 | \r | |
295 | //\r | |
296 | // Store NoncePayload for SKEYID computing.\r | |
297 | //\r | |
298 | NonceSize = NoncePayload->PayloadSize - sizeof (IKEV2_COMMON_PAYLOAD_HEADER);\r | |
299 | NonceBuffer = (UINT8 *) AllocatePool (NonceSize);\r | |
300 | ASSERT (NonceBuffer != NULL);\r | |
301 | CopyMem (\r | |
302 | NonceBuffer,\r | |
303 | NoncePayload->PayloadBuf + sizeof (IKEV2_COMMON_PAYLOAD_HEADER),\r | |
304 | NonceSize\r | |
305 | );\r | |
306 | \r | |
307 | //\r | |
308 | // Check if IkePacket Header matches the state\r | |
309 | //\r | |
310 | if (IkeSaSession->SessionCommon.IsInitiator) {\r | |
311 | //\r | |
312 | // 1. Check the IkePacket->Hdr == IKE_HEADER_FLAGS_RESPOND\r | |
313 | //\r | |
314 | if (IkePacket->Header->Flags != IKE_HEADER_FLAGS_RESPOND) {\r | |
315 | Status = EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r | |
316 | goto CheckError;\r | |
317 | }\r | |
318 | \r | |
319 | //\r | |
320 | // 2. Parse the SA Payload and Key Payload to find out the cryptographic\r | |
321 | // suite and fill in the Sa paramse into CommonSession->SaParams\r | |
322 | //\r | |
323 | if (!Ikev2SaParseSaPayload (IkeSaSession, SaPayload, IkePacket->Header->Flags)) {\r | |
324 | Status = EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r | |
325 | goto CheckError;\r | |
326 | }\r | |
327 | \r | |
328 | //\r | |
329 | // 3. If Initiator, the NoncePayload is Nr_b.\r | |
330 | //\r | |
331 | IKEV2_DUMP_STATE (IkeSaSession->SessionCommon.State, IkeStateAuth);\r | |
332 | IkeSaSession->NrBlock = NonceBuffer;\r | |
333 | IkeSaSession->NrBlkSize = NonceSize;\r | |
334 | IkeSaSession->SessionCommon.State = IkeStateAuth;\r | |
335 | IkeSaSession->ResponderCookie = IkePacket->Header->ResponderCookie;\r | |
336 | \r | |
337 | //\r | |
338 | // 4. Change the state of IkeSaSession\r | |
339 | //\r | |
340 | IkeSaSession->SessionCommon.State = IkeStateAuth;\r | |
341 | } else {\r | |
342 | //\r | |
343 | // 1. Check the IkePacket->Hdr == IKE_HEADER_FLAGS_INIT\r | |
344 | //\r | |
345 | if (IkePacket->Header->Flags != IKE_HEADER_FLAGS_INIT) {\r | |
346 | Status = EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r | |
347 | goto CheckError;\r | |
348 | }\r | |
349 | \r | |
350 | //\r | |
351 | // 2. Parse the SA payload and find out the perfered one\r | |
352 | // and fill in the SA parameters into CommonSession->SaParams and SaData into\r | |
353 | // IkeSaSession for the responder SA payload generation.\r | |
354 | //\r | |
355 | if (!Ikev2SaParseSaPayload (IkeSaSession, SaPayload, IkePacket->Header->Flags)) {\r | |
356 | Status = EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r | |
357 | goto CheckError;\r | |
358 | }\r | |
359 | \r | |
360 | //\r | |
361 | // 3. Generat Dh Y parivate Key\r | |
362 | //\r | |
363 | Status = Ikev2GenerateSaDhPublicKey (IkeSaSession);\r | |
364 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
365 | goto CheckError;\r | |
366 | }\r | |
367 | \r | |
368 | //\r | |
369 | // 4. If Responder, the NoncePayload is Ni_b and go to generate Nr_b.\r | |
370 | //\r | |
371 | IkeSaSession->NiBlock = NonceBuffer;\r | |
372 | IkeSaSession->NiBlkSize = NonceSize;\r | |
373 | \r | |
374 | //\r | |
375 | // 5. Generate Nr_b\r | |
376 | //\r | |
377 | IkeSaSession->NrBlock = IkeGenerateNonce (IKE_NONCE_SIZE);\r | |
378 | ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (IkeSaSession->NrBlock != NULL);\r | |
379 | IkeSaSession->NrBlkSize = IKE_NONCE_SIZE;\r | |
380 | \r | |
381 | //\r | |
382 | // 6. Save the Cookies\r | |
383 | //\r | |
384 | IkeSaSession->InitiatorCookie = IkePacket->Header->InitiatorCookie;\r | |
385 | IkeSaSession->ResponderCookie = IkeGenerateCookie ();\r | |
386 | }\r | |
387 | \r | |
388 | if (IkeSaSession->SessionCommon.PreferDhGroup != ((IKEV2_KEY_EXCHANGE *)KeyPayload->PayloadBuf)->DhGroup) {\r | |
389 | Status = EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r | |
390 | goto CheckError;\r | |
391 | }\r | |
392 | //\r | |
393 | // Call Ikev2GenerateSaKeys to create SKEYID, SKEYID_d, SKEYID_a, SKEYID_e.\r | |
394 | //\r | |
395 | Status = Ikev2GenerateSaKeys (IkeSaSession, KeyPayload);\r | |
396 | if (EFI_ERROR(Status)) {\r | |
397 | goto CheckError;\r | |
398 | }\r | |
399 | return EFI_SUCCESS;\r | |
400 | \r | |
401 | CheckError:\r | |
402 | if (NonceBuffer != NULL) {\r | |
403 | FreePool (NonceBuffer);\r | |
404 | }\r | |
405 | \r | |
406 | return Status;\r | |
407 | }\r | |
408 | \r | |
409 | /**\r | |
410 | Generates the IKEv2 packet for IKE_AUTH exchange.\r | |
411 | \r | |
412 | @param[in] SaSession Pointer to IKEV2_SA_SESSION.\r | |
413 | @param[in] Context Context data passed by caller.\r | |
414 | \r | |
415 | @retval Pointer to IKE Packet to be sent out.\r | |
416 | \r | |
417 | **/\r | |
418 | IKE_PACKET *\r | |
419 | Ikev2AuthPskGenerator (\r | |
420 | IN UINT8 *SaSession,\r | |
421 | IN VOID *Context\r | |
422 | )\r | |
423 | {\r | |
424 | IKE_PACKET *IkePacket;\r | |
425 | IKEV2_SA_SESSION *IkeSaSession;\r | |
426 | IKE_PAYLOAD *IdPayload;\r | |
427 | IKE_PAYLOAD *AuthPayload;\r | |
428 | IKE_PAYLOAD *SaPayload;\r | |
429 | IKE_PAYLOAD *TsiPayload;\r | |
430 | IKE_PAYLOAD *TsrPayload;\r | |
431 | IKE_PAYLOAD *NotifyPayload;\r | |
432 | IKE_PAYLOAD *CpPayload;\r | |
433 | IKEV2_CHILD_SA_SESSION *ChildSaSession;\r | |
434 | \r | |
435 | \r | |
436 | IkeSaSession = (IKEV2_SA_SESSION *) SaSession;\r | |
437 | ChildSaSession = IKEV2_CHILD_SA_SESSION_BY_IKE_SA (GetFirstNode (&IkeSaSession->ChildSaSessionList));\r | |
438 | \r | |
439 | CpPayload = NULL;\r | |
440 | NotifyPayload = NULL;\r | |
441 | \r | |
442 | //\r | |
443 | // 1. Allocate IKE Packet\r | |
444 | //\r | |
445 | IkePacket= IkePacketAlloc ();\r | |
446 | ASSERT (IkePacket != NULL);\r | |
447 | \r | |
448 | //\r | |
449 | // 1.a Fill the IkePacket Header.\r | |
450 | //\r | |
451 | IkePacket->Header->ExchangeType = IKEV2_EXCHANGE_TYPE_AUTH;\r | |
452 | IkePacket->Header->InitiatorCookie = IkeSaSession->InitiatorCookie;\r | |
453 | IkePacket->Header->ResponderCookie = IkeSaSession->ResponderCookie;\r | |
454 | IkePacket->Header->Version = (UINT8)(2 << 4);\r | |
455 | if (ChildSaSession->SessionCommon.IsInitiator) {\r | |
456 | IkePacket->Header->NextPayload = IKEV2_PAYLOAD_TYPE_ID_INIT;\r | |
457 | } else {\r | |
458 | IkePacket->Header->NextPayload = IKEV2_PAYLOAD_TYPE_ID_RSP;\r | |
459 | }\r | |
460 | \r | |
461 | //\r | |
462 | // According to RFC4306_2.2, For the IKE_SA_INIT message the MessageID should \r | |
463 | // be always number 0 and 1;\r | |
464 | //\r | |
465 | IkePacket->Header->MessageId = 1;\r | |
466 | \r | |
467 | if (IkeSaSession->SessionCommon.IsInitiator) {\r | |
468 | IkePacket->Header->Flags = IKE_HEADER_FLAGS_INIT;\r | |
469 | } else {\r | |
470 | IkePacket->Header->Flags = IKE_HEADER_FLAGS_RESPOND;\r | |
471 | }\r | |
472 | \r | |
473 | //\r | |
474 | // 2. Generate ID Payload according to IP version and address.\r | |
475 | //\r | |
476 | IdPayload = Ikev2GenerateIdPayload (\r | |
477 | &IkeSaSession->SessionCommon,\r | |
478 | IKEV2_PAYLOAD_TYPE_AUTH\r | |
479 | );\r | |
480 | \r | |
481 | //\r | |
482 | // 3. Generate Auth Payload\r | |
483 | // If it is tunnel mode, should create the configuration payload after the\r | |
484 | // Auth payload.\r | |
485 | //\r | |
486 | if (IkeSaSession->Spd->Data->ProcessingPolicy->Mode == EfiIPsecTransport) {\r | |
487 | \r | |
488 | AuthPayload = Ikev2PskGenerateAuthPayload (\r | |
489 | ChildSaSession->IkeSaSession,\r | |
490 | IdPayload,\r | |
491 | IKEV2_PAYLOAD_TYPE_SA,\r | |
492 | FALSE\r | |
493 | );\r | |
494 | } else {\r | |
495 | AuthPayload = Ikev2PskGenerateAuthPayload (\r | |
496 | ChildSaSession->IkeSaSession,\r | |
497 | IdPayload,\r | |
498 | IKEV2_PAYLOAD_TYPE_CP,\r | |
499 | FALSE\r | |
500 | );\r | |
501 | if (IkeSaSession->SessionCommon.UdpService->IpVersion == IP_VERSION_4) {\r | |
502 | CpPayload = Ikev2GenerateCpPayload (\r | |
503 | ChildSaSession->IkeSaSession,\r | |
504 | IKEV2_PAYLOAD_TYPE_SA,\r | |
505 | IKEV2_CFG_ATTR_INTERNAL_IP4_ADDRESS\r | |
506 | );\r | |
507 | } else {\r | |
508 | CpPayload = Ikev2GenerateCpPayload (\r | |
509 | ChildSaSession->IkeSaSession,\r | |
510 | IKEV2_PAYLOAD_TYPE_SA,\r | |
511 | IKEV2_CFG_ATTR_INTERNAL_IP6_ADDRESS\r | |
512 | );\r | |
513 | }\r | |
514 | }\r | |
515 | \r | |
516 | //\r | |
