#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
#include <net/sock.h>
+#include "include/af_unix.h"
#include "include/apparmor.h"
#include "include/apparmorfs.h"
#include "include/audit.h"
#include "include/context.h"
#include "include/file.h"
#include "include/ipc.h"
+#include "include/net.h"
#include "include/path.h"
#include "include/policy.h"
#include "include/procattr.h"
+#include "include/mount.h"
/* Flag indicating whether initialization completed */
int apparmor_initialized __initdata;
+DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct aa_buffers, aa_buffers);
+
+
/*
* LSM hook functions
*/
/*
- * free the associated aa_task_cxt and put its profiles
+ * free the associated aa_task_ctx and put its labels
*/
static void apparmor_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
{
- aa_free_task_context(cred_cxt(cred));
- cred_cxt(cred) = NULL;
+ aa_free_task_context(cred_ctx(cred));
+ cred_ctx(cred) = NULL;
}
/*
static int apparmor_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp)
{
/* freed by apparmor_cred_free */
- struct aa_task_cxt *cxt = aa_alloc_task_context(gfp);
- if (!cxt)
+ struct aa_task_ctx *ctx = aa_alloc_task_context(gfp);
+ if (!ctx)
return -ENOMEM;
- cred_cxt(cred) = cxt;
+ cred_ctx(cred) = ctx;
return 0;
}
/*
- * prepare new aa_task_cxt for modification by prepare_cred block
+ * prepare new aa_task_ctx for modification by prepare_cred block
*/
static int apparmor_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
gfp_t gfp)
{
/* freed by apparmor_cred_free */
- struct aa_task_cxt *cxt = aa_alloc_task_context(gfp);
- if (!cxt)
+ struct aa_task_ctx *ctx = aa_alloc_task_context(gfp);
+ if (!ctx)
return -ENOMEM;
- aa_dup_task_context(cxt, cred_cxt(old));
- cred_cxt(new) = cxt;
+ aa_dup_task_context(ctx, cred_ctx(old));
+ cred_ctx(new) = ctx;
return 0;
}
*/
static void apparmor_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
{
- const struct aa_task_cxt *old_cxt = cred_cxt(old);
- struct aa_task_cxt *new_cxt = cred_cxt(new);
+ const struct aa_task_ctx *old_ctx = cred_ctx(old);
+ struct aa_task_ctx *new_ctx = cred_ctx(new);
- aa_dup_task_context(new_cxt, old_cxt);
+ aa_dup_task_context(new_ctx, old_ctx);
}
static int apparmor_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child,
unsigned int mode)
{
- return aa_ptrace(current, child, mode);
+ struct aa_label *tracer, *tracee;
+ int error;
+
+ tracer = aa_begin_current_label(DO_UPDATE);
+ tracee = aa_get_task_label(child);
+ error = aa_may_ptrace(tracer, tracee,
+ mode == PTRACE_MODE_READ ? AA_PTRACE_READ : AA_PTRACE_TRACE);
+ aa_put_label(tracee);
+ aa_end_current_label(tracer);
+
+ return error;
}
static int apparmor_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
{
- return aa_ptrace(parent, current, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH);
+ struct aa_label *tracer, *tracee;
+ int error;
+
+ tracee = aa_begin_current_label(DO_UPDATE);
+ tracer = aa_get_task_label(parent);
+ error = aa_may_ptrace(tracer, tracee, AA_PTRACE_TRACE);
+ aa_put_label(tracer);
+ aa_end_current_label(tracee);
+
+ return error;
}
/* Derived from security/commoncap.c:cap_capget */
static int apparmor_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
{
- struct aa_profile *profile;
+ struct aa_label *label;
const struct cred *cred;
rcu_read_lock();
cred = __task_cred(target);
- profile = aa_cred_profile(cred);
+ label = aa_get_newest_cred_label(cred);
/*
* cap_capget is stacked ahead of this and will
* initialize effective and permitted.
*/
- if (!unconfined(profile) && !COMPLAIN_MODE(profile)) {
- *effective = cap_intersect(*effective, profile->caps.allow);
- *permitted = cap_intersect(*permitted, profile->caps.allow);
+ if (!unconfined(label)) {
+ struct aa_profile *profile;
+ struct label_it i;
+ label_for_each_confined(i, label, profile) {
+ if (COMPLAIN_MODE(profile))
+ continue;
+ *effective = cap_intersect(*effective,
+ profile->caps.allow);
+ *permitted = cap_intersect(*permitted,
+ profile->caps.allow);
+ }
}
rcu_read_unlock();
+ aa_put_label(label);
return 0;
}
static int apparmor_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
int cap, int audit)
{
- struct aa_profile *profile;
+ struct aa_label *label;
int error = 0;
- profile = aa_cred_profile(cred);
- if (!unconfined(profile))
- error = aa_capable(profile, cap, audit);
+ label = aa_get_newest_cred_label(cred);
+ if (!unconfined(label))
+ error = aa_capable(label, cap, audit);
+ aa_put_label(label);
+
return error;
}
*
* Returns: %0 else error code if error or permission denied
*/
-static int common_perm(int op, const struct path *path, u32 mask,
+static int common_perm(const char *op, const struct path *path, u32 mask,
struct path_cond *cond)
{
- struct aa_profile *profile;
+ struct aa_label *label;
int error = 0;
- profile = __aa_current_profile();
- if (!unconfined(profile))
- error = aa_path_perm(op, profile, path, 0, mask, cond);
+ label = aa_begin_current_label(NO_UPDATE);
+ if (!unconfined(label))
+ error = aa_path_perm(op, label, path, 0, mask, cond);
+ aa_end_current_label(label);
return error;
}
+static int common_perm_cond(const char *op, const struct path *path, u32 mask)
+{
+ struct path_cond cond = { d_backing_inode(path->dentry)->i_uid,
+ d_backing_inode(path->dentry)->i_mode
+ };
+
+ if (!path_mediated_fs(path->dentry))
+ return 0;
+
