1 /* auditsc.c -- System-call auditing support
2 * Handles all system-call specific auditing features.
4 * Copyright 2003-2004 Red Hat Inc., Durham, North Carolina.
5 * Copyright 2005 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
6 * Copyright (C) 2005, 2006 IBM Corporation
9 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
10 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
11 * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
12 * (at your option) any later version.
14 * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
15 * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
16 * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
17 * GNU General Public License for more details.
19 * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
20 * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
21 * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA
23 * Written by Rickard E. (Rik) Faith <faith@redhat.com>
25 * Many of the ideas implemented here are from Stephen C. Tweedie,
26 * especially the idea of avoiding a copy by using getname.
28 * The method for actual interception of syscall entry and exit (not in
29 * this file -- see entry.S) is based on a GPL'd patch written by
30 * okir@suse.de and Copyright 2003 SuSE Linux AG.
32 * POSIX message queue support added by George Wilson <ltcgcw@us.ibm.com>,
35 * The support of additional filter rules compares (>, <, >=, <=) was
36 * added by Dustin Kirkland <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com>, 2005.
38 * Modified by Amy Griffis <amy.griffis@hp.com> to collect additional
39 * filesystem information.
41 * Subject and object context labeling support added by <danjones@us.ibm.com>
42 * and <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com> for LSPP certification compliance.
45 #define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
47 #include <linux/init.h>
48 #include <asm/types.h>
49 #include <linux/atomic.h>
51 #include <linux/namei.h>
53 #include <linux/export.h>
54 #include <linux/slab.h>
55 #include <linux/mount.h>
56 #include <linux/socket.h>
57 #include <linux/mqueue.h>
58 #include <linux/audit.h>
59 #include <linux/personality.h>
60 #include <linux/time.h>
61 #include <linux/netlink.h>
62 #include <linux/compiler.h>
63 #include <asm/unistd.h>
64 #include <linux/security.h>
65 #include <linux/list.h>
66 #include <linux/binfmts.h>
67 #include <linux/highmem.h>
68 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
69 #include <asm/syscall.h>
70 #include <linux/capability.h>
71 #include <linux/fs_struct.h>
72 #include <linux/compat.h>
73 #include <linux/ctype.h>
74 #include <linux/string.h>
75 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
76 #include <linux/fsnotify_backend.h>
77 #include <uapi/linux/limits.h>
78 #include <uapi/linux/netfilter/nf_tables.h>
82 /* flags stating the success for a syscall */
83 #define AUDITSC_INVALID 0
84 #define AUDITSC_SUCCESS 1
85 #define AUDITSC_FAILURE 2
87 /* no execve audit message should be longer than this (userspace limits),
88 * see the note near the top of audit_log_execve_info() about this value */
89 #define MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN 7500
91 /* max length to print of cmdline/proctitle value during audit */
92 #define MAX_PROCTITLE_AUDIT_LEN 128
94 /* number of audit rules */
97 /* determines whether we collect data for signals sent */
100 struct audit_aux_data
{
101 struct audit_aux_data
*next
;
105 /* Number of target pids per aux struct. */
106 #define AUDIT_AUX_PIDS 16
108 struct audit_aux_data_pids
{
109 struct audit_aux_data d
;
110 pid_t target_pid
[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS
];
111 kuid_t target_auid
[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS
];
112 kuid_t target_uid
[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS
];
113 unsigned int target_sessionid
[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS
];
114 struct lsmblob target_lsm
[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS
];
115 char target_comm
[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS
][TASK_COMM_LEN
];
119 struct audit_aux_data_bprm_fcaps
{
120 struct audit_aux_data d
;
121 struct audit_cap_data fcap
;
122 unsigned int fcap_ver
;
123 struct audit_cap_data old_pcap
;
124 struct audit_cap_data new_pcap
;
127 struct audit_tree_refs
{
128 struct audit_tree_refs
*next
;
129 struct audit_chunk
*c
[31];
132 struct audit_nfcfgop_tab
{
133 enum audit_nfcfgop op
;
137 static const struct audit_nfcfgop_tab audit_nfcfgs
[] = {
138 { AUDIT_XT_OP_REGISTER
, "xt_register" },
139 { AUDIT_XT_OP_REPLACE
, "xt_replace" },
140 { AUDIT_XT_OP_UNREGISTER
, "xt_unregister" },
141 { AUDIT_NFT_OP_TABLE_REGISTER
, "nft_register_table" },
142 { AUDIT_NFT_OP_TABLE_UNREGISTER
, "nft_unregister_table" },
143 { AUDIT_NFT_OP_CHAIN_REGISTER
, "nft_register_chain" },
144 { AUDIT_NFT_OP_CHAIN_UNREGISTER
, "nft_unregister_chain" },
145 { AUDIT_NFT_OP_RULE_REGISTER
, "nft_register_rule" },
146 { AUDIT_NFT_OP_RULE_UNREGISTER
, "nft_unregister_rule" },
147 { AUDIT_NFT_OP_SET_REGISTER
, "nft_register_set" },
148 { AUDIT_NFT_OP_SET_UNREGISTER
, "nft_unregister_set" },
149 { AUDIT_NFT_OP_SETELEM_REGISTER
, "nft_register_setelem" },
150 { AUDIT_NFT_OP_SETELEM_UNREGISTER
, "nft_unregister_setelem" },
151 { AUDIT_NFT_OP_GEN_REGISTER
, "nft_register_gen" },
152 { AUDIT_NFT_OP_OBJ_REGISTER
, "nft_register_obj" },
153 { AUDIT_NFT_OP_OBJ_UNREGISTER
, "nft_unregister_obj" },
154 { AUDIT_NFT_OP_OBJ_RESET
, "nft_reset_obj" },
155 { AUDIT_NFT_OP_FLOWTABLE_REGISTER
, "nft_register_flowtable" },
156 { AUDIT_NFT_OP_FLOWTABLE_UNREGISTER
, "nft_unregister_flowtable" },
157 { AUDIT_NFT_OP_INVALID
, "nft_invalid" },
160 static int audit_match_perm(struct audit_context
*ctx
, int mask
)
168 switch (audit_classify_syscall(ctx
->arch
, n
)) {
170 if ((mask
& AUDIT_PERM_WRITE
) &&
171 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_WRITE
, n
))
173 if ((mask
& AUDIT_PERM_READ
) &&
174 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_READ
, n
))
176 if ((mask
& AUDIT_PERM_ATTR
) &&
177 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_CHATTR
, n
))
180 case 1: /* 32bit on biarch */
181 if ((mask
& AUDIT_PERM_WRITE
) &&
182 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_WRITE_32
, n
))
184 if ((mask
& AUDIT_PERM_READ
) &&
185 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_READ_32
, n
))
187 if ((mask
& AUDIT_PERM_ATTR
) &&
188 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_CHATTR_32
, n
))
192 return mask
& ACC_MODE(ctx
->argv
[1]);
194 return mask
& ACC_MODE(ctx
->argv
[2]);
195 case 4: /* socketcall */
196 return ((mask
& AUDIT_PERM_WRITE
) && ctx
->argv
[0] == SYS_BIND
);
198 return mask
& AUDIT_PERM_EXEC
;
204 static int audit_match_filetype(struct audit_context
*ctx
, int val
)
206 struct audit_names
*n
;
207 umode_t mode
= (umode_t
)val
;
212 list_for_each_entry(n
, &ctx
->names_list
, list
) {
213 if ((n
->ino
!= AUDIT_INO_UNSET
) &&
214 ((n
->mode
& S_IFMT
) == mode
))
222 * We keep a linked list of fixed-sized (31 pointer) arrays of audit_chunk *;
223 * ->first_trees points to its beginning, ->trees - to the current end of data.
224 * ->tree_count is the number of free entries in array pointed to by ->trees.
225 * Original condition is (NULL, NULL, 0); as soon as it grows we never revert to NULL,
226 * "empty" becomes (p, p, 31) afterwards. We don't shrink the list (and seriously,
227 * it's going to remain 1-element for almost any setup) until we free context itself.
228 * References in it _are_ dropped - at the same time we free/drop aux stuff.