517 | // 4. Generate SA Payload according to the SA Data in ChildSaSession\r | |
518 | //\r | |
519 | SaPayload = Ikev2GenerateSaPayload (\r | |
520 | ChildSaSession->SaData,\r | |
521 | IKEV2_PAYLOAD_TYPE_TS_INIT,\r | |
522 | IkeSessionTypeChildSa\r | |
523 | );\r | |
524 | \r | |
525 | if (IkeSaSession->Spd->Data->ProcessingPolicy->Mode == EfiIPsecTransport) {\r | |
526 | //\r | |
527 | // Generate Tsi and Tsr.\r | |
528 | //\r | |
529 | TsiPayload = Ikev2GenerateTsPayload (\r | |
530 | ChildSaSession,\r | |
531 | IKEV2_PAYLOAD_TYPE_TS_RSP,\r | |
532 | FALSE\r | |
533 | );\r | |
534 | \r | |
535 | TsrPayload = Ikev2GenerateTsPayload (\r | |
536 | ChildSaSession,\r | |
537 | IKEV2_PAYLOAD_TYPE_NOTIFY,\r | |
538 | FALSE\r | |
539 | );\r | |
540 | \r | |
541 | //\r | |
542 | // Generate Notify Payload. If transport mode, there should have Notify\r | |
543 | // payload with TRANSPORT_MODE notification.\r | |
544 | //\r | |
545 | NotifyPayload = Ikev2GenerateNotifyPayload (\r | |
546 | 0,\r | |
547 | IKEV2_PAYLOAD_TYPE_NONE,\r | |
548 | 0,\r | |
549 | IKEV2_NOTIFICATION_USE_TRANSPORT_MODE,\r | |
550 | NULL,\r | |
551 | NULL,\r | |
552 | 0\r | |
553 | );\r | |
554 | } else {\r | |
555 | //\r | |
556 | // Generate Tsr for Tunnel mode.\r | |
557 | //\r | |
558 | TsiPayload = Ikev2GenerateTsPayload (\r | |
559 | ChildSaSession,\r | |
560 | IKEV2_PAYLOAD_TYPE_TS_RSP,\r | |
561 | TRUE\r | |
562 | );\r | |
563 | TsrPayload = Ikev2GenerateTsPayload (\r | |
564 | ChildSaSession,\r | |
565 | IKEV2_PAYLOAD_TYPE_NONE,\r | |
566 | FALSE\r | |
567 | );\r | |
568 | }\r | |
569 | \r | |
570 | IKE_PACKET_APPEND_PAYLOAD (IkePacket, IdPayload);\r | |
571 | IKE_PACKET_APPEND_PAYLOAD (IkePacket, AuthPayload);\r | |
572 | if (IkeSaSession->Spd->Data->ProcessingPolicy->Mode == EfiIPsecTunnel) {\r | |
573 | IKE_PACKET_APPEND_PAYLOAD (IkePacket, CpPayload);\r | |
574 | }\r | |
575 | IKE_PACKET_APPEND_PAYLOAD (IkePacket, SaPayload);\r | |
576 | IKE_PACKET_APPEND_PAYLOAD (IkePacket, TsiPayload);\r | |
577 | IKE_PACKET_APPEND_PAYLOAD (IkePacket, TsrPayload);\r | |
578 | if (IkeSaSession->Spd->Data->ProcessingPolicy->Mode == EfiIPsecTransport) {\r | |
579 | IKE_PACKET_APPEND_PAYLOAD (IkePacket, NotifyPayload);\r | |
580 | }\r | |
581 | \r | |
582 | return IkePacket;\r | |
583 | }\r | |
584 | \r | |
585 | /**\r | |
586 | Parses IKE_AUTH packet.\r | |
587 | \r | |
588 | @param[in] SaSession Pointer to the IKE_SA_SESSION related to this packet.\r | |
589 | @param[in] IkePacket Pointer to the IKE_AUTH packet to be parsered.\r | |
590 | \r | |
591 | @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER The IKE packet is malformed or the SA \r | |
592 | proposal is unacceptable.\r | |
593 | @retval EFI_SUCCESS The IKE packet is acceptable and the\r | |
594 | relative data is saved for furthure communication.\r | |
595 | \r | |
596 | **/\r | |
597 | EFI_STATUS \r | |
598 | Ikev2AuthPskParser (\r | |
599 | IN UINT8 *SaSession,\r | |
600 | IN IKE_PACKET *IkePacket\r | |
601 | )\r | |
602 | {\r | |
603 | IKEV2_CHILD_SA_SESSION *ChildSaSession;\r | |
604 | IKEV2_SA_SESSION *IkeSaSession;\r | |
605 | IKE_PAYLOAD *IkePayload;\r | |
606 | IKE_PAYLOAD *SaPayload;\r | |
607 | IKE_PAYLOAD *IdiPayload;\r | |
608 | IKE_PAYLOAD *IdrPayload;\r | |
609 | IKE_PAYLOAD *AuthPayload;\r | |
610 | IKE_PAYLOAD *TsiPayload;\r | |
611 | IKE_PAYLOAD *TsrPayload;\r | |
612 | IKE_PAYLOAD *VerifiedAuthPayload;\r | |
613 | LIST_ENTRY *Entry;\r | |
614 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r | |
615 | \r | |
616 | IkeSaSession = (IKEV2_SA_SESSION *) SaSession;\r | |
617 | ChildSaSession = IKEV2_CHILD_SA_SESSION_BY_IKE_SA (GetFirstNode (&IkeSaSession->ChildSaSessionList));\r | |
618 | \r | |
619 | SaPayload = NULL;\r | |
620 | IdiPayload = NULL;\r | |
621 | IdrPayload = NULL;\r | |
622 | AuthPayload = NULL;\r | |
623 | TsiPayload = NULL;\r | |
624 | TsrPayload = NULL;\r | |
625 | \r | |
626 | //\r | |
627 | // Iterate payloads to find the SaPayload/ID/AUTH/TS Payload.\r | |
628 | //\r | |
629 | NET_LIST_FOR_EACH (Entry, &(IkePacket)->PayloadList) {\r | |
630 | IkePayload = IKE_PAYLOAD_BY_PACKET (Entry);\r | |
631 | \r | |
632 | if (IkePayload->PayloadType == IKEV2_PAYLOAD_TYPE_ID_INIT) {\r | |
633 | IdiPayload = IkePayload;\r | |
634 | }\r | |
635 | if (IkePayload->PayloadType == IKEV2_PAYLOAD_TYPE_ID_RSP) {\r | |
636 | IdrPayload = IkePayload;\r | |
637 | }\r | |
638 | if (IkePayload->PayloadType == IKEV2_PAYLOAD_TYPE_SA) {\r | |
639 | SaPayload = IkePayload;\r | |
640 | }\r | |
641 | if (IkePayload->PayloadType == IKEV2_PAYLOAD_TYPE_AUTH) {\r | |
642 | AuthPayload = IkePayload;\r | |
643 | }\r | |
644 | if (IkePayload->PayloadType == IKEV2_PAYLOAD_TYPE_TS_INIT) {\r | |
645 | TsiPayload = IkePayload;\r | |
646 | }\r | |
647 | if (IkePayload->PayloadType == IKEV2_PAYLOAD_TYPE_TS_RSP) {\r | |
648 | TsrPayload = IkePayload;\r | |
649 | }\r | |
650 | }\r | |
651 | \r | |
652 | if ((SaPayload == NULL) || (AuthPayload == NULL) || (TsiPayload == NULL) || (TsrPayload == NULL)) {\r | |
653 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r | |
654 | }\r | |
655 | if ((IdiPayload == NULL) && (IdrPayload == NULL)) {\r | |
656 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r | |
657 | }\r | |
658 | \r | |
659 | //\r | |
660 | // Check IkePacket Header is match the state\r | |
661 | //\r | |
662 | if (IkeSaSession->SessionCommon.IsInitiator) {\r | |
663 | \r | |
664 | //\r | |
665 | // 1. Check the IkePacket->Hdr == IKE_HEADER_FLAGS_RESPOND\r | |
666 | //\r | |
667 | if ((IkePacket->Header->Flags != IKE_HEADER_FLAGS_RESPOND) ||\r | |
668 | (IkePacket->Header->ExchangeType != IKEV2_EXCHANGE_TYPE_AUTH)\r | |
669 | ) {\r | |
670 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r | |
671 | }\r | |
672 | \r | |
673 | } else {\r | |
674 | //\r | |
675 | // 1. Check the IkePacket->Hdr == IKE_HEADER_FLAGS_INIT\r | |
676 | //\r | |
677 | if ((IkePacket->Header->Flags != IKE_HEADER_FLAGS_INIT) ||\r | |
678 | (IkePacket->Header->ExchangeType != IKEV2_EXCHANGE_TYPE_AUTH)\r | |
679 | ) {\r | |
680 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r | |
681 | }\r | |
682 | \r | |
683 | //\r | |
684 | // 2. Parse the SA payload and Key Payload and find out the perferable one\r | |
685 | // and fill in the Sa paramse into CommonSession->SaParams and SaData into\r | |
686 | // IkeSaSession for the responder SA payload generation.\r | |
687 | //\r | |
688 | }\r | |
689 | \r | |
690 | //\r | |
691 | // Verify the Auth Payload.\r | |
692 | //\r | |
693 | VerifiedAuthPayload = Ikev2PskGenerateAuthPayload (\r | |
694 | IkeSaSession,\r | |
695 | IkeSaSession->SessionCommon.IsInitiator ? IdrPayload : IdiPayload,\r | |
696 | IKEV2_PAYLOAD_TYPE_SA,\r | |
697 | TRUE\r | |
698 | );\r | |
699 | if ((VerifiedAuthPayload != NULL) &&\r | |
700 | (0 != CompareMem (\r | |
701 | VerifiedAuthPayload->PayloadBuf + sizeof (IKEV2_COMMON_PAYLOAD_HEADER),\r | |
702 | AuthPayload->PayloadBuf + sizeof (IKEV2_COMMON_PAYLOAD_HEADER),\r | |
703 | VerifiedAuthPayload->PayloadSize - sizeof (IKEV2_COMMON_PAYLOAD_HEADER)\r | |
704 | ))) {\r | |
705 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r | |
706 | };\r | |
707 | \r | |
708 | //\r | |
709 | // 3. Parse the SA Payload to find out the cryptographic suite\r | |
710 | // and fill in the Sa paramse into CommonSession->SaParams. If no acceptable\r | |
711 | // porposal found, return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER.\r | |
712 | //\r | |
713 | if (!Ikev2ChildSaParseSaPayload (ChildSaSession, SaPayload, IkePacket->Header->Flags)) {\r | |
714 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r | |
715 | }\r | |
716 | \r | |
717 | //\r | |
718 | // 4. Parse TSi, TSr payloads.\r | |
719 | //\r | |
720 | if ((((TRAFFIC_SELECTOR *)(TsiPayload->PayloadBuf + sizeof (IKEV2_TS)))->IpProtocolId !=\r | |
721 | ((TRAFFIC_SELECTOR *)(TsrPayload->PayloadBuf + sizeof (IKEV2_TS)))->IpProtocolId) &&\r | |
722 | (((TRAFFIC_SELECTOR *)(TsiPayload->PayloadBuf + sizeof (IKEV2_TS)))->IpProtocolId != 0) &&\r | |
723 | (((TRAFFIC_SELECTOR *)(TsrPayload->PayloadBuf + sizeof (IKEV2_TS)))->IpProtocolId != 0)\r | |
724 | ) {\r | |
725 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r | |
726 | }\r | |
727 | \r | |
728 | if (!IkeSaSession->SessionCommon.IsInitiator) {\r | |
