2 * NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module
4 * This file contains the SELinux hook function implementations.
6 * Authors: Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
7 * Chris Vance, <cvance@nai.com>
8 * Wayne Salamon, <wsalamon@nai.com>
9 * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
11 * Copyright (C) 2001,2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
12 * Copyright (C) 2003-2008 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
13 * Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
14 * Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
15 * <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
16 * Copyright (C) 2006, 2007, 2009 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
17 * Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
18 * Copyright (C) 2007 Hitachi Software Engineering Co., Ltd.
19 * Yuichi Nakamura <ynakam@hitachisoft.jp>
20 * Copyright (C) 2016 Mellanox Technologies
22 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
23 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
24 * as published by the Free Software Foundation.
27 #include <linux/init.h>
29 #include <linux/kernel.h>
30 #include <linux/tracehook.h>
31 #include <linux/errno.h>
32 #include <linux/sched/signal.h>
33 #include <linux/sched/task.h>
34 #include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
35 #include <linux/xattr.h>
36 #include <linux/capability.h>
37 #include <linux/unistd.h>
39 #include <linux/mman.h>
40 #include <linux/slab.h>
41 #include <linux/pagemap.h>
42 #include <linux/proc_fs.h>
43 #include <linux/swap.h>
44 #include <linux/spinlock.h>
45 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
46 #include <linux/dcache.h>
47 #include <linux/file.h>
48 #include <linux/fdtable.h>
49 #include <linux/namei.h>
50 #include <linux/mount.h>
51 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
52 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h>
53 #include <linux/tty.h>
55 #include <net/ip.h> /* for local_port_range[] */
56 #include <net/tcp.h> /* struct or_callable used in sock_rcv_skb */
57 #include <net/inet_connection_sock.h>
58 #include <net/net_namespace.h>
59 #include <net/netlabel.h>
60 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
61 #include <asm/ioctls.h>
62 #include <linux/atomic.h>
63 #include <linux/bitops.h>
64 #include <linux/interrupt.h>
65 #include <linux/netdevice.h> /* for network interface checks */
66 #include <net/netlink.h>
67 #include <linux/tcp.h>
68 #include <linux/udp.h>
69 #include <linux/dccp.h>
70 #include <linux/quota.h>
71 #include <linux/un.h> /* for Unix socket types */
72 #include <net/af_unix.h> /* for Unix socket types */
73 #include <linux/parser.h>
74 #include <linux/nfs_mount.h>
76 #include <linux/hugetlb.h>
77 #include <linux/personality.h>
78 #include <linux/audit.h>
79 #include <linux/string.h>
80 #include <linux/selinux.h>
81 #include <linux/mutex.h>
82 #include <linux/posix-timers.h>
83 #include <linux/syslog.h>
84 #include <linux/user_namespace.h>
85 #include <linux/export.h>
86 #include <linux/msg.h>
87 #include <linux/shm.h>
100 /* SECMARK reference count */
101 static atomic_t selinux_secmark_refcount
= ATOMIC_INIT(0);
103 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
104 int selinux_enforcing
;
106 static int __init
enforcing_setup(char *str
)
108 unsigned long enforcing
;
109 if (!kstrtoul(str
, 0, &enforcing
))
110 selinux_enforcing
= enforcing
? 1 : 0;
113 __setup("enforcing=", enforcing_setup
);
116 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM
117 int selinux_enabled
= CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE
;
119 static int __init
selinux_enabled_setup(char *str
)
121 unsigned long enabled
;
122 if (!kstrtoul(str
, 0, &enabled
))
123 selinux_enabled
= enabled
? 1 : 0;
126 __setup("selinux=", selinux_enabled_setup
);
128 int selinux_enabled
= 1;
131 static struct kmem_cache
*sel_inode_cache
;
132 static struct kmem_cache
*file_security_cache
;
135 * selinux_secmark_enabled - Check to see if SECMARK is currently enabled
138 * This function checks the SECMARK reference counter to see if any SECMARK
139 * targets are currently configured, if the reference counter is greater than
140 * zero SECMARK is considered to be enabled. Returns true (1) if SECMARK is
141 * enabled, false (0) if SECMARK is disabled. If the always_check_network
142 * policy capability is enabled, SECMARK is always considered enabled.
145 static int selinux_secmark_enabled(void)
147 return (selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork
|| atomic_read(&selinux_secmark_refcount
));
151 * selinux_peerlbl_enabled - Check to see if peer labeling is currently enabled
154 * This function checks if NetLabel or labeled IPSEC is enabled. Returns true
155 * (1) if any are enabled or false (0) if neither are enabled. If the
156 * always_check_network policy capability is enabled, peer labeling
157 * is always considered enabled.
160 static int selinux_peerlbl_enabled(void)
162 return (selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork
|| netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled());
165 static int selinux_netcache_avc_callback(u32 event
)
167 if (event
== AVC_CALLBACK_RESET
) {
176 static int selinux_lsm_notifier_avc_callback(u32 event
)
178 if (event
== AVC_CALLBACK_RESET
) {
180 call_lsm_notifier(LSM_POLICY_CHANGE
, NULL
);
187 * initialise the security for the init task
189 static void cred_init_security(void)
191 struct cred
*cred
= (struct cred
*) current
->real_cred
;
192 struct task_security_struct
*tsec
;
194 tsec
= kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct
), GFP_KERNEL
);
196 panic("SELinux: Failed to initialize initial task.\n");
198 tsec
->osid
= tsec
->sid
= SECINITSID_KERNEL
;
199 cred
->security
= tsec
;
203 * get the security ID of a set of credentials
205 static inline u32
cred_sid(const struct cred
*cred
)
207 const struct task_security_struct
*tsec
;
209 tsec
= cred
->security
;
214 * get the objective security ID of a task
216 static inline u32
task_sid(const struct task_struct
*task
)
221 sid
= cred_sid(__task_cred(task
));
226 /* Allocate and free functions for each kind of security blob. */
228 static int inode_alloc_security(struct inode
*inode
)
230 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
;
231 u32 sid
= current_sid();
233 isec
= kmem_cache_zalloc(sel_inode_cache
, GFP_NOFS
);
237 spin_lock_init(&isec
->lock
);
238 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&isec
->list
);
240 isec
->sid
= SECINITSID_UNLABELED
;
241 isec
->sclass
= SECCLASS_FILE
;
242 isec
->task_sid
= sid
;
243 isec
->initialized
= LABEL_INVALID
;
244 inode
->i_security
= isec
;
249 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode
*inode
, struct dentry
*opt_dentry
);
252 * Try reloading inode security labels that have been marked as invalid. The
253 * @may_sleep parameter indicates when sleeping and thus reloading labels is
254 * allowed; when set to false, returns -ECHILD when the label is
255 * invalid. The @opt_dentry parameter should be set to a dentry of the inode;
256 * when no dentry is available, set it to NULL instead.
258 static int __inode_security_revalidate(struct inode
*inode
,
259 struct dentry
*opt_dentry
,
262 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= inode
->i_security
;
264 might_sleep_if(may_sleep
);
266 if (ss_initialized
&& isec
->initialized
!= LABEL_INITIALIZED
) {
271 * Try reloading the inode security label. This will fail if
272 * @opt_dentry is NULL and no dentry for this inode can be
273 * found; in that case, continue using the old label.
275 inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode
, opt_dentry
);
280 static struct inode_security_struct
*inode_security_novalidate(struct inode
*inode
)
282 return inode
->i_security
;
285 static struct inode_security_struct
*inode_security_rcu(struct inode
*inode
, bool rcu
)
289 error
= __inode_security_revalidate(inode
, NULL
, !rcu
);
291 return ERR_PTR(error
);
292 return inode
->i_security
;
296 * Get the security label of an inode.
298 static struct inode_security_struct
*inode_security(struct inode
*inode
)
300 __inode_security_revalidate(inode
, NULL
, true);
301 return inode
->i_security
;
304 static struct inode_security_struct
*backing_inode_security_novalidate(struct dentry
*dentry
)
306 struct inode
*inode
= d_backing_inode(dentry
);
308 return inode
->i_security
;
312 * Get the security label of a dentry's backing inode.
314 static struct inode_security_struct
*backing_inode_security(struct dentry
*dentry
)
316 struct inode
*inode
= d_backing_inode(dentry
);
318 __inode_security_revalidate(inode
, dentry
, true);
319 return inode
->i_security
;
322 static void inode_free_rcu(struct rcu_head
*head
)
324 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
;
326 isec
= container_of(head
, struct inode_security_struct
, rcu
);
327 kmem_cache_free(sel_inode_cache
, isec
);
330 static void inode_free_security(struct inode
*inode
)
332 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= inode
->i_security
;
333 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
= inode
->i_sb
->s_security
;
336 * As not all inode security structures are in a list, we check for
337 * empty list outside of the lock to make sure that we won't waste
338 * time taking a lock doing nothing.
340 * The list_del_init() function can be safely called more than once.
341 * It should not be possible for this function to be called with
342 * concurrent list_add(), but for better safety against future changes
343 * in the code, we use list_empty_careful() here.
345 if (!list_empty_careful(&isec
->list
)) {
346 spin_lock(&sbsec
->isec_lock
);
347 list_del_init(&isec
->list
);
348 spin_unlock(&sbsec
->isec_lock
);
352 * The inode may still be referenced in a path walk and
353 * a call to selinux_inode_permission() can be made
354 * after inode_free_security() is called. Ideally, the VFS
355 * wouldn't do this, but fixing that is a much harder
356 * job. For now, simply free the i_security via RCU, and
357 * leave the current inode->i_security pointer intact.
358 * The inode will be freed after the RCU grace period too.
360 call_rcu(&isec
->rcu
, inode_free_rcu
);
363 static int file_alloc_security(struct file
*file
)
365 struct file_security_struct
*fsec
;
366 u32 sid
= current_sid();
368 fsec
= kmem_cache_zalloc(file_security_cache
, GFP_KERNEL
);
373 fsec
->fown_sid
= sid
;
374 file
->f_security
= fsec
;
379 static void file_free_security(struct file
*file
)
381 struct file_security_struct
*fsec
= file
->f_security
;
382 file
->f_security
= NULL
;
383 kmem_cache_free(file_security_cache
, fsec
);
386 static int superblock_alloc_security(struct super_block
*sb
)
388 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
;
390 sbsec
= kzalloc(sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct
), GFP_KERNEL
);
394 mutex_init(&sbsec
->lock
);
395 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec
->isec_head
);
396 spin_lock_init(&sbsec
->isec_lock
);
398 sbsec
->sid
= SECINITSID_UNLABELED
;
399 sbsec
->def_sid
= SECINITSID_FILE
;
400 sbsec
->mntpoint_sid
= SECINITSID_UNLABELED
;
401 sb
->s_security
= sbsec
;
406 static void superblock_free_security(struct super_block
*sb
)
408 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
= sb
->s_security
;
409 sb
->s_security
= NULL
;
413 static inline int inode_doinit(struct inode
*inode
)
415 return inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode
, NULL
);
424 Opt_labelsupport
= 5,
428 #define NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS (Opt_nextmntopt - 1)
430 static const match_table_t tokens
= {
431 {Opt_context
, CONTEXT_STR
"%s"},
432 {Opt_fscontext
, FSCONTEXT_STR
"%s"},
433 {Opt_defcontext
, DEFCONTEXT_STR
"%s"},
434 {Opt_rootcontext
, ROOTCONTEXT_STR
"%s"},
435 {Opt_labelsupport
, LABELSUPP_STR
},
439 #define SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG "SELinux: duplicate or incompatible mount options\n"
441 static int may_context_mount_sb_relabel(u32 sid
,
442 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
,
443 const struct cred
*cred
)
445 const struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= cred
->security
;
448 rc
= avc_has_perm(tsec
->sid
, sbsec
->sid
, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM
,
449 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM
, NULL
);
453 rc
= avc_has_perm(tsec
->sid
, sid
, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM
,
454 FILESYSTEM__RELABELTO
, NULL
);
458 static int may_context_mount_inode_relabel(u32 sid
,
459 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
,
460 const struct cred
*cred
)
462 const struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= cred
->security
;
464 rc
= avc_has_perm(tsec
->sid
, sbsec
->sid
, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM
,
465 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM
, NULL
);
469 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, sbsec
->sid
, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM
,
470 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE
, NULL
);
474 static int selinux_is_sblabel_mnt(struct super_block
*sb
)
476 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
= sb
->s_security
;
478 return sbsec
->behavior
== SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR
||
479 sbsec
->behavior
== SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS
||
480 sbsec
->behavior
== SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK
||
481 sbsec
->behavior
== SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE
||
482 /* Special handling. Genfs but also in-core setxattr handler */
483 !strcmp(sb
->s_type
->name
, "sysfs") ||
484 !strcmp(sb
->s_type
->name
, "pstore") ||
485 !strcmp(sb
->s_type
->name
, "debugfs") ||
486 !strcmp(sb
->s_type
->name
, "tracefs") ||
487 !strcmp(sb
->s_type
->name
, "rootfs") ||
488 (selinux_policycap_cgroupseclabel
&&
489 (!strcmp(sb
->s_type
->name
, "cgroup") ||
490 !strcmp(sb
->s_type
->name
, "cgroup2")));
493 static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block
*sb
)
495 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
= sb
->s_security
;
496 struct dentry
*root
= sb
->s_root
;
497 struct inode
*root_inode
= d_backing_inode(root
);
500 if (sbsec
->behavior
== SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR
) {
501 /* Make sure that the xattr handler exists and that no
502 error other than -ENODATA is returned by getxattr on
503 the root directory. -ENODATA is ok, as this may be
504 the first boot of the SELinux kernel before we have
505 assigned xattr values to the filesystem. */
506 if (!(root_inode
->i_opflags
& IOP_XATTR
)) {
507 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) has no "
508 "xattr support\n", sb
->s_id
, sb
->s_type
->name
);
513 rc
= __vfs_getxattr(root
, root_inode
, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX
, NULL
, 0);
514 if (rc
< 0 && rc
!= -ENODATA
) {
515 if (rc
== -EOPNOTSUPP
)
516 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: (dev %s, type "
517 "%s) has no security xattr handler\n",
518 sb
->s_id
, sb
->s_type
->name
);
520 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: (dev %s, type "
521 "%s) getxattr errno %d\n", sb
->s_id
,
522 sb
->s_type
->name
, -rc
);
527 sbsec
->flags
|= SE_SBINITIALIZED
;
530 * Explicitly set or clear SBLABEL_MNT. It's not sufficient to simply
531 * leave the flag untouched because sb_clone_mnt_opts might be handing
532 * us a superblock that needs the flag to be cleared.
534 if (selinux_is_sblabel_mnt(sb
))
535 sbsec
->flags
|= SBLABEL_MNT
;
537 sbsec
->flags
&= ~SBLABEL_MNT
;
539 /* Initialize the root inode. */
540 rc
= inode_doinit_with_dentry(root_inode
, root
);
542 /* Initialize any other inodes associated with the superblock, e.g.
543 inodes created prior to initial policy load or inodes created
544 during get_sb by a pseudo filesystem that directly
546 spin_lock(&sbsec
->isec_lock
);
548 if (!list_empty(&sbsec
->isec_head
)) {
549 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
=
550 list_entry(sbsec
->isec_head
.next
,
551 struct inode_security_struct
, list
);
552 struct inode
*inode
= isec
->inode
;
553 list_del_init(&isec
->list
);
554 spin_unlock(&sbsec
->isec_lock
);
555 inode
= igrab(inode
);
557 if (!IS_PRIVATE(inode
))
561 spin_lock(&sbsec
->isec_lock
);
564 spin_unlock(&sbsec
->isec_lock
);
570 * This function should allow an FS to ask what it's mount security
571 * options were so it can use those later for submounts, displaying
572 * mount options, or whatever.
574 static int selinux_get_mnt_opts(const struct super_block
*sb
,
575 struct security_mnt_opts
*opts
)
578 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
= sb
->s_security
;
579 char *context
= NULL
;
583 security_init_mnt_opts(opts
);
585 if (!(sbsec
->flags
& SE_SBINITIALIZED
))
591 /* make sure we always check enough bits to cover the mask */
592 BUILD_BUG_ON(SE_MNTMASK
>= (1 << NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS
));
594 tmp
= sbsec
->flags
& SE_MNTMASK
;
595 /* count the number of mount options for this sb */
596 for (i
= 0; i
< NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS
; i
++) {
598 opts
->num_mnt_opts
++;
601 /* Check if the Label support flag is set */
602 if (sbsec
->flags
& SBLABEL_MNT
)
603 opts
->num_mnt_opts
++;
605 opts
->mnt_opts
= kcalloc(opts
->num_mnt_opts
, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC
);
606 if (!opts
->mnt_opts
) {
611 opts
->mnt_opts_flags
= kcalloc(opts
->num_mnt_opts
, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC
);
612 if (!opts
->mnt_opts_flags
) {
618 if (sbsec
->flags
& FSCONTEXT_MNT
) {
619 rc
= security_sid_to_context(sbsec
->sid
, &context
, &len
);
622 opts
->mnt_opts
[i
] = context
;
623 opts
->mnt_opts_flags
[i
++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT
;
625 if (sbsec
->flags
& CONTEXT_MNT
) {
626 rc
= security_sid_to_context(sbsec
->mntpoint_sid
, &context
, &len
);
629 opts
->mnt_opts
[i
] = context
;
630 opts
->mnt_opts_flags
[i
++] = CONTEXT_MNT
;
632 if (sbsec
->flags
& DEFCONTEXT_MNT
) {
633 rc
= security_sid_to_context(sbsec
->def_sid
, &context
, &len
);
636 opts
->mnt_opts
[i
] = context
;
637 opts
->mnt_opts_flags
[i
++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT
;
639 if (sbsec
->flags
& ROOTCONTEXT_MNT
) {
640 struct dentry
*root
= sbsec
->sb
->s_root
;
641 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= backing_inode_security(root
);
643 rc
= security_sid_to_context(isec
->sid
, &context
, &len
);
646 opts
->mnt_opts
[i
] = context
;
647 opts
->mnt_opts_flags
[i
++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT
;
649 if (sbsec
->flags
& SBLABEL_MNT
) {
650 opts
->mnt_opts
[i
] = NULL
;
651 opts
->mnt_opts_flags
[i
++] = SBLABEL_MNT
;
654 BUG_ON(i
!= opts
->num_mnt_opts
);
659 security_free_mnt_opts(opts
);
663 static int bad_option(struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
, char flag
,
664 u32 old_sid
, u32 new_sid
)
666 char mnt_flags
= sbsec
->flags
& SE_MNTMASK
;
668 /* check if the old mount command had the same options */
669 if (sbsec
->flags
& SE_SBINITIALIZED
)
670 if (!(sbsec
->flags
& flag
) ||
671 (old_sid
!= new_sid
))
674 /* check if we were passed the same options twice,
675 * aka someone passed context=a,context=b
677 if (!(sbsec
->flags
& SE_SBINITIALIZED
))
678 if (mnt_flags
& flag
)
684 * Allow filesystems with binary mount data to explicitly set mount point
685 * labeling information.
687 static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block
*sb
,
688 struct security_mnt_opts
*opts
,
689 unsigned long kern_flags
,
690 unsigned long *set_kern_flags
)
692 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
694 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
= sb
->s_security
;
695 const char *name
= sb
->s_type
->name
;
696 struct dentry
*root
= sbsec
->sb
->s_root
;
697 struct inode_security_struct
*root_isec
;
698 u32 fscontext_sid
= 0, context_sid
= 0, rootcontext_sid
= 0;
699 u32 defcontext_sid
= 0;
700 char **mount_options
= opts
->mnt_opts
;
701 int *flags
= opts
->mnt_opts_flags
;
702 int num_opts
= opts
->num_mnt_opts
;
704 mutex_lock(&sbsec
->lock
);
706 if (!ss_initialized
) {
708 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
709 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
710 server is ready to handle calls. */
714 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: Unable to set superblock options "
715 "before the security server is initialized\n");
718 if (kern_flags
&& !set_kern_flags
) {
719 /* Specifying internal flags without providing a place to
720 * place the results is not allowed */
726 * Binary mount data FS will come through this function twice. Once
727 * from an explicit call and once from the generic calls from the vfs.
728 * Since the generic VFS calls will not contain any security mount data
729 * we need to skip the double mount verification.
731 * This does open a hole in which we will not notice if the first
732 * mount using this sb set explict options and a second mount using
733 * this sb does not set any security options. (The first options
734 * will be used for both mounts)
736 if ((sbsec
->flags
& SE_SBINITIALIZED
) && (sb
->s_type
->fs_flags
& FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA
)
740 root_isec
= backing_inode_security_novalidate(root
);
743 * parse the mount options, check if they are valid sids.
744 * also check if someone is trying to mount the same sb more
745 * than once with different security options.
