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1 // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
2 /*
3 * Simplified MAC Kernel (smack) security module
4 *
5 * This file contains the smack hook function implementations.
6 *
7 * Authors:
8 * Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
9 * Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@intel.com>
10 *
11 * Copyright (C) 2007 Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
12 * Copyright (C) 2009 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
13 * Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
14 * Copyright (C) 2010 Nokia Corporation
15 * Copyright (C) 2011 Intel Corporation.
16 */
17
18 #include <linux/xattr.h>
19 #include <linux/pagemap.h>
20 #include <linux/mount.h>
21 #include <linux/stat.h>
22 #include <linux/kd.h>
23 #include <asm/ioctls.h>
24 #include <linux/ip.h>
25 #include <linux/tcp.h>
26 #include <linux/udp.h>
27 #include <linux/dccp.h>
28 #include <linux/icmpv6.h>
29 #include <linux/slab.h>
30 #include <linux/mutex.h>
31 #include <net/cipso_ipv4.h>
32 #include <net/ip.h>
33 #include <net/ipv6.h>
34 #include <linux/audit.h>
35 #include <linux/magic.h>
36 #include <linux/dcache.h>
37 #include <linux/personality.h>
38 #include <linux/msg.h>
39 #include <linux/shm.h>
40 #include <linux/binfmts.h>
41 #include <linux/parser.h>
42 #include <linux/fs_context.h>
43 #include <linux/fs_parser.h>
44 #include <linux/watch_queue.h>
45 #include "smack.h"
46
47 #define TRANS_TRUE "TRUE"
48 #define TRANS_TRUE_SIZE 4
49
50 #define SMK_CONNECTING 0
51 #define SMK_RECEIVING 1
52 #define SMK_SENDING 2
53
54 static DEFINE_MUTEX(smack_ipv6_lock);
55 static LIST_HEAD(smk_ipv6_port_list);
56 struct kmem_cache *smack_rule_cache;
57 int smack_enabled;
58
59 #define A(s) {"smack"#s, sizeof("smack"#s) - 1, Opt_##s}
60 static struct {
61 const char *name;
62 int len;
63 int opt;
64 } smk_mount_opts[] = {
65 {"smackfsdef", sizeof("smackfsdef") - 1, Opt_fsdefault},
66 A(fsdefault), A(fsfloor), A(fshat), A(fsroot), A(fstransmute)
67 };
68 #undef A
69
70 static int match_opt_prefix(char *s, int l, char **arg)
71 {
72 int i;
73
74 for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(smk_mount_opts); i++) {
75 size_t len = smk_mount_opts[i].len;
76 if (len > l || memcmp(s, smk_mount_opts[i].name, len))
77 continue;
78 if (len == l || s[len] != '=')
79 continue;
80 *arg = s + len + 1;
81 return smk_mount_opts[i].opt;
82 }
83 return Opt_error;
84 }
85
86 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
87 static char *smk_bu_mess[] = {
88 "Bringup Error", /* Unused */
89 "Bringup", /* SMACK_BRINGUP_ALLOW */
90 "Unconfined Subject", /* SMACK_UNCONFINED_SUBJECT */
91 "Unconfined Object", /* SMACK_UNCONFINED_OBJECT */
92 };
93
94 static void smk_bu_mode(int mode, char *s)
95 {
96 int i = 0;
97
98 if (mode & MAY_READ)
99 s[i++] = 'r';
100 if (mode & MAY_WRITE)
101 s[i++] = 'w';
102 if (mode & MAY_EXEC)
103 s[i++] = 'x';
104 if (mode & MAY_APPEND)
105 s[i++] = 'a';
106 if (mode & MAY_TRANSMUTE)
107 s[i++] = 't';
108 if (mode & MAY_LOCK)
109 s[i++] = 'l';
110 if (i == 0)
111 s[i++] = '-';
112 s[i] = '\0';
113 }
114 #endif
115
116 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
117 static int smk_bu_note(char *note, struct smack_known *sskp,
118 struct smack_known *oskp, int mode, int rc)
119 {
120 char acc[SMK_NUM_ACCESS_TYPE + 1];
121
122 if (rc <= 0)
123 return rc;
124 if (rc > SMACK_UNCONFINED_OBJECT)
125 rc = 0;
126
127 smk_bu_mode(mode, acc);
128 pr_info("Smack %s: (%s %s %s) %s\n", smk_bu_mess[rc],
129 sskp->smk_known, oskp->smk_known, acc, note);
130 return 0;
131 }
132 #else
133 #define smk_bu_note(note, sskp, oskp, mode, RC) (RC)
134 #endif
135
136 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
137 static int smk_bu_current(char *note, struct smack_known *oskp,
138 int mode, int rc)
139 {
140 struct task_smack *tsp = smack_cred(current_cred());
141 char acc[SMK_NUM_ACCESS_TYPE + 1];
142
143 if (rc <= 0)
144 return rc;
145 if (rc > SMACK_UNCONFINED_OBJECT)
146 rc = 0;
147
148 smk_bu_mode(mode, acc);
149 pr_info("Smack %s: (%s %s %s) %s %s\n", smk_bu_mess[rc],
150 tsp->smk_task->smk_known, oskp->smk_known,
151 acc, current->comm, note);
152 return 0;
153 }
154 #else
155 #define smk_bu_current(note, oskp, mode, RC) (RC)
156 #endif
157
158 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
159 static int smk_bu_task(struct task_struct *otp, int mode, int rc)
160 {
161 struct task_smack *tsp = smack_cred(current_cred());
162 struct smack_known *smk_task = smk_of_task_struct(otp);
163 char acc[SMK_NUM_ACCESS_TYPE + 1];
164
165 if (rc <= 0)
166 return rc;
167 if (rc > SMACK_UNCONFINED_OBJECT)
168 rc = 0;
169
170 smk_bu_mode(mode, acc);
171 pr_info("Smack %s: (%s %s %s) %s to %s\n", smk_bu_mess[rc],
172 tsp->smk_task->smk_known, smk_task->smk_known, acc,
173 current->comm, otp->comm);
174 return 0;
175 }
176 #else
177 #define smk_bu_task(otp, mode, RC) (RC)
178 #endif
179
180 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
181 static int smk_bu_inode(struct inode *inode, int mode, int rc)
182 {
183 struct task_smack *tsp = smack_cred(current_cred());
184 struct inode_smack *isp = smack_inode(inode);
185 char acc[SMK_NUM_ACCESS_TYPE + 1];
186
187 if (isp->smk_flags & SMK_INODE_IMPURE)
188 pr_info("Smack Unconfined Corruption: inode=(%s %ld) %s\n",
189 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, current->comm);
190
191 if (rc <= 0)
192 return rc;
193 if (rc > SMACK_UNCONFINED_OBJECT)
194 rc = 0;
195 if (rc == SMACK_UNCONFINED_SUBJECT &&
196 (mode & (MAY_WRITE | MAY_APPEND)))
197 isp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_IMPURE;
198
199 smk_bu_mode(mode, acc);
200
201 pr_info("Smack %s: (%s %s %s) inode=(%s %ld) %s\n", smk_bu_mess[rc],
202 tsp->smk_task->smk_known, isp->smk_inode->smk_known, acc,
203 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, current->comm);
204 return 0;
205 }
206 #else
207 #define smk_bu_inode(inode, mode, RC) (RC)
208 #endif
209
210 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
211 static int smk_bu_file(struct file *file, int mode, int rc)
212 {
213 struct task_smack *tsp = smack_cred(current_cred());
214 struct smack_known *sskp = tsp->smk_task;
215 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
216 struct inode_smack *isp = smack_inode(inode);
217 char acc[SMK_NUM_ACCESS_TYPE + 1];
218
219 if (isp->smk_flags & SMK_INODE_IMPURE)
220 pr_info("Smack Unconfined Corruption: inode=(%s %ld) %s\n",
221 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, current->comm);
222
223 if (rc <= 0)
224 return rc;
225 if (rc > SMACK_UNCONFINED_OBJECT)
226 rc = 0;
227
228 smk_bu_mode(mode, acc);
229 pr_info("Smack %s: (%s %s %s) file=(%s %ld %pD) %s\n", smk_bu_mess[rc],
230 sskp->smk_known, smk_of_inode(inode)->smk_known, acc,
231 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, file,
232 current->comm);
233 return 0;
234 }
235 #else
236 #define smk_bu_file(file, mode, RC) (RC)
237 #endif
238
239 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
240 static int smk_bu_credfile(const struct cred *cred, struct file *file,
241 int mode, int rc)
242 {
243 struct task_smack *tsp = smack_cred(cred);
244 struct smack_known *sskp = tsp->smk_task;
245 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
246 struct inode_smack *isp = smack_inode(inode);
247 char acc[SMK_NUM_ACCESS_TYPE + 1];
248
249 if (isp->smk_flags & SMK_INODE_IMPURE)
250 pr_info("Smack Unconfined Corruption: inode=(%s %ld) %s\n",
251 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, current->comm);
252
253 if (rc <= 0)
254 return rc;
255 if (rc > SMACK_UNCONFINED_OBJECT)
256 rc = 0;
257
258 smk_bu_mode(mode, acc);
259 pr_info("Smack %s: (%s %s %s) file=(%s %ld %pD) %s\n", smk_bu_mess[rc],
260 sskp->smk_known, smk_of_inode(inode)->smk_known, acc,
261 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, file,
262 current->comm);
263 return 0;
264 }
265 #else
266 #define smk_bu_credfile(cred, file, mode, RC) (RC)
267 #endif
268
269 /**
270 * smk_fetch - Fetch the smack label from a file.
271 * @name: type of the label (attribute)
272 * @ip: a pointer to the inode
273 * @dp: a pointer to the dentry
274 *
275 * Returns a pointer to the master list entry for the Smack label,
276 * NULL if there was no label to fetch, or an error code.
277 */
278 static struct smack_known *smk_fetch(const char *name, struct inode *ip,
279 struct dentry *dp)
280 {
281 int rc;
282 char *buffer;
283 struct smack_known *skp = NULL;
284
285 if (!(ip->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR))
286 return ERR_PTR(-EOPNOTSUPP);
287
288 buffer = kzalloc(SMK_LONGLABEL, GFP_NOFS);
289 if (buffer == NULL)
290 return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
291
292 rc = __vfs_getxattr(dp, ip, name, buffer, SMK_LONGLABEL);
293 if (rc < 0)
294 skp = ERR_PTR(rc);
295 else if (rc == 0)
296 skp = NULL;
297 else
298 skp = smk_import_entry(buffer, rc);
299
300 kfree(buffer);
301
302 return skp;
303 }
304
305 /**
306 * init_inode_smack - initialize an inode security blob
307 * @inode: inode to extract the info from
308 * @skp: a pointer to the Smack label entry to use in the blob
309 *
310 */
311 static void init_inode_smack(struct inode *inode, struct smack_known *skp)
312 {
313 struct inode_smack *isp = smack_inode(inode);
314
315 isp->smk_inode = skp;
316 isp->smk_flags = 0;
317 }
318
319 /**
320 * init_task_smack - initialize a task security blob
321 * @tsp: blob to initialize
322 * @task: a pointer to the Smack label for the running task
323 * @forked: a pointer to the Smack label for the forked task
324 *
325 */
326 static void init_task_smack(struct task_smack *tsp, struct smack_known *task,
327 struct smack_known *forked)
328 {
329 tsp->smk_task = task;
330 tsp->smk_forked = forked;
331 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&tsp->smk_rules);
332 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&tsp->smk_relabel);
333 mutex_init(&tsp->smk_rules_lock);
334 }
335
336 /**
337 * smk_copy_rules - copy a rule set
338 * @nhead: new rules header pointer
339 * @ohead: old rules header pointer
340 * @gfp: type of the memory for the allocation
341 *
342 * Returns 0 on success, -ENOMEM on error
343 */
344 static int smk_copy_rules(struct list_head *nhead, struct list_head *ohead,
345 gfp_t gfp)
346 {
347 struct smack_rule *nrp;
348 struct smack_rule *orp;
349 int rc = 0;
350
351 list_for_each_entry_rcu(orp, ohead, list) {
352 nrp = kmem_cache_zalloc(smack_rule_cache, gfp);
353 if (nrp == NULL) {
354 rc = -ENOMEM;
355 break;
356 }
357 *nrp = *orp;
358 list_add_rcu(&nrp->list, nhead);
359 }
360 return rc;
361 }
362
363 /**
364 * smk_copy_relabel - copy smk_relabel labels list
365 * @nhead: new rules header pointer
366 * @ohead: old rules header pointer
367 * @gfp: type of the memory for the allocation
368 *
369 * Returns 0 on success, -ENOMEM on error
370 */
371 static int smk_copy_relabel(struct list_head *nhead, struct list_head *ohead,
372 gfp_t gfp)
373 {
374 struct smack_known_list_elem *nklep;
375 struct smack_known_list_elem *oklep;
376
377 list_for_each_entry(oklep, ohead, list) {
378 nklep = kzalloc(sizeof(struct smack_known_list_elem), gfp);
379 if (nklep == NULL) {
380 smk_destroy_label_list(nhead);
381 return -ENOMEM;
382 }
383 nklep->smk_label = oklep->smk_label;
384 list_add(&nklep->list, nhead);
385 }
386
387 return 0;
388 }
389
390 /**
391 * smk_ptrace_mode - helper function for converting PTRACE_MODE_* into MAY_*
392 * @mode - input mode in form of PTRACE_MODE_*
393 *
394 * Returns a converted MAY_* mode usable by smack rules
395 */
396 static inline unsigned int smk_ptrace_mode(unsigned int mode)
397 {
398 if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH)
399 return MAY_READWRITE;
400 if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_READ)
401 return MAY_READ;
402
403 return 0;
404 }
405
406 /**
407 * smk_ptrace_rule_check - helper for ptrace access
408 * @tracer: tracer process
409 * @tracee_known: label entry of the process that's about to be traced
410 * @mode: ptrace attachment mode (PTRACE_MODE_*)
411 * @func: name of the function that called us, used for audit
412 *
413 * Returns 0 on access granted, -error on error
414 */
415 static int smk_ptrace_rule_check(struct task_struct *tracer,
416 struct smack_known *tracee_known,
417 unsigned int mode, const char *func)
418 {
419 int rc;
420 struct smk_audit_info ad, *saip = NULL;
421 struct task_smack *tsp;
422 struct smack_known *tracer_known;
423 const struct cred *tracercred;
424
425 if ((mode & PTRACE_MODE_NOAUDIT) == 0) {
426 smk_ad_init(&ad, func, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);
427 smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, tracer);
428 saip = &ad;
429 }
430
431 rcu_read_lock();
432 tracercred = __task_cred(tracer);
433 tsp = smack_cred(tracercred);
434 tracer_known = smk_of_task(tsp);
435
436 if ((mode & PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH) &&
437 (smack_ptrace_rule == SMACK_PTRACE_EXACT ||
438 smack_ptrace_rule == SMACK_PTRACE_DRACONIAN)) {
439 if (tracer_known->smk_known == tracee_known->smk_known)
440 rc = 0;
441 else if (smack_ptrace_rule == SMACK_PTRACE_DRACONIAN)
442 rc = -EACCES;
443 else if (smack_privileged_cred(CAP_SYS_PTRACE, tracercred))
444 rc = 0;
445 else
446 rc = -EACCES;
447
448 if (saip)
449 smack_log(tracer_known->smk_known,
450 tracee_known->smk_known,
451 0, rc, saip);
452
453 rcu_read_unlock();
454 return rc;
455 }
456
457 /* In case of rule==SMACK_PTRACE_DEFAULT or mode==PTRACE_MODE_READ */
458 rc = smk_tskacc(tsp, tracee_known, smk_ptrace_mode(mode), saip);
459
460 rcu_read_unlock();
461 return rc;
462 }
463
464 /*
465 * LSM hooks.
466 * We he, that is fun!
467 */
468
469 /**
470 * smack_ptrace_access_check - Smack approval on PTRACE_ATTACH
471 * @ctp: child task pointer
472 * @mode: ptrace attachment mode (PTRACE_MODE_*)
473 *
474 * Returns 0 if access is OK, an error code otherwise
475 *
476 * Do the capability checks.
477 */
478 static int smack_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *ctp, unsigned int mode)
479 {
480 struct smack_known *skp;
481
482 skp = smk_of_task_struct(ctp);
483
484 return smk_ptrace_rule_check(current, skp, mode, __func__);
485 }
486
487 /**
488 * smack_ptrace_traceme - Smack approval on PTRACE_TRACEME
489 * @ptp: parent task pointer
490 *
491 * Returns 0 if access is OK, an error code otherwise
492 *
493 * Do the capability checks, and require PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH.
494 */
495 static int smack_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *ptp)
496 {
497 int rc;
498 struct smack_known *skp;
499
500 skp = smk_of_task(smack_cred(current_cred()));
501
502 rc = smk_ptrace_rule_check(ptp, skp, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH, __func__);
503 return rc;
504 }
505
506 /**
507 * smack_syslog - Smack approval on syslog
508 * @typefrom_file: unused
509 *
510 * Returns 0 on success, error code otherwise.
511 */
512 static int smack_syslog(int typefrom_file)
513 {
514 int rc = 0;
515 struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
516
517 if (smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
518 return 0;
519
520 if (smack_syslog_label != NULL && smack_syslog_label != skp)
521 rc = -EACCES;
522
523 return rc;
524 }
525
526 /*
527 * Superblock Hooks.
528 */
529
530 /**
531 * smack_sb_alloc_security - allocate a superblock blob
532 * @sb: the superblock getting the blob
533 *
534 * Returns 0 on success or -ENOMEM on error.
535 */
536 static int smack_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
537 {
538 struct superblock_smack *sbsp;
539
540 sbsp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct superblock_smack), GFP_KERNEL);
541
542 if (sbsp == NULL)
543 return -ENOMEM;
544
545 sbsp->smk_root = &smack_known_floor;
546 sbsp->smk_default = &smack_known_floor;
547 sbsp->smk_floor = &smack_known_floor;
548 sbsp->smk_hat = &smack_known_hat;
549 /*
550 * SMK_SB_INITIALIZED will be zero from kzalloc.
