X-Git-Url: https://git.proxmox.com/?a=blobdiff_plain;f=SecurityPkg%2FLibrary%2FDxeImageVerificationLib%2FDxeImageVerificationLib.c;h=c86ce1f312ae5c7543e4ea356863fb9c81b08c64;hb=5db28a6753d307cdfb1cfdeb2f63739a9f959837;hp=dab35d5f6c2edfb4e0a6a36bbc2fd6f138d0edb4;hpb=570b3d1a7278df29878da87990e8366bd42d0ec5;p=mirror_edk2.git
diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.c b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.c
index dab35d5f6c..c86ce1f312 100644
--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.c
+++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.c
@@ -1,27 +1,46 @@
/** @file
Implement image verification services for secure boot service in UEFI2.3.1.
-Copyright (c) 2009 - 2011, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.
-This program and the accompanying materials
-are licensed and made available under the terms and conditions of the BSD License
-which accompanies this distribution. The full text of the license may be found at
+ Caution: This file requires additional review when modified.
+ This library will have external input - PE/COFF image.
+ This external input must be validated carefully to avoid security issue like
+ buffer overflow, integer overflow.
+
+ DxeImageVerificationLibImageRead() function will make sure the PE/COFF image content
+ read is within the image buffer.
+
+ DxeImageVerificationHandler(), HashPeImageByType(), HashPeImage() function will accept
+ untrusted PE/COFF image and validate its data structure within this image buffer before use.
+
+Copyright (c) 2009 - 2012, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.
+This program and the accompanying materials
+are licensed and made available under the terms and conditions of the BSD License
+which accompanies this distribution. The full text of the license may be found at
http://opensource.org/licenses/bsd-license.php
-THE PROGRAM IS DISTRIBUTED UNDER THE BSD LICENSE ON AN "AS IS" BASIS,
+THE PROGRAM IS DISTRIBUTED UNDER THE BSD LICENSE ON AN "AS IS" BASIS,
WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR REPRESENTATIONS OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED.
**/
#include "DxeImageVerificationLib.h"
+//
+// Caution: This is used by a function which may receive untrusted input.
+// These global variables hold PE/COFF image data, and they should be validated before use.
+//
EFI_IMAGE_OPTIONAL_HEADER_PTR_UNION mNtHeader;
+UINT32 mPeCoffHeaderOffset;
+EFI_IMAGE_DATA_DIRECTORY *mSecDataDir = NULL;
+EFI_GUID mCertType;
+
+//
+// Information on current PE/COFF image
+//
UINTN mImageSize;
-UINT32 mPeCoffHeaderOffset;
+UINT8 *mImageBase = NULL;
UINT8 mImageDigest[MAX_DIGEST_SIZE];
UINTN mImageDigestSize;
-EFI_IMAGE_DATA_DIRECTORY *mSecDataDir = NULL;
-UINT8 *mImageBase = NULL;
-EFI_GUID mCertType;
//
// Notify string for authorization UI.
@@ -54,14 +73,62 @@ HASH_TABLE mHash[] = {
{ L"SHA512", 64, &mHashOidValue[40], 9, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL }
};
+/**
+ Reads contents of a PE/COFF image in memory buffer.
+
+ Caution: This function may receive untrusted input.
+ PE/COFF image is external input, so this function will make sure the PE/COFF image content
+ read is within the image buffer.
+
+ @param FileHandle Pointer to the file handle to read the PE/COFF image.
+ @param FileOffset Offset into the PE/COFF image to begin the read operation.
+ @param ReadSize On input, the size in bytes of the requested read operation.
+ On output, the number of bytes actually read.
+ @param Buffer Output buffer that contains the data read from the PE/COFF image.
+
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS The specified portion of the PE/COFF image was read and the size
+**/
+EFI_STATUS
+EFIAPI
+DxeImageVerificationLibImageRead (
+ IN VOID *FileHandle,
+ IN UINTN FileOffset,
+ IN OUT UINTN *ReadSize,
+ OUT VOID *Buffer
+ )
+{
+ UINTN EndPosition;
+
+ if (FileHandle == NULL || ReadSize == NULL || Buffer == NULL) {
+ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+ }
+
+ if (MAX_ADDRESS - FileOffset < *ReadSize) {
+ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+ }
+
+ EndPosition = FileOffset + *ReadSize;
+ if (EndPosition > mImageSize) {
+ *ReadSize = (UINT32)(mImageSize - FileOffset);
+ }
+
+ if (FileOffset >= mImageSize) {
+ *ReadSize = 0;
+ }
+
+ CopyMem (Buffer, (UINT8 *)((UINTN) FileHandle + FileOffset), *ReadSize);
+
+ return EFI_SUCCESS;
+}
+
/**
Get the image type.
@param[in] File This is a pointer to the device path of the file that is
- being dispatched.
+ being dispatched.
- @return UINT32 Image Type
+ @return UINT32 Image Type
**/
UINT32
@@ -70,15 +137,19 @@ GetImageType (
)
{
EFI_STATUS Status;
- EFI_HANDLE DeviceHandle;
+ EFI_HANDLE DeviceHandle;
EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *TempDevicePath;
EFI_BLOCK_IO_PROTOCOL *BlockIo;
+ if (File == NULL) {
+ return IMAGE_UNKNOWN;
+ }
+
//
// First check to see if File is from a Firmware Volume
//
DeviceHandle = NULL;
- TempDevicePath = (EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *)File;
+ TempDevicePath = (EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *) File;
Status = gBS->LocateDevicePath (
&gEfiFirmwareVolume2ProtocolGuid,
&TempDevicePath,
@@ -102,7 +173,7 @@ GetImageType (
// Next check to see if File is from a Block I/O device
//
DeviceHandle = NULL;
- TempDevicePath = (EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *)File;
+ TempDevicePath = (EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *) File;
Status = gBS->LocateDevicePath (
&gEfiBlockIoProtocolGuid,
&TempDevicePath,
@@ -136,11 +207,11 @@ GetImageType (
}
//
- // File is not in a Firmware Volume or on a Block I/O device, so check to see if
+ // File is not in a Firmware Volume or on a Block I/O device, so check to see if
// the device path supports the Simple File System Protocol.
