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1 | # | |
2 | # Security configuration | |
3 | # | |
4 | ||
5 | menu "Security options" | |
6 | ||
7 | source security/keys/Kconfig | |
8 | ||
9 | config SECURITY_DMESG_RESTRICT | |
10 | bool "Restrict unprivileged access to the kernel syslog" | |
11 | default n | |
12 | help | |
13 | This enforces restrictions on unprivileged users reading the kernel | |
14 | syslog via dmesg(8). | |
15 | ||
16 | If this option is not selected, no restrictions will be enforced | |
17 | unless the dmesg_restrict sysctl is explicitly set to (1). | |
18 | ||
19 | If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N. | |
20 | ||
21 | config SECURITY_PERF_EVENTS_RESTRICT | |
22 | bool "Restrict unprivileged use of performance events" | |
23 | depends on PERF_EVENTS | |
24 | help | |
25 | If you say Y here, the kernel.perf_event_paranoid sysctl | |
26 | will be set to 3 by default, and no unprivileged use of the | |
27 | perf_event_open syscall will be permitted unless it is | |
28 | changed. | |
29 | ||
30 | config SECURITY | |
31 | bool "Enable different security models" | |
32 | depends on SYSFS | |
33 | depends on MULTIUSER | |
34 | help | |
35 | This allows you to choose different security modules to be | |
36 | configured into your kernel. | |
37 | ||
38 | If this option is not selected, the default Linux security | |
39 | model will be used. | |
40 | ||
41 | If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N. | |
42 | ||
43 | config SECURITY_WRITABLE_HOOKS | |
44 | depends on SECURITY | |
45 | bool | |
46 | default n | |
47 | ||
48 | config SECURITY_STACKING | |
49 | bool "Security module stacking" | |
50 | depends on SECURITY | |
51 | help | |
52 | Allows multiple major security modules to be stacked. | |
53 | Modules are invoked in the order registered with a | |
54 | "bail on fail" policy, in which the infrastructure | |
55 | will stop processing once a denial is detected. Not | |
56 | all modules can be stacked. SELinux and Smack are | |
57 | known to be incompatible. User space components may | |
58 | have trouble identifying the security module providing | |
59 | data in some cases. | |
60 | ||
61 | If you select this option you will have to select which | |
62 | of the stackable modules you wish to be active. The | |
63 | "Default security module" will be ignored. The boot line | |
64 | "security=" option can be used to specify that one of | |
65 | the modules identifed for stacking should be used instead | |
66 | of the entire stack. | |
67 | ||
68 | If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N. | |
69 | ||
70 | config SECURITY_LSM_DEBUG | |
71 | bool "Enable debugging of the LSM infrastructure" | |
72 | depends on SECURITY | |
73 | help | |
74 | This allows you to choose debug messages related to | |
75 | security modules configured into your kernel. These | |
76 | messages may be helpful in determining how a security | |
77 | module is using security blobs. | |
78 | ||
79 | If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N. | |
80 | ||
81 | config SECURITYFS | |
82 | bool "Enable the securityfs filesystem" | |
83 | help | |
84 | This will build the securityfs filesystem. It is currently used by | |
85 | the TPM bios character driver and IMA, an integrity provider. It is | |
86 | not used by SELinux or SMACK. | |
87 | ||
88 | If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N. | |
89 | ||
90 | config SECURITY_NETWORK | |
91 | bool "Socket and Networking Security Hooks" | |
92 | depends on SECURITY | |
93 | help | |
94 | This enables the socket and networking security hooks. | |
95 | If enabled, a security module can use these hooks to | |
96 | implement socket and networking access controls. | |
97 | If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N. | |
98 | ||
99 | config PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION | |
100 | bool "Remove the kernel mapping in user mode" | |
101 | default y | |
102 | depends on (X86_64 || X86_PAE) && !UML | |
103 | help | |
104 | This feature reduces the number of hardware side channels by | |
105 | ensuring that the majority of kernel addresses are not mapped | |
106 | into userspace. | |
107 | ||
108 | See Documentation/x86/pti.txt for more details. | |
109 | ||
110 | config SECURITY_INFINIBAND | |
111 | bool "Infiniband Security Hooks" | |
112 | depends on SECURITY && INFINIBAND | |