551 */
552 sb->s_security = sbsp;
553
554 return 0;
555 }
556
557 /**
558 * smack_sb_free_security - free a superblock blob
559 * @sb: the superblock getting the blob
560 *
561 */
562 static void smack_sb_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
563 {
564 kfree(sb->s_security);
565 sb->s_security = NULL;
566 }
567
568 struct smack_mnt_opts {
569 const char *fsdefault, *fsfloor, *fshat, *fsroot, *fstransmute;
570 };
571
572 static void smack_free_mnt_opts(void *mnt_opts)
573 {
574 struct smack_mnt_opts *opts = mnt_opts;
575 kfree(opts->fsdefault);
576 kfree(opts->fsfloor);
577 kfree(opts->fshat);
578 kfree(opts->fsroot);
579 kfree(opts->fstransmute);
580 kfree(opts);
581 }
582
583 static int smack_add_opt(int token, const char *s, void **mnt_opts)
584 {
585 struct smack_mnt_opts *opts = *mnt_opts;
586
587 if (!opts) {
588 opts = kzalloc(sizeof(struct smack_mnt_opts), GFP_KERNEL);
589 if (!opts)
590 return -ENOMEM;
591 *mnt_opts = opts;
592 }
593 if (!s)
594 return -ENOMEM;
595
596 switch (token) {
597 case Opt_fsdefault:
598 if (opts->fsdefault)
599 goto out_opt_err;
600 opts->fsdefault = s;
601 break;
602 case Opt_fsfloor:
603 if (opts->fsfloor)
604 goto out_opt_err;
605 opts->fsfloor = s;
606 break;
607 case Opt_fshat:
608 if (opts->fshat)
609 goto out_opt_err;
610 opts->fshat = s;
611 break;
612 case Opt_fsroot:
613 if (opts->fsroot)
614 goto out_opt_err;
615 opts->fsroot = s;
616 break;
617 case Opt_fstransmute:
618 if (opts->fstransmute)
619 goto out_opt_err;
620 opts->fstransmute = s;
621 break;
622 }
623 return 0;
624
625 out_opt_err:
626 pr_warn("Smack: duplicate mount options\n");
627 return -EINVAL;
628 }
629
630 /**
631 * smack_fs_context_dup - Duplicate the security data on fs_context duplication
632 * @fc: The new filesystem context.
633 * @src_fc: The source filesystem context being duplicated.
634 *
635 * Returns 0 on success or -ENOMEM on error.
636 */
637 static int smack_fs_context_dup(struct fs_context *fc,
638 struct fs_context *src_fc)
639 {
640 struct smack_mnt_opts *dst, *src = src_fc->security;
641
642 if (!src)
643 return 0;
644
645 fc->security = kzalloc(sizeof(struct smack_mnt_opts), GFP_KERNEL);
646 if (!fc->security)
647 return -ENOMEM;
648 dst = fc->security;
649
650 if (src->fsdefault) {
651 dst->fsdefault = kstrdup(src->fsdefault, GFP_KERNEL);
652 if (!dst->fsdefault)
653 return -ENOMEM;
654 }
655 if (src->fsfloor) {
656 dst->fsfloor = kstrdup(src->fsfloor, GFP_KERNEL);
657 if (!dst->fsfloor)
658 return -ENOMEM;
659 }
660 if (src->fshat) {
661 dst->fshat = kstrdup(src->fshat, GFP_KERNEL);
662 if (!dst->fshat)
663 return -ENOMEM;
664 }
665 if (src->fsroot) {
666 dst->fsroot = kstrdup(src->fsroot, GFP_KERNEL);
667 if (!dst->fsroot)
668 return -ENOMEM;
669 }
670 if (src->fstransmute) {
671 dst->fstransmute = kstrdup(src->fstransmute, GFP_KERNEL);
672 if (!dst->fstransmute)
673 return -ENOMEM;
674 }
675 return 0;
676 }
677
678 static const struct fs_parameter_spec smack_fs_parameters[] = {
679 fsparam_string("smackfsdef", Opt_fsdefault),
680 fsparam_string("smackfsdefault", Opt_fsdefault),
681 fsparam_string("smackfsfloor", Opt_fsfloor),
682 fsparam_string("smackfshat", Opt_fshat),
683 fsparam_string("smackfsroot", Opt_fsroot),
684 fsparam_string("smackfstransmute", Opt_fstransmute),
685 {}
686 };
687
688 /**
689 * smack_fs_context_parse_param - Parse a single mount parameter
690 * @fc: The new filesystem context being constructed.
691 * @param: The parameter.
692 *
693 * Returns 0 on success, -ENOPARAM to pass the parameter on or anything else on
694 * error.
695 */
696 static int smack_fs_context_parse_param(struct fs_context *fc,
697 struct fs_parameter *param)
698 {
699 struct fs_parse_result result;
700 int opt, rc;
701
702 opt = fs_parse(fc, smack_fs_parameters, param, &result);
703 if (opt < 0)
704 return opt;
705
706 rc = smack_add_opt(opt, param->string, &fc->security);
707 if (!rc)
708 param->string = NULL;
709 return rc;
710 }
711
712 static int smack_sb_eat_lsm_opts(char *options, void **mnt_opts)
713 {
714 char *from = options, *to = options;
715 bool first = true;
716
717 while (1) {
718 char *next = strchr(from, ',');
719 int token, len, rc;
720 char *arg = NULL;
721
722 if (next)
723 len = next - from;
724 else
725 len = strlen(from);
726
727 token = match_opt_prefix(from, len, &arg);
728 if (token != Opt_error) {
729 arg = kmemdup_nul(arg, from + len - arg, GFP_KERNEL);
730 rc = smack_add_opt(token, arg, mnt_opts);
731 if (unlikely(rc)) {
732 kfree(arg);
733 if (*mnt_opts)
734 smack_free_mnt_opts(*mnt_opts);
735 *mnt_opts = NULL;
736 return rc;
737 }
738 } else {
739 if (!first) { // copy with preceding comma
740 from--;
741 len++;
742 }
743 if (to != from)
744 memmove(to, from, len);
745 to += len;
746 first = false;
747 }
748 if (!from[len])
749 break;
750 from += len + 1;
751 }
752 *to = '\0';
753 return 0;
754 }
755
756 /**
757 * smack_set_mnt_opts - set Smack specific mount options
758 * @sb: the file system superblock
759 * @mnt_opts: Smack mount options
760 * @kern_flags: mount option from kernel space or user space
761 * @set_kern_flags: where to store converted mount opts
762 *
763 * Returns 0 on success, an error code on failure
764 *
765 * Allow filesystems with binary mount data to explicitly set Smack mount
766 * labels.
767 */
768 static int smack_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
769 void *mnt_opts,
770 unsigned long kern_flags,
771 unsigned long *set_kern_flags)
772 {
773 struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
774 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(root);
775 struct superblock_smack *sp = sb->s_security;
776 struct inode_smack *isp;
777 struct smack_known *skp;
778 struct smack_mnt_opts *opts = mnt_opts;
779 bool transmute = false;
780
781 if (sp->smk_flags & SMK_SB_INITIALIZED)
782 return 0;
783
784 if (inode->i_security == NULL) {
785 int rc = lsm_inode_alloc(inode);
786
787 if (rc)
788 return rc;
789 }
790
791 if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) {
792 /*
793 * Unprivileged mounts don't get to specify Smack values.
794 */
795 if (opts)
796 return -EPERM;
797 /*
798 * Unprivileged mounts get root and default from the caller.
799 */
800 skp = smk_of_current();
801 sp->smk_root = skp;
802 sp->smk_default = skp;
803 /*
804 * For a handful of fs types with no user-controlled
805 * backing store it's okay to trust security labels
806 * in the filesystem. The rest are untrusted.
807 */
808 if (sb->s_user_ns != &init_user_ns &&
809 sb->s_magic != SYSFS_MAGIC && sb->s_magic != TMPFS_MAGIC &&
810 sb->s_magic != RAMFS_MAGIC) {
811 transmute = true;
812 sp->smk_flags |= SMK_SB_UNTRUSTED;
813 }
814 }
815
816 sp->smk_flags |= SMK_SB_INITIALIZED;
817
818 if (opts) {
819 if (opts->fsdefault) {
820 skp = smk_import_entry(opts->fsdefault, 0);
821 if (IS_ERR(skp))
822 return PTR_ERR(skp);
823 sp->smk_default = skp;
824 }
825 if (opts->fsfloor) {
826 skp = smk_import_entry(opts->fsfloor, 0);
827 if (IS_ERR(skp))
828 return PTR_ERR(skp);
829 sp->smk_floor = skp;
830 }
831 if (opts->fshat) {
832 skp = smk_import_entry(opts->fshat, 0);
833 if (IS_ERR(skp))
834 return PTR_ERR(skp);
835 sp->smk_hat = skp;
836 }
837 if (opts->fsroot) {
838 skp = smk_import_entry(opts->fsroot, 0);
839 if (IS_ERR(skp))
840 return PTR_ERR(skp);
841 sp->smk_root = skp;
842 }
843 if (opts->fstransmute) {
844 skp = smk_import_entry(opts->fstransmute, 0);
845 if (IS_ERR(skp))
846 return PTR_ERR(skp);
847 sp->smk_root = skp;
848 transmute = true;
849 }
850 }
851
852 /*
853 * Initialize the root inode.
854 */
855 init_inode_smack(inode, sp->smk_root);
856
857 if (transmute) {
858 isp = smack_inode(inode);
859 isp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE;
860 }
861
862 return 0;
863 }
864
865 /**
866 * smack_sb_statfs - Smack check on statfs
867 * @dentry: identifies the file system in question
868 *
869 * Returns 0 if current can read the floor of the filesystem,
870 * and error code otherwise
871 */
872 static int smack_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
873 {
874 struct superblock_smack *sbp = dentry->d_sb->s_security;
875 int rc;
876 struct smk_audit_info ad;
877
878 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
879 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
880
881 rc = smk_curacc(sbp->smk_floor, MAY_READ, &ad);
882 rc = smk_bu_current("statfs", sbp->smk_floor, MAY_READ, rc);
883 return rc;
884 }
885
886 /*
887 * BPRM hooks
888 */
889
890 /**
891 * smack_bprm_creds_for_exec - Update bprm->cred if needed for exec
892 * @bprm: the exec information
893 *
894 * Returns 0 if it gets a blob, -EPERM if exec forbidden and -ENOMEM otherwise
895 */
896 static int smack_bprm_creds_for_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
897 {
898 struct inode *inode = file_inode(bprm->file);
899 struct task_smack *bsp = smack_cred(bprm->cred);
900 struct inode_smack *isp;
901 struct superblock_smack *sbsp;
902 int rc;
903
904 isp = smack_inode(inode);
905 if (isp->smk_task == NULL || isp->smk_task == bsp->smk_task)
906 return 0;
907
908 sbsp = inode->i_sb->s_security;
909 if ((sbsp->smk_flags & SMK_SB_UNTRUSTED) &&
910 isp->smk_task != sbsp->smk_root)
911 return 0;
912
913 if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE) {
914 struct task_struct *tracer;
915 rc = 0;
916
917 rcu_read_lock();
918 tracer = ptrace_parent(current);
919 if (likely(tracer != NULL))
920 rc = smk_ptrace_rule_check(tracer,
921 isp->smk_task,
922 PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH,
923 __func__);
924 rcu_read_unlock();
925
926 if (rc != 0)
927 return rc;
928 }
929 if (bprm->unsafe & ~LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE)
930 return -EPERM;
931
932 bsp->smk_task = isp->smk_task;
933 bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
934
935 /* Decide if this is a secure exec. */
936 if (bsp->smk_task != bsp->smk_forked)
937 bprm->secureexec = 1;
938
939 return 0;
940 }
941
942 /*
943 * Inode hooks
944 */
945
946 /**
947 * smack_inode_alloc_security - allocate an inode blob
948 * @inode: the inode in need of a blob
949 *
950 * Returns 0
951 */
952 static int smack_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
953 {
954 struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
955
956 init_inode_smack(inode, skp);
957 return 0;
958 }
959
960 /**
961 * smack_inode_init_security - copy out the smack from an inode
962 * @inode: the newly created inode
963 * @dir: containing directory object
964 * @qstr: unused
965 * @name: where to put the attribute name
966 * @value: where to put the attribute value
967 * @len: where to put the length of the attribute
968 *
969 * Returns 0 if it all works out, -ENOMEM if there's no memory
970 */
971 static int smack_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
972 const struct qstr *qstr, const char **name,
973 void **value, size_t *len)
974 {
975 struct inode_smack *issp = smack_inode(inode);
976 struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
977 struct smack_known *isp = smk_of_inode(inode);
978 struct smack_known *dsp = smk_of_inode(dir);
979 int may;
980
981 if (name)
982 *name = XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX;
983
984 if (value && len) {
985 rcu_read_lock();
986 may = smk_access_entry(skp->smk_known, dsp->smk_known,
987 &skp->smk_rules);
988 rcu_read_unlock();
989
990 /*
991 * If the access rule allows transmutation and
992 * the directory requests transmutation then
993 * by all means transmute.
994 * Mark the inode as changed.
995 */
996 if (may > 0 && ((may & MAY_TRANSMUTE) != 0) &&
997 smk_inode_transmutable(dir)) {
998 isp = dsp;
999 issp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_CHANGED;
1000 }
1001
1002 *value = kstrdup(isp->smk_known, GFP_NOFS);
1003 if (*value == NULL)
1004 return -ENOMEM;
1005
1006 *len = strlen(isp->smk_known);
1007 }
1008
1009 return 0;
1010 }
1011
1012 /**
1013 * smack_inode_link - Smack check on link
1014 * @old_dentry: the existing object
1015 * @dir: unused
1016 * @new_dentry: the new object
1017 *
1018 * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
1019 */
1020 static int smack_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir,
1021 struct dentry *new_dentry)
1022 {
1023 struct smack_known *isp;
1024 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1025 int rc;
1026
1027 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
1028 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, old_dentry);
1029
1030 isp = smk_of_inode(d_backing_inode(old_dentry));
1031 rc = smk_curacc(isp, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1032 rc = smk_bu_inode(d_backing_inode(old_dentry), MAY_WRITE, rc);
1033
1034 if (rc == 0 && d_is_positive(new_dentry)) {
1035 isp = smk_of_inode(d_backing_inode(new_dentry));
1036 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, new_dentry);
1037 rc = smk_curacc(isp, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1038 rc = smk_bu_inode(d_backing_inode(new_dentry), MAY_WRITE, rc);
1039 }
1040
1041 return rc;
1042 }
1043
1044 /**
1045 * smack_inode_unlink - Smack check on inode deletion
1046 * @dir: containing directory object
1047 * @dentry: file to unlink
1048 *
1049 * Returns 0 if current can write the containing directory
1050 * and the object, error code otherwise
1051 */
1052 static int smack_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
1053 {
1054 struct inode *ip = d_backing_inode(dentry);
1055 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1056 int rc;
1057
1058 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
1059 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
1060
1061 /*
1062 * You need write access to the thing you're unlinking
1063 */
1064 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(ip), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1065 rc = smk_bu_inode(ip, MAY_WRITE, rc);
1066 if (rc == 0) {
1067 /*
1068 * You also need write access to the containing directory
1069 */
1070 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_INODE);
1071 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_inode(&ad, dir);
1072 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dir), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1073 rc = smk_bu_inode(dir, MAY_WRITE, rc);
1074 }
1075 return rc;
1076 }
1077
1078 /**
1079 * smack_inode_rmdir - Smack check on directory deletion
1080 * @dir: containing directory object
1081 * @dentry: directory to unlink
1082 *
1083 * Returns 0 if current can write the containing directory
1084 * and the directory, error code otherwise
1085 */
1086 static int smack_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
1087 {
1088 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1089 int rc;
1090
1091 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
1092 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
1093
1094 /*
1095 * You need write access to the thing you're removing
1096 */
1097 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry)), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1098 rc = smk_bu_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry), MAY_WRITE, rc);
1099 if (rc == 0) {
1100 /*
1101 * You also need write access to the containing directory
1102 */
1103 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_INODE);
1104 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_inode(&ad, dir);
1105 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dir), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1106 rc = smk_bu_inode(dir, MAY_WRITE, rc);
1107 }
1108
1109 return rc;
1110 }
1111
1112 /**
1113 * smack_inode_rename - Smack check on rename
1114 * @old_inode: unused
1115 * @old_dentry: the old object
1116 * @new_inode: unused
1117 * @new_dentry: the new object
1118 *
1119 * Read and write access is required on both the old and
1120 * new directories.
1121 *
1122 * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
1123 */
1124 static int smack_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode,
1125 struct dentry *old_dentry,
1126 struct inode *new_inode,
1127 struct dentry *new_dentry)
1128 {
1129 int rc;
1130 struct smack_known *isp;
1131 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1132
1133 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
1134 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, old_dentry);
1135
1136 isp = smk_of_inode(d_backing_inode(old_dentry));
1137 rc = smk_curacc(isp, MAY_READWRITE, &ad);
1138 rc = smk_bu_inode(d_backing_inode(old_dentry), MAY_READWRITE, rc);
1139
1140 if (rc == 0 && d_is_positive(new_dentry)) {
1141 isp = smk_of_inode(d_backing_inode(new_dentry));
1142 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, new_dentry);
1143 rc = smk_curacc(isp, MAY_READWRITE, &ad);
1144 rc = smk_bu_inode(d_backing_inode(new_dentry), MAY_READWRITE, rc);
1145 }
1146 return rc;
1147 }
1148
1149 /**
1150 * smack_inode_permission - Smack version of permission()
1151 * @inode: the inode in question
1152 * @mask: the access requested
1153 *
1154 * This is the important Smack hook.
1155 *
1156 * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
1157 */
1158 static int smack_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
1159 {
1160 struct superblock_smack *sbsp = inode->i_sb->s_security;
1161 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1162 int no_block = mask & MAY_NOT_BLOCK;
1163 int rc;
1164
1165 mask &= (MAY_READ|MAY_WRITE|MAY_EXEC|MAY_APPEND);
1166 /*
1167 * No permission to check. Existence test. Yup, it's there.
1168 */
1169 if (mask == 0)
1170 return 0;
1171
1172 if (sbsp->smk_flags & SMK_SB_UNTRUSTED) {
1173 if (smk_of_inode(inode) != sbsp->smk_root)
1174 return -EACCES;
1175 }
1176
1177 /* May be droppable after audit */
1178 if (no_block)
1179 return -ECHILD;
1180 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_INODE);
1181 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_inode(&ad, inode);
1182 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(inode), mask, &ad);
1183 rc = smk_bu_inode(inode, mask, rc);
1184 return rc;
1185 }
1186
1187 /**
1188 * smack_inode_setattr - Smack check for setting attributes
1189 * @dentry: the object
1190 * @iattr: for the force flag
1191 *
1192 * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
1193 */
1194 static int smack_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
1195 {
1196 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1197 int rc;
1198
1199 /*
1200 * Need to allow for clearing the setuid bit.
1201 */
1202 if (iattr->ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE)
1203 return 0;
1204 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
1205 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
1206
1207 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry)), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1208 rc = smk_bu_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry), MAY_WRITE, rc);
1209 return rc;
1210 }
1211
1212 /**
1213 * smack_inode_getattr - Smack check for getting attributes
1214 * @path: path to extract the info from
1215 *
1216 * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
1217 */
1218 static int smack_inode_getattr(const struct path *path)
1219 {
1220 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1221 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(path->dentry);
1222 int rc;
1223
1224 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
1225 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, *path);
1226 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(inode), MAY_READ, &ad);
1227 rc = smk_bu_inode(inode, MAY_READ, rc);
1228 return rc;
1229 }
1230
1231 /**
1232 * smack_inode_setxattr - Smack check for setting xattrs
1233 * @dentry: the object
1234 * @name: name of the attribute
1235 * @value: value of the attribute
1236 * @size: size of the value
1237 * @flags: unused
1238 *
1239 * This protects the Smack attribute explicitly.