//
DeviceHandle = NULL;
- TempDevicePath = (EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *)File;
+ TempDevicePath = (EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *) File;
Status = gBS->LocateDevicePath (
&gEfiSimpleFileSystemProtocolGuid,
&TempDevicePath,
@@ -155,12 +226,12 @@ GetImageType (
//
// File is not from an FV, Block I/O or Simple File System, so the only options
- // left are a PCI Option ROM and a Load File Protocol such as a PXE Boot from a NIC.
+ // left are a PCI Option ROM and a Load File Protocol such as a PXE Boot from a NIC.
//
- TempDevicePath = (EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *)File;
+ TempDevicePath = (EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *) File;
while (!IsDevicePathEndType (TempDevicePath)) {
switch (DevicePathType (TempDevicePath)) {
-
+
case MEDIA_DEVICE_PATH:
if (DevicePathSubType (TempDevicePath) == MEDIA_RELATIVE_OFFSET_RANGE_DP) {
return IMAGE_FROM_OPTION_ROM;
@@ -170,7 +241,7 @@ GetImageType (
case MESSAGING_DEVICE_PATH:
if (DevicePathSubType(TempDevicePath) == MSG_MAC_ADDR_DP) {
return IMAGE_FROM_REMOVABLE_MEDIA;
- }
+ }
break;
default:
@@ -178,20 +249,24 @@ GetImageType (
}
TempDevicePath = NextDevicePathNode (TempDevicePath);
}
- return IMAGE_UNKNOWN;
+ return IMAGE_UNKNOWN;
}
/**
Caculate hash of Pe/Coff image based on the authenticode image hashing in
PE/COFF Specification 8.0 Appendix A
+ Caution: This function may receive untrusted input.
+ PE/COFF image is external input, so this function will validate its data structure
+ within this image buffer before use.
+
@param[in] HashAlg Hash algorithm type.
-
+
@retval TRUE Successfully hash image.
@retval FALSE Fail in hash image.
**/
-BOOLEAN
+BOOLEAN
HashPeImage (
IN UINT32 HashAlg
)
@@ -207,9 +282,9 @@ HashPeImage (
EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER *SectionHeader;
UINTN Index;
UINTN Pos;
- UINTN SumOfSectionBytes;
- EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER *SectionCache;
-
+ UINT32 CertSize;
+ UINT32 NumberOfRvaAndSizes;
+
HashCtx = NULL;
SectionHeader = NULL;
Status = FALSE;
@@ -217,7 +292,7 @@ HashPeImage (
if ((HashAlg != HASHALG_SHA1) && (HashAlg != HASHALG_SHA256)) {
return FALSE;
}
-
+
//
// Initialize context of hash.
//
@@ -234,7 +309,7 @@ HashPeImage (
}
CtxSize = mHash[HashAlg].GetContextSize();
-
+
HashCtx = AllocatePool (CtxSize);
if (HashCtx == NULL) {
return FALSE;
@@ -244,15 +319,30 @@ HashPeImage (
// 2. Initialize a SHA hash context.
Status = mHash[HashAlg].HashInit(HashCtx);
-
+
if (!Status) {
goto Done;
}
+
//
// Measuring PE/COFF Image Header;
// But CheckSum field and SECURITY data directory (certificate) are excluded
//
- Magic = mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.Magic;
+ if (mNtHeader.Pe32->FileHeader.Machine == IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_IA64 && mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {
+ //
+ // NOTE: Some versions of Linux ELILO for Itanium have an incorrect magic value
+ // in the PE/COFF Header. If the MachineType is Itanium(IA64) and the
+ // Magic value in the OptionalHeader is EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC
+ // then override the magic value to EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR64_MAGIC
+ //
+ Magic = EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR64_MAGIC;
+ } else {
+ //
+ // Get the magic value from the PE/COFF Optional Header
+ //
+ Magic = mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.Magic;
+ }
+
//
// 3. Calculate the distance from the base of the image header to the image checksum address.
// 4. Hash the image header from its base to beginning of the image checksum.
@@ -263,11 +353,13 @@ HashPeImage (
// Use PE32 offset.
//
HashSize = (UINTN) ((UINT8 *) (&mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.CheckSum) - HashBase);
+ NumberOfRvaAndSizes = mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.NumberOfRvaAndSizes;
} else if (Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR64_MAGIC) {
//
// Use PE32+ offset.
//
HashSize = (UINTN) ((UINT8 *) (&mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.CheckSum) - HashBase);
+ NumberOfRvaAndSizes = mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.NumberOfRvaAndSizes;
} else {
//
// Invalid header magic number.
@@ -280,51 +372,86 @@ HashPeImage (
if (!Status) {
goto Done;
}
+
//
// 5. Skip over the image checksum (it occupies a single ULONG).
- // 6. Get the address of the beginning of the Cert Directory.
- // 7. Hash everything from the end of the checksum to the start of the Cert Directory.
//
- if (Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {
- //
- // Use PE32 offset.
+ if (NumberOfRvaAndSizes <= EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY) {
//
- HashBase = (UINT8 *) &mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.CheckSum + sizeof (UINT32);
- HashSize = (UINTN) ((UINT8 *) (&mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY]) - HashBase);
- } else {
+ // 6. Since there is no Cert Directory in optional header, hash everything
+ // from the end of the checksum to the end of image header.
//
- // Use PE32+ offset.
- //
- HashBase = (UINT8 *) &mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.CheckSum + sizeof (UINT32);
- HashSize = (UINTN) ((UINT8 *) (&mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY]) - HashBase);
- }
+ if (Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {
+ //
+ // Use PE32 offset.
+ //
+ HashBase = (UINT8 *) &mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.CheckSum + sizeof (UINT32);
+ HashSize = mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.SizeOfHeaders - (UINTN) (HashBase - mImageBase);
+ } else {
+ //
+ // Use PE32+ offset.
+ //
+ HashBase = (UINT8 *) &mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.CheckSum + sizeof (UINT32);
+ HashSize = mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.SizeOfHeaders - (UINTN) (HashBase - mImageBase);
+ }
- Status = mHash[HashAlg].HashUpdate(HashCtx, HashBase, HashSize);
- if (!Status) {
- goto Done;
- }
- //
- // 8. Skip over the Cert Directory. (It is sizeof(IMAGE_DATA_DIRECTORY) bytes.)
- // 9. Hash everything from the end of the Cert Directory to the end of image header.
- //
- if (Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {
+ if (HashSize != 0) {
+ Status = mHash[HashAlg].HashUpdate(HashCtx, HashBase, HashSize);
+ if (!Status) {
+ goto Done;
+ }
+ }
+ } else {
//
- // Use PE32 offset
+ // 7. Hash everything from the end of the checksum to the start of the Cert Directory.