231 static void audit_set_auditable(struct audit_context
*ctx
)
235 ctx
->current_state
= AUDIT_STATE_RECORD
;
239 static int put_tree_ref(struct audit_context
*ctx
, struct audit_chunk
*chunk
)
241 struct audit_tree_refs
*p
= ctx
->trees
;
242 int left
= ctx
->tree_count
;
245 p
->c
[--left
] = chunk
;
246 ctx
->tree_count
= left
;
255 ctx
->tree_count
= 30;
261 static int grow_tree_refs(struct audit_context
*ctx
)
263 struct audit_tree_refs
*p
= ctx
->trees
;
265 ctx
->trees
= kzalloc(sizeof(struct audit_tree_refs
), GFP_KERNEL
);
271 p
->next
= ctx
->trees
;
273 ctx
->first_trees
= ctx
->trees
;
274 ctx
->tree_count
= 31;
278 static void unroll_tree_refs(struct audit_context
*ctx
,
279 struct audit_tree_refs
*p
, int count
)
281 struct audit_tree_refs
*q
;
285 /* we started with empty chain */
286 p
= ctx
->first_trees
;
288 /* if the very first allocation has failed, nothing to do */
293 for (q
= p
; q
!= ctx
->trees
; q
= q
->next
, n
= 31) {
295 audit_put_chunk(q
->c
[n
]);
299 while (n
-- > ctx
->tree_count
) {
300 audit_put_chunk(q
->c
[n
]);
304 ctx
->tree_count
= count
;
307 static void free_tree_refs(struct audit_context
*ctx
)
309 struct audit_tree_refs
*p
, *q
;
311 for (p
= ctx
->first_trees
; p
; p
= q
) {
317 static int match_tree_refs(struct audit_context
*ctx
, struct audit_tree
*tree
)
319 struct audit_tree_refs
*p
;
325 for (p
= ctx
->first_trees
; p
!= ctx
->trees
; p
= p
->next
) {
326 for (n
= 0; n
< 31; n
++)
327 if (audit_tree_match(p
->c
[n
], tree
))
332 for (n
= ctx
->tree_count
; n
< 31; n
++)
333 if (audit_tree_match(p
->c
[n
], tree
))
339 static int audit_compare_uid(kuid_t uid
,
340 struct audit_names
*name
,
341 struct audit_field
*f
,
342 struct audit_context
*ctx
)
344 struct audit_names
*n
;
348 rc
= audit_uid_comparator(uid
, f
->op
, name
->uid
);
354 list_for_each_entry(n
, &ctx
->names_list
, list
) {
355 rc
= audit_uid_comparator(uid
, f
->op
, n
->uid
);
363 static int audit_compare_gid(kgid_t gid
,
364 struct audit_names
*name
,
365 struct audit_field
*f
,
366 struct audit_context
*ctx
)
368 struct audit_names
*n
;
372 rc
= audit_gid_comparator(gid
, f
->op
, name
->gid
);
378 list_for_each_entry(n
, &ctx
->names_list
, list
) {
379 rc
= audit_gid_comparator(gid
, f
->op
, n
->gid
);
387 static int audit_field_compare(struct task_struct
*tsk
,
388 const struct cred
*cred
,
389 struct audit_field
*f
,
390 struct audit_context
*ctx
,
391 struct audit_names
*name
)
394 /* process to file object comparisons */
395 case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_OBJ_UID
:
396 return audit_compare_uid(cred
->uid
, name
, f
, ctx
);
397 case AUDIT_COMPARE_GID_TO_OBJ_GID
:
398 return audit_compare_gid(cred
->gid
, name
, f
, ctx
);
399 case AUDIT_COMPARE_EUID_TO_OBJ_UID
:
400 return audit_compare_uid(cred
->euid
, name
, f
, ctx
);
401 case AUDIT_COMPARE_EGID_TO_OBJ_GID
:
402 return audit_compare_gid(cred
->egid
, name
, f
, ctx
);
403 case AUDIT_COMPARE_AUID_TO_OBJ_UID
:
404 return audit_compare_uid(audit_get_loginuid(tsk
), name
, f
, ctx
);
405 case AUDIT_COMPARE_SUID_TO_OBJ_UID
:
406 return audit_compare_uid(cred
->suid
, name
, f
, ctx
);
407 case AUDIT_COMPARE_SGID_TO_OBJ_GID
:
408 return audit_compare_gid(cred
->sgid
, name
, f
, ctx
);
409 case AUDIT_COMPARE_FSUID_TO_OBJ_UID
:
410 return audit_compare_uid(cred
->fsuid
, name
, f
, ctx
);
411 case AUDIT_COMPARE_FSGID_TO_OBJ_GID
:
412 return audit_compare_gid(cred
->fsgid
, name
, f
, ctx
);
413 /* uid comparisons */
414 case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_AUID
:
415 return audit_uid_comparator(cred
->uid
, f
->op
,
416 audit_get_loginuid(tsk
));
417 case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_EUID
:
418 return audit_uid_comparator(cred
->uid
, f
->op
, cred
->euid
);
419 case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_SUID
:
420 return audit_uid_comparator(cred
->uid
, f
->op
, cred
->suid
);
421 case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_FSUID
:
422 return audit_uid_comparator(cred
->uid
, f
->op
, cred
->fsuid
);
423 /* auid comparisons */
424 case AUDIT_COMPARE_AUID_TO_EUID
:
425 return audit_uid_comparator(audit_get_loginuid(tsk
), f
->op
,
427 case AUDIT_COMPARE_AUID_TO_SUID
:
428 return audit_uid_comparator(audit_get_loginuid(tsk
), f
->op
,
430 case AUDIT_COMPARE_AUID_TO_FSUID
:
431 return audit_uid_comparator(audit_get_loginuid(tsk
), f
->op
,
433 /* euid comparisons */
434 case AUDIT_COMPARE_EUID_TO_SUID
:
435 return audit_uid_comparator(cred
->euid
, f
->op
, cred
->suid
);
436 case AUDIT_COMPARE_EUID_TO_FSUID
:
437 return audit_uid_comparator(cred
->euid
, f
->op
, cred
->fsuid
);
438 /* suid comparisons */
439 case AUDIT_COMPARE_SUID_TO_FSUID
:
440 return audit_uid_comparator(cred
->suid
, f
->op
, cred
->fsuid
);
441 /* gid comparisons */
442 case AUDIT_COMPARE_GID_TO_EGID
:
443 return audit_gid_comparator(cred
->gid
, f
->op
, cred
->egid
);
444 case AUDIT_COMPARE_GID_TO_SGID
:
445 return audit_gid_comparator(cred
->gid
, f
->op
, cred
->sgid
);
446 case AUDIT_COMPARE_GID_TO_FSGID
:
447 return audit_gid_comparator(cred
->gid
, f
->op
, cred
->fsgid
);
448 /* egid comparisons */
449 case AUDIT_COMPARE_EGID_TO_SGID
:
450 return audit_gid_comparator(cred
->egid
, f
->op
, cred
->sgid
);
451 case AUDIT_COMPARE_EGID_TO_FSGID
:
452 return audit_gid_comparator(cred
->egid
, f
->op
, cred
->fsgid
);
453 /* sgid comparison */
454 case AUDIT_COMPARE_SGID_TO_FSGID
:
455 return audit_gid_comparator(cred
->sgid
, f
->op
, cred
->fsgid
);
457 WARN(1, "Missing AUDIT_COMPARE define. Report as a bug\n");
463 /* Determine if any context name data matches a rule's watch data */
464 /* Compare a task_struct with an audit_rule. Return 1 on match, 0
467 * If task_creation is true, this is an explicit indication that we are
468 * filtering a task rule at task creation time. This and tsk == current are
469 * the only situations where tsk->cred may be accessed without an rcu read lock.
471 static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct
*tsk
,
472 struct audit_krule
*rule
,
473 struct audit_context
*ctx
,
474 struct audit_names
*name
,
475 enum audit_state
*state
,
478 const struct cred
*cred
;
480 struct lsmblob blob
= { };
481 unsigned int sessionid
;
483 cred
= rcu_dereference_check(tsk
->cred
, tsk
== current
|| task_creation
);
485 for (i
= 0; i
< rule
->field_count
; i
++) {
486 struct audit_field
*f
= &rule
->fields
[i
];
487 struct audit_names
*n
;
493 pid
= task_tgid_nr(tsk
);
494 result
= audit_comparator(pid
, f
->op
, f
->val
);
499 ctx
->ppid
= task_ppid_nr(tsk
);
500 result
= audit_comparator(ctx
->ppid
, f
->op
, f
->val
);
504 result
= audit_exe_compare(tsk
, rule
->exe
);
505 if (f
->op
== Audit_not_equal
)
509 result
= audit_uid_comparator(cred
->uid
, f
->op
, f
->uid
);
512 result
= audit_uid_comparator(cred
->euid
, f
->op
, f
->uid
);
515 result
= audit_uid_comparator(cred
->suid
, f
->op
, f
->uid
);
518 result
= audit_uid_comparator(cred
->fsuid
, f
->op
, f
->uid
);
521 result
= audit_gid_comparator(cred
->gid
, f
->op
, f
->gid
);
522 if (f
->op
== Audit_equal
) {
524 result
= groups_search(cred
->group_info
, f
->gid
);
525 } else if (f
->op
== Audit_not_equal
) {
527 result
= !groups_search(cred
->group_info
, f
->gid
);
531 result
= audit_gid_comparator(cred
->egid
, f
->op
, f
->gid
);
532 if (f
->op
== Audit_equal
) {
534 result
= groups_search(cred
->group_info
, f
->gid
);
535 } else if (f
->op
== Audit_not_equal
) {
537 result
= !groups_search(cred
->group_info
, f
->gid
);
541 result
= audit_gid_comparator(cred
->sgid
, f
->op
, f
->gid
);
544 result
= audit_gid_comparator(cred
->fsgid
, f
->op
, f
->gid
);
546 case AUDIT_SESSIONID
:
547 sessionid
= audit_get_sessionid(tsk
);
548 result
= audit_comparator(sessionid
, f
->op
, f
->val
);
551 result
= audit_comparator(tsk
->personality
, f
->op
, f
->val
);
555 result
= audit_comparator(ctx
->arch
, f
->op
, f
->val
);
559 if (ctx
&& ctx
->return_valid
!= AUDITSC_INVALID
)
560 result
= audit_comparator(ctx
->return_code
, f
->op
, f
->val
);
563 if (ctx
&& ctx
->return_valid
!= AUDITSC_INVALID
) {
565 result
= audit_comparator(ctx
->return_valid
, f
->op
, AUDITSC_SUCCESS
);
567 result
= audit_comparator(ctx
->return_valid
, f
->op
, AUDITSC_FAILURE
);
572 if (audit_comparator(MAJOR(name
->dev
), f
->op
, f
->val
) ||
573 audit_comparator(MAJOR(name
->rdev
), f
->op
, f
->val
))
576 list_for_each_entry(n
, &ctx
->names_list
, list
) {
577 if (audit_comparator(MAJOR(n
->dev
), f
->op
, f
->val
) ||
578 audit_comparator(MAJOR(n
->rdev
), f
->op
, f
->val
)) {
587 if (audit_comparator(MINOR(name
->dev
), f
->op
, f
->val
) ||
588 audit_comparator(MINOR(name
->rdev
), f
->op
, f
->val
))
591 list_for_each_entry(n
, &ctx
->names_list
, list
) {
592 if (audit_comparator(MINOR(n
->dev
), f
->op
, f
->val
) ||
593 audit_comparator(MINOR(n
->rdev
), f
->op
, f
->val
)) {
602 result
= audit_comparator(name
->ino
, f
->op
, f
->val
);
604 list_for_each_entry(n
, &ctx
->names_list
, list
) {
605 if (audit_comparator(n
->ino
, f
->op
, f
->val
)) {
614 result
= audit_uid_comparator(name
->uid
, f
->op
, f
->uid
);
616 list_for_each_entry(n
, &ctx
->names_list
, list
) {
617 if (audit_uid_comparator(n
->uid
, f
->op
, f
->uid
)) {
626 result
= audit_gid_comparator(name
->gid
, f
->op
, f
->gid
);
628 list_for_each_entry(n
, &ctx
->names_list
, list
) {
629 if (audit_gid_comparator(n
->gid
, f
->op
, f
->gid
)) {
638 result
= audit_watch_compare(rule
->watch
,
641 if (f
->op
== Audit_not_equal
)
647 result
= match_tree_refs(ctx
, rule
->tree
);
648 if (f
->op
== Audit_not_equal
)
653 result
= audit_uid_comparator(audit_get_loginuid(tsk
),
656 case AUDIT_LOGINUID_SET
:
657 result
= audit_comparator(audit_loginuid_set(tsk
), f
->op
, f
->val
);
659 case AUDIT_SADDR_FAM
:
660 if (ctx
&& ctx
->sockaddr
)
661 result
= audit_comparator(ctx
->sockaddr
->ss_family
,
664 case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER
:
665 case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE
:
666 case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE
:
669 /* NOTE: this may return negative values indicating
670 a temporary error. We simply treat this as a
671 match for now to avoid losing information that
672 may be wanted. An error message will also be
676 security_task_getsecid_subj(tsk
, &blob
);
679 result
= security_audit_rule_match(&blob
,
688 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW
:
689 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH
:
690 /* The above note for AUDIT_SUBJ_USER...AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR
693 /* Find files that match */
695 result
= security_audit_rule_match(
701 list_for_each_entry(n
, &ctx
->names_list
, list
) {
702 if (security_audit_rule_match(
712 /* Find ipc objects that match */
713 if (!ctx
|| ctx
->type
!= AUDIT_IPC
)
715 if (security_audit_rule_match(&ctx
->ipc
.oblob
,
726 result
= audit_comparator(ctx
->argv
[f
->type
-AUDIT_ARG0
], f
->op
, f
->val
);
728 case AUDIT_FILTERKEY
:
729 /* ignore this field for filtering */
733 result
= audit_match_perm(ctx
, f
->val
);
734 if (f
->op
== Audit_not_equal
)
738 result
= audit_match_filetype(ctx
, f
->val
);
739 if (f
->op
== Audit_not_equal
)
742 case AUDIT_FIELD_COMPARE
:
743 result
= audit_field_compare(tsk
, cred
, f
, ctx
, name
);
751 if (rule
->prio
<= ctx
->prio
)
753 if (rule
->filterkey
) {
754 kfree(ctx
->filterkey
);
755 ctx
->filterkey
= kstrdup(rule
->filterkey
, GFP_ATOMIC
);
757 ctx
->prio
= rule
->prio
;
759 switch (rule
->action
) {
761 *state
= AUDIT_STATE_DISABLED
;
764 *state
= AUDIT_STATE_RECORD
;
770 /* At process creation time, we can determine if system-call auditing is
771 * completely disabled for this task. Since we only have the task
772 * structure at this point, we can only check uid and gid.