1240 *
1241 * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
1242 */
1243 static int smack_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
1244 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
1245 {
1246 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1247 struct smack_known *skp;
1248 int check_priv = 0;
1249 int check_import = 0;
1250 int check_star = 0;
1251 int rc = 0;
1252
1253 /*
1254 * Check label validity here so import won't fail in post_setxattr
1255 */
1256 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK) == 0 ||
1257 strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPIN) == 0 ||
1258 strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPOUT) == 0) {
1259 check_priv = 1;
1260 check_import = 1;
1261 } else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC) == 0 ||
1262 strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP) == 0) {
1263 check_priv = 1;
1264 check_import = 1;
1265 check_star = 1;
1266 } else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE) == 0) {
1267 check_priv = 1;
1268 if (size != TRANS_TRUE_SIZE ||
1269 strncmp(value, TRANS_TRUE, TRANS_TRUE_SIZE) != 0)
1270 rc = -EINVAL;
1271 } else
1272 rc = cap_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags);
1273
1274 if (check_priv && !smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
1275 rc = -EPERM;
1276
1277 if (rc == 0 && check_import) {
1278 skp = size ? smk_import_entry(value, size) : NULL;
1279 if (IS_ERR(skp))
1280 rc = PTR_ERR(skp);
1281 else if (skp == NULL || (check_star &&
1282 (skp == &smack_known_star || skp == &smack_known_web)))
1283 rc = -EINVAL;
1284 }
1285
1286 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
1287 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
1288
1289 if (rc == 0) {
1290 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry)), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1291 rc = smk_bu_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry), MAY_WRITE, rc);
1292 }
1293
1294 return rc;
1295 }
1296
1297 /**
1298 * smack_inode_post_setxattr - Apply the Smack update approved above
1299 * @dentry: object
1300 * @name: attribute name
1301 * @value: attribute value
1302 * @size: attribute size
1303 * @flags: unused
1304 *
1305 * Set the pointer in the inode blob to the entry found
1306 * in the master label list.
1307 */
1308 static void smack_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
1309 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
1310 {
1311 struct smack_known *skp;
1312 struct inode_smack *isp = smack_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry));
1313
1314 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE) == 0) {
1315 isp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE;
1316 return;
1317 }
1318
1319 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK) == 0) {
1320 skp = smk_import_entry(value, size);
1321 if (!IS_ERR(skp))
1322 isp->smk_inode = skp;
1323 } else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC) == 0) {
1324 skp = smk_import_entry(value, size);
1325 if (!IS_ERR(skp))
1326 isp->smk_task = skp;
1327 } else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP) == 0) {
1328 skp = smk_import_entry(value, size);
1329 if (!IS_ERR(skp))
1330 isp->smk_mmap = skp;
1331 }
1332
1333 return;
1334 }
1335
1336 /**
1337 * smack_inode_getxattr - Smack check on getxattr
1338 * @dentry: the object
1339 * @name: unused
1340 *
1341 * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
1342 */
1343 static int smack_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
1344 {
1345 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1346 int rc;
1347
1348 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
1349 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
1350
1351 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry)), MAY_READ, &ad);
1352 rc = smk_bu_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry), MAY_READ, rc);
1353 return rc;
1354 }
1355
1356 /**
1357 * smack_inode_removexattr - Smack check on removexattr
1358 * @dentry: the object
1359 * @name: name of the attribute
1360 *
1361 * Removing the Smack attribute requires CAP_MAC_ADMIN
1362 *
1363 * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
1364 */
1365 static int smack_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
1366 {
1367 struct inode_smack *isp;
1368 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1369 int rc = 0;
1370
1371 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK) == 0 ||
1372 strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPIN) == 0 ||
1373 strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPOUT) == 0 ||
1374 strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC) == 0 ||
1375 strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE) == 0 ||
1376 strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP) == 0) {
1377 if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
1378 rc = -EPERM;
1379 } else
1380 rc = cap_inode_removexattr(dentry, name);
1381
1382 if (rc != 0)
1383 return rc;
1384
1385 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
1386 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
1387
1388 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry)), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1389 rc = smk_bu_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry), MAY_WRITE, rc);
1390 if (rc != 0)
1391 return rc;
1392
1393 isp = smack_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry));
1394 /*
1395 * Don't do anything special for these.
1396 * XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPIN
1397 * XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPOUT
1398 */
1399 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK) == 0) {
1400 struct super_block *sbp = dentry->d_sb;
1401 struct superblock_smack *sbsp = sbp->s_security;
1402
1403 isp->smk_inode = sbsp->smk_default;
1404 } else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC) == 0)
1405 isp->smk_task = NULL;
1406 else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP) == 0)
1407 isp->smk_mmap = NULL;
1408 else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE) == 0)
1409 isp->smk_flags &= ~SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE;
1410
1411 return 0;
1412 }
1413
1414 /**
1415 * smack_inode_getsecurity - get smack xattrs
1416 * @inode: the object
1417 * @name: attribute name
1418 * @buffer: where to put the result
1419 * @alloc: duplicate memory
1420 *
1421 * Returns the size of the attribute or an error code
1422 */
1423 static int smack_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode,
1424 const char *name, void **buffer,
1425 bool alloc)
1426 {
1427 struct socket_smack *ssp;
1428 struct socket *sock;
1429 struct super_block *sbp;
1430 struct inode *ip = (struct inode *)inode;
1431 struct smack_known *isp;
1432
1433 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX) == 0)
1434 isp = smk_of_inode(inode);
1435 else {
1436 /*
1437 * The rest of the Smack xattrs are only on sockets.
1438 */
1439 sbp = ip->i_sb;
1440 if (sbp->s_magic != SOCKFS_MAGIC)
1441 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
1442
1443 sock = SOCKET_I(ip);
1444 if (sock == NULL || sock->sk == NULL)
1445 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
1446
1447 ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
1448
1449 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_IPIN) == 0)
1450 isp = ssp->smk_in;
1451 else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_IPOUT) == 0)
1452 isp = ssp->smk_out;
1453 else
1454 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
1455 }
1456
1457 if (alloc) {
1458 *buffer = kstrdup(isp->smk_known, GFP_KERNEL);
1459 if (*buffer == NULL)
1460 return -ENOMEM;
1461 }
1462
1463 return strlen(isp->smk_known);
1464 }
1465
1466
1467 /**
1468 * smack_inode_listsecurity - list the Smack attributes
1469 * @inode: the object
1470 * @buffer: where they go
1471 * @buffer_size: size of buffer
1472 */
1473 static int smack_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer,
1474 size_t buffer_size)
1475 {
1476 int len = sizeof(XATTR_NAME_SMACK);
1477
1478 if (buffer != NULL && len <= buffer_size)
1479 memcpy(buffer, XATTR_NAME_SMACK, len);
1480
1481 return len;
1482 }
1483
1484 /**
1485 * smack_inode_getsecid - Extract inode's security id
1486 * @inode: inode to extract the info from
1487 * @secid: where result will be saved
1488 */
1489 static void smack_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
1490 {
1491 struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_inode(inode);
1492
1493 *secid = skp->smk_secid;
1494 }
1495
1496 /*
1497 * File Hooks
1498 */
1499
1500 /*
1501 * There is no smack_file_permission hook
1502 *
1503 * Should access checks be done on each read or write?
1504 * UNICOS and SELinux say yes.
1505 * Trusted Solaris, Trusted Irix, and just about everyone else says no.
1506 *
1507 * I'll say no for now. Smack does not do the frequent
1508 * label changing that SELinux does.
1509 */
1510
1511 /**
1512 * smack_file_alloc_security - assign a file security blob
1513 * @file: the object
1514 *
1515 * The security blob for a file is a pointer to the master
1516 * label list, so no allocation is done.
1517 *
1518 * f_security is the owner security information. It
1519 * isn't used on file access checks, it's for send_sigio.
1520 *
1521 * Returns 0
1522 */
1523 static int smack_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
1524 {
1525 struct smack_known **blob = smack_file(file);
1526
1527 *blob = smk_of_current();
1528 return 0;
1529 }
1530
1531 /**
1532 * smack_file_ioctl - Smack check on ioctls
1533 * @file: the object
1534 * @cmd: what to do
1535 * @arg: unused
1536 *
1537 * Relies heavily on the correct use of the ioctl command conventions.
1538 *
1539 * Returns 0 if allowed, error code otherwise
1540 */
1541 static int smack_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
1542 unsigned long arg)
1543 {
1544 int rc = 0;
1545 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1546 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
1547
1548 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
1549 return 0;
1550
1551 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
1552 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, file->f_path);
1553
1554 if (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_WRITE) {
1555 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(inode), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1556 rc = smk_bu_file(file, MAY_WRITE, rc);
1557 }
1558
1559 if (rc == 0 && (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_READ)) {
1560 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(inode), MAY_READ, &ad);
1561 rc = smk_bu_file(file, MAY_READ, rc);
1562 }
1563
1564 return rc;
1565 }
1566
1567 /**
1568 * smack_file_lock - Smack check on file locking
1569 * @file: the object
1570 * @cmd: unused
1571 *
1572 * Returns 0 if current has lock access, error code otherwise
1573 */
1574 static int smack_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
1575 {
1576 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1577 int rc;
1578 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
1579
1580 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
1581 return 0;
1582
1583 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
1584 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, file->f_path);
1585 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(inode), MAY_LOCK, &ad);
1586 rc = smk_bu_file(file, MAY_LOCK, rc);
1587 return rc;
1588 }
1589
1590 /**
1591 * smack_file_fcntl - Smack check on fcntl
1592 * @file: the object
1593 * @cmd: what action to check
1594 * @arg: unused
1595 *
1596 * Generally these operations are harmless.
1597 * File locking operations present an obvious mechanism
1598 * for passing information, so they require write access.
1599 *
1600 * Returns 0 if current has access, error code otherwise
1601 */
1602 static int smack_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
1603 unsigned long arg)
1604 {
1605 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1606 int rc = 0;
1607 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
1608
1609 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
1610 return 0;
1611
1612 switch (cmd) {
1613 case F_GETLK:
1614 break;
1615 case F_SETLK:
1616 case F_SETLKW:
1617 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
1618 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, file->f_path);
1619 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(inode), MAY_LOCK, &ad);
1620 rc = smk_bu_file(file, MAY_LOCK, rc);
1621 break;
1622 case F_SETOWN:
1623 case F_SETSIG:
1624 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
1625 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, file->f_path);
1626 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(inode), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1627 rc = smk_bu_file(file, MAY_WRITE, rc);
1628 break;
1629 default:
1630 break;
1631 }
1632
1633 return rc;
1634 }
1635
1636 /**
1637 * smack_mmap_file :
1638 * Check permissions for a mmap operation. The @file may be NULL, e.g.
1639 * if mapping anonymous memory.
1640 * @file contains the file structure for file to map (may be NULL).
1641 * @reqprot contains the protection requested by the application.
1642 * @prot contains the protection that will be applied by the kernel.
1643 * @flags contains the operational flags.
1644 * Return 0 if permission is granted.
1645 */
1646 static int smack_mmap_file(struct file *file,
1647 unsigned long reqprot, unsigned long prot,
1648 unsigned long flags)
1649 {
1650 struct smack_known *skp;
1651 struct smack_known *mkp;
1652 struct smack_rule *srp;
1653 struct task_smack *tsp;
1654 struct smack_known *okp;
1655 struct inode_smack *isp;
1656 struct superblock_smack *sbsp;
1657 int may;
1658 int mmay;
1659 int tmay;
1660 int rc;
1661
1662 if (file == NULL)
1663 return 0;
1664
1665 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(file_inode(file))))
1666 return 0;
1667
1668 isp = smack_inode(file_inode(file));
1669 if (isp->smk_mmap == NULL)
1670 return 0;
1671 sbsp = file_inode(file)->i_sb->s_security;
1672 if (sbsp->smk_flags & SMK_SB_UNTRUSTED &&
1673 isp->smk_mmap != sbsp->smk_root)
1674 return -EACCES;
1675 mkp = isp->smk_mmap;
1676
1677 tsp = smack_cred(current_cred());
1678 skp = smk_of_current();
1679 rc = 0;
1680
1681 rcu_read_lock();
1682 /*
1683 * For each Smack rule associated with the subject
1684 * label verify that the SMACK64MMAP also has access
1685 * to that rule's object label.
1686 */
1687 list_for_each_entry_rcu(srp, &skp->smk_rules, list) {
1688 okp = srp->smk_object;
1689 /*
1690 * Matching labels always allows access.
1691 */
1692 if (mkp->smk_known == okp->smk_known)
1693 continue;
1694 /*
1695 * If there is a matching local rule take
1696 * that into account as well.
1697 */
1698 may = smk_access_entry(srp->smk_subject->smk_known,
1699 okp->smk_known,
1700 &tsp->smk_rules);
1701 if (may == -ENOENT)
1702 may = srp->smk_access;
1703 else
1704 may &= srp->smk_access;
1705 /*
1706 * If may is zero the SMACK64MMAP subject can't
1707 * possibly have less access.
1708 */
1709 if (may == 0)
1710 continue;
1711
1712 /*
1713 * Fetch the global list entry.
1714 * If there isn't one a SMACK64MMAP subject
1715 * can't have as much access as current.
1716 */
1717 mmay = smk_access_entry(mkp->smk_known, okp->smk_known,
1718 &mkp->smk_rules);
1719 if (mmay == -ENOENT) {
1720 rc = -EACCES;
1721 break;
1722 }
1723 /*
1724 * If there is a local entry it modifies the
1725 * potential access, too.
1726 */
1727 tmay = smk_access_entry(mkp->smk_known, okp->smk_known,
1728 &tsp->smk_rules);
1729 if (tmay != -ENOENT)
1730 mmay &= tmay;
1731
1732 /*
1733 * If there is any access available to current that is
1734 * not available to a SMACK64MMAP subject
1735 * deny access.
1736 */
1737 if ((may | mmay) != mmay) {
1738 rc = -EACCES;
1739 break;
1740 }
1741 }
1742
1743 rcu_read_unlock();
1744
1745 return rc;
1746 }
1747
1748 /**
1749 * smack_file_set_fowner - set the file security blob value
1750 * @file: object in question
1751 *
1752 */
1753 static void smack_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
1754 {
1755 struct smack_known **blob = smack_file(file);
1756
1757 *blob = smk_of_current();
1758 }
1759
1760 /**
1761 * smack_file_send_sigiotask - Smack on sigio
1762 * @tsk: The target task
1763 * @fown: the object the signal come from
1764 * @signum: unused
1765 *
1766 * Allow a privileged task to get signals even if it shouldn't
1767 *
1768 * Returns 0 if a subject with the object's smack could
1769 * write to the task, an error code otherwise.
1770 */
1771 static int smack_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
1772 struct fown_struct *fown, int signum)
1773 {
1774 struct smack_known **blob;
1775 struct smack_known *skp;
1776 struct smack_known *tkp = smk_of_task(smack_cred(tsk->cred));
1777 const struct cred *tcred;
1778 struct file *file;
1779 int rc;
1780 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1781
1782 /*
1783 * struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file
1784 */
1785 file = container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner);
1786
1787 /* we don't log here as rc can be overriden */
1788 blob = smack_file(file);
1789 skp = *blob;
1790 rc = smk_access(skp, tkp, MAY_DELIVER, NULL);
1791 rc = smk_bu_note("sigiotask", skp, tkp, MAY_DELIVER, rc);
1792
1793 rcu_read_lock();
1794 tcred = __task_cred(tsk);
1795 if (rc != 0 && smack_privileged_cred(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE, tcred))
1796 rc = 0;
1797 rcu_read_unlock();
1798
1799 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);
1800 smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, tsk);
1801 smack_log(skp->smk_known, tkp->smk_known, MAY_DELIVER, rc, &ad);
1802 return rc;
1803 }
1804
1805 /**
1806 * smack_file_receive - Smack file receive check
1807 * @file: the object
1808 *
1809 * Returns 0 if current has access, error code otherwise
1810 */
1811 static int smack_file_receive(struct file *file)
1812 {
1813 int rc;
1814 int may = 0;
1815 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1816 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
1817 struct socket *sock;
1818 struct task_smack *tsp;
1819 struct socket_smack *ssp;
1820
1821 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
1822 return 0;
1823
1824 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
1825 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, file->f_path);
1826
1827 if (inode->i_sb->s_magic == SOCKFS_MAGIC) {
1828 sock = SOCKET_I(inode);
1829 ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
1830 tsp = smack_cred(current_cred());
1831 /*
1832 * If the receiving process can't write to the
1833 * passed socket or if the passed socket can't
1834 * write to the receiving process don't accept
1835 * the passed socket.
1836 */
1837 rc = smk_access(tsp->smk_task, ssp->smk_out, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1838 rc = smk_bu_file(file, may, rc);
1839 if (rc < 0)
1840 return rc;
1841 rc = smk_access(ssp->smk_in, tsp->smk_task, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1842 rc = smk_bu_file(file, may, rc);
1843 return rc;
1844 }
1845 /*
1846 * This code relies on bitmasks.
1847 */
1848 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)
1849 may = MAY_READ;
1850 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE)
1851 may |= MAY_WRITE;
1852
1853 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(inode), may, &ad);
1854 rc = smk_bu_file(file, may, rc);
1855 return rc;
1856 }
1857
1858 /**
1859 * smack_file_open - Smack dentry open processing
1860 * @file: the object
1861 *
1862 * Set the security blob in the file structure.
1863 * Allow the open only if the task has read access. There are
1864 * many read operations (e.g. fstat) that you can do with an
1865 * fd even if you have the file open write-only.
1866 *
1867 * Returns 0 if current has access, error code otherwise
1868 */
1869 static int smack_file_open(struct file *file)
1870 {
1871 struct task_smack *tsp = smack_cred(file->f_cred);
1872 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
1873 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1874 int rc;
1875
1876 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
1877 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, file->f_path);
1878 rc = smk_tskacc(tsp, smk_of_inode(inode), MAY_READ, &ad);
1879 rc = smk_bu_credfile(file->f_cred, file, MAY_READ, rc);
1880
1881 return rc;
1882 }
1883
1884 /*
1885 * Task hooks
1886 */
1887
1888 /**
1889 * smack_cred_alloc_blank - "allocate" blank task-level security credentials
1890 * @cred: the new credentials
1891 * @gfp: the atomicity of any memory allocations
1892 *
1893 * Prepare a blank set of credentials for modification. This must allocate all
1894 * the memory the LSM module might require such that cred_transfer() can
1895 * complete without error.