//
- HashBase = (UINT8 *) &mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY + 1];
- HashSize = mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.SizeOfHeaders - (UINTN) ((UINT8 *) (&mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY + 1]) - mImageBase);
- } else {
+ if (Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {
+ //
+ // Use PE32 offset.
+ //
+ HashBase = (UINT8 *) &mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.CheckSum + sizeof (UINT32);
+ HashSize = (UINTN) ((UINT8 *) (&mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY]) - HashBase);
+ } else {
+ //
+ // Use PE32+ offset.
+ //
+ HashBase = (UINT8 *) &mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.CheckSum + sizeof (UINT32);
+ HashSize = (UINTN) ((UINT8 *) (&mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY]) - HashBase);
+ }
+
+ if (HashSize != 0) {
+ Status = mHash[HashAlg].HashUpdate(HashCtx, HashBase, HashSize);
+ if (!Status) {
+ goto Done;
+ }
+ }
+
//
- // Use PE32+ offset.
+ // 8. Skip over the Cert Directory. (It is sizeof(IMAGE_DATA_DIRECTORY) bytes.)
+ // 9. Hash everything from the end of the Cert Directory to the end of image header.
//
- HashBase = (UINT8 *) &mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY + 1];
- HashSize = mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.SizeOfHeaders - (UINTN) ((UINT8 *) (&mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY + 1]) - mImageBase);
- }
+ if (Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {
+ //
+ // Use PE32 offset
+ //
+ HashBase = (UINT8 *) &mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY + 1];
+ HashSize = mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.SizeOfHeaders - (UINTN) (HashBase - mImageBase);
+ } else {
+ //
+ // Use PE32+ offset.
+ //
+ HashBase = (UINT8 *) &mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY + 1];
+ HashSize = mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.SizeOfHeaders - (UINTN) (HashBase - mImageBase);
+ }
- Status = mHash[HashAlg].HashUpdate(HashCtx, HashBase, HashSize);
- if (!Status) {
- goto Done;
+ if (HashSize != 0) {
+ Status = mHash[HashAlg].HashUpdate(HashCtx, HashBase, HashSize);
+ if (!Status) {
+ goto Done;
+ }
+ }
}
+
//
// 10. Set the SUM_OF_BYTES_HASHED to the size of the header.
//
@@ -349,20 +476,6 @@ HashPeImage (
mNtHeader.Pe32->FileHeader.SizeOfOptionalHeader
);
- SectionCache = Section;
- for (Index = 0, SumOfSectionBytes = 0; Index < mNtHeader.Pe32->FileHeader.NumberOfSections; Index++, SectionCache++) {
- SumOfSectionBytes += SectionCache->SizeOfRawData;
- }
-
- //
- // Sanity check for file corruption. Sections raw data size should be smaller
- // than Image Size.
- //
- if (SumOfSectionBytes >= mImageSize) {
- Status = FALSE;
- goto Done;
- }
-
//
// 11. Build a temporary table of pointers to all the IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER
// structures in the image. The 'NumberOfSections' field of the image
@@ -421,29 +534,36 @@ HashPeImage (
//
if (mImageSize > SumOfBytesHashed) {
HashBase = mImageBase + SumOfBytesHashed;
- if (Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {
- //
- // Use PE32 offset.
- //
- HashSize = (UINTN)(
- mImageSize -
- mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY].Size -
- SumOfBytesHashed);
+
+ if (NumberOfRvaAndSizes <= EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY) {
+ CertSize = 0;
} else {
- //
- // Use PE32+ offset.
- //
- HashSize = (UINTN)(
- mImageSize -
- mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY].Size -
- SumOfBytesHashed);
+ if (Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {
+ //
+ // Use PE32 offset.
+ //
+ CertSize = mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY].Size;
+ } else {
+ //
+ // Use PE32+ offset.
+ //
+ CertSize = mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY].Size;
+ }
}
- Status = mHash[HashAlg].HashUpdate(HashCtx, HashBase, HashSize);
- if (!Status) {
+ if (mImageSize > CertSize + SumOfBytesHashed) {
+ HashSize = (UINTN) (mImageSize - CertSize - SumOfBytesHashed);
+
+ Status = mHash[HashAlg].HashUpdate(HashCtx, HashBase, HashSize);
+ if (!Status) {
+ goto Done;
+ }
+ } else if (mImageSize < CertSize + SumOfBytesHashed) {
+ Status = FALSE;
goto Done;
}
}
+
Status = mHash[HashAlg].HashFinal(HashCtx, mImageDigest);
Done:
@@ -457,15 +577,19 @@ Done:
}
/**
- Recognize the Hash algorithm in PE/COFF Authenticode and caculate hash of
- Pe/Coff image based on the authenticode image hashing in PE/COFF Specification
+ Recognize the Hash algorithm in PE/COFF Authenticode and caculate hash of
+ Pe/Coff image based on the authenticode image hashing in PE/COFF Specification
8.0 Appendix A
+ Caution: This function may receive untrusted input.
+ PE/COFF image is external input, so this function will validate its data structure
+ within this image buffer before use.
+
@retval EFI_UNSUPPORTED Hash algorithm is not supported.
@retval EFI_SUCCESS Hash successfully.
**/
-EFI_STATUS
+EFI_STATUS
HashPeImageByType (
VOID
)
@@ -475,10 +599,14 @@ HashPeImageByType (
PkcsCertData = (WIN_CERTIFICATE_EFI_PKCS *) (mImageBase + mSecDataDir->VirtualAddress);
- for (Index = 0; Index < HASHALG_MAX; Index++) {
+ if (PkcsCertData->Hdr.dwLength < sizeof (WIN_CERTIFICATE_EFI_PKCS) + 32) {
+ return EFI_UNSUPPORTED;
+ }
+
+ for (Index = 0; Index < HASHALG_MAX; Index++) {
//
// Check the Hash algorithm in PE/COFF Authenticode.
- // According to PKCS#7 Definition:
+ // According to PKCS#7 Definition:
// SignedData ::= SEQUENCE {
// version Version,
// digestAlgorithms DigestAlgorithmIdentifiers,
@@ -486,7 +614,19 @@ HashPeImageByType (
// .... }
// The DigestAlgorithmIdentifiers can be used to determine the hash algorithm in PE/COFF hashing
// This field has the fixed offset (+32) in final Authenticode ASN.1 data.