747 for (i
= 0; i
< num_opts
; i
++) {
750 if (flags
[i
] == SBLABEL_MNT
)
752 rc
= security_context_str_to_sid(mount_options
[i
], &sid
, GFP_KERNEL
);
754 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: security_context_str_to_sid"
755 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
756 mount_options
[i
], sb
->s_id
, name
, rc
);
763 if (bad_option(sbsec
, FSCONTEXT_MNT
, sbsec
->sid
,
765 goto out_double_mount
;
767 sbsec
->flags
|= FSCONTEXT_MNT
;
772 if (bad_option(sbsec
, CONTEXT_MNT
, sbsec
->mntpoint_sid
,
774 goto out_double_mount
;
776 sbsec
->flags
|= CONTEXT_MNT
;
778 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT
:
779 rootcontext_sid
= sid
;
781 if (bad_option(sbsec
, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT
, root_isec
->sid
,
783 goto out_double_mount
;
785 sbsec
->flags
|= ROOTCONTEXT_MNT
;
789 defcontext_sid
= sid
;
791 if (bad_option(sbsec
, DEFCONTEXT_MNT
, sbsec
->def_sid
,
793 goto out_double_mount
;
795 sbsec
->flags
|= DEFCONTEXT_MNT
;
804 if (sbsec
->flags
& SE_SBINITIALIZED
) {
805 /* previously mounted with options, but not on this attempt? */
806 if ((sbsec
->flags
& SE_MNTMASK
) && !num_opts
)
807 goto out_double_mount
;
812 if (strcmp(sb
->s_type
->name
, "proc") == 0)
813 sbsec
->flags
|= SE_SBPROC
| SE_SBGENFS
;
815 if (!strcmp(sb
->s_type
->name
, "debugfs") ||
816 !strcmp(sb
->s_type
->name
, "tracefs") ||
817 !strcmp(sb
->s_type
->name
, "sysfs") ||
818 !strcmp(sb
->s_type
->name
, "pstore"))
819 sbsec
->flags
|= SE_SBGENFS
;
821 if (!sbsec
->behavior
) {
823 * Determine the labeling behavior to use for this
826 rc
= security_fs_use(sb
);
829 "%s: security_fs_use(%s) returned %d\n",
830 __func__
, sb
->s_type
->name
, rc
);
836 * If this is a user namespace mount and the filesystem type is not
837 * explicitly whitelisted, then no contexts are allowed on the command
838 * line and security labels must be ignored.
840 if (sb
->s_user_ns
!= &init_user_ns
&&
841 strcmp(sb
->s_type
->name
, "tmpfs") &&
842 strcmp(sb
->s_type
->name
, "ramfs") &&
843 strcmp(sb
->s_type
->name
, "devpts")) {
844 if (context_sid
|| fscontext_sid
|| rootcontext_sid
||
849 if (sbsec
->behavior
== SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR
) {
850 sbsec
->behavior
= SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT
;
851 rc
= security_transition_sid(current_sid(), current_sid(),
853 &sbsec
->mntpoint_sid
);
860 /* sets the context of the superblock for the fs being mounted. */
862 rc
= may_context_mount_sb_relabel(fscontext_sid
, sbsec
, cred
);
866 sbsec
->sid
= fscontext_sid
;
870 * Switch to using mount point labeling behavior.
871 * sets the label used on all file below the mountpoint, and will set
872 * the superblock context if not already set.
874 if (kern_flags
& SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS
&& !context_sid
) {
875 sbsec
->behavior
= SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE
;
876 *set_kern_flags
|= SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS
;
880 if (!fscontext_sid
) {
881 rc
= may_context_mount_sb_relabel(context_sid
, sbsec
,
885 sbsec
->sid
= context_sid
;
887 rc
= may_context_mount_inode_relabel(context_sid
, sbsec
,
892 if (!rootcontext_sid
)
893 rootcontext_sid
= context_sid
;
895 sbsec
->mntpoint_sid
= context_sid
;
896 sbsec
->behavior
= SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT
;
899 if (rootcontext_sid
) {
900 rc
= may_context_mount_inode_relabel(rootcontext_sid
, sbsec
,
905 root_isec
->sid
= rootcontext_sid
;
906 root_isec
->initialized
= LABEL_INITIALIZED
;
909 if (defcontext_sid
) {
910 if (sbsec
->behavior
!= SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR
&&
911 sbsec
->behavior
!= SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE
) {
913 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: defcontext option is "
914 "invalid for this filesystem type\n");
918 if (defcontext_sid
!= sbsec
->def_sid
) {
919 rc
= may_context_mount_inode_relabel(defcontext_sid
,
925 sbsec
->def_sid
= defcontext_sid
;
929 rc
= sb_finish_set_opts(sb
);
931 mutex_unlock(&sbsec
->lock
);
935 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, different "
936 "security settings for (dev %s, type %s)\n", sb
->s_id
, name
);
940 static int selinux_cmp_sb_context(const struct super_block
*oldsb
,
941 const struct super_block
*newsb
)
943 struct superblock_security_struct
*old
= oldsb
->s_security
;
944 struct superblock_security_struct
*new = newsb
->s_security
;
945 char oldflags
= old
->flags
& SE_MNTMASK
;
946 char newflags
= new->flags
& SE_MNTMASK
;
948 if (oldflags
!= newflags
)
950 if ((oldflags
& FSCONTEXT_MNT
) && old
->sid
!= new->sid
)
952 if ((oldflags
& CONTEXT_MNT
) && old
->mntpoint_sid
!= new->mntpoint_sid
)
954 if ((oldflags
& DEFCONTEXT_MNT
) && old
->def_sid
!= new->def_sid
)
956 if (oldflags
& ROOTCONTEXT_MNT
) {
957 struct inode_security_struct
*oldroot
= backing_inode_security(oldsb
->s_root
);
958 struct inode_security_struct
*newroot
= backing_inode_security(newsb
->s_root
);
959 if (oldroot
->sid
!= newroot
->sid
)
964 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, "
965 "different security settings for (dev %s, "
966 "type %s)\n", newsb
->s_id
, newsb
->s_type
->name
);
970 static int selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block
*oldsb
,
971 struct super_block
*newsb
,
972 unsigned long kern_flags
,
973 unsigned long *set_kern_flags
)
976 const struct superblock_security_struct
*oldsbsec
= oldsb
->s_security
;
977 struct superblock_security_struct
*newsbsec
= newsb
->s_security
;
979 int set_fscontext
= (oldsbsec
->flags
& FSCONTEXT_MNT
);
980 int set_context
= (oldsbsec
->flags
& CONTEXT_MNT
);
981 int set_rootcontext
= (oldsbsec
->flags
& ROOTCONTEXT_MNT
);
984 * if the parent was able to be mounted it clearly had no special lsm
985 * mount options. thus we can safely deal with this superblock later
991 * Specifying internal flags without providing a place to
992 * place the results is not allowed.
994 if (kern_flags
&& !set_kern_flags
)
997 /* how can we clone if the old one wasn't set up?? */
998 BUG_ON(!(oldsbsec
->flags
& SE_SBINITIALIZED
));
1000 /* if fs is reusing a sb, make sure that the contexts match */
1001 if (newsbsec
->flags
& SE_SBINITIALIZED
)
1002 return selinux_cmp_sb_context(oldsb
, newsb
);
1004 mutex_lock(&newsbsec
->lock
);
1006 newsbsec
->flags
= oldsbsec
->flags
;
1008 newsbsec
->sid
= oldsbsec
->sid
;
1009 newsbsec
->def_sid
= oldsbsec
->def_sid
;
1010 newsbsec
->behavior
= oldsbsec
->behavior
;
1012 if (newsbsec
->behavior
== SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE
&&
1013 !(kern_flags
& SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS
) && !set_context
) {
1014 rc
= security_fs_use(newsb
);
1019 if (kern_flags
& SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS
&& !set_context
) {
1020 newsbsec
->behavior
= SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE
;
1021 *set_kern_flags
|= SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS
;
1025 u32 sid
= oldsbsec
->mntpoint_sid
;
1028 newsbsec
->sid
= sid
;
1029 if (!set_rootcontext
) {
1030 struct inode_security_struct
*newisec
= backing_inode_security(newsb
->s_root
);
1033 newsbsec
->mntpoint_sid
= sid
;
1035 if (set_rootcontext
) {
1036 const struct inode_security_struct
*oldisec
= backing_inode_security(oldsb
->s_root
);
1037 struct inode_security_struct
*newisec
= backing_inode_security(newsb
->s_root
);
1039 newisec
->sid
= oldisec
->sid
;
1042 sb_finish_set_opts(newsb
);
1044 mutex_unlock(&newsbsec
->lock
);
1048 static int selinux_parse_opts_str(char *options
,
1049 struct security_mnt_opts
*opts
)
1052 char *context
= NULL
, *defcontext
= NULL
;
1053 char *fscontext
= NULL
, *rootcontext
= NULL
;
1054 int rc
, num_mnt_opts
= 0;
1056 opts
->num_mnt_opts
= 0;
1058 /* Standard string-based options. */
1059 while ((p
= strsep(&options
, "|")) != NULL
) {
1061 substring_t args
[MAX_OPT_ARGS
];
1066 token
= match_token(p
, tokens
, args
);
1070 if (context
|| defcontext
) {
1072 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG
);
1075 context
= match_strdup(&args
[0]);
1085 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG
);
1088 fscontext
= match_strdup(&args
[0]);
1095 case Opt_rootcontext
:
1098 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG
);
1101 rootcontext
= match_strdup(&args
[0]);
1108 case Opt_defcontext
:
1109 if (context
|| defcontext
) {
1111 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG
);
1114 defcontext
= match_strdup(&args
[0]);
1120 case Opt_labelsupport
:
1124 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: unknown mount option\n");
1131 opts
->mnt_opts
= kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS
, sizeof(char *), GFP_KERNEL
);
1132 if (!opts
->mnt_opts
)
1135 opts
->mnt_opts_flags
= kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS
, sizeof(int),
1137 if (!opts
->mnt_opts_flags
)
1141 opts
->mnt_opts
[num_mnt_opts
] = fscontext
;
1142 opts
->mnt_opts_flags
[num_mnt_opts
++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT
;
1145 opts
->mnt_opts
[num_mnt_opts
] = context
;
1146 opts
->mnt_opts_flags
[num_mnt_opts
++] = CONTEXT_MNT
;
1149 opts
->mnt_opts
[num_mnt_opts
] = rootcontext
;
1150 opts
->mnt_opts_flags
[num_mnt_opts
++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT
;
1153 opts
->mnt_opts
[num_mnt_opts
] = defcontext
;
1154 opts
->mnt_opts_flags
[num_mnt_opts
++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT
;
1157 opts
->num_mnt_opts
= num_mnt_opts
;
1161 security_free_mnt_opts(opts
);
1169 * string mount options parsing and call set the sbsec
1171 static int superblock_doinit(struct super_block
*sb
, void *data
)
1174 char *options
= data
;
1175 struct security_mnt_opts opts
;
1177 security_init_mnt_opts(&opts
);
1182 BUG_ON(sb
->s_type
->fs_flags
& FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA
);
1184 rc
= selinux_parse_opts_str(options
, &opts
);
1189 rc
= selinux_set_mnt_opts(sb
, &opts
, 0, NULL
);
1192 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts
);
1196 static void selinux_write_opts(struct seq_file
*m
,
1197 struct security_mnt_opts
*opts
)
1202 for (i
= 0; i
< opts
->num_mnt_opts
; i
++) {
1205 if (opts
->mnt_opts
[i
])
1206 has_comma
= strchr(opts
->mnt_opts
[i
], ',');
1210 switch (opts
->mnt_opts_flags
[i
]) {
1212 prefix
= CONTEXT_STR
;
1215 prefix
= FSCONTEXT_STR
;
1217 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT
:
1218 prefix
= ROOTCONTEXT_STR
;
1220 case DEFCONTEXT_MNT
:
1221 prefix
= DEFCONTEXT_STR
;
1225 seq_puts(m
, LABELSUPP_STR
);
1231 /* we need a comma before each option */
1233 seq_puts(m
, prefix
);
1236 seq_escape(m
, opts
->mnt_opts
[i
], "\"\n\\");
1242 static int selinux_sb_show_options(struct seq_file
*m
, struct super_block
*sb
)
1244 struct security_mnt_opts opts
;
1247 rc
= selinux_get_mnt_opts(sb
, &opts
);
1249 /* before policy load we may get EINVAL, don't show anything */
1255 selinux_write_opts(m
, &opts
);
1257 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts
);
1262 static inline u16
inode_mode_to_security_class(umode_t mode
)
1264 switch (mode
& S_IFMT
) {
1266 return SECCLASS_SOCK_FILE
;
1268 return SECCLASS_LNK_FILE
;
1270 return SECCLASS_FILE
;
1272 return SECCLASS_BLK_FILE
;
1274 return SECCLASS_DIR
;
1276 return SECCLASS_CHR_FILE
;
1278 return SECCLASS_FIFO_FILE
;
1282 return SECCLASS_FILE
;
1285 static inline int default_protocol_stream(int protocol
)
1287 return (protocol
== IPPROTO_IP
|| protocol
== IPPROTO_TCP
);
1290 static inline int default_protocol_dgram(int protocol
)
1292 return (protocol
== IPPROTO_IP
|| protocol
== IPPROTO_UDP
);
1295 static inline u16
socket_type_to_security_class(int family
, int type
, int protocol
)
1297 int extsockclass
= selinux_policycap_extsockclass
;
1303 case SOCK_SEQPACKET
:
1304 return SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET
;
1306 return SECCLASS_UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET
;
1313 case SOCK_SEQPACKET
:
1314 if (default_protocol_stream(protocol
))
1315 return SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET
;
1316 else if (extsockclass
&& protocol
== IPPROTO_SCTP
)
1317 return SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET
;
1319 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET
;
1321 if (default_protocol_dgram(protocol
))
1322 return SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET
;
1323 else if (extsockclass
&& (protocol
== IPPROTO_ICMP
||
1324 protocol
== IPPROTO_ICMPV6
))
1325 return SECCLASS_ICMP_SOCKET
;
1327 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET
;
1329 return SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET
;
1331 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET
;
1337 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET
;
1338 case NETLINK_SOCK_DIAG
:
1339 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET
;
1341 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET
;
1343 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET
;
1344 case NETLINK_SELINUX
:
1345 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET
;
1347 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ISCSI_SOCKET
;
1349 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET
;
1350 case NETLINK_FIB_LOOKUP
:
1351 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_FIB_LOOKUP_SOCKET
;
1352 case NETLINK_CONNECTOR
:
1353 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_CONNECTOR_SOCKET
;
1354 case NETLINK_NETFILTER
:
1355 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NETFILTER_SOCKET
;
1356 case NETLINK_DNRTMSG
:
1357 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET
;
1358 case NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT
:
1359 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET
;
1360 case NETLINK_GENERIC
:
1361 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_GENERIC_SOCKET
;
1362 case NETLINK_SCSITRANSPORT
:
1363 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SCSITRANSPORT_SOCKET
;
1365 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_RDMA_SOCKET
;
1366 case NETLINK_CRYPTO
:
1367 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_CRYPTO_SOCKET
;
1369 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET
;
1372 return SECCLASS_PACKET_SOCKET
;
1374 return SECCLASS_KEY_SOCKET
;
1376 return SECCLASS_APPLETALK_SOCKET
;
1382 return SECCLASS_AX25_SOCKET
;
1384 return SECCLASS_IPX_SOCKET
;
1386 return SECCLASS_NETROM_SOCKET
;
1388 return SECCLASS_ATMPVC_SOCKET
;
1390 return SECCLASS_X25_SOCKET
;
1392 return SECCLASS_ROSE_SOCKET
;
1394 return SECCLASS_DECNET_SOCKET
;
1396 return SECCLASS_ATMSVC_SOCKET
;
1398 return SECCLASS_RDS_SOCKET
;
1400 return SECCLASS_IRDA_SOCKET
;
1402 return SECCLASS_PPPOX_SOCKET
;
1404 return SECCLASS_LLC_SOCKET
;
1406 return SECCLASS_CAN_SOCKET
;
1408 return SECCLASS_TIPC_SOCKET
;
1410 return SECCLASS_BLUETOOTH_SOCKET
;
1412 return SECCLASS_IUCV_SOCKET
;
1414 return SECCLASS_RXRPC_SOCKET
;
1416 return SECCLASS_ISDN_SOCKET
;
1418 return SECCLASS_PHONET_SOCKET
;
1420 return SECCLASS_IEEE802154_SOCKET
;
1422 return SECCLASS_CAIF_SOCKET
;
1424 return SECCLASS_ALG_SOCKET
;
1426 return SECCLASS_NFC_SOCKET
;
1428 return SECCLASS_VSOCK_SOCKET
;
1430 return SECCLASS_KCM_SOCKET
;
1432 return SECCLASS_QIPCRTR_SOCKET
;
1434 return SECCLASS_SMC_SOCKET
;
1436 #error New address family defined, please update this function.
1441 return SECCLASS_SOCKET
;
1444 static int selinux_genfs_get_sid(struct dentry
*dentry
,
1450 struct super_block
*sb
= dentry
->d_sb
;
1451 char *buffer
, *path
;
1453 buffer
= (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL
);
1457 path
= dentry_path_raw(dentry
, buffer
, PAGE_SIZE
);
1461 if (flags
& SE_SBPROC
) {
1462 /* each process gets a /proc/PID/ entry. Strip off the
1463 * PID part to get a valid selinux labeling.
1464 * e.g. /proc/1/net/rpc/nfs -> /net/rpc/nfs */
1465 while (path
[1] >= '0' && path
[1] <= '9') {
1470 rc
= security_genfs_sid(sb
->s_type
->name
, path
, tclass
, sid
);
1472 free_page((unsigned long)buffer
);
1476 /* The inode's security attributes must be initialized before first use. */
1477 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode
*inode
, struct dentry
*opt_dentry
)
1479 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
= NULL
;
1480 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= inode
->i_security
;
1481 u32 task_sid
, sid
= 0;
1483 struct dentry
*dentry
;
1484 #define INITCONTEXTLEN 255
1485 char *context
= NULL
;
1489 if (isec
->initialized
== LABEL_INITIALIZED
)
1492 spin_lock(&isec
->lock
);
1493 if (isec
->initialized
== LABEL_INITIALIZED
)
1496 if (isec
->sclass
== SECCLASS_FILE
)
1497 isec
->sclass
= inode_mode_to_security_class(inode
->i_mode
);
1499 sbsec
= inode
->i_sb
->s_security
;
1500 if (!(sbsec
->flags
& SE_SBINITIALIZED
)) {
1501 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
1502 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
1503 server is ready to handle calls. */
1504 spin_lock(&sbsec
->isec_lock
);
1505 if (list_empty(&isec
->list
))
1506 list_add(&isec
->list
, &sbsec
->isec_head
);
1507 spin_unlock(&sbsec
->isec_lock
);
1511 sclass
= isec
->sclass
;
1512 task_sid
= isec
->task_sid
;
1514 isec
->initialized
= LABEL_PENDING
;
1515 spin_unlock(&isec
->lock
);
1517 switch (sbsec
->behavior
) {
1518 case SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE
:
1520 case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR
:
1521 if (!(inode
->i_opflags
& IOP_XATTR
)) {
1522 sid
= sbsec
->def_sid
;
1525 /* Need a dentry, since the xattr API requires one.
1526 Life would be simpler if we could just pass the inode. */
1528 /* Called from d_instantiate or d_splice_alias. */
1529 dentry
= dget(opt_dentry
);
1531 /* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to find a dentry. */
1532 dentry
= d_find_alias(inode
);
1536 * this is can be hit on boot when a file is accessed
1537 * before the policy is loaded. When we load policy we
1538 * may find inodes that have no dentry on the
1539 * sbsec->isec_head list. No reason to complain as these
1540 * will get fixed up the next time we go through
1541 * inode_doinit with a dentry, before these inodes could
1542 * be used again by userspace.
1547 len
= INITCONTEXTLEN
;
1548 context
= kmalloc(len
+1, GFP_NOFS
);
1554 context
[len
] = '\0';
1555 rc
= __vfs_getxattr(dentry
, inode
, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX
, context
, len
);
1556 if (rc
== -ERANGE
) {
1559 /* Need a larger buffer. Query for the right size. */
1560 rc
= __vfs_getxattr(dentry
, inode
, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX
, NULL
, 0);
1566 context
= kmalloc(len
+1, GFP_NOFS
);
1572 context
[len
] = '\0';
1573 rc
= __vfs_getxattr(dentry
, inode
, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX
, context
, len
);
1577 if (rc
!= -ENODATA
) {
1578 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: %s: getxattr returned "
1579 "%d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n", __func__
,
1580 -rc
, inode
->i_sb
->s_id
, inode
->i_ino
);
1584 /* Map ENODATA to the default file SID */
1585 sid
= sbsec
->def_sid
;
1588 rc
= security_context_to_sid_default(context
, rc
, &sid
,
1592 char *dev
= inode
->i_sb
->s_id
;
1593 unsigned long ino
= inode
->i_ino
;
1595 if (rc
== -EINVAL
) {
1596 if (printk_ratelimit())
1597 printk(KERN_NOTICE
"SELinux: inode=%lu on dev=%s was found to have an invalid "
1598 "context=%s. This indicates you may need to relabel the inode or the "
1599 "filesystem in question.\n", ino
, dev
, context
);
1601 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: %s: context_to_sid(%s) "
1602 "returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
1603 __func__
, context
, -rc
, dev
, ino
);
1606 /* Leave with the unlabeled SID */
1613 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK
:
1616 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS
:
1617 /* Default to the fs SID. */
1620 /* Try to obtain a transition SID. */
1621 rc
= security_transition_sid(task_sid
, sid
, sclass
, NULL
, &sid
);
1625 case SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT
:
1626 sid
= sbsec
->mntpoint_sid
;
1629 /* Default to the fs superblock SID. */
1632 if ((sbsec
->flags
& SE_SBGENFS
) && !S_ISLNK(inode
->i_mode
)) {
1633 /* We must have a dentry to determine the label on
1636 /* Called from d_instantiate or
1637 * d_splice_alias. */
1638 dentry
= dget(opt_dentry
);
1640 /* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to
1642 dentry
= d_find_alias(inode
);
1644 * This can be hit on boot when a file is accessed
1645 * before the policy is loaded. When we load policy we
1646 * may find inodes that have no dentry on the
1647 * sbsec->isec_head list. No reason to complain as
1648 * these will get fixed up the next time we go through
1649 * inode_doinit() with a dentry, before these inodes
1650 * could be used again by userspace.
1654 rc
= selinux_genfs_get_sid(dentry
, sclass
,
1655 sbsec
->flags
, &sid
);
1664 spin_lock(&isec
->lock
);
1665 if (isec
->initialized
== LABEL_PENDING
) {
1667 isec
->initialized
= LABEL_INVALID
;
1671 isec
->initialized
= LABEL_INITIALIZED
;
1676 spin_unlock(&isec
->lock
);
1680 /* Convert a Linux signal to an access vector. */
1681 static inline u32
signal_to_av(int sig
)
1687 /* Commonly granted from child to parent. */
1688 perm
= PROCESS__SIGCHLD
;
1691 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1692 perm
= PROCESS__SIGKILL
;
1695 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1696 perm
= PROCESS__SIGSTOP
;
1699 /* All other signals. */
1700 perm
= PROCESS__SIGNAL
;
1707 #if CAP_LAST_CAP > 63
1708 #error Fix SELinux to handle capabilities > 63.