1896 */
1897 static int smack_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp)
1898 {
1899 init_task_smack(smack_cred(cred), NULL, NULL);
1900 return 0;
1901 }
1902
1903
1904 /**
1905 * smack_cred_free - "free" task-level security credentials
1906 * @cred: the credentials in question
1907 *
1908 */
1909 static void smack_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
1910 {
1911 struct task_smack *tsp = smack_cred(cred);
1912 struct smack_rule *rp;
1913 struct list_head *l;
1914 struct list_head *n;
1915
1916 smk_destroy_label_list(&tsp->smk_relabel);
1917
1918 list_for_each_safe(l, n, &tsp->smk_rules) {
1919 rp = list_entry(l, struct smack_rule, list);
1920 list_del(&rp->list);
1921 kmem_cache_free(smack_rule_cache, rp);
1922 }
1923 }
1924
1925 /**
1926 * smack_cred_prepare - prepare new set of credentials for modification
1927 * @new: the new credentials
1928 * @old: the original credentials
1929 * @gfp: the atomicity of any memory allocations
1930 *
1931 * Prepare a new set of credentials for modification.
1932 */
1933 static int smack_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
1934 gfp_t gfp)
1935 {
1936 struct task_smack *old_tsp = smack_cred(old);
1937 struct task_smack *new_tsp = smack_cred(new);
1938 int rc;
1939
1940 init_task_smack(new_tsp, old_tsp->smk_task, old_tsp->smk_task);
1941
1942 rc = smk_copy_rules(&new_tsp->smk_rules, &old_tsp->smk_rules, gfp);
1943 if (rc != 0)
1944 return rc;
1945
1946 rc = smk_copy_relabel(&new_tsp->smk_relabel, &old_tsp->smk_relabel,
1947 gfp);
1948 return rc;
1949 }
1950
1951 /**
1952 * smack_cred_transfer - Transfer the old credentials to the new credentials
1953 * @new: the new credentials
1954 * @old: the original credentials
1955 *
1956 * Fill in a set of blank credentials from another set of credentials.
1957 */
1958 static void smack_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
1959 {
1960 struct task_smack *old_tsp = smack_cred(old);
1961 struct task_smack *new_tsp = smack_cred(new);
1962
1963 new_tsp->smk_task = old_tsp->smk_task;
1964 new_tsp->smk_forked = old_tsp->smk_task;
1965 mutex_init(&new_tsp->smk_rules_lock);
1966 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&new_tsp->smk_rules);
1967
1968 /* cbs copy rule list */
1969 }
1970
1971 /**
1972 * smack_cred_getsecid - get the secid corresponding to a creds structure
1973 * @cred: the object creds
1974 * @secid: where to put the result
1975 *
1976 * Sets the secid to contain a u32 version of the smack label.
1977 */
1978 static void smack_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *cred, u32 *secid)
1979 {
1980 struct smack_known *skp;
1981
1982 rcu_read_lock();
1983 skp = smk_of_task(smack_cred(cred));
1984 *secid = skp->smk_secid;
1985 rcu_read_unlock();
1986 }
1987
1988 /**
1989 * smack_kernel_act_as - Set the subjective context in a set of credentials
1990 * @new: points to the set of credentials to be modified.
1991 * @secid: specifies the security ID to be set
1992 *
1993 * Set the security data for a kernel service.
1994 */
1995 static int smack_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
1996 {
1997 struct task_smack *new_tsp = smack_cred(new);
1998
1999 new_tsp->smk_task = smack_from_secid(secid);
2000 return 0;
2001 }
2002
2003 /**
2004 * smack_kernel_create_files_as - Set the file creation label in a set of creds
2005 * @new: points to the set of credentials to be modified
2006 * @inode: points to the inode to use as a reference
2007 *
2008 * Set the file creation context in a set of credentials to the same
2009 * as the objective context of the specified inode
2010 */
2011 static int smack_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new,
2012 struct inode *inode)
2013 {
2014 struct inode_smack *isp = smack_inode(inode);
2015 struct task_smack *tsp = smack_cred(new);
2016
2017 tsp->smk_forked = isp->smk_inode;
2018 tsp->smk_task = tsp->smk_forked;
2019 return 0;
2020 }
2021
2022 /**
2023 * smk_curacc_on_task - helper to log task related access
2024 * @p: the task object
2025 * @access: the access requested
2026 * @caller: name of the calling function for audit
2027 *
2028 * Return 0 if access is permitted
2029 */
2030 static int smk_curacc_on_task(struct task_struct *p, int access,
2031 const char *caller)
2032 {
2033 struct smk_audit_info ad;
2034 struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task_struct(p);
2035 int rc;
2036
2037 smk_ad_init(&ad, caller, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);
2038 smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, p);
2039 rc = smk_curacc(skp, access, &ad);
2040 rc = smk_bu_task(p, access, rc);
2041 return rc;
2042 }
2043
2044 /**
2045 * smack_task_setpgid - Smack check on setting pgid
2046 * @p: the task object
2047 * @pgid: unused
2048 *
2049 * Return 0 if write access is permitted
2050 */
2051 static int smack_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
2052 {
2053 return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_WRITE, __func__);
2054 }
2055
2056 /**
2057 * smack_task_getpgid - Smack access check for getpgid
2058 * @p: the object task
2059 *
2060 * Returns 0 if current can read the object task, error code otherwise
2061 */
2062 static int smack_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p)
2063 {
2064 return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_READ, __func__);
2065 }
2066
2067 /**
2068 * smack_task_getsid - Smack access check for getsid
2069 * @p: the object task
2070 *
2071 * Returns 0 if current can read the object task, error code otherwise
2072 */
2073 static int smack_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
2074 {
2075 return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_READ, __func__);
2076 }
2077
2078 /**
2079 * smack_task_getsecid - get the secid of the task
2080 * @p: the object task
2081 * @secid: where to put the result
2082 *
2083 * Sets the secid to contain a u32 version of the smack label.
2084 */
2085 static void smack_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
2086 {
2087 struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task_struct(p);
2088
2089 *secid = skp->smk_secid;
2090 }
2091
2092 /**
2093 * smack_task_setnice - Smack check on setting nice
2094 * @p: the task object
2095 * @nice: unused
2096 *
2097 * Return 0 if write access is permitted
2098 */
2099 static int smack_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
2100 {
2101 return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_WRITE, __func__);
2102 }
2103
2104 /**
2105 * smack_task_setioprio - Smack check on setting ioprio
2106 * @p: the task object
2107 * @ioprio: unused
2108 *
2109 * Return 0 if write access is permitted
2110 */
2111 static int smack_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
2112 {
2113 return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_WRITE, __func__);
2114 }
2115
2116 /**
2117 * smack_task_getioprio - Smack check on reading ioprio
2118 * @p: the task object
2119 *
2120 * Return 0 if read access is permitted
2121 */
2122 static int smack_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p)
2123 {
2124 return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_READ, __func__);
2125 }
2126
2127 /**
2128 * smack_task_setscheduler - Smack check on setting scheduler
2129 * @p: the task object
2130 *
2131 * Return 0 if read access is permitted
2132 */
2133 static int smack_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
2134 {
2135 return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_WRITE, __func__);
2136 }
2137
2138 /**
2139 * smack_task_getscheduler - Smack check on reading scheduler
2140 * @p: the task object
2141 *
2142 * Return 0 if read access is permitted
2143 */
2144 static int smack_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
2145 {
2146 return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_READ, __func__);
2147 }
2148
2149 /**
2150 * smack_task_movememory - Smack check on moving memory
2151 * @p: the task object
2152 *
2153 * Return 0 if write access is permitted
2154 */
2155 static int smack_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
2156 {
2157 return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_WRITE, __func__);
2158 }
2159
2160 /**
2161 * smack_task_kill - Smack check on signal delivery
2162 * @p: the task object
2163 * @info: unused
2164 * @sig: unused
2165 * @cred: identifies the cred to use in lieu of current's
2166 *
2167 * Return 0 if write access is permitted
2168 *
2169 */
2170 static int smack_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct kernel_siginfo *info,
2171 int sig, const struct cred *cred)
2172 {
2173 struct smk_audit_info ad;
2174 struct smack_known *skp;
2175 struct smack_known *tkp = smk_of_task_struct(p);
2176 int rc;
2177
2178 if (!sig)
2179 return 0; /* null signal; existence test */
2180
2181 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);
2182 smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, p);
2183 /*
2184 * Sending a signal requires that the sender
2185 * can write the receiver.
2186 */
2187 if (cred == NULL) {
2188 rc = smk_curacc(tkp, MAY_DELIVER, &ad);
2189 rc = smk_bu_task(p, MAY_DELIVER, rc);
2190 return rc;
2191 }
2192 /*
2193 * If the cred isn't NULL we're dealing with some USB IO
2194 * specific behavior. This is not clean. For one thing
2195 * we can't take privilege into account.
2196 */
2197 skp = smk_of_task(smack_cred(cred));
2198 rc = smk_access(skp, tkp, MAY_DELIVER, &ad);
2199 rc = smk_bu_note("USB signal", skp, tkp, MAY_DELIVER, rc);
2200 return rc;
2201 }
2202
2203 /**
2204 * smack_task_to_inode - copy task smack into the inode blob
2205 * @p: task to copy from
2206 * @inode: inode to copy to
2207 *
2208 * Sets the smack pointer in the inode security blob
2209 */
2210 static void smack_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode)
2211 {
2212 struct inode_smack *isp = smack_inode(inode);
2213 struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task_struct(p);
2214
2215 isp->smk_inode = skp;
2216 isp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_INSTANT;
2217 }
2218
2219 /*
2220 * Socket hooks.
2221 */
2222
2223 /**
2224 * smack_sk_alloc_security - Allocate a socket blob
2225 * @sk: the socket
2226 * @family: unused
2227 * @gfp_flags: memory allocation flags
2228 *
2229 * Assign Smack pointers to current
2230 *
2231 * Returns 0 on success, -ENOMEM is there's no memory
2232 */
2233 static int smack_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t gfp_flags)
2234 {
2235 struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
2236 struct socket_smack *ssp;
2237
2238 ssp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct socket_smack), gfp_flags);
2239 if (ssp == NULL)
2240 return -ENOMEM;
2241
2242 /*
2243 * Sockets created by kernel threads receive web label.
2244 */
2245 if (unlikely(current->flags & PF_KTHREAD)) {
2246 ssp->smk_in = &smack_known_web;
2247 ssp->smk_out = &smack_known_web;
2248 } else {
2249 ssp->smk_in = skp;
2250 ssp->smk_out = skp;
2251 }
2252 ssp->smk_packet = NULL;
2253
2254 sk->sk_security = ssp;
2255
2256 return 0;
2257 }
2258
2259 /**
2260 * smack_sk_free_security - Free a socket blob
2261 * @sk: the socket
2262 *
2263 * Clears the blob pointer
2264 */
2265 static void smack_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
2266 {
2267 #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
2268 struct smk_port_label *spp;
2269
2270 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET6) {
2271 rcu_read_lock();
2272 list_for_each_entry_rcu(spp, &smk_ipv6_port_list, list) {
2273 if (spp->smk_sock != sk)
2274 continue;
2275 spp->smk_can_reuse = 1;
2276 break;
2277 }
2278 rcu_read_unlock();
2279 }
2280 #endif
2281 kfree(sk->sk_security);
2282 }
2283
2284 /**
2285 * smack_ipv4host_label - check host based restrictions
2286 * @sip: the object end
2287 *
2288 * looks for host based access restrictions
2289 *
2290 * This version will only be appropriate for really small sets of single label
2291 * hosts. The caller is responsible for ensuring that the RCU read lock is
2292 * taken before calling this function.
2293 *
2294 * Returns the label of the far end or NULL if it's not special.
2295 */
2296 static struct smack_known *smack_ipv4host_label(struct sockaddr_in *sip)
2297 {
2298 struct smk_net4addr *snp;
2299 struct in_addr *siap = &sip->sin_addr;
2300
2301 if (siap->s_addr == 0)
2302 return NULL;
2303
2304 list_for_each_entry_rcu(snp, &smk_net4addr_list, list)
2305 /*
2306 * we break after finding the first match because
2307 * the list is sorted from longest to shortest mask
2308 * so we have found the most specific match
2309 */
2310 if (snp->smk_host.s_addr ==
2311 (siap->s_addr & snp->smk_mask.s_addr))
2312 return snp->smk_label;
2313
2314 return NULL;
2315 }
2316
2317 /*
2318 * smk_ipv6_localhost - Check for local ipv6 host address
2319 * @sip: the address
2320 *
2321 * Returns boolean true if this is the localhost address
2322 */
2323 static bool smk_ipv6_localhost(struct sockaddr_in6 *sip)
2324 {
2325 __be16 *be16p = (__be16 *)&sip->sin6_addr;
2326 __be32 *be32p = (__be32 *)&sip->sin6_addr;
2327
2328 if (be32p[0] == 0 && be32p[1] == 0 && be32p[2] == 0 && be16p[6] == 0 &&
2329 ntohs(be16p[7]) == 1)
2330 return true;
2331 return false;
2332 }
2333
2334 /**
2335 * smack_ipv6host_label - check host based restrictions
2336 * @sip: the object end
2337 *
2338 * looks for host based access restrictions
2339 *
2340 * This version will only be appropriate for really small sets of single label
2341 * hosts. The caller is responsible for ensuring that the RCU read lock is
2342 * taken before calling this function.
2343 *
2344 * Returns the label of the far end or NULL if it's not special.
2345 */
2346 static struct smack_known *smack_ipv6host_label(struct sockaddr_in6 *sip)
2347 {
2348 struct smk_net6addr *snp;
2349 struct in6_addr *sap = &sip->sin6_addr;
2350 int i;
2351 int found = 0;
2352
2353 /*
2354 * It's local. Don't look for a host label.
2355 */
2356 if (smk_ipv6_localhost(sip))
2357 return NULL;
2358
2359 list_for_each_entry_rcu(snp, &smk_net6addr_list, list) {
2360 /*
2361 * If the label is NULL the entry has
2362 * been renounced. Ignore it.
2363 */
2364 if (snp->smk_label == NULL)
2365 continue;
2366 /*
2367 * we break after finding the first match because
2368 * the list is sorted from longest to shortest mask
2369 * so we have found the most specific match
2370 */
2371 for (found = 1, i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
2372 if ((sap->s6_addr16[i] & snp->smk_mask.s6_addr16[i]) !=
2373 snp->smk_host.s6_addr16[i]) {
2374 found = 0;
2375 break;
2376 }
2377 }
2378 if (found)
2379 return snp->smk_label;
2380 }
2381
2382 return NULL;
2383 }
2384
2385 /**
2386 * smack_netlbl_add - Set the secattr on a socket
2387 * @sk: the socket
2388 *
2389 * Attach the outbound smack value (smk_out) to the socket.
2390 *
2391 * Returns 0 on success or an error code
2392 */
2393 static int smack_netlbl_add(struct sock *sk)
2394 {
2395 struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
2396 struct smack_known *skp = ssp->smk_out;
2397 int rc;
2398
2399 local_bh_disable();
2400 bh_lock_sock_nested(sk);
2401
2402 rc = netlbl_sock_setattr(sk, sk->sk_family, &skp->smk_netlabel);
2403 switch (rc) {
2404 case 0:
2405 ssp->smk_state = SMK_NETLBL_LABELED;
2406 break;
2407 case -EDESTADDRREQ:
2408 ssp->smk_state = SMK_NETLBL_REQSKB;
2409 rc = 0;
2410 break;
2411 }
2412
2413 bh_unlock_sock(sk);
2414 local_bh_enable();
2415
2416 return rc;
2417 }
2418
2419 /**
2420 * smack_netlbl_delete - Remove the secattr from a socket
2421 * @sk: the socket
2422 *
2423 * Remove the outbound smack value from a socket
2424 */
2425 static void smack_netlbl_delete(struct sock *sk)
2426 {
2427 struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
2428
2429 /*
2430 * Take the label off the socket if one is set.
2431 */
2432 if (ssp->smk_state != SMK_NETLBL_LABELED)
2433 return;
2434
2435 local_bh_disable();
2436 bh_lock_sock_nested(sk);
2437 netlbl_sock_delattr(sk);
2438 bh_unlock_sock(sk);
2439 local_bh_enable();
2440 ssp->smk_state = SMK_NETLBL_UNLABELED;
2441 }
2442
2443 /**
2444 * smk_ipv4_check - Perform IPv4 host access checks
2445 * @sk: the socket
2446 * @sap: the destination address
2447 *
2448 * Set the correct secattr for the given socket based on the destination
2449 * address and perform any outbound access checks needed.
2450 *
2451 * Returns 0 on success or an error code.
2452 *
2453 */
2454 static int smk_ipv4_check(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr_in *sap)
2455 {
2456 struct smack_known *skp;
2457 int rc = 0;
2458 struct smack_known *hkp;
2459 struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
2460 struct smk_audit_info ad;
2461
2462 rcu_read_lock();
2463 hkp = smack_ipv4host_label(sap);
2464 if (hkp != NULL) {
2465 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
2466 struct lsm_network_audit net;
2467
2468 smk_ad_init_net(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET, &net);
2469 ad.a.u.net->family = sap->sin_family;
2470 ad.a.u.net->dport = sap->sin_port;
2471 ad.a.u.net->v4info.daddr = sap->sin_addr.s_addr;
2472 #endif
2473 skp = ssp->smk_out;
2474 rc = smk_access(skp, hkp, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
2475 rc = smk_bu_note("IPv4 host check", skp, hkp, MAY_WRITE, rc);
2476 /*
2477 * Clear the socket netlabel if it's set.
2478 */
2479 if (!rc)
2480 smack_netlbl_delete(sk);
2481 }
2482 rcu_read_unlock();
2483
2484 return rc;
2485 }
2486
2487 /**
2488 * smk_ipv6_check - check Smack access
2489 * @subject: subject Smack label
2490 * @object: object Smack label
2491 * @address: address
2492 * @act: the action being taken
2493 *
2494 * Check an IPv6 access
2495 */
2496 static int smk_ipv6_check(struct smack_known *subject,
2497 struct smack_known *object,
2498 struct sockaddr_in6 *address, int act)
2499 {
2500 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
2501 struct lsm_network_audit net;
2502 #endif
2503 struct smk_audit_info ad;
2504 int rc;
2505
2506 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
2507 smk_ad_init_net(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET, &net);
2508 ad.a.u.net->family = PF_INET6;
2509 ad.a.u.net->dport = ntohs(address->sin6_port);
2510 if (act == SMK_RECEIVING)
2511 ad.a.u.net->v6info.saddr = address->sin6_addr;
2512 else
2513 ad.a.u.net->v6info.daddr = address->sin6_addr;
2514 #endif
2515 rc = smk_access(subject, object, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
2516 rc = smk_bu_note("IPv6 check", subject, object, MAY_WRITE, rc);
2517 return rc;
2518 }
2519
2520 #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
2521 /**
2522 * smk_ipv6_port_label - Smack port access table management
2523 * @sock: socket
2524 * @address: address
2525 *
2526 * Create or update the port list entry
2527 */
2528 static void smk_ipv6_port_label(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address)
2529 {
2530 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
2531 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6;
2532 struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
2533 struct smk_port_label *spp;
2534 unsigned short port = 0;
2535
2536 if (address == NULL) {
2537 /*
2538 * This operation is changing the Smack information
2539 * on the bound socket. Take the changes to the port
2540 * as well.