- //
+ // Fixed offset (+32) is calculated based on two bytes of length encoding.
+ //
+ if ((*(PkcsCertData->CertData + 1) & TWO_BYTE_ENCODE) != TWO_BYTE_ENCODE) {
+ //
+ // Only support two bytes of Long Form of Length Encoding.
+ //
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ if (PkcsCertData->Hdr.dwLength < sizeof (WIN_CERTIFICATE_EFI_PKCS) + 32 + mHash[Index].OidLength) {
+ return EFI_UNSUPPORTED;
+ }
+
if (CompareMem (PkcsCertData->CertData + 32, mHash[Index].OidValue, mHash[Index].OidLength) == 0) {
break;
}
@@ -514,7 +654,7 @@ HashPeImageByType (
ImageExeInfoTable. If ImageExeInfoTable is NULL, then 0 is returned.
@param ImageExeInfoTable A pointer to a image execution info table structure.
-
+
@retval 0 If ImageExeInfoTable is NULL.
@retval Others The size of a image execution info table in bytes.
@@ -550,12 +690,12 @@ GetImageExeInfoTableSize (
@param[in] DevicePath Input device path pointer.
@param[in] Signature Input signature info in EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST data structure.
@param[in] SignatureSize Size of signature.
-
+
**/
VOID
AddImageExeInfo (
- IN EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_ACTION Action,
- IN CHAR16 *Name OPTIONAL,
+ IN EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_ACTION Action,
+ IN CHAR16 *Name OPTIONAL,
IN CONST EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *DevicePath,
IN EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *Signature OPTIONAL,
IN UINTN SignatureSize
@@ -577,13 +717,13 @@ AddImageExeInfo (
if (DevicePath == NULL) {
return ;
}
-
+
if (Name != NULL) {
NameStringLen = StrSize (Name);
}
ImageExeInfoTable = NULL;
- EfiGetSystemConfigurationTable (&gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, (VOID**)&ImageExeInfoTable);
+ EfiGetSystemConfigurationTable (&gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, (VOID **) &ImageExeInfoTable);
if (ImageExeInfoTable != NULL) {
//
// The table has been found!
@@ -637,7 +777,7 @@ AddImageExeInfo (
// Update/replace the image execution table.
//
gBS->InstallConfigurationTable (&gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, (VOID *) NewImageExeInfoTable);
-
+
//
// Free Old table data!
//
@@ -646,60 +786,6 @@ AddImageExeInfo (
}
}
-/**
- Discover if the UEFI image is authorized by user's policy setting.
-
- @param[in] Policy Specify platform's policy setting.
-
- @retval EFI_ACCESS_DENIED Image is not allowed to run.
- @retval EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION Image is deferred.
- @retval EFI_SUCCESS Image is authorized to run.
-
-**/
-EFI_STATUS
-ImageAuthorization (
- IN UINT32 Policy
- )
-{
- EFI_STATUS Status;
- EFI_INPUT_KEY Key;
-
- Status = EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;
-
- switch (Policy) {
-
- case QUERY_USER_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION:
- do {
- CreatePopUp (EFI_LIGHTGRAY | EFI_BACKGROUND_BLUE, &Key, mNotifyString1, mNotifyString2, NULL);
- if (Key.UnicodeChar == L'Y' || Key.UnicodeChar == L'y') {
- Status = EFI_SUCCESS;
- break;
- } else if (Key.UnicodeChar == L'N' || Key.UnicodeChar == L'n') {
- Status = EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;
- break;
- } else if (Key.UnicodeChar == L'D' || Key.UnicodeChar == L'd') {
- Status = EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;
- break;
- }
- } while (TRUE);
- break;
-
- case ALLOW_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION:
- Status = EFI_SUCCESS;
- break;
-
- case DEFER_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION:
- Status = EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;
- break;
-
- case DENY_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION:
- Status = EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;
- break;
- }
-
- return Status;
-}
-
/**
Check whether signature is in specified database.
@@ -715,7 +801,7 @@ ImageAuthorization (
BOOLEAN
IsSignatureFoundInDatabase (
IN CHAR16 *VariableName,
- IN UINT8 *Signature,
+ IN UINT8 *Signature,
IN EFI_GUID *CertType,
IN UINTN SignatureSize
)
@@ -786,16 +872,20 @@ Done:
}
/**
- Verify certificate in WIN_CERT_TYPE_PKCS_SIGNED_DATA format .
+ Verify PKCS#7 SignedData using certificate found in Variable which formatted
+ as EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST. The Variable may be PK, KEK, DB or DBX.
- @retval EFI_SUCCESS Image pass verification.
- @retval EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION Image fail verification.
- @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCE Fail to allocate memory.
+ @param VariableName Name of Variable to search for Certificate.
+ @param VendorGuid Variable vendor GUID.
+
+ @retval TRUE Image pass verification.
+ @retval FALSE Image fail verification.
**/
-EFI_STATUS
-VerifyCertPkcsSignedData (
- VOID
+BOOLEAN
+IsPkcsSignedDataVerifiedBySignatureList (
+ IN CHAR16 *VariableName,
+ IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid
)
{
EFI_STATUS Status;
@@ -804,126 +894,64 @@ VerifyCertPkcsSignedData (
EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *CertList;
EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *Cert;
UINTN DataSize;
- UINT8 *KekData;
- UINT8 *DbData;
+ UINT8 *Data;
UINT8 *RootCert;
UINTN RootCertSize;
UINTN Index;
UINTN CertCount;
- KekData = NULL;
- DbData = NULL;
- CertList = NULL;
- Cert = NULL;
- RootCert = NULL;
- RootCertSize = 0;
- VerifyStatus = FALSE;
- PkcsCertData = (WIN_CERTIFICATE_EFI_PKCS *) (mImageBase + mSecDataDir->VirtualAddress);
-
- //
- // 1: Find certificate from KEK database and try to verify authenticode struct.
- //
- DataSize = 0;
- Status = gRT->GetVariable (EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, NULL, &DataSize, NULL);
- if (Status == EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {
- KekData = (UINT8 *)AllocateZeroPool (DataSize);
- if (KekData == NULL) {
- return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;
- }
-
- Status = gRT->GetVariable (EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, NULL, &DataSize, (VOID *)KekData);
- if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
- goto Done;
- }
-
- //
- // Find Cert Enrolled in KEK database to verify the signature in pkcs7 signed data.