1711 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a capability. */
1712 static int cred_has_capability(const struct cred
*cred
,
1713 int cap
, int audit
, bool initns
)
1715 struct common_audit_data ad
;
1716 struct av_decision avd
;
1718 u32 sid
= cred_sid(cred
);
1719 u32 av
= CAP_TO_MASK(cap
);
1722 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_CAP
;
1725 switch (CAP_TO_INDEX(cap
)) {
1727 sclass
= initns
? SECCLASS_CAPABILITY
: SECCLASS_CAP_USERNS
;
1730 sclass
= initns
? SECCLASS_CAPABILITY2
: SECCLASS_CAP2_USERNS
;
1734 "SELinux: out of range capability %d\n", cap
);
1739 rc
= avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid
, sid
, sclass
, av
, 0, &avd
);
1740 if (audit
== SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT
) {
1741 int rc2
= avc_audit(sid
, sid
, sclass
, av
, &avd
, rc
, &ad
, 0);
1748 /* Check whether a task has a particular permission to an inode.
1749 The 'adp' parameter is optional and allows other audit
1750 data to be passed (e.g. the dentry). */
1751 static int inode_has_perm(const struct cred
*cred
,
1752 struct inode
*inode
,
1754 struct common_audit_data
*adp
)
1756 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
;
1759 validate_creds(cred
);
1761 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode
)))
1764 sid
= cred_sid(cred
);
1765 isec
= inode
->i_security
;
1767 return avc_has_perm(sid
, isec
->sid
, isec
->sclass
, perms
, adp
);
1770 /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1771 the dentry to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1772 pathname if needed. */
1773 static inline int dentry_has_perm(const struct cred
*cred
,
1774 struct dentry
*dentry
,
1777 struct inode
*inode
= d_backing_inode(dentry
);
1778 struct common_audit_data ad
;
1780 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY
;
1781 ad
.u
.dentry
= dentry
;
1782 __inode_security_revalidate(inode
, dentry
, true);
1783 return inode_has_perm(cred
, inode
, av
, &ad
);
1786 /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1787 the path to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1788 pathname if needed. */
1789 static inline int path_has_perm(const struct cred
*cred
,
1790 const struct path
*path
,
1793 struct inode
*inode
= d_backing_inode(path
->dentry
);
1794 struct common_audit_data ad
;
1796 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH
;
1798 __inode_security_revalidate(inode
, path
->dentry
, true);
1799 return inode_has_perm(cred
, inode
, av
, &ad
);
1802 /* Same as path_has_perm, but uses the inode from the file struct. */
1803 static inline int file_path_has_perm(const struct cred
*cred
,
1807 struct common_audit_data ad
;
1809 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE
;
1811 return inode_has_perm(cred
, file_inode(file
), av
, &ad
);
1814 /* Check whether a task can use an open file descriptor to
1815 access an inode in a given way. Check access to the
1816 descriptor itself, and then use dentry_has_perm to
1817 check a particular permission to the file.
1818 Access to the descriptor is implicitly granted if it
1819 has the same SID as the process. If av is zero, then
1820 access to the file is not checked, e.g. for cases
1821 where only the descriptor is affected like seek. */
1822 static int file_has_perm(const struct cred
*cred
,
1826 struct file_security_struct
*fsec
= file
->f_security
;
1827 struct inode
*inode
= file_inode(file
);
1828 struct common_audit_data ad
;
1829 u32 sid
= cred_sid(cred
);
1832 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE
;
1835 if (sid
!= fsec
->sid
) {
1836 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, fsec
->sid
,
1844 /* av is zero if only checking access to the descriptor. */
1847 rc
= inode_has_perm(cred
, inode
, av
, &ad
);
1854 * Determine the label for an inode that might be unioned.
1857 selinux_determine_inode_label(const struct task_security_struct
*tsec
,
1859 const struct qstr
*name
, u16 tclass
,
1862 const struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
= dir
->i_sb
->s_security
;
1864 if ((sbsec
->flags
& SE_SBINITIALIZED
) &&
1865 (sbsec
->behavior
== SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT
)) {
1866 *_new_isid
= sbsec
->mntpoint_sid
;
1867 } else if ((sbsec
->flags
& SBLABEL_MNT
) &&
1869 *_new_isid
= tsec
->create_sid
;
1871 const struct inode_security_struct
*dsec
= inode_security(dir
);
1872 return security_transition_sid(tsec
->sid
, dsec
->sid
, tclass
,
1879 /* Check whether a task can create a file. */
1880 static int may_create(struct inode
*dir
,
1881 struct dentry
*dentry
,
1884 const struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= current_security();
1885 struct inode_security_struct
*dsec
;
1886 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
;
1888 struct common_audit_data ad
;
1891 dsec
= inode_security(dir
);
1892 sbsec
= dir
->i_sb
->s_security
;
1896 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY
;
1897 ad
.u
.dentry
= dentry
;
1899 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, dsec
->sid
, SECCLASS_DIR
,
1900 DIR__ADD_NAME
| DIR__SEARCH
,
1905 rc
= selinux_determine_inode_label(current_security(), dir
,
1906 &dentry
->d_name
, tclass
, &newsid
);
1910 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, newsid
, tclass
, FILE__CREATE
, &ad
);
1914 return avc_has_perm(newsid
, sbsec
->sid
,
1915 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM
,
1916 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE
, &ad
);
1920 #define MAY_UNLINK 1
1923 /* Check whether a task can link, unlink, or rmdir a file/directory. */
1924 static int may_link(struct inode
*dir
,
1925 struct dentry
*dentry
,
1929 struct inode_security_struct
*dsec
, *isec
;
1930 struct common_audit_data ad
;
1931 u32 sid
= current_sid();
1935 dsec
= inode_security(dir
);
1936 isec
= backing_inode_security(dentry
);
1938 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY
;
1939 ad
.u
.dentry
= dentry
;
1942 av
|= (kind
? DIR__REMOVE_NAME
: DIR__ADD_NAME
);
1943 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, dsec
->sid
, SECCLASS_DIR
, av
, &ad
);
1958 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: %s: unrecognized kind %d\n",
1963 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, isec
->sid
, isec
->sclass
, av
, &ad
);
1967 static inline int may_rename(struct inode
*old_dir
,
1968 struct dentry
*old_dentry
,
1969 struct inode
*new_dir
,
1970 struct dentry
*new_dentry
)
1972 struct inode_security_struct
*old_dsec
, *new_dsec
, *old_isec
, *new_isec
;
1973 struct common_audit_data ad
;
1974 u32 sid
= current_sid();
1976 int old_is_dir
, new_is_dir
;
1979 old_dsec
= inode_security(old_dir
);
1980 old_isec
= backing_inode_security(old_dentry
);
1981 old_is_dir
= d_is_dir(old_dentry
);
1982 new_dsec
= inode_security(new_dir
);
1984 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY
;
1986 ad
.u
.dentry
= old_dentry
;
1987 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, old_dsec
->sid
, SECCLASS_DIR
,
1988 DIR__REMOVE_NAME
| DIR__SEARCH
, &ad
);
1991 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, old_isec
->sid
,
1992 old_isec
->sclass
, FILE__RENAME
, &ad
);
1995 if (old_is_dir
&& new_dir
!= old_dir
) {
1996 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, old_isec
->sid
,
1997 old_isec
->sclass
, DIR__REPARENT
, &ad
);
2002 ad
.u
.dentry
= new_dentry
;
2003 av
= DIR__ADD_NAME
| DIR__SEARCH
;
2004 if (d_is_positive(new_dentry
))
2005 av
|= DIR__REMOVE_NAME
;
2006 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, new_dsec
->sid
, SECCLASS_DIR
, av
, &ad
);
2009 if (d_is_positive(new_dentry
)) {
2010 new_isec
= backing_inode_security(new_dentry
);
2011 new_is_dir
= d_is_dir(new_dentry
);
2012 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, new_isec
->sid
,
2014 (new_is_dir
? DIR__RMDIR
: FILE__UNLINK
), &ad
);
2022 /* Check whether a task can perform a filesystem operation. */
2023 static int superblock_has_perm(const struct cred
*cred
,
2024 struct super_block
*sb
,
2026 struct common_audit_data
*ad
)
2028 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
;
2029 u32 sid
= cred_sid(cred
);
2031 sbsec
= sb
->s_security
;
2032 return avc_has_perm(sid
, sbsec
->sid
, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM
, perms
, ad
);
2035 /* Convert a Linux mode and permission mask to an access vector. */
2036 static inline u32
file_mask_to_av(int mode
, int mask
)
2040 if (!S_ISDIR(mode
)) {
2041 if (mask
& MAY_EXEC
)
2042 av
|= FILE__EXECUTE
;
2043 if (mask
& MAY_READ
)
2046 if (mask
& MAY_APPEND
)
2048 else if (mask
& MAY_WRITE
)
2052 if (mask
& MAY_EXEC
)
2054 if (mask
& MAY_WRITE
)
2056 if (mask
& MAY_READ
)
2063 /* Convert a Linux file to an access vector. */
2064 static inline u32
file_to_av(struct file
*file
)
2068 if (file
->f_mode
& FMODE_READ
)
2070 if (file
->f_mode
& FMODE_WRITE
) {
2071 if (file
->f_flags
& O_APPEND
)
2078 * Special file opened with flags 3 for ioctl-only use.
2087 * Convert a file to an access vector and include the correct open
2090 static inline u32
open_file_to_av(struct file
*file
)
2092 u32 av
= file_to_av(file
);
2093 struct inode
*inode
= file_inode(file
);
2095 if (selinux_policycap_openperm
&& inode
->i_sb
->s_magic
!= SOCKFS_MAGIC
)
2101 /* Hook functions begin here. */
2103 static int selinux_binder_set_context_mgr(struct task_struct
*mgr
)
2105 u32 mysid
= current_sid();
2106 u32 mgrsid
= task_sid(mgr
);
2108 return avc_has_perm(mysid
, mgrsid
, SECCLASS_BINDER
,
2109 BINDER__SET_CONTEXT_MGR
, NULL
);
2112 static int selinux_binder_transaction(struct task_struct
*from
,
2113 struct task_struct
*to
)
2115 u32 mysid
= current_sid();
2116 u32 fromsid
= task_sid(from
);
2117 u32 tosid
= task_sid(to
);
2120 if (mysid
!= fromsid
) {
2121 rc
= avc_has_perm(mysid
, fromsid
, SECCLASS_BINDER
,
2122 BINDER__IMPERSONATE
, NULL
);
2127 return avc_has_perm(fromsid
, tosid
, SECCLASS_BINDER
, BINDER__CALL
,
2131 static int selinux_binder_transfer_binder(struct task_struct
*from
,
2132 struct task_struct
*to
)
2134 u32 fromsid
= task_sid(from
);
2135 u32 tosid
= task_sid(to
);
2137 return avc_has_perm(fromsid
, tosid
, SECCLASS_BINDER
, BINDER__TRANSFER
,
2141 static int selinux_binder_transfer_file(struct task_struct
*from
,
2142 struct task_struct
*to
,
2145 u32 sid
= task_sid(to
);
2146 struct file_security_struct
*fsec
= file
->f_security
;
2147 struct dentry
*dentry
= file
->f_path
.dentry
;
2148 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
;
2149 struct common_audit_data ad
;
2152 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH
;
2153 ad
.u
.path
= file
->f_path
;
2155 if (sid
!= fsec
->sid
) {
2156 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, fsec
->sid
,
2164 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry
))))
2167 isec
= backing_inode_security(dentry
);
2168 return avc_has_perm(sid
, isec
->sid
, isec
->sclass
, file_to_av(file
),
2172 static int selinux_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct
*child
,
2175 u32 sid
= current_sid();
2176 u32 csid
= task_sid(child
);
2178 if (mode
& PTRACE_MODE_READ
)
2179 return avc_has_perm(sid
, csid
, SECCLASS_FILE
, FILE__READ
, NULL
);
2181 return avc_has_perm(sid
, csid
, SECCLASS_PROCESS
, PROCESS__PTRACE
, NULL
);
2184 static int selinux_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct
*parent
)
2186 return avc_has_perm(task_sid(parent
), current_sid(), SECCLASS_PROCESS
,
2187 PROCESS__PTRACE
, NULL
);
2190 static int selinux_capget(struct task_struct
*target
, kernel_cap_t
*effective
,
2191 kernel_cap_t
*inheritable
, kernel_cap_t
*permitted
)
2193 return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), task_sid(target
), SECCLASS_PROCESS
,
2194 PROCESS__GETCAP
, NULL
);
2197 static int selinux_capset(struct cred
*new, const struct cred
*old
,
2198 const kernel_cap_t
*effective
,
2199 const kernel_cap_t
*inheritable
,
2200 const kernel_cap_t
*permitted
)
2202 return avc_has_perm(cred_sid(old
), cred_sid(new), SECCLASS_PROCESS
,
2203 PROCESS__SETCAP
, NULL
);
2207 * (This comment used to live with the selinux_task_setuid hook,
2208 * which was removed).
2210 * Since setuid only affects the current process, and since the SELinux
2211 * controls are not based on the Linux identity attributes, SELinux does not
2212 * need to control this operation. However, SELinux does control the use of
2213 * the CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID capabilities using the capable hook.
2216 static int selinux_capable(const struct cred
*cred
, struct user_namespace
*ns
,
2219 return cred_has_capability(cred
, cap
, audit
, ns
== &init_user_ns
);
2222 static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds
, int type
, int id
, struct super_block
*sb
)
2224 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
2236 rc
= superblock_has_perm(cred
, sb
, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAMOD
, NULL
);
2241 rc
= superblock_has_perm(cred
, sb
, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAGET
, NULL
);
2244 rc
= 0; /* let the kernel handle invalid cmds */
2250 static int selinux_quota_on(struct dentry
*dentry
)
2252 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
2254 return dentry_has_perm(cred
, dentry
, FILE__QUOTAON
);
2257 static int selinux_syslog(int type
)
2260 case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_ALL
: /* Read last kernel messages */
2261 case SYSLOG_ACTION_SIZE_BUFFER
: /* Return size of the log buffer */
2262 return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL
,
2263 SECCLASS_SYSTEM
, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_READ
, NULL
);
2264 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_OFF
: /* Disable logging to console */
2265 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_ON
: /* Enable logging to console */
2266 /* Set level of messages printed to console */
2267 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_LEVEL
:
2268 return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL
,
2269 SECCLASS_SYSTEM
, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_CONSOLE
,
2272 /* All other syslog types */
2273 return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL
,
2274 SECCLASS_SYSTEM
, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_MOD
, NULL
);
2278 * Check that a process has enough memory to allocate a new virtual
2279 * mapping. 0 means there is enough memory for the allocation to
2280 * succeed and -ENOMEM implies there is not.
2282 * Do not audit the selinux permission check, as this is applied to all
2283 * processes that allocate mappings.
2285 static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct
*mm
, long pages
)
2287 int rc
, cap_sys_admin
= 0;
2289 rc
= cred_has_capability(current_cred(), CAP_SYS_ADMIN
,
2290 SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT
, true);
2294 return cap_sys_admin
;
2297 /* binprm security operations */
2299 static u32
ptrace_parent_sid(void)
2302 struct task_struct
*tracer
;
2305 tracer
= ptrace_parent(current
);
2307 sid
= task_sid(tracer
);
2313 static int check_nnp_nosuid(const struct linux_binprm
*bprm
,
2314 const struct task_security_struct
*old_tsec
,
2315 const struct task_security_struct
*new_tsec
)
2317 int nnp
= (bprm
->unsafe
& LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS
);
2318 int nosuid
= !mnt_may_suid(bprm
->file
->f_path
.mnt
);
2321 if (!nnp
&& !nosuid
)
2322 return 0; /* neither NNP nor nosuid */
2324 if (new_tsec
->sid
== old_tsec
->sid
)
2325 return 0; /* No change in credentials */
2328 * The only transitions we permit under NNP or nosuid
2329 * are transitions to bounded SIDs, i.e. SIDs that are
2330 * guaranteed to only be allowed a subset of the permissions
2331 * of the current SID.
2333 rc
= security_bounded_transition(old_tsec
->sid
, new_tsec
->sid
);
2336 * On failure, preserve the errno values for NNP vs nosuid.
2337 * NNP: Operation not permitted for caller.
2338 * nosuid: Permission denied to file.
2348 static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm
*bprm
)
2350 const struct task_security_struct
*old_tsec
;
2351 struct task_security_struct
*new_tsec
;
2352 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
;
2353 struct common_audit_data ad
;
2354 struct inode
*inode
= file_inode(bprm
->file
);
2357 /* SELinux context only depends on initial program or script and not
2358 * the script interpreter */
2359 if (bprm
->cred_prepared
)
2362 old_tsec
= current_security();
2363 new_tsec
= bprm
->cred
->security
;
2364 isec
= inode_security(inode
);
2366 /* Default to the current task SID. */
2367 new_tsec
->sid
= old_tsec
->sid
;
2368 new_tsec
->osid
= old_tsec
->sid
;
2370 /* Reset fs, key, and sock SIDs on execve. */
2371 new_tsec
->create_sid
= 0;
2372 new_tsec
->keycreate_sid
= 0;
2373 new_tsec
->sockcreate_sid
= 0;
2375 if (old_tsec
->exec_sid
) {
2376 new_tsec
->sid
= old_tsec
->exec_sid
;
2377 /* Reset exec SID on execve. */
2378 new_tsec
->exec_sid
= 0;
2380 /* Fail on NNP or nosuid if not an allowed transition. */
2381 rc
= check_nnp_nosuid(bprm
, old_tsec
, new_tsec
);
2385 /* Check for a default transition on this program. */
2386 rc
= security_transition_sid(old_tsec
->sid
, isec
->sid
,
2387 SECCLASS_PROCESS
, NULL
,
2393 * Fallback to old SID on NNP or nosuid if not an allowed
2396 rc
= check_nnp_nosuid(bprm
, old_tsec
, new_tsec
);
2398 new_tsec
->sid
= old_tsec
->sid
;
2401 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE
;
2402 ad
.u
.file
= bprm
->file
;
2404 if (new_tsec
->sid
== old_tsec
->sid
) {
2405 rc
= avc_has_perm(old_tsec
->sid
, isec
->sid
,
2406 SECCLASS_FILE
, FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS
, &ad
);
2410 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
2411 rc
= avc_has_perm(old_tsec
->sid
, new_tsec
->sid
,
2412 SECCLASS_PROCESS
, PROCESS__TRANSITION
, &ad
);
2416 rc
= avc_has_perm(new_tsec
->sid
, isec
->sid
,
2417 SECCLASS_FILE
, FILE__ENTRYPOINT
, &ad
);
2421 /* Check for shared state */
2422 if (bprm
->unsafe
& LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE
) {
2423 rc
= avc_has_perm(old_tsec
->sid
, new_tsec
->sid
,
2424 SECCLASS_PROCESS
, PROCESS__SHARE
,
2430 /* Make sure that anyone attempting to ptrace over a task that
2431 * changes its SID has the appropriate permit */
2432 if (bprm
->unsafe
& LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE
) {
2433 u32 ptsid
= ptrace_parent_sid();
2435 rc
= avc_has_perm(ptsid
, new_tsec
->sid
,
2437 PROCESS__PTRACE
, NULL
);
2443 /* Clear any possibly unsafe personality bits on exec: */
2444 bprm
->per_clear
|= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID
;
2450 static int selinux_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm
*bprm
)
2452 const struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= current_security();
2460 /* Enable secure mode for SIDs transitions unless
2461 the noatsecure permission is granted between
2462 the two SIDs, i.e. ahp returns 0. */
2463 atsecure
= avc_has_perm(osid
, sid
,
2465 PROCESS__NOATSECURE
, NULL
);
2471 static int match_file(const void *p
, struct file
*file
, unsigned fd
)
2473 return file_has_perm(p
, file
, file_to_av(file
)) ? fd
+ 1 : 0;
2476 /* Derived from fs/exec.c:flush_old_files. */
2477 static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(const struct cred
*cred
,
2478 struct files_struct
*files
)
2480 struct file
*file
, *devnull
= NULL
;
2481 struct tty_struct
*tty
;
2485 tty
= get_current_tty();
2487 spin_lock(&tty
->files_lock
);
2488 if (!list_empty(&tty
->tty_files
)) {
2489 struct tty_file_private
*file_priv
;
2491 /* Revalidate access to controlling tty.
2492 Use file_path_has_perm on the tty path directly
2493 rather than using file_has_perm, as this particular
2494 open file may belong to another process and we are
2495 only interested in the inode-based check here. */
2496 file_priv
= list_first_entry(&tty
->tty_files
,
2497 struct tty_file_private
, list
);
2498 file
= file_priv
->file
;
2499 if (file_path_has_perm(cred
, file
, FILE__READ
| FILE__WRITE
))
2502 spin_unlock(&tty
->files_lock
);
2505 /* Reset controlling tty. */
2509 /* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */
2510 n
= iterate_fd(files
, 0, match_file
, cred
);
2511 if (!n
) /* none found? */
2514 devnull
= dentry_open(&selinux_null
, O_RDWR
, cred
);
2515 if (IS_ERR(devnull
))
2517 /* replace all the matching ones with this */
2519 replace_fd(n
- 1, devnull
, 0);
2520 } while ((n
= iterate_fd(files
, n
, match_file
, cred
)) != 0);
2526 * Prepare a process for imminent new credential changes due to exec
2528 static void selinux_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm
*bprm
)
2530 struct task_security_struct
*new_tsec
;
2531 struct rlimit
*rlim
, *initrlim
;
2534 new_tsec
= bprm
->cred
->security
;
2535 if (new_tsec
->sid
== new_tsec
->osid
)
2538 /* Close files for which the new task SID is not authorized. */
2539 flush_unauthorized_files(bprm
->cred
, current
->files
);
2541 /* Always clear parent death signal on SID transitions. */
2542 current
->pdeath_signal
= 0;
2544 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit resource limits from the old
2545 * SID. If not, reset all soft limits to the lower of the current
2546 * task's hard limit and the init task's soft limit.