2541 */
2542 rcu_read_lock();
2543 list_for_each_entry_rcu(spp, &smk_ipv6_port_list, list) {
2544 if (sk != spp->smk_sock)
2545 continue;
2546 spp->smk_in = ssp->smk_in;
2547 spp->smk_out = ssp->smk_out;
2548 rcu_read_unlock();
2549 return;
2550 }
2551 /*
2552 * A NULL address is only used for updating existing
2553 * bound entries. If there isn't one, it's OK.
2554 */
2555 rcu_read_unlock();
2556 return;
2557 }
2558
2559 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
2560 port = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
2561 /*
2562 * This is a special case that is safely ignored.
2563 */
2564 if (port == 0)
2565 return;
2566
2567 /*
2568 * Look for an existing port list entry.
2569 * This is an indication that a port is getting reused.
2570 */
2571 rcu_read_lock();
2572 list_for_each_entry_rcu(spp, &smk_ipv6_port_list, list) {
2573 if (spp->smk_port != port || spp->smk_sock_type != sock->type)
2574 continue;
2575 if (spp->smk_can_reuse != 1) {
2576 rcu_read_unlock();
2577 return;
2578 }
2579 spp->smk_port = port;
2580 spp->smk_sock = sk;
2581 spp->smk_in = ssp->smk_in;
2582 spp->smk_out = ssp->smk_out;
2583 spp->smk_can_reuse = 0;
2584 rcu_read_unlock();
2585 return;
2586 }
2587 rcu_read_unlock();
2588 /*
2589 * A new port entry is required.
2590 */
2591 spp = kzalloc(sizeof(*spp), GFP_KERNEL);
2592 if (spp == NULL)
2593 return;
2594
2595 spp->smk_port = port;
2596 spp->smk_sock = sk;
2597 spp->smk_in = ssp->smk_in;
2598 spp->smk_out = ssp->smk_out;
2599 spp->smk_sock_type = sock->type;
2600 spp->smk_can_reuse = 0;
2601
2602 mutex_lock(&smack_ipv6_lock);
2603 list_add_rcu(&spp->list, &smk_ipv6_port_list);
2604 mutex_unlock(&smack_ipv6_lock);
2605 return;
2606 }
2607 #endif
2608
2609 /**
2610 * smk_ipv6_port_check - check Smack port access
2611 * @sk: socket
2612 * @address: address
2613 * @act: the action being taken
2614 *
2615 * Create or update the port list entry
2616 */
2617 static int smk_ipv6_port_check(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr_in6 *address,
2618 int act)
2619 {
2620 struct smk_port_label *spp;
2621 struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
2622 struct smack_known *skp = NULL;
2623 unsigned short port;
2624 struct smack_known *object;
2625
2626 if (act == SMK_RECEIVING) {
2627 skp = smack_ipv6host_label(address);
2628 object = ssp->smk_in;
2629 } else {
2630 skp = ssp->smk_out;
2631 object = smack_ipv6host_label(address);
2632 }
2633
2634 /*
2635 * The other end is a single label host.
2636 */
2637 if (skp != NULL && object != NULL)
2638 return smk_ipv6_check(skp, object, address, act);
2639 if (skp == NULL)
2640 skp = smack_net_ambient;
2641 if (object == NULL)
2642 object = smack_net_ambient;
2643
2644 /*
2645 * It's remote, so port lookup does no good.
2646 */
2647 if (!smk_ipv6_localhost(address))
2648 return smk_ipv6_check(skp, object, address, act);
2649
2650 /*
2651 * It's local so the send check has to have passed.
2652 */
2653 if (act == SMK_RECEIVING)
2654 return 0;
2655
2656 port = ntohs(address->sin6_port);
2657 rcu_read_lock();
2658 list_for_each_entry_rcu(spp, &smk_ipv6_port_list, list) {
2659 if (spp->smk_port != port || spp->smk_sock_type != sk->sk_type)
2660 continue;
2661 object = spp->smk_in;
2662 if (act == SMK_CONNECTING)
2663 ssp->smk_packet = spp->smk_out;
2664 break;
2665 }
2666 rcu_read_unlock();
2667
2668 return smk_ipv6_check(skp, object, address, act);
2669 }
2670
2671 /**
2672 * smack_inode_setsecurity - set smack xattrs
2673 * @inode: the object
2674 * @name: attribute name
2675 * @value: attribute value
2676 * @size: size of the attribute
2677 * @flags: unused
2678 *
2679 * Sets the named attribute in the appropriate blob
2680 *
2681 * Returns 0 on success, or an error code
2682 */
2683 static int smack_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
2684 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2685 {
2686 struct smack_known *skp;
2687 struct inode_smack *nsp = smack_inode(inode);
2688 struct socket_smack *ssp;
2689 struct socket *sock;
2690 int rc = 0;
2691
2692 if (value == NULL || size > SMK_LONGLABEL || size == 0)
2693 return -EINVAL;
2694
2695 skp = smk_import_entry(value, size);
2696 if (IS_ERR(skp))
2697 return PTR_ERR(skp);
2698
2699 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX) == 0) {
2700 nsp->smk_inode = skp;
2701 nsp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_INSTANT;
2702 return 0;
2703 }
2704 /*
2705 * The rest of the Smack xattrs are only on sockets.
2706 */
2707 if (inode->i_sb->s_magic != SOCKFS_MAGIC)
2708 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
2709
2710 sock = SOCKET_I(inode);
2711 if (sock == NULL || sock->sk == NULL)
2712 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
2713
2714 ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
2715
2716 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_IPIN) == 0)
2717 ssp->smk_in = skp;
2718 else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_IPOUT) == 0) {
2719 ssp->smk_out = skp;
2720 if (sock->sk->sk_family == PF_INET) {
2721 rc = smack_netlbl_add(sock->sk);
2722 if (rc != 0)
2723 printk(KERN_WARNING
2724 "Smack: \"%s\" netlbl error %d.\n",
2725 __func__, -rc);
2726 }
2727 } else
2728 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
2729
2730 #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
2731 if (sock->sk->sk_family == PF_INET6)
2732 smk_ipv6_port_label(sock, NULL);
2733 #endif
2734
2735 return 0;
2736 }
2737
2738 /**
2739 * smack_socket_post_create - finish socket setup
2740 * @sock: the socket
2741 * @family: protocol family
2742 * @type: unused
2743 * @protocol: unused
2744 * @kern: unused
2745 *
2746 * Sets the netlabel information on the socket
2747 *
2748 * Returns 0 on success, and error code otherwise
2749 */
2750 static int smack_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
2751 int type, int protocol, int kern)
2752 {
2753 struct socket_smack *ssp;
2754
2755 if (sock->sk == NULL)
2756 return 0;
2757
2758 /*
2759 * Sockets created by kernel threads receive web label.
2760 */
2761 if (unlikely(current->flags & PF_KTHREAD)) {
2762 ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
2763 ssp->smk_in = &smack_known_web;
2764 ssp->smk_out = &smack_known_web;
2765 }
2766
2767 if (family != PF_INET)
2768 return 0;
2769 /*
2770 * Set the outbound netlbl.
2771 */
2772 return smack_netlbl_add(sock->sk);
2773 }
2774
2775 /**
2776 * smack_socket_socketpair - create socket pair
2777 * @socka: one socket
2778 * @sockb: another socket
2779 *
2780 * Cross reference the peer labels for SO_PEERSEC
2781 *
2782 * Returns 0
2783 */
2784 static int smack_socket_socketpair(struct socket *socka,
2785 struct socket *sockb)
2786 {
2787 struct socket_smack *asp = socka->sk->sk_security;
2788 struct socket_smack *bsp = sockb->sk->sk_security;
2789
2790 asp->smk_packet = bsp->smk_out;
2791 bsp->smk_packet = asp->smk_out;
2792
2793 return 0;
2794 }
2795
2796 #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
2797 /**
2798 * smack_socket_bind - record port binding information.
2799 * @sock: the socket
2800 * @address: the port address
2801 * @addrlen: size of the address
2802 *
2803 * Records the label bound to a port.
2804 *
2805 * Returns 0 on success, and error code otherwise
2806 */
2807 static int smack_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address,
2808 int addrlen)
2809 {
2810 if (sock->sk != NULL && sock->sk->sk_family == PF_INET6) {
2811 if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133 ||
2812 address->sa_family != AF_INET6)
2813 return -EINVAL;
2814 smk_ipv6_port_label(sock, address);
2815 }
2816 return 0;
2817 }
2818 #endif /* SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING */
2819
2820 /**
2821 * smack_socket_connect - connect access check
2822 * @sock: the socket
2823 * @sap: the other end
2824 * @addrlen: size of sap
2825 *
2826 * Verifies that a connection may be possible
2827 *
2828 * Returns 0 on success, and error code otherwise
2829 */
2830 static int smack_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *sap,
2831 int addrlen)
2832 {
2833 int rc = 0;
2834
2835 if (sock->sk == NULL)
2836 return 0;
2837 if (sock->sk->sk_family != PF_INET &&
2838 (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) || sock->sk->sk_family != PF_INET6))
2839 return 0;
2840 if (addrlen < offsetofend(struct sockaddr, sa_family))
2841 return 0;
2842 if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) && sap->sa_family == AF_INET6) {
2843 struct sockaddr_in6 *sip = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)sap;
2844 struct smack_known *rsp = NULL;
2845
2846 if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
2847 return 0;
2848 if (__is_defined(SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING))
2849 rsp = smack_ipv6host_label(sip);
2850 if (rsp != NULL) {
2851 struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
2852
2853 rc = smk_ipv6_check(ssp->smk_out, rsp, sip,
2854 SMK_CONNECTING);
2855 }
2856 if (__is_defined(SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING))
2857 rc = smk_ipv6_port_check(sock->sk, sip, SMK_CONNECTING);
2858
2859 return rc;
2860 }
2861 if (sap->sa_family != AF_INET || addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
2862 return 0;
2863 rc = smk_ipv4_check(sock->sk, (struct sockaddr_in *)sap);
2864 return rc;
2865 }
2866
2867 /**
2868 * smack_flags_to_may - convert S_ to MAY_ values
2869 * @flags: the S_ value
2870 *
2871 * Returns the equivalent MAY_ value
2872 */
2873 static int smack_flags_to_may(int flags)
2874 {
2875 int may = 0;
2876
2877 if (flags & S_IRUGO)
2878 may |= MAY_READ;
2879 if (flags & S_IWUGO)
2880 may |= MAY_WRITE;
2881 if (flags & S_IXUGO)
2882 may |= MAY_EXEC;
2883
2884 return may;
2885 }
2886
2887 /**
2888 * smack_msg_msg_alloc_security - Set the security blob for msg_msg
2889 * @msg: the object
2890 *
2891 * Returns 0
2892 */
2893 static int smack_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
2894 {
2895 struct smack_known **blob = smack_msg_msg(msg);
2896
2897 *blob = smk_of_current();
2898 return 0;
2899 }
2900
2901 /**
2902 * smack_of_ipc - the smack pointer for the ipc
2903 * @isp: the object
2904 *
2905 * Returns a pointer to the smack value
2906 */
2907 static struct smack_known *smack_of_ipc(struct kern_ipc_perm *isp)
2908 {
2909 struct smack_known **blob = smack_ipc(isp);
2910
2911 return *blob;
2912 }
2913
2914 /**
2915 * smack_ipc_alloc_security - Set the security blob for ipc
2916 * @isp: the object
2917 *
2918 * Returns 0
2919 */
2920 static int smack_ipc_alloc_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *isp)
2921 {
2922 struct smack_known **blob = smack_ipc(isp);
2923
2924 *blob = smk_of_current();
2925 return 0;
2926 }
2927
2928 /**
2929 * smk_curacc_shm : check if current has access on shm
2930 * @isp : the object
2931 * @access : access requested
2932 *
2933 * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
2934 */
2935 static int smk_curacc_shm(struct kern_ipc_perm *isp, int access)
2936 {
2937 struct smack_known *ssp = smack_of_ipc(isp);
2938 struct smk_audit_info ad;
2939 int rc;
2940
2941 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
2942 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC);
2943 ad.a.u.ipc_id = isp->id;
2944 #endif
2945 rc = smk_curacc(ssp, access, &ad);
2946 rc = smk_bu_current("shm", ssp, access, rc);
2947 return rc;
2948 }
2949
2950 /**
2951 * smack_shm_associate - Smack access check for shm
2952 * @isp: the object
2953 * @shmflg: access requested
2954 *
2955 * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
2956 */
2957 static int smack_shm_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *isp, int shmflg)
2958 {
2959 int may;
2960
2961 may = smack_flags_to_may(shmflg);
2962 return smk_curacc_shm(isp, may);
2963 }
2964
2965 /**
2966 * smack_shm_shmctl - Smack access check for shm
2967 * @isp: the object
2968 * @cmd: what it wants to do
2969 *
2970 * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
2971 */
2972 static int smack_shm_shmctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *isp, int cmd)
2973 {
2974 int may;
2975
2976 switch (cmd) {
2977 case IPC_STAT:
2978 case SHM_STAT:
2979 case SHM_STAT_ANY:
2980 may = MAY_READ;
2981 break;
2982 case IPC_SET:
2983 case SHM_LOCK:
2984 case SHM_UNLOCK:
2985 case IPC_RMID:
2986 may = MAY_READWRITE;
2987 break;
2988 case IPC_INFO:
2989 case SHM_INFO:
2990 /*
2991 * System level information.
2992 */
2993 return 0;
2994 default:
2995 return -EINVAL;
2996 }
2997 return smk_curacc_shm(isp, may);
2998 }
2999
3000 /**
3001 * smack_shm_shmat - Smack access for shmat
3002 * @isp: the object
3003 * @shmaddr: unused
3004 * @shmflg: access requested
3005 *
3006 * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
3007 */
3008 static int smack_shm_shmat(struct kern_ipc_perm *isp, char __user *shmaddr,
3009 int shmflg)
3010 {
3011 int may;
3012
3013 may = smack_flags_to_may(shmflg);
3014 return smk_curacc_shm(isp, may);
3015 }
3016
3017 /**
3018 * smk_curacc_sem : check if current has access on sem
3019 * @isp : the object
3020 * @access : access requested
3021 *
3022 * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
3023 */
3024 static int smk_curacc_sem(struct kern_ipc_perm *isp, int access)
3025 {
3026 struct smack_known *ssp = smack_of_ipc(isp);
3027 struct smk_audit_info ad;
3028 int rc;
3029
3030 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
3031 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC);
3032 ad.a.u.ipc_id = isp->id;
3033 #endif
3034 rc = smk_curacc(ssp, access, &ad);
3035 rc = smk_bu_current("sem", ssp, access, rc);
3036 return rc;
3037 }
3038
3039 /**
3040 * smack_sem_associate - Smack access check for sem
3041 * @isp: the object
3042 * @semflg: access requested
3043 *
3044 * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
3045 */
3046 static int smack_sem_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *isp, int semflg)
3047 {
3048 int may;
3049
3050 may = smack_flags_to_may(semflg);
3051 return smk_curacc_sem(isp, may);
3052 }
3053
3054 /**
3055 * smack_sem_shmctl - Smack access check for sem
3056 * @isp: the object
3057 * @cmd: what it wants to do
3058 *
3059 * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
3060 */
3061 static int smack_sem_semctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *isp, int cmd)
3062 {
3063 int may;
3064
3065 switch (cmd) {
3066 case GETPID:
3067 case GETNCNT:
3068 case GETZCNT:
3069 case GETVAL:
3070 case GETALL:
3071 case IPC_STAT:
3072 case SEM_STAT:
3073 case SEM_STAT_ANY:
3074 may = MAY_READ;
3075 break;
3076 case SETVAL:
3077 case SETALL:
3078 case IPC_RMID:
3079 case IPC_SET:
3080 may = MAY_READWRITE;
3081 break;
3082 case IPC_INFO:
3083 case SEM_INFO:
3084 /*
3085 * System level information
3086 */
3087 return 0;
3088 default:
3089 return -EINVAL;
3090 }
3091
3092 return smk_curacc_sem(isp, may);
3093 }
3094
3095 /**
3096 * smack_sem_semop - Smack checks of semaphore operations
3097 * @isp: the object
3098 * @sops: unused
3099 * @nsops: unused
3100 * @alter: unused
3101 *
3102 * Treated as read and write in all cases.