729 | //\r | |
730 | //TODO:check the Port range. Only support any port and one certain port here.\r | |
731 | //\r | |
732 | ChildSaSession->ProtoId = ((TRAFFIC_SELECTOR *)(TsrPayload->PayloadBuf + sizeof (IKEV2_TS)))->IpProtocolId;\r | |
733 | ChildSaSession->LocalPort = ((TRAFFIC_SELECTOR *)(TsrPayload->PayloadBuf + sizeof (IKEV2_TS)))->StartPort;\r | |
734 | ChildSaSession->RemotePort = ((TRAFFIC_SELECTOR *)(TsiPayload->PayloadBuf + sizeof (IKEV2_TS)))->StartPort;\r | |
735 | //\r | |
736 | // Association a SPD with this SA.\r | |
737 | //\r | |
738 | Status = Ikev2ChildSaAssociateSpdEntry (ChildSaSession);\r | |
739 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
740 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r | |
741 | }\r | |
742 | //\r | |
743 | // Associate the IkeSaSession's SPD to the first ChildSaSession's SPD.\r | |
744 | //\r | |
745 | if (ChildSaSession->IkeSaSession->Spd == NULL) {\r | |
746 | ChildSaSession->IkeSaSession->Spd = ChildSaSession->Spd;\r | |
747 | Ikev2ChildSaSessionSpdSelectorCreate (ChildSaSession);\r | |
748 | }\r | |
749 | } else {\r | |
750 | //\r | |
751 | //TODO:check the Port range.\r | |
752 | //\r | |
753 | if ((((TRAFFIC_SELECTOR *)(TsrPayload->PayloadBuf + sizeof (IKEV2_TS)))->StartPort != 0) &&\r | |
754 | (((TRAFFIC_SELECTOR *)(TsrPayload->PayloadBuf + sizeof (IKEV2_TS)))->StartPort != ChildSaSession->RemotePort)\r | |
755 | ) {\r | |
756 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r | |
757 | } \r | |
758 | if ((((TRAFFIC_SELECTOR *)(TsiPayload->PayloadBuf + sizeof (IKEV2_TS)))->StartPort != 0) &&\r | |
759 | (((TRAFFIC_SELECTOR *)(TsiPayload->PayloadBuf + sizeof (IKEV2_TS)))->StartPort != ChildSaSession->LocalPort)\r | |
760 | ) {\r | |
761 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r | |
762 | }\r | |
763 | //\r | |
764 | // For the tunnel mode, it should add the vitual IP address into the SA's SPD Selector.\r | |
765 | //\r | |
766 | if (ChildSaSession->Spd->Data->ProcessingPolicy->Mode == EfiIPsecTunnel) {\r | |
767 | if (!ChildSaSession->IkeSaSession->SessionCommon.IsInitiator) {\r | |
768 | //\r | |
769 | // If it is tunnel mode, the UEFI part must be the initiator.\r | |
770 | //\r | |
771 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r | |
772 | }\r | |
773 | //\r | |
774 | // Get the Virtual IP address from the Tsi traffic selector. \r | |
775 | // TODO: check the CFG reply payload\r | |
776 | //\r | |
777 | CopyMem (\r | |
778 | &ChildSaSession->SpdSelector->LocalAddress[0].Address,\r | |
779 | TsiPayload->PayloadBuf + sizeof (IKEV2_TS) + sizeof (TRAFFIC_SELECTOR),\r | |
780 | (ChildSaSession->SessionCommon.UdpService->IpVersion == IP_VERSION_4) ?\r | |
781 | sizeof (EFI_IPv4_ADDRESS) : sizeof (EFI_IPv6_ADDRESS)\r | |
782 | );\r | |
783 | } \r | |
784 | }\r | |
785 | \r | |
786 | //\r | |
787 | // 5. Generate keymats for IPsec protocol.\r | |
788 | //\r | |
789 | Ikev2GenerateChildSaKeys (ChildSaSession, NULL);\r | |
790 | if (IkeSaSession->SessionCommon.IsInitiator) {\r | |
791 | //\r | |
792 | // 6. Change the state of IkeSaSession\r | |
793 | //\r | |
794 | IKEV2_DUMP_STATE (IkeSaSession->SessionCommon.State, IkeStateIkeSaEstablished);\r | |
795 | IkeSaSession->SessionCommon.State = IkeStateIkeSaEstablished;\r | |
796 | }\r | |
797 | \r | |
798 | return EFI_SUCCESS;\r | |
799 | }\r | |
800 | \r | |
801 | /**\r | |
802 | Gernerates IKEv2 packet for IKE_SA_INIT exchange.\r | |
803 | \r | |
804 | @param[in] SaSession Pointer to IKEV2_SA_SESSION related to the exchange.\r | |
805 | @param[in] Context Context Data passed by caller.\r | |
806 | \r | |
807 | @retval EFI_SUCCESS The IKE packet generation succeeded.\r | |
808 | @retval Others The IKE packet generation failed.\r | |
809 | \r | |
810 | **/\r | |
811 | IKE_PACKET*\r | |
812 | Ikev2InitCertGenerator (\r | |
813 | IN UINT8 *SaSession,\r | |
814 | IN VOID *Context\r | |
815 | ) \r | |
816 | {\r | |
817 | IKE_PACKET *IkePacket;\r | |
818 | IKE_PAYLOAD *CertReqPayload;\r | |
819 | LIST_ENTRY *Node;\r | |
820 | IKE_PAYLOAD *NoncePayload;\r | |
821 | \r | |
822 | if (!FeaturePcdGet (PcdIpsecCertificateEnabled)) {\r | |
823 | return NULL;\r | |
824 | }\r | |
825 | \r | |
826 | //\r | |
827 | // The first two messages exchange is same between PSK and Cert.\r | |
828 | //\r | |
829 | IkePacket = Ikev2InitPskGenerator (SaSession, Context);\r | |
830 | \r | |
831 | if ((IkePacket != NULL) && (!((IKEV2_SA_SESSION *)SaSession)->SessionCommon.IsInitiator)) {\r | |
832 | //\r | |
833 | // Add the Certification Request Payload\r | |
834 | //\r | |
835 | CertReqPayload = Ikev2GenerateCertificatePayload (\r | |
836 | (IKEV2_SA_SESSION *)SaSession,\r | |
837 | IKEV2_PAYLOAD_TYPE_NONE,\r | |
838 | (UINT8*)PcdGetPtr(PcdIpsecUefiCaFile),\r | |
839 | PcdGet32(PcdIpsecUefiCaFileSize),\r | |
840 | IKEV2_CERT_ENCODEING_HASH_AND_URL_OF_X509_CERT,\r | |
841 | TRUE\r | |
842 | );\r | |
843 | //\r | |
844 | // Change Nonce Payload Next payload type.\r | |
845 | //\r | |
846 | IKE_PACKET_END_PAYLOAD (IkePacket, Node);\r | |
847 | NoncePayload = IKE_PAYLOAD_BY_PACKET (Node);\r | |
848 | ((IKEV2_NONCE *)NoncePayload->PayloadBuf)->Header.NextPayload = IKEV2_PAYLOAD_TYPE_CERTREQ;\r | |
849 | \r | |
850 | //\r | |
851 | // Add Certification Request Payload\r | |
852 | //\r | |
853 | IKE_PACKET_APPEND_PAYLOAD (IkePacket, CertReqPayload);\r | |
854 | }\r | |
855 | \r | |
856 | return IkePacket;\r | |
857 | }\r | |
858 | \r | |
859 | /**\r | |
860 | Parses the IKEv2 packet for IKE_SA_INIT exchange.\r | |
861 | \r | |
862 | @param[in] SaSession Pointer to IKEV2_SA_SESSION related to the exchange.\r | |
863 | @param[in] IkePacket The received IKEv2 packet to be parsed.\r | |
864 | \r | |
865 | @retval EFI_SUCCESS The IKEv2 packet is acceptable and the relative data is\r | |
866 | saved for furthure communication.\r | |
867 | @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER The IKE packet is malformed or the SA proposal is unacceptable. \r | |
868 | @retval EFI_UNSUPPORTED The certificate authentication is not supported.\r | |
869 | \r | |
870 | **/\r | |
871 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
872 | Ikev2InitCertParser (\r | |
873 | IN UINT8 *SaSession,\r | |
874 | IN IKE_PACKET *IkePacket\r | |
875 | )\r | |
876 | {\r | |
877 | if (!FeaturePcdGet (PcdIpsecCertificateEnabled)) {\r | |
878 | return EFI_UNSUPPORTED;\r | |
879 | } \r | |
880 | \r | |
881 | //\r | |
882 | // The first two messages exchange is same between PSK and Cert.\r | |
883 | // Todo: Parse Certificate Request from responder Initial Exchange. \r | |
884 | //\r | |
885 | return Ikev2InitPskParser (SaSession, IkePacket);\r | |
886 | }\r | |
887 | \r | |
888 | /**\r | |
889 | Generates the IKEv2 packet for IKE_AUTH exchange.\r | |
890 | \r | |
891 | @param[in] SaSession Pointer to IKEV2_SA_SESSION.\r | |
892 | @param[in] Context Context data passed by caller.\r | |
893 | \r | |
894 | @retval Pointer to IKEv2 Packet to be sent out.\r | |
895 | \r | |
896 | **/\r | |
897 | IKE_PACKET *\r | |
898 | Ikev2AuthCertGenerator (\r | |
899 | IN UINT8 *SaSession,\r | |
900 | IN VOID *Context\r | |
901 | )\r | |
902 | {\r | |
903 | IKE_PACKET *IkePacket;\r | |
904 | IKEV2_SA_SESSION *IkeSaSession;\r | |
905 | IKE_PAYLOAD *IdPayload;\r | |
906 | IKE_PAYLOAD *AuthPayload;\r | |
907 | IKE_PAYLOAD *SaPayload;\r | |
908 | IKE_PAYLOAD *TsiPayload;\r | |
909 | IKE_PAYLOAD *TsrPayload;\r | |
910 | IKE_PAYLOAD *NotifyPayload;\r | |
911 | IKE_PAYLOAD *CpPayload;\r | |
912 | IKE_PAYLOAD *CertPayload;\r | |
913 | IKE_PAYLOAD *CertReqPayload;\r | |
914 | IKEV2_CHILD_SA_SESSION *ChildSaSession;\r | |
915 | \r | |
916 | if (!FeaturePcdGet (PcdIpsecCertificateEnabled)) {\r | |
917 | return NULL;\r | |
918 | }\r | |
919 | \r | |
920 | IkeSaSession = (IKEV2_SA_SESSION *) SaSession;\r | |
921 | ChildSaSession = IKEV2_CHILD_SA_SESSION_BY_IKE_SA (GetFirstNode (&IkeSaSession->ChildSaSessionList));\r | |
922 | \r | |
923 | CpPayload = NULL;\r | |
924 | NotifyPayload = NULL;\r | |
925 | CertPayload = NULL;\r | |
926 | CertReqPayload = NULL;\r | |
927 | \r | |
928 | //\r | |
929 | // 1. Allocate IKE Packet\r | |
930 | //\r | |
931 | IkePacket= IkePacketAlloc ();\r | |
932 | ASSERT (IkePacket != NULL);\r | |
933 | \r | |
934 | //\r | |
935 | // 1.a Fill the IkePacket Header.\r | |