+ return common_perm(op, path, mask, &cond);
+}
+
+static void apparmor_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
+{
+ struct aa_label *ctx = inode_ctx(inode);
+
+ if (ctx) {
+ inode_ctx(inode) = NULL;
+ aa_put_label(ctx);
+ }
+}
+
/**
* common_perm_dir_dentry - common permission wrapper when path is dir, dentry
* @op: operation being checked
*
* Returns: %0 else error code if error or permission denied
*/
-static int common_perm_dir_dentry(int op, const struct path *dir,
+static int common_perm_dir_dentry(const char *op, const struct path *dir,
struct dentry *dentry, u32 mask,
struct path_cond *cond)
{
return common_perm(op, &path, mask, cond);
}
-/**
- * common_perm_path - common permission wrapper when mnt, dentry
- * @op: operation being checked
- * @path: location to check (NOT NULL)
- * @mask: requested permissions mask
- *
- * Returns: %0 else error code if error or permission denied
- */
-static inline int common_perm_path(int op, const struct path *path, u32 mask)
-{
- struct path_cond cond = { d_backing_inode(path->dentry)->i_uid,
- d_backing_inode(path->dentry)->i_mode
- };
- if (!mediated_filesystem(path->dentry))
- return 0;
-
- return common_perm(op, path, mask, &cond);
-}
-
/**
* common_perm_rm - common permission wrapper for operations doing rm
* @op: operation being checked
*
* Returns: %0 else error code if error or permission denied
*/
-static int common_perm_rm(int op, const struct path *dir,
+static int common_perm_rm(const char *op, const struct path *dir,
struct dentry *dentry, u32 mask)
{
struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
struct path_cond cond = { };
- if (!inode || !mediated_filesystem(dentry))
+ if (!inode || !path_mediated_fs(dentry))
return 0;
cond.uid = inode->i_uid;
*
* Returns: %0 else error code if error or permission denied
*/
-static int common_perm_create(int op, const struct path *dir,
+static int common_perm_create(const char *op, const struct path *dir,
struct dentry *dentry, u32 mask, umode_t mode)
{
struct path_cond cond = { current_fsuid(), mode };
- if (!mediated_filesystem(dir->dentry))
+ if (!path_mediated_fs(dir->dentry))
return 0;
return common_perm_dir_dentry(op, dir, dentry, mask, &cond);
static int apparmor_path_truncate(const struct path *path)
{
- return common_perm_path(OP_TRUNC, path, MAY_WRITE | AA_MAY_META_WRITE);
+ return common_perm_cond(OP_TRUNC, path, MAY_WRITE | AA_MAY_SETATTR);
}
static int apparmor_path_symlink(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
static int apparmor_path_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, const struct path *new_dir,
struct dentry *new_dentry)
{
- struct aa_profile *profile;
+ struct aa_label *label;
int error = 0;
- if (!mediated_filesystem(old_dentry))
+ if (!path_mediated_fs(old_dentry))
return 0;
- profile = aa_current_profile();
- if (!unconfined(profile))
- error = aa_path_link(profile, old_dentry, new_dir, new_dentry);
+ label = aa_begin_current_label(DO_UPDATE);
+ if (!unconfined(label))
+ error = aa_path_link(label, old_dentry, new_dir, new_dentry);
+ aa_end_current_label(label);
+
return error;
}
static int apparmor_path_rename(const struct path *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry,
const struct path *new_dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
{
- struct aa_profile *profile;
+ struct aa_label *label;
int error = 0;
- if (!mediated_filesystem(old_dentry))
+ if (!path_mediated_fs(old_dentry))
return 0;
- profile = aa_current_profile();
- if (!unconfined(profile)) {
+ label = aa_begin_current_label(DO_UPDATE);
+ if (!unconfined(label)) {
struct path old_path = { old_dir->mnt, old_dentry };
struct path new_path = { new_dir->mnt, new_dentry };
struct path_cond cond = { d_backing_inode(old_dentry)->i_uid,
d_backing_inode(old_dentry)->i_mode
};
- error = aa_path_perm(OP_RENAME_SRC, profile, &old_path, 0,
- MAY_READ | AA_MAY_META_READ | MAY_WRITE |
- AA_MAY_META_WRITE | AA_MAY_DELETE,
+ error = aa_path_perm(OP_RENAME_SRC, label, &old_path, 0,
+ MAY_READ | AA_MAY_GETATTR | MAY_WRITE |
+ AA_MAY_SETATTR | AA_MAY_DELETE,
&cond);
if (!error)
- error = aa_path_perm(OP_RENAME_DEST, profile, &new_path,
- 0, MAY_WRITE | AA_MAY_META_WRITE |
+ error = aa_path_perm(OP_RENAME_DEST, label, &new_path,
+ 0, MAY_WRITE | AA_MAY_SETATTR |
AA_MAY_CREATE, &cond);
}
+ aa_end_current_label(label);
+
return error;
}
static int apparmor_path_chmod(const struct path *path, umode_t mode)
{
- return common_perm_path(OP_CHMOD, path, AA_MAY_CHMOD);
+ return common_perm_cond(OP_CHMOD, path, AA_MAY_CHMOD);
}
static int apparmor_path_chown(const struct path *path, kuid_t uid, kgid_t gid)
{
- return common_perm_path(OP_CHOWN, path, AA_MAY_CHOWN);
+ return common_perm_cond(OP_CHOWN, path, AA_MAY_CHOWN);
}
static int apparmor_inode_getattr(const struct path *path)
{
- return common_perm_path(OP_GETATTR, path, AA_MAY_META_READ);
+ return common_perm_cond(OP_GETATTR, path, AA_MAY_GETATTR);
}
static int apparmor_file_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred)
{
- struct aa_file_cxt *fcxt = file->f_security;
- struct aa_profile *profile;
+ struct aa_file_ctx *fctx = file_ctx(file);
+ struct aa_label *label;
int error = 0;
- if (!mediated_filesystem(file->f_path.dentry))
+ if (!path_mediated_fs(file->f_path.dentry))
return 0;
/* If in exec, permission is handled by bprm hooks.