113 | help | |
114 | This enables the Infiniband security hooks. | |
115 | If enabled, a security module can use these hooks to | |
116 | implement Infiniband access controls. | |
117 | If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N. | |
118 | ||
119 | config SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM | |
120 | bool "XFRM (IPSec) Networking Security Hooks" | |
121 | depends on XFRM && SECURITY_NETWORK | |
122 | help | |
123 | This enables the XFRM (IPSec) networking security hooks. | |
124 | If enabled, a security module can use these hooks to | |
125 | implement per-packet access controls based on labels | |
126 | derived from IPSec policy. Non-IPSec communications are | |
127 | designated as unlabelled, and only sockets authorized | |
128 | to communicate unlabelled data can send without using | |
129 | IPSec. | |
130 | If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N. | |
131 | ||
132 | config SECURITY_PATH | |
133 | bool "Security hooks for pathname based access control" | |
134 | depends on SECURITY | |
135 | help | |
136 | This enables the security hooks for pathname based access control. | |
137 | If enabled, a security module can use these hooks to | |
138 | implement pathname based access controls. | |
139 | If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N. | |
140 | ||
141 | config INTEL_TXT | |
142 | bool "Enable Intel(R) Trusted Execution Technology (Intel(R) TXT)" | |
143 | depends on HAVE_INTEL_TXT | |
144 | help | |
145 | This option enables support for booting the kernel with the | |
146 | Trusted Boot (tboot) module. This will utilize | |
147 | Intel(R) Trusted Execution Technology to perform a measured launch | |
148 | of the kernel. If the system does not support Intel(R) TXT, this | |
149 | will have no effect. | |
150 | ||
151 | Intel TXT will provide higher assurance of system configuration and | |
152 | initial state as well as data reset protection. This is used to | |
153 | create a robust initial kernel measurement and verification, which | |
154 | helps to ensure that kernel security mechanisms are functioning | |
155 | correctly. This level of protection requires a root of trust outside | |
156 | of the kernel itself. | |
157 | ||
158 | Intel TXT also helps solve real end user concerns about having | |
159 | confidence that their hardware is running the VMM or kernel that | |
160 | it was configured with, especially since they may be responsible for | |
161 | providing such assurances to VMs and services running on it. | |
162 | ||
163 | See <http://www.intel.com/technology/security/> for more information | |
164 | about Intel(R) TXT. | |
165 | See <http://tboot.sourceforge.net> for more information about tboot. | |
166 | See Documentation/intel_txt.txt for a description of how to enable | |
167 | Intel TXT support in a kernel boot. | |
168 | ||
169 | If you are unsure as to whether this is required, answer N. | |
170 | ||
171 | config LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR | |
172 | int "Low address space for LSM to protect from user allocation" | |
173 | depends on SECURITY && SECURITY_SELINUX | |
174 | default 32768 if ARM || (ARM64 && COMPAT) | |
175 | default 65536 | |
176 | help | |
177 | This is the portion of low virtual memory which should be protected | |
178 | from userspace allocation. Keeping a user from writing to low pages | |
179 | can help reduce the impact of kernel NULL pointer bugs. | |
180 | ||
181 | For most ia64, ppc64 and x86 users with lots of address space | |
182 | a value of 65536 is reasonable and should cause no problems. | |
183 | On arm and other archs it should not be higher than 32768. | |
184 | Programs which use vm86 functionality or have some need to map | |
185 | this low address space will need the permission specific to the | |
186 | systems running LSM. | |
187 | ||
188 | config HAVE_HARDENED_USERCOPY_ALLOCATOR | |
189 | bool | |
190 | help | |
191 | The heap allocator implements __check_heap_object() for | |
192 | validating memory ranges against heap object sizes in | |
193 | support of CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY. | |
194 | ||
195 | config HARDENED_USERCOPY | |
196 | bool "Harden memory copies between kernel and userspace" | |
197 | depends on HAVE_HARDENED_USERCOPY_ALLOCATOR | |
198 | select BUG | |
199 | imply STRICT_DEVMEM | |
200 | help | |