936 | //\r | |
937 | IkePacket->Header->ExchangeType = IKEV2_EXCHANGE_TYPE_AUTH;\r | |
938 | IkePacket->Header->InitiatorCookie = IkeSaSession->InitiatorCookie;\r | |
939 | IkePacket->Header->ResponderCookie = IkeSaSession->ResponderCookie;\r | |
940 | IkePacket->Header->Version = (UINT8)(2 << 4);\r | |
941 | if (ChildSaSession->SessionCommon.IsInitiator) {\r | |
942 | IkePacket->Header->NextPayload = IKEV2_PAYLOAD_TYPE_ID_INIT;\r | |
943 | } else {\r | |
944 | IkePacket->Header->NextPayload = IKEV2_PAYLOAD_TYPE_ID_RSP;\r | |
945 | }\r | |
946 | \r | |
947 | //\r | |
948 | // According to RFC4306_2.2, For the IKE_SA_INIT message the MessageID should\r | |
949 | // be always number 0 and 1;\r | |
950 | //\r | |
951 | IkePacket->Header->MessageId = 1;\r | |
952 | \r | |
953 | if (IkeSaSession->SessionCommon.IsInitiator) {\r | |
954 | IkePacket->Header->Flags = IKE_HEADER_FLAGS_INIT;\r | |
955 | } else {\r | |
956 | IkePacket->Header->Flags = IKE_HEADER_FLAGS_RESPOND;\r | |
957 | }\r | |
958 | \r | |
959 | //\r | |
960 | // 2. Generate ID Payload according to IP version and address.\r | |
961 | //\r | |
962 | IdPayload = Ikev2GenerateCertIdPayload (\r | |
963 | &IkeSaSession->SessionCommon,\r | |
964 | IKEV2_PAYLOAD_TYPE_CERT,\r | |
965 | (UINT8 *)PcdGetPtr (PcdIpsecUefiCertificate),\r | |
966 | PcdGet32 (PcdIpsecUefiCertificateSize)\r | |
967 | );\r | |
968 | \r | |
969 | //\r | |
970 | // 3. Generate Certificate Payload\r | |
971 | //\r | |
972 | CertPayload = Ikev2GenerateCertificatePayload (\r | |
973 | IkeSaSession,\r | |
974 | (UINT8)(IkeSaSession->SessionCommon.IsInitiator ? IKEV2_PAYLOAD_TYPE_CERTREQ : IKEV2_PAYLOAD_TYPE_AUTH),\r | |
975 | (UINT8 *)PcdGetPtr (PcdIpsecUefiCertificate),\r | |
976 | PcdGet32 (PcdIpsecUefiCertificateSize),\r | |
977 | IKEV2_CERT_ENCODEING_X509_CERT_SIGN,\r | |
978 | FALSE\r | |
979 | );\r | |
980 | if (IkeSaSession->SessionCommon.IsInitiator) {\r | |
981 | CertReqPayload = Ikev2GenerateCertificatePayload (\r | |
982 | IkeSaSession,\r | |
983 | IKEV2_PAYLOAD_TYPE_AUTH,\r | |
984 | (UINT8 *)PcdGetPtr (PcdIpsecUefiCertificate),\r | |
985 | PcdGet32 (PcdIpsecUefiCertificateSize),\r | |
986 | IKEV2_CERT_ENCODEING_HASH_AND_URL_OF_X509_CERT,\r | |
987 | TRUE\r | |
988 | );\r | |
989 | }\r | |
990 | \r | |
991 | //\r | |
992 | // 4. Generate Auth Payload\r | |
993 | // If it is tunnel mode, should create the configuration payload after the\r | |
994 | // Auth payload.\r | |
995 | //\r | |
996 | if (IkeSaSession->Spd->Data->ProcessingPolicy->Mode == EfiIPsecTransport) {\r | |
997 | AuthPayload = Ikev2CertGenerateAuthPayload (\r | |
998 | ChildSaSession->IkeSaSession,\r | |
999 | IdPayload,\r | |
1000 | IKEV2_PAYLOAD_TYPE_SA,\r | |
1001 | FALSE,\r | |
1002 | (UINT8 *)PcdGetPtr (PcdIpsecUefiCertificateKey),\r | |
1003 | PcdGet32 (PcdIpsecUefiCertificateKeySize),\r | |
1004 | ChildSaSession->IkeSaSession->Pad->Data->AuthData,\r | |
1005 | ChildSaSession->IkeSaSession->Pad->Data->AuthDataSize\r | |
1006 | );\r | |
1007 | } else {\r | |
1008 | AuthPayload = Ikev2CertGenerateAuthPayload (\r | |
1009 | ChildSaSession->IkeSaSession,\r | |
1010 | IdPayload,\r | |
1011 | IKEV2_PAYLOAD_TYPE_CP,\r | |
1012 | FALSE,\r | |
1013 | (UINT8 *)PcdGetPtr (PcdIpsecUefiCertificateKey),\r | |
1014 | PcdGet32 (PcdIpsecUefiCertificateKeySize),\r | |
1015 | ChildSaSession->IkeSaSession->Pad->Data->AuthData,\r | |
1016 | ChildSaSession->IkeSaSession->Pad->Data->AuthDataSize\r | |
1017 | );\r | |
1018 | if (IkeSaSession->SessionCommon.UdpService->IpVersion == IP_VERSION_4) {\r | |
1019 | CpPayload = Ikev2GenerateCpPayload (\r | |
1020 | ChildSaSession->IkeSaSession,\r | |
1021 | IKEV2_PAYLOAD_TYPE_SA,\r | |
1022 | IKEV2_CFG_ATTR_INTERNAL_IP4_ADDRESS\r | |
1023 | );\r | |
1024 | } else {\r | |
1025 | CpPayload = Ikev2GenerateCpPayload (\r | |
1026 | ChildSaSession->IkeSaSession,\r | |
1027 | IKEV2_PAYLOAD_TYPE_SA,\r | |
1028 | IKEV2_CFG_ATTR_INTERNAL_IP6_ADDRESS\r | |
1029 | );\r | |
1030 | }\r | |
1031 | }\r | |
1032 | \r | |
1033 | //\r | |
1034 | // 5. Generate SA Payload according to the Sa Data in ChildSaSession\r | |
1035 | //\r | |
1036 | SaPayload = Ikev2GenerateSaPayload (\r | |
1037 | ChildSaSession->SaData,\r | |
1038 | IKEV2_PAYLOAD_TYPE_TS_INIT,\r | |
1039 | IkeSessionTypeChildSa\r | |
1040 | );\r | |
1041 | \r | |
1042 | if (IkeSaSession->Spd->Data->ProcessingPolicy->Mode == EfiIPsecTransport) {\r | |
1043 | //\r | |
1044 | // Generate Tsi and Tsr.\r | |
1045 | //\r | |
1046 | TsiPayload = Ikev2GenerateTsPayload (\r | |
1047 | ChildSaSession,\r | |
1048 | IKEV2_PAYLOAD_TYPE_TS_RSP,\r | |
1049 | FALSE\r | |
1050 | );\r | |
1051 | \r | |
1052 | TsrPayload = Ikev2GenerateTsPayload (\r | |
1053 | ChildSaSession,\r | |
1054 | IKEV2_PAYLOAD_TYPE_NOTIFY,\r | |
1055 | FALSE\r | |
1056 | );\r | |
1057 | \r | |
1058 | //\r | |
1059 | // Generate Notify Payload. If transport mode, there should have Notify \r | |
1060 | // payload with TRANSPORT_MODE notification.\r | |
1061 | //\r | |
1062 | NotifyPayload = Ikev2GenerateNotifyPayload (\r | |
1063 | 0,\r | |
1064 | IKEV2_PAYLOAD_TYPE_NONE,\r | |
1065 | 0,\r | |
1066 | IKEV2_NOTIFICATION_USE_TRANSPORT_MODE,\r | |
1067 | NULL,\r | |
1068 | NULL,\r | |
1069 | 0\r | |
1070 | );\r | |
1071 | } else {\r | |
1072 | //\r | |
1073 | // Generate Tsr for Tunnel mode.\r | |
1074 | //\r | |
1075 | TsiPayload = Ikev2GenerateTsPayload (\r | |
1076 | ChildSaSession,\r | |
1077 | IKEV2_PAYLOAD_TYPE_TS_RSP,\r | |
1078 | TRUE\r | |
1079 | );\r | |
1080 | TsrPayload = Ikev2GenerateTsPayload (\r | |
1081 | ChildSaSession,\r | |
1082 | IKEV2_PAYLOAD_TYPE_NONE,\r | |
1083 | FALSE\r | |
1084 | );\r | |
1085 | }\r | |
1086 | \r | |
1087 | IKE_PACKET_APPEND_PAYLOAD (IkePacket, IdPayload);\r | |
1088 | IKE_PACKET_APPEND_PAYLOAD (IkePacket, CertPayload);\r | |
1089 | if (IkeSaSession->SessionCommon.IsInitiator) {\r | |
1090 | IKE_PACKET_APPEND_PAYLOAD (IkePacket, CertReqPayload);\r | |
1091 | }\r | |
1092 | IKE_PACKET_APPEND_PAYLOAD (IkePacket, AuthPayload);\r | |
1093 | if (IkeSaSession->Spd->Data->ProcessingPolicy->Mode == EfiIPsecTunnel) {\r | |
1094 | IKE_PACKET_APPEND_PAYLOAD (IkePacket, CpPayload);\r | |
1095 | }\r | |
1096 | IKE_PACKET_APPEND_PAYLOAD (IkePacket, SaPayload);\r | |
1097 | IKE_PACKET_APPEND_PAYLOAD (IkePacket, TsiPayload);\r | |
1098 | IKE_PACKET_APPEND_PAYLOAD (IkePacket, TsrPayload);\r | |
1099 | if (IkeSaSession->Spd->Data->ProcessingPolicy->Mode == EfiIPsecTransport) {\r | |
1100 | IKE_PACKET_APPEND_PAYLOAD (IkePacket, NotifyPayload);\r | |
1101 | }\r | |
1102 | \r | |
1103 | return IkePacket;\r | |
1104 | }\r | |
1105 | \r | |
1106 | /**\r | |
1107 | Parses IKE_AUTH packet.\r | |
1108 | \r | |
1109 | @param[in] SaSession Pointer to the IKE_SA_SESSION related to this packet.\r | |
1110 | @param[in] IkePacket Pointer to the IKE_AUTH packet to be parsered.\r | |
1111 | \r | |
1112 | @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER The IKEv2 packet is malformed or the SA\r | |
1113 | proposal is unacceptable.\r | |
1114 | @retval EFI_SUCCESS The IKE packet is acceptable and the\r | |
1115 | relative data is saved for furthure communication.\r | |
1116 | @retval EFI_UNSUPPORTED The certificate authentication is not supported.\r | |
1117 | \r | |
1118 | **/\r | |
1119 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
1120 | Ikev2AuthCertParser (\r | |
1121 | IN UINT8 *SaSession,\r | |
1122 | IN IKE_PACKET *IkePacket\r | |
1123 | )\r | |
1124 | {\r | |
1125 | IKEV2_CHILD_SA_SESSION *ChildSaSession;\r | |
1126 | IKEV2_SA_SESSION *IkeSaSession;\r | |
1127 | IKE_PAYLOAD *IkePayload;\r | |
1128 | IKE_PAYLOAD *SaPayload;\r | |
1129 | IKE_PAYLOAD *IdiPayload;\r | |
1130 | IKE_PAYLOAD *IdrPayload;\r | |
1131 | IKE_PAYLOAD *AuthPayload;\r | |
1132 | IKE_PAYLOAD *TsiPayload;\r | |
1133 | IKE_PAYLOAD *TsrPayload;\r | |
1134 | IKE_PAYLOAD *CertPayload;\r | |
1135 | IKE_PAYLOAD *CertReqPayload;\r | |
1136 | IKE_PAYLOAD *VerifiedAuthPayload;\r | |
1137 | LIST_ENTRY *Entry;\r | |
1138 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r | |
1139 | \r | |
1140 | if (!FeaturePcdGet (PcdIpsecCertificateEnabled)) {\r | |
1141 | return EFI_UNSUPPORTED;\r | |
1142 | }\r | |
1143 | \r | |
1144 | IkeSaSession = (IKEV2_SA_SESSION *) SaSession;\r | |
1145 | ChildSaSession = IKEV2_CHILD_SA_SESSION_BY_IKE_SA (GetFirstNode (&IkeSaSession->ChildSaSessionList));\r | |