* actually execute the image.
*/
if (current->in_execve) {
- fcxt->allow = MAY_EXEC | MAY_READ | AA_EXEC_MMAP;
+ fctx->allow = MAY_EXEC | MAY_READ | AA_EXEC_MMAP;
return 0;
}
- profile = aa_cred_profile(cred);
- if (!unconfined(profile)) {
+ label = aa_get_newest_cred_label(cred);
+ if (!unconfined(label)) {
struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
struct path_cond cond = { inode->i_uid, inode->i_mode };
- error = aa_path_perm(OP_OPEN, profile, &file->f_path, 0,
+ error = aa_path_perm(OP_OPEN, label, &file->f_path, 0,
aa_map_file_to_perms(file), &cond);
/* todo cache full allowed permissions set and state */
- fcxt->allow = aa_map_file_to_perms(file);
+ fctx->allow = aa_map_file_to_perms(file);
}
+ aa_put_label(label);
return error;
}
static int apparmor_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
{
+ int error = 0;
+
/* freed by apparmor_file_free_security */
- file->f_security = aa_alloc_file_context(GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!file->f_security)
- return -ENOMEM;
- return 0;
+ struct aa_label *label = aa_begin_current_label(DO_UPDATE);
+ file->f_security = aa_alloc_file_ctx(label, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!file_ctx(file))
+ error = -ENOMEM;
+ aa_end_current_label(label);
+ return error;
}
static void apparmor_file_free_security(struct file *file)
{
- struct aa_file_cxt *cxt = file->f_security;
-
- aa_free_file_context(cxt);
+ aa_free_file_ctx(file_ctx(file));
}
-static int common_file_perm(int op, struct file *file, u32 mask)
+static int common_file_perm(const char *op, struct file *file, u32 mask)
{
- struct aa_file_cxt *fcxt = file->f_security;
- struct aa_profile *profile, *fprofile = aa_cred_profile(file->f_cred);
+ struct aa_label *label;
int error = 0;
- BUG_ON(!fprofile);
-
- if (!file->f_path.mnt ||
- !mediated_filesystem(file->f_path.dentry))
- return 0;
-
- profile = __aa_current_profile();
-
- /* revalidate access, if task is unconfined, or the cached cred
- * doesn't match or if the request is for more permissions than
- * was granted.
- *
- * Note: the test for !unconfined(fprofile) is to handle file
- * delegation from unconfined tasks
- */
- if (!unconfined(profile) && !unconfined(fprofile) &&
- ((fprofile != profile) || (mask & ~fcxt->allow)))
- error = aa_file_perm(op, profile, file, mask);
+ label = aa_begin_current_label(NO_UPDATE);
+ error = aa_file_perm(op, label, file, mask);
+ aa_end_current_label(label);
return error;
}
+static int apparmor_file_receive(struct file *file)
+{
+ return common_file_perm(OP_FRECEIVE, file, aa_map_file_to_perms(file));
+}
+
static int apparmor_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
{
return common_file_perm(OP_FPERM, file, mask);
return common_file_perm(OP_FLOCK, file, mask);
}
-static int common_mmap(int op, struct file *file, unsigned long prot,
+static int common_mmap(const char *op, struct file *file, unsigned long prot,
unsigned long flags)
{
int mask = 0;
- if (!file || !file->f_security)
+ if (!file || !file_ctx(file))
return 0;
if (prot & PROT_READ)
!(vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED) ? MAP_PRIVATE : 0);
}
+static int apparmor_sb_mount(const char *dev_name, const struct path *path,
+ const char *type, unsigned long flags, void *data)
+{
+ struct aa_label *label;
+ int error = 0;
+
+ /* Discard magic */
+ if ((flags & MS_MGC_MSK) == MS_MGC_VAL)
+ flags &= ~MS_MGC_MSK;
+
+ flags &= ~AA_MS_IGNORE_MASK;
+
+ label = aa_begin_current_label(NO_UPDATE);
+ if (!unconfined(label)) {
+ if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
+ error = aa_remount(label, path, flags, data);
+ else if (flags & MS_BIND)
+ error = aa_bind_mount(label, path, dev_name, flags);
+ else if (flags & (MS_SHARED | MS_PRIVATE | MS_SLAVE |
+ MS_UNBINDABLE))
+ error = aa_mount_change_type(label, path, flags);
+ else if (flags & MS_MOVE)
+ error = aa_move_mount(label, path, dev_name);
+ else
+ error = aa_new_mount(label, dev_name, path, type,
+ flags, data);
+ }
+ aa_end_current_label(label);
+
+ return error;
+}
+
+static int apparmor_sb_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
+{
+ struct aa_label *label;
+ int error = 0;
+
+ label = aa_begin_current_label(NO_UPDATE);
+ if (!unconfined(label))
+ error = aa_umount(label, mnt, flags);
+ aa_end_current_label(label);
+
+ return error;
+}
+
+static int apparmor_sb_pivotroot(const struct path *old_path,
+ const struct path *new_path)
+{
+ struct aa_label *label;
+ int error = 0;
+
+ label = aa_get_current_label();
+ if (!unconfined(label))
+ error = aa_pivotroot(label, old_path, new_path);
+ aa_put_label(label);
+
+ return error;
+}
+