774 static enum audit_state
audit_filter_task(struct task_struct
*tsk
, char **key
)
776 struct audit_entry
*e
;
777 enum audit_state state
;
780 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e
, &audit_filter_list
[AUDIT_FILTER_TASK
], list
) {
781 if (audit_filter_rules(tsk
, &e
->rule
, NULL
, NULL
,
783 if (state
== AUDIT_STATE_RECORD
)
784 *key
= kstrdup(e
->rule
.filterkey
, GFP_ATOMIC
);
790 return AUDIT_STATE_BUILD
;
793 static int audit_in_mask(const struct audit_krule
*rule
, unsigned long val
)
797 if (val
> 0xffffffff)
800 word
= AUDIT_WORD(val
);
801 if (word
>= AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE
)
804 bit
= AUDIT_BIT(val
);
806 return rule
->mask
[word
] & bit
;
809 /* At syscall exit time, this filter is called if the audit_state is
810 * not low enough that auditing cannot take place, but is also not
811 * high enough that we already know we have to write an audit record
812 * (i.e., the state is AUDIT_STATE_BUILD).
814 static void audit_filter_syscall(struct task_struct
*tsk
,
815 struct audit_context
*ctx
)
817 struct audit_entry
*e
;
818 enum audit_state state
;
820 if (auditd_test_task(tsk
))
824 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e
, &audit_filter_list
[AUDIT_FILTER_EXIT
], list
) {
825 if (audit_in_mask(&e
->rule
, ctx
->major
) &&
826 audit_filter_rules(tsk
, &e
->rule
, ctx
, NULL
,
829 ctx
->current_state
= state
;
838 * Given an audit_name check the inode hash table to see if they match.
839 * Called holding the rcu read lock to protect the use of audit_inode_hash
841 static int audit_filter_inode_name(struct task_struct
*tsk
,
842 struct audit_names
*n
,
843 struct audit_context
*ctx
) {
844 int h
= audit_hash_ino((u32
)n
->ino
);
845 struct list_head
*list
= &audit_inode_hash
[h
];
846 struct audit_entry
*e
;
847 enum audit_state state
;
849 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e
, list
, list
) {
850 if (audit_in_mask(&e
->rule
, ctx
->major
) &&
851 audit_filter_rules(tsk
, &e
->rule
, ctx
, n
, &state
, false)) {
852 ctx
->current_state
= state
;
859 /* At syscall exit time, this filter is called if any audit_names have been
860 * collected during syscall processing. We only check rules in sublists at hash
861 * buckets applicable to the inode numbers in audit_names.
862 * Regarding audit_state, same rules apply as for audit_filter_syscall().
864 void audit_filter_inodes(struct task_struct
*tsk
, struct audit_context
*ctx
)
866 struct audit_names
*n
;
868 if (auditd_test_task(tsk
))
873 list_for_each_entry(n
, &ctx
->names_list
, list
) {
874 if (audit_filter_inode_name(tsk
, n
, ctx
))
880 static inline void audit_proctitle_free(struct audit_context
*context
)
882 kfree(context
->proctitle
.value
);
883 context
->proctitle
.value
= NULL
;
884 context
->proctitle
.len
= 0;
887 static inline void audit_free_module(struct audit_context
*context
)
889 if (context
->type
== AUDIT_KERN_MODULE
) {
890 kfree(context
->module
.name
);
891 context
->module
.name
= NULL
;
894 static inline void audit_free_names(struct audit_context
*context
)
896 struct audit_names
*n
, *next
;
898 list_for_each_entry_safe(n
, next
, &context
->names_list
, list
) {
905 context
->name_count
= 0;
906 path_put(&context
->pwd
);
907 context
->pwd
.dentry
= NULL
;
908 context
->pwd
.mnt
= NULL
;
911 static inline void audit_free_aux(struct audit_context
*context
)
913 struct audit_aux_data
*aux
;
915 while ((aux
= context
->aux
)) {
916 context
->aux
= aux
->next
;
919 while ((aux
= context
->aux_pids
)) {
920 context
->aux_pids
= aux
->next
;
925 static inline struct audit_context
*audit_alloc_context(enum audit_state state
)
927 struct audit_context
*context
;
929 context
= kzalloc(sizeof(*context
), GFP_KERNEL
);
932 context
->state
= state
;
933 context
->prio
= state
== AUDIT_STATE_RECORD
? ~0ULL : 0;
934 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&context
->killed_trees
);
935 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&context
->names_list
);
936 context
->fds
[0] = -1;
937 context
->return_valid
= AUDITSC_INVALID
;
942 * audit_alloc - allocate an audit context block for a task
945 * Filter on the task information and allocate a per-task audit context
946 * if necessary. Doing so turns on system call auditing for the
947 * specified task. This is called from copy_process, so no lock is
950 int audit_alloc(struct task_struct
*tsk
)
952 struct audit_context
*context
;
953 enum audit_state state
;
956 if (likely(!audit_ever_enabled
))
957 return 0; /* Return if not auditing. */
959 state
= audit_filter_task(tsk
, &key
);
960 if (!lsm_multiple_contexts() && state
== AUDIT_STATE_DISABLED
) {
961 clear_task_syscall_work(tsk
, SYSCALL_AUDIT
);
964 if (state
== AUDIT_STATE_DISABLED
)
965 clear_task_syscall_work(tsk
, SYSCALL_AUDIT
);
967 if (!(context
= audit_alloc_context(state
))) {
969 audit_log_lost("out of memory in audit_alloc");
972 context
->filterkey
= key
;
974 audit_set_context(tsk
, context
);
975 set_task_syscall_work(tsk
, SYSCALL_AUDIT
);
979 static inline void audit_free_context(struct audit_context
*context
)
981 audit_free_module(context
);
982 audit_free_names(context
);
983 unroll_tree_refs(context
, NULL
, 0);
984 free_tree_refs(context
);
985 audit_free_aux(context
);
986 kfree(context
->filterkey
);
987 kfree(context
->sockaddr
);
988 audit_proctitle_free(context
);
992 static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context
*context
, pid_t pid
,
993 kuid_t auid
, kuid_t uid
,
994 unsigned int sessionid
,
995 struct lsmblob
*blob
, char *comm
)
997 struct audit_buffer
*ab
;
1000 ab
= audit_log_start(context
, GFP_KERNEL
, AUDIT_OBJ_PID
);
1004 audit_log_format(ab
, "opid=%d oauid=%d ouid=%d oses=%d", pid
,
1005 from_kuid(&init_user_ns
, auid
),
1006 from_kuid(&init_user_ns
, uid
), sessionid
);
1007 rc
= audit_log_object_context(ab
, blob
);
1008 audit_log_format(ab
, " ocomm=");
1009 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab
, comm
);
1015 static void audit_log_execve_info(struct audit_context
*context
,
1016 struct audit_buffer
**ab
)
1030 const char __user
*p
= (const char __user
*)current
->mm
->arg_start
;
1032 /* NOTE: this buffer needs to be large enough to hold all the non-arg
1033 * data we put in the audit record for this argument (see the
1034 * code below) ... at this point in time 96 is plenty */
1037 /* NOTE: we set MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN to a rather arbitrary limit, the
1038 * current value of 7500 is not as important as the fact that it
1039 * is less than 8k, a setting of 7500 gives us plenty of wiggle
1040 * room if we go over a little bit in the logging below */
1041 WARN_ON_ONCE(MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN
> 7500);
1042 len_max
= MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN
;
1044 /* scratch buffer to hold the userspace args */
1045 buf_head
= kmalloc(MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN
+ 1, GFP_KERNEL
);
1047 audit_panic("out of memory for argv string");
1052 audit_log_format(*ab
, "argc=%d", context
->execve
.argc
);
1057 require_data
= true;
1062 /* NOTE: we don't ever want to trust this value for anything
1063 * serious, but the audit record format insists we
1064 * provide an argument length for really long arguments,
1065 * e.g. > MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN, so we have no choice but
1066 * to use strncpy_from_user() to obtain this value for
1067 * recording in the log, although we don't use it
1068 * anywhere here to avoid a double-fetch problem */
1070 len_full
= strnlen_user(p
, MAX_ARG_STRLEN
) - 1;
1072 /* read more data from userspace */
1074 /* can we make more room in the buffer? */
1075 if (buf
!= buf_head
) {
1076 memmove(buf_head
, buf
, len_buf
);
1080 /* fetch as much as we can of the argument */
1081 len_tmp
= strncpy_from_user(&buf_head
[len_buf
], p
,
1083 if (len_tmp
== -EFAULT
) {
1084 /* unable to copy from userspace */
1085 send_sig(SIGKILL
, current
, 0);
1087 } else if (len_tmp
== (len_max
- len_buf
)) {
1088 /* buffer is not large enough */
1089 require_data
= true;
1090 /* NOTE: if we are going to span multiple
1091 * buffers force the encoding so we stand
1092 * a chance at a sane len_full value and
1093 * consistent record encoding */
1095 len_full
= len_full
* 2;
1098 require_data
= false;
1100 encode
= audit_string_contains_control(
1102 /* try to use a trusted value for len_full */
1103 if (len_full
< len_max
)
1104 len_full
= (encode
?