2548 * Note that the setting of hard limits (even to lower them) can be
2549 * controlled by the setrlimit check. The inclusion of the init task's
2550 * soft limit into the computation is to avoid resetting soft limits
2551 * higher than the default soft limit for cases where the default is
2552 * lower than the hard limit, e.g. RLIMIT_CORE or RLIMIT_STACK.
2554 rc
= avc_has_perm(new_tsec
->osid
, new_tsec
->sid
, SECCLASS_PROCESS
,
2555 PROCESS__RLIMITINH
, NULL
);
2557 /* protect against do_prlimit() */
2559 for (i
= 0; i
< RLIM_NLIMITS
; i
++) {
2560 rlim
= current
->signal
->rlim
+ i
;
2561 initrlim
= init_task
.signal
->rlim
+ i
;
2562 rlim
->rlim_cur
= min(rlim
->rlim_max
, initrlim
->rlim_cur
);
2564 task_unlock(current
);
2565 if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_POSIX_TIMERS
))
2566 update_rlimit_cpu(current
, rlimit(RLIMIT_CPU
));
2571 * Clean up the process immediately after the installation of new credentials
2574 static void selinux_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm
*bprm
)
2576 const struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= current_security();
2577 struct itimerval itimer
;
2587 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit signal state from the old SID.
2588 * If not, clear itimers to avoid subsequent signal generation and
2589 * flush and unblock signals.
2591 * This must occur _after_ the task SID has been updated so that any
2592 * kill done after the flush will be checked against the new SID.
2594 rc
= avc_has_perm(osid
, sid
, SECCLASS_PROCESS
, PROCESS__SIGINH
, NULL
);
2596 if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_POSIX_TIMERS
)) {
2597 memset(&itimer
, 0, sizeof itimer
);
2598 for (i
= 0; i
< 3; i
++)
2599 do_setitimer(i
, &itimer
, NULL
);
2601 spin_lock_irq(¤t
->sighand
->siglock
);
2602 if (!fatal_signal_pending(current
)) {
2603 flush_sigqueue(¤t
->pending
);
2604 flush_sigqueue(¤t
->signal
->shared_pending
);
2605 flush_signal_handlers(current
, 1);
2606 sigemptyset(¤t
->blocked
);
2607 recalc_sigpending();
2609 spin_unlock_irq(¤t
->sighand
->siglock
);
2612 /* Wake up the parent if it is waiting so that it can recheck
2613 * wait permission to the new task SID. */
2614 read_lock(&tasklist_lock
);
2615 __wake_up_parent(current
, current
->real_parent
);
2616 read_unlock(&tasklist_lock
);
2619 /* superblock security operations */
2621 static int selinux_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block
*sb
)
2623 return superblock_alloc_security(sb
);
2626 static void selinux_sb_free_security(struct super_block
*sb
)
2628 superblock_free_security(sb
);
2631 static inline int match_prefix(char *prefix
, int plen
, char *option
, int olen
)
2636 return !memcmp(prefix
, option
, plen
);
2639 static inline int selinux_option(char *option
, int len
)
2641 return (match_prefix(CONTEXT_STR
, sizeof(CONTEXT_STR
)-1, option
, len
) ||
2642 match_prefix(FSCONTEXT_STR
, sizeof(FSCONTEXT_STR
)-1, option
, len
) ||
2643 match_prefix(DEFCONTEXT_STR
, sizeof(DEFCONTEXT_STR
)-1, option
, len
) ||
2644 match_prefix(ROOTCONTEXT_STR
, sizeof(ROOTCONTEXT_STR
)-1, option
, len
) ||
2645 match_prefix(LABELSUPP_STR
, sizeof(LABELSUPP_STR
)-1, option
, len
));
2648 static inline void take_option(char **to
, char *from
, int *first
, int len
)
2655 memcpy(*to
, from
, len
);
2659 static inline void take_selinux_option(char **to
, char *from
, int *first
,
2662 int current_size
= 0;
2670 while (current_size
< len
) {
2680 static int selinux_sb_copy_data(char *orig
, char *copy
)
2682 int fnosec
, fsec
, rc
= 0;
2683 char *in_save
, *in_curr
, *in_end
;
2684 char *sec_curr
, *nosec_save
, *nosec
;
2690 nosec
= (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL
);
2698 in_save
= in_end
= orig
;
2702 open_quote
= !open_quote
;
2703 if ((*in_end
== ',' && open_quote
== 0) ||
2705 int len
= in_end
- in_curr
;
2707 if (selinux_option(in_curr
, len
))
2708 take_selinux_option(&sec_curr
, in_curr
, &fsec
, len
);
2710 take_option(&nosec
, in_curr
, &fnosec
, len
);
2712 in_curr
= in_end
+ 1;
2714 } while (*in_end
++);
2716 strcpy(in_save
, nosec_save
);
2717 free_page((unsigned long)nosec_save
);
2722 static int selinux_sb_remount(struct super_block
*sb
, void *data
)
2725 struct security_mnt_opts opts
;
2726 char *secdata
, **mount_options
;
2727 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
= sb
->s_security
;
2729 if (!(sbsec
->flags
& SE_SBINITIALIZED
))
2735 if (sb
->s_type
->fs_flags
& FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA
)
2738 security_init_mnt_opts(&opts
);
2739 secdata
= alloc_secdata();
2742 rc
= selinux_sb_copy_data(data
, secdata
);
2744 goto out_free_secdata
;
2746 rc
= selinux_parse_opts_str(secdata
, &opts
);
2748 goto out_free_secdata
;
2750 mount_options
= opts
.mnt_opts
;
2751 flags
= opts
.mnt_opts_flags
;
2753 for (i
= 0; i
< opts
.num_mnt_opts
; i
++) {
2756 if (flags
[i
] == SBLABEL_MNT
)
2758 rc
= security_context_str_to_sid(mount_options
[i
], &sid
, GFP_KERNEL
);
2760 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: security_context_str_to_sid"
2761 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
2762 mount_options
[i
], sb
->s_id
, sb
->s_type
->name
, rc
);
2768 if (bad_option(sbsec
, FSCONTEXT_MNT
, sbsec
->sid
, sid
))
2769 goto out_bad_option
;
2772 if (bad_option(sbsec
, CONTEXT_MNT
, sbsec
->mntpoint_sid
, sid
))
2773 goto out_bad_option
;
2775 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT
: {
2776 struct inode_security_struct
*root_isec
;
2777 root_isec
= backing_inode_security(sb
->s_root
);
2779 if (bad_option(sbsec
, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT
, root_isec
->sid
, sid
))
2780 goto out_bad_option
;
2783 case DEFCONTEXT_MNT
:
2784 if (bad_option(sbsec
, DEFCONTEXT_MNT
, sbsec
->def_sid
, sid
))
2785 goto out_bad_option
;
2794 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts
);
2796 free_secdata(secdata
);
2799 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: unable to change security options "
2800 "during remount (dev %s, type=%s)\n", sb
->s_id
,
2805 static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block
*sb
, int flags
, void *data
)
2807 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
2808 struct common_audit_data ad
;
2811 rc
= superblock_doinit(sb
, data
);
2815 /* Allow all mounts performed by the kernel */
2816 if (flags
& MS_KERNMOUNT
)
2819 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY
;
2820 ad
.u
.dentry
= sb
->s_root
;
2821 return superblock_has_perm(cred
, sb
, FILESYSTEM__MOUNT
, &ad
);
2824 static int selinux_sb_statfs(struct dentry
*dentry
)
2826 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
2827 struct common_audit_data ad
;
2829 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY
;
2830 ad
.u
.dentry
= dentry
->d_sb
->s_root
;
2831 return superblock_has_perm(cred
, dentry
->d_sb
, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR
, &ad
);
2834 static int selinux_mount(const char *dev_name
,
2835 const struct path
*path
,
2837 unsigned long flags
,
2840 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
2842 if (flags
& MS_REMOUNT
)
2843 return superblock_has_perm(cred
, path
->dentry
->d_sb
,
2844 FILESYSTEM__REMOUNT
, NULL
);
2846 return path_has_perm(cred
, path
, FILE__MOUNTON
);
2849 static int selinux_umount(struct vfsmount
*mnt
, int flags
)
2851 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
2853 return superblock_has_perm(cred
, mnt
->mnt_sb
,
2854 FILESYSTEM__UNMOUNT
, NULL
);
2857 /* inode security operations */
2859 static int selinux_inode_alloc_security(struct inode
*inode
)
2861 return inode_alloc_security(inode
);
2864 static void selinux_inode_free_security(struct inode
*inode
)
2866 inode_free_security(inode
);
2869 static int selinux_dentry_init_security(struct dentry
*dentry
, int mode
,
2870 const struct qstr
*name
, void **ctx
,
2876 rc
= selinux_determine_inode_label(current_security(),
2877 d_inode(dentry
->d_parent
), name
,
2878 inode_mode_to_security_class(mode
),
2883 return security_sid_to_context(newsid
, (char **)ctx
, ctxlen
);
2886 static int selinux_dentry_create_files_as(struct dentry
*dentry
, int mode
,
2888 const struct cred
*old
,
2893 struct task_security_struct
*tsec
;
2895 rc
= selinux_determine_inode_label(old
->security
,
2896 d_inode(dentry
->d_parent
), name
,
2897 inode_mode_to_security_class(mode
),
2902 tsec
= new->security
;
2903 tsec
->create_sid
= newsid
;
2907 static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode
*inode
, struct inode
*dir
,
2908 const struct qstr
*qstr
,
2910 void **value
, size_t *len
)
2912 const struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= current_security();
2913 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
;
2914 u32 sid
, newsid
, clen
;
2918 sbsec
= dir
->i_sb
->s_security
;
2921 newsid
= tsec
->create_sid
;
2923 rc
= selinux_determine_inode_label(current_security(),
2925 inode_mode_to_security_class(inode
->i_mode
),
2930 /* Possibly defer initialization to selinux_complete_init. */
2931 if (sbsec
->flags
& SE_SBINITIALIZED
) {
2932 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= inode
->i_security
;
2933 isec
->sclass
= inode_mode_to_security_class(inode
->i_mode
);
2935 isec
->initialized
= LABEL_INITIALIZED
;
2938 if (!ss_initialized
|| !(sbsec
->flags
& SBLABEL_MNT
))
2942 *name
= XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
;
2945 rc
= security_sid_to_context_force(newsid
, &context
, &clen
);
2955 static int selinux_inode_create(struct inode
*dir
, struct dentry
*dentry
, umode_t mode
)
2957 return may_create(dir
, dentry
, SECCLASS_FILE
);
2960 static int selinux_inode_link(struct dentry
*old_dentry
, struct inode
*dir
, struct dentry
*new_dentry
)
2962 return may_link(dir
, old_dentry
, MAY_LINK
);
2965 static int selinux_inode_unlink(struct inode
*dir
, struct dentry
*dentry
)
2967 return may_link(dir
, dentry
, MAY_UNLINK
);
2970 static int selinux_inode_symlink(struct inode
*dir
, struct dentry
*dentry
, const char *name
)
2972 return may_create(dir
, dentry
, SECCLASS_LNK_FILE
);
2975 static int selinux_inode_mkdir(struct inode
*dir
, struct dentry
*dentry
, umode_t mask
)
2977 return may_create(dir
, dentry
, SECCLASS_DIR
);
2980 static int selinux_inode_rmdir(struct inode
*dir
, struct dentry
*dentry
)
2982 return may_link(dir
, dentry
, MAY_RMDIR
);
2985 static int selinux_inode_mknod(struct inode
*dir
, struct dentry
*dentry
, umode_t mode
, dev_t dev
)
2987 return may_create(dir
, dentry
, inode_mode_to_security_class(mode
));
2990 static int selinux_inode_rename(struct inode
*old_inode
, struct dentry
*old_dentry
,
2991 struct inode
*new_inode
, struct dentry
*new_dentry
)
2993 return may_rename(old_inode
, old_dentry
, new_inode
, new_dentry
);
2996 static int selinux_inode_readlink(struct dentry
*dentry
)
2998 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
3000 return dentry_has_perm(cred
, dentry
, FILE__READ
);
3003 static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry
*dentry
, struct inode
*inode
,
3006 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
3007 struct common_audit_data ad
;
3008 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
;
3011 validate_creds(cred
);
3013 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY
;
3014 ad
.u
.dentry
= dentry
;
3015 sid
= cred_sid(cred
);
3016 isec
= inode_security_rcu(inode
, rcu
);
3018 return PTR_ERR(isec
);
3020 return avc_has_perm_flags(sid
, isec
->sid
, isec
->sclass
, FILE__READ
, &ad
,
3021 rcu
? MAY_NOT_BLOCK
: 0);
3024 static noinline
int audit_inode_permission(struct inode
*inode
,
3025 u32 perms
, u32 audited
, u32 denied
,
3029 struct common_audit_data ad
;
3030 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= inode
->i_security
;
3033 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_INODE
;
3036 rc
= slow_avc_audit(current_sid(), isec
->sid
, isec
->sclass
, perms
,
3037 audited
, denied
, result
, &ad
, flags
);
3043 static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode
*inode
, int mask
)
3045 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
3048 unsigned flags
= mask
& MAY_NOT_BLOCK
;
3049 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
;
3051 struct av_decision avd
;
3053 u32 audited
, denied
;
3055 from_access
= mask
& MAY_ACCESS
;
3056 mask
&= (MAY_READ
|MAY_WRITE
|MAY_EXEC
|MAY_APPEND
);
3058 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
3062 validate_creds(cred
);
3064 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode
)))
3067 perms
= file_mask_to_av(inode
->i_mode
, mask
);
3069 sid
= cred_sid(cred
);
3070 isec
= inode_security_rcu(inode
, flags
& MAY_NOT_BLOCK
);
3072 return PTR_ERR(isec
);
3074 rc
= avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid
, isec
->sid
, isec
->sclass
, perms
, 0, &avd
);
3075 audited
= avc_audit_required(perms
, &avd
, rc
,
3076 from_access
? FILE__AUDIT_ACCESS
: 0,
3078 if (likely(!audited
))
3081 rc2
= audit_inode_permission(inode
, perms
, audited
, denied
, rc
, flags
);
3087 static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry
*dentry
, struct iattr
*iattr
)
3089 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
3090 struct inode
*inode
= d_backing_inode(dentry
);
3091 unsigned int ia_valid
= iattr
->ia_valid
;
3092 __u32 av
= FILE__WRITE
;
3094 /* ATTR_FORCE is just used for ATTR_KILL_S[UG]ID. */
3095 if (ia_valid
& ATTR_FORCE
) {
3096 ia_valid
&= ~(ATTR_KILL_SUID
| ATTR_KILL_SGID
| ATTR_MODE
|
3102 if (ia_valid
& (ATTR_MODE
| ATTR_UID
| ATTR_GID
|
3103 ATTR_ATIME_SET
| ATTR_MTIME_SET
| ATTR_TIMES_SET
))
3104 return dentry_has_perm(cred
, dentry
, FILE__SETATTR
);
3106 if (selinux_policycap_openperm
&&
3107 inode
->i_sb
->s_magic
!= SOCKFS_MAGIC
&&
3108 (ia_valid
& ATTR_SIZE
) &&
3109 !(ia_valid
& ATTR_FILE
))
3112 return dentry_has_perm(cred
, dentry
, av
);
3115 static int selinux_inode_getattr(const struct path
*path
)
3117 return path_has_perm(current_cred(), path
, FILE__GETATTR
);
3120 static int selinux_inode_setotherxattr(struct dentry
*dentry
, const char *name
)
3122 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
3124 if (!strncmp(name
, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX
,
3125 sizeof XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX
- 1)) {
3126 if (!strcmp(name
, XATTR_NAME_CAPS
)) {
3127 if (!capable(CAP_SETFCAP
))
3129 } else if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN
)) {
3130 /* A different attribute in the security namespace.
3131 Restrict to administrator. */
3136 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
3137 ordinary setattr permission. */
3138 return dentry_has_perm(cred
, dentry
, FILE__SETATTR
);
3141 static bool has_cap_mac_admin(bool audit
)
3143 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
3144 int cap_audit
= audit
? SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT
: SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT
;
3146 if (cap_capable(cred
, &init_user_ns
, CAP_MAC_ADMIN
, cap_audit
))
3148 if (cred_has_capability(cred
, CAP_MAC_ADMIN
, cap_audit
, true))
3153 static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry
*dentry
, const char *name
,
3154 const void *value
, size_t size
, int flags
)
3156 struct inode
*inode
= d_backing_inode(dentry
);
3157 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
;
3158 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
;
3159 struct common_audit_data ad
;
3160 u32 newsid
, sid
= current_sid();
3163 if (strcmp(name
, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX
))
3164 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry
, name
);
3166 sbsec
= inode
->i_sb
->s_security
;
3167 if (!(sbsec
->flags
& SBLABEL_MNT
))
3170 if (!inode_owner_or_capable(inode
))
3173 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY
;
3174 ad
.u
.dentry
= dentry
;
3176 isec
= backing_inode_security(dentry
);
3177 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, isec
->sid
, isec
->sclass
,
3178 FILE__RELABELFROM
, &ad
);
3182 rc
= security_context_to_sid(value
, size
, &newsid
, GFP_KERNEL
);
3183 if (rc
== -EINVAL
) {
3184 if (!has_cap_mac_admin(true)) {
3185 struct audit_buffer
*ab
;
3189 /* We strip a nul only if it is at the end, otherwise the
3190 * context contains a nul and we should audit that */
3193 if (str
[size
- 1] == '\0')
3194 audit_size
= size
- 1;
3201 ab
= audit_log_start(current
->audit_context
, GFP_ATOMIC
, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR
);
3202 audit_log_format(ab
, "op=setxattr invalid_context=");
3203 audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab
, value
, audit_size
);
3208 rc
= security_context_to_sid_force(value
, size
, &newsid
);
3213 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, newsid
, isec
->sclass
,
3214 FILE__RELABELTO
, &ad
);
3218 rc
= security_validate_transition(isec
->sid
, newsid
, sid
,
3223 return avc_has_perm(newsid
,
3225 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM
,
3226 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE
,
3230 static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry
*dentry
, const char *name
,
3231 const void *value
, size_t size
,
3234 struct inode
*inode
= d_backing_inode(dentry
);
3235 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
;
3239 if (strcmp(name
, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX
)) {
3240 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so nothing to do. */
3244 rc
= security_context_to_sid_force(value
, size
, &newsid
);
3246 printk(KERN_ERR
"SELinux: unable to map context to SID"
3247 "for (%s, %lu), rc=%d\n",
3248 inode
->i_sb
->s_id
, inode
->i_ino
, -rc
);
3252 isec
= backing_inode_security(dentry
);
3253 spin_lock(&isec
->lock
);
3254 isec
->sclass
= inode_mode_to_security_class(inode
->i_mode
);
3256 isec
->initialized
= LABEL_INITIALIZED
;
3257 spin_unlock(&isec
->lock
);
3262 static int selinux_inode_getxattr(struct dentry
*dentry
, const char *name
)
3264 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
3266 return dentry_has_perm(cred
, dentry
, FILE__GETATTR
);
3269 static int selinux_inode_listxattr(struct dentry
*dentry
)
3271 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
3273 return dentry_has_perm(cred
, dentry
, FILE__GETATTR
);
3276 static int selinux_inode_removexattr(struct dentry
*dentry
, const char *name
)
3278 if (strcmp(name
, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX
))
3279 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry
, name
);
3281 /* No one is allowed to remove a SELinux security label.
3282 You can change the label, but all data must be labeled. */
3287 * Copy the inode security context value to the user.
3289 * Permission check is handled by selinux_inode_getxattr hook.
3291 static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(struct inode
*inode
, const char *name
, void **buffer
, bool alloc
)
3295 char *context
= NULL
;
3296 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
;
3298 if (strcmp(name
, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
))
3302 * If the caller has CAP_MAC_ADMIN, then get the raw context
3303 * value even if it is not defined by current policy; otherwise,
3304 * use the in-core value under current policy.
3305 * Use the non-auditing forms of the permission checks since
3306 * getxattr may be called by unprivileged processes commonly
3307 * and lack of permission just means that we fall back to the
3308 * in-core context value, not a denial.
3310 isec
= inode_security(inode
);
3311 if (has_cap_mac_admin(false))
3312 error
= security_sid_to_context_force(isec
->sid
, &context
,
3315 error
= security_sid_to_context(isec
->sid
, &context
, &size
);
3328 static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode
*inode
, const char *name
,
3329 const void *value
, size_t size
, int flags
)
3331 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= inode_security_novalidate(inode
);
3335 if (strcmp(name
, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
))
3338 if (!value
|| !size
)
3341 rc
= security_context_to_sid(value
, size
, &newsid
, GFP_KERNEL
);
3345 spin_lock(&isec
->lock
);
3346 isec
->sclass
= inode_mode_to_security_class(inode
->i_mode
);
3348 isec
->initialized
= LABEL_INITIALIZED
;
3349 spin_unlock(&isec
->lock
);
3353 static int selinux_inode_listsecurity(struct inode
*inode
, char *buffer
, size_t buffer_size
)
3355 const int len
= sizeof(XATTR_NAME_SELINUX
);
3356 if (buffer
&& len
<= buffer_size
)
3357 memcpy(buffer
, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX
, len
);
3361 static void selinux_inode_getsecid(struct inode
*inode
, u32
*secid
)
3363 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= inode_security_novalidate(inode
);
3367 static int selinux_inode_copy_up(struct dentry
*src
, struct cred
**new)
3370 struct task_security_struct
*tsec
;
3371 struct cred
*new_creds
= *new;
3373 if (new_creds
== NULL
) {
3374 new_creds
= prepare_creds();
3379 tsec
= new_creds
->security
;
3380 /* Get label from overlay inode and set it in create_sid */
3381 selinux_inode_getsecid(d_inode(src
), &sid
);
3382 tsec
->create_sid
= sid
;
3387 static int selinux_inode_copy_up_xattr(const char *name
)
3389 /* The copy_up hook above sets the initial context on an inode, but we
3390 * don't then want to overwrite it by blindly copying all the lower
3391 * xattrs up. Instead, we have to filter out SELinux-related xattrs.