201 | This option checks for obviously wrong memory regions when | |
202 | copying memory to/from the kernel (via copy_to_user() and | |
203 | copy_from_user() functions) by rejecting memory ranges that | |
204 | are larger than the specified heap object, span multiple | |
205 | separately allocated pages, are not on the process stack, | |
206 | or are part of the kernel text. This kills entire classes | |
207 | of heap overflow exploits and similar kernel memory exposures. | |
208 | ||
209 | config HARDENED_USERCOPY_PAGESPAN | |
210 | bool "Refuse to copy allocations that span multiple pages" | |
211 | depends on HARDENED_USERCOPY | |
212 | depends on EXPERT | |
213 | help | |
214 | When a multi-page allocation is done without __GFP_COMP, | |
215 | hardened usercopy will reject attempts to copy it. There are, | |
216 | however, several cases of this in the kernel that have not all | |
217 | been removed. This config is intended to be used only while | |
218 | trying to find such users. | |
219 | ||
220 | config FORTIFY_SOURCE | |
221 | bool "Harden common str/mem functions against buffer overflows" | |
222 | depends on ARCH_HAS_FORTIFY_SOURCE | |
223 | help | |
224 | Detect overflows of buffers in common string and memory functions | |
225 | where the compiler can determine and validate the buffer sizes. | |
226 | ||
227 | config STATIC_USERMODEHELPER | |
228 | bool "Force all usermode helper calls through a single binary" | |
229 | help | |
230 | By default, the kernel can call many different userspace | |
231 | binary programs through the "usermode helper" kernel | |
232 | interface. Some of these binaries are statically defined | |
233 | either in the kernel code itself, or as a kernel configuration | |
234 | option. However, some of these are dynamically created at | |
235 | runtime, or can be modified after the kernel has started up. | |
236 | To provide an additional layer of security, route all of these | |
237 | calls through a single executable that can not have its name | |
238 | changed. | |
239 | ||
240 | Note, it is up to this single binary to then call the relevant | |
241 | "real" usermode helper binary, based on the first argument | |
242 | passed to it. If desired, this program can filter and pick | |
243 | and choose what real programs are called. | |
244 | ||
245 | If you wish for all usermode helper programs are to be | |
246 | disabled, choose this option and then set | |
247 | STATIC_USERMODEHELPER_PATH to an empty string. | |
248 | ||
249 | config STATIC_USERMODEHELPER_PATH | |
250 | string "Path to the static usermode helper binary" | |
251 | depends on STATIC_USERMODEHELPER | |
252 | default "/sbin/usermode-helper" | |
253 | help | |
254 | The binary called by the kernel when any usermode helper | |
255 | program is wish to be run. The "real" application's name will | |
256 | be in the first argument passed to this program on the command | |
257 | line. | |
258 | ||
259 | If you wish for all usermode helper programs to be disabled, | |
260 | specify an empty string here (i.e. ""). | |
261 | ||
262 | config LOCK_DOWN_KERNEL | |
263 | bool "Allow the kernel to be 'locked down'" | |
264 | help | |
265 | Allow the kernel to be locked down under certain circumstances, for | |
266 | instance if UEFI secure boot is enabled. Locking down the kernel | |
267 | turns off various features that might otherwise allow access to the | |
268 | kernel image (eg. setting MSR registers). | |
269 | ||
270 | config LOCK_DOWN_IN_EFI_SECURE_BOOT | |
271 | bool "Lock down the kernel in EFI Secure Boot mode" | |
272 | default n | |
273 | select LOCK_DOWN_KERNEL | |
274 | depends on EFI | |
275 | help | |
276 | UEFI Secure Boot provides a mechanism for ensuring that the firmware | |
277 | will only load signed bootloaders and kernels. Secure boot mode may | |
278 | be determined from EFI variables provided by the system firmware if | |
279 | not indicated by the boot parameters. | |
280 | ||
281 | Enabling this option turns on results in kernel lockdown being | |
282 | triggered if EFI Secure Boot is set. | |
283 | ||
284 | ||
285 | source security/selinux/Kconfig | |
286 | source security/smack/Kconfig | |
287 | source security/tomoyo/Kconfig | |
288 | source security/apparmor/Kconfig | |
289 | source security/loadpin/Kconfig | |
290 | source security/yama/Kconfig | |
291 | ||
292 | source security/integrity/Kconfig | |
293 | ||
294 | menu "Security Module Selection" | |