- //
- CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) KekData;
- while ((DataSize > 0) && (DataSize >= CertList->SignatureListSize)) {
- if (CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Guid)) {
- Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize);
- CertCount = (CertList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - CertList->SignatureHeaderSize) / CertList->SignatureSize;
- for (Index = 0; Index < CertCount; Index++) {
- //
- // Iterate each Signature Data Node within this CertList for a verify
- //
- RootCert = Cert->SignatureData;
- RootCertSize = CertList->SignatureSize;
-
- //
- // Call AuthenticodeVerify library to Verify Authenticode struct.
- //
- VerifyStatus = AuthenticodeVerify (
- PkcsCertData->CertData,
- mSecDataDir->Size - sizeof(PkcsCertData->Hdr),
- RootCert,
- RootCertSize,
- mImageDigest,
- mImageDigestSize
- );
-
- if (VerifyStatus) {
- goto Done;
- }
- Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) Cert + CertList->SignatureSize);
- }
- }
- DataSize -= CertList->SignatureListSize;
- CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + CertList->SignatureListSize);
- }
- }
-
-
+ Data = NULL;
+ CertList = NULL;
+ Cert = NULL;
+ RootCert = NULL;
+ RootCertSize = 0;
+ VerifyStatus = FALSE;
+ PkcsCertData = (WIN_CERTIFICATE_EFI_PKCS *) (mImageBase + mSecDataDir->VirtualAddress);
- //
- // 2: Find certificate from DB database and try to verify authenticode struct.
- //
DataSize = 0;
- Status = gRT->GetVariable (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, NULL, &DataSize, NULL);
+ Status = gRT->GetVariable (VariableName, VendorGuid, NULL, &DataSize, NULL);
if (Status == EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {
- DbData = (UINT8 *)AllocateZeroPool (DataSize);
- if (DbData == NULL) {
- goto Done;
+ Data = (UINT8 *) AllocateZeroPool (DataSize);
+ if (Data == NULL) {
+ return VerifyStatus;
}
- Status = gRT->GetVariable (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, NULL, &DataSize, (VOID *)DbData);
+ Status = gRT->GetVariable (VariableName, VendorGuid, NULL, &DataSize, (VOID *) Data);
if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
goto Done;
}
//
- // Find Cert Enrolled in DB database to verify the signature in pkcs7 signed data.
- //
- CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) DbData;
+ // Find X509 certificate in Signature List to verify the signature in pkcs7 signed data.
+ //
+ CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) Data;
while ((DataSize > 0) && (DataSize >= CertList->SignatureListSize)) {
if (CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Guid)) {
Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize);
CertCount = (CertList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - CertList->SignatureHeaderSize) / CertList->SignatureSize;
for (Index = 0; Index < CertCount; Index++) {
//
- // Iterate each Signature Data Node within this CertList for a verify
- //
+ // Iterate each Signature Data Node within this CertList for verify.
+ //
RootCert = Cert->SignatureData;
- RootCertSize = CertList->SignatureSize;
-
+ RootCertSize = CertList->SignatureSize - sizeof (EFI_GUID);
+
//
- // Call AuthenticodeVerify library to Verify Authenticode struct.
+ // Call AuthenticodeVerify library to Verify Authenticode struct.
//
VerifyStatus = AuthenticodeVerify (
PkcsCertData->CertData,
- mSecDataDir->Size - sizeof(PkcsCertData->Hdr),
+ PkcsCertData->Hdr.dwLength - sizeof(PkcsCertData->Hdr),
RootCert,
RootCertSize,
mImageDigest,
mImageDigestSize
);
-
if (VerifyStatus) {
goto Done;
}
Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) Cert + CertList->SignatureSize);
- }
+ }
}
DataSize -= CertList->SignatureListSize;
CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + CertList->SignatureListSize);
@@ -931,148 +959,40 @@ VerifyCertPkcsSignedData (
}
Done:
- if (KekData != NULL) {
- FreePool (KekData);
- }
-
- if (DbData != NULL) {
- FreePool (DbData);
+ if (Data != NULL) {
+ FreePool (Data);
}
- if (VerifyStatus) {
- return EFI_SUCCESS;
- } else {
- return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;
- }
+ return VerifyStatus;
}
/**
- Verify certificate in WIN_CERTIFICATE_UEFI_GUID format.
+ Verify certificate in WIN_CERT_TYPE_PKCS_SIGNED_DATA format.
@retval EFI_SUCCESS Image pass verification.
@retval EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION Image fail verification.
- @retval other error value
**/
-EFI_STATUS
-VerifyCertUefiGuid (
+EFI_STATUS
+VerifyCertPkcsSignedData (
VOID
)
{
- BOOLEAN Status;
- WIN_CERTIFICATE_UEFI_GUID *EfiCert;
- EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *KekList;
- EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *KekItem;
- EFI_CERT_BLOCK_RSA_2048_SHA256 *CertBlock;
- VOID *Rsa;
- UINTN KekCount;
- UINTN Index;
- UINTN KekDataSize;
- BOOLEAN IsFound;
- EFI_STATUS Result;
-
- EfiCert = NULL;
- KekList = NULL;
- KekItem = NULL;
- CertBlock = NULL;
- Rsa = NULL;
- Status = FALSE;
- IsFound = FALSE;
- KekDataSize = 0;
-
- EfiCert = (WIN_CERTIFICATE_UEFI_GUID *) (mImageBase + mSecDataDir->VirtualAddress);
- CertBlock = (EFI_CERT_BLOCK_RSA_2048_SHA256 *) EfiCert->CertData;
- if (!CompareGuid (&EfiCert->CertType, &gEfiCertTypeRsa2048Sha256Guid)) {
- //
- // Invalid Certificate Data Type.
- //
- return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;
- }
-
- //
- // Get KEK database variable data size
- //
- Result = gRT->GetVariable (EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, NULL, &KekDataSize, NULL);
- if (Result != EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {
- return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;
- }
-
- //
- // Get KEK database variable.
- //
- KekList = GetEfiGlobalVariable (EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME);
- if (KekList == NULL) {
- return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;
- }
-
//
- // Enumerate all Kek items in this list to verify the variable certificate data.
- // If anyone is authenticated successfully, it means the variable is correct!
+ // 1: Find certificate from DBX forbidden database for revoked certificate.