1105 len_tmp
* 2 : len_tmp
);
1109 buf_head
[len_buf
] = '\0';
1111 /* length of the buffer in the audit record? */
1112 len_abuf
= (encode
? len_buf
* 2 : len_buf
+ 2);
1115 /* write as much as we can to the audit log */
1117 /* NOTE: some magic numbers here - basically if we
1118 * can't fit a reasonable amount of data into the
1119 * existing audit buffer, flush it and start with
1121 if ((sizeof(abuf
) + 8) > len_rem
) {
1124 *ab
= audit_log_start(context
,
1125 GFP_KERNEL
, AUDIT_EXECVE
);
1130 /* create the non-arg portion of the arg record */
1132 if (require_data
|| (iter
> 0) ||
1133 ((len_abuf
+ sizeof(abuf
)) > len_rem
)) {
1135 len_tmp
+= snprintf(&abuf
[len_tmp
],
1136 sizeof(abuf
) - len_tmp
,
1140 len_tmp
+= snprintf(&abuf
[len_tmp
],
1141 sizeof(abuf
) - len_tmp
,
1142 " a%d[%d]=", arg
, iter
++);
1144 len_tmp
+= snprintf(&abuf
[len_tmp
],
1145 sizeof(abuf
) - len_tmp
,
1147 WARN_ON(len_tmp
>= sizeof(abuf
));
1148 abuf
[sizeof(abuf
) - 1] = '\0';
1150 /* log the arg in the audit record */
1151 audit_log_format(*ab
, "%s", abuf
);
1155 if (len_abuf
> len_rem
)
1156 len_tmp
= len_rem
/ 2; /* encoding */
1157 audit_log_n_hex(*ab
, buf
, len_tmp
);
1158 len_rem
-= len_tmp
* 2;
1159 len_abuf
-= len_tmp
* 2;
1161 if (len_abuf
> len_rem
)
1162 len_tmp
= len_rem
- 2; /* quotes */
1163 audit_log_n_string(*ab
, buf
, len_tmp
);
1164 len_rem
-= len_tmp
+ 2;
1165 /* don't subtract the "2" because we still need
1166 * to add quotes to the remaining string */
1167 len_abuf
-= len_tmp
;
1173 /* ready to move to the next argument? */
1174 if ((len_buf
== 0) && !require_data
) {
1178 require_data
= true;
1181 } while (arg
< context
->execve
.argc
);
1183 /* NOTE: the caller handles the final audit_log_end() call */
1189 static void audit_log_cap(struct audit_buffer
*ab
, char *prefix
,
1194 if (cap_isclear(*cap
)) {
1195 audit_log_format(ab
, " %s=0", prefix
);
1198 audit_log_format(ab
, " %s=", prefix
);
1200 audit_log_format(ab
, "%08x", cap
->cap
[CAP_LAST_U32
- i
]);
1203 static void audit_log_fcaps(struct audit_buffer
*ab
, struct audit_names
*name
)
1205 if (name
->fcap_ver
== -1) {
1206 audit_log_format(ab
, " cap_fe=? cap_fver=? cap_fp=? cap_fi=?");
1209 audit_log_cap(ab
, "cap_fp", &name
->fcap
.permitted
);
1210 audit_log_cap(ab
, "cap_fi", &name
->fcap
.inheritable
);
1211 audit_log_format(ab
, " cap_fe=%d cap_fver=%x cap_frootid=%d",
1212 name
->fcap
.fE
, name
->fcap_ver
,
1213 from_kuid(&init_user_ns
, name
->fcap
.rootid
));
1216 static void audit_log_time(struct audit_context
*context
, struct audit_buffer
**ab
)
1218 const struct audit_ntp_data
*ntp
= &context
->time
.ntp_data
;
1219 const struct timespec64
*tk
= &context
->time
.tk_injoffset
;
1220 static const char * const ntp_name
[] = {
1230 if (context
->type
== AUDIT_TIME_ADJNTPVAL
) {
1231 for (type
= 0; type
< AUDIT_NTP_NVALS
; type
++) {
1232 if (ntp
->vals
[type
].newval
!= ntp
->vals
[type
].oldval
) {
1234 *ab
= audit_log_start(context
,
1236 AUDIT_TIME_ADJNTPVAL
);
1240 audit_log_format(*ab
, "op=%s old=%lli new=%lli",
1242 ntp
->vals
[type
].oldval
,
1243 ntp
->vals
[type
].newval
);
1249 if (tk
->tv_sec
!= 0 || tk
->tv_nsec
!= 0) {
1251 *ab
= audit_log_start(context
, GFP_KERNEL
,
1252 AUDIT_TIME_INJOFFSET
);
1256 audit_log_format(*ab
, "sec=%lli nsec=%li",
1257 (long long)tk
->tv_sec
, tk
->tv_nsec
);
1263 static void show_special(struct audit_context
*context
, int *call_panic
)
1265 struct audit_buffer
*ab
;
1268 ab
= audit_log_start(context
, GFP_KERNEL
, context
->type
);
1272 switch (context
->type
) {
1273 case AUDIT_SOCKETCALL
: {
1274 int nargs
= context
->socketcall
.nargs
;
1276 audit_log_format(ab
, "nargs=%d", nargs
);
1277 for (i
= 0; i
< nargs
; i
++)
1278 audit_log_format(ab
, " a%d=%lx", i
,
1279 context
->socketcall
.args
[i
]);
1282 struct lsmblob
*oblob
= &context
->ipc
.oblob
;
1284 audit_log_format(ab
, "ouid=%u ogid=%u mode=%#ho",
1285 from_kuid(&init_user_ns
, context
->ipc
.uid
),
1286 from_kgid(&init_user_ns
, context
->ipc
.gid
),
1288 if (audit_log_object_context(ab
, oblob
))
1290 if (context
->ipc
.has_perm
) {
1292 ab
= audit_log_start(context
, GFP_KERNEL
,
1293 AUDIT_IPC_SET_PERM
);
1296 audit_log_format(ab
,
1297 "qbytes=%lx ouid=%u ogid=%u mode=%#ho",
1298 context
->ipc
.qbytes
,
1299 context
->ipc
.perm_uid
,
1300 context
->ipc
.perm_gid
,
1301 context
->ipc
.perm_mode
);
1305 audit_log_format(ab
,
1306 "oflag=0x%x mode=%#ho mq_flags=0x%lx mq_maxmsg=%ld "
1307 "mq_msgsize=%ld mq_curmsgs=%ld",
1308 context
->mq_open
.oflag
, context
->mq_open
.mode
,
1309 context
->mq_open
.attr
.mq_flags
,
1310 context
->mq_open
.attr
.mq_maxmsg
,
1311 context
->mq_open
.attr
.mq_msgsize
,
1312 context
->mq_open
.attr
.mq_curmsgs
);
1314 case AUDIT_MQ_SENDRECV
:
1315 audit_log_format(ab
,
1316 "mqdes=%d msg_len=%zd msg_prio=%u "
1317 "abs_timeout_sec=%lld abs_timeout_nsec=%ld",
1318 context
->mq_sendrecv
.mqdes
,
1319 context
->mq_sendrecv
.msg_len
,
1320 context
->mq_sendrecv
.msg_prio
,
1321 (long long) context
->mq_sendrecv
.abs_timeout
.tv_sec
,
1322 context
->mq_sendrecv
.abs_timeout
.tv_nsec
);
1324 case AUDIT_MQ_NOTIFY
:
1325 audit_log_format(ab
, "mqdes=%d sigev_signo=%d",
1326 context
->mq_notify
.mqdes
,
1327 context
->mq_notify
.sigev_signo
);
1329 case AUDIT_MQ_GETSETATTR
: {
1330 struct mq_attr
*attr
= &context
->mq_getsetattr
.mqstat
;
1332 audit_log_format(ab
,
1333 "mqdes=%d mq_flags=0x%lx mq_maxmsg=%ld mq_msgsize=%ld "
1335 context
->mq_getsetattr
.mqdes
,
1336 attr
->mq_flags
, attr
->mq_maxmsg
,
1337 attr
->mq_msgsize
, attr
->mq_curmsgs
);
1340 audit_log_format(ab
, "pid=%d", context
->capset
.pid
);
1341 audit_log_cap(ab
, "cap_pi", &context
->capset
.cap
.inheritable
);
1342 audit_log_cap(ab
, "cap_pp", &context
->capset
.cap
.permitted
);
1343 audit_log_cap(ab
, "cap_pe", &context
->capset
.cap
.effective
);
1344 audit_log_cap(ab
, "cap_pa", &context
->capset
.cap
.ambient
);
1347 audit_log_format(ab
, "fd=%d flags=0x%x", context
->mmap
.fd
,
1348 context
->mmap
.flags
);
1351 audit_log_execve_info(context
, &ab
);
1353 case AUDIT_KERN_MODULE
:
1354 audit_log_format(ab
, "name=");
1355 if (context
->module
.name
) {
1356 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab
, context
->module
.name
);
1358 audit_log_format(ab
, "(null)");
1361 case AUDIT_TIME_ADJNTPVAL
:
1362 case AUDIT_TIME_INJOFFSET
:
1363 /* this call deviates from the rest, eating the buffer */
1364 audit_log_time(context
, &ab
);
1370 static inline int audit_proctitle_rtrim(char *proctitle
, int len
)
1372 char *end
= proctitle
+ len
- 1;
1374 while (end
> proctitle
&& !isprint(*end
))
1377 /* catch the case where proctitle is only 1 non-print character */
1378 len
= end
- proctitle
+ 1;
1379 len
-= isprint(proctitle
[len
-1]) == 0;
1384 * audit_log_name - produce AUDIT_PATH record from struct audit_names
1385 * @context: audit_context for the task
1386 * @n: audit_names structure with reportable details
1387 * @path: optional path to report instead of audit_names->name
1388 * @record_num: record number to report when handling a list of names
1389 * @call_panic: optional pointer to int that will be updated if secid fails
1391 static void audit_log_name(struct audit_context
*context
, struct audit_names
*n
,
1392 const struct path
*path
, int record_num
, int *call_panic
)
1394 struct audit_buffer
*ab
;
1396 ab
= audit_log_start(context
, GFP_KERNEL
, AUDIT_PATH
);
1400 audit_log_format(ab
, "item=%d", record_num
);
1403 audit_log_d_path(ab
, " name=", path
);
1405 switch (n
->name_len
) {
1406 case AUDIT_NAME_FULL
:
1407 /* log the full path */
1408 audit_log_format(ab
, " name=");
1409 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab
, n
->name
->name
);
1412 /* name was specified as a relative path and the
1413 * directory component is the cwd
1415 if (context
->pwd
.dentry
&& context
->pwd
.mnt
)
1416 audit_log_d_path(ab
, " name=", &context
->pwd
);
1418 audit_log_format(ab
, " name=(null)");
1421 /* log the name's directory component */
1422 audit_log_format(ab
, " name=");
1423 audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab
, n
->name
->name
,
1427 audit_log_format(ab
, " name=(null)");
1429 if (n
->ino
!= AUDIT_INO_UNSET
)
1430 audit_log_format(ab
, " inode=%lu dev=%02x:%02x mode=%#ho ouid=%u ogid=%u rdev=%02x:%02x",
1435 from_kuid(&init_user_ns
, n
->uid
),
1436 from_kgid(&init_user_ns
, n
->gid
),
1439 if (audit_log_object_context(ab
, &n
->oblob
) && call_panic
)
1442 /* log the audit_names record type */
1444 case AUDIT_TYPE_NORMAL
:
1445 audit_log_format(ab
, " nametype=NORMAL");
1447 case AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT
:
1448 audit_log_format(ab
, " nametype=PARENT");
