X-Git-Url: https://git.proxmox.com/?a=blobdiff_plain;f=SecurityPkg%2FSecurityPkg.dec;h=a46d88d392323ffc111881a6b14045befaf2d091;hb=0d9675a1bcf54b8daaae7d3b3b1699d40a83d6ea;hp=8cf9b39f73346f0c83b7e13161b1e978c856e810;hpb=68fc0c7319d9c72e2f2e7fffdf9e1e8fb1e272d1;p=mirror_edk2.git
diff --git a/SecurityPkg/SecurityPkg.dec b/SecurityPkg/SecurityPkg.dec
index 8cf9b39f73..a46d88d392 100644
--- a/SecurityPkg/SecurityPkg.dec
+++ b/SecurityPkg/SecurityPkg.dec
@@ -1,8 +1,13 @@
## @file SecurityPkg.dec
-# This package includes the security drivers, defintions(including PPIs/PROTOCOLs/GUIDs
-# and library classes) and libraries instances.
+# Provides security features that conform to TCG/UEFI industry standards
#
-# Copyright (c) 2009 - 2013, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.
+# The security features include secure boot, measured boot and user identification.
+# It also provides the definitions(including PPIs/PROTOCOLs/GUIDs and library classes)
+# and libraries instances, which are used for those features.
+#
+# Copyright (c) 2009 - 2019, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.
+# (C) Copyright 2015 Hewlett Packard Enterprise Development LP
+# Copyright (c) 2017, Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.
# This program and the accompanying materials are licensed and made available under
# the terms and conditions of the BSD License which accompanies this distribution.
# The full text of the license may be found at
@@ -16,234 +21,462 @@
[Defines]
DEC_SPECIFICATION = 0x00010005
PACKAGE_NAME = SecurityPkg
- PACKAGE_GUID = 24369CAC-6AA6-4fb8-88DB-90BF061668AD
- PACKAGE_VERSION = 0.92
+ PACKAGE_UNI_FILE = SecurityPkg.uni
+ PACKAGE_GUID = 4EFC4F66-6219-4427-B780-FB99F470767F
+ PACKAGE_VERSION = 0.98
[Includes]
Include
[LibraryClasses]
- ## @libraryclass Definitions for common TPM commands as library API for TPM
- # module use.
+ ## @libraryclass Provides hash interfaces from different implementations.
+ #
HashLib|Include/Library/HashLib.h
+
+ ## @libraryclass Provides a platform specific interface to detect physically present user.
+ #
PlatformSecureLib|Include/Library/PlatformSecureLib.h
+
+ ## @libraryclass Provides interfaces to handle TPM 1.2 request.
+ #
TcgPhysicalPresenceLib|Include/Library/TcgPhysicalPresenceLib.h
+
+ ## @libraryclass Provides support for TCG PP >= 128 Vendor Specific PPI Operation.
+ #
+ TcgPpVendorLib|Include/Library/TcgPpVendorLib.h
+
+ ## @libraryclass Provides interfaces for other modules to send TPM 2.0 command.
+ #
Tpm2CommandLib|Include/Library/Tpm2CommandLib.h
+
+ ## @libraryclass Provides interfaces on how to access TPM 2.0 hardware device.
+ #
Tpm2DeviceLib|Include/Library/Tpm2DeviceLib.h
+
+ ## @libraryclass Provides interfaces for other modules to send TPM 1.2 command.
+ #
Tpm12CommandLib|Include/Library/Tpm12CommandLib.h
+
+ ## @libraryclass Provides interfaces on how to access TPM 1.2 hardware device.
+ #
Tpm12DeviceLib|Include/Library/Tpm12DeviceLib.h
+
+ ## @libraryclass Provides TPM Interface Specification (TIS) interfaces for TPM command.
+ #
TpmCommLib|Include/Library/TpmCommLib.h
- TpmMeasurementLib|Include/Library/TpmMeasurementLib.h
- TrEEPhysicalPresenceLib|Include/Library/TrEEPhysicalPresenceLib.h
+
+ ## @libraryclass Provides support for TCG Physical Presence Interface (PPI) specification
+ # >= 128 Vendor Specific PPI Operation.
+ #
+ Tcg2PpVendorLib|Include/Library/TcgPpVendorLib.h
+
+ ## @libraryclass Handle TPM 2.0 physical presence request from OS.
+ #
+ Tcg2PhysicalPresenceLib|Include/Library/Tcg2PhysicalPresenceLib.h
+
+ ## @libraryclass Provides interfaces about TCG storage generic commond.