1146 | \r | |
1147 | SaPayload = NULL;\r | |
1148 | IdiPayload = NULL;\r | |
1149 | IdrPayload = NULL;\r | |
1150 | AuthPayload = NULL;\r | |
1151 | TsiPayload = NULL;\r | |
1152 | TsrPayload = NULL;\r | |
1153 | CertPayload = NULL;\r | |
1154 | CertReqPayload = NULL;\r | |
1155 | VerifiedAuthPayload = NULL;\r | |
1156 | Status = EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r | |
1157 | \r | |
1158 | //\r | |
1159 | // Iterate payloads to find the SaPayload/ID/AUTH/TS Payload.\r | |
1160 | //\r | |
1161 | NET_LIST_FOR_EACH (Entry, &(IkePacket)->PayloadList) {\r | |
1162 | IkePayload = IKE_PAYLOAD_BY_PACKET (Entry);\r | |
1163 | \r | |
1164 | if (IkePayload->PayloadType == IKEV2_PAYLOAD_TYPE_ID_INIT) {\r | |
1165 | IdiPayload = IkePayload;\r | |
1166 | }\r | |
1167 | if (IkePayload->PayloadType == IKEV2_PAYLOAD_TYPE_ID_RSP) {\r | |
1168 | IdrPayload = IkePayload;\r | |
1169 | }\r | |
1170 | \r | |
1171 | if (IkePayload->PayloadType == IKEV2_PAYLOAD_TYPE_SA) {\r | |
1172 | SaPayload = IkePayload;\r | |
1173 | }\r | |
1174 | if (IkePayload->PayloadType == IKEV2_PAYLOAD_TYPE_AUTH) {\r | |
1175 | AuthPayload = IkePayload;\r | |
1176 | }\r | |
1177 | if (IkePayload->PayloadType == IKEV2_PAYLOAD_TYPE_TS_INIT) {\r | |
1178 | TsiPayload = IkePayload;\r | |
1179 | }\r | |
1180 | if (IkePayload->PayloadType == IKEV2_PAYLOAD_TYPE_TS_RSP) {\r | |
1181 | TsrPayload = IkePayload;\r | |
1182 | }\r | |
1183 | if (IkePayload->PayloadType == IKEV2_PAYLOAD_TYPE_CERT) {\r | |
1184 | CertPayload = IkePayload;\r | |
1185 | }\r | |
1186 | if (IkePayload->PayloadType == IKEV2_PAYLOAD_TYPE_CERTREQ) {\r | |
1187 | CertReqPayload = IkePayload;\r | |
1188 | }\r | |
1189 | }\r | |
1190 | \r | |
1191 | if ((SaPayload == NULL) || (AuthPayload == NULL) || (TsiPayload == NULL) || \r | |
1192 | (TsrPayload == NULL) || (CertPayload == NULL)) {\r | |
1193 | goto Exit;\r | |
1194 | }\r | |
1195 | if ((IdiPayload == NULL) && (IdrPayload == NULL)) {\r | |
1196 | goto Exit;\r | |
1197 | }\r | |
1198 | \r | |
1199 | //\r | |
1200 | // Check IkePacket Header is match the state\r | |
1201 | //\r | |
1202 | if (IkeSaSession->SessionCommon.IsInitiator) {\r | |
1203 | \r | |
1204 | //\r | |
1205 | // 1. Check the IkePacket->Hdr == IKE_HEADER_FLAGS_RESPOND\r | |
1206 | //\r | |
1207 | if ((IkePacket->Header->Flags != IKE_HEADER_FLAGS_RESPOND) ||\r | |
1208 | (IkePacket->Header->ExchangeType != IKEV2_EXCHANGE_TYPE_AUTH)) {\r | |
1209 | goto Exit;\r | |
1210 | }\r | |
1211 | } else {\r | |
1212 | //\r | |
1213 | // 1. Check the IkePacket->Hdr == IKE_HEADER_FLAGS_INIT\r | |
1214 | //\r | |
1215 | if ((IkePacket->Header->Flags != IKE_HEADER_FLAGS_INIT) ||\r | |
1216 | (IkePacket->Header->ExchangeType != IKEV2_EXCHANGE_TYPE_AUTH)) {\r | |
1217 | goto Exit;\r | |
1218 | }\r | |
1219 | }\r | |
1220 | \r | |
1221 | //\r | |
1222 | // Verify the Auth Payload.\r | |
1223 | //\r | |
1224 | VerifiedAuthPayload = Ikev2CertGenerateAuthPayload (\r | |
1225 | IkeSaSession,\r | |
1226 | IkeSaSession->SessionCommon.IsInitiator ? IdrPayload:IdiPayload,\r | |
1227 | IKEV2_PAYLOAD_TYPE_SA,\r | |
1228 | TRUE,\r | |
1229 | NULL,\r | |
1230 | 0,\r | |
1231 | NULL,\r | |
1232 | 0\r | |
1233 | );\r | |
1234 | \r | |
1235 | if ((VerifiedAuthPayload != NULL) &&\r | |
1236 | (!IpSecCryptoIoVerifySignDataByCertificate (\r | |
1237 | CertPayload->PayloadBuf + sizeof (IKEV2_CERT),\r | |
1238 | CertPayload->PayloadSize - sizeof (IKEV2_CERT),\r | |
1239 | (UINT8 *)PcdGetPtr (PcdIpsecUefiCaFile),\r | |
1240 | PcdGet32 (PcdIpsecUefiCaFileSize),\r | |
1241 | VerifiedAuthPayload->PayloadBuf + sizeof (IKEV2_AUTH),\r | |
1242 | VerifiedAuthPayload->PayloadSize - sizeof (IKEV2_AUTH),\r | |
1243 | AuthPayload->PayloadBuf + sizeof (IKEV2_AUTH),\r | |
1244 | AuthPayload->PayloadSize - sizeof (IKEV2_AUTH)\r | |
1245 | ))) {\r | |
1246 | goto Exit;\r | |
1247 | }\r | |
1248 | \r | |
1249 | //\r | |
1250 | // 3. Parse the SA Payload to find out the cryptographic suite\r | |
1251 | // and fill in the SA paramse into CommonSession->SaParams. If no acceptable\r | |
1252 | // porposal found, return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER.\r | |
1253 | //\r | |
1254 | if (!Ikev2ChildSaParseSaPayload (ChildSaSession, SaPayload, IkePacket->Header->Flags)) {\r | |
1255 | goto Exit;\r | |
1256 | }\r | |
1257 | \r | |
1258 | //\r | |
1259 | // 4. Parse TSi, TSr payloads.\r | |
1260 | //\r | |
1261 | if ((((TRAFFIC_SELECTOR *)(TsiPayload->PayloadBuf + sizeof (IKEV2_TS)))->IpProtocolId !=\r | |
1262 | ((TRAFFIC_SELECTOR *)(TsrPayload->PayloadBuf + sizeof (IKEV2_TS)))->IpProtocolId) &&\r | |
1263 | (((TRAFFIC_SELECTOR *)(TsiPayload->PayloadBuf + sizeof (IKEV2_TS)))->IpProtocolId != 0) &&\r | |
1264 | (((TRAFFIC_SELECTOR *)(TsrPayload->PayloadBuf + sizeof (IKEV2_TS)))->IpProtocolId != 0)\r | |
1265 | ) {\r | |
1266 | goto Exit;\r | |
1267 | }\r | |
1268 | \r | |
1269 | if (!IkeSaSession->SessionCommon.IsInitiator) {\r | |
1270 | //\r | |
1271 | //Todo:check the Port range. Only support any port and one certain port here.\r | |
1272 | //\r | |
1273 | ChildSaSession->ProtoId = ((TRAFFIC_SELECTOR *)(TsrPayload->PayloadBuf + sizeof (IKEV2_TS)))->IpProtocolId;\r | |
1274 | ChildSaSession->LocalPort = ((TRAFFIC_SELECTOR *)(TsrPayload->PayloadBuf + sizeof (IKEV2_TS)))->StartPort;\r | |
1275 | ChildSaSession->RemotePort = ((TRAFFIC_SELECTOR *)(TsiPayload->PayloadBuf + sizeof (IKEV2_TS)))->StartPort;\r | |
1276 | //\r | |
1277 | // Association a SPD with this SA.\r | |
1278 | //\r | |
1279 | if (EFI_ERROR (Ikev2ChildSaAssociateSpdEntry (ChildSaSession))) {\r | |
1280 | goto Exit;\r | |
1281 | }\r | |
1282 | //\r | |
1283 | // Associate the IkeSaSession's SPD to the first ChildSaSession's SPD.\r | |
1284 | //\r | |
1285 | if (ChildSaSession->IkeSaSession->Spd == NULL) {\r | |
1286 | ChildSaSession->IkeSaSession->Spd = ChildSaSession->Spd;\r | |
1287 | Ikev2ChildSaSessionSpdSelectorCreate (ChildSaSession);\r | |
1288 | }\r | |
1289 | } else {\r | |
1290 | //\r | |
1291 | // Todo:check the Port range.\r | |
1292 | //\r | |
1293 | if ((((TRAFFIC_SELECTOR *)(TsrPayload->PayloadBuf + sizeof (IKEV2_TS)))->StartPort != 0) &&\r | |
1294 | (((TRAFFIC_SELECTOR *)(TsrPayload->PayloadBuf + sizeof (IKEV2_TS)))->StartPort != ChildSaSession->RemotePort)\r | |
1295 | ) {\r | |
1296 | goto Exit;\r | |
1297 | } \r | |
1298 | if ((((TRAFFIC_SELECTOR *)(TsiPayload->PayloadBuf + sizeof (IKEV2_TS)))->StartPort != 0) &&\r | |
1299 | (((TRAFFIC_SELECTOR *)(TsiPayload->PayloadBuf + sizeof (IKEV2_TS)))->StartPort != ChildSaSession->LocalPort)\r | |
1300 | ) {\r | |
1301 | goto Exit;\r | |
1302 | }\r | |
1303 | //\r | |
1304 | // For the tunnel mode, it should add the vitual IP address into the SA's SPD Selector.\r | |
1305 | //\r | |
1306 | if (ChildSaSession->Spd->Data->ProcessingPolicy->Mode == EfiIPsecTunnel) {\r | |
1307 | if (!ChildSaSession->IkeSaSession->SessionCommon.IsInitiator) {\r | |
1308 | //\r | |
1309 | // If it is tunnel mode, the UEFI part must be the initiator.\r | |
1310 | //\r | |
1311 | goto Exit;\r | |
1312 | }\r | |
1313 | //\r | |
1314 | // Get the Virtual IP address from the Tsi traffic selector. \r | |
1315 | // TODO: check the CFG reply payload\r | |
1316 | //\r | |
1317 | CopyMem (\r | |
1318 | &ChildSaSession->SpdSelector->LocalAddress[0].Address,\r | |
1319 | TsiPayload->PayloadBuf + sizeof (IKEV2_TS) + sizeof (TRAFFIC_SELECTOR),\r | |
1320 | (ChildSaSession->SessionCommon.UdpService->IpVersion == IP_VERSION_4) ?\r | |
1321 | sizeof (EFI_IPv4_ADDRESS) : sizeof (EFI_IPv6_ADDRESS)\r | |
1322 | );\r | |
1323 | }\r | |
1324 | }\r | |
1325 | \r | |
1326 | //\r | |
1327 | // 5. Generat keymats for IPsec protocol.\r | |
1328 | //\r | |
1329 | Ikev2GenerateChildSaKeys (ChildSaSession, NULL);\r | |
1330 | if (IkeSaSession->SessionCommon.IsInitiator) {\r | |
1331 | //\r | |
1332 | // 6. Change the state of IkeSaSession\r | |
1333 | //\r | |
1334 | IKEV2_DUMP_STATE (IkeSaSession->SessionCommon.State, IkeStateIkeSaEstablished);\r | |
1335 | IkeSaSession->SessionCommon.State = IkeStateIkeSaEstablished;\r | |
1336 | }\r | |
1337 | \r | |
1338 | Status = EFI_SUCCESS;\r | |
1339 | \r | |
1340 | Exit:\r | |
1341 | if (VerifiedAuthPayload != NULL) {\r | |
1342 | IkePayloadFree (VerifiedAuthPayload);\r | |