1450 case AUDIT_TYPE_CHILD_DELETE
:
1451 audit_log_format(ab
, " nametype=DELETE");
1453 case AUDIT_TYPE_CHILD_CREATE
:
1454 audit_log_format(ab
, " nametype=CREATE");
1457 audit_log_format(ab
, " nametype=UNKNOWN");
1461 audit_log_fcaps(ab
, n
);
1465 static void audit_log_proctitle(void)
1469 char *msg
= "(null)";
1470 int len
= strlen(msg
);
1471 struct audit_context
*context
= audit_context();
1472 struct audit_buffer
*ab
;
1474 ab
= audit_log_start(context
, GFP_KERNEL
, AUDIT_PROCTITLE
);
1476 return; /* audit_panic or being filtered */
1478 audit_log_format(ab
, "proctitle=");
1481 if (!context
->proctitle
.value
) {
1482 buf
= kmalloc(MAX_PROCTITLE_AUDIT_LEN
, GFP_KERNEL
);
1485 /* Historically called this from procfs naming */
1486 res
= get_cmdline(current
, buf
, MAX_PROCTITLE_AUDIT_LEN
);
1491 res
= audit_proctitle_rtrim(buf
, res
);
1496 context
->proctitle
.value
= buf
;
1497 context
->proctitle
.len
= res
;
1499 msg
= context
->proctitle
.value
;
1500 len
= context
->proctitle
.len
;
1502 audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab
, msg
, len
);
1506 void audit_log_lsm(struct lsmblob
*blob
, bool exiting
)
1508 struct audit_context
*context
= audit_context();
1509 struct lsmcontext lsmdata
;
1510 struct audit_buffer
*ab
;
1511 struct lsmblob localblob
;
1516 if (!lsm_multiple_contexts())
1519 if (context
&& context
->in_syscall
&& !exiting
)
1522 ab
= audit_log_start(context
, GFP_ATOMIC
, AUDIT_MAC_TASK_CONTEXTS
);
1524 return; /* audit_panic or being filtered */
1527 security_task_getsecid_subj(current
, &localblob
);
1528 if (!lsmblob_is_set(&localblob
))
1533 for (i
= 0; i
< LSMBLOB_ENTRIES
; i
++) {
1534 if (blob
->secid
[i
] == 0)
1536 error
= security_secid_to_secctx(blob
, &lsmdata
, i
);
1537 if (error
&& error
!= -EINVAL
) {
1538 audit_panic("error in audit_log_lsm");
1542 audit_log_format(ab
, "%ssubj_%s=%s", sep
? " " : "",
1543 security_lsm_slot_name(i
), lsmdata
.context
);
1546 security_release_secctx(&lsmdata
);
1552 static void audit_log_exit(void)
1554 int i
, call_panic
= 0;
1555 struct audit_context
*context
= audit_context();
1556 struct audit_buffer
*ab
;
1557 struct audit_aux_data
*aux
;
1558 struct audit_names
*n
;
1560 context
->personality
= current
->personality
;
1562 ab
= audit_log_start(context
, GFP_KERNEL
, AUDIT_SYSCALL
);
1564 return; /* audit_panic has been called */
1565 audit_log_format(ab
, "arch=%x syscall=%d",
1566 context
->arch
, context
->major
);
1567 if (context
->personality
!= PER_LINUX
)
1568 audit_log_format(ab
, " per=%lx", context
->personality
);
1569 if (context
->return_valid
!= AUDITSC_INVALID
)
1570 audit_log_format(ab
, " success=%s exit=%ld",
1571 (context
->return_valid
==AUDITSC_SUCCESS
)?"yes":"no",
1572 context
->return_code
);
1574 audit_log_format(ab
,
1575 " a0=%lx a1=%lx a2=%lx a3=%lx items=%d",
1580 context
->name_count
);
1582 audit_log_task_info(ab
);
1583 audit_log_key(ab
, context
->filterkey
);
1586 for (aux
= context
->aux
; aux
; aux
= aux
->next
) {
1588 ab
= audit_log_start(context
, GFP_KERNEL
, aux
->type
);
1590 continue; /* audit_panic has been called */
1592 switch (aux
->type
) {
1594 case AUDIT_BPRM_FCAPS
: {
1595 struct audit_aux_data_bprm_fcaps
*axs
= (void *)aux
;
1597 audit_log_format(ab
, "fver=%x", axs
->fcap_ver
);
1598 audit_log_cap(ab
, "fp", &axs
->fcap
.permitted
);
1599 audit_log_cap(ab
, "fi", &axs
->fcap
.inheritable
);
1600 audit_log_format(ab
, " fe=%d", axs
->fcap
.fE
);
1601 audit_log_cap(ab
, "old_pp", &axs
->old_pcap
.permitted
);
1602 audit_log_cap(ab
, "old_pi", &axs
->old_pcap
.inheritable
);
1603 audit_log_cap(ab
, "old_pe", &axs
->old_pcap
.effective
);
1604 audit_log_cap(ab
, "old_pa", &axs
->old_pcap
.ambient
);
1605 audit_log_cap(ab
, "pp", &axs
->new_pcap
.permitted
);
1606 audit_log_cap(ab
, "pi", &axs
->new_pcap
.inheritable
);
1607 audit_log_cap(ab
, "pe", &axs
->new_pcap
.effective
);
1608 audit_log_cap(ab
, "pa", &axs
->new_pcap
.ambient
);
1609 audit_log_format(ab
, " frootid=%d",
1610 from_kuid(&init_user_ns
,
1619 show_special(context
, &call_panic
);
1621 if (context
->fds
[0] >= 0) {
1622 ab
= audit_log_start(context
, GFP_KERNEL
, AUDIT_FD_PAIR
);
1624 audit_log_format(ab
, "fd0=%d fd1=%d",
1625 context
->fds
[0], context
->fds
[1]);
1630 if (context
->sockaddr_len
) {
1631 ab
= audit_log_start(context
, GFP_KERNEL
, AUDIT_SOCKADDR
);
1633 audit_log_format(ab
, "saddr=");
1634 audit_log_n_hex(ab
, (void *)context
->sockaddr
,
1635 context
->sockaddr_len
);
1640 for (aux
= context
->aux_pids
; aux
; aux
= aux
->next
) {
1641 struct audit_aux_data_pids
*axs
= (void *)aux
;
1643 for (i
= 0; i
< axs
->pid_count
; i
++)
1644 if (audit_log_pid_context(context
, axs
->target_pid
[i
],
1645 axs
->target_auid
[i
],
1647 axs
->target_sessionid
[i
],
1648 &axs
->target_lsm
[i
],
1649 axs
->target_comm
[i
]))
1653 if (context
->target_pid
&&
1654 audit_log_pid_context(context
, context
->target_pid
,
1655 context
->target_auid
, context
->target_uid
,
1656 context
->target_sessionid
,
1657 &context
->target_lsm
, context
->target_comm
))
1660 if (context
->pwd
.dentry
&& context
->pwd
.mnt
) {
1661 ab
= audit_log_start(context
, GFP_KERNEL
, AUDIT_CWD
);
1663 audit_log_d_path(ab
, "cwd=", &context
->pwd
);
1669 list_for_each_entry(n
, &context
->names_list
, list
) {
1672 audit_log_name(context
, n
, NULL
, i
++, &call_panic
);
1675 audit_log_proctitle();
1676 audit_log_lsm(NULL
, true);
1678 /* Send end of event record to help user space know we are finished */
1679 ab
= audit_log_start(context
, GFP_KERNEL
, AUDIT_EOE
);
1683 audit_panic("error converting sid to string");
1687 * __audit_free - free a per-task audit context
1688 * @tsk: task whose audit context block to free
1690 * Called from copy_process and do_exit
1692 void __audit_free(struct task_struct
*tsk
)
1694 struct audit_context
*context
= tsk
->audit_context
;
1699 if (!list_empty(&context
->killed_trees
))
1700 audit_kill_trees(context
);
1702 /* We are called either by do_exit() or the fork() error handling code;
1703 * in the former case tsk == current and in the latter tsk is a
1704 * random task_struct that doesn't doesn't have any meaningful data we
1705 * need to log via audit_log_exit().
1707 if (tsk
== current
&& !context
->dummy
&& context
->in_syscall
) {
1708 context
->return_valid
= AUDITSC_INVALID
;
1709 context
->return_code
= 0;
1711 audit_filter_syscall(tsk
, context
);
1712 audit_filter_inodes(tsk
, context
);
1713 if (context
->current_state
== AUDIT_STATE_RECORD
)
1717 audit_set_context(tsk
, NULL
);
1718 audit_free_context(context
);
1722 * __audit_syscall_entry - fill in an audit record at syscall entry
1723 * @major: major syscall type (function)
1724 * @a1: additional syscall register 1
1725 * @a2: additional syscall register 2
1726 * @a3: additional syscall register 3
1727 * @a4: additional syscall register 4
1729 * Fill in audit context at syscall entry. This only happens if the
1730 * audit context was created when the task was created and the state or
1731 * filters demand the audit context be built. If the state from the
1732 * per-task filter or from the per-syscall filter is AUDIT_STATE_RECORD,
1733 * then the record will be written at syscall exit time (otherwise, it
1734 * will only be written if another part of the kernel requests that it
1737 void __audit_syscall_entry(int major
, unsigned long a1
, unsigned long a2
,
1738 unsigned long a3
, unsigned long a4
)
1740 struct audit_context
*context
= audit_context();
1741 enum audit_state state
;
1743 if (!audit_enabled
|| !context
)
1746 BUG_ON(context
->in_syscall
|| context
->name_count
);
1748 state
= context
->state
;
1749 if (state
== AUDIT_STATE_DISABLED
)
1752 context
->dummy
= !audit_n_rules
;
1753 if (!context
->dummy
&& state
== AUDIT_STATE_BUILD
) {
1755 if (auditd_test_task(current
))
1759 context
->arch
= syscall_get_arch(current
);
1760 context
->major
= major
;
1761 context
->argv
[0] = a1
;
1762 context
->argv
[1] = a2
;
1763 context
->argv
[2] = a3
;
1764 context
->argv
[3] = a4
;
1765 context
->serial
= 0;
1766 context
->in_syscall
= 1;
1767 context
->current_state
= state
;
1769 ktime_get_coarse_real_ts64(&context
->ctime
);
1773 * __audit_syscall_exit - deallocate audit context after a system call
1774 * @success: success value of the syscall
1775 * @return_code: return value of the syscall
1777 * Tear down after system call. If the audit context has been marked as
1778 * auditable (either because of the AUDIT_STATE_RECORD state from
1779 * filtering, or because some other part of the kernel wrote an audit
1780 * message), then write out the syscall information. In call cases,
1781 * free the names stored from getname().