//
- while ((KekDataSize > 0) && (KekDataSize >= KekList->SignatureListSize)) {
- if (CompareGuid (&KekList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertRsa2048Guid)) {
- KekItem = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) KekList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + KekList->SignatureHeaderSize);
- KekCount = (KekList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - KekList->SignatureHeaderSize) / KekList->SignatureSize;
- for (Index = 0; Index < KekCount; Index++) {
- if (CompareMem (KekItem->SignatureData, CertBlock->PublicKey, EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE) == 0) {
- IsFound = TRUE;
- break;
- }
- KekItem = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) KekItem + KekList->SignatureSize);
- }
- }
- KekDataSize -= KekList->SignatureListSize;
- KekList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) KekList + KekList->SignatureListSize);
- }
-
- if (!IsFound) {
+ if (IsPkcsSignedDataVerifiedBySignatureList (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid)) {
//
- // Signed key is not a trust one.
+ // DBX is forbidden database, if Authenticode verification pass with
+ // one of the certificate in DBX, this image should be rejected.
//
- goto Done;
+ return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;
}
//
- // Now, we found the corresponding security policy.
- // Verify the data payload.
- //
- Rsa = RsaNew ();
- if (Rsa == NULL) {
- Status = FALSE;
- goto Done;
- }
-
- //
- // Set RSA Key Components.
- // NOTE: Only N and E are needed to be set as RSA public key for signature verification.
- //
- Status = RsaSetKey (Rsa, RsaKeyN, CertBlock->PublicKey, EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE);
- if (!Status) {
- goto Done;
- }
- Status = RsaSetKey (Rsa, RsaKeyE, mRsaE, sizeof (mRsaE));
- if (!Status) {
- goto Done;
- }
- //
- // Verify the signature.
+ // 2: Find certificate from DB database and try to verify authenticode struct.
//
- Status = RsaPkcs1Verify (
- Rsa,
- mImageDigest,
- mImageDigestSize,
- CertBlock->Signature,
- EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SHA256_SIZE
- );
-
-Done:
- if (KekList != NULL) {
- FreePool (KekList);
- }
- if (Rsa != NULL ) {
- RsaFree (Rsa);
- }
- if (Status) {
+ if (IsPkcsSignedDataVerifiedBySignatureList (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid)) {
return EFI_SUCCESS;
} else {
return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;
@@ -1081,32 +1001,60 @@ Done:
/**
Provide verification service for signed images, which include both signature validation
- and platform policy control. For signature types, both UEFI WIN_CERTIFICATE_UEFI_GUID and
+ and platform policy control. For signature types, both UEFI WIN_CERTIFICATE_UEFI_GUID and
MSFT Authenticode type signatures are supported.
-
- In this implementation, only verify external executables when in USER MODE.
- Executables from FV is bypass, so pass in AuthenticationStatus is ignored.
- @param[in] AuthenticationStatus
+ In this implementation, only verify external executables when in USER MODE.
+ Executables from FV is bypass, so pass in AuthenticationStatus is ignored.
+
+ The image verification process is:
+ If the image is signed,
+ If the image's certificate verifies against a certificate (root or intermediate) in the allowed
+ database (DB) and not in the forbidden database (DBX), the certificate verification is passed.
+ If the image's hash digest is in DBX,
+ deny execution.
+ If not,
+ run it.
+ If the Image's certificate verification failed.
+ If the Image's Hash is in DB and not in DBX,
+ run it.
+ Otherwise,
+ deny execution.
+ Otherwise, the image is not signed,
+ Is the Image's Hash in DBX?
+ If yes, deny execution.
+ If not, is the Image's Hash in DB?
+ If yes, run it.
+ If not, deny execution.
+
+ Caution: This function may receive untrusted input.
+ PE/COFF image is external input, so this function will validate its data structure
+ within this image buffer before use.
+
+ @param[in] AuthenticationStatus
This is the authentication status returned from the security
measurement services for the input file.
@param[in] File This is a pointer to the device path of the file that is
being dispatched. This will optionally be used for logging.
@param[in] FileBuffer File buffer matches the input file device path.
@param[in] FileSize Size of File buffer matches the input file device path.
-
- @retval EFI_SUCCESS The file specified by File did authenticate, and the
- platform policy dictates that the DXE Core may use File.
- @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Input argument is incorrect.
+ @param[in] BootPolicy A boot policy that was used to call LoadImage() UEFI service.
+
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS The file specified by DevicePath and non-NULL
+ FileBuffer did authenticate, and the platform policy dictates
+ that the DXE Foundation may use the file.
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS The device path specified by NULL device path DevicePath
+ and non-NULL FileBuffer did authenticate, and the platform
+ policy dictates that the DXE Foundation may execute the image in
+ FileBuffer.
@retval EFI_OUT_RESOURCE Fail to allocate memory.
@retval EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION The file specified by File did not authenticate, and
the platform policy dictates that File should be placed
- in the untrusted state. A file may be promoted from
- the untrusted to the trusted state at a future time
- with a call to the Trust() DXE Service.
- @retval EFI_ACCESS_DENIED The file specified by File did not authenticate, and
- the platform policy dictates that File should not be
- used for any purpose.
+ in the untrusted state. The image has been added to the file
+ execution table.
+ @retval EFI_ACCESS_DENIED The file specified by File and FileBuffer did not
+ authenticate, and the platform policy dictates that the DXE
+ Foundation many not use File.
**/
EFI_STATUS
@@ -1115,25 +1063,24 @@ DxeImageVerificationHandler (
IN UINT32 AuthenticationStatus,
IN CONST EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *File,
IN VOID *FileBuffer,
- IN UINTN FileSize
+ IN UINTN FileSize,
+ IN BOOLEAN BootPolicy
)
-
{
- EFI_STATUS Status;
- UINT16 Magic;
- EFI_IMAGE_DOS_HEADER *DosHdr;
- EFI_STATUS VerifyStatus;
- UINT8 *SetupMode;
- EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *SignatureList;
- UINTN SignatureListSize;
- EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *Signature;
- EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_ACTION Action;
- WIN_CERTIFICATE *WinCertificate;
- UINT32 Policy;
-
- if (File == NULL) {
- return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
- }
+ EFI_STATUS Status;
+ UINT16 Magic;
+ EFI_IMAGE_DOS_HEADER *DosHdr;
+ EFI_STATUS VerifyStatus;
+ EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *SignatureList;
+ UINTN SignatureListSize;
+ EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *Signature;
+ EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_ACTION Action;
+ WIN_CERTIFICATE *WinCertificate;
+ UINT32 Policy;
+ UINT8 *SecureBoot;
+ PE_COFF_LOADER_IMAGE_CONTEXT ImageContext;
+ UINT32 NumberOfRvaAndSizes;
+ UINT32 CertSize;
SignatureList = NULL;
SignatureListSize = 0;
@@ -1144,7 +1091,7 @@ DxeImageVerificationHandler (
// Check the image type and get policy setting.