static int apparmor_getprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name,
char **value)
{
int error = -ENOENT;
/* released below */
const struct cred *cred = get_task_cred(task);
- struct aa_task_cxt *cxt = cred_cxt(cred);
- struct aa_profile *profile = NULL;
+ struct aa_task_ctx *ctx = cred_ctx(cred);
+ struct aa_label *label = NULL;
if (strcmp(name, "current") == 0)
- profile = aa_get_newest_profile(cxt->profile);
- else if (strcmp(name, "prev") == 0 && cxt->previous)
- profile = aa_get_newest_profile(cxt->previous);
- else if (strcmp(name, "exec") == 0 && cxt->onexec)
- profile = aa_get_newest_profile(cxt->onexec);
+ label = aa_get_newest_label(ctx->label);
+ else if (strcmp(name, "prev") == 0 && ctx->previous)
+ label = aa_get_newest_label(ctx->previous);
+ else if (strcmp(name, "exec") == 0 && ctx->onexec)
+ label = aa_get_newest_label(ctx->onexec);
else
error = -EINVAL;
- if (profile)
- error = aa_getprocattr(profile, value);
+ if (label)
+ error = aa_getprocattr(label, value);
- aa_put_profile(profile);
+ aa_put_label(label);
put_cred(cred);
return error;
static int apparmor_setprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name,
void *value, size_t size)
{
- struct common_audit_data sa;
- struct apparmor_audit_data aad = {0,};
char *command, *largs = NULL, *args = value;
size_t arg_size;
int error;
+ DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(sa, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE, OP_SETPROCATTR);
if (size == 0)
return -EINVAL;
error = aa_setprocattr_changehat(args, arg_size,
AA_DO_TEST);
} else if (strcmp(command, "changeprofile") == 0) {
- error = aa_setprocattr_changeprofile(args, !AA_ONEXEC,
- !AA_DO_TEST);
+ error = aa_change_profile(args, !AA_ONEXEC,
+ !AA_DO_TEST, false);
} else if (strcmp(command, "permprofile") == 0) {
- error = aa_setprocattr_changeprofile(args, !AA_ONEXEC,
- AA_DO_TEST);
+ error = aa_change_profile(args, !AA_ONEXEC, AA_DO_TEST,
+ false);
+ } else if (strcmp(command, "stack") == 0) {
+ error = aa_change_profile(args, !AA_ONEXEC, !AA_DO_TEST,
+ true);
} else
goto fail;
} else if (strcmp(name, "exec") == 0) {
if (strcmp(command, "exec") == 0)
- error = aa_setprocattr_changeprofile(args, AA_ONEXEC,
- !AA_DO_TEST);
+ error = aa_change_profile(args, AA_ONEXEC, !AA_DO_TEST,
+ false);
+ else if (strcmp(command, "stack") == 0)
+ error = aa_change_profile(args, AA_ONEXEC, !AA_DO_TEST,
+ true);
else
goto fail;
} else
return error;
fail:
- sa.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE;
- sa.aad = &aad;
- aad.profile = aa_current_profile();
- aad.op = OP_SETPROCATTR;
- aad.info = name;
- aad.error = error = -EINVAL;
+ aad(&sa)->label = aa_begin_current_label(DO_UPDATE);
+ aad(&sa)->info = name;
+ aad(&sa)->error = error = -EINVAL;
aa_audit_msg(AUDIT_APPARMOR_DENIED, &sa, NULL);
+ aa_end_current_label(aad(&sa)->label);
goto out;
}
+/**
+ * apparmor_bprm_committing_creds - do task cleanup on committing new creds
+ * @bprm: binprm for the exec (NOT NULL)
+ */
+void apparmor_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+{
+ struct aa_label *label = aa_current_raw_label();
+ struct aa_task_ctx *new_ctx = cred_ctx(bprm->cred);
+
+ /* bail out if unconfined or not changing profile */
+ if ((new_ctx->label->proxy == label->proxy) ||
+ (unconfined(new_ctx->label)))
+ return;
+
+ aa_inherit_files(bprm->cred, current->files);
+
+ current->pdeath_signal = 0;
+
+ /* reset soft limits and set hard limits for the new label */
+ __aa_transition_rlimits(label, new_ctx->label);
+}
+
+/**
+ * apparmor_bprm_commited_cred - do cleanup after new creds committed
+ * @bprm: binprm for the exec (NOT NULL)
+ */
+void apparmor_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+{
+ /* TODO: cleanup signals - ipc mediation */
+ return;
+}
+
static int apparmor_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *task,
unsigned int resource, struct rlimit *new_rlim)
{
- struct aa_profile *profile = __aa_current_profile();
+ struct aa_label *label = aa_begin_current_label(NO_UPDATE);
int error = 0;
- if (!unconfined(profile))
- error = aa_task_setrlimit(profile, task, resource, new_rlim);
+ if (!unconfined(label))
+ error = aa_task_setrlimit(label, task, resource, new_rlim);
+ aa_end_current_label(label);
+
+ return error;
+}
+
+/**
+ * apparmor_sk_alloc_security - allocate and attach the sk_security field
+ */
+static int apparmor_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t flags)
+{
+ struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx;
+
+ ctx = kzalloc(sizeof(*ctx), flags);
+ if (!ctx)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ SK_CTX(sk) = ctx;
+ //??? set local too current???