3393 if (strcmp(name
, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX
) == 0)
3394 return 1; /* Discard */
3396 * Any other attribute apart from SELINUX is not claimed, supported
3402 /* file security operations */
3404 static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file
*file
, int mask
)
3406 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
3407 struct inode
*inode
= file_inode(file
);
3409 /* file_mask_to_av won't add FILE__WRITE if MAY_APPEND is set */
3410 if ((file
->f_flags
& O_APPEND
) && (mask
& MAY_WRITE
))
3413 return file_has_perm(cred
, file
,
3414 file_mask_to_av(inode
->i_mode
, mask
));
3417 static int selinux_file_permission(struct file
*file
, int mask
)
3419 struct inode
*inode
= file_inode(file
);
3420 struct file_security_struct
*fsec
= file
->f_security
;
3421 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
;
3422 u32 sid
= current_sid();
3425 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
3428 isec
= inode_security(inode
);
3429 if (sid
== fsec
->sid
&& fsec
->isid
== isec
->sid
&&
3430 fsec
->pseqno
== avc_policy_seqno())
3431 /* No change since file_open check. */
3434 return selinux_revalidate_file_permission(file
, mask
);
3437 static int selinux_file_alloc_security(struct file
*file
)
3439 return file_alloc_security(file
);
3442 static void selinux_file_free_security(struct file
*file
)
3444 file_free_security(file
);
3448 * Check whether a task has the ioctl permission and cmd
3449 * operation to an inode.
3451 static int ioctl_has_perm(const struct cred
*cred
, struct file
*file
,
3452 u32 requested
, u16 cmd
)
3454 struct common_audit_data ad
;
3455 struct file_security_struct
*fsec
= file
->f_security
;
3456 struct inode
*inode
= file_inode(file
);
3457 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
;
3458 struct lsm_ioctlop_audit ioctl
;
3459 u32 ssid
= cred_sid(cred
);
3461 u8 driver
= cmd
>> 8;
3462 u8 xperm
= cmd
& 0xff;
3464 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IOCTL_OP
;
3467 ad
.u
.op
->path
= file
->f_path
;
3469 if (ssid
!= fsec
->sid
) {
3470 rc
= avc_has_perm(ssid
, fsec
->sid
,
3478 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode
)))
3481 isec
= inode_security(inode
);
3482 rc
= avc_has_extended_perms(ssid
, isec
->sid
, isec
->sclass
,
3483 requested
, driver
, xperm
, &ad
);
3488 static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file
*file
, unsigned int cmd
,
3491 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
3501 case FS_IOC_GETFLAGS
:
3503 case FS_IOC_GETVERSION
:
3504 error
= file_has_perm(cred
, file
, FILE__GETATTR
);
3507 case FS_IOC_SETFLAGS
:
3509 case FS_IOC_SETVERSION
:
3510 error
= file_has_perm(cred
, file
, FILE__SETATTR
);
3513 /* sys_ioctl() checks */
3517 error
= file_has_perm(cred
, file
, 0);
3522 error
= cred_has_capability(cred
, CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG
,
3523 SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT
, true);
3526 /* default case assumes that the command will go
3527 * to the file's ioctl() function.
3530 error
= ioctl_has_perm(cred
, file
, FILE__IOCTL
, (u16
) cmd
);
3535 static int default_noexec
;
3537 static int file_map_prot_check(struct file
*file
, unsigned long prot
, int shared
)
3539 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
3540 u32 sid
= cred_sid(cred
);
3543 if (default_noexec
&&
3544 (prot
& PROT_EXEC
) && (!file
|| IS_PRIVATE(file_inode(file
)) ||
3545 (!shared
&& (prot
& PROT_WRITE
)))) {
3547 * We are making executable an anonymous mapping or a
3548 * private file mapping that will also be writable.
3549 * This has an additional check.
3551 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, sid
, SECCLASS_PROCESS
,
3552 PROCESS__EXECMEM
, NULL
);
3558 /* read access is always possible with a mapping */
3559 u32 av
= FILE__READ
;
3561 /* write access only matters if the mapping is shared */
3562 if (shared
&& (prot
& PROT_WRITE
))
3565 if (prot
& PROT_EXEC
)
3566 av
|= FILE__EXECUTE
;
3568 return file_has_perm(cred
, file
, av
);
3575 static int selinux_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr
)
3579 if (addr
< CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR
) {
3580 u32 sid
= current_sid();
3581 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, sid
, SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT
,
3582 MEMPROTECT__MMAP_ZERO
, NULL
);
3588 static int selinux_mmap_file(struct file
*file
, unsigned long reqprot
,
3589 unsigned long prot
, unsigned long flags
)
3591 struct common_audit_data ad
;
3595 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE
;
3597 rc
= inode_has_perm(current_cred(), file_inode(file
),
3603 if (selinux_checkreqprot
)
3606 return file_map_prot_check(file
, prot
,
3607 (flags
& MAP_TYPE
) == MAP_SHARED
);
3610 static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct
*vma
,
3611 unsigned long reqprot
,
3614 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
3615 u32 sid
= cred_sid(cred
);
3617 if (selinux_checkreqprot
)
3620 if (default_noexec
&&
3621 (prot
& PROT_EXEC
) && !(vma
->vm_flags
& VM_EXEC
)) {
3623 if (vma
->vm_start
>= vma
->vm_mm
->start_brk
&&
3624 vma
->vm_end
<= vma
->vm_mm
->brk
) {
3625 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, sid
, SECCLASS_PROCESS
,
3626 PROCESS__EXECHEAP
, NULL
);
3627 } else if (!vma
->vm_file
&&
3628 ((vma
->vm_start
<= vma
->vm_mm
->start_stack
&&
3629 vma
->vm_end
>= vma
->vm_mm
->start_stack
) ||
3630 vma_is_stack_for_current(vma
))) {
3631 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, sid
, SECCLASS_PROCESS
,
3632 PROCESS__EXECSTACK
, NULL
);
3633 } else if (vma
->vm_file
&& vma
->anon_vma
) {
3635 * We are making executable a file mapping that has
3636 * had some COW done. Since pages might have been
3637 * written, check ability to execute the possibly
3638 * modified content. This typically should only
3639 * occur for text relocations.
3641 rc
= file_has_perm(cred
, vma
->vm_file
, FILE__EXECMOD
);
3647 return file_map_prot_check(vma
->vm_file
, prot
, vma
->vm_flags
&VM_SHARED
);
3650 static int selinux_file_lock(struct file
*file
, unsigned int cmd
)
3652 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
3654 return file_has_perm(cred
, file
, FILE__LOCK
);
3657 static int selinux_file_fcntl(struct file
*file
, unsigned int cmd
,
3660 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
3665 if ((file
->f_flags
& O_APPEND
) && !(arg
& O_APPEND
)) {
3666 err
= file_has_perm(cred
, file
, FILE__WRITE
);
3675 case F_GETOWNER_UIDS
:
3676 /* Just check FD__USE permission */
3677 err
= file_has_perm(cred
, file
, 0);
3685 #if BITS_PER_LONG == 32
3690 err
= file_has_perm(cred
, file
, FILE__LOCK
);
3697 static void selinux_file_set_fowner(struct file
*file
)
3699 struct file_security_struct
*fsec
;
3701 fsec
= file
->f_security
;
3702 fsec
->fown_sid
= current_sid();
3705 static int selinux_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct
*tsk
,
3706 struct fown_struct
*fown
, int signum
)
3709 u32 sid
= task_sid(tsk
);
3711 struct file_security_struct
*fsec
;
3713 /* struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file */
3714 file
= container_of(fown
, struct file
, f_owner
);
3716 fsec
= file
->f_security
;
3719 perm
= signal_to_av(SIGIO
); /* as per send_sigio_to_task */
3721 perm
= signal_to_av(signum
);
3723 return avc_has_perm(fsec
->fown_sid
, sid
,
3724 SECCLASS_PROCESS
, perm
, NULL
);
3727 static int selinux_file_receive(struct file
*file
)
3729 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
3731 return file_has_perm(cred
, file
, file_to_av(file
));
3734 static int selinux_file_open(struct file
*file
, const struct cred
*cred
)
3736 struct file_security_struct
*fsec
;
3737 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
;
3739 fsec
= file
->f_security
;
3740 isec
= inode_security(file_inode(file
));
3742 * Save inode label and policy sequence number
3743 * at open-time so that selinux_file_permission
3744 * can determine whether revalidation is necessary.
3745 * Task label is already saved in the file security
3746 * struct as its SID.
3748 fsec
->isid
= isec
->sid
;
3749 fsec
->pseqno
= avc_policy_seqno();
3751 * Since the inode label or policy seqno may have changed
3752 * between the selinux_inode_permission check and the saving
3753 * of state above, recheck that access is still permitted.
3754 * Otherwise, access might never be revalidated against the
3755 * new inode label or new policy.
3756 * This check is not redundant - do not remove.
3758 return file_path_has_perm(cred
, file
, open_file_to_av(file
));
3761 /* task security operations */
3763 static int selinux_task_alloc(struct task_struct
*task
,
3764 unsigned long clone_flags
)
3766 u32 sid
= current_sid();
3768 return avc_has_perm(sid
, sid
, SECCLASS_PROCESS
, PROCESS__FORK
, NULL
);
3772 * allocate the SELinux part of blank credentials
3774 static int selinux_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred
*cred
, gfp_t gfp
)
3776 struct task_security_struct
*tsec
;
3778 tsec
= kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct
), gfp
);
3782 cred
->security
= tsec
;
3787 * detach and free the LSM part of a set of credentials
3789 static void selinux_cred_free(struct cred
*cred
)
3791 struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= cred
->security
;
3794 * cred->security == NULL if security_cred_alloc_blank() or
3795 * security_prepare_creds() returned an error.
3797 BUG_ON(cred
->security
&& (unsigned long) cred
->security
< PAGE_SIZE
);
3798 cred
->security
= (void *) 0x7UL
;
3803 * prepare a new set of credentials for modification
3805 static int selinux_cred_prepare(struct cred
*new, const struct cred
*old
,
3808 const struct task_security_struct
*old_tsec
;
3809 struct task_security_struct
*tsec
;
3811 old_tsec
= old
->security
;
3813 tsec
= kmemdup(old_tsec
, sizeof(struct task_security_struct
), gfp
);
3817 new->security
= tsec
;
3822 * transfer the SELinux data to a blank set of creds
3824 static void selinux_cred_transfer(struct cred
*new, const struct cred
*old
)
3826 const struct task_security_struct
*old_tsec
= old
->security
;
3827 struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= new->security
;
3833 * set the security data for a kernel service
3834 * - all the creation contexts are set to unlabelled
3836 static int selinux_kernel_act_as(struct cred
*new, u32 secid
)
3838 struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= new->security
;
3839 u32 sid
= current_sid();
3842 ret
= avc_has_perm(sid
, secid
,
3843 SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE
,
3844 KERNEL_SERVICE__USE_AS_OVERRIDE
,
3848 tsec
->create_sid
= 0;
3849 tsec
->keycreate_sid
= 0;
3850 tsec
->sockcreate_sid
= 0;
3856 * set the file creation context in a security record to the same as the
3857 * objective context of the specified inode
3859 static int selinux_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred
*new, struct inode
*inode
)
3861 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= inode_security(inode
);
3862 struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= new->security
;
3863 u32 sid
= current_sid();
3866 ret
= avc_has_perm(sid
, isec
->sid
,
3867 SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE
,
3868 KERNEL_SERVICE__CREATE_FILES_AS
,
3872 tsec
->create_sid
= isec
->sid
;
3876 static int selinux_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name
)
3878 struct common_audit_data ad
;
3880 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_KMOD
;
3881 ad
.u
.kmod_name
= kmod_name
;
3883 return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL
, SECCLASS_SYSTEM
,
3884 SYSTEM__MODULE_REQUEST
, &ad
);
3887 static int selinux_kernel_module_from_file(struct file
*file
)
3889 struct common_audit_data ad
;
3890 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
;
3891 struct file_security_struct
*fsec
;
3892 u32 sid
= current_sid();
3897 return avc_has_perm(sid
, sid
, SECCLASS_SYSTEM
,
3898 SYSTEM__MODULE_LOAD
, NULL
);
3902 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE
;
3905 fsec
= file
->f_security
;
3906 if (sid
!= fsec
->sid
) {
3907 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, fsec
->sid
, SECCLASS_FD
, FD__USE
, &ad
);
3912 isec
= inode_security(file_inode(file
));
3913 return avc_has_perm(sid
, isec
->sid
, SECCLASS_SYSTEM
,
3914 SYSTEM__MODULE_LOAD
, &ad
);
3917 static int selinux_kernel_read_file(struct file
*file
,
3918 enum kernel_read_file_id id
)
3923 case READING_MODULE
:
3924 rc
= selinux_kernel_module_from_file(file
);
3933 static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct
*p
, pid_t pgid
)
3935 return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), task_sid(p
), SECCLASS_PROCESS
,
3936 PROCESS__SETPGID
, NULL
);
3939 static int selinux_task_getpgid(struct task_struct
*p
)
3941 return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), task_sid(p
), SECCLASS_PROCESS
,
3942 PROCESS__GETPGID
, NULL
);
3945 static int selinux_task_getsid(struct task_struct
*p
)
3947 return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), task_sid(p
), SECCLASS_PROCESS
,
3948 PROCESS__GETSESSION
, NULL
);
3951 static void selinux_task_getsecid(struct task_struct
*p
, u32
*secid
)
3953 *secid
= task_sid(p
);
3956 static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct
*p
, int nice
)
3958 return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), task_sid(p
), SECCLASS_PROCESS
,
3959 PROCESS__SETSCHED
, NULL
);
3962 static int selinux_task_setioprio(struct task_struct
*p
, int ioprio
)
3964 return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), task_sid(p
), SECCLASS_PROCESS
,
3965 PROCESS__SETSCHED
, NULL
);
3968 static int selinux_task_getioprio(struct task_struct
*p
)
3970 return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), task_sid(p
), SECCLASS_PROCESS
,
3971 PROCESS__GETSCHED
, NULL
);
3974 int selinux_task_prlimit(const struct cred
*cred
, const struct cred
*tcred
,
3981 if (flags
& LSM_PRLIMIT_WRITE
)
3982 av
|= PROCESS__SETRLIMIT
;
3983 if (flags
& LSM_PRLIMIT_READ
)
3984 av
|= PROCESS__GETRLIMIT
;
3985 return avc_has_perm(cred_sid(cred
), cred_sid(tcred
),
3986 SECCLASS_PROCESS
, av
, NULL
);
3989 static int selinux_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct
*p
, unsigned int resource
,
3990 struct rlimit
*new_rlim
)
3992 struct rlimit
*old_rlim
= p
->signal
->rlim
+ resource
;
3994 /* Control the ability to change the hard limit (whether
3995 lowering or raising it), so that the hard limit can
3996 later be used as a safe reset point for the soft limit
3997 upon context transitions. See selinux_bprm_committing_creds. */
3998 if (old_rlim
->rlim_max
!= new_rlim
->rlim_max
)
3999 return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), task_sid(p
),
4000 SECCLASS_PROCESS
, PROCESS__SETRLIMIT
, NULL
);
4005 static int selinux_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct
*p
)
4007 return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), task_sid(p
), SECCLASS_PROCESS
,
4008 PROCESS__SETSCHED
, NULL
);
4011 static int selinux_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct
*p
)
4013 return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), task_sid(p
), SECCLASS_PROCESS
,
4014 PROCESS__GETSCHED
, NULL
);
4017 static int selinux_task_movememory(struct task_struct
*p
)
4019 return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), task_sid(p
), SECCLASS_PROCESS
,
4020 PROCESS__SETSCHED
, NULL
);
4023 static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct
*p
, struct siginfo
*info
,
4029 perm
= PROCESS__SIGNULL
; /* null signal; existence test */
4031 perm
= signal_to_av(sig
);
4033 secid
= current_sid();
4034 return avc_has_perm(secid
, task_sid(p
), SECCLASS_PROCESS
, perm
, NULL
);
4037 static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct
*p
,
4038 struct inode
*inode
)
4040 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= inode
->i_security
;
4041 u32 sid
= task_sid(p
);
4043 spin_lock(&isec
->lock
);
4044 isec
->sclass
= inode_mode_to_security_class(inode
->i_mode
);
4046 isec
->initialized
= LABEL_INITIALIZED
;
4047 spin_unlock(&isec
->lock
);
4050 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
4051 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff
*skb
,
4052 struct common_audit_data
*ad
, u8
*proto
)
4054 int offset
, ihlen
, ret
= -EINVAL
;
4055 struct iphdr _iph
, *ih
;
4057 offset
= skb_network_offset(skb
);
4058 ih
= skb_header_pointer(skb
, offset
, sizeof(_iph
), &_iph
);
4062 ihlen
= ih
->ihl
* 4;
4063 if (ihlen
< sizeof(_iph
))
4066 ad
->u
.net
->v4info
.saddr
= ih
->saddr
;
4067 ad
->u
.net
->v4info
.daddr
= ih
->daddr
;
4071 *proto
= ih
->protocol
;
4073 switch (ih
->protocol
) {
4075 struct tcphdr _tcph
, *th
;
4077 if (ntohs(ih
->frag_off
) & IP_OFFSET
)
4081 th
= skb_header_pointer(skb
, offset
, sizeof(_tcph
), &_tcph
);
4085 ad
->u
.net
->sport
= th
->source
;
4086 ad
->u
.net
->dport
= th
->dest
;
4091 struct udphdr _udph
, *uh
;
4093 if (ntohs(ih
->frag_off
) & IP_OFFSET
)
4097 uh
= skb_header_pointer(skb
, offset
, sizeof(_udph
), &_udph
);
4101 ad
->u
.net
->sport
= uh
->source
;
4102 ad
->u
.net
->dport
= uh
->dest
;
4106 case IPPROTO_DCCP
: {
4107 struct dccp_hdr _dccph
, *dh
;
4109 if (ntohs(ih
->frag_off
) & IP_OFFSET
)
4113 dh
= skb_header_pointer(skb
, offset
, sizeof(_dccph
), &_dccph
);
4117 ad
->u
.net
->sport
= dh
->dccph_sport
;
4118 ad
->u
.net
->dport
= dh
->dccph_dport
;
4129 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
4131 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
4132 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff
*skb
,
4133 struct common_audit_data
*ad
, u8
*proto
)
4136 int ret
= -EINVAL
, offset
;
4137 struct ipv6hdr _ipv6h
, *ip6
;
4140 offset
= skb_network_offset(skb
);
4141 ip6
= skb_header_pointer(skb
, offset
, sizeof(_ipv6h
), &_ipv6h
);
4145 ad
->u
.net
->v6info
.saddr
= ip6
->saddr
;
4146 ad
->u
.net
->v6info
.daddr
= ip6
->daddr
;
4149 nexthdr
= ip6
->nexthdr
;
4150 offset
+= sizeof(_ipv6h
);
4151 offset
= ipv6_skip_exthdr(skb
, offset
, &nexthdr
, &frag_off
);
4160 struct tcphdr _tcph
, *th
;
4162 th
= skb_header_pointer(skb
, offset
, sizeof(_tcph
), &_tcph
);
4166 ad
->u
.net
->sport
= th
->source
;
4167 ad
->u
.net
->dport
= th
->dest
;
4172 struct udphdr _udph
, *uh
;
4174 uh
= skb_header_pointer(skb
, offset
, sizeof(_udph
), &_udph
);
4178 ad
->u
.net
->sport
= uh
->source
;
4179 ad
->u
.net
->dport
= uh
->dest
;
4183 case IPPROTO_DCCP
: {
4184 struct dccp_hdr _dccph
, *dh
;
4186 dh
= skb_header_pointer(skb
, offset
, sizeof(_dccph
), &_dccph
);
4190 ad
->u
.net
->sport
= dh
->dccph_sport
;
4191 ad
->u
.net
->dport
= dh
->dccph_dport
;
4195 /* includes fragments */
4205 static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff
*skb
, struct common_audit_data
*ad
,
4206 char **_addrp
, int src
, u8
*proto
)
4211 switch (ad
->u
.net
->family
) {
4213 ret
= selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(skb
, ad
, proto
);
4216 addrp
= (char *)(src
? &ad
->u
.net
->v4info
.saddr
:
4217 &ad
->u
.net
->v4info
.daddr
);
4220 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
4222 ret
= selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(skb
, ad
, proto
);
4225 addrp
= (char *)(src
? &ad
->u
.net
->v6info
.saddr
:
4226 &ad
->u
.net
->v6info
.daddr
);
4236 "SELinux: failure in selinux_parse_skb(),"
4237 " unable to parse packet\n");
4247 * selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid - Determine the peer label of a packet
4249 * @family: protocol family
4250 * @sid: the packet's peer label SID
4253 * Check the various different forms of network peer labeling and determine
4254 * the peer label/SID for the packet; most of the magic actually occurs in
4255 * the security server function security_net_peersid_cmp(). The function
4256 * returns zero if the value in @sid is valid (although it may be SECSID_NULL)
4257 * or -EACCES if @sid is invalid due to inconsistencies with the different
4261 static int selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(struct sk_buff
*skb
, u16 family
, u32
*sid
)
4268 err
= selinux_xfrm_skb_sid(skb
, &xfrm_sid
);
4271 err
= selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb
, family
, &nlbl_type
, &nlbl_sid
);
4275 err
= security_net_peersid_resolve(nlbl_sid
, nlbl_type
, xfrm_sid
, sid
);
4276 if (unlikely(err
)) {
4278 "SELinux: failure in selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(),"
4279 " unable to determine packet's peer label\n");
4287 * selinux_conn_sid - Determine the child socket label for a connection
4288 * @sk_sid: the parent socket's SID
4289 * @skb_sid: the packet's SID
4290 * @conn_sid: the resulting connection SID
4292 * If @skb_sid is valid then the user:role:type information from @sk_sid is
4293 * combined with the MLS information from @skb_sid in order to create
4294 * @conn_sid. If @skb_sid is not valid then then @conn_sid is simply a copy
4295 * of @sk_sid. Returns zero on success, negative values on failure.