3103 *
3104 * Returns 0 if access is allowed, error code otherwise
3105 */
3106 static int smack_sem_semop(struct kern_ipc_perm *isp, struct sembuf *sops,
3107 unsigned nsops, int alter)
3108 {
3109 return smk_curacc_sem(isp, MAY_READWRITE);
3110 }
3111
3112 /**
3113 * smk_curacc_msq : helper to check if current has access on msq
3114 * @isp : the msq
3115 * @access : access requested
3116 *
3117 * return 0 if current has access, error otherwise
3118 */
3119 static int smk_curacc_msq(struct kern_ipc_perm *isp, int access)
3120 {
3121 struct smack_known *msp = smack_of_ipc(isp);
3122 struct smk_audit_info ad;
3123 int rc;
3124
3125 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
3126 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC);
3127 ad.a.u.ipc_id = isp->id;
3128 #endif
3129 rc = smk_curacc(msp, access, &ad);
3130 rc = smk_bu_current("msq", msp, access, rc);
3131 return rc;
3132 }
3133
3134 /**
3135 * smack_msg_queue_associate - Smack access check for msg_queue
3136 * @isp: the object
3137 * @msqflg: access requested
3138 *
3139 * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
3140 */
3141 static int smack_msg_queue_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *isp, int msqflg)
3142 {
3143 int may;
3144
3145 may = smack_flags_to_may(msqflg);
3146 return smk_curacc_msq(isp, may);
3147 }
3148
3149 /**
3150 * smack_msg_queue_msgctl - Smack access check for msg_queue
3151 * @isp: the object
3152 * @cmd: what it wants to do
3153 *
3154 * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
3155 */
3156 static int smack_msg_queue_msgctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *isp, int cmd)
3157 {
3158 int may;
3159
3160 switch (cmd) {
3161 case IPC_STAT:
3162 case MSG_STAT:
3163 case MSG_STAT_ANY:
3164 may = MAY_READ;
3165 break;
3166 case IPC_SET:
3167 case IPC_RMID:
3168 may = MAY_READWRITE;
3169 break;
3170 case IPC_INFO:
3171 case MSG_INFO:
3172 /*
3173 * System level information
3174 */
3175 return 0;
3176 default:
3177 return -EINVAL;
3178 }
3179
3180 return smk_curacc_msq(isp, may);
3181 }
3182
3183 /**
3184 * smack_msg_queue_msgsnd - Smack access check for msg_queue
3185 * @isp: the object
3186 * @msg: unused
3187 * @msqflg: access requested
3188 *
3189 * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
3190 */
3191 static int smack_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct kern_ipc_perm *isp, struct msg_msg *msg,
3192 int msqflg)
3193 {
3194 int may;
3195
3196 may = smack_flags_to_may(msqflg);
3197 return smk_curacc_msq(isp, may);
3198 }
3199
3200 /**
3201 * smack_msg_queue_msgsnd - Smack access check for msg_queue
3202 * @isp: the object
3203 * @msg: unused
3204 * @target: unused
3205 * @type: unused
3206 * @mode: unused
3207 *
3208 * Returns 0 if current has read and write access, error code otherwise
3209 */
3210 static int smack_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct kern_ipc_perm *isp, struct msg_msg *msg,
3211 struct task_struct *target, long type, int mode)
3212 {
3213 return smk_curacc_msq(isp, MAY_READWRITE);
3214 }
3215
3216 /**
3217 * smack_ipc_permission - Smack access for ipc_permission()
3218 * @ipp: the object permissions
3219 * @flag: access requested
3220 *
3221 * Returns 0 if current has read and write access, error code otherwise
3222 */
3223 static int smack_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipp, short flag)
3224 {
3225 struct smack_known **blob = smack_ipc(ipp);
3226 struct smack_known *iskp = *blob;
3227 int may = smack_flags_to_may(flag);
3228 struct smk_audit_info ad;
3229 int rc;
3230
3231 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
3232 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC);
3233 ad.a.u.ipc_id = ipp->id;
3234 #endif
3235 rc = smk_curacc(iskp, may, &ad);
3236 rc = smk_bu_current("svipc", iskp, may, rc);
3237 return rc;
3238 }
3239
3240 /**
3241 * smack_ipc_getsecid - Extract smack security id
3242 * @ipp: the object permissions
3243 * @secid: where result will be saved
3244 */
3245 static void smack_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipp, u32 *secid)
3246 {
3247 struct smack_known **blob = smack_ipc(ipp);
3248 struct smack_known *iskp = *blob;
3249
3250 *secid = iskp->smk_secid;
3251 }
3252
3253 /**
3254 * smack_d_instantiate - Make sure the blob is correct on an inode
3255 * @opt_dentry: dentry where inode will be attached
3256 * @inode: the object
3257 *
3258 * Set the inode's security blob if it hasn't been done already.
3259 */
3260 static void smack_d_instantiate(struct dentry *opt_dentry, struct inode *inode)
3261 {
3262 struct super_block *sbp;
3263 struct superblock_smack *sbsp;
3264 struct inode_smack *isp;
3265 struct smack_known *skp;
3266 struct smack_known *ckp = smk_of_current();
3267 struct smack_known *final;
3268 char trattr[TRANS_TRUE_SIZE];
3269 int transflag = 0;
3270 int rc;
3271 struct dentry *dp;
3272
3273 if (inode == NULL)
3274 return;
3275
3276 isp = smack_inode(inode);
3277
3278 /*
3279 * If the inode is already instantiated
3280 * take the quick way out
3281 */
3282 if (isp->smk_flags & SMK_INODE_INSTANT)
3283 return;
3284
3285 sbp = inode->i_sb;
3286 sbsp = sbp->s_security;
3287 /*
3288 * We're going to use the superblock default label
3289 * if there's no label on the file.
3290 */
3291 final = sbsp->smk_default;
3292
3293 /*
3294 * If this is the root inode the superblock
3295 * may be in the process of initialization.
3296 * If that is the case use the root value out
3297 * of the superblock.
3298 */
3299 if (opt_dentry->d_parent == opt_dentry) {
3300 switch (sbp->s_magic) {
3301 case CGROUP_SUPER_MAGIC:
3302 case CGROUP2_SUPER_MAGIC:
3303 /*
3304 * The cgroup filesystem is never mounted,
3305 * so there's no opportunity to set the mount
3306 * options.
3307 */
3308 sbsp->smk_root = &smack_known_star;
3309 sbsp->smk_default = &smack_known_star;
3310 isp->smk_inode = sbsp->smk_root;
3311 break;
3312 case TMPFS_MAGIC:
3313 /*
3314 * What about shmem/tmpfs anonymous files with dentry
3315 * obtained from d_alloc_pseudo()?
3316 */
3317 isp->smk_inode = smk_of_current();
3318 break;
3319 case PIPEFS_MAGIC:
3320 isp->smk_inode = smk_of_current();
3321 break;
3322 case SOCKFS_MAGIC:
3323 /*
3324 * Socket access is controlled by the socket
3325 * structures associated with the task involved.
3326 */
3327 isp->smk_inode = &smack_known_star;
3328 break;
3329 default:
3330 isp->smk_inode = sbsp->smk_root;
3331 break;
3332 }
3333 isp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_INSTANT;
3334 return;
3335 }
3336
3337 /*
3338 * This is pretty hackish.
3339 * Casey says that we shouldn't have to do
3340 * file system specific code, but it does help
3341 * with keeping it simple.
3342 */
3343 switch (sbp->s_magic) {
3344 case SMACK_MAGIC:
3345 case CGROUP_SUPER_MAGIC:
3346 case CGROUP2_SUPER_MAGIC:
3347 /*
3348 * Casey says that it's a little embarrassing
3349 * that the smack file system doesn't do
3350 * extended attributes.
3351 *
3352 * Cgroupfs is special
3353 */
3354 final = &smack_known_star;
3355 break;
3356 case DEVPTS_SUPER_MAGIC:
3357 /*
3358 * devpts seems content with the label of the task.
3359 * Programs that change smack have to treat the
3360 * pty with respect.
3361 */
3362 final = ckp;
3363 break;
3364 case PROC_SUPER_MAGIC:
3365 /*
3366 * Casey says procfs appears not to care.
3367 * The superblock default suffices.
3368 */
3369 break;
3370 case TMPFS_MAGIC:
3371 /*
3372 * Device labels should come from the filesystem,
3373 * but watch out, because they're volitile,
3374 * getting recreated on every reboot.
3375 */
3376 final = &smack_known_star;
3377 /*
3378 * If a smack value has been set we want to use it,
3379 * but since tmpfs isn't giving us the opportunity
3380 * to set mount options simulate setting the
3381 * superblock default.
3382 */
3383 fallthrough;
3384 default:
3385 /*
3386 * This isn't an understood special case.
3387 * Get the value from the xattr.
3388 */
3389
3390 /*
3391 * UNIX domain sockets use lower level socket data.
3392 */
3393 if (S_ISSOCK(inode->i_mode)) {
3394 final = &smack_known_star;
3395 break;
3396 }
3397 /*
3398 * No xattr support means, alas, no SMACK label.
3399 * Use the aforeapplied default.
3400 * It would be curious if the label of the task
3401 * does not match that assigned.
3402 */
3403 if (!(inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR))
3404 break;
3405 /*
3406 * Get the dentry for xattr.
3407 */
3408 dp = dget(opt_dentry);
3409 skp = smk_fetch(XATTR_NAME_SMACK, inode, dp);
3410 if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL(skp))
3411 final = skp;
3412
3413 /*
3414 * Transmuting directory
3415 */
3416 if (S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode)) {
3417 /*
3418 * If this is a new directory and the label was
3419 * transmuted when the inode was initialized
3420 * set the transmute attribute on the directory
3421 * and mark the inode.
3422 *
3423 * If there is a transmute attribute on the
3424 * directory mark the inode.
3425 */
3426 if (isp->smk_flags & SMK_INODE_CHANGED) {
3427 isp->smk_flags &= ~SMK_INODE_CHANGED;
3428 rc = __vfs_setxattr(dp, inode,
3429 XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE,
3430 TRANS_TRUE, TRANS_TRUE_SIZE,
3431 0);
3432 } else {
3433 rc = __vfs_getxattr(dp, inode,
3434 XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE, trattr,
3435 TRANS_TRUE_SIZE);
3436 if (rc >= 0 && strncmp(trattr, TRANS_TRUE,
3437 TRANS_TRUE_SIZE) != 0)
3438 rc = -EINVAL;
3439 }
3440 if (rc >= 0)
3441 transflag = SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE;
3442 }
3443 /*
3444 * Don't let the exec or mmap label be "*" or "@".
3445 */
3446 skp = smk_fetch(XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC, inode, dp);
3447 if (IS_ERR(skp) || skp == &smack_known_star ||
3448 skp == &smack_known_web)
3449 skp = NULL;
3450 isp->smk_task = skp;
3451
3452 skp = smk_fetch(XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP, inode, dp);
3453 if (IS_ERR(skp) || skp == &smack_known_star ||
3454 skp == &smack_known_web)
3455 skp = NULL;
3456 isp->smk_mmap = skp;
3457
3458 dput(dp);
3459 break;
3460 }
3461
3462 if (final == NULL)
3463 isp->smk_inode = ckp;
3464 else
3465 isp->smk_inode = final;
3466
3467 isp->smk_flags |= (SMK_INODE_INSTANT | transflag);
3468
3469 return;
3470 }
3471
3472 /**
3473 * smack_getprocattr - Smack process attribute access
3474 * @p: the object task
3475 * @name: the name of the attribute in /proc/.../attr
3476 * @value: where to put the result
3477 *
3478 * Places a copy of the task Smack into value
3479 *
3480 * Returns the length of the smack label or an error code
3481 */
3482 static int smack_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, char **value)
3483 {
3484 struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task_struct(p);
3485 char *cp;
3486 int slen;
3487
3488 if (strcmp(name, "current") != 0)
3489 return -EINVAL;
3490
3491 cp = kstrdup(skp->smk_known, GFP_KERNEL);
3492 if (cp == NULL)
3493 return -ENOMEM;
3494
3495 slen = strlen(cp);
3496 *value = cp;
3497 return slen;
3498 }
3499
3500 /**
3501 * smack_setprocattr - Smack process attribute setting
3502 * @name: the name of the attribute in /proc/.../attr
3503 * @value: the value to set
3504 * @size: the size of the value
3505 *
3506 * Sets the Smack value of the task. Only setting self
3507 * is permitted and only with privilege
3508 *
3509 * Returns the length of the smack label or an error code
3510 */
3511 static int smack_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value, size_t size)
3512 {
3513 struct task_smack *tsp = smack_cred(current_cred());
3514 struct cred *new;
3515 struct smack_known *skp;
3516 struct smack_known_list_elem *sklep;
3517 int rc;
3518
3519 if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN) && list_empty(&tsp->smk_relabel))
3520 return -EPERM;
3521
3522 if (value == NULL || size == 0 || size >= SMK_LONGLABEL)
3523 return -EINVAL;
3524
3525 if (strcmp(name, "current") != 0)
3526 return -EINVAL;
3527
3528 skp = smk_import_entry(value, size);
3529 if (IS_ERR(skp))
3530 return PTR_ERR(skp);
3531
3532 /*
3533 * No process is ever allowed the web ("@") label
3534 * and the star ("*") label.
3535 */
3536 if (skp == &smack_known_web || skp == &smack_known_star)
3537 return -EINVAL;
3538
3539 if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) {
3540 rc = -EPERM;
3541 list_for_each_entry(sklep, &tsp->smk_relabel, list)
3542 if (sklep->smk_label == skp) {
3543 rc = 0;
3544 break;
3545 }
3546 if (rc)
3547 return rc;
3548 }
3549
3550 new = prepare_creds();
3551 if (new == NULL)
3552 return -ENOMEM;
3553
3554 tsp = smack_cred(new);
3555 tsp->smk_task = skp;
3556 /*
3557 * process can change its label only once
3558 */
3559 smk_destroy_label_list(&tsp->smk_relabel);
3560
3561 commit_creds(new);
3562 return size;
3563 }
3564
3565 /**
3566 * smack_unix_stream_connect - Smack access on UDS
3567 * @sock: one sock
3568 * @other: the other sock
3569 * @newsk: unused
3570 *
3571 * Return 0 if a subject with the smack of sock could access
3572 * an object with the smack of other, otherwise an error code
3573 */
3574 static int smack_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock,
3575 struct sock *other, struct sock *newsk)
3576 {
3577 struct smack_known *skp;
3578 struct smack_known *okp;
3579 struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk_security;
3580 struct socket_smack *osp = other->sk_security;
3581 struct socket_smack *nsp = newsk->sk_security;
3582 struct smk_audit_info ad;
3583 int rc = 0;
3584 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
3585 struct lsm_network_audit net;
3586 #endif
3587
3588 if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE)) {
3589 skp = ssp->smk_out;
3590 okp = osp->smk_in;
3591 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
3592 smk_ad_init_net(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET, &net);
3593 smk_ad_setfield_u_net_sk(&ad, other);
3594 #endif
3595 rc = smk_access(skp, okp, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
3596 rc = smk_bu_note("UDS connect", skp, okp, MAY_WRITE, rc);
3597 if (rc == 0) {
3598 okp = osp->smk_out;
3599 skp = ssp->smk_in;
3600 rc = smk_access(okp, skp, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
3601 rc = smk_bu_note("UDS connect", okp, skp,
3602 MAY_WRITE, rc);
3603 }
3604 }
3605
3606 /*
3607 * Cross reference the peer labels for SO_PEERSEC.
3608 */
3609 if (rc == 0) {
3610 nsp->smk_packet = ssp->smk_out;
3611 ssp->smk_packet = osp->smk_out;
3612 }
3613
3614 return rc;
3615 }
3616
3617 /**
3618 * smack_unix_may_send - Smack access on UDS
3619 * @sock: one socket
3620 * @other: the other socket
3621 *
3622 * Return 0 if a subject with the smack of sock could access
3623 * an object with the smack of other, otherwise an error code
3624 */
3625 static int smack_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock, struct socket *other)
3626 {
3627 struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
3628 struct socket_smack *osp = other->sk->sk_security;
3629 struct smk_audit_info ad;
3630 int rc;
3631
3632 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
3633 struct lsm_network_audit net;
3634
3635 smk_ad_init_net(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET, &net);
3636 smk_ad_setfield_u_net_sk(&ad, other->sk);
3637 #endif
3638
3639 if (smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
3640 return 0;
3641
3642 rc = smk_access(ssp->smk_out, osp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
3643 rc = smk_bu_note("UDS send", ssp->smk_out, osp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, rc);
3644 return rc;
3645 }
3646
3647 /**
3648 * smack_socket_sendmsg - Smack check based on destination host
3649 * @sock: the socket
3650 * @msg: the message
3651 * @size: the size of the message
3652 *
3653 * Return 0 if the current subject can write to the destination host.
3654 * For IPv4 this is only a question if the destination is a single label host.
3655 * For IPv6 this is a check against the label of the port.
3656 */
3657 static int smack_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
3658 int size)
3659 {
3660 struct sockaddr_in *sip = (struct sockaddr_in *) msg->msg_name;
3661 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
3662 struct sockaddr_in6 *sap = (struct sockaddr_in6 *) msg->msg_name;
3663 #endif
3664 #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING
3665 struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
3666 struct smack_known *rsp;
3667 #endif
3668 int rc = 0;
3669
3670 /*
3671 * Perfectly reasonable for this to be NULL
3672 */
3673 if (sip == NULL)
3674 return 0;
3675
3676 switch (sock->sk->sk_family) {
3677 case AF_INET:
3678 if (msg->msg_namelen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in) ||
3679 sip->sin_family != AF_INET)
3680 return -EINVAL;
3681 rc = smk_ipv4_check(sock->sk, sip);
3682 break;
3683 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
3684 case AF_INET6:
3685 if (msg->msg_namelen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133 ||
3686 sap->sin6_family != AF_INET6)
3687 return -EINVAL;
3688 #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING
3689 rsp = smack_ipv6host_label(sap);
3690 if (rsp != NULL)
3691 rc = smk_ipv6_check(ssp->smk_out, rsp, sap,
3692 SMK_CONNECTING);
3693 #endif
3694 #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
3695 rc = smk_ipv6_port_check(sock->sk, sap, SMK_SENDING);
3696 #endif
3697 #endif /* IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) */
3698 break;
3699 }
3700 return rc;
3701 }
3702
3703 /**
3704 * smack_from_secattr - Convert a netlabel attr.mls.lvl/attr.mls.cat pair to smack
3705 * @sap: netlabel secattr
3706 * @ssp: socket security information
3707 *
3708 * Returns a pointer to a Smack label entry found on the label list.
3709 */
3710 static struct smack_known *smack_from_secattr(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *sap,
3711 struct socket_smack *ssp)
3712 {
3713 struct smack_known *skp;
3714 int found = 0;
3715 int acat;
3716 int kcat;
3717
3718 /*
3719 * Netlabel found it in the cache.
3720 */
3721 if ((sap->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_CACHE) != 0)
3722 return (struct smack_known *)sap->cache->data;
3723
3724 if ((sap->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID) != 0)
3725 /*
3726 * Looks like a fallback, which gives us a secid.
3727 */
3728 return smack_from_secid(sap->attr.secid);
3729
3730 if ((sap->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_LVL) != 0) {
3731 /*
3732 * Looks like a CIPSO packet.
3733 * If there are flags but no level netlabel isn't
3734 * behaving the way we expect it to.
3735 *
3736 * Look it up in the label table
3737 * Without guidance regarding the smack value
3738 * for the packet fall back on the network
3739 * ambient value.
3740 */
3741 rcu_read_lock();
3742 list_for_each_entry_rcu(skp, &smack_known_list, list) {
3743 if (sap->attr.mls.lvl != skp->smk_netlabel.attr.mls.lvl)
3744 continue;
3745 /*
3746 * Compare the catsets. Use the netlbl APIs.
3747 */
3748 if ((sap->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_CAT) == 0) {
3749 if ((skp->smk_netlabel.flags &
3750 NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_CAT) == 0)
3751 found = 1;
3752 break;
3753 }
3754 for (acat = -1, kcat = -1; acat == kcat; ) {
3755 acat = netlbl_catmap_walk(sap->attr.mls.cat,
3756 acat + 1);
3757 kcat = netlbl_catmap_walk(
3758 skp->smk_netlabel.attr.mls.cat,
3759 kcat + 1);
3760 if (acat < 0 || kcat < 0)
3761 break;
3762 }
3763 if (acat == kcat) {
3764 found = 1;
3765 break;
3766 }
3767 }
3768 rcu_read_unlock();
3769
3770 if (found)
3771 return skp;
3772
3773 if (ssp != NULL && ssp->smk_in == &smack_known_star)
3774 return &smack_known_web;
3775 return &smack_known_star;
3776 }
3777 /*
3778 * Without guidance regarding the smack value
3779 * for the packet fall back on the network
3780 * ambient value.
