X-Git-Url: https://git.proxmox.com/?a=blobdiff_plain;f=MdeModulePkg%2FMdeModulePkg.dec;h=037b16e2d0f4a8df8bad9a171ef9a87fc838d6ac;hb=a2ea6894e6ca95e8d7a254593661a79e4b988626;hp=403a66a5ad64b8dc89875efbbb9e053f58cff322;hpb=915a3a82e017a3c098271bddffc1bb5352435ca5;p=mirror_edk2.git
diff --git a/MdeModulePkg/MdeModulePkg.dec b/MdeModulePkg/MdeModulePkg.dec
index 403a66a5ad..037b16e2d0 100644
--- a/MdeModulePkg/MdeModulePkg.dec
+++ b/MdeModulePkg/MdeModulePkg.dec
@@ -184,6 +184,10 @@
# Include/Guid/MdeModuleHii.h
gEfiIfrTianoGuid = { 0xf0b1735, 0x87a0, 0x4193, {0xb2, 0x66, 0x53, 0x8c, 0x38, 0xaf, 0x48, 0xce }}
+ ## Guid for EDKII implementation extension, used to indaicate there are bit fields in the varstore.
+ # Include/Guid/MdeModuleHii.h
+ gEdkiiIfrBitVarstoreGuid = {0x82DDD68B, 0x9163, 0x4187, {0x9B, 0x27, 0x20, 0xA8, 0xFD, 0x60,0xA7, 0x1D}}
+
## Guid for Framework vfr GUIDed opcodes.
# Include/Guid/MdeModuleHii.h
gEfiIfrFrameworkGuid = { 0x31ca5d1a, 0xd511, 0x4931, { 0xb7, 0x82, 0xae, 0x6b, 0x2b, 0x17, 0x8c, 0xd7 }}
@@ -388,6 +392,9 @@
## Include/Guid/PlatformHasAcpi.h
gEdkiiPlatformHasAcpiGuid = { 0xf0966b41, 0xc23f, 0x41b9, { 0x96, 0x04, 0x0f, 0xf7, 0xe1, 0x11, 0x96, 0x5a } }
+ ## Include/Guid/EndofS3Resume.h
+ gEdkiiEndOfS3ResumeGuid = { 0x96f5296d, 0x05f7, 0x4f3c, {0x84, 0x67, 0xe4, 0x56, 0x89, 0x0e, 0x0c, 0xb5 } }
+
[Ppis]
## Include/Ppi/AtaController.h
gPeiAtaControllerPpiGuid = { 0xa45e60d1, 0xc719, 0x44aa, { 0xb0, 0x7a, 0xaa, 0x77, 0x7f, 0x85, 0x90, 0x6d }}
@@ -552,6 +559,9 @@
## Include/Protocol/IoMmu.h
gEdkiiIoMmuProtocolGuid = { 0x4e939de9, 0xd948, 0x4b0f, { 0x88, 0xed, 0xe6, 0xe1, 0xce, 0x51, 0x7c, 0x1e } }
+ ## Include/Protocol/SmmMemoryAttribute.h
+ gEdkiiSmmMemoryAttributeProtocolGuid = { 0x69b792ea, 0x39ce, 0x402d, { 0xa2, 0xa6, 0xf7, 0x21, 0xde, 0x35, 0x1d, 0xfe } }
+
#
# [Error.gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid]
# 0x80000001 | Invalid value provided.
@@ -863,6 +873,93 @@
# @ValidList 0x80000006 | 0x03058002
gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdErrorCodeSetVariable|0x03058002|UINT32|0x30001040
+ ## Mask to control the NULL address detection in code for different phases.
+ # If enabled, accessing NULL address in UEFI or SMM code can be caught.
+ # BIT0 - Enable NULL pointer detection for UEFI.
+ # BIT1 - Enable NULL pointer detection for SMM.
+ # BIT2..6 - Reserved for future uses.
+ # BIT7 - Disable NULL pointer detection just after EndOfDxe.
+ # This is a workaround for those unsolvable NULL access issues in
+ # OptionROM, boot loader, etc. It can also help to avoid unnecessary
+ # exception caused by legacy memory (0-4095) access after EndOfDxe,
+ # such as Windows 7 boot on Qemu.
+ # @Prompt Enable NULL address detection.
+ gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdNullPointerDetectionPropertyMask|0x0|UINT8|0x30001050
+
+ ## Init Value in Temp Stack to be shared between SEC and PEI_CORE
+ # SEC fills the full temp stack with this values. When switch stack, PeiCore can check
+ # this value in the temp stack to know how many stack has been used.
+ # @Prompt Init Value in Temp Stack
+ gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdInitValueInTempStack|0x5AA55AA5|UINT32|0x30001051
+
+ ## Indicates which type allocation need guard page.