4298 static int selinux_conn_sid(u32 sk_sid
, u32 skb_sid
, u32
*conn_sid
)
4302 if (skb_sid
!= SECSID_NULL
)
4303 err
= security_sid_mls_copy(sk_sid
, skb_sid
, conn_sid
);
4310 /* socket security operations */
4312 static int socket_sockcreate_sid(const struct task_security_struct
*tsec
,
4313 u16 secclass
, u32
*socksid
)
4315 if (tsec
->sockcreate_sid
> SECSID_NULL
) {
4316 *socksid
= tsec
->sockcreate_sid
;
4320 return security_transition_sid(tsec
->sid
, tsec
->sid
, secclass
, NULL
,
4324 static int sock_has_perm(struct sock
*sk
, u32 perms
)
4326 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4327 struct common_audit_data ad
;
4328 struct lsm_network_audit net
= {0,};
4330 if (sksec
->sid
== SECINITSID_KERNEL
)
4333 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET
;
4337 return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), sksec
->sid
, sksec
->sclass
, perms
,
4341 static int selinux_socket_create(int family
, int type
,
4342 int protocol
, int kern
)
4344 const struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= current_security();
4352 secclass
= socket_type_to_security_class(family
, type
, protocol
);
4353 rc
= socket_sockcreate_sid(tsec
, secclass
, &newsid
);
4357 return avc_has_perm(tsec
->sid
, newsid
, secclass
, SOCKET__CREATE
, NULL
);
4360 static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket
*sock
, int family
,
4361 int type
, int protocol
, int kern
)
4363 const struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= current_security();
4364 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(sock
));
4365 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
;
4366 u16 sclass
= socket_type_to_security_class(family
, type
, protocol
);
4367 u32 sid
= SECINITSID_KERNEL
;
4371 err
= socket_sockcreate_sid(tsec
, sclass
, &sid
);
4376 isec
->sclass
= sclass
;
4378 isec
->initialized
= LABEL_INITIALIZED
;
4381 sksec
= sock
->sk
->sk_security
;
4382 sksec
->sclass
= sclass
;
4384 err
= selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(sock
->sk
, family
);
4390 /* Range of port numbers used to automatically bind.
4391 Need to determine whether we should perform a name_bind
4392 permission check between the socket and the port number. */
4394 static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket
*sock
, struct sockaddr
*address
, int addrlen
)
4396 struct sock
*sk
= sock
->sk
;
4400 err
= sock_has_perm(sk
, SOCKET__BIND
);
4405 * If PF_INET or PF_INET6, check name_bind permission for the port.
4406 * Multiple address binding for SCTP is not supported yet: we just
4407 * check the first address now.
4409 family
= sk
->sk_family
;
4410 if (family
== PF_INET
|| family
== PF_INET6
) {
4412 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4413 struct common_audit_data ad
;
4414 struct lsm_network_audit net
= {0,};
4415 struct sockaddr_in
*addr4
= NULL
;
4416 struct sockaddr_in6
*addr6
= NULL
;
4417 unsigned short snum
;
4420 if (family
== PF_INET
) {
4421 if (addrlen
< sizeof(struct sockaddr_in
)) {
4425 addr4
= (struct sockaddr_in
*)address
;
4426 snum
= ntohs(addr4
->sin_port
);
4427 addrp
= (char *)&addr4
->sin_addr
.s_addr
;
4429 if (addrlen
< SIN6_LEN_RFC2133
) {
4433 addr6
= (struct sockaddr_in6
*)address
;
4434 snum
= ntohs(addr6
->sin6_port
);
4435 addrp
= (char *)&addr6
->sin6_addr
.s6_addr
;
4441 inet_get_local_port_range(sock_net(sk
), &low
, &high
);
4443 if (snum
< max(inet_prot_sock(sock_net(sk
)), low
) ||
4445 err
= sel_netport_sid(sk
->sk_protocol
,
4449 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET
;
4451 ad
.u
.net
->sport
= htons(snum
);
4452 ad
.u
.net
->family
= family
;
4453 err
= avc_has_perm(sksec
->sid
, sid
,
4455 SOCKET__NAME_BIND
, &ad
);
4461 switch (sksec
->sclass
) {
4462 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET
:
4463 node_perm
= TCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND
;
4466 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET
:
4467 node_perm
= UDP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND
;
4470 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET
:
4471 node_perm
= DCCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND
;
4475 node_perm
= RAWIP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND
;
4479 err
= sel_netnode_sid(addrp
, family
, &sid
);
4483 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET
;
4485 ad
.u
.net
->sport
= htons(snum
);
4486 ad
.u
.net
->family
= family
;
4488 if (family
== PF_INET
)
4489 ad
.u
.net
->v4info
.saddr
= addr4
->sin_addr
.s_addr
;
4491 ad
.u
.net
->v6info
.saddr
= addr6
->sin6_addr
;
4493 err
= avc_has_perm(sksec
->sid
, sid
,
4494 sksec
->sclass
, node_perm
, &ad
);
4502 static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket
*sock
, struct sockaddr
*address
, int addrlen
)
4504 struct sock
*sk
= sock
->sk
;
4505 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4508 err
= sock_has_perm(sk
, SOCKET__CONNECT
);
4513 * If a TCP or DCCP socket, check name_connect permission for the port.
4515 if (sksec
->sclass
== SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET
||
4516 sksec
->sclass
== SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET
) {
4517 struct common_audit_data ad
;
4518 struct lsm_network_audit net
= {0,};
4519 struct sockaddr_in
*addr4
= NULL
;
4520 struct sockaddr_in6
*addr6
= NULL
;
4521 unsigned short snum
;
4524 if (sk
->sk_family
== PF_INET
) {
4525 addr4
= (struct sockaddr_in
*)address
;
4526 if (addrlen
< sizeof(struct sockaddr_in
))
4528 snum
= ntohs(addr4
->sin_port
);
4530 addr6
= (struct sockaddr_in6
*)address
;
4531 if (addrlen
< SIN6_LEN_RFC2133
)
4533 snum
= ntohs(addr6
->sin6_port
);
4536 err
= sel_netport_sid(sk
->sk_protocol
, snum
, &sid
);
4540 perm
= (sksec
->sclass
== SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET
) ?
4541 TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT
: DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT
;
4543 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET
;
4545 ad
.u
.net
->dport
= htons(snum
);
4546 ad
.u
.net
->family
= sk
->sk_family
;
4547 err
= avc_has_perm(sksec
->sid
, sid
, sksec
->sclass
, perm
, &ad
);
4552 err
= selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(sk
, address
);
4558 static int selinux_socket_listen(struct socket
*sock
, int backlog
)
4560 return sock_has_perm(sock
->sk
, SOCKET__LISTEN
);
4563 static int selinux_socket_accept(struct socket
*sock
, struct socket
*newsock
)
4566 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
;
4567 struct inode_security_struct
*newisec
;
4571 err
= sock_has_perm(sock
->sk
, SOCKET__ACCEPT
);
4575 isec
= inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(sock
));
4576 spin_lock(&isec
->lock
);
4577 sclass
= isec
->sclass
;
4579 spin_unlock(&isec
->lock
);
4581 newisec
= inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(newsock
));
4582 newisec
->sclass
= sclass
;
4584 newisec
->initialized
= LABEL_INITIALIZED
;
4589 static int selinux_socket_sendmsg(struct socket
*sock
, struct msghdr
*msg
,
4592 return sock_has_perm(sock
->sk
, SOCKET__WRITE
);
4595 static int selinux_socket_recvmsg(struct socket
*sock
, struct msghdr
*msg
,
4596 int size
, int flags
)
4598 return sock_has_perm(sock
->sk
, SOCKET__READ
);
4601 static int selinux_socket_getsockname(struct socket
*sock
)
4603 return sock_has_perm(sock
->sk
, SOCKET__GETATTR
);
4606 static int selinux_socket_getpeername(struct socket
*sock
)
4608 return sock_has_perm(sock
->sk
, SOCKET__GETATTR
);
4611 static int selinux_socket_setsockopt(struct socket
*sock
, int level
, int optname
)
4615 err
= sock_has_perm(sock
->sk
, SOCKET__SETOPT
);
4619 return selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(sock
, level
, optname
);
4622 static int selinux_socket_getsockopt(struct socket
*sock
, int level
,
4625 return sock_has_perm(sock
->sk
, SOCKET__GETOPT
);
4628 static int selinux_socket_shutdown(struct socket
*sock
, int how
)
4630 return sock_has_perm(sock
->sk
, SOCKET__SHUTDOWN
);
4633 static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct sock
*sock
,
4637 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec_sock
= sock
->sk_security
;
4638 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec_other
= other
->sk_security
;
4639 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec_new
= newsk
->sk_security
;
4640 struct common_audit_data ad
;
4641 struct lsm_network_audit net
= {0,};
4644 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET
;
4646 ad
.u
.net
->sk
= other
;
4648 err
= avc_has_perm(sksec_sock
->sid
, sksec_other
->sid
,
4649 sksec_other
->sclass
,
4650 UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__CONNECTTO
, &ad
);
4654 /* server child socket */
4655 sksec_new
->peer_sid
= sksec_sock
->sid
;
4656 err
= security_sid_mls_copy(sksec_other
->sid
, sksec_sock
->sid
,
4661 /* connecting socket */
4662 sksec_sock
->peer_sid
= sksec_new
->sid
;
4667 static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket
*sock
,
4668 struct socket
*other
)
4670 struct sk_security_struct
*ssec
= sock
->sk
->sk_security
;
4671 struct sk_security_struct
*osec
= other
->sk
->sk_security
;
4672 struct common_audit_data ad
;
4673 struct lsm_network_audit net
= {0,};
4675 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET
;
4677 ad
.u
.net
->sk
= other
->sk
;
4679 return avc_has_perm(ssec
->sid
, osec
->sid
, osec
->sclass
, SOCKET__SENDTO
,
4683 static int selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(struct net
*ns
, int ifindex
,
4684 char *addrp
, u16 family
, u32 peer_sid
,
4685 struct common_audit_data
*ad
)
4691 err
= sel_netif_sid(ns
, ifindex
, &if_sid
);
4694 err
= avc_has_perm(peer_sid
, if_sid
,
4695 SECCLASS_NETIF
, NETIF__INGRESS
, ad
);
4699 err
= sel_netnode_sid(addrp
, family
, &node_sid
);
4702 return avc_has_perm(peer_sid
, node_sid
,
4703 SECCLASS_NODE
, NODE__RECVFROM
, ad
);
4706 static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock
*sk
, struct sk_buff
*skb
,
4710 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4711 u32 sk_sid
= sksec
->sid
;
4712 struct common_audit_data ad
;
4713 struct lsm_network_audit net
= {0,};
4716 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET
;
4718 ad
.u
.net
->netif
= skb
->skb_iif
;
4719 ad
.u
.net
->family
= family
;
4720 err
= selinux_parse_skb(skb
, &ad
, &addrp
, 1, NULL
);
4724 if (selinux_secmark_enabled()) {
4725 err
= avc_has_perm(sk_sid
, skb
->secmark
, SECCLASS_PACKET
,
4731 err
= selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(sksec
, skb
, family
, &ad
);
4734 err
= selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sksec
->sid
, skb
, &ad
);
4739 static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock
*sk
, struct sk_buff
*skb
)
4742 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4743 u16 family
= sk
->sk_family
;
4744 u32 sk_sid
= sksec
->sid
;
4745 struct common_audit_data ad
;
4746 struct lsm_network_audit net
= {0,};
4751 if (family
!= PF_INET
&& family
!= PF_INET6
)
4754 /* Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4755 if (family
== PF_INET6
&& skb
->protocol
== htons(ETH_P_IP
))
4758 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
4759 * to the selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat() function to deal with the
4760 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
4761 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
4762 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer
)
4763 return selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(sk
, skb
, family
);
4765 secmark_active
= selinux_secmark_enabled();
4766 peerlbl_active
= selinux_peerlbl_enabled();
4767 if (!secmark_active
&& !peerlbl_active
)
4770 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET
;
4772 ad
.u
.net
->netif
= skb
->skb_iif
;
4773 ad
.u
.net
->family
= family
;
4774 err
= selinux_parse_skb(skb
, &ad
, &addrp
, 1, NULL
);
4778 if (peerlbl_active
) {
4781 err
= selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb
, family
, &peer_sid
);
4784 err
= selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(sock_net(sk
), skb
->skb_iif
,
4785 addrp
, family
, peer_sid
, &ad
);
4787 selinux_netlbl_err(skb
, family
, err
, 0);
4790 err
= avc_has_perm(sk_sid
, peer_sid
, SECCLASS_PEER
,
4793 selinux_netlbl_err(skb
, family
, err
, 0);
4798 if (secmark_active
) {
4799 err
= avc_has_perm(sk_sid
, skb
->secmark
, SECCLASS_PACKET
,
4808 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket
*sock
, char __user
*optval
,
4809 int __user
*optlen
, unsigned len
)
4814 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sock
->sk
->sk_security
;
4815 u32 peer_sid
= SECSID_NULL
;
4817 if (sksec
->sclass
== SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET
||
4818 sksec
->sclass
== SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET
)
4819 peer_sid
= sksec
->peer_sid
;
4820 if (peer_sid
== SECSID_NULL
)
4821 return -ENOPROTOOPT
;
4823 err
= security_sid_to_context(peer_sid
, &scontext
, &scontext_len
);
4827 if (scontext_len
> len
) {
4832 if (copy_to_user(optval
, scontext
, scontext_len
))
4836 if (put_user(scontext_len
, optlen
))
4842 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket
*sock
, struct sk_buff
*skb
, u32
*secid
)
4844 u32 peer_secid
= SECSID_NULL
;
4846 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
;
4848 if (skb
&& skb
->protocol
== htons(ETH_P_IP
))
4850 else if (skb
&& skb
->protocol
== htons(ETH_P_IPV6
))
4853 family
= sock
->sk
->sk_family
;
4857 if (sock
&& family
== PF_UNIX
) {
4858 isec
= inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(sock
));
4859 peer_secid
= isec
->sid
;
4861 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb
, family
, &peer_secid
);
4864 *secid
= peer_secid
;
4865 if (peer_secid
== SECSID_NULL
)
4870 static int selinux_sk_alloc_security(struct sock
*sk
, int family
, gfp_t priority
)
4872 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
;
4874 sksec
= kzalloc(sizeof(*sksec
), priority
);
4878 sksec
->peer_sid
= SECINITSID_UNLABELED
;
4879 sksec
->sid
= SECINITSID_UNLABELED
;
4880 sksec
->sclass
= SECCLASS_SOCKET
;
4881 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(sksec
);
4882 sk
->sk_security
= sksec
;
4887 static void selinux_sk_free_security(struct sock
*sk
)
4889 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4891 sk
->sk_security
= NULL
;
4892 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(sksec
);
4896 static void selinux_sk_clone_security(const struct sock
*sk
, struct sock
*newsk
)
4898 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4899 struct sk_security_struct
*newsksec
= newsk
->sk_security
;
4901 newsksec
->sid
= sksec
->sid
;
4902 newsksec
->peer_sid
= sksec
->peer_sid
;
4903 newsksec
->sclass
= sksec
->sclass
;
4905 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newsksec
);
4908 static void selinux_sk_getsecid(struct sock
*sk
, u32
*secid
)
4911 *secid
= SECINITSID_ANY_SOCKET
;
4913 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4915 *secid
= sksec
->sid
;
4919 static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock
*sk
, struct socket
*parent
)
4921 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
=
4922 inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(parent
));
4923 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4925 if (sk
->sk_family
== PF_INET
|| sk
->sk_family
== PF_INET6
||
4926 sk
->sk_family
== PF_UNIX
)
4927 isec
->sid
= sksec
->sid
;
4928 sksec
->sclass
= isec
->sclass
;
4931 static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock
*sk
, struct sk_buff
*skb
,
4932 struct request_sock
*req
)
4934 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4936 u16 family
= req
->rsk_ops
->family
;
4940 err
= selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb
, family
, &peersid
);
4943 err
= selinux_conn_sid(sksec
->sid
, peersid
, &connsid
);
4946 req
->secid
= connsid
;
4947 req
->peer_secid
= peersid
;
4949 return selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request(req
, family
);
4952 static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock
*newsk
,
4953 const struct request_sock
*req
)
4955 struct sk_security_struct
*newsksec
= newsk
->sk_security
;
4957 newsksec
->sid
= req
->secid
;
4958 newsksec
->peer_sid
= req
->peer_secid
;
4959 /* NOTE: Ideally, we should also get the isec->sid for the
4960 new socket in sync, but we don't have the isec available yet.
4961 So we will wait until sock_graft to do it, by which
4962 time it will have been created and available. */
4964 /* We don't need to take any sort of lock here as we are the only
4965 * thread with access to newsksec */
4966 selinux_netlbl_inet_csk_clone(newsk
, req
->rsk_ops
->family
);
4969 static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock
*sk
, struct sk_buff
*skb
)
4971 u16 family
= sk
->sk_family
;
4972 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4974 /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4975 if (family
== PF_INET6
&& skb
->protocol
== htons(ETH_P_IP
))
4978 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb
, family
, &sksec
->peer_sid
);
4981 static int selinux_secmark_relabel_packet(u32 sid
)
4983 const struct task_security_struct
*__tsec
;
4986 __tsec
= current_security();
4989 return avc_has_perm(tsid
, sid
, SECCLASS_PACKET
, PACKET__RELABELTO
, NULL
);
4992 static void selinux_secmark_refcount_inc(void)
4994 atomic_inc(&selinux_secmark_refcount
);
4997 static void selinux_secmark_refcount_dec(void)
4999 atomic_dec(&selinux_secmark_refcount
);
5002 static void selinux_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock
*req
,
5005 fl
->flowi_secid
= req
->secid
;
5008 static int selinux_tun_dev_alloc_security(void **security
)
5010 struct tun_security_struct
*tunsec
;
5012 tunsec
= kzalloc(sizeof(*tunsec
), GFP_KERNEL
);
5015 tunsec
->sid
= current_sid();
5021 static void selinux_tun_dev_free_security(void *security
)
5026 static int selinux_tun_dev_create(void)
5028 u32 sid
= current_sid();
5030 /* we aren't taking into account the "sockcreate" SID since the socket
5031 * that is being created here is not a socket in the traditional sense,
5032 * instead it is a private sock, accessible only to the kernel, and
5033 * representing a wide range of network traffic spanning multiple
5034 * connections unlike traditional sockets - check the TUN driver to
5035 * get a better understanding of why this socket is special */
5037 return avc_has_perm(sid
, sid
, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET
, TUN_SOCKET__CREATE
,
5041 static int selinux_tun_dev_attach_queue(void *security
)
5043 struct tun_security_struct
*tunsec
= security
;
5045 return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), tunsec
->sid
, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET
,
5046 TUN_SOCKET__ATTACH_QUEUE
, NULL
);
5049 static int selinux_tun_dev_attach(struct sock
*sk
, void *security
)
5051 struct tun_security_struct
*tunsec
= security
;
5052 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
5054 /* we don't currently perform any NetLabel based labeling here and it
5055 * isn't clear that we would want to do so anyway; while we could apply
5056 * labeling without the support of the TUN user the resulting labeled
5057 * traffic from the other end of the connection would almost certainly
5058 * cause confusion to the TUN user that had no idea network labeling
5059 * protocols were being used */
5061 sksec
->sid
= tunsec
->sid
;
5062 sksec
->sclass
= SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET
;
5067 static int selinux_tun_dev_open(void *security
)
5069 struct tun_security_struct
*tunsec
= security
;
5070 u32 sid
= current_sid();
5073 err
= avc_has_perm(sid
, tunsec
->sid
, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET
,
5074 TUN_SOCKET__RELABELFROM
, NULL
);
5077 err
= avc_has_perm(sid
, sid
, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET
,
5078 TUN_SOCKET__RELABELTO
, NULL
);
5086 static int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock
*sk
, struct sk_buff
*skb
)
5090 struct nlmsghdr
*nlh
;
5091 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
5093 if (skb
->len
< NLMSG_HDRLEN
) {
5097 nlh
= nlmsg_hdr(skb
);
5099 err
= selinux_nlmsg_lookup(sksec
->sclass
, nlh
->nlmsg_type
, &perm
);
5101 if (err
== -EINVAL
) {
5102 pr_warn_ratelimited("SELinux: unrecognized netlink"
5103 " message: protocol=%hu nlmsg_type=%hu sclass=%s"
5104 " pig=%d comm=%s\n",
5105 sk
->sk_protocol
, nlh
->nlmsg_type
,
5106 secclass_map
[sksec
->sclass
- 1].name
,
5107 task_pid_nr(current
), current
->comm
);
5108 if (!selinux_enforcing
|| security_get_allow_unknown())
5118 err
= sock_has_perm(sk
, perm
);
5123 #ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER
5125 static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(struct sk_buff
*skb
,
5126 const struct net_device
*indev
,
5132 struct common_audit_data ad
;
5133 struct lsm_network_audit net
= {0,};
5138 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer
)
5141 secmark_active
= selinux_secmark_enabled();
5142 netlbl_active
= netlbl_enabled();
5143 peerlbl_active
= selinux_peerlbl_enabled();
5144 if (!secmark_active
&& !peerlbl_active
)
5147 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb
, family
, &peer_sid
) != 0)
5150 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET
;
5152 ad
.u
.net
->netif
= indev
->ifindex
;
5153 ad
.u
.net
->family
= family
;
5154 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb
, &ad
, &addrp
, 1, NULL
) != 0)
5157 if (peerlbl_active
) {
5158 err
= selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(dev_net(indev
), indev
->ifindex
,
5159 addrp
, family
, peer_sid
, &ad
);
5161 selinux_netlbl_err(skb
, family
, err
, 1);
5167 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid
, skb
->secmark
,
5168 SECCLASS_PACKET
, PACKET__FORWARD_IN
, &ad
))
5172 /* we do this in the FORWARD path and not the POST_ROUTING
5173 * path because we want to make sure we apply the necessary
5174 * labeling before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH
5176 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb
, family
, peer_sid
) != 0)
5182 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_forward(void *priv
,
5183 struct sk_buff
*skb
,
5184 const struct nf_hook_state
*state
)
5186 return selinux_ip_forward(skb
, state
->in
, PF_INET
);
5189 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
5190 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_forward(void *priv
,
5191 struct sk_buff
*skb
,
5192 const struct nf_hook_state
*state
)
5194 return selinux_ip_forward(skb
, state
->in
, PF_INET6
);
5198 static unsigned int selinux_ip_output(struct sk_buff
*skb
,
5204 if (!netlbl_enabled())
5207 /* we do this in the LOCAL_OUT path and not the POST_ROUTING path
5208 * because we want to make sure we apply the necessary labeling
5209 * before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH protection */
5212 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
;
5214 if (sk_listener(sk
))
5215 /* if the socket is the listening state then this
5216 * packet is a SYN-ACK packet which means it needs to
5217 * be labeled based on the connection/request_sock and
5218 * not the parent socket. unfortunately, we can't
5219 * lookup the request_sock yet as it isn't queued on
5220 * the parent socket until after the SYN-ACK is sent.