3781 */
3782 return smack_net_ambient;
3783 }
3784
3785 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
3786 static int smk_skb_to_addr_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sockaddr_in6 *sip)
3787 {
3788 u8 nexthdr;
3789 int offset;
3790 int proto = -EINVAL;
3791 struct ipv6hdr _ipv6h;
3792 struct ipv6hdr *ip6;
3793 __be16 frag_off;
3794 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
3795 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
3796 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
3797
3798 sip->sin6_port = 0;
3799
3800 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
3801 ip6 = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_ipv6h), &_ipv6h);
3802 if (ip6 == NULL)
3803 return -EINVAL;
3804 sip->sin6_addr = ip6->saddr;
3805
3806 nexthdr = ip6->nexthdr;
3807 offset += sizeof(_ipv6h);
3808 offset = ipv6_skip_exthdr(skb, offset, &nexthdr, &frag_off);
3809 if (offset < 0)
3810 return -EINVAL;
3811
3812 proto = nexthdr;
3813 switch (proto) {
3814 case IPPROTO_TCP:
3815 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
3816 if (th != NULL)
3817 sip->sin6_port = th->source;
3818 break;
3819 case IPPROTO_UDP:
3820 case IPPROTO_UDPLITE:
3821 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
3822 if (uh != NULL)
3823 sip->sin6_port = uh->source;
3824 break;
3825 case IPPROTO_DCCP:
3826 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
3827 if (dh != NULL)
3828 sip->sin6_port = dh->dccph_sport;
3829 break;
3830 }
3831 return proto;
3832 }
3833 #endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */
3834
3835 /**
3836 * smack_from_skb - Smack data from the secmark in an skb
3837 * @skb: packet
3838 *
3839 * Returns smack_known of the secmark or NULL if that won't work.
3840 */
3841 #ifdef CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK
3842 static struct smack_known *smack_from_skb(struct sk_buff *skb)
3843 {
3844 if (skb == NULL || skb->secmark == 0)
3845 return NULL;
3846
3847 return smack_from_secid(skb->secmark);
3848 }
3849 #else
3850 static inline struct smack_known *smack_from_skb(struct sk_buff *skb)
3851 {
3852 return NULL;
3853 }
3854 #endif
3855
3856 /**
3857 * smack_from_netlbl - Smack data from the IP options in an skb
3858 * @sk: socket data came in on
3859 * @family: address family
3860 * @skb: packet
3861 *
3862 * Find the Smack label in the IP options. If it hasn't been
3863 * added to the netlabel cache, add it here.
3864 *
3865 * Returns smack_known of the IP options or NULL if that won't work.
3866 */
3867 static struct smack_known *smack_from_netlbl(const struct sock *sk, u16 family,
3868 struct sk_buff *skb)
3869 {
3870 struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
3871 struct socket_smack *ssp = NULL;
3872 struct smack_known *skp = NULL;
3873
3874 netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
3875
3876 if (sk)
3877 ssp = sk->sk_security;
3878
3879 if (netlbl_skbuff_getattr(skb, family, &secattr) == 0) {
3880 skp = smack_from_secattr(&secattr, ssp);
3881 if (secattr.flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_CACHEABLE)
3882 netlbl_cache_add(skb, family, &skp->smk_netlabel);
3883 }
3884
3885 netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr);
3886
3887 return skp;
3888 }
3889
3890 /**
3891 * smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb - Smack packet delivery access check
3892 * @sk: socket
3893 * @skb: packet
3894 *
3895 * Returns 0 if the packet should be delivered, an error code otherwise
3896 */
3897 static int smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
3898 {
3899 struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
3900 struct smack_known *skp = NULL;
3901 int rc = 0;
3902 struct smk_audit_info ad;
3903 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
3904 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
3905 struct lsm_network_audit net;
3906 #endif
3907 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
3908 struct sockaddr_in6 sadd;
3909 int proto;
3910
3911 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
3912 family = PF_INET;
3913 #endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */
3914
3915 switch (family) {
3916 case PF_INET:
3917 /*
3918 * If there is a secmark use it rather than the CIPSO label.
3919 * If there is no secmark fall back to CIPSO.
3920 * The secmark is assumed to reflect policy better.
3921 */
3922 skp = smack_from_skb(skb);
3923 if (skp == NULL) {
3924 skp = smack_from_netlbl(sk, family, skb);
3925 if (skp == NULL)
3926 skp = smack_net_ambient;
3927 }
3928
3929 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
3930 smk_ad_init_net(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET, &net);
3931 ad.a.u.net->family = family;
3932 ad.a.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif;
3933 ipv4_skb_to_auditdata(skb, &ad.a, NULL);
3934 #endif
3935 /*
3936 * Receiving a packet requires that the other end
3937 * be able to write here. Read access is not required.
3938 * This is the simplist possible security model
3939 * for networking.
3940 */
3941 rc = smk_access(skp, ssp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
3942 rc = smk_bu_note("IPv4 delivery", skp, ssp->smk_in,
3943 MAY_WRITE, rc);
3944 if (rc != 0)
3945 netlbl_skbuff_err(skb, family, rc, 0);
3946 break;
3947 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
3948 case PF_INET6:
3949 proto = smk_skb_to_addr_ipv6(skb, &sadd);
3950 if (proto != IPPROTO_UDP && proto != IPPROTO_UDPLITE &&
3951 proto != IPPROTO_TCP && proto != IPPROTO_DCCP)
3952 break;
3953 #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING
3954 skp = smack_from_skb(skb);
3955 if (skp == NULL) {
3956 if (smk_ipv6_localhost(&sadd))
3957 break;
3958 skp = smack_ipv6host_label(&sadd);
3959 if (skp == NULL)
3960 skp = smack_net_ambient;
3961 }
3962 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
3963 smk_ad_init_net(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET, &net);
3964 ad.a.u.net->family = family;
3965 ad.a.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif;
3966 ipv6_skb_to_auditdata(skb, &ad.a, NULL);
3967 #endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
3968 rc = smk_access(skp, ssp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
3969 rc = smk_bu_note("IPv6 delivery", skp, ssp->smk_in,
3970 MAY_WRITE, rc);
3971 #endif /* SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING */
3972 #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
3973 rc = smk_ipv6_port_check(sk, &sadd, SMK_RECEIVING);
3974 #endif /* SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING */
3975 if (rc != 0)
3976 icmpv6_send(skb, ICMPV6_DEST_UNREACH,
3977 ICMPV6_ADM_PROHIBITED, 0);
3978 break;
3979 #endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */
3980 }
3981
3982 return rc;
3983 }
3984
3985 /**
3986 * smack_socket_getpeersec_stream - pull in packet label
3987 * @sock: the socket
3988 * @optval: user's destination
3989 * @optlen: size thereof
3990 * @len: max thereof
3991 *
3992 * returns zero on success, an error code otherwise
3993 */
3994 static int smack_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock,
3995 char __user *optval,
3996 int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
3997 {
3998 struct socket_smack *ssp;
3999 char *rcp = "";
4000 int slen = 1;
4001 int rc = 0;
4002
4003 ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
4004 if (ssp->smk_packet != NULL) {
4005 rcp = ssp->smk_packet->smk_known;
4006 slen = strlen(rcp) + 1;
4007 }
4008
4009 if (slen > len)
4010 rc = -ERANGE;
4011 else if (copy_to_user(optval, rcp, slen) != 0)
4012 rc = -EFAULT;
4013
4014 if (put_user(slen, optlen) != 0)
4015 rc = -EFAULT;
4016
4017 return rc;
4018 }
4019
4020
4021 /**
4022 * smack_socket_getpeersec_dgram - pull in packet label
4023 * @sock: the peer socket
4024 * @skb: packet data
4025 * @secid: pointer to where to put the secid of the packet
4026 *
4027 * Sets the netlabel socket state on sk from parent
4028 */
4029 static int smack_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock,
4030 struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
4031
4032 {
4033 struct socket_smack *ssp = NULL;
4034 struct smack_known *skp;
4035 struct sock *sk = NULL;
4036 int family = PF_UNSPEC;
4037 u32 s = 0; /* 0 is the invalid secid */
4038
4039 if (skb != NULL) {
4040 if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4041 family = PF_INET;
4042 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
4043 else if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6))
4044 family = PF_INET6;
4045 #endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */
4046 }
4047 if (family == PF_UNSPEC && sock != NULL)
4048 family = sock->sk->sk_family;
4049
4050 switch (family) {
4051 case PF_UNIX:
4052 ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
4053 s = ssp->smk_out->smk_secid;
4054 break;
4055 case PF_INET:
4056 skp = smack_from_skb(skb);
4057 if (skp) {
4058 s = skp->smk_secid;
4059 break;
4060 }
4061 /*
4062 * Translate what netlabel gave us.
4063 */
4064 if (sock != NULL)
4065 sk = sock->sk;
4066 skp = smack_from_netlbl(sk, family, skb);
4067 if (skp != NULL)
4068 s = skp->smk_secid;
4069 break;
4070 case PF_INET6:
4071 #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING
4072 skp = smack_from_skb(skb);
4073 if (skp)
4074 s = skp->smk_secid;
4075 #endif
4076 break;
4077 }
4078 *secid = s;
4079 if (s == 0)
4080 return -EINVAL;
4081 return 0;
4082 }
4083
4084 /**
4085 * smack_sock_graft - Initialize a newly created socket with an existing sock
4086 * @sk: child sock
4087 * @parent: parent socket
4088 *
4089 * Set the smk_{in,out} state of an existing sock based on the process that
4090 * is creating the new socket.
4091 */
4092 static void smack_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
4093 {
4094 struct socket_smack *ssp;
4095 struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
4096
4097 if (sk == NULL ||
4098 (sk->sk_family != PF_INET && sk->sk_family != PF_INET6))
4099 return;
4100
4101 ssp = sk->sk_security;
4102 ssp->smk_in = skp;
4103 ssp->smk_out = skp;
4104 /* cssp->smk_packet is already set in smack_inet_csk_clone() */
4105 }
4106
4107 /**
4108 * smack_inet_conn_request - Smack access check on connect
4109 * @sk: socket involved
4110 * @skb: packet
4111 * @req: unused
4112 *
4113 * Returns 0 if a task with the packet label could write to
4114 * the socket, otherwise an error code
4115 */
4116 static int smack_inet_conn_request(const struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
4117 struct request_sock *req)
4118 {
4119 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4120 struct smack_known *skp;
4121 struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
4122 struct sockaddr_in addr;
4123 struct iphdr *hdr;
4124 struct smack_known *hskp;
4125 int rc;
4126 struct smk_audit_info ad;
4127 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
4128 struct lsm_network_audit net;
4129 #endif
4130
4131 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
4132 if (family == PF_INET6) {
4133 /*
4134 * Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving
4135 * via IPv6 sockets. Don't set up netlabel
4136 * processing on IPv6.
4137 */
4138 if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4139 family = PF_INET;
4140 else
4141 return 0;
4142 }
4143 #endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */
4144
4145 /*
4146 * If there is a secmark use it rather than the CIPSO label.
4147 * If there is no secmark fall back to CIPSO.
4148 * The secmark is assumed to reflect policy better.
4149 */
4150 skp = smack_from_skb(skb);
4151 if (skp == NULL) {
4152 skp = smack_from_netlbl(sk, family, skb);
4153 if (skp == NULL)
4154 skp = &smack_known_huh;
4155 }
4156
4157 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
4158 smk_ad_init_net(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET, &net);
4159 ad.a.u.net->family = family;
4160 ad.a.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif;
4161 ipv4_skb_to_auditdata(skb, &ad.a, NULL);
4162 #endif
4163 /*
4164 * Receiving a packet requires that the other end be able to write
4165 * here. Read access is not required.
4166 */
4167 rc = smk_access(skp, ssp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
4168 rc = smk_bu_note("IPv4 connect", skp, ssp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, rc);
4169 if (rc != 0)
4170 return rc;
4171
4172 /*
4173 * Save the peer's label in the request_sock so we can later setup
4174 * smk_packet in the child socket so that SO_PEERCRED can report it.
4175 */
4176 req->peer_secid = skp->smk_secid;
4177
4178 /*
4179 * We need to decide if we want to label the incoming connection here
4180 * if we do we only need to label the request_sock and the stack will
4181 * propagate the wire-label to the sock when it is created.
4182 */
4183 hdr = ip_hdr(skb);
4184 addr.sin_addr.s_addr = hdr->saddr;
4185 rcu_read_lock();
4186 hskp = smack_ipv4host_label(&addr);
4187 rcu_read_unlock();
4188
4189 if (hskp == NULL)
4190 rc = netlbl_req_setattr(req, &skp->smk_netlabel);
4191 else
4192 netlbl_req_delattr(req);
4193
4194 return rc;
4195 }
4196
4197 /**
4198 * smack_inet_csk_clone - Copy the connection information to the new socket
4199 * @sk: the new socket
4200 * @req: the connection's request_sock
4201 *
4202 * Transfer the connection's peer label to the newly created socket.
4203 */
4204 static void smack_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *sk,
4205 const struct request_sock *req)
4206 {
4207 struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
4208 struct smack_known *skp;
4209
4210 if (req->peer_secid != 0) {
4211 skp = smack_from_secid(req->peer_secid);
4212 ssp->smk_packet = skp;
4213 } else
4214 ssp->smk_packet = NULL;
4215 }
4216
4217 /*
4218 * Key management security hooks
4219 *
4220 * Casey has not tested key support very heavily.
4221 * The permission check is most likely too restrictive.
4222 * If you care about keys please have a look.
4223 */
4224 #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
4225
4226 /**
4227 * smack_key_alloc - Set the key security blob
4228 * @key: object
4229 * @cred: the credentials to use
4230 * @flags: unused
4231 *
4232 * No allocation required
4233 *
4234 * Returns 0
4235 */
4236 static int smack_key_alloc(struct key *key, const struct cred *cred,
4237 unsigned long flags)
4238 {
4239 struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task(smack_cred(cred));
4240
4241 key->security = skp;
4242 return 0;
4243 }
4244
4245 /**
4246 * smack_key_free - Clear the key security blob
4247 * @key: the object
4248 *
4249 * Clear the blob pointer
4250 */
4251 static void smack_key_free(struct key *key)
4252 {
4253 key->security = NULL;
4254 }
4255
4256 /**
4257 * smack_key_permission - Smack access on a key
4258 * @key_ref: gets to the object
4259 * @cred: the credentials to use
4260 * @need_perm: requested key permission
4261 *
4262 * Return 0 if the task has read and write to the object,
4263 * an error code otherwise
4264 */
4265 static int smack_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
4266 const struct cred *cred,
4267 enum key_need_perm need_perm)
4268 {
4269 struct key *keyp;
4270 struct smk_audit_info ad;
4271 struct smack_known *tkp = smk_of_task(smack_cred(cred));
4272 int request = 0;
4273 int rc;
4274
4275 /*
4276 * Validate requested permissions
4277 */
4278 switch (need_perm) {
4279 case KEY_NEED_READ:
4280 case KEY_NEED_SEARCH:
4281 case KEY_NEED_VIEW:
4282 request |= MAY_READ;
4283 break;
4284 case KEY_NEED_WRITE:
4285 case KEY_NEED_LINK:
4286 case KEY_NEED_SETATTR:
4287 request |= MAY_WRITE;
4288 break;
4289 case KEY_NEED_UNSPECIFIED:
4290 case KEY_NEED_UNLINK:
4291 case KEY_SYSADMIN_OVERRIDE:
4292 case KEY_AUTHTOKEN_OVERRIDE:
4293 case KEY_DEFER_PERM_CHECK:
4294 return 0;
4295 default:
4296 return -EINVAL;
4297 }
4298
4299 keyp = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
4300 if (keyp == NULL)
4301 return -EINVAL;
4302 /*
4303 * If the key hasn't been initialized give it access so that
4304 * it may do so.
4305 */
4306 if (keyp->security == NULL)
4307 return 0;
4308 /*
4309 * This should not occur
4310 */
4311 if (tkp == NULL)
4312 return -EACCES;
4313
4314 if (smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
4315 return 0;
4316
4317 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
4318 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_KEY);
4319 ad.a.u.key_struct.key = keyp->serial;
4320 ad.a.u.key_struct.key_desc = keyp->description;
4321 #endif
4322 rc = smk_access(tkp, keyp->security, request, &ad);
4323 rc = smk_bu_note("key access", tkp, keyp->security, request, rc);
4324 return rc;
4325 }
4326
4327 /*
4328 * smack_key_getsecurity - Smack label tagging the key
4329 * @key points to the key to be queried
4330 * @_buffer points to a pointer that should be set to point to the
4331 * resulting string (if no label or an error occurs).
4332 * Return the length of the string (including terminating NUL) or -ve if
4333 * an error.
4334 * May also return 0 (and a NULL buffer pointer) if there is no label.
4335 */
4336 static int smack_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
4337 {
4338 struct smack_known *skp = key->security;
4339 size_t length;
4340 char *copy;
4341
4342 if (key->security == NULL) {
4343 *_buffer = NULL;
4344 return 0;
4345 }
4346
4347 copy = kstrdup(skp->smk_known, GFP_KERNEL);
4348 if (copy == NULL)
4349 return -ENOMEM;
4350 length = strlen(copy) + 1;
4351
4352 *_buffer = copy;
4353 return length;
4354 }
4355
4356
4357 #ifdef CONFIG_KEY_NOTIFICATIONS
4358 /**
4359 * smack_watch_key - Smack access to watch a key for notifications.
4360 * @key: The key to be watched
4361 *
4362 * Return 0 if the @watch->cred has permission to read from the key object and
4363 * an error otherwise.
4364 */
4365 static int smack_watch_key(struct key *key)
4366 {
4367 struct smk_audit_info ad;
4368 struct smack_known *tkp = smk_of_current();
4369 int rc;
4370
4371 if (key == NULL)
4372 return -EINVAL;
4373 /*
4374 * If the key hasn't been initialized give it access so that
4375 * it may do so.
4376 */
4377 if (key->security == NULL)
4378 return 0;
4379 /*
4380 * This should not occur
4381 */
4382 if (tkp == NULL)
4383 return -EACCES;
4384
4385 if (smack_privileged_cred(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE, current_cred()))
4386 return 0;
4387
4388 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
4389 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_KEY);
4390 ad.a.u.key_struct.key = key->serial;
4391 ad.a.u.key_struct.key_desc = key->description;
4392 #endif
4393 rc = smk_access(tkp, key->security, MAY_READ, &ad);
4394 rc = smk_bu_note("key watch", tkp, key->security, MAY_READ, rc);
4395 return rc;
4396 }
4397 #endif /* CONFIG_KEY_NOTIFICATIONS */
4398 #endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
4399
4400 #ifdef CONFIG_WATCH_QUEUE
4401 /**
4402 * smack_post_notification - Smack access to post a notification to a queue
4403 * @w_cred: The credentials of the watcher.