295 | visible if !SECURITY_STACKING | |
296 | ||
297 | choice | |
298 | prompt "Default security module" | |
299 | default DEFAULT_SECURITY_SELINUX if SECURITY_SELINUX | |
300 | default DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK if SECURITY_SMACK | |
301 | default DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO if SECURITY_TOMOYO | |
302 | default DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR if SECURITY_APPARMOR | |
303 | default DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC | |
304 | ||
305 | help | |
306 | Select the security module that will be used by default if the | |
307 | kernel parameter security= is not specified. | |
308 | ||
309 | config DEFAULT_SECURITY_SELINUX | |
310 | bool "SELinux" if SECURITY_SELINUX=y | |
311 | ||
312 | config DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK | |
313 | bool "Simplified Mandatory Access Control" if SECURITY_SMACK=y | |
314 | ||
315 | config DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO | |
316 | bool "TOMOYO" if SECURITY_TOMOYO=y | |
317 | ||
318 | config DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR | |
319 | bool "AppArmor" if SECURITY_APPARMOR=y | |
320 | ||
321 | config DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC | |
322 | bool "Unix Discretionary Access Controls" | |
323 | ||
324 | endchoice | |
325 | endmenu | |
326 | ||
327 | menu "Default Security Module or Modules" | |
328 | visible if SECURITY_STACKING | |
329 | ||
330 | config SECURITY_SELINUX_STACKED | |
331 | bool "SELinux" if SECURITY_SELINUX && !SECURITY_SMACK_STACKED | |
332 | help | |
333 | Add the SELinux security module to the stack. | |
334 | Please be sure your user space code is accomodating of | |
335 | this security module. | |
336 | Ensure that your network configuration is compatible | |
337 | with your combination of security modules. | |
338 | ||
339 | Incompatible with Smack being stacked. | |
340 | ||
341 | If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N | |
342 | ||
343 | config SECURITY_SMACK_STACKED | |
344 | bool "Simplified Mandatory Access Control" if SECURITY_SMACK | |
345 | help | |
346 | Add the Smack security module to the stack. | |
347 | Please be sure your user space code is accomodating of | |
348 | this security module. | |
349 | Ensure that your network configuration is compatible | |
350 | with your combination of security modules. | |
351 | ||
352 | Incompatible with SeLinux being stacked. | |
353 | ||
354 | If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer | |
355 | ||
356 | config SECURITY_TOMOYO_STACKED | |
357 | bool "TOMOYO support is enabled by default" if SECURITY_TOMOYO | |
358 | default n | |
359 | help | |
360 | This option instructs the system to use the TOMOYO checks. | |
361 | If not selected the module will not be invoked. | |
362 | Stacked security modules may interact in unexpected ways. | |
363 | ||
364 | If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N. | |
365 | ||
366 | config SECURITY_APPARMOR_STACKED | |
367 | bool "AppArmor" if SECURITY_APPARMOR | |
368 | help | |
369 | This option instructs the system to use the AppArmor checks. | |
370 | ||
371 | If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N. | |
372 | ||
373 | config SECURITY_DAC_STACKED | |
374 | bool "Unix Discretionary Access Controls" if !SECURITY_SELINUX_STACKED && !SECURITY_SMACK_STACKED && !SECURITY_TOMOYO_STACKED && !SECURITY_APPARMOR_STACKED | |
375 | default y if !SECURITY_SELINUX_STACKED && !SECURITY_SMACK_STACKED && !SECURITY_TOMOYO_STACKED && !SECURITY_APPARMOR_STACKED | |
376 | help | |
377 | This option instructs the system to not use security modules | |
378 | by default. This choice can be over ridden by specifying | |
379 | the desired module using the security= parameter. | |
380 | ||
381 | This option is incompatible with selecting selinux, smack, | |
382 | tomoyo, or apparmor. | |
383 | ||
384 | config DEFAULT_SECURITY_SELINUX | |
385 | bool | |
386 | default y if SECURITY_SELINUX_STACKED | |
387 | ||
388 | config DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK | |
389 | bool | |
390 | default y if SECURITY_SMACK_STACKED | |
391 | ||
392 | config DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO | |
393 | bool | |
394 | default y if SECURITY_TOMOYO_STACKED | |
395 | ||
396 | config DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR | |
397 | bool | |
398 | default y if SECURITY_APPARMOR_STACKED | |
399 | ||
400 | config DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC | |
401 | bool | |
402 | default y if SECURITY_DAC_STACKED | |
403 | ||
404 | choice | |
405 | depends on SECURITY_STACKING && !SECURITY_DAC_STACKED | |
406 | prompt "Default LSM for legacy interfaces" | |
407 | default SECURITY_DEFAULT_DISPLAY_SELINUX if SECURITY_SELINUX_STACKED | |
408 | default SECURITY_DEFAULT_DISPLAY_SMACK if SECURITY_SMACK_STACKED | |
409 | default SECURITY_DEFAULT_DISPLAY_TOMOYO if SECURITY_TOMOYO_STACKED | |
410 | default SECURITY_DEFAULT_DISPALY_APPARMOR if SECURITY_APPARMOR_STACKED | |
411 | default SECURITY_DEFAULT_DISPLAY_FIRST | |
412 | ||
413 | help | |
414 | Select the security module context that will be displayed by | |
415 | default on legacy interfaces if the kernel parameter | |
416 | security.display= is not specified. | |
417 | ||
418 | config SECURITY_DEFAULT_DISPLAY_SELINUX | |
419 | bool "SELinux" if SECURITY_SELINUX_STACKED=y | |
420 | ||
421 | config SECURITY_DEFAULT_DISPLAY_SMACK | |
422 | bool "Simplified Mandatory Access Control" if SECURITY_SMACK_STACKED | |
423 | ||
424 | config SECURITY_DEFAULT_DISPLAY_TOMOYO | |
425 | bool "TOMOYO" if SECURITY_TOMOYO_STACKED | |
426 | ||
427 | config SECURITY_DEFAULT_DISPLAY_APPARMOR | |
428 | bool "AppArmor" if SECURITY_APPARMOR_STACKED | |
429 | ||
430 | endchoice | |
431 | ||
432 | config SECURITY_DEFAULT_DISPLAY_NAME | |
433 | string | |
434 | default "selinux" if SECURITY_DEFAULT_DISPLAY_SELINUX | |
435 | default "smack" if SECURITY_DEFAULT_DISPLAY_SMACK | |
436 | default "tomoyo" if SECURITY_DEFAULT_DISPLAY_TOMOYO | |
437 | default "apparmor" if SECURITY_DEFAULT_DISPLAY_APPARMOR | |
438 | default "" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC | |
439 | ||
440 | endmenu | |
441 | ||
442 | config DEFAULT_SECURITY | |
443 | string | |
444 | default "selinux,smack,tomoyo,apparmor" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_SELINUX && DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK && DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO && DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR | |
445 | default "selinux,smack,tomoyo" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_SELINUX && DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK && DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO | |
446 | default "selinux,smack,apparmor" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_SELINUX && DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK && DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR | |
447 | default "selinux,tomoyo,apparmor" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_SELINUX && DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO && DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR | |
448 | default "smack,tomoyo,apparmor" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK && DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO && DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR | |
449 | default "selinux,smack" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_SELINUX && DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK | |
450 | default "selinux,tomoyo" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_SELINUX && DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO | |
451 | default "selinux,apparmor" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_SELINUX && DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR | |
452 | default "smack,tomoyo" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK && DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO | |
453 | default "smack,apparmor" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK && DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR | |
454 | default "tomoyo,apparmor" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO && DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR | |
455 | default "selinux" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_SELINUX | |
456 | default "smack" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK | |
457 | default "tomoyo" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO | |
458 | default "apparmor" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR | |
459 | default "" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC | |
460 | endmenu |