//
switch (GetImageType (File)) {
-
+
case IMAGE_FROM_FV:
Policy = ALWAYS_EXECUTE;
break;
@@ -1162,7 +1109,7 @@ DxeImageVerificationHandler (
break;
default:
- Policy = DENY_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION;
+ Policy = DENY_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION;
break;
}
//
@@ -1173,36 +1120,55 @@ DxeImageVerificationHandler (
} else if (Policy == NEVER_EXECUTE) {
return EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;
}
- SetupMode = GetEfiGlobalVariable (EFI_SETUP_MODE_NAME);
+ GetEfiGlobalVariable2 (EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME, (VOID**)&SecureBoot, NULL);
//
- // SetupMode doesn't exist means no AuthVar driver is dispatched,
- // skip verification.
+ // Skip verification if SecureBoot variable doesn't exist.
//
- if (SetupMode == NULL) {
+ if (SecureBoot == NULL) {
return EFI_SUCCESS;
}
//
- // If platform is in SETUP MODE, skip verification.
+ // Skip verification if SecureBoot is disabled.
//
- if (*SetupMode == SETUP_MODE) {
- FreePool (SetupMode);
+ if (*SecureBoot == SECURE_BOOT_MODE_DISABLE) {
+ FreePool (SecureBoot);
return EFI_SUCCESS;
}
+ FreePool (SecureBoot);
+
//
// Read the Dos header.
//
if (FileBuffer == NULL) {
- FreePool (SetupMode);
return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
}
+
mImageBase = (UINT8 *) FileBuffer;
mImageSize = FileSize;
- DosHdr = (EFI_IMAGE_DOS_HEADER *) (mImageBase);
+
+ ZeroMem (&ImageContext, sizeof (ImageContext));
+ ImageContext.Handle = (VOID *) FileBuffer;
+ ImageContext.ImageRead = (PE_COFF_LOADER_READ_FILE) DxeImageVerificationLibImageRead;
+
+ //
+ // Get information about the image being loaded
+ //
+ Status = PeCoffLoaderGetImageInfo (&ImageContext);
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ //
+ // The information can't be got from the invalid PeImage
+ //
+ goto Done;
+ }
+
+ Status = EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;
+
+ DosHdr = (EFI_IMAGE_DOS_HEADER *) mImageBase;
if (DosHdr->e_magic == EFI_IMAGE_DOS_SIGNATURE) {
//
- // DOS image header is present,
+ // DOS image header is present,
// so read the PE header after the DOS image header.
//
mPeCoffHeaderOffset = DosHdr->e_lfanew;
@@ -1217,126 +1183,146 @@ DxeImageVerificationHandler (
//
// It is not a valid Pe/Coff file.
//
- return EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;
+ goto Done;
}
- Magic = mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.Magic;
- if (Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {
+ if (mNtHeader.Pe32->FileHeader.Machine == IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_IA64 && mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {
//
- // Use PE32 offset.
+ // NOTE: Some versions of Linux ELILO for Itanium have an incorrect magic value
+ // in the PE/COFF Header. If the MachineType is Itanium(IA64) and the
+ // Magic value in the OptionalHeader is EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC
+ // then override the magic value to EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR64_MAGIC
//
- mSecDataDir = (EFI_IMAGE_DATA_DIRECTORY *)&mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY];
- } else if (Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR64_MAGIC) {
+ Magic = EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR64_MAGIC;
+ } else {
//
- // Use PE32+ offset.
+ // Get the magic value from the PE/COFF Optional Header
+ //
+ Magic = mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.Magic;
+ }
+
+ if (Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {
+ //
+ // Use PE32 offset.
//
- mSecDataDir = (EFI_IMAGE_DATA_DIRECTORY *)&mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY];
+ NumberOfRvaAndSizes = mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.NumberOfRvaAndSizes;
+ if (NumberOfRvaAndSizes > EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY) {
+ mSecDataDir = (EFI_IMAGE_DATA_DIRECTORY *) &mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY];
+ }
} else {
//
- // Invalid header magic number.
+ // Use PE32+ offset.
//
- Status = EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
- goto Done;
+ NumberOfRvaAndSizes = mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.NumberOfRvaAndSizes;
+ if (NumberOfRvaAndSizes > EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY) {
+ mSecDataDir = (EFI_IMAGE_DATA_DIRECTORY *) &mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY];
+ }
}
- if (mSecDataDir->VirtualAddress >= mImageSize) {
+ if ((mSecDataDir == NULL) || ((mSecDataDir != NULL) && (mSecDataDir->Size == 0))) {
//
- // Sanity check to see if this file is corrupted.
+ // This image is not signed.
//
- Status = EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
- goto Done;
- }
+ if (!HashPeImage (HASHALG_SHA256)) {
+ goto Done;
+ }
+
+ if (IsSignatureFoundInDatabase (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1, mImageDigest, &mCertType, mImageDigestSize)) {
+ //
+ // Image Hash is in forbidden database (DBX).
+ //
+ goto Done;
+ }
+
+ if (IsSignatureFoundInDatabase (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE, mImageDigest, &mCertType, mImageDigestSize)) {
+ //
+ // Image Hash is in allowed database (DB).
+ //
+ return EFI_SUCCESS;
+ }
- if (mSecDataDir->Size == 0) {
//
- // This image is not signed.
+ // Image Hash is not found in both forbidden and allowed database.
//
- Action = EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_AUTH_UNTESTED;
- Status = EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;
- goto Done;
+ goto Done;
}
+
//
// Verify signature of executables.
//
WinCertificate = (WIN_CERTIFICATE *) (mImageBase + mSecDataDir->VirtualAddress);
- switch (WinCertificate->wCertificateType) {
-
- case WIN_CERT_TYPE_EFI_GUID:
- //
- // Verify UEFI GUID type.