5221 * the "solution" is to simply pass the packet as-is
5222 * as any IP option based labeling should be copied
5223 * from the initial connection request (in the IP
5224 * layer). it is far from ideal, but until we get a
5225 * security label in the packet itself this is the
5226 * best we can do. */
5229 /* standard practice, label using the parent socket */
5230 sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
5233 sid
= SECINITSID_KERNEL
;
5234 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb
, family
, sid
) != 0)
5240 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_output(void *priv
,
5241 struct sk_buff
*skb
,
5242 const struct nf_hook_state
*state
)
5244 return selinux_ip_output(skb
, PF_INET
);
5247 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
5248 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_output(void *priv
,
5249 struct sk_buff
*skb
,
5250 const struct nf_hook_state
*state
)
5252 return selinux_ip_output(skb
, PF_INET6
);
5256 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff
*skb
,
5260 struct sock
*sk
= skb_to_full_sk(skb
);
5261 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
;
5262 struct common_audit_data ad
;
5263 struct lsm_network_audit net
= {0,};
5269 sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
5271 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET
;
5273 ad
.u
.net
->netif
= ifindex
;
5274 ad
.u
.net
->family
= family
;
5275 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb
, &ad
, &addrp
, 0, &proto
))
5278 if (selinux_secmark_enabled())
5279 if (avc_has_perm(sksec
->sid
, skb
->secmark
,
5280 SECCLASS_PACKET
, PACKET__SEND
, &ad
))
5281 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED
);
5283 if (selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(sksec
->sid
, skb
, &ad
, proto
))
5284 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED
);
5289 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff
*skb
,
5290 const struct net_device
*outdev
,
5295 int ifindex
= outdev
->ifindex
;
5297 struct common_audit_data ad
;
5298 struct lsm_network_audit net
= {0,};
5303 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
5304 * to the selinux_ip_postroute_compat() function to deal with the
5305 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
5306 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
5307 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer
)
5308 return selinux_ip_postroute_compat(skb
, ifindex
, family
);
5310 secmark_active
= selinux_secmark_enabled();
5311 peerlbl_active
= selinux_peerlbl_enabled();
5312 if (!secmark_active
&& !peerlbl_active
)
5315 sk
= skb_to_full_sk(skb
);
5318 /* If skb->dst->xfrm is non-NULL then the packet is undergoing an IPsec
5319 * packet transformation so allow the packet to pass without any checks
5320 * since we'll have another chance to perform access control checks
5321 * when the packet is on it's final way out.
5322 * NOTE: there appear to be some IPv6 multicast cases where skb->dst
5323 * is NULL, in this case go ahead and apply access control.
5324 * NOTE: if this is a local socket (skb->sk != NULL) that is in the
5325 * TCP listening state we cannot wait until the XFRM processing
5326 * is done as we will miss out on the SA label if we do;
5327 * unfortunately, this means more work, but it is only once per
5329 if (skb_dst(skb
) != NULL
&& skb_dst(skb
)->xfrm
!= NULL
&&
5330 !(sk
&& sk_listener(sk
)))
5335 /* Without an associated socket the packet is either coming
5336 * from the kernel or it is being forwarded; check the packet
5337 * to determine which and if the packet is being forwarded
5338 * query the packet directly to determine the security label. */
5340 secmark_perm
= PACKET__FORWARD_OUT
;
5341 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb
, family
, &peer_sid
))
5344 secmark_perm
= PACKET__SEND
;
5345 peer_sid
= SECINITSID_KERNEL
;
5347 } else if (sk_listener(sk
)) {
5348 /* Locally generated packet but the associated socket is in the
5349 * listening state which means this is a SYN-ACK packet. In
5350 * this particular case the correct security label is assigned
5351 * to the connection/request_sock but unfortunately we can't
5352 * query the request_sock as it isn't queued on the parent
5353 * socket until after the SYN-ACK packet is sent; the only
5354 * viable choice is to regenerate the label like we do in
5355 * selinux_inet_conn_request(). See also selinux_ip_output()
5356 * for similar problems. */
5358 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
;
5360 sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
5361 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb
, family
, &skb_sid
))
5363 /* At this point, if the returned skb peerlbl is SECSID_NULL
5364 * and the packet has been through at least one XFRM
5365 * transformation then we must be dealing with the "final"
5366 * form of labeled IPsec packet; since we've already applied
5367 * all of our access controls on this packet we can safely
5368 * pass the packet. */
5369 if (skb_sid
== SECSID_NULL
) {
5372 if (IPCB(skb
)->flags
& IPSKB_XFRM_TRANSFORMED
)
5376 if (IP6CB(skb
)->flags
& IP6SKB_XFRM_TRANSFORMED
)
5380 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED
);
5383 if (selinux_conn_sid(sksec
->sid
, skb_sid
, &peer_sid
))
5385 secmark_perm
= PACKET__SEND
;
5387 /* Locally generated packet, fetch the security label from the
5388 * associated socket. */
5389 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
5390 peer_sid
= sksec
->sid
;
5391 secmark_perm
= PACKET__SEND
;
5394 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET
;
5396 ad
.u
.net
->netif
= ifindex
;
5397 ad
.u
.net
->family
= family
;
5398 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb
, &ad
, &addrp
, 0, NULL
))
5402 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid
, skb
->secmark
,
5403 SECCLASS_PACKET
, secmark_perm
, &ad
))
5404 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED
);
5406 if (peerlbl_active
) {
5410 if (sel_netif_sid(dev_net(outdev
), ifindex
, &if_sid
))
5412 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid
, if_sid
,
5413 SECCLASS_NETIF
, NETIF__EGRESS
, &ad
))
5414 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED
);
5416 if (sel_netnode_sid(addrp
, family
, &node_sid
))
5418 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid
, node_sid
,
5419 SECCLASS_NODE
, NODE__SENDTO
, &ad
))
5420 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED
);
5426 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_postroute(void *priv
,
5427 struct sk_buff
*skb
,
5428 const struct nf_hook_state
*state
)
5430 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb
, state
->out
, PF_INET
);
5433 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
5434 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_postroute(void *priv
,
5435 struct sk_buff
*skb
,
5436 const struct nf_hook_state
*state
)
5438 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb
, state
->out
, PF_INET6
);
5442 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5444 static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock
*sk
, struct sk_buff
*skb
)
5446 return selinux_nlmsg_perm(sk
, skb
);
5449 static int ipc_alloc_security(struct kern_ipc_perm
*perm
,
5452 struct ipc_security_struct
*isec
;
5454 isec
= kzalloc(sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct
), GFP_KERNEL
);
5458 isec
->sclass
= sclass
;
5459 isec
->sid
= current_sid();
5460 perm
->security
= isec
;
5465 static void ipc_free_security(struct kern_ipc_perm
*perm
)
5467 struct ipc_security_struct
*isec
= perm
->security
;
5468 perm
->security
= NULL
;
5472 static int msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg
*msg
)
5474 struct msg_security_struct
*msec
;
5476 msec
= kzalloc(sizeof(struct msg_security_struct
), GFP_KERNEL
);
5480 msec
->sid
= SECINITSID_UNLABELED
;
5481 msg
->security
= msec
;
5486 static void msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg
*msg
)
5488 struct msg_security_struct
*msec
= msg
->security
;
5490 msg
->security
= NULL
;
5494 static int ipc_has_perm(struct kern_ipc_perm
*ipc_perms
,
5497 struct ipc_security_struct
*isec
;
5498 struct common_audit_data ad
;
5499 u32 sid
= current_sid();
5501 isec
= ipc_perms
->security
;
5503 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC
;
5504 ad
.u
.ipc_id
= ipc_perms
->key
;
5506 return avc_has_perm(sid
, isec
->sid
, isec
->sclass
, perms
, &ad
);
5509 static int selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg
*msg
)
5511 return msg_msg_alloc_security(msg
);
5514 static void selinux_msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg
*msg
)
5516 msg_msg_free_security(msg
);
5519 /* message queue security operations */
5520 static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue
*msq
)
5522 struct ipc_security_struct
*isec
;
5523 struct common_audit_data ad
;
5524 u32 sid
= current_sid();
5527 rc
= ipc_alloc_security(&msq
->q_perm
, SECCLASS_MSGQ
);
5531 isec
= msq
->q_perm
.security
;
5533 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC
;
5534 ad
.u
.ipc_id
= msq
->q_perm
.key
;
5536 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, isec
->sid
, SECCLASS_MSGQ
,
5539 ipc_free_security(&msq
->q_perm
);
5545 static void selinux_msg_queue_free_security(struct msg_queue
*msq
)
5547 ipc_free_security(&msq
->q_perm
);
5550 static int selinux_msg_queue_associate(struct msg_queue
*msq
, int msqflg
)
5552 struct ipc_security_struct
*isec
;
5553 struct common_audit_data ad
;
5554 u32 sid
= current_sid();
5556 isec
= msq
->q_perm
.security
;
5558 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC
;
5559 ad
.u
.ipc_id
= msq
->q_perm
.key
;
5561 return avc_has_perm(sid
, isec
->sid
, SECCLASS_MSGQ
,
5562 MSGQ__ASSOCIATE
, &ad
);
5565 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgctl(struct msg_queue
*msq
, int cmd
)
5573 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
5574 return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL
,
5575 SECCLASS_SYSTEM
, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO
, NULL
);
5578 perms
= MSGQ__GETATTR
| MSGQ__ASSOCIATE
;
5581 perms
= MSGQ__SETATTR
;
5584 perms
= MSGQ__DESTROY
;
5590 err
= ipc_has_perm(&msq
->q_perm
, perms
);
5594 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue
*msq
, struct msg_msg
*msg
, int msqflg
)
5596 struct ipc_security_struct
*isec
;
5597 struct msg_security_struct
*msec
;
5598 struct common_audit_data ad
;
5599 u32 sid
= current_sid();
5602 isec
= msq
->q_perm
.security
;
5603 msec
= msg
->security
;
5606 * First time through, need to assign label to the message
5608 if (msec
->sid
== SECINITSID_UNLABELED
) {
5610 * Compute new sid based on current process and
5611 * message queue this message will be stored in
5613 rc
= security_transition_sid(sid
, isec
->sid
, SECCLASS_MSG
,
5619 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC
;
5620 ad
.u
.ipc_id
= msq
->q_perm
.key
;
5622 /* Can this process write to the queue? */
5623 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, isec
->sid
, SECCLASS_MSGQ
,
5626 /* Can this process send the message */
5627 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, msec
->sid
, SECCLASS_MSG
,
5630 /* Can the message be put in the queue? */
5631 rc
= avc_has_perm(msec
->sid
, isec
->sid
, SECCLASS_MSGQ
,
5632 MSGQ__ENQUEUE
, &ad
);
5637 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue
*msq
, struct msg_msg
*msg
,
5638 struct task_struct
*target
,
5639 long type
, int mode
)
5641 struct ipc_security_struct
*isec
;
5642 struct msg_security_struct
*msec
;
5643 struct common_audit_data ad
;
5644 u32 sid
= task_sid(target
);
5647 isec
= msq
->q_perm
.security
;
5648 msec
= msg
->security
;
5650 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC
;
5651 ad
.u
.ipc_id
= msq
->q_perm
.key
;
5653 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, isec
->sid
,
5654 SECCLASS_MSGQ
, MSGQ__READ
, &ad
);
5656 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, msec
->sid
,
5657 SECCLASS_MSG
, MSG__RECEIVE
, &ad
);
5661 /* Shared Memory security operations */
5662 static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel
*shp
)
5664 struct ipc_security_struct
*isec
;
5665 struct common_audit_data ad
;
5666 u32 sid
= current_sid();
5669 rc
= ipc_alloc_security(&shp
->shm_perm
, SECCLASS_SHM
);
5673 isec
= shp
->shm_perm
.security
;
5675 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC
;
5676 ad
.u
.ipc_id
= shp
->shm_perm
.key
;
5678 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, isec
->sid
, SECCLASS_SHM
,
5681 ipc_free_security(&shp
->shm_perm
);
5687 static void selinux_shm_free_security(struct shmid_kernel
*shp
)
5689 ipc_free_security(&shp
->shm_perm
);
5692 static int selinux_shm_associate(struct shmid_kernel
*shp
, int shmflg
)
5694 struct ipc_security_struct
*isec
;
5695 struct common_audit_data ad
;
5696 u32 sid
= current_sid();
5698 isec
= shp
->shm_perm
.security
;
5700 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC
;
5701 ad
.u
.ipc_id
= shp
->shm_perm
.key
;
5703 return avc_has_perm(sid
, isec
->sid
, SECCLASS_SHM
,
5704 SHM__ASSOCIATE
, &ad
);
5707 /* Note, at this point, shp is locked down */
5708 static int selinux_shm_shmctl(struct shmid_kernel
*shp
, int cmd
)
5716 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
5717 return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL
,
5718 SECCLASS_SYSTEM
, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO
, NULL
);
5721 perms
= SHM__GETATTR
| SHM__ASSOCIATE
;
5724 perms
= SHM__SETATTR
;
5731 perms
= SHM__DESTROY
;
5737 err
= ipc_has_perm(&shp
->shm_perm
, perms
);
5741 static int selinux_shm_shmat(struct shmid_kernel
*shp
,
5742 char __user
*shmaddr
, int shmflg
)
5746 if (shmflg
& SHM_RDONLY
)
5749 perms
= SHM__READ
| SHM__WRITE
;
5751 return ipc_has_perm(&shp
->shm_perm
, perms
);
5754 /* Semaphore security operations */
5755 static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array
*sma
)
5757 struct ipc_security_struct
*isec
;
5758 struct common_audit_data ad
;
5759 u32 sid
= current_sid();
5762 rc
= ipc_alloc_security(&sma
->sem_perm
, SECCLASS_SEM
);
5766 isec
= sma
->sem_perm
.security
;
5768 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC
;
5769 ad
.u
.ipc_id
= sma
->sem_perm
.key
;
5771 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, isec
->sid
, SECCLASS_SEM
,
5774 ipc_free_security(&sma
->sem_perm
);
5780 static void selinux_sem_free_security(struct sem_array
*sma
)
5782 ipc_free_security(&sma
->sem_perm
);
5785 static int selinux_sem_associate(struct sem_array
*sma
, int semflg
)
5787 struct ipc_security_struct
*isec
;
5788 struct common_audit_data ad
;
5789 u32 sid
= current_sid();
5791 isec
= sma
->sem_perm
.security
;
5793 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC
;
5794 ad
.u
.ipc_id
= sma
->sem_perm
.key
;
5796 return avc_has_perm(sid
, isec
->sid
, SECCLASS_SEM
,
5797 SEM__ASSOCIATE
, &ad
);
5800 /* Note, at this point, sma is locked down */
5801 static int selinux_sem_semctl(struct sem_array
*sma
, int cmd
)
5809 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
5810 return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL
,
5811 SECCLASS_SYSTEM
, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO
, NULL
);
5815 perms
= SEM__GETATTR
;
5826 perms
= SEM__DESTROY
;
5829 perms
= SEM__SETATTR
;
5833 perms
= SEM__GETATTR
| SEM__ASSOCIATE
;
5839 err
= ipc_has_perm(&sma
->sem_perm
, perms
);
5843 static int selinux_sem_semop(struct sem_array
*sma
,
5844 struct sembuf
*sops
, unsigned nsops
, int alter
)
5849 perms
= SEM__READ
| SEM__WRITE
;
5853 return ipc_has_perm(&sma
->sem_perm
, perms
);
5856 static int selinux_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm
*ipcp
, short flag
)
5862 av
|= IPC__UNIX_READ
;
5864 av
|= IPC__UNIX_WRITE
;
5869 return ipc_has_perm(ipcp
, av
);
5872 static void selinux_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm
*ipcp
, u32
*secid
)
5874 struct ipc_security_struct
*isec
= ipcp
->security
;
5878 static void selinux_d_instantiate(struct dentry
*dentry
, struct inode
*inode
)
5881 inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode
, dentry
);
5884 static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct
*p
,
5885 char *name
, char **value
)
5887 const struct task_security_struct
*__tsec
;
5893 __tsec
= __task_cred(p
)->security
;
5896 error
= avc_has_perm(current_sid(), __tsec
->sid
,
5897 SECCLASS_PROCESS
, PROCESS__GETATTR
, NULL
);
5902 if (!strcmp(name
, "current"))
5904 else if (!strcmp(name
, "prev"))
5906 else if (!strcmp(name
, "exec"))
5907 sid
= __tsec
->exec_sid
;
5908 else if (!strcmp(name
, "fscreate"))
5909 sid
= __tsec
->create_sid
;
5910 else if (!strcmp(name
, "keycreate"))
5911 sid
= __tsec
->keycreate_sid
;
5912 else if (!strcmp(name
, "sockcreate"))
5913 sid
= __tsec
->sockcreate_sid
;
5923 error
= security_sid_to_context(sid
, value
, &len
);
5933 static int selinux_setprocattr(const char *name
, void *value
, size_t size
)
5935 struct task_security_struct
*tsec
;
5937 u32 mysid
= current_sid(), sid
= 0, ptsid
;
5942 * Basic control over ability to set these attributes at all.