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * apparmor_sk_free_security - free the sk_security field
+ */
+static void apparmor_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
+{
+ struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk);
+
+ SK_CTX(sk) = NULL;
+ aa_put_label(ctx->label);
+ aa_put_label(ctx->peer);
+ path_put(&ctx->path);
+ kfree(ctx);
+}
+
+/**
+ * apparmor_clone_security - clone the sk_security field
+ */
+static void apparmor_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk,
+ struct sock *newsk)
+{
+ struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk);
+ struct aa_sk_ctx *new = SK_CTX(newsk);
+
+ new->label = aa_get_label(ctx->label);
+ new->peer = aa_get_label(ctx->peer);
+ new->path = ctx->path;
+ path_get(&new->path);
+}
+
+static struct path *UNIX_FS_CONN_PATH(struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
+{
+ if (sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX && UNIX_FS(sk))
+ return &unix_sk(sk)->path;
+ else if (newsk->sk_family == PF_UNIX && UNIX_FS(newsk))
+ return &unix_sk(newsk)->path;
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * apparmor_unix_stream_connect - check perms before making unix domain conn
+ *
+ * peer is locked when this hook is called
+ */
+static int apparmor_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sk, struct sock *peer_sk,
+ struct sock *newsk)
+{
+ struct aa_sk_ctx *sk_ctx = SK_CTX(sk);
+ struct aa_sk_ctx *peer_ctx = SK_CTX(peer_sk);
+ struct aa_sk_ctx *new_ctx = SK_CTX(newsk);
+ struct aa_label *label;
+ struct path *path;
+ int error;
+
+ label = aa_begin_current_label(NO_UPDATE);
+ error = aa_unix_peer_perm(label, OP_CONNECT,
+ (AA_MAY_CONNECT | AA_MAY_SEND | AA_MAY_RECEIVE),
+ sk, peer_sk, NULL);
+ if (!UNIX_FS(peer_sk)) {
+ last_error(error,
+ aa_unix_peer_perm(peer_ctx->label, OP_CONNECT,
+ (AA_MAY_ACCEPT | AA_MAY_SEND | AA_MAY_RECEIVE),
+ peer_sk, sk, label));
+ }
+ aa_end_current_label(label);
+
+ if (error)
+ return error;
+
+ /* label newsk if it wasn't labeled in post_create. Normally this
+ * would be done in sock_graft, but because we are directly looking
+ * at the peer_sk to obtain peer_labeling for unix socks this
+ * does not work
+ */
+ if (!new_ctx->label)
+ new_ctx->label = aa_get_label(peer_ctx->label);
+
+ /* Cross reference the peer labels for SO_PEERSEC */
+ if (new_ctx->peer)
+ aa_put_label(new_ctx->peer);
+
+ if (sk_ctx->peer)
+ aa_put_label(sk_ctx->peer);
+
+ new_ctx->peer = aa_get_label(sk_ctx->label);
+ sk_ctx->peer = aa_get_label(peer_ctx->label);
+
+ path = UNIX_FS_CONN_PATH(sk, peer_sk);
+ if (path) {
+ new_ctx->path = *path;
+ sk_ctx->path = *path;
+ path_get(path);
+ path_get(path);
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * apparmor_unix_may_send - check perms before conn or sending unix dgrams
+ *
+ * other is locked when this hook is called
+ *
+ * dgram connect calls may_send, peer setup but path not copied?????
+ */
+static int apparmor_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock, struct socket *peer)
+{
+ struct aa_sk_ctx *peer_ctx = SK_CTX(peer->sk);
+ struct aa_label *label = aa_begin_current_label(NO_UPDATE);
+ int error;
+
+ error = xcheck(aa_unix_peer_perm(label, OP_SENDMSG, AA_MAY_SEND,
+ sock->sk, peer->sk, NULL),
+ aa_unix_peer_perm(peer_ctx->label, OP_SENDMSG, AA_MAY_RECEIVE,
+ peer->sk, sock->sk, label));
+ aa_end_current_label(label);
+
+ return error;
+}
+
+/**
+ * apparmor_socket_create - check perms before creating a new socket
+ */
+static int apparmor_socket_create(int family, int type, int protocol, int kern)
+{
+ struct aa_label *label;
+ int error = 0;
+
+ label = aa_begin_current_label(DO_UPDATE);
+ if (!(kern || unconfined(label)))
+ error = aa_sock_create_perm(label, family, type, protocol);
+ aa_end_current_label(label);
+
+ return error;
+}
+
+/**
+ * apparmor_socket_post_create - setup the per-socket security struct
+ *
+ * Note:
+ * - kernel sockets currently labeled unconfined but we may want to
+ * move to a special kernel label
+ * - socket may not have sk here if created with sock_create_lite or
+ * sock_alloc. These should be accept cases which will be handled in
+ * sock_graft.
+ */
+static int apparmor_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
+ int type, int protocol, int kern)
+{
+ struct aa_label *label;
+
+ if (kern) {
+ struct aa_ns *ns = aa_get_current_ns();
+ label = aa_get_label(ns_unconfined(ns));
+ aa_put_ns(ns);
+ } else
+ label = aa_get_current_label();
+
+ if (sock->sk) {
+ struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sock->sk);
+ aa_put_label(ctx->label);
+ ctx->label = aa_get_label(label);
+ }
+ aa_put_label(label);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * apparmor_socket_bind - check perms before bind addr to socket
+ */
+static int apparmor_socket_bind(struct socket *sock,
+ struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
+{
+ return aa_sock_bind_perm(sock, address, addrlen);
+}
+
+/**
+ * apparmor_socket_connect - check perms before connecting @sock to @address
+ */
+static int apparmor_socket_connect(struct socket *sock,
+ struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
+{
+ return aa_sock_connect_perm(sock, address, addrlen);
+}
+
+/**
+ * apparmor_socket_list - check perms before allowing listen
+ */
+static int apparmor_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
+{
+ return aa_sock_listen_perm(sock, backlog);
+}
+
+/**
+ * apparmor_socket_accept - check perms before accepting a new connection.