+ # Below is bit mask for this PCD: (Order is same as UEFI spec)
+ # EfiReservedMemoryType 0x0000000000000001
+ # EfiLoaderCode 0x0000000000000002
+ # EfiLoaderData 0x0000000000000004
+ # EfiBootServicesCode 0x0000000000000008
+ # EfiBootServicesData 0x0000000000000010
+ # EfiRuntimeServicesCode 0x0000000000000020
+ # EfiRuntimeServicesData 0x0000000000000040
+ # EfiConventionalMemory 0x0000000000000080
+ # EfiUnusableMemory 0x0000000000000100
+ # EfiACPIReclaimMemory 0x0000000000000200
+ # EfiACPIMemoryNVS 0x0000000000000400
+ # EfiMemoryMappedIO 0x0000000000000800
+ # EfiMemoryMappedIOPortSpace 0x0000000000001000
+ # EfiPalCode 0x0000000000002000
+ # EfiPersistentMemory 0x0000000000004000
+ # OEM Reserved 0x4000000000000000
+ # OS Reserved 0x8000000000000000
+ # e.g. LoaderCode+LoaderData+BootServicesCode+BootServicesData are needed, 0x1E should be used.
+ # @Prompt The memory type mask for Page Guard.
+ gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdHeapGuardPageType|0x0|UINT64|0x30001052
+
+ ## Indicates which type allocation need guard page.
+ # Below is bit mask for this PCD: (Order is same as UEFI spec)
+ # EfiReservedMemoryType 0x0000000000000001
+ # EfiLoaderCode 0x0000000000000002
+ # EfiLoaderData 0x0000000000000004
+ # EfiBootServicesCode 0x0000000000000008
+ # EfiBootServicesData 0x0000000000000010
+ # EfiRuntimeServicesCode 0x0000000000000020
+ # EfiRuntimeServicesData 0x0000000000000040
+ # EfiConventionalMemory 0x0000000000000080
+ # EfiUnusableMemory 0x0000000000000100
+ # EfiACPIReclaimMemory 0x0000000000000200
+ # EfiACPIMemoryNVS 0x0000000000000400
+ # EfiMemoryMappedIO 0x0000000000000800
+ # EfiMemoryMappedIOPortSpace 0x0000000000001000
+ # EfiPalCode 0x0000000000002000
+ # EfiPersistentMemory 0x0000000000004000
+ # OEM Reserved 0x4000000000000000
+ # OS Reserved 0x8000000000000000
+ # e.g. LoaderCode+LoaderData+BootServicesCode+BootServicesData are needed, 0x1E should be used.
+ # @Prompt The memory type mask for Pool Guard.
+ gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdHeapGuardPoolType|0x0|UINT64|0x30001053
+
+ ## This mask is to control Heap Guard behavior.
+ # Note that due to the limit of pool memory implementation and the alignment
+ # requirement of UEFI spec, BIT7 is a try-best setting which cannot guarantee
+ # that the returned pool is exactly adjacent to head guard page or tail guard
+ # page.
+ # BIT0 - Enable UEFI page guard.
+ # BIT1 - Enable UEFI pool guard.
+ # BIT2 - Enable SMM page guard.
+ # BIT3 - Enable SMM pool guard.
+ # BIT7 - The direction of Guard Page for Pool Guard.
+ # 0 - The returned pool is near the tail guard page.
+ # 1 - The returned pool is near the head guard page.
+ # @Prompt The Heap Guard feature mask
+ gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdHeapGuardPropertyMask|0x0|UINT8|0x30001054
+
+ ## Indicates if UEFI Stack Guard will be enabled.
+ # If enabled, stack overflow in UEFI can be caught, preventing chaotic consequences.
+ # TRUE - UEFI Stack Guard will be enabled.
+ # FALSE - UEFI Stack Guard will be disabled.
+ # @Prompt Enable UEFI Stack Guard.
+ gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdCpuStackGuard|FALSE|BOOLEAN|0x30001055
+
[PcdsFixedAtBuild, PcdsPatchableInModule]
## Dynamic type PCD can be registered callback function for Pcd setting action.
# PcdMaxPeiPcdCallBackNumberPerPcdEntry indicates the maximum number of callback function
@@ -1810,5 +1907,16 @@
# @Prompt If there is any test key used by the platform.
gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTestKeyUsed|FALSE|BOOLEAN|0x00030003
+[PcdsDynamicEx]
+ ## This dynamic PCD enables the default variable setting.
+ # Its value is the default store ID value. The default value is zero as Standard default.
+ # When its value is set in PEI, it will trig the default setting to be applied as the default EFI variable.
+ # @Prompt NV Storage DefaultId
+ gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdSetNvStoreDefaultId|0x0|UINT16|0x00030004
+
+ ## This dynamic PCD holds the DynamicHii PCD value. Its value is the auto generated.
+ # @Prompt NV Storage Default Value Buffer
+ gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdNvStoreDefaultValueBuffer|{0x0}|VOID*|0x00030005
+
[UserExtensions.TianoCore."ExtraFiles"]
MdeModulePkgExtra.uni