- //
- if (!HashPeImage (HASHALG_SHA256)) {
- goto Done;
- }
+ CertSize = sizeof (WIN_CERTIFICATE);
- VerifyStatus = VerifyCertUefiGuid ();
- break;
+ if ((mSecDataDir->Size <= CertSize) || (mSecDataDir->Size < WinCertificate->dwLength)) {
+ goto Done;
+ }
- case WIN_CERT_TYPE_PKCS_SIGNED_DATA:
+ if (WinCertificate->wCertificateType == WIN_CERT_TYPE_PKCS_SIGNED_DATA) {
//
// Verify Pkcs signed data type.
//
- Status = HashPeImageByType();
- if (EFI_ERROR(Status)) {
+ Status = HashPeImageByType();
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
goto Done;
}
-
+
VerifyStatus = VerifyCertPkcsSignedData ();
+ } else {
+ goto Done;
+ }
+ if (!EFI_ERROR (VerifyStatus)) {
//
- // For image verification against enrolled certificate(root or intermediate),
- // no need to check image's hash in the allowed database.
+ // Verification is passed.
+ // Continue to check the image digest in signature database.
//
- if (!EFI_ERROR (VerifyStatus)) {
+ if (IsSignatureFoundInDatabase (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1, mImageDigest, &mCertType, mImageDigestSize)) {
+ //
+ // Executable signature verification passes, but is found in forbidden signature database.
+ //
+ Action = EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_AUTH_SIG_FOUND;
+ Status = EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;
+ } else {
+ //
+ // For image verification against enrolled X.509 certificate(root or intermediate),
+ // no need to check image's hash in the allowed database.
+ //
return EFI_SUCCESS;
}
-
- default:
- return EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;
- }
- //
- // Get image hash value as executable's signature.
- //
- SignatureListSize = sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1 + mImageDigestSize;
- SignatureList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) AllocateZeroPool (SignatureListSize);
- if (SignatureList == NULL) {
- Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;
- goto Done;
- }
- SignatureList->SignatureHeaderSize = 0;
- SignatureList->SignatureListSize = (UINT32) SignatureListSize;
- SignatureList->SignatureSize = (UINT32) mImageDigestSize;
- CopyMem (&SignatureList->SignatureType, &mCertType, sizeof (EFI_GUID));
- Signature = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) SignatureList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST));
- CopyMem (Signature->SignatureData, mImageDigest, mImageDigestSize);
- //
- // Signature database check after verification.
- //
- if (EFI_ERROR (VerifyStatus)) {
+ } else {
//
// Verification failure.
//
- Action = EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_AUTH_SIG_FAILED;
- Status = EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;
- } else if (IsSignatureFoundInDatabase (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1, Signature->SignatureData, &mCertType, mImageDigestSize)) {
- //
- // Executable signature verification passes, but is found in forbidden signature database.
- //
- Action = EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_AUTH_SIG_FOUND;
- Status = EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;
- } else if (IsSignatureFoundInDatabase (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE, Signature->SignatureData, &mCertType, mImageDigestSize)) {
- //
- // Executable signature is found in authorized signature database.
- //
- Status = EFI_SUCCESS;
- } else {
+ if (!IsSignatureFoundInDatabase (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1, mImageDigest, &mCertType, mImageDigestSize) &&
+ IsSignatureFoundInDatabase (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE, mImageDigest, &mCertType, mImageDigestSize)) {
+ //
+ // Verification fail, Image Hash is not in forbidden database (DBX),
+ // and Image Hash is in allowed database (DB).
+ //
+ Status = EFI_SUCCESS;
+ } else {
+ Action = EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_AUTH_SIG_FAILED;
+ Status = EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
//
- // Executable signature verification passes, but cannot be found in authorized signature database.
- // Get platform policy to determine the action.
+ // Get image hash value as executable's signature.
//
- Action = EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_AUTH_SIG_PASSED;
- Status = ImageAuthorization (Policy);
+ SignatureListSize = sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1 + mImageDigestSize;
+ SignatureList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) AllocateZeroPool (SignatureListSize);
+ if (SignatureList == NULL) {
+ Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;
+ goto Done;
+ }
+ SignatureList->SignatureHeaderSize = 0;
+ SignatureList->SignatureListSize = (UINT32) SignatureListSize;
+ SignatureList->SignatureSize = (UINT32) mImageDigestSize;
+ CopyMem (&SignatureList->SignatureType, &mCertType, sizeof (EFI_GUID));
+ Signature = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) SignatureList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST));
+ CopyMem (Signature->SignatureData, mImageDigest, mImageDigestSize);
}
Done:
@@ -1345,23 +1331,22 @@ Done:
// Policy decides to defer or reject the image; add its information in image executable information table.
//
AddImageExeInfo (Action, NULL, File, SignatureList, SignatureListSize);
+ Status = EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;
}
if (SignatureList != NULL) {
FreePool (SignatureList);
}
- FreePool (SetupMode);
-
return Status;
}
/**
When VariableWriteArchProtocol install, create "SecureBoot" variable.
-
+
@param[in] Event Event whose notification function is being invoked.
@param[in] Context Pointer to the notification function's context.
-
+
**/
VOID
EFIAPI
@@ -1379,13 +1364,13 @@ VariableWriteCallBack (
if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
return;
}
-
+
//
// Check whether "SecureBoot" variable exists.
// If this library is built-in, it means firmware has capability to perform
// driver signing verification.
//
- SecureBootModePtr = GetEfiGlobalVariable (EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME);
+ GetEfiGlobalVariable2 (EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME, (VOID**)&SecureBootModePtr, NULL);
if (SecureBootModePtr == NULL) {
SecureBootMode = SECURE_BOOT_MODE_DISABLE;
//
@@ -1401,7 +1386,7 @@ VariableWriteCallBack (
} else {
FreePool (SecureBootModePtr);
}
-}
+}
/**
Register security measurement handler.
@@ -1422,7 +1407,7 @@ DxeImageVerificationLibConstructor (
//
// Register callback function upon VariableWriteArchProtocol.
- //
+ //
EfiCreateProtocolNotifyEvent (
&gEfiVariableWriteArchProtocolGuid,
TPL_CALLBACK,
@@ -1431,8 +1416,8 @@ DxeImageVerificationLibConstructor (
&Registration
);
- return RegisterSecurityHandler (
+ return RegisterSecurity2Handler (
DxeImageVerificationHandler,
EFI_AUTH_OPERATION_VERIFY_IMAGE | EFI_AUTH_OPERATION_IMAGE_REQUIRED
- );
+ );
}