+ *
+ * Note: while @newsock is created and has some information, the accept
+ * has not been done.
+ */
+static int apparmor_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
+{
+ return aa_sock_accept_perm(sock, newsock);
+}
+
+/**
+ * apparmor_socket_sendmsg - check perms before sending msg to another socket
+ */
+static int apparmor_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock,
+ struct msghdr *msg, int size)
+{
+ int error = aa_sock_msg_perm(OP_SENDMSG, AA_MAY_SEND, sock, msg, size);
+ if (!error) {
+ /* TODO: setup delegation on scm rights
+ see smack for AF_INET, AF_INET6 */
+ ;
+ }
return error;
}
+/**
+ * apparmor_socket_recvmsg - check perms before receiving a message
+ */
+static int apparmor_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock,
+ struct msghdr *msg, int size, int flags)
+{
+ return aa_sock_msg_perm(OP_RECVMSG, AA_MAY_RECEIVE, sock, msg, size);
+}
+
+/**
+ * apparmor_socket_getsockname - check perms before getting the local address
+ */
+static int apparmor_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock)
+{
+ return aa_sock_perm(OP_GETSOCKNAME, AA_MAY_GETATTR, sock);
+}
+
+/**
+ * apparmor_socket_getpeername - check perms before getting remote address
+ */
+static int apparmor_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock)
+{
+ return aa_sock_perm(OP_GETPEERNAME, AA_MAY_GETATTR, sock);
+}
+
+/**
+ * apparmor_getsockopt - check perms before getting socket options
+ */
+static int apparmor_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
+ int optname)
+{
+ return aa_sock_opt_perm(OP_GETSOCKOPT, AA_MAY_GETOPT, sock,
+ level, optname);
+}
+
+/**
+ * apparmor_setsockopt - check perms before setting socket options
+ */
+static int apparmor_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
+ int optname)
+{
+ return aa_sock_opt_perm(OP_SETSOCKOPT, AA_MAY_SETOPT, sock,
+ level, optname);
+}
+
+/**
+ * apparmor_socket_shutdown - check perms before shutting down @sock conn
+ */
+static int apparmor_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
+{
+ return aa_sock_perm(OP_SHUTDOWN, AA_MAY_SHUTDOWN, sock);
+}
+
+/**
+ * apparmor_socket_sock_recv_skb - check perms before associating skb to sk
+ *
+ * Note: can not sleep maybe called with locks held
+
+dont want protocol specific in __skb_recv_datagram()
+to deny an incoming connection socket_sock_rcv_skb()
+
+ */
+static int apparmor_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+ /* TODO: */
+ return 0;
+}
+
+
+static struct aa_label *sk_peer_label(struct sock *sk)
+{
+ struct sock *peer_sk;
+ struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk);
+
+ if (ctx->peer)
+ return ctx->peer;
+
+ if (sk->sk_family != PF_UNIX)
+ return ERR_PTR(-ENOPROTOOPT);
+
+ /* check for sockpair peering which does not go through
+ * security_unix_stream_connect
+ */
+ peer_sk = unix_peer(sk);
+ if (peer_sk) {
+ ctx = SK_CTX(peer_sk);
+ if (ctx->label)
+ return ctx->label;
+ }
+
+ return ERR_PTR(-ENOPROTOOPT);
+}
+
+/**
+ * apparmor_socket_getpeersec_stream - get security context of peer
+ *
+ * Note: for tcp only valid if using ipsec or cipso on lan
+ */
+static int apparmor_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock,
+ char __user *optval,
+ int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
+{
+ char *name;
+ int slen, error = 0;
+ struct aa_label *label = aa_begin_current_label(DO_UPDATE);
+ struct aa_label *peer = sk_peer_label(sock->sk);
+
+ if (IS_ERR(peer))
+ return PTR_ERR(peer);
+
+ slen = aa_label_asxprint(&name, labels_ns(label), peer,
+ FLAG_SHOW_MODE | FLAG_VIEW_SUBNS |
+ FLAG_HIDDEN_UNCONFINED, GFP_KERNEL);
+ /* don't include terminating \0 in slen, it breaks some apps */
+ if (slen < 0) {
+ error = -ENOMEM;
+ } else {
+ if (slen > len) {
+ error = -ERANGE;
+ } else if (copy_to_user(optval, name, slen)) {
+ error = -EFAULT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (put_user(slen, optlen))
+ error = -EFAULT;
+ out:
+ kfree(name);
+
+ }
+ aa_end_current_label(label);
+
+ return error;
+}
+
+/**
+ * apparmor_socket_getpeersec_dgram - get security label of packet
+ * @sock: the peer socket
+ * @skb: packet data
+ * @secid: pointer to where to put the secid of the packet
+ *
+ * Sets the netlabel socket state on sk from parent
+ */
+static int apparmor_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock,
+ struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
+
+{
+ /* TODO: requires secid support, and netlabel */
+ return -ENOPROTOOPT;
+}
+
+/**
+ * apparmor_sock_graft - Initialize newly created socket
+ * @sk: child sock
+ * @parent: parent socket
+ *
+ * Note: could set off of SOCK_CTX(parent) but need to track inode and we can
+ * just set sk security information off of current creating process label
+ * Labeling of sk for accept case - probably should be sock based
+ * instead of task, because of the case where an implicitly labeled
+ * socket is shared by different tasks.