5944 if (!strcmp(name
, "exec"))
5945 error
= avc_has_perm(mysid
, mysid
, SECCLASS_PROCESS
,
5946 PROCESS__SETEXEC
, NULL
);
5947 else if (!strcmp(name
, "fscreate"))
5948 error
= avc_has_perm(mysid
, mysid
, SECCLASS_PROCESS
,
5949 PROCESS__SETFSCREATE
, NULL
);
5950 else if (!strcmp(name
, "keycreate"))
5951 error
= avc_has_perm(mysid
, mysid
, SECCLASS_PROCESS
,
5952 PROCESS__SETKEYCREATE
, NULL
);
5953 else if (!strcmp(name
, "sockcreate"))
5954 error
= avc_has_perm(mysid
, mysid
, SECCLASS_PROCESS
,
5955 PROCESS__SETSOCKCREATE
, NULL
);
5956 else if (!strcmp(name
, "current"))
5957 error
= avc_has_perm(mysid
, mysid
, SECCLASS_PROCESS
,
5958 PROCESS__SETCURRENT
, NULL
);
5964 /* Obtain a SID for the context, if one was specified. */
5965 if (size
&& str
[0] && str
[0] != '\n') {
5966 if (str
[size
-1] == '\n') {
5970 error
= security_context_to_sid(value
, size
, &sid
, GFP_KERNEL
);
5971 if (error
== -EINVAL
&& !strcmp(name
, "fscreate")) {
5972 if (!has_cap_mac_admin(true)) {
5973 struct audit_buffer
*ab
;
5976 /* We strip a nul only if it is at the end, otherwise the
5977 * context contains a nul and we should audit that */
5978 if (str
[size
- 1] == '\0')
5979 audit_size
= size
- 1;
5982 ab
= audit_log_start(current
->audit_context
, GFP_ATOMIC
, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR
);
5983 audit_log_format(ab
, "op=fscreate invalid_context=");
5984 audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab
, value
, audit_size
);
5989 error
= security_context_to_sid_force(value
, size
,
5996 new = prepare_creds();
6000 /* Permission checking based on the specified context is
6001 performed during the actual operation (execve,
6002 open/mkdir/...), when we know the full context of the
6003 operation. See selinux_bprm_set_creds for the execve
6004 checks and may_create for the file creation checks. The
6005 operation will then fail if the context is not permitted. */
6006 tsec
= new->security
;
6007 if (!strcmp(name
, "exec")) {
6008 tsec
->exec_sid
= sid
;
6009 } else if (!strcmp(name
, "fscreate")) {
6010 tsec
->create_sid
= sid
;
6011 } else if (!strcmp(name
, "keycreate")) {
6012 error
= avc_has_perm(mysid
, sid
, SECCLASS_KEY
, KEY__CREATE
,
6016 tsec
->keycreate_sid
= sid
;
6017 } else if (!strcmp(name
, "sockcreate")) {
6018 tsec
->sockcreate_sid
= sid
;
6019 } else if (!strcmp(name
, "current")) {
6024 /* Only allow single threaded processes to change context */
6026 if (!current_is_single_threaded()) {
6027 error
= security_bounded_transition(tsec
->sid
, sid
);
6032 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
6033 error
= avc_has_perm(tsec
->sid
, sid
, SECCLASS_PROCESS
,
6034 PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION
, NULL
);
6038 /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
6039 Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and fail. */
6040 ptsid
= ptrace_parent_sid();
6042 error
= avc_has_perm(ptsid
, sid
, SECCLASS_PROCESS
,
6043 PROCESS__PTRACE
, NULL
);
6062 static int selinux_ismaclabel(const char *name
)
6064 return (strcmp(name
, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
) == 0);
6067 static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid
, char **secdata
, u32
*seclen
)
6069 return security_sid_to_context(secid
, secdata
, seclen
);
6072 static int selinux_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata
, u32 seclen
, u32
*secid
)
6074 return security_context_to_sid(secdata
, seclen
, secid
, GFP_KERNEL
);
6077 static void selinux_release_secctx(char *secdata
, u32 seclen
)
6082 static void selinux_inode_invalidate_secctx(struct inode
*inode
)
6084 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= inode
->i_security
;
6086 spin_lock(&isec
->lock
);
6087 isec
->initialized
= LABEL_INVALID
;
6088 spin_unlock(&isec
->lock
);
6092 * called with inode->i_mutex locked
6094 static int selinux_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode
*inode
, void *ctx
, u32 ctxlen
)
6096 return selinux_inode_setsecurity(inode
, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
, ctx
, ctxlen
, 0);
6100 * called with inode->i_mutex locked
6102 static int selinux_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry
*dentry
, void *ctx
, u32 ctxlen
)
6104 return __vfs_setxattr_noperm(dentry
, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX
, ctx
, ctxlen
, 0);
6107 static int selinux_inode_getsecctx(struct inode
*inode
, void **ctx
, u32
*ctxlen
)
6110 len
= selinux_inode_getsecurity(inode
, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
,
6119 static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key
*k
, const struct cred
*cred
,
6120 unsigned long flags
)
6122 const struct task_security_struct
*tsec
;
6123 struct key_security_struct
*ksec
;
6125 ksec
= kzalloc(sizeof(struct key_security_struct
), GFP_KERNEL
);
6129 tsec
= cred
->security
;
6130 if (tsec
->keycreate_sid
)
6131 ksec
->sid
= tsec
->keycreate_sid
;
6133 ksec
->sid
= tsec
->sid
;
6139 static void selinux_key_free(struct key
*k
)
6141 struct key_security_struct
*ksec
= k
->security
;
6147 static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref
,
6148 const struct cred
*cred
,
6152 struct key_security_struct
*ksec
;
6155 /* if no specific permissions are requested, we skip the
6156 permission check. No serious, additional covert channels
6157 appear to be created. */
6161 sid
= cred_sid(cred
);
6163 key
= key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref
);
6164 ksec
= key
->security
;
6166 return avc_has_perm(sid
, ksec
->sid
, SECCLASS_KEY
, perm
, NULL
);
6169 static int selinux_key_getsecurity(struct key
*key
, char **_buffer
)
6171 struct key_security_struct
*ksec
= key
->security
;
6172 char *context
= NULL
;
6176 rc
= security_sid_to_context(ksec
->sid
, &context
, &len
);
6184 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND
6185 static int selinux_ib_pkey_access(void *ib_sec
, u64 subnet_prefix
, u16 pkey_val
)
6187 struct common_audit_data ad
;
6190 struct ib_security_struct
*sec
= ib_sec
;
6191 struct lsm_ibpkey_audit ibpkey
;
6193 err
= sel_ib_pkey_sid(subnet_prefix
, pkey_val
, &sid
);
6197 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IBPKEY
;
6198 ibpkey
.subnet_prefix
= subnet_prefix
;
6199 ibpkey
.pkey
= pkey_val
;
6200 ad
.u
.ibpkey
= &ibpkey
;
6201 return avc_has_perm(sec
->sid
, sid
,
6202 SECCLASS_INFINIBAND_PKEY
,
6203 INFINIBAND_PKEY__ACCESS
, &ad
);
6206 static int selinux_ib_endport_manage_subnet(void *ib_sec
, const char *dev_name
,
6209 struct common_audit_data ad
;
6212 struct ib_security_struct
*sec
= ib_sec
;
6213 struct lsm_ibendport_audit ibendport
;
6215 err
= security_ib_endport_sid(dev_name
, port_num
, &sid
);
6220 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IBENDPORT
;
6221 strncpy(ibendport
.dev_name
, dev_name
, sizeof(ibendport
.dev_name
));
6222 ibendport
.port
= port_num
;
6223 ad
.u
.ibendport
= &ibendport
;
6224 return avc_has_perm(sec
->sid
, sid
,
6225 SECCLASS_INFINIBAND_ENDPORT
,
6226 INFINIBAND_ENDPORT__MANAGE_SUBNET
, &ad
);
6229 static int selinux_ib_alloc_security(void **ib_sec
)
6231 struct ib_security_struct
*sec
;
6233 sec
= kzalloc(sizeof(*sec
), GFP_KERNEL
);
6236 sec
->sid
= current_sid();
6242 static void selinux_ib_free_security(void *ib_sec
)
6248 static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks
[] __lsm_ro_after_init
= {
6249 LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_set_context_mgr
, selinux_binder_set_context_mgr
),
6250 LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_transaction
, selinux_binder_transaction
),
6251 LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_transfer_binder
, selinux_binder_transfer_binder
),
6252 LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_transfer_file
, selinux_binder_transfer_file
),
6254 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check
, selinux_ptrace_access_check
),
6255 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme
, selinux_ptrace_traceme
),
6256 LSM_HOOK_INIT(capget
, selinux_capget
),
6257 LSM_HOOK_INIT(capset
, selinux_capset
),
6258 LSM_HOOK_INIT(capable
, selinux_capable
),
6259 LSM_HOOK_INIT(quotactl
, selinux_quotactl
),
6260 LSM_HOOK_INIT(quota_on
, selinux_quota_on
),
6261 LSM_HOOK_INIT(syslog
, selinux_syslog
),
6262 LSM_HOOK_INIT(vm_enough_memory
, selinux_vm_enough_memory
),
6264 LSM_HOOK_INIT(netlink_send
, selinux_netlink_send
),
6266 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_set_creds
, selinux_bprm_set_creds
),
6267 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committing_creds
, selinux_bprm_committing_creds
),
6268 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committed_creds
, selinux_bprm_committed_creds
),
6269 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_secureexec
, selinux_bprm_secureexec
),
6271 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_alloc_security
, selinux_sb_alloc_security
),
6272 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_free_security
, selinux_sb_free_security
),
6273 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_copy_data
, selinux_sb_copy_data
),
6274 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_remount
, selinux_sb_remount
),
6275 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_kern_mount
, selinux_sb_kern_mount
),
6276 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_show_options
, selinux_sb_show_options
),
6277 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_statfs
, selinux_sb_statfs
),
6278 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_mount
, selinux_mount
),
6279 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_umount
, selinux_umount
),
6280 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_set_mnt_opts
, selinux_set_mnt_opts
),
6281 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_clone_mnt_opts
, selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts
),
6282 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_parse_opts_str
, selinux_parse_opts_str
),
6284 LSM_HOOK_INIT(dentry_init_security
, selinux_dentry_init_security
),
6285 LSM_HOOK_INIT(dentry_create_files_as
, selinux_dentry_create_files_as
),
6287 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_alloc_security
, selinux_inode_alloc_security
),
6288 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_free_security
, selinux_inode_free_security
),
6289 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_init_security
, selinux_inode_init_security
),
6290 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_create
, selinux_inode_create
),
6291 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_link
, selinux_inode_link
),
6292 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_unlink
, selinux_inode_unlink
),
6293 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_symlink
, selinux_inode_symlink
),
6294 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_mkdir
, selinux_inode_mkdir
),
6295 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_rmdir
, selinux_inode_rmdir
),
6296 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_mknod
, selinux_inode_mknod
),
6297 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_rename
, selinux_inode_rename
),
6298 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_readlink
, selinux_inode_readlink
),
6299 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_follow_link
, selinux_inode_follow_link
),
6300 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_permission
, selinux_inode_permission
),
6301 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setattr
, selinux_inode_setattr
),
6302 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getattr
, selinux_inode_getattr
),
6303 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setxattr
, selinux_inode_setxattr
),
6304 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_post_setxattr
, selinux_inode_post_setxattr
),
6305 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getxattr
, selinux_inode_getxattr
),
6306 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_listxattr
, selinux_inode_listxattr
),
6307 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_removexattr
, selinux_inode_removexattr
),
6308 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecurity
, selinux_inode_getsecurity
),
6309 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setsecurity
, selinux_inode_setsecurity
),
6310 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_listsecurity
, selinux_inode_listsecurity
),
6311 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecid
, selinux_inode_getsecid
),
6312 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_copy_up
, selinux_inode_copy_up
),
6313 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_copy_up_xattr
, selinux_inode_copy_up_xattr
),
6315 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_permission
, selinux_file_permission
),
6316 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_alloc_security
, selinux_file_alloc_security
),
6317 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_free_security
, selinux_file_free_security
),
6318 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_ioctl
, selinux_file_ioctl
),
6319 LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_file
, selinux_mmap_file
),
6320 LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_addr
, selinux_mmap_addr
),
6321 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_mprotect
, selinux_file_mprotect
),
6322 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_lock
, selinux_file_lock
),
6323 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_fcntl
, selinux_file_fcntl
),
6324 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_set_fowner
, selinux_file_set_fowner
),
6325 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_send_sigiotask
, selinux_file_send_sigiotask
),
6326 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_receive
, selinux_file_receive
),
6328 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_open
, selinux_file_open
),
6330 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_alloc
, selinux_task_alloc
),
6331 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_alloc_blank
, selinux_cred_alloc_blank
),
6332 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_free
, selinux_cred_free
),
6333 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_prepare
, selinux_cred_prepare
),
6334 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_transfer
, selinux_cred_transfer
),
6335 LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_act_as
, selinux_kernel_act_as
),
6336 LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_create_files_as
, selinux_kernel_create_files_as
),
6337 LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_module_request
, selinux_kernel_module_request
),
6338 LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_read_file
, selinux_kernel_read_file
),
6339 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setpgid
, selinux_task_setpgid
),
6340 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getpgid
, selinux_task_getpgid
),
6341 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsid
, selinux_task_getsid
),
6342 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsecid
, selinux_task_getsecid
),
6343 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setnice
, selinux_task_setnice
),
6344 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setioprio
, selinux_task_setioprio
),
6345 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getioprio
, selinux_task_getioprio
),
6346 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_prlimit
, selinux_task_prlimit
),
6347 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setrlimit
, selinux_task_setrlimit
),
6348 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setscheduler
, selinux_task_setscheduler
),
6349 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getscheduler
, selinux_task_getscheduler
),
6350 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_movememory
, selinux_task_movememory
),
6351 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_kill
, selinux_task_kill
),
6352 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_to_inode
, selinux_task_to_inode
),
6354 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ipc_permission
, selinux_ipc_permission
),
6355 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ipc_getsecid
, selinux_ipc_getsecid
),
6357 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_msg_alloc_security
, selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security
),
6358 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_msg_free_security
, selinux_msg_msg_free_security
),
6360 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_alloc_security
,
6361 selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security
),
6362 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_free_security
, selinux_msg_queue_free_security
),
6363 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_associate
, selinux_msg_queue_associate
),
6364 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgctl
, selinux_msg_queue_msgctl
),
6365 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgsnd
, selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd
),
6366 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgrcv
, selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv
),
6368 LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_alloc_security
, selinux_shm_alloc_security
),
6369 LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_free_security
, selinux_shm_free_security
),
6370 LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_associate
, selinux_shm_associate
),
6371 LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_shmctl
, selinux_shm_shmctl
),
6372 LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_shmat
, selinux_shm_shmat
),
6374 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_alloc_security
, selinux_sem_alloc_security
),
6375 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_free_security
, selinux_sem_free_security
),
6376 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_associate
, selinux_sem_associate
),
6377 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_semctl
, selinux_sem_semctl
),
6378 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_semop
, selinux_sem_semop
),
6380 LSM_HOOK_INIT(d_instantiate
, selinux_d_instantiate
),
6382 LSM_HOOK_INIT(getprocattr
, selinux_getprocattr
),
6383 LSM_HOOK_INIT(setprocattr
, selinux_setprocattr
),
6385 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ismaclabel
, selinux_ismaclabel
),
6386 LSM_HOOK_INIT(secid_to_secctx
, selinux_secid_to_secctx
),
6387 LSM_HOOK_INIT(secctx_to_secid
, selinux_secctx_to_secid
),
6388 LSM_HOOK_INIT(release_secctx
, selinux_release_secctx
),
6389 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_invalidate_secctx
, selinux_inode_invalidate_secctx
),
6390 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_notifysecctx
, selinux_inode_notifysecctx
),
6391 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setsecctx
, selinux_inode_setsecctx
),
6392 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecctx
, selinux_inode_getsecctx
),
6394 LSM_HOOK_INIT(unix_stream_connect
, selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect
),
6395 LSM_HOOK_INIT(unix_may_send
, selinux_socket_unix_may_send
),
6397 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_create
, selinux_socket_create
),
6398 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_post_create
, selinux_socket_post_create
),
6399 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_bind
, selinux_socket_bind
),
6400 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_connect
, selinux_socket_connect
),
6401 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_listen
, selinux_socket_listen
),
6402 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_accept
, selinux_socket_accept
),
6403 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sendmsg
, selinux_socket_sendmsg
),
6404 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_recvmsg
, selinux_socket_recvmsg
),
6405 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getsockname
, selinux_socket_getsockname
),
6406 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeername
, selinux_socket_getpeername
),
6407 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getsockopt
, selinux_socket_getsockopt
),
6408 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_setsockopt
, selinux_socket_setsockopt
),
6409 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_shutdown
, selinux_socket_shutdown
),
6410 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sock_rcv_skb
, selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb
),
6411 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_stream
,
6412 selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream
),
6413 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_dgram
, selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram
),
6414 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_alloc_security
, selinux_sk_alloc_security
),
6415 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_free_security
, selinux_sk_free_security
),
6416 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_clone_security
, selinux_sk_clone_security
),
6417 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_getsecid
, selinux_sk_getsecid
),
6418 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sock_graft
, selinux_sock_graft
),
6419 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_request
, selinux_inet_conn_request
),
6420 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_csk_clone
, selinux_inet_csk_clone
),
6421 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_established
, selinux_inet_conn_established
),
6422 LSM_HOOK_INIT(secmark_relabel_packet
, selinux_secmark_relabel_packet
),
6423 LSM_HOOK_INIT(secmark_refcount_inc
, selinux_secmark_refcount_inc
),
6424 LSM_HOOK_INIT(secmark_refcount_dec
, selinux_secmark_refcount_dec
),
6425 LSM_HOOK_INIT(req_classify_flow
, selinux_req_classify_flow
),
6426 LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_alloc_security
, selinux_tun_dev_alloc_security
),
6427 LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_free_security
, selinux_tun_dev_free_security
),
6428 LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_create
, selinux_tun_dev_create
),
6429 LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_attach_queue
, selinux_tun_dev_attach_queue
),
6430 LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_attach
, selinux_tun_dev_attach
),
6431 LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_open
, selinux_tun_dev_open
),
6432 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND
6433 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ib_pkey_access
, selinux_ib_pkey_access
),
6434 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ib_endport_manage_subnet
,
6435 selinux_ib_endport_manage_subnet
),
6436 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ib_alloc_security
, selinux_ib_alloc_security
),
6437 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ib_free_security
, selinux_ib_free_security
),
6439 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
6440 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_alloc_security
, selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc
),
6441 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_clone_security
, selinux_xfrm_policy_clone
),
6442 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_free_security
, selinux_xfrm_policy_free
),
6443 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_delete_security
, selinux_xfrm_policy_delete
),
6444 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_alloc
, selinux_xfrm_state_alloc
),
6445 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_alloc_acquire
,
6446 selinux_xfrm_state_alloc_acquire
),
6447 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_free_security
, selinux_xfrm_state_free
),
6448 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_delete_security
, selinux_xfrm_state_delete
),
6449 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_lookup
, selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup
),
6450 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_pol_flow_match
,
6451 selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match
),
6452 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_decode_session
, selinux_xfrm_decode_session
),
6456 LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_alloc
, selinux_key_alloc
),
6457 LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_free
, selinux_key_free
),
6458 LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_permission
, selinux_key_permission
),
6459 LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_getsecurity
, selinux_key_getsecurity
),
6463 LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_init
, selinux_audit_rule_init
),
6464 LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_known
, selinux_audit_rule_known
),
6465 LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_match
, selinux_audit_rule_match
),
6466 LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_free
, selinux_audit_rule_free
),
6470 static __init
int selinux_init(void)
6472 if (!security_module_enable("selinux")) {
6473 selinux_enabled
= 0;
6477 if (!selinux_enabled
) {
6478 printk(KERN_INFO
"SELinux: Disabled at boot.\n");
6482 printk(KERN_INFO
"SELinux: Initializing.\n");
6484 /* Set the security state for the initial task. */
6485 cred_init_security();
6487 default_noexec
= !(VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS
& VM_EXEC
);
6489 sel_inode_cache
= kmem_cache_create("selinux_inode_security",
6490 sizeof(struct inode_security_struct
),
6491 0, SLAB_PANIC
, NULL
);
6492 file_security_cache
= kmem_cache_create("selinux_file_security",
6493 sizeof(struct file_security_struct
),
6494 0, SLAB_PANIC
, NULL
);
6497 security_add_hooks(selinux_hooks
, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_hooks
), "selinux");
6499 if (avc_add_callback(selinux_netcache_avc_callback
, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET
))
6500 panic("SELinux: Unable to register AVC netcache callback\n");
6502 if (avc_add_callback(selinux_lsm_notifier_avc_callback
, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET
))
6503 panic("SELinux: Unable to register AVC LSM notifier callback\n");
6505 if (selinux_enforcing
)
6506 printk(KERN_DEBUG
"SELinux: Starting in enforcing mode\n");
6508 printk(KERN_DEBUG
"SELinux: Starting in permissive mode\n");
6513 static void delayed_superblock_init(struct super_block
*sb
, void *unused
)
6515 superblock_doinit(sb
, NULL
);
6518 void selinux_complete_init(void)
6520 printk(KERN_DEBUG
"SELinux: Completing initialization.\n");
6522 /* Set up any superblocks initialized prior to the policy load. */
6523 printk(KERN_DEBUG
"SELinux: Setting up existing superblocks.\n");
6524 iterate_supers(delayed_superblock_init
, NULL
);
6527 /* SELinux requires early initialization in order to label
6528 all processes and objects when they are created. */
6529 security_initcall(selinux_init
);
6531 #if defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER)
6533 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_nf_ops
[] = {
6535 .hook
= selinux_ipv4_postroute
,
6537 .hooknum
= NF_INET_POST_ROUTING
,
6538 .priority
= NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_LAST
,
6541 .hook
= selinux_ipv4_forward
,
6543 .hooknum
= NF_INET_FORWARD
,
6544 .priority
= NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST
,
6547 .hook
= selinux_ipv4_output
,
6549 .hooknum
= NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT
,
6550 .priority
= NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST
,
6552 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
6554 .hook
= selinux_ipv6_postroute
,
6556 .hooknum
= NF_INET_POST_ROUTING
,
6557 .priority
= NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_LAST
,
6560 .hook
= selinux_ipv6_forward
,
6562 .hooknum
= NF_INET_FORWARD
,
6563 .priority
= NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST
,
6566 .hook
= selinux_ipv6_output
,
6568 .hooknum
= NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT
,
6569 .priority
= NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST
,
6574 static int __net_init
selinux_nf_register(struct net
*net
)
6576 return nf_register_net_hooks(net
, selinux_nf_ops
,
6577 ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_nf_ops
));
6580 static void __net_exit
selinux_nf_unregister(struct net
*net
)
6582 nf_unregister_net_hooks(net
, selinux_nf_ops
,
6583 ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_nf_ops
));
6586 static struct pernet_operations selinux_net_ops
= {
6587 .init
= selinux_nf_register
,
6588 .exit
= selinux_nf_unregister
,
6591 static int __init
selinux_nf_ip_init(void)
6595 if (!selinux_enabled
)
6598 printk(KERN_DEBUG
"SELinux: Registering netfilter hooks\n");
6600 err
= register_pernet_subsys(&selinux_net_ops
);
6602 panic("SELinux: register_pernet_subsys: error %d\n", err
);
6606 __initcall(selinux_nf_ip_init
);
6608 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
6609 static void selinux_nf_ip_exit(void)
6611 printk(KERN_DEBUG
"SELinux: Unregistering netfilter hooks\n");
6613 unregister_pernet_subsys(&selinux_net_ops
);
6617 #else /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
6619 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
6620 #define selinux_nf_ip_exit()
6623 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
6625 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
6626 static int selinux_disabled
;
6628 int selinux_disable(void)
6630 if (ss_initialized
) {
6631 /* Not permitted after initial policy load. */
6635 if (selinux_disabled
) {
6636 /* Only do this once. */
6640 printk(KERN_INFO
"SELinux: Disabled at runtime.\n");
6642 selinux_disabled
= 1;
6643 selinux_enabled
= 0;
6645 security_delete_hooks(selinux_hooks
, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_hooks
));
6647 /* Try to destroy the avc node cache */
6650 /* Unregister netfilter hooks. */
6651 selinux_nf_ip_exit();
6653 /* Unregister selinuxfs. */