1343 | }\r | |
1344 | return Status;\r | |
1345 | }\r | |
1346 | \r | |
1347 | /**\r | |
1348 | Generates the DH Public Key.\r | |
1349 | \r | |
1350 | This generates the DH local public key and store it in the IKE SA Session's GxBuffer.\r | |
1351 | \r | |
1352 | @param[in] IkeSaSession Pointer to related IKE SA Session.\r | |
1353 | \r | |
1354 | @retval EFI_SUCCESS The operation succeeded.\r | |
1355 | @retval Others The operation failed.\r | |
1356 | \r | |
1357 | **/\r | |
1358 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
1359 | Ikev2GenerateSaDhPublicKey (\r | |
1360 | IN IKEV2_SA_SESSION *IkeSaSession\r | |
1361 | )\r | |
1362 | {\r | |
1363 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r | |
1364 | IKEV2_SESSION_KEYS *IkeKeys;\r | |
1365 | \r | |
1366 | IkeSaSession->IkeKeys = AllocateZeroPool (sizeof (IKEV2_SESSION_KEYS));\r | |
1367 | ASSERT (IkeSaSession->IkeKeys != NULL);\r | |
1368 | IkeKeys = IkeSaSession->IkeKeys;\r | |
1369 | IkeKeys->DhBuffer = AllocateZeroPool (sizeof (IKEV2_DH_BUFFER));\r | |
1370 | ASSERT (IkeKeys->DhBuffer != NULL);\r | |
1371 | \r | |
1372 | //\r | |
1373 | // Init DH with the certain DH Group Description.\r | |
1374 | //\r | |
1375 | IkeKeys->DhBuffer->GxSize = OakleyModpGroup[(UINT8)IkeSaSession->SessionCommon.PreferDhGroup].Size >> 3;\r | |
1376 | IkeKeys->DhBuffer->GxBuffer = AllocateZeroPool (IkeKeys->DhBuffer->GxSize);\r | |
1377 | ASSERT (IkeKeys->DhBuffer->GxBuffer != NULL);\r | |
1378 | \r | |
1379 | //\r | |
1380 | // Get X PublicKey\r | |
1381 | //\r | |
1382 | Status = IpSecCryptoIoDhGetPublicKey (\r | |
1383 | &IkeKeys->DhBuffer->DhContext,\r | |
1384 | OakleyModpGroup[(UINT8)IkeSaSession->SessionCommon.PreferDhGroup].GroupGenerator,\r | |
1385 | OakleyModpGroup[(UINT8)IkeSaSession->SessionCommon.PreferDhGroup].Size,\r | |
1386 | OakleyModpGroup[(UINT8)IkeSaSession->SessionCommon.PreferDhGroup].Modulus,\r | |
1387 | IkeKeys->DhBuffer->GxBuffer,\r | |
1388 | &IkeKeys->DhBuffer->GxSize\r | |
1389 | );\r | |
1390 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
1391 | DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Error CPLKeyManGetKeyParam X public key error Status = %r\n", Status));\r | |
1392 | return Status;\r | |
1393 | }\r | |
1394 | \r | |
1395 | IPSEC_DUMP_BUF ("DH Public Key (g^x) Dump", IkeKeys->DhBuffer->GxBuffer, IkeKeys->DhBuffer->GxSize);\r | |
1396 | \r | |
1397 | return EFI_SUCCESS;\r | |
1398 | }\r | |
1399 | \r | |
1400 | /**\r | |
1401 | Computes the DH Shared/Exchange Key.\r | |
1402 | \r | |
1403 | Given peer's public key, this function computes the exchanged common key and\r | |
1404 | stores it in the IKEv2 SA Session's GxyBuffer.\r | |
1405 | \r | |
1406 | @param[in] DhBuffer Pointer to buffer of peer's puliic key.\r | |
1407 | @param[in] KePayload Pointer to received key payload.\r | |
1408 | \r | |
1409 | @retval EFI_SUCCESS The operation succeeded.\r | |
1410 | @retval Otherwise The operation failed.\r | |
1411 | \r | |
1412 | **/\r | |
1413 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
1414 | Ikev2GenerateSaDhComputeKey (\r | |
1415 | IN IKEV2_DH_BUFFER *DhBuffer,\r | |
1416 | IN IKE_PAYLOAD *KePayload\r | |
1417 | )\r | |
1418 | {\r | |
1419 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r | |
1420 | IKEV2_KEY_EXCHANGE *Ke;\r | |
1421 | UINT8 *PubKey;\r | |
1422 | UINTN PubKeySize;\r | |
1423 | \r | |
1424 | Ke = (IKEV2_KEY_EXCHANGE *) KePayload->PayloadBuf;\r | |
1425 | PubKey = (UINT8 *) (Ke + 1);\r | |
1426 | PubKeySize = KePayload->PayloadSize - sizeof (IKEV2_KEY_EXCHANGE);\r | |
1427 | DhBuffer->GxySize = DhBuffer->GxSize;\r | |
1428 | DhBuffer->GxyBuffer = AllocateZeroPool (DhBuffer->GxySize);\r | |
1429 | ASSERT (DhBuffer->GxyBuffer != NULL);\r | |
1430 | \r | |
1431 | //\r | |
1432 | // Get GxyBuf\r | |
1433 | //\r | |
1434 | Status = IpSecCryptoIoDhComputeKey (\r | |
1435 | DhBuffer->DhContext,\r | |
1436 | PubKey,\r | |
1437 | PubKeySize,\r | |
1438 | DhBuffer->GxyBuffer,\r | |
1439 | &DhBuffer->GxySize\r | |
1440 | );\r | |
1441 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
1442 | DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Error CPLKeyManGetKeyParam Y session key error Status = %r\n", Status));\r | |
1443 | return Status;\r | |
1444 | }\r | |
1445 | \r | |
1446 | //\r | |
1447 | // Create GxyBuf.\r | |
1448 | //\r | |
1449 | DhBuffer->GySize = PubKeySize;\r | |
1450 | DhBuffer->GyBuffer = AllocateZeroPool (DhBuffer->GySize);\r | |
1451 | ASSERT (DhBuffer->GyBuffer != NULL);\r | |
1452 | CopyMem (DhBuffer->GyBuffer, PubKey, DhBuffer->GySize);\r | |
1453 | \r | |
1454 | IPSEC_DUMP_BUF ("DH Public Key (g^y) Dump", DhBuffer->GyBuffer, DhBuffer->GySize);\r | |
1455 | IPSEC_DUMP_BUF ("DH Shared Key (g^xy) Dump", DhBuffer->GxyBuffer, DhBuffer->GxySize);\r | |
1456 | \r | |
1457 | return EFI_SUCCESS;\r | |
1458 | }\r | |
1459 | \r | |
1460 | /**\r | |
1461 | Generates the IKE SKEYSEED and seven other secrets. SK_d, SK_ai, SK_ar, SK_ei, SK_er,\r | |
1462 | SK_pi, SK_pr are keys for the furthure IKE exchange.\r | |
1463 | \r | |
1464 | @param[in] IkeSaSession Pointer to IKE SA Session.\r | |
1465 | @param[in] KePayload Pointer to Key payload used to generate the Key.\r | |
1466 | \r | |
1467 | @retval EFI_UNSUPPORTED If one or more Algorithm Id is not supported.\r | |
1468 | @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES If there is no enough resource to be allocated to\r | |
1469 | meet the requirement.\r | |
1470 | @retval EFI_SUCCESS The operation succeeded.\r | |
1471 | \r | |
1472 | **/\r | |
1473 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
1474 | Ikev2GenerateSaKeys (\r | |
1475 | IN IKEV2_SA_SESSION *IkeSaSession,\r | |
1476 | IN IKE_PAYLOAD *KePayload\r | |
1477 | )\r | |
1478 | {\r | |
1479 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r | |
1480 | IKEV2_SA_PARAMS *SaParams;\r | |
1481 | IPSEC_PAD_ENTRY *Pad;\r | |
1482 | PRF_DATA_FRAGMENT Fragments[4];\r | |
1483 | UINT64 InitiatorCookieNet;\r | |
1484 | UINT64 ResponderCookieNet;\r | |
1485 | UINT8 *KeyBuffer;\r | |
1486 | UINTN KeyBufferSize;\r | |
1487 | UINTN AuthAlgKeyLen;\r | |
1488 | UINTN EncryptAlgKeyLen;\r | |
1489 | UINTN IntegrityAlgKeyLen;\r | |
1490 | UINTN PrfAlgKeyLen;\r | |
1491 | UINT8 *OutputKey;\r | |
1492 | UINTN OutputKeyLength;\r | |
1493 | UINT8 *Digest;\r | |
1494 | UINTN DigestSize;\r | |
1495 | \r | |
1496 | Digest = NULL;\r | |
1497 | OutputKey = NULL;\r | |
1498 | KeyBuffer = NULL;\r | |
1499 | \r | |
1500 | //\r | |
1501 | // Generate Gxy\r | |
1502 | //\r | |
1503 | Ikev2GenerateSaDhComputeKey (IkeSaSession->IkeKeys->DhBuffer, KePayload);\r | |
1504 | \r | |
1505 | Pad = IkeSaSession->Pad;\r | |
1506 | \r | |
1507 | //\r | |
1508 | // Get the key length of Authenticaion, Encryption, PRF, and Integrity.\r | |
1509 | //\r | |
1510 | SaParams = IkeSaSession->SessionCommon.SaParams;\r | |
1511 | AuthAlgKeyLen = IpSecGetHmacDigestLength ((UINT8)SaParams->Prf);\r | |
1512 | EncryptAlgKeyLen = IpSecGetEncryptKeyLength ((UINT8)SaParams->EncAlgId);\r | |
1513 | IntegrityAlgKeyLen = IpSecGetHmacDigestLength ((UINT8)SaParams->IntegAlgId);\r | |
1514 | PrfAlgKeyLen = IpSecGetHmacDigestLength ((UINT8)SaParams->Prf);\r | |
1515 | \r | |
1516 | //\r | |
1517 | // If one or more algorithm is not support, return EFI_UNSUPPORTED.\r | |
1518 | //\r | |
1519 | if (AuthAlgKeyLen == 0 || \r | |
1520 | EncryptAlgKeyLen == 0 ||\r | |
1521 | IntegrityAlgKeyLen == 0 ||\r | |
1522 | PrfAlgKeyLen == 0\r | |
1523 | ) {\r | |
1524 | Status = EFI_UNSUPPORTED;\r | |
1525 | goto Exit;\r | |
1526 | }\r | |
1527 | \r | |
1528 | //\r | |
1529 | // Compute SKEYSEED = prf(Ni | Nr, g^ir)\r | |
1530 | //\r | |
1531 | KeyBufferSize = IkeSaSession->NiBlkSize + IkeSaSession->NrBlkSize;\r | |
1532 | KeyBuffer = AllocateZeroPool (KeyBufferSize);\r | |
1533 | ASSERT (KeyBuffer != NULL);\r | |
1534 | \r | |
1535 | CopyMem (KeyBuffer, IkeSaSession->NiBlock, IkeSaSession->NiBlkSize);\r | |
1536 | CopyMem (KeyBuffer + IkeSaSession->NiBlkSize, IkeSaSession->NrBlock, IkeSaSession->NrBlkSize);\r | |
1537 | \r | |
1538 | Fragments[0].Data = IkeSaSession->IkeKeys->DhBuffer->GxyBuffer;\r | |
1539 | Fragments[0].DataSize = IkeSaSession->IkeKeys->DhBuffer->GxySize;\r | |
1540 | \r | |
1541 | DigestSize = IpSecGetHmacDigestLength ((UINT8)SaParams->Prf);\r | |