+ */
+static void apparmor_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
+{
+ struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk);
+ if (!ctx->label)
+ ctx->label = aa_get_current_label();
+}
+
+static int apparmor_task_kill(struct task_struct *target, struct siginfo *info,
+ int sig, u32 secid)
+{
+ struct aa_label *cl, *tl;
+ int error;
+
+ if (secid)
+ /* TODO: after secid to label mapping is done.
+ * Dealing with USB IO specific behavior
+ */
+ return 0;
+ cl = aa_begin_current_label(NO_UPDATE);
+ tl = aa_get_task_label(target);
+ error = aa_may_signal(cl, tl, sig);
+ aa_put_label(tl);
+ aa_end_current_label(cl);
+
+ return error;
+}
+
+#ifndef LSM_HOOKS_NAME
+#define LSM_HOOKS_NAME(X) //.name = (X),
+#endif
static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] = {
+ LSM_HOOKS_NAME("apparmor")
+
LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, apparmor_ptrace_access_check),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, apparmor_ptrace_traceme),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(capget, apparmor_capget),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(capable, apparmor_capable),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_free_security, apparmor_inode_free_security),
+
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_mount, apparmor_sb_mount),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_umount, apparmor_sb_umount),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_pivotroot, apparmor_sb_pivotroot),
+
LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_link, apparmor_path_link),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_unlink, apparmor_path_unlink),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_symlink, apparmor_path_symlink),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getattr, apparmor_inode_getattr),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_open, apparmor_file_open),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_receive, apparmor_file_receive),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_permission, apparmor_file_permission),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_alloc_security, apparmor_file_alloc_security),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_free_security, apparmor_file_free_security),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_file, apparmor_mmap_file),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_addr, cap_mmap_addr),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_mprotect, apparmor_file_mprotect),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_lock, apparmor_file_lock),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(getprocattr, apparmor_getprocattr),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(setprocattr, apparmor_setprocattr),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_alloc_security, apparmor_sk_alloc_security),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_free_security, apparmor_sk_free_security),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_clone_security, apparmor_sk_clone_security),
+
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(unix_stream_connect, apparmor_unix_stream_connect),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(unix_may_send, apparmor_unix_may_send),
+
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_create, apparmor_socket_create),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_post_create, apparmor_socket_post_create),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_bind, apparmor_socket_bind),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_connect, apparmor_socket_connect),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_listen, apparmor_socket_listen),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_accept, apparmor_socket_accept),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sendmsg, apparmor_socket_sendmsg),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_recvmsg, apparmor_socket_recvmsg),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getsockname, apparmor_socket_getsockname),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeername, apparmor_socket_getpeername),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getsockopt, apparmor_socket_getsockopt),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_setsockopt, apparmor_socket_setsockopt),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_shutdown, apparmor_socket_shutdown),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sock_rcv_skb, apparmor_socket_sock_rcv_skb),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_stream, apparmor_socket_getpeersec_stream),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_dgram, apparmor_socket_getpeersec_dgram),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(sock_graft, apparmor_sock_graft),
+
LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_alloc_blank, apparmor_cred_alloc_blank),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_free, apparmor_cred_free),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_prepare, apparmor_cred_prepare),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_secureexec, apparmor_bprm_secureexec),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setrlimit, apparmor_task_setrlimit),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_kill, apparmor_task_kill),
};
/*
/* AppArmor global enforcement switch - complain, enforce, kill */
enum profile_mode aa_g_profile_mode = APPARMOR_ENFORCE;
module_param_call(mode, param_set_mode, param_get_mode,
- &aa_g_profile_mode, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
+ &aa_g_profile_mode, S_IRUGO | S_IWUSR);
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH
/* whether policy verification hashing is enabled */
/* Debug mode */
bool aa_g_debug;
-module_param_named(debug, aa_g_debug, aabool, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
+module_param_named(debug, aa_g_debug, aabool, S_IRUGO | S_IWUSR);
/* Audit mode */
enum audit_mode aa_g_audit;
-module_param_call(audit, param_set_audit, param_get_audit,
- &aa_g_audit, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
+module_param_call(audit, param_set_audit, param_get_audit, &aa_g_audit,
+ S_IRUGO | S_IWUSR);
/* Determines if audit header is included in audited messages. This
* provides more context if the audit daemon is not running
*/
bool aa_g_audit_header = 1;
-module_param_named(audit_header, aa_g_audit_header, aabool,
- S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
+module_param_named(audit_header, aa_g_audit_header, aabool, S_IRUGO | S_IWUSR);
/* lock out loading/removal of policy
* TODO: add in at boot loading of policy, which is the only way to
*/
bool aa_g_lock_policy;
module_param_named(lock_policy, aa_g_lock_policy, aalockpolicy,
- S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
+ S_IRUGO | S_IWUSR);
/* Syscall logging mode */
bool aa_g_logsyscall;
-module_param_named(logsyscall, aa_g_logsyscall, aabool, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
+module_param_named(logsyscall, aa_g_logsyscall, aabool, S_IRUGO | S_IWUSR);
/* Maximum pathname length before accesses will start getting rejected */
unsigned int aa_g_path_max = 2 * PATH_MAX;
-module_param_named(path_max, aa_g_path_max, aauint, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
+module_param_named(path_max, aa_g_path_max, aauint, S_IRUGO | S_IWUSR);
/* Determines how paranoid loading of policy is and how much verification
* on the loaded policy is done.