4404 * @cred: The credentials of the event source (may be NULL).
4405 * @n: The notification message to be posted.
4406 */
4407 static int smack_post_notification(const struct cred *w_cred,
4408 const struct cred *cred,
4409 struct watch_notification *n)
4410 {
4411 struct smk_audit_info ad;
4412 struct smack_known *subj, *obj;
4413 int rc;
4414
4415 /* Always let maintenance notifications through. */
4416 if (n->type == WATCH_TYPE_META)
4417 return 0;
4418
4419 if (!cred)
4420 return 0;
4421 subj = smk_of_task(smack_cred(cred));
4422 obj = smk_of_task(smack_cred(w_cred));
4423
4424 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NOTIFICATION);
4425 rc = smk_access(subj, obj, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
4426 rc = smk_bu_note("notification", subj, obj, MAY_WRITE, rc);
4427 return rc;
4428 }
4429 #endif /* CONFIG_WATCH_QUEUE */
4430
4431 /*
4432 * Smack Audit hooks
4433 *
4434 * Audit requires a unique representation of each Smack specific
4435 * rule. This unique representation is used to distinguish the
4436 * object to be audited from remaining kernel objects and also
4437 * works as a glue between the audit hooks.
4438 *
4439 * Since repository entries are added but never deleted, we'll use
4440 * the smack_known label address related to the given audit rule as
4441 * the needed unique representation. This also better fits the smack
4442 * model where nearly everything is a label.
4443 */
4444 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
4445
4446 /**
4447 * smack_audit_rule_init - Initialize a smack audit rule
4448 * @field: audit rule fields given from user-space (audit.h)
4449 * @op: required testing operator (=, !=, >, <, ...)
4450 * @rulestr: smack label to be audited
4451 * @vrule: pointer to save our own audit rule representation
4452 *
4453 * Prepare to audit cases where (@field @op @rulestr) is true.
4454 * The label to be audited is created if necessay.
4455 */
4456 static int smack_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule)
4457 {
4458 struct smack_known *skp;
4459 char **rule = (char **)vrule;
4460 *rule = NULL;
4461
4462 if (field != AUDIT_SUBJ_USER && field != AUDIT_OBJ_USER)
4463 return -EINVAL;
4464
4465 if (op != Audit_equal && op != Audit_not_equal)
4466 return -EINVAL;
4467
4468 skp = smk_import_entry(rulestr, 0);
4469 if (IS_ERR(skp))
4470 return PTR_ERR(skp);
4471
4472 *rule = skp->smk_known;
4473
4474 return 0;
4475 }
4476
4477 /**
4478 * smack_audit_rule_known - Distinguish Smack audit rules
4479 * @krule: rule of interest, in Audit kernel representation format
4480 *
4481 * This is used to filter Smack rules from remaining Audit ones.
4482 * If it's proved that this rule belongs to us, the
4483 * audit_rule_match hook will be called to do the final judgement.
4484 */
4485 static int smack_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule)
4486 {
4487 struct audit_field *f;
4488 int i;
4489
4490 for (i = 0; i < krule->field_count; i++) {
4491 f = &krule->fields[i];
4492
4493 if (f->type == AUDIT_SUBJ_USER || f->type == AUDIT_OBJ_USER)
4494 return 1;
4495 }
4496
4497 return 0;
4498 }
4499
4500 /**
4501 * smack_audit_rule_match - Audit given object ?
4502 * @secid: security id for identifying the object to test
4503 * @field: audit rule flags given from user-space
4504 * @op: required testing operator
4505 * @vrule: smack internal rule presentation
4506 *
4507 * The core Audit hook. It's used to take the decision of
4508 * whether to audit or not to audit a given object.
4509 */
4510 static int smack_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule)
4511 {
4512 struct smack_known *skp;
4513 char *rule = vrule;
4514
4515 if (unlikely(!rule)) {
4516 WARN_ONCE(1, "Smack: missing rule\n");
4517 return -ENOENT;
4518 }
4519
4520 if (field != AUDIT_SUBJ_USER && field != AUDIT_OBJ_USER)
4521 return 0;
4522
4523 skp = smack_from_secid(secid);
4524
4525 /*
4526 * No need to do string comparisons. If a match occurs,
4527 * both pointers will point to the same smack_known
4528 * label.
4529 */
4530 if (op == Audit_equal)
4531 return (rule == skp->smk_known);
4532 if (op == Audit_not_equal)
4533 return (rule != skp->smk_known);
4534
4535 return 0;
4536 }
4537
4538 /*
4539 * There is no need for a smack_audit_rule_free hook.
4540 * No memory was allocated.
4541 */
4542
4543 #endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
4544
4545 /**
4546 * smack_ismaclabel - check if xattr @name references a smack MAC label
4547 * @name: Full xattr name to check.
4548 */
4549 static int smack_ismaclabel(const char *name)
4550 {
4551 return (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX) == 0);
4552 }
4553
4554
4555 /**
4556 * smack_secid_to_secctx - return the smack label for a secid
4557 * @secid: incoming integer
4558 * @secdata: destination
4559 * @seclen: how long it is
4560 *
4561 * Exists for networking code.
4562 */
4563 static int smack_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
4564 {
4565 struct smack_known *skp = smack_from_secid(secid);
4566
4567 if (secdata)
4568 *secdata = skp->smk_known;
4569 *seclen = strlen(skp->smk_known);
4570 return 0;
4571 }
4572
4573 /**
4574 * smack_secctx_to_secid - return the secid for a smack label
4575 * @secdata: smack label
4576 * @seclen: how long result is
4577 * @secid: outgoing integer
4578 *
4579 * Exists for audit and networking code.
4580 */
4581 static int smack_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
4582 {
4583 struct smack_known *skp = smk_find_entry(secdata);
4584
4585 if (skp)
4586 *secid = skp->smk_secid;
4587 else
4588 *secid = 0;
4589 return 0;
4590 }
4591
4592 /*
4593 * There used to be a smack_release_secctx hook
4594 * that did nothing back when hooks were in a vector.
4595 * Now that there's a list such a hook adds cost.
4596 */
4597
4598 static int smack_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
4599 {
4600 return smack_inode_setsecurity(inode, XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX, ctx, ctxlen, 0);
4601 }
4602
4603 static int smack_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
4604 {
4605 return __vfs_setxattr_noperm(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SMACK, ctx, ctxlen, 0);
4606 }
4607
4608 static int smack_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen)
4609 {
4610 struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_inode(inode);
4611
4612 *ctx = skp->smk_known;
4613 *ctxlen = strlen(skp->smk_known);
4614 return 0;
4615 }
4616
4617 static int smack_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *dentry, struct cred **new)
4618 {
4619
4620 struct task_smack *tsp;
4621 struct smack_known *skp;
4622 struct inode_smack *isp;
4623 struct cred *new_creds = *new;
4624
4625 if (new_creds == NULL) {
4626 new_creds = prepare_creds();
4627 if (new_creds == NULL)
4628 return -ENOMEM;
4629 }
4630
4631 tsp = smack_cred(new_creds);
4632
4633 /*
4634 * Get label from overlay inode and set it in create_sid
4635 */
4636 isp = smack_inode(d_inode(dentry->d_parent));
4637 skp = isp->smk_inode;
4638 tsp->smk_task = skp;
4639 *new = new_creds;
4640 return 0;
4641 }
4642
4643 static int smack_inode_copy_up_xattr(const char *name)
4644 {
4645 /*
4646 * Return 1 if this is the smack access Smack attribute.
4647 */
4648 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK) == 0)
4649 return 1;
4650
4651 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
4652 }
4653
4654 static int smack_dentry_create_files_as(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
4655 struct qstr *name,
4656 const struct cred *old,
4657 struct cred *new)
4658 {
4659 struct task_smack *otsp = smack_cred(old);
4660 struct task_smack *ntsp = smack_cred(new);
4661 struct inode_smack *isp;
4662 int may;
4663
4664 /*
4665 * Use the process credential unless all of
4666 * the transmuting criteria are met
4667 */
4668 ntsp->smk_task = otsp->smk_task;
4669
4670 /*
4671 * the attribute of the containing directory
4672 */
4673 isp = smack_inode(d_inode(dentry->d_parent));
4674
4675 if (isp->smk_flags & SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE) {
4676 rcu_read_lock();
4677 may = smk_access_entry(otsp->smk_task->smk_known,
4678 isp->smk_inode->smk_known,
4679 &otsp->smk_task->smk_rules);
4680 rcu_read_unlock();
4681
4682 /*
4683 * If the directory is transmuting and the rule
4684 * providing access is transmuting use the containing
4685 * directory label instead of the process label.
4686 */
4687 if (may > 0 && (may & MAY_TRANSMUTE))
4688 ntsp->smk_task = isp->smk_inode;
4689 }
4690 return 0;
4691 }
4692
4693 struct lsm_blob_sizes smack_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
4694 .lbs_cred = sizeof(struct task_smack),
4695 .lbs_file = sizeof(struct smack_known *),
4696 .lbs_inode = sizeof(struct inode_smack),
4697 .lbs_ipc = sizeof(struct smack_known *),
4698 .lbs_msg_msg = sizeof(struct smack_known *),
4699 };
4700
4701 static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
4702 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, smack_ptrace_access_check),
4703 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, smack_ptrace_traceme),
4704 LSM_HOOK_INIT(syslog, smack_syslog),
4705
4706 LSM_HOOK_INIT(fs_context_dup, smack_fs_context_dup),
4707 LSM_HOOK_INIT(fs_context_parse_param, smack_fs_context_parse_param),
4708
4709 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_alloc_security, smack_sb_alloc_security),
4710 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_free_security, smack_sb_free_security),
4711 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_free_mnt_opts, smack_free_mnt_opts),
4712 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_eat_lsm_opts, smack_sb_eat_lsm_opts),
4713 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_statfs, smack_sb_statfs),
4714 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_set_mnt_opts, smack_set_mnt_opts),
4715
4716 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_creds_for_exec, smack_bprm_creds_for_exec),
4717
4718 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_alloc_security, smack_inode_alloc_security),
4719 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_init_security, smack_inode_init_security),
4720 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_link, smack_inode_link),
4721 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_unlink, smack_inode_unlink),
4722 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_rmdir, smack_inode_rmdir),
4723 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_rename, smack_inode_rename),
4724 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_permission, smack_inode_permission),
4725 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setattr, smack_inode_setattr),
4726 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getattr, smack_inode_getattr),
4727 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setxattr, smack_inode_setxattr),
4728 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_post_setxattr, smack_inode_post_setxattr),
4729 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getxattr, smack_inode_getxattr),
4730 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_removexattr, smack_inode_removexattr),
4731 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecurity, smack_inode_getsecurity),
4732 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setsecurity, smack_inode_setsecurity),
4733 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_listsecurity, smack_inode_listsecurity),
4734 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecid, smack_inode_getsecid),
4735
4736 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_alloc_security, smack_file_alloc_security),
4737 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_ioctl, smack_file_ioctl),
4738 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_lock, smack_file_lock),
4739 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_fcntl, smack_file_fcntl),
4740 LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_file, smack_mmap_file),
4741 LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_addr, cap_mmap_addr),
4742 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_set_fowner, smack_file_set_fowner),
4743 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_send_sigiotask, smack_file_send_sigiotask),
4744 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_receive, smack_file_receive),
4745
4746 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_open, smack_file_open),
4747
4748 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_alloc_blank, smack_cred_alloc_blank),
4749 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_free, smack_cred_free),
4750 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_prepare, smack_cred_prepare),
4751 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_transfer, smack_cred_transfer),
4752 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_getsecid, smack_cred_getsecid),
4753 LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_act_as, smack_kernel_act_as),
4754 LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_create_files_as, smack_kernel_create_files_as),
4755 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setpgid, smack_task_setpgid),
4756 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getpgid, smack_task_getpgid),
4757 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsid, smack_task_getsid),
4758 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsecid, smack_task_getsecid),
4759 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setnice, smack_task_setnice),
4760 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setioprio, smack_task_setioprio),
4761 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getioprio, smack_task_getioprio),
4762 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setscheduler, smack_task_setscheduler),
4763 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getscheduler, smack_task_getscheduler),
4764 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_movememory, smack_task_movememory),
4765 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_kill, smack_task_kill),
4766 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_to_inode, smack_task_to_inode),
4767
4768 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ipc_permission, smack_ipc_permission),
4769 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ipc_getsecid, smack_ipc_getsecid),
4770
4771 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_msg_alloc_security, smack_msg_msg_alloc_security),
4772
4773 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_alloc_security, smack_ipc_alloc_security),
4774 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_associate, smack_msg_queue_associate),
4775 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgctl, smack_msg_queue_msgctl),
4776 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgsnd, smack_msg_queue_msgsnd),
4777 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgrcv, smack_msg_queue_msgrcv),
4778
4779 LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_alloc_security, smack_ipc_alloc_security),
4780 LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_associate, smack_shm_associate),
4781 LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_shmctl, smack_shm_shmctl),
4782 LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_shmat, smack_shm_shmat),
4783
4784 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_alloc_security, smack_ipc_alloc_security),
4785 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_associate, smack_sem_associate),
4786 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_semctl, smack_sem_semctl),
4787 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_semop, smack_sem_semop),
4788
4789 LSM_HOOK_INIT(d_instantiate, smack_d_instantiate),
4790
4791 LSM_HOOK_INIT(getprocattr, smack_getprocattr),
4792 LSM_HOOK_INIT(setprocattr, smack_setprocattr),
4793
4794 LSM_HOOK_INIT(unix_stream_connect, smack_unix_stream_connect),
4795 LSM_HOOK_INIT(unix_may_send, smack_unix_may_send),
4796
4797 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_post_create, smack_socket_post_create),
4798 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_socketpair, smack_socket_socketpair),
4799 #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
4800 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_bind, smack_socket_bind),
4801 #endif
4802 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_connect, smack_socket_connect),
4803 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sendmsg, smack_socket_sendmsg),
4804 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sock_rcv_skb, smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb),
4805 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_stream, smack_socket_getpeersec_stream),
4806 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_dgram, smack_socket_getpeersec_dgram),
4807 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_alloc_security, smack_sk_alloc_security),
4808 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_free_security, smack_sk_free_security),
4809 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sock_graft, smack_sock_graft),
4810 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_request, smack_inet_conn_request),
4811 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_csk_clone, smack_inet_csk_clone),
4812
4813 /* key management security hooks */
4814 #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
4815 LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_alloc, smack_key_alloc),
4816 LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_free, smack_key_free),
4817 LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_permission, smack_key_permission),
4818 LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_getsecurity, smack_key_getsecurity),
4819 #ifdef CONFIG_KEY_NOTIFICATIONS
4820 LSM_HOOK_INIT(watch_key, smack_watch_key),
4821 #endif
4822 #endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
4823
4824 #ifdef CONFIG_WATCH_QUEUE
4825 LSM_HOOK_INIT(post_notification, smack_post_notification),
4826 #endif
4827
4828 /* Audit hooks */
4829 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
4830 LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_init, smack_audit_rule_init),
4831 LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_known, smack_audit_rule_known),
4832 LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_match, smack_audit_rule_match),
4833 #endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
4834
4835 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ismaclabel, smack_ismaclabel),
4836 LSM_HOOK_INIT(secid_to_secctx, smack_secid_to_secctx),
4837 LSM_HOOK_INIT(secctx_to_secid, smack_secctx_to_secid),
4838 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_notifysecctx, smack_inode_notifysecctx),
4839 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setsecctx, smack_inode_setsecctx),
4840 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecctx, smack_inode_getsecctx),
4841 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_copy_up, smack_inode_copy_up),
4842 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_copy_up_xattr, smack_inode_copy_up_xattr),
4843 LSM_HOOK_INIT(dentry_create_files_as, smack_dentry_create_files_as),
4844 };
4845
4846
4847 static __init void init_smack_known_list(void)
4848 {
4849 /*
4850 * Initialize rule list locks
4851 */
4852 mutex_init(&smack_known_huh.smk_rules_lock);
4853 mutex_init(&smack_known_hat.smk_rules_lock);
4854 mutex_init(&smack_known_floor.smk_rules_lock);
4855 mutex_init(&smack_known_star.smk_rules_lock);
4856 mutex_init(&smack_known_web.smk_rules_lock);
4857 /*
4858 * Initialize rule lists
4859 */
4860 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&smack_known_huh.smk_rules);
4861 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&smack_known_hat.smk_rules);
4862 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&smack_known_star.smk_rules);
4863 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&smack_known_floor.smk_rules);
4864 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&smack_known_web.smk_rules);
4865 /*
4866 * Create the known labels list
4867 */
4868 smk_insert_entry(&smack_known_huh);
4869 smk_insert_entry(&smack_known_hat);
4870 smk_insert_entry(&smack_known_star);
4871 smk_insert_entry(&smack_known_floor);
4872 smk_insert_entry(&smack_known_web);
4873 }
4874
4875 /**
4876 * smack_init - initialize the smack system
4877 *
4878 * Returns 0 on success, -ENOMEM is there's no memory
4879 */
4880 static __init int smack_init(void)
4881 {
4882 struct cred *cred = (struct cred *) current->cred;
4883 struct task_smack *tsp;
4884
4885 smack_rule_cache = KMEM_CACHE(smack_rule, 0);
4886 if (!smack_rule_cache)
4887 return -ENOMEM;
4888
4889 /*
4890 * Set the security state for the initial task.
4891 */
4892 tsp = smack_cred(cred);
4893 init_task_smack(tsp, &smack_known_floor, &smack_known_floor);
4894
4895 /*
4896 * Register with LSM
4897 */
4898 security_add_hooks(smack_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(smack_hooks), "smack");
4899 smack_enabled = 1;
4900
4901 pr_info("Smack: Initializing.\n");
4902 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER
4903 pr_info("Smack: Netfilter enabled.\n");
4904 #endif
4905 #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
4906 pr_info("Smack: IPv6 port labeling enabled.\n");
4907 #endif
4908 #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING
4909 pr_info("Smack: IPv6 Netfilter enabled.\n");
4910 #endif
4911
4912 /* initialize the smack_known_list */
4913 init_smack_known_list();
4914
4915 return 0;
4916 }
4917
4918 /*
4919 * Smack requires early initialization in order to label
4920 * all processes and objects when they are created.
4921 */
4922 DEFINE_LSM(smack) = {
4923 .name = "smack",
4924 .flags = LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR | LSM_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE,
4925 .blobs = &smack_blob_sizes,
4926 .init = smack_init,
4927 };