1542 | Digest = AllocateZeroPool (DigestSize);\r | |
1543 | \r | |
1544 | if (Digest == NULL) {\r | |
1545 | Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r | |
1546 | goto Exit;\r | |
1547 | }\r | |
1548 | \r | |
1549 | IpSecCryptoIoHmac (\r | |
1550 | (UINT8)SaParams->Prf,\r | |
1551 | KeyBuffer,\r | |
1552 | KeyBufferSize,\r | |
1553 | (HASH_DATA_FRAGMENT *) Fragments,\r | |
1554 | 1,\r | |
1555 | Digest,\r | |
1556 | DigestSize\r | |
1557 | );\r | |
1558 | \r | |
1559 | //\r | |
1560 | // {SK_d | SK_ai | SK_ar | SK_ei | SK_er | SK_pi | SK_pr } = prf+\r | |
1561 | // (SKEYSEED, Ni | Nr | SPIi | SPIr )\r | |
1562 | //\r | |
1563 | Fragments[0].Data = IkeSaSession->NiBlock;\r | |
1564 | Fragments[0].DataSize = IkeSaSession->NiBlkSize;\r | |
1565 | Fragments[1].Data = IkeSaSession->NrBlock;\r | |
1566 | Fragments[1].DataSize = IkeSaSession->NrBlkSize;\r | |
1567 | InitiatorCookieNet = HTONLL (IkeSaSession->InitiatorCookie);\r | |
1568 | ResponderCookieNet = HTONLL (IkeSaSession->ResponderCookie);\r | |
1569 | Fragments[2].Data = (UINT8 *)(&InitiatorCookieNet);\r | |
1570 | Fragments[2].DataSize = sizeof (IkeSaSession->InitiatorCookie);\r | |
1571 | Fragments[3].Data = (UINT8 *)(&ResponderCookieNet);\r | |
1572 | Fragments[3].DataSize = sizeof (IkeSaSession->ResponderCookie);\r | |
1573 | \r | |
1574 | IPSEC_DUMP_BUF (">>> NiBlock", IkeSaSession->NiBlock, IkeSaSession->NiBlkSize);\r | |
1575 | IPSEC_DUMP_BUF (">>> NrBlock", IkeSaSession->NrBlock, IkeSaSession->NrBlkSize);\r | |
1576 | IPSEC_DUMP_BUF (">>> InitiatorCookie", (UINT8 *)&IkeSaSession->InitiatorCookie, sizeof(UINT64));\r | |
1577 | IPSEC_DUMP_BUF (">>> ResponderCookie", (UINT8 *)&IkeSaSession->ResponderCookie, sizeof(UINT64));\r | |
1578 | \r | |
1579 | OutputKeyLength = PrfAlgKeyLen + \r | |
1580 | 2 * EncryptAlgKeyLen +\r | |
1581 | 2 * AuthAlgKeyLen +\r | |
1582 | 2 * IntegrityAlgKeyLen;\r | |
1583 | OutputKey = AllocateZeroPool (OutputKeyLength);\r | |
1584 | \r | |
1585 | //\r | |
1586 | // Generate Seven Keymates.\r | |
1587 | //\r | |
1588 | Status = Ikev2SaGenerateKey (\r | |
1589 | (UINT8)SaParams->Prf,\r | |
1590 | Digest,\r | |
1591 | DigestSize,\r | |
1592 | OutputKey,\r | |
1593 | OutputKeyLength,\r | |
1594 | Fragments,\r | |
1595 | 4\r | |
1596 | );\r | |
1597 | if (EFI_ERROR(Status)) {\r | |
1598 | goto Exit;\r | |
1599 | }\r | |
1600 | \r | |
1601 | //\r | |
1602 | // Save the seven keys into KeySession.\r | |
1603 | // First, SK_d\r | |
1604 | //\r | |
1605 | IkeSaSession->IkeKeys->SkdKey = AllocateZeroPool (PrfAlgKeyLen);\r | |
1606 | IkeSaSession->IkeKeys->SkdKeySize = PrfAlgKeyLen;\r | |
1607 | CopyMem (IkeSaSession->IkeKeys->SkdKey, OutputKey, PrfAlgKeyLen);\r | |
1608 | \r | |
1609 | IPSEC_DUMP_BUF (">>> SK_D Key", IkeSaSession->IkeKeys->SkdKey, PrfAlgKeyLen);\r | |
1610 | \r | |
1611 | //\r | |
1612 | // Second, Sk_ai\r | |
1613 | //\r | |
1614 | IkeSaSession->IkeKeys->SkAiKey = AllocateZeroPool (IntegrityAlgKeyLen);\r | |
1615 | IkeSaSession->IkeKeys->SkAiKeySize = IntegrityAlgKeyLen;\r | |
1616 | CopyMem (IkeSaSession->IkeKeys->SkAiKey, OutputKey + PrfAlgKeyLen, IntegrityAlgKeyLen);\r | |
1617 | \r | |
1618 | IPSEC_DUMP_BUF (">>> SK_Ai Key", IkeSaSession->IkeKeys->SkAiKey, IkeSaSession->IkeKeys->SkAiKeySize);\r | |
1619 | \r | |
1620 | //\r | |
1621 | // Third, Sk_ar\r | |
1622 | //\r | |
1623 | IkeSaSession->IkeKeys->SkArKey = AllocateZeroPool (IntegrityAlgKeyLen);\r | |
1624 | IkeSaSession->IkeKeys->SkArKeySize = IntegrityAlgKeyLen;\r | |
1625 | CopyMem (\r | |
1626 | IkeSaSession->IkeKeys->SkArKey,\r | |
1627 | OutputKey + PrfAlgKeyLen + IntegrityAlgKeyLen,\r | |
1628 | IntegrityAlgKeyLen\r | |
1629 | );\r | |
1630 | \r | |
1631 | IPSEC_DUMP_BUF (">>> SK_Ar Key", IkeSaSession->IkeKeys->SkArKey, IkeSaSession->IkeKeys->SkArKeySize);\r | |
1632 | \r | |
1633 | //\r | |
1634 | // Fourth, Sk_ei\r | |
1635 | //\r | |
1636 | IkeSaSession->IkeKeys->SkEiKey = AllocateZeroPool (EncryptAlgKeyLen);\r | |
1637 | IkeSaSession->IkeKeys->SkEiKeySize = EncryptAlgKeyLen;\r | |
1638 | \r | |
1639 | CopyMem (\r | |
1640 | IkeSaSession->IkeKeys->SkEiKey,\r | |
1641 | OutputKey + AuthAlgKeyLen + 2 * IntegrityAlgKeyLen,\r | |
1642 | EncryptAlgKeyLen\r | |
1643 | );\r | |
1644 | IPSEC_DUMP_BUF (\r | |
1645 | ">>> SK_Ei Key", \r | |
1646 | OutputKey + AuthAlgKeyLen + 2 * IntegrityAlgKeyLen,\r | |
1647 | EncryptAlgKeyLen\r | |
1648 | );\r | |
1649 | \r | |
1650 | //\r | |
1651 | // Fifth, Sk_er\r | |
1652 | //\r | |
1653 | IkeSaSession->IkeKeys->SkErKey = AllocateZeroPool (EncryptAlgKeyLen);\r | |
1654 | IkeSaSession->IkeKeys->SkErKeySize = EncryptAlgKeyLen;\r | |
1655 | \r | |
1656 | CopyMem (\r | |
1657 | IkeSaSession->IkeKeys->SkErKey,\r | |
1658 | OutputKey + AuthAlgKeyLen + 2 * IntegrityAlgKeyLen + EncryptAlgKeyLen,\r | |
1659 | EncryptAlgKeyLen\r | |
1660 | );\r | |
1661 | IPSEC_DUMP_BUF (\r | |
1662 | ">>> SK_Er Key",\r | |
1663 | OutputKey + AuthAlgKeyLen + 2 * IntegrityAlgKeyLen + EncryptAlgKeyLen,\r | |
1664 | EncryptAlgKeyLen\r | |
1665 | );\r | |
1666 | \r | |
1667 | //\r | |
1668 | // Sixth, Sk_pi\r | |
1669 | //\r | |
1670 | IkeSaSession->IkeKeys->SkPiKey = AllocateZeroPool (AuthAlgKeyLen);\r | |
1671 | IkeSaSession->IkeKeys->SkPiKeySize = AuthAlgKeyLen;\r | |
1672 | \r | |
1673 | CopyMem (\r | |
1674 | IkeSaSession->IkeKeys->SkPiKey,\r | |
1675 | OutputKey + AuthAlgKeyLen + 2 * IntegrityAlgKeyLen + 2 * EncryptAlgKeyLen,\r | |
1676 | AuthAlgKeyLen\r | |
1677 | );\r | |
1678 | IPSEC_DUMP_BUF (\r | |
1679 | ">>> SK_Pi Key",\r | |
1680 | OutputKey + AuthAlgKeyLen + 2 * IntegrityAlgKeyLen + 2 * EncryptAlgKeyLen,\r | |
1681 | AuthAlgKeyLen\r | |
1682 | );\r | |
1683 | \r | |
1684 | //\r | |
1685 | // Seventh, Sk_pr\r | |
1686 | //\r | |
1687 | IkeSaSession->IkeKeys->SkPrKey = AllocateZeroPool (AuthAlgKeyLen);\r | |
1688 | IkeSaSession->IkeKeys->SkPrKeySize = AuthAlgKeyLen;\r | |
1689 | \r | |
1690 | CopyMem (\r | |
1691 | IkeSaSession->IkeKeys->SkPrKey,\r | |
1692 | OutputKey + AuthAlgKeyLen + 2 * IntegrityAlgKeyLen + 2 * EncryptAlgKeyLen + AuthAlgKeyLen,\r | |
1693 | AuthAlgKeyLen\r | |
1694 | ); \r | |
1695 | IPSEC_DUMP_BUF (\r | |
1696 | ">>> SK_Pr Key",\r | |
1697 | OutputKey + AuthAlgKeyLen + 2 * IntegrityAlgKeyLen + 2 * EncryptAlgKeyLen + AuthAlgKeyLen,\r | |
1698 | AuthAlgKeyLen\r | |
1699 | );\r | |
1700 | \r | |
1701 | \r | |
1702 | Exit:\r | |
1703 | if (Digest != NULL) {\r | |
1704 | FreePool (Digest);\r | |
1705 | }\r | |
1706 | if (KeyBuffer != NULL) {\r | |
1707 | FreePool (KeyBuffer);\r | |
1708 | }\r | |
1709 | if (OutputKey != NULL) {\r | |
1710 | FreePool (OutputKey);\r | |
1711 | }\r | |
1712 | \r | |
1713 | return Status;\r | |
1714 | }\r | |
1715 | \r | |
1716 | /**\r | |
1717 | Generates the Keys for the furthure IPsec Protocol.\r | |
1718 | \r | |
1719 | @param[in] ChildSaSession Pointer to IKE Child SA Session.\r | |
1720 | @param[in] KePayload Pointer to Key payload used to generate the Key.\r | |
1721 | \r | |
1722 | @retval EFI_UNSUPPORTED If one or more Algorithm Id is not supported.\r | |
1723 | @retval EFI_SUCCESS The operation succeeded.\r | |
1724 | \r | |
1725 | **/\r | |
1726 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
1727 | Ikev2GenerateChildSaKeys (\r | |
1728 | IN IKEV2_CHILD_SA_SESSION *ChildSaSession,\r | |
1729 | IN IKE_PAYLOAD *KePayload\r | |
1730 | )\r | |
1731 | {\r | |
1732 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r | |
1733 | IKEV2_SA_PARAMS *SaParams;\r | |
1734 | PRF_DATA_FRAGMENT Fragments[3];\r | |
1735 | UINTN EncryptAlgKeyLen;\r | |
1736 | UINTN IntegrityAlgKeyLen;\r | |
1737 | UINT8* OutputKey;\r | |
1738 | UINTN OutputKeyLength;\r | |
1739 | \r | |
1740 | if (KePayload != NULL) {\r | |
1741 | //\r | |
1742 | // Generate Gxy \r | |
1743 | //\r | |
1744 | Ikev2GenerateSaDhComputeKey (ChildSaSession->DhBuffer, KePayload);\r | |
1745 | Fragments[0].Data = ChildSaSession->DhBuffer->GxyBuffer;\r | |
1746 | Fragments[0].DataSize = ChildSaSession->DhBuffer->GxySize;\r | |
1747 | }\r | |
1748 | \r | |
1749 | Fragments[1].Data = ChildSaSession->NiBlock;\r | |
1750 | Fragments[1].DataSize = ChildSaSession->NiBlkSize;\r | |
1751 | Fragments[2].Data = ChildSaSession->NrBlock;\r | |
1752 | Fragments[2].DataSize = ChildSaSession->NrBlkSize;\r | |
1753 | \r | |
1754 | //\r | |