+ * DEPRECATED: read only as strict checking of load is always done now
+ * that none root users (user namespaces) can load policy.
*/
bool aa_g_paranoid_load = 1;
-module_param_named(paranoid_load, aa_g_paranoid_load, aabool,
- S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
+module_param_named(paranoid_load, aa_g_paranoid_load, aabool, S_IRUGO);
/* Boot time disable flag */
static bool apparmor_enabled = CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_BOOTPARAM_VALUE;
module_param_named(enabled, apparmor_enabled, bool, S_IRUGO);
+/* Boot time to set use of default or unconfined as initial profile */
+bool aa_g_unconfined_init = CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_UNCONFINED_INIT;
+module_param_named(unconfined, aa_g_unconfined_init, aabool, S_IRUGO);
+
+
static int __init apparmor_enabled_setup(char *str)
{
unsigned long enabled;
static int param_get_aalockpolicy(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp)
{
- if (!policy_view_capable())
+ if (!policy_admin_capable())
return -EPERM;
+ if (!apparmor_enabled)
+ return -EINVAL;
return param_get_bool(buffer, kp);
}
{
if (!policy_admin_capable())
return -EPERM;
+ if (!apparmor_enabled)
+ return -EINVAL;
return param_set_bool(val, kp);
}
static int param_get_aabool(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp)
{
- if (!policy_view_capable())
+ if (!policy_admin_capable())
return -EPERM;
+ if (!apparmor_enabled)
+ return -EINVAL;
return param_get_bool(buffer, kp);
}
{
if (!policy_admin_capable())
return -EPERM;
+ if (!apparmor_enabled)
+ return -EINVAL;
return param_set_uint(val, kp);
}
static int param_get_aauint(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp)
{
- if (!policy_view_capable())
+ if (!policy_admin_capable())
return -EPERM;
+ if (!apparmor_enabled)
+ return -EINVAL;
return param_get_uint(buffer, kp);
}
static int param_get_audit(char *buffer, struct kernel_param *kp)
{
- if (!policy_view_capable())
+ if (!policy_admin_capable())
return -EPERM;
-
if (!apparmor_enabled)
return -EINVAL;
-
return sprintf(buffer, "%s", audit_mode_names[aa_g_audit]);
}
int i;
if (!policy_admin_capable())
return -EPERM;
-
if (!apparmor_enabled)
return -EINVAL;
-
if (!val)
return -EINVAL;
{
if (!policy_admin_capable())
return -EPERM;
-
if (!apparmor_enabled)
return -EINVAL;
int i;
if (!policy_admin_capable())
return -EPERM;
-
if (!apparmor_enabled)
return -EINVAL;
-
if (!val)
return -EINVAL;
*/
/**
- * set_init_cxt - set a task context and profile on the first task.
- *
- * TODO: allow setting an alternate profile than unconfined
+ * set_init_ctx - set a task context and profile on the first task.
*/
-static int __init set_init_cxt(void)
+static int __init set_init_ctx(void)
{
struct cred *cred = (struct cred *)current->real_cred;
- struct aa_task_cxt *cxt;
+ struct aa_task_ctx *ctx;
- cxt = aa_alloc_task_context(GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!cxt)
+ ctx = aa_alloc_task_context(GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!ctx)
return -ENOMEM;
- cxt->profile = aa_get_profile(root_ns->unconfined);
- cred_cxt(cred) = cxt;
+ if (!aa_g_unconfined_init) {
+ ctx->label = aa_setup_default_label();
+ if (!ctx->label) {
+ aa_free_task_context(ctx);
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+ /* fs setup of default is done in aa_create_aafs() */
+ } else
+ ctx->label = aa_get_label(ns_unconfined(root_ns));
+ cred_ctx(cred) = ctx;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void destroy_buffers(void)
+{
+ u32 i, j;
+
+ for_each_possible_cpu(i) {
+ for_each_cpu_buffer(j) {
+ kfree(per_cpu(aa_buffers, i).buf[j]);
+ per_cpu(aa_buffers, i).buf[j] = NULL;
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+static int __init alloc_buffers(void)
+{
+ u32 i, j;
+
+ for_each_possible_cpu(i) {
+ for_each_cpu_buffer(j) {
+ char *buffer;
+ if (cpu_to_node(i) > num_online_nodes())
+ /* fallback to kmalloc for offline nodes */
+ buffer = kmalloc(aa_g_path_max, GFP_KERNEL);
+ else
+ buffer = kmalloc_node(aa_g_path_max, GFP_KERNEL,
+ cpu_to_node(i));
+ if (!buffer) {
+ destroy_buffers();
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+ per_cpu(aa_buffers, i).buf[j] = buffer;
+ }
+ }
return 0;
}
return 0;
}
+ error = aa_setup_dfa_engine();
+ if (error) {
+ AA_ERROR("Unable to setup dfa engine\n");
+ goto alloc_out;
+ }
+
error = aa_alloc_root_ns();
if (error) {
AA_ERROR("Unable to allocate default profile namespace\n");
goto alloc_out;
}
- error = set_init_cxt();
+ error = alloc_buffers();
+ if (error) {
+ AA_ERROR("Unable to allocate work buffers\n");
+ goto buffers_out;
+ }
+
+ error = set_init_ctx();
if (error) {
AA_ERROR("Failed to set context on init task\n");
aa_free_root_ns();
- goto alloc_out;
+ goto buffers_out;
}
security_add_hooks(apparmor_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(apparmor_hooks));
return error;
+buffers_out:
+ destroy_buffers();
+
alloc_out:
aa_destroy_aafs();
+ aa_teardown_dfa_engine();
apparmor_enabled = 0;
return error;