1783 void __audit_syscall_exit(int success
, long return_code
)
1785 struct audit_context
*context
;
1787 context
= audit_context();
1791 if (!list_empty(&context
->killed_trees
))
1792 audit_kill_trees(context
);
1794 if (!context
->dummy
&& context
->in_syscall
) {
1796 context
->return_valid
= AUDITSC_SUCCESS
;
1798 context
->return_valid
= AUDITSC_FAILURE
;
1801 * we need to fix up the return code in the audit logs if the
1802 * actual return codes are later going to be fixed up by the
1803 * arch specific signal handlers
1805 * This is actually a test for:
1806 * (rc == ERESTARTSYS ) || (rc == ERESTARTNOINTR) ||
1807 * (rc == ERESTARTNOHAND) || (rc == ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK)
1809 * but is faster than a bunch of ||
1811 if (unlikely(return_code
<= -ERESTARTSYS
) &&
1812 (return_code
>= -ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK
) &&
1813 (return_code
!= -ENOIOCTLCMD
))
1814 context
->return_code
= -EINTR
;
1816 context
->return_code
= return_code
;
1818 audit_filter_syscall(current
, context
);
1819 audit_filter_inodes(current
, context
);
1820 if (context
->current_state
== AUDIT_STATE_RECORD
)
1824 context
->in_syscall
= 0;
1825 context
->prio
= context
->state
== AUDIT_STATE_RECORD
? ~0ULL : 0;
1827 audit_free_module(context
);
1828 audit_free_names(context
);
1829 unroll_tree_refs(context
, NULL
, 0);
1830 audit_free_aux(context
);
1831 context
->aux
= NULL
;
1832 context
->aux_pids
= NULL
;
1833 context
->target_pid
= 0;
1834 lsmblob_init(&context
->target_lsm
, 0);
1835 context
->sockaddr_len
= 0;
1837 context
->fds
[0] = -1;
1838 if (context
->state
!= AUDIT_STATE_RECORD
) {
1839 kfree(context
->filterkey
);
1840 context
->filterkey
= NULL
;
1844 static inline void handle_one(const struct inode
*inode
)
1846 struct audit_context
*context
;
1847 struct audit_tree_refs
*p
;
1848 struct audit_chunk
*chunk
;
1851 if (likely(!inode
->i_fsnotify_marks
))
1853 context
= audit_context();
1855 count
= context
->tree_count
;
1857 chunk
= audit_tree_lookup(inode
);
1861 if (likely(put_tree_ref(context
, chunk
)))
1863 if (unlikely(!grow_tree_refs(context
))) {
1864 pr_warn("out of memory, audit has lost a tree reference\n");
1865 audit_set_auditable(context
);
1866 audit_put_chunk(chunk
);
1867 unroll_tree_refs(context
, p
, count
);
1870 put_tree_ref(context
, chunk
);
1873 static void handle_path(const struct dentry
*dentry
)
1875 struct audit_context
*context
;
1876 struct audit_tree_refs
*p
;
1877 const struct dentry
*d
, *parent
;
1878 struct audit_chunk
*drop
;
1882 context
= audit_context();
1884 count
= context
->tree_count
;
1889 seq
= read_seqbegin(&rename_lock
);
1891 struct inode
*inode
= d_backing_inode(d
);
1893 if (inode
&& unlikely(inode
->i_fsnotify_marks
)) {
1894 struct audit_chunk
*chunk
;
1896 chunk
= audit_tree_lookup(inode
);
1898 if (unlikely(!put_tree_ref(context
, chunk
))) {
1904 parent
= d
->d_parent
;
1909 if (unlikely(read_seqretry(&rename_lock
, seq
) || drop
)) { /* in this order */
1912 /* just a race with rename */
1913 unroll_tree_refs(context
, p
, count
);
1916 audit_put_chunk(drop
);
1917 if (grow_tree_refs(context
)) {
1918 /* OK, got more space */
1919 unroll_tree_refs(context
, p
, count
);
1923 pr_warn("out of memory, audit has lost a tree reference\n");
1924 unroll_tree_refs(context
, p
, count
);
1925 audit_set_auditable(context
);
1931 static struct audit_names
*audit_alloc_name(struct audit_context
*context
,
1934 struct audit_names
*aname
;
1936 if (context
->name_count
< AUDIT_NAMES
) {
1937 aname
= &context
->preallocated_names
[context
->name_count
];
1938 memset(aname
, 0, sizeof(*aname
));
1940 aname
= kzalloc(sizeof(*aname
), GFP_NOFS
);
1943 aname
->should_free
= true;
1946 aname
->ino
= AUDIT_INO_UNSET
;
1948 list_add_tail(&aname
->list
, &context
->names_list
);
1950 context
->name_count
++;
1951 if (!context
->pwd
.dentry
)
1952 get_fs_pwd(current
->fs
, &context
->pwd
);
1957 * __audit_reusename - fill out filename with info from existing entry
1958 * @uptr: userland ptr to pathname
1960 * Search the audit_names list for the current audit context. If there is an
1961 * existing entry with a matching "uptr" then return the filename
1962 * associated with that audit_name. If not, return NULL.
1965 __audit_reusename(const __user
char *uptr
)
1967 struct audit_context
*context
= audit_context();
1968 struct audit_names
*n
;
1970 list_for_each_entry(n
, &context
->names_list
, list
) {
1973 if (n
->name
->uptr
== uptr
) {
1982 * __audit_getname - add a name to the list
1983 * @name: name to add
1985 * Add a name to the list of audit names for this context.
1986 * Called from fs/namei.c:getname().
1988 void __audit_getname(struct filename
*name
)
1990 struct audit_context
*context
= audit_context();
1991 struct audit_names
*n
;
1993 if (!context
->in_syscall
)
1996 n
= audit_alloc_name(context
, AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN
);
2001 n
->name_len
= AUDIT_NAME_FULL
;
2006 static inline int audit_copy_fcaps(struct audit_names
*name
,
2007 const struct dentry
*dentry
)
2009 struct cpu_vfs_cap_data caps
;
2015 rc
= get_vfs_caps_from_disk(&init_user_ns
, dentry
, &caps
);
2019 name
->fcap
.permitted
= caps
.permitted
;
2020 name
->fcap
.inheritable
= caps
.inheritable
;
2021 name
->fcap
.fE
= !!(caps
.magic_etc
& VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE
);
2022 name
->fcap
.rootid
= caps
.rootid
;
2023 name
->fcap_ver
= (caps
.magic_etc
& VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK
) >>
2024 VFS_CAP_REVISION_SHIFT
;
2029 /* Copy inode data into an audit_names. */
2030 static void audit_copy_inode(struct audit_names
*name
,
2031 const struct dentry
*dentry
,
2032 struct inode
*inode
, unsigned int flags
)
2034 name
->ino
= inode
->i_ino
;
2035 name
->dev
= inode
->i_sb
->s_dev
;
2036 name
->mode
= inode
->i_mode
;
2037 name
->uid
= inode
->i_uid
;
2038 name
->gid
= inode
->i_gid
;
2039 name
->rdev
= inode
->i_rdev
;
2040 security_inode_getsecid(inode
, &name
->oblob
);
2041 if (flags
& AUDIT_INODE_NOEVAL
) {
2042 name
->fcap_ver
= -1;
2045 audit_copy_fcaps(name
, dentry
);
2049 * __audit_inode - store the inode and device from a lookup
2050 * @name: name being audited
2051 * @dentry: dentry being audited
2052 * @flags: attributes for this particular entry
2054 void __audit_inode(struct filename
*name
, const struct dentry
*dentry
,
2057 struct audit_context
*context
= audit_context();
2058 struct inode
*inode
= d_backing_inode(dentry
);
2059 struct audit_names
*n
;
2060 bool parent
= flags
& AUDIT_INODE_PARENT
;
2061 struct audit_entry
*e
;
2062 struct list_head
*list
= &audit_filter_list
[AUDIT_FILTER_FS
];
2065 if (!context
->in_syscall
)
2069 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e
, list
, list
) {
2070 for (i
= 0; i
< e
->rule
.field_count
; i
++) {
2071 struct audit_field
*f
= &e
->rule
.fields
[i
];
2073 if (f
->type
== AUDIT_FSTYPE
2074 && audit_comparator(inode
->i_sb
->s_magic
,
2076 && e
->rule
.action
== AUDIT_NEVER
) {
2088 * If we have a pointer to an audit_names entry already, then we can
2089 * just use it directly if the type is correct.
2094 if (n
->type
== AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT
||
2095 n
->type
== AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN
)
2098 if (n
->type
!= AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT
)
2103 list_for_each_entry_reverse(n
, &context
->names_list
, list
) {
2105 /* valid inode number, use that for the comparison */
2106 if (n
->ino
!= inode
->i_ino
||
2107 n
->dev
!= inode
->i_sb
->s_dev
)
2109 } else if (n
->name
) {
2110 /* inode number has not been set, check the name */
2111 if (strcmp(n
->name
->name
, name
->name
))
2114 /* no inode and no name (?!) ... this is odd ... */
2117 /* match the correct record type */
2119 if (n
->type
== AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT
||
2120 n
->type
== AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN
)
2123 if (n
->type
!= AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT
)
2129 /* unable to find an entry with both a matching name and type */
2130 n
= audit_alloc_name(context
, AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN
);
2140 n
->name_len
= n
->name
? parent_len(n
->name
->name
) : AUDIT_NAME_FULL
;
2141 n
->type
= AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT
;
2142 if (flags
& AUDIT_INODE_HIDDEN
)
2145 n
->name_len
= AUDIT_NAME_FULL
;
2146 n
->type
= AUDIT_TYPE_NORMAL
;
2148 handle_path(dentry
);
2149 audit_copy_inode(n
, dentry
, inode
, flags
& AUDIT_INODE_NOEVAL
);
2152 void __audit_file(const struct file
*file
)
2154 __audit_inode(NULL
, file
->f_path
.dentry
, 0);
2158 * __audit_inode_child - collect inode info for created/removed objects
2159 * @parent: inode of dentry parent
2160 * @dentry: dentry being audited
2161 * @type: AUDIT_TYPE_* value that we're looking for
2163 * For syscalls that create or remove filesystem objects, audit_inode
2164 * can only collect information for the filesystem object's parent.