1755 | // Get the key length of Authenticaion, Encryption, PRF, and Integrity.\r | |
1756 | //\r | |
1757 | SaParams = ChildSaSession->SessionCommon.SaParams;\r | |
1758 | EncryptAlgKeyLen = IpSecGetEncryptKeyLength ((UINT8)SaParams->EncAlgId);\r | |
1759 | IntegrityAlgKeyLen = IpSecGetHmacDigestLength ((UINT8)SaParams->IntegAlgId);\r | |
1760 | OutputKeyLength = 2 * EncryptAlgKeyLen + 2 * IntegrityAlgKeyLen;\r | |
1761 | \r | |
1762 | if ((EncryptAlgKeyLen == 0) || (IntegrityAlgKeyLen == 0)) {\r | |
1763 | return EFI_UNSUPPORTED;\r | |
1764 | }\r | |
1765 | \r | |
1766 | //\r | |
1767 | // \r | |
1768 | // If KePayload is not NULL, calculate KEYMAT = prf+(SK_d, g^ir (new) | Ni | Nr ),\r | |
1769 | // otherwise, KEYMAT = prf+(SK_d, Ni | Nr )\r | |
1770 | //\r | |
1771 | OutputKey = AllocateZeroPool (OutputKeyLength);\r | |
1772 | \r | |
1773 | //\r | |
1774 | // Derive Key from the SkdKey Buffer.\r | |
1775 | //\r | |
1776 | Status = Ikev2SaGenerateKey (\r | |
1777 | (UINT8)ChildSaSession->IkeSaSession->SessionCommon.SaParams->Prf,\r | |
1778 | ChildSaSession->IkeSaSession->IkeKeys->SkdKey,\r | |
1779 | ChildSaSession->IkeSaSession->IkeKeys->SkdKeySize,\r | |
1780 | OutputKey,\r | |
1781 | OutputKeyLength,\r | |
1782 | KePayload == NULL ? &Fragments[1] : Fragments,\r | |
1783 | KePayload == NULL ? 2 : 3\r | |
1784 | );\r | |
1785 | \r | |
1786 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
1787 | FreePool (OutputKey);\r | |
1788 | return Status;\r | |
1789 | }\r | |
1790 | \r | |
1791 | //\r | |
1792 | // Copy KEYMATE (SK_ENCRYPT_i | SK_ENCRYPT_r | SK_INTEG_i | SK_INTEG_r) to\r | |
1793 | // ChildKeyMates.\r | |
1794 | // \r | |
1795 | if (!ChildSaSession->SessionCommon.IsInitiator) {\r | |
1796 | \r | |
1797 | // \r | |
1798 | // Initiator Encryption Key\r | |
1799 | //\r | |
1800 | ChildSaSession->ChildKeymats.LocalPeerInfo.EspAlgoInfo.EncAlgoId = (UINT8)SaParams->EncAlgId;\r | |
1801 | ChildSaSession->ChildKeymats.LocalPeerInfo.EspAlgoInfo.EncKeyLength = EncryptAlgKeyLen;\r | |
1802 | ChildSaSession->ChildKeymats.LocalPeerInfo.EspAlgoInfo.EncKey = AllocateZeroPool (EncryptAlgKeyLen);\r | |
1803 | \r | |
1804 | CopyMem (\r | |
1805 | ChildSaSession->ChildKeymats.LocalPeerInfo.EspAlgoInfo.EncKey,\r | |
1806 | OutputKey,\r | |
1807 | EncryptAlgKeyLen\r | |
1808 | );\r | |
1809 | \r | |
1810 | //\r | |
1811 | // Initiator Authentication Key\r | |
1812 | //\r | |
1813 | ChildSaSession->ChildKeymats.LocalPeerInfo.EspAlgoInfo.AuthAlgoId = (UINT8)SaParams->IntegAlgId;\r | |
1814 | ChildSaSession->ChildKeymats.LocalPeerInfo.EspAlgoInfo.AuthKeyLength = IntegrityAlgKeyLen;\r | |
1815 | ChildSaSession->ChildKeymats.LocalPeerInfo.EspAlgoInfo.AuthKey = AllocateZeroPool (IntegrityAlgKeyLen);\r | |
1816 | \r | |
1817 | CopyMem (\r | |
1818 | ChildSaSession->ChildKeymats.LocalPeerInfo.EspAlgoInfo.AuthKey,\r | |
1819 | OutputKey + EncryptAlgKeyLen,\r | |
1820 | IntegrityAlgKeyLen\r | |
1821 | );\r | |
1822 | \r | |
1823 | //\r | |
1824 | // Responder Encrypt Key\r | |
1825 | //\r | |
1826 | ChildSaSession->ChildKeymats.RemotePeerInfo.EspAlgoInfo.EncAlgoId = (UINT8)SaParams->EncAlgId;\r | |
1827 | ChildSaSession->ChildKeymats.RemotePeerInfo.EspAlgoInfo.EncKeyLength = EncryptAlgKeyLen;\r | |
1828 | ChildSaSession->ChildKeymats.RemotePeerInfo.EspAlgoInfo.EncKey = AllocateZeroPool (EncryptAlgKeyLen);\r | |
1829 | \r | |
1830 | CopyMem (\r | |
1831 | ChildSaSession->ChildKeymats.RemotePeerInfo.EspAlgoInfo.EncKey,\r | |
1832 | OutputKey + EncryptAlgKeyLen + IntegrityAlgKeyLen,\r | |
1833 | EncryptAlgKeyLen\r | |
1834 | );\r | |
1835 | \r | |
1836 | //\r | |
1837 | // Responder Authentication Key\r | |
1838 | //\r | |
1839 | ChildSaSession->ChildKeymats.RemotePeerInfo.EspAlgoInfo.AuthAlgoId = (UINT8)SaParams->IntegAlgId;\r | |
1840 | ChildSaSession->ChildKeymats.RemotePeerInfo.EspAlgoInfo.AuthKeyLength = IntegrityAlgKeyLen;\r | |
1841 | ChildSaSession->ChildKeymats.RemotePeerInfo.EspAlgoInfo.AuthKey = AllocateZeroPool (IntegrityAlgKeyLen);\r | |
1842 | \r | |
1843 | CopyMem (\r | |
1844 | ChildSaSession->ChildKeymats.RemotePeerInfo.EspAlgoInfo.AuthKey,\r | |
1845 | OutputKey + 2 * EncryptAlgKeyLen + IntegrityAlgKeyLen,\r | |
1846 | IntegrityAlgKeyLen\r | |
1847 | );\r | |
1848 | } else {\r | |
1849 | //\r | |
1850 | // Initiator Encryption Key\r | |
1851 | //\r | |
1852 | ChildSaSession->ChildKeymats.RemotePeerInfo.EspAlgoInfo.EncAlgoId = (UINT8)SaParams->EncAlgId;\r | |
1853 | ChildSaSession->ChildKeymats.RemotePeerInfo.EspAlgoInfo.EncKeyLength = EncryptAlgKeyLen;\r | |
1854 | ChildSaSession->ChildKeymats.RemotePeerInfo.EspAlgoInfo.EncKey = AllocateZeroPool (EncryptAlgKeyLen);\r | |
1855 | \r | |
1856 | CopyMem (\r | |
1857 | ChildSaSession->ChildKeymats.RemotePeerInfo.EspAlgoInfo.EncKey,\r | |
1858 | OutputKey,\r | |
1859 | EncryptAlgKeyLen\r | |
1860 | );\r | |
1861 | \r | |
1862 | //\r | |
1863 | // Initiator Authentication Key\r | |
1864 | //\r | |
1865 | ChildSaSession->ChildKeymats.RemotePeerInfo.EspAlgoInfo.AuthAlgoId = (UINT8)SaParams->IntegAlgId;\r | |
1866 | ChildSaSession->ChildKeymats.RemotePeerInfo.EspAlgoInfo.AuthKeyLength = IntegrityAlgKeyLen;\r | |
1867 | ChildSaSession->ChildKeymats.RemotePeerInfo.EspAlgoInfo.AuthKey = AllocateZeroPool (IntegrityAlgKeyLen);\r | |
1868 | \r | |
1869 | CopyMem (\r | |
1870 | ChildSaSession->ChildKeymats.RemotePeerInfo.EspAlgoInfo.AuthKey,\r | |
1871 | OutputKey + EncryptAlgKeyLen,\r | |
1872 | IntegrityAlgKeyLen\r | |
1873 | );\r | |
1874 | \r | |
1875 | //\r | |
1876 | // Responder Encryption Key\r | |
1877 | //\r | |
1878 | ChildSaSession->ChildKeymats.LocalPeerInfo.EspAlgoInfo.EncAlgoId = (UINT8)SaParams->EncAlgId;\r | |
1879 | ChildSaSession->ChildKeymats.LocalPeerInfo.EspAlgoInfo.EncKeyLength = EncryptAlgKeyLen;\r | |
1880 | ChildSaSession->ChildKeymats.LocalPeerInfo.EspAlgoInfo.EncKey = AllocateZeroPool (EncryptAlgKeyLen);\r | |
1881 | \r | |
1882 | CopyMem (\r | |
1883 | ChildSaSession->ChildKeymats.LocalPeerInfo.EspAlgoInfo.EncKey,\r | |
1884 | OutputKey + EncryptAlgKeyLen + IntegrityAlgKeyLen,\r | |
1885 | EncryptAlgKeyLen\r | |
1886 | );\r | |
1887 | \r | |
1888 | //\r | |
1889 | // Responder Authentication Key\r | |
1890 | //\r | |
1891 | ChildSaSession->ChildKeymats.LocalPeerInfo.EspAlgoInfo.AuthAlgoId = (UINT8)SaParams->IntegAlgId;\r | |
1892 | ChildSaSession->ChildKeymats.LocalPeerInfo.EspAlgoInfo.AuthKeyLength = IntegrityAlgKeyLen;\r | |
1893 | ChildSaSession->ChildKeymats.LocalPeerInfo.EspAlgoInfo.AuthKey = AllocateZeroPool (IntegrityAlgKeyLen);\r | |
1894 | \r | |
1895 | CopyMem (\r | |
1896 | ChildSaSession->ChildKeymats.LocalPeerInfo.EspAlgoInfo.AuthKey,\r | |
1897 | OutputKey + 2 * EncryptAlgKeyLen + IntegrityAlgKeyLen,\r | |
1898 | IntegrityAlgKeyLen\r | |
1899 | );\r | |
1900 | }\r | |
1901 | \r | |
1902 | IPSEC_DUMP_BUF (\r | |
1903 | " >>> Local Encryption Key",\r | |
1904 | ChildSaSession->ChildKeymats.LocalPeerInfo.EspAlgoInfo.EncKey,\r | |
1905 | EncryptAlgKeyLen\r | |
1906 | );\r | |
1907 | IPSEC_DUMP_BUF (\r | |
1908 | " >>> Remote Encryption Key",\r | |
1909 | ChildSaSession->ChildKeymats.RemotePeerInfo.EspAlgoInfo.EncKey,\r | |
1910 | EncryptAlgKeyLen\r | |
1911 | );\r | |
1912 | IPSEC_DUMP_BUF (\r | |
1913 | " >>> Local Authentication Key",\r | |
1914 | ChildSaSession->ChildKeymats.LocalPeerInfo.EspAlgoInfo.AuthKey,\r | |
1915 | IntegrityAlgKeyLen\r | |
1916 | );\r | |
1917 | IPSEC_DUMP_BUF (\r | |
1918 | " >>> Remote Authentication Key",\r | |
1919 | ChildSaSession->ChildKeymats.RemotePeerInfo.EspAlgoInfo.AuthKey,\r | |
1920 | IntegrityAlgKeyLen\r | |
1921 | );\r | |
1922 | \r | |
1923 | FreePool (OutputKey);\r | |
1924 | \r | |
1925 | return EFI_SUCCESS;\r | |
1926 | }\r | |
1927 | \r | |
1928 | GLOBAL_REMOVE_IF_UNREFERENCED IKEV2_PACKET_HANDLER mIkev2Initial[][2] = {\r | |
1929 | { //PSK\r | |
1930 | { // IKEV2_INIT\r | |
1931 | Ikev2InitPskParser,\r | |
1932 | Ikev2InitPskGenerator\r | |
1933 | },\r | |
1934 | { //IKEV2_AUTH\r | |
1935 | Ikev2AuthPskParser,\r | |
1936 | Ikev2AuthPskGenerator\r | |
1937 | }\r | |
1938 | },\r | |
1939 | { // CERT\r | |
1940 | { // IKEV2_INIT\r | |
1941 | Ikev2InitCertParser,\r | |
1942 | Ikev2InitCertGenerator\r | |
1943 | },\r | |
1944 | { // IKEV2_AUTH\r | |
1945 | Ikev2AuthCertParser,\r | |
1946 | Ikev2AuthCertGenerator\r | |
1947 | },\r | |
1948 | },\r | |
1949 | };\r |