2165 * This call updates the audit context with the child's information.
2166 * Syscalls that create a new filesystem object must be hooked after
2167 * the object is created. Syscalls that remove a filesystem object
2168 * must be hooked prior, in order to capture the target inode during
2169 * unsuccessful attempts.
2171 void __audit_inode_child(struct inode
*parent
,
2172 const struct dentry
*dentry
,
2173 const unsigned char type
)
2175 struct audit_context
*context
= audit_context();
2176 struct inode
*inode
= d_backing_inode(dentry
);
2177 const struct qstr
*dname
= &dentry
->d_name
;
2178 struct audit_names
*n
, *found_parent
= NULL
, *found_child
= NULL
;
2179 struct audit_entry
*e
;
2180 struct list_head
*list
= &audit_filter_list
[AUDIT_FILTER_FS
];
2183 if (!context
->in_syscall
)
2187 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e
, list
, list
) {
2188 for (i
= 0; i
< e
->rule
.field_count
; i
++) {
2189 struct audit_field
*f
= &e
->rule
.fields
[i
];
2191 if (f
->type
== AUDIT_FSTYPE
2192 && audit_comparator(parent
->i_sb
->s_magic
,
2194 && e
->rule
.action
== AUDIT_NEVER
) {
2205 /* look for a parent entry first */
2206 list_for_each_entry(n
, &context
->names_list
, list
) {
2208 (n
->type
!= AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT
&&
2209 n
->type
!= AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN
))
2212 if (n
->ino
== parent
->i_ino
&& n
->dev
== parent
->i_sb
->s_dev
&&
2213 !audit_compare_dname_path(dname
,
2214 n
->name
->name
, n
->name_len
)) {
2215 if (n
->type
== AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN
)
2216 n
->type
= AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT
;
2222 /* is there a matching child entry? */
2223 list_for_each_entry(n
, &context
->names_list
, list
) {
2224 /* can only match entries that have a name */
2226 (n
->type
!= type
&& n
->type
!= AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN
))
2229 if (!strcmp(dname
->name
, n
->name
->name
) ||
2230 !audit_compare_dname_path(dname
, n
->name
->name
,
2232 found_parent
->name_len
:
2234 if (n
->type
== AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN
)
2241 if (!found_parent
) {
2242 /* create a new, "anonymous" parent record */
2243 n
= audit_alloc_name(context
, AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT
);
2246 audit_copy_inode(n
, NULL
, parent
, 0);
2250 found_child
= audit_alloc_name(context
, type
);
2254 /* Re-use the name belonging to the slot for a matching parent
2255 * directory. All names for this context are relinquished in
2256 * audit_free_names() */
2258 found_child
->name
= found_parent
->name
;
2259 found_child
->name_len
= AUDIT_NAME_FULL
;
2260 found_child
->name
->refcnt
++;
2265 audit_copy_inode(found_child
, dentry
, inode
, 0);
2267 found_child
->ino
= AUDIT_INO_UNSET
;
2269 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__audit_inode_child
);
2272 * audit_stamp_context - set the timestamp+serial in an audit context
2273 * @ctx: audit_context to set
2275 void audit_stamp_context(struct audit_context
*ctx
)
2277 /* ctx will be NULL unless lsm_multiple_contexts() is true */
2281 ktime_get_coarse_real_ts64(&ctx
->ctime
);
2282 ctx
->serial
= audit_serial();
2283 ctx
->current_state
= AUDIT_STATE_BUILD
;
2287 * auditsc_get_stamp - get local copies of audit_context values
2288 * @ctx: audit_context for the task
2289 * @t: timespec64 to store time recorded in the audit_context
2290 * @serial: serial value that is recorded in the audit_context
2292 * Also sets the context as auditable.
2294 int auditsc_get_stamp(struct audit_context
*ctx
,
2295 struct timespec64
*t
, unsigned int *serial
)
2297 if (ctx
->serial
&& !ctx
->in_syscall
) {
2298 t
->tv_sec
= ctx
->ctime
.tv_sec
;
2299 t
->tv_nsec
= ctx
->ctime
.tv_nsec
;
2300 *serial
= ctx
->serial
;
2303 if (!ctx
->in_syscall
)
2306 ctx
->serial
= audit_serial();
2307 t
->tv_sec
= ctx
->ctime
.tv_sec
;
2308 t
->tv_nsec
= ctx
->ctime
.tv_nsec
;
2309 *serial
= ctx
->serial
;
2312 ctx
->current_state
= AUDIT_STATE_RECORD
;
2318 * __audit_mq_open - record audit data for a POSIX MQ open
2321 * @attr: queue attributes
2324 void __audit_mq_open(int oflag
, umode_t mode
, struct mq_attr
*attr
)
2326 struct audit_context
*context
= audit_context();
2329 memcpy(&context
->mq_open
.attr
, attr
, sizeof(struct mq_attr
));
2331 memset(&context
->mq_open
.attr
, 0, sizeof(struct mq_attr
));
2333 context
->mq_open
.oflag
= oflag
;
2334 context
->mq_open
.mode
= mode
;
2336 context
->type
= AUDIT_MQ_OPEN
;
2340 * __audit_mq_sendrecv - record audit data for a POSIX MQ timed send/receive
2341 * @mqdes: MQ descriptor
2342 * @msg_len: Message length
2343 * @msg_prio: Message priority
2344 * @abs_timeout: Message timeout in absolute time
2347 void __audit_mq_sendrecv(mqd_t mqdes
, size_t msg_len
, unsigned int msg_prio
,
2348 const struct timespec64
*abs_timeout
)
2350 struct audit_context
*context
= audit_context();
2351 struct timespec64
*p
= &context
->mq_sendrecv
.abs_timeout
;
2354 memcpy(p
, abs_timeout
, sizeof(*p
));
2356 memset(p
, 0, sizeof(*p
));
2358 context
->mq_sendrecv
.mqdes
= mqdes
;
2359 context
->mq_sendrecv
.msg_len
= msg_len
;
2360 context
->mq_sendrecv
.msg_prio
= msg_prio
;
2362 context
->type
= AUDIT_MQ_SENDRECV
;
2366 * __audit_mq_notify - record audit data for a POSIX MQ notify
2367 * @mqdes: MQ descriptor
2368 * @notification: Notification event
2372 void __audit_mq_notify(mqd_t mqdes
, const struct sigevent
*notification
)
2374 struct audit_context
*context
= audit_context();
2377 context
->mq_notify
.sigev_signo
= notification
->sigev_signo
;
2379 context
->mq_notify
.sigev_signo
= 0;
2381 context
->mq_notify
.mqdes
= mqdes
;
2382 context
->type
= AUDIT_MQ_NOTIFY
;
2386 * __audit_mq_getsetattr - record audit data for a POSIX MQ get/set attribute
2387 * @mqdes: MQ descriptor
2391 void __audit_mq_getsetattr(mqd_t mqdes
, struct mq_attr
*mqstat
)
2393 struct audit_context
*context
= audit_context();
2395 context
->mq_getsetattr
.mqdes
= mqdes
;
2396 context
->mq_getsetattr
.mqstat
= *mqstat
;
2397 context
->type
= AUDIT_MQ_GETSETATTR
;
2401 * __audit_ipc_obj - record audit data for ipc object
2402 * @ipcp: ipc permissions
2405 void __audit_ipc_obj(struct kern_ipc_perm
*ipcp
)
2407 struct audit_context
*context
= audit_context();
2408 context
->ipc
.uid
= ipcp
->uid
;
2409 context
->ipc
.gid
= ipcp
->gid
;
2410 context
->ipc
.mode
= ipcp
->mode
;
2411 context
->ipc
.has_perm
= 0;
2412 security_ipc_getsecid(ipcp
, &context
->ipc
.oblob
);
2413 context
->type
= AUDIT_IPC
;
2417 * __audit_ipc_set_perm - record audit data for new ipc permissions
2418 * @qbytes: msgq bytes
2419 * @uid: msgq user id
2420 * @gid: msgq group id
2421 * @mode: msgq mode (permissions)
2423 * Called only after audit_ipc_obj().
2425 void __audit_ipc_set_perm(unsigned long qbytes
, uid_t uid
, gid_t gid
, umode_t mode
)
2427 struct audit_context
*context
= audit_context();
2429 context
->ipc
.qbytes
= qbytes
;
2430 context
->ipc
.perm_uid
= uid
;
2431 context
->ipc
.perm_gid
= gid
;
2432 context
->ipc
.perm_mode
= mode
;
2433 context
->ipc
.has_perm
= 1;
2436 void __audit_bprm(struct linux_binprm
*bprm
)
2438 struct audit_context
*context
= audit_context();
2440 context
->type
= AUDIT_EXECVE
;
2441 context
->execve
.argc
= bprm
->argc
;
2446 * __audit_socketcall - record audit data for sys_socketcall
2447 * @nargs: number of args, which should not be more than AUDITSC_ARGS.
2451 int __audit_socketcall(int nargs
, unsigned long *args
)
2453 struct audit_context
*context
= audit_context();
2455 if (nargs
<= 0 || nargs
> AUDITSC_ARGS
|| !args
)
2457 context
->type
= AUDIT_SOCKETCALL
;
2458 context
->socketcall
.nargs
= nargs
;
2459 memcpy(context
->socketcall
.args
, args
, nargs
* sizeof(unsigned long));
2464 * __audit_fd_pair - record audit data for pipe and socketpair
2465 * @fd1: the first file descriptor
2466 * @fd2: the second file descriptor
2469 void __audit_fd_pair(int fd1
, int fd2
)
2471 struct audit_context
*context
= audit_context();
2473 context
->fds
[0] = fd1
;
2474 context
->fds
[1] = fd2
;
2478 * __audit_sockaddr - record audit data for sys_bind, sys_connect, sys_sendto
2479 * @len: data length in user space
2480 * @a: data address in kernel space
2482 * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
2484 int __audit_sockaddr(int len
, void *a
)
2486 struct audit_context
*context
= audit_context();
2488 if (!context
->sockaddr
) {
2489 void *p
= kmalloc(sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage
), GFP_KERNEL
);
2493 context
->sockaddr
= p
;
2496 context
->sockaddr_len
= len
;
2497 memcpy(context
->sockaddr
, a
, len
);
2501 void __audit_ptrace(struct task_struct
*t
)
2503 struct audit_context
*context
= audit_context();
2505 context
->target_pid
= task_tgid_nr(t
);
2506 context
->target_auid
= audit_get_loginuid(t
);
2507 context
->target_uid
= task_uid(t
);
2508 context
->target_sessionid
= audit_get_sessionid(t
);
2509 security_task_getsecid_obj(t
, &context
->target_lsm
);
2510 memcpy(context
->target_comm
, t
->comm
, TASK_COMM_LEN
);
2514 * audit_signal_info_syscall - record signal info for syscalls
2515 * @t: task being signaled
2517 * If the audit subsystem is being terminated, record the task (pid)
2518 * and uid that is doing that.
2520 int audit_signal_info_syscall(struct task_struct
*t
)
2522 struct audit_aux_data_pids
*axp
;
2523 struct audit_context
*ctx
= audit_context();
2524 kuid_t t_uid
= task_uid(t
);
2526 if (!audit_signals
|| audit_dummy_context())
2529 /* optimize the common case by putting first signal recipient directly
2530 * in audit_context */
2531 if (!ctx
->target_pid
) {
2532 ctx
->target_pid
= task_tgid_nr(t
);
2533 ctx
->target_auid
= audit_get_loginuid(t
);
2534 ctx
->target_uid
= t_uid
;
2535 ctx
->target_sessionid
= audit_get_sessionid(t
);
2536 security_task_getsecid_obj(t
, &ctx
->target_lsm
);
2537 memcpy(ctx
->target_comm
, t
->comm
, TASK_COMM_LEN
);
2541 axp
= (void *)ctx
->aux_pids
;
2542 if (!axp
|| axp
->pid_count
== AUDIT_AUX_PIDS
) {
2543 axp
= kzalloc(sizeof(*axp
), GFP_ATOMIC
);
2547 axp
->d
.type
= AUDIT_OBJ_PID
;
2548 axp
->d
.next
= ctx
->aux_pids
;
2549 ctx
->aux_pids
= (void *)axp
;
2551 BUG_ON(axp
->pid_count
>= AUDIT_AUX_PIDS
);
2553 axp
->target_pid
[axp
->pid_count
] = task_tgid_nr(t
);
2554 axp
->target_auid
[axp
->pid_count
] = audit_get_loginuid(t
);
2555 axp
->target_uid
[axp
->pid_count
] = t_uid
;
2556 axp
->target_sessionid
[axp
->pid_count
] = audit_get_sessionid(t
);
2557 security_task_getsecid_obj(t
, &axp
->target_lsm
[axp
->pid_count
]);
2558 memcpy(axp
->target_comm
[axp
->pid_count
], t
->comm
, TASK_COMM_LEN
);
2565 * __audit_log_bprm_fcaps - store information about a loading bprm and relevant fcaps
2566 * @bprm: pointer to the bprm being processed
2567 * @new: the proposed new credentials
2568 * @old: the old credentials
2570 * Simply check if the proc already has the caps given by the file and if not
2571 * store the priv escalation info for later auditing at the end of the syscall
2575 int __audit_log_bprm_fcaps(struct linux_binprm
*bprm
,
2576 const struct cred
*new, const struct cred
*old
)
2578 struct audit_aux_data_bprm_fcaps
*ax
;
2579 struct audit_context
*context
= audit_context();
2580 struct cpu_vfs_cap_data vcaps
;
2582 ax
= kmalloc(sizeof(*ax
), GFP_KERNEL
);
2586 ax
->d
.type
= AUDIT_BPRM_FCAPS
;
2587 ax
->d
.next
= context
->aux
;
2588 context
->aux
= (void *)ax
;
2590 get_vfs_caps_from_disk(&init_user_ns
,
2591 bprm
->file
->f_path
.dentry
, &vcaps
);
2593 ax
->fcap
.permitted
= vcaps
.permitted
;
2594 ax
->fcap
.inheritable
= vcaps
.inheritable
;
2595 ax
->fcap
.fE
= !!(vcaps
.magic_etc
& VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE
);
2596 ax
->fcap
.rootid
= vcaps
.rootid
;
2597 ax
->fcap_ver
= (vcaps
.magic_etc
& VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK
) >> VFS_CAP_REVISION_SHIFT
;
2599 ax
->old_pcap
.permitted
= old
->cap_permitted
;
2600 ax
->old_pcap
.inheritable
= old
->cap_inheritable
;
2601 ax
->old_pcap
.effective
= old
->cap_effective
;
2602 ax
->old_pcap
.ambient
= old
->cap_ambient
;
2604 ax
->new_pcap
.permitted
= new->cap_permitted
;
2605 ax
->new_pcap
.inheritable
= new->cap_inheritable
;
2606 ax
->new_pcap
.effective
= new->cap_effective
;
2607 ax
->new_pcap
.ambient
= new->cap_ambient
;
2612 * __audit_log_capset - store information about the arguments to the capset syscall
2613 * @new: the new credentials
2614 * @old: the old (current) credentials
2616 * Record the arguments userspace sent to sys_capset for later printing by the
2617 * audit system if applicable
2619 void __audit_log_capset(const struct cred
*new, const struct cred
*old
)
2621 struct audit_context
*context
= audit_context();
2623 context
->capset
.pid
= task_tgid_nr(current
);
2624 context
->capset
.cap
.effective
= new->cap_effective
;
2625 context
->capset
.cap
.inheritable
= new->cap_effective
;
2626 context
->capset
.cap
.permitted
= new->cap_permitted
;
2627 context
->capset
.cap
.ambient
= new->cap_ambient
;
2628 context
->type
= AUDIT_CAPSET
;
2631 void __audit_mmap_fd(int fd
, int flags
)
2633 struct audit_context
*context
= audit_context();
2635 context
->mmap
.fd
= fd
;
2636 context
->mmap
.flags
= flags
;
2637 context
->type
= AUDIT_MMAP
;
2640 void __audit_log_kern_module(char *name
)
2642 struct audit_context
*context
= audit_context();
2644 context
->module
.name
= kstrdup(name
, GFP_KERNEL
);
2645 if (!context
->module
.name
)
2646 audit_log_lost("out of memory in __audit_log_kern_module");
2647 context
->type
= AUDIT_KERN_MODULE
;
2650 void __audit_fanotify(unsigned int response
)
2652 audit_log(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL
,
2653 AUDIT_FANOTIFY
, "resp=%u", response
);
2656 void __audit_tk_injoffset(struct timespec64 offset
)
2658 struct audit_context
*context
= audit_context();
2660 /* only set type if not already set by NTP */
2662 context
->type
= AUDIT_TIME_INJOFFSET
;
2663 memcpy(&context
->time
.tk_injoffset
, &offset
, sizeof(offset
));
2666 void __audit_ntp_log(const struct audit_ntp_data
*ad
)
2668 struct audit_context
*context
= audit_context();
2671 for (type
= 0; type
< AUDIT_NTP_NVALS
; type
++)
2672 if (ad
->vals
[type
].newval
!= ad
->vals
[type
].oldval
) {
2673 /* unconditionally set type, overwriting TK */
2674 context
->type
= AUDIT_TIME_ADJNTPVAL
;
2675 memcpy(&context
->time
.ntp_data
, ad
, sizeof(*ad
));
2680 void __audit_log_nfcfg(const char *name
, u8 af
, unsigned int nentries
,
2681 enum audit_nfcfgop op
, gfp_t gfp
)
2683 struct audit_buffer
*ab
;
2684 char comm
[sizeof(current
->comm
)];
2686 ab
= audit_log_start(audit_context(), gfp
, AUDIT_NETFILTER_CFG
);
2689 audit_log_format(ab
, "table=%s family=%u entries=%u op=%s",
2690 name
, af
, nentries
, audit_nfcfgs
[op
].s
);
2692 audit_log_format(ab
, " pid=%u", task_pid_nr(current
));
2693 audit_log_task_context(ab
, NULL
); /* subj= */
2694 audit_log_format(ab
, " comm=");
2695 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab
, get_task_comm(comm
, current
));
2698 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__audit_log_nfcfg
);
2700 static void audit_log_task(struct audit_buffer
*ab
)
2704 unsigned int sessionid
;
2705 char comm
[sizeof(current
->comm
)];
2707 auid
= audit_get_loginuid(current
);
2708 sessionid
= audit_get_sessionid(current
);
2709 current_uid_gid(&uid
, &gid
);
2711 audit_log_format(ab
, "auid=%u uid=%u gid=%u ses=%u",
2712 from_kuid(&init_user_ns
, auid
),
2713 from_kuid(&init_user_ns
, uid
),
2714 from_kgid(&init_user_ns
, gid
),
2716 audit_log_task_context(ab
, NULL
);
2717 audit_log_format(ab
, " pid=%d comm=", task_tgid_nr(current
));
2718 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab
, get_task_comm(comm
, current
));
2719 audit_log_d_path_exe(ab
, current
->mm
);
2723 * audit_core_dumps - record information about processes that end abnormally
2724 * @signr: signal value
2726 * If a process ends with a core dump, something fishy is going on and we
2727 * should record the event for investigation.
2729 void audit_core_dumps(long signr
)
2731 struct audit_buffer
*ab
;
2736 if (signr
== SIGQUIT
) /* don't care for those */
2739 audit_stamp_context(audit_context());
2740 ab
= audit_log_start(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL
, AUDIT_ANOM_ABEND
);
2744 audit_log_format(ab
, " sig=%ld res=1", signr
);
2745 audit_log_lsm(NULL
, true);
2750 * audit_seccomp - record information about a seccomp action
2751 * @syscall: syscall number
2752 * @signr: signal value
2753 * @code: the seccomp action
2755 * Record the information associated with a seccomp action. Event filtering for
2756 * seccomp actions that are not to be logged is done in seccomp_log().
2757 * Therefore, this function forces auditing independent of the audit_enabled
2758 * and dummy context state because seccomp actions should be logged even when
2759 * audit is not in use.
2761 void audit_seccomp(unsigned long syscall
, long signr
, int code
)
2763 struct audit_buffer
*ab
;
2765 ab
= audit_log_start(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL
, AUDIT_SECCOMP
);
2769 audit_log_format(ab
, " sig=%ld arch=%x syscall=%ld compat=%d ip=0x%lx code=0x%x",
2770 signr
, syscall_get_arch(current
), syscall
,
2771 in_compat_syscall(), KSTK_EIP(current
), code
);
2775 void audit_seccomp_actions_logged(const char *names
, const char *old_names
,
2778 struct audit_buffer
*ab
;
2783 ab
= audit_log_start(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL
,
2784 AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE
);
2788 audit_log_format(ab
,
2789 "op=seccomp-logging actions=%s old-actions=%s res=%d",
2790 names
, old_names
, res
);
2794 struct list_head
*audit_killed_trees(void)
2796 struct audit_context
*ctx
= audit_context();
2798 if (likely(!ctx
|| !ctx
->in_syscall
))
2800 return &ctx
->killed_trees
;