+ #
+ TcgStorageCoreLib|Include/Library/TcgStorageCoreLib.h
+
+ ## @libraryclass Provides interfaces about TCG storage Opal generic commond.
+ #
+ TcgStorageOpalLib|Include/Library/TcgStorageOpalLib.h
[Guids]
- ## Security package token space guid
+ ## Security package token space guid.
# Include/Guid/SecurityPkgTokenSpace.h
gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid = { 0xd3fb176, 0x9569, 0x4d51, { 0xa3, 0xef, 0x7d, 0x61, 0xc6, 0x4f, 0xea, 0xba }}
- ## Guid acted as the authenticated variable store header's signature, and to specify the variable list entries put in the EFI system table.
- # Include/Guid/AuthenticatedVariableFormat.h
- gEfiAuthenticatedVariableGuid = { 0xaaf32c78, 0x947b, 0x439a, { 0xa1, 0x80, 0x2e, 0x14, 0x4e, 0xc3, 0x77, 0x92 } }
+ ## GUID used to "SecureBootEnable" variable for the Secure Boot feature enable/disable.
+ # This variable is used for allowing a physically present user to disable Secure Boot via firmware setup without the possession of PKpriv.
# Include/Guid/AuthenticatedVariableFormat.h
gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid = { 0xf0a30bc7, 0xaf08, 0x4556, { 0x99, 0xc4, 0x0, 0x10, 0x9, 0xc9, 0x3a, 0x44 } }
+ ## GUID used to "CustomMode" variable for two Secure Boot modes feature: "Custom" and "Standard".
+ # Standard Secure Boot mode is the default mode as UEFI Spec's description.
+ # Custom Secure Boot mode allows for more flexibility as specified in the following:
+ # Can enroll or delete PK without existing PK's private key.
+ # Can enroll or delete KEK without existing PK's private key.
+ # Can enroll or delete signature from DB/DBX without KEK's private key.
# Include/Guid/AuthenticatedVariableFormat.h
gEfiCustomModeEnableGuid = { 0xc076ec0c, 0x7028, 0x4399, { 0xa0, 0x72, 0x71, 0xee, 0x5c, 0x44, 0x8b, 0x9f } }
+ ## GUID used to "VendorKeysNv" variable to record the out of band secure boot keys modification.
+ # This variable is a read-only NV variable that indicates whether someone other than the platform vendor has used a
+ # mechanism not defined by the UEFI Specification to transition the system to setup mode or to update secure boot keys.
# Include/Guid/AuthenticatedVariableFormat.h
gEfiVendorKeysNvGuid = { 0x9073e4e0, 0x60ec, 0x4b6e, { 0x99, 0x3, 0x4c, 0x22, 0x3c, 0x26, 0xf, 0x3c } }
+ ## GUID used to "certdb"/"certdbv" variable to store the signer's certificates for common variables with EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS attribute.
# Include/Guid/AuthenticatedVariableFormat.h
gEfiCertDbGuid = { 0xd9bee56e, 0x75dc, 0x49d9, { 0xb4, 0xd7, 0xb5, 0x34, 0x21, 0xf, 0x63, 0x7a } }
-
- ## Include/Guid/TcgEventHob.h
+
+ ## Hob GUID used to pass a TCG_PCR_EVENT from a TPM PEIM to a TPM DXE Driver.
+ # Include/Guid/TcgEventHob.h
gTcgEventEntryHobGuid = { 0x2b9ffb52, 0x1b13, 0x416f, { 0xa8, 0x7b, 0xbc, 0x93, 0xd, 0xef, 0x92, 0xa8 }}
- ## Include/Guid/MeasuredFvHob.h
+ ## Hob GUID used to pass a TCG_PCR_EVENT_2 from a TPM2 PEIM to a TPM2 DXE Driver.
+ ## Include/Guid/TcgEventHob.h
+ gTcgEvent2EntryHobGuid = { 0xd26c221e, 0x2430, 0x4c8a, { 0x91, 0x70, 0x3f, 0xcb, 0x45, 0x0, 0x41, 0x3f }}
+
+ ## HOB GUID used to record TPM device error.
+ # Include/Guid/TcgEventHob.h
+ gTpmErrorHobGuid = { 0xef598499, 0xb25e, 0x473a, { 0xbf, 0xaf, 0xe7, 0xe5, 0x7d, 0xce, 0x82, 0xc4 }}
+
+ ## HOB GUID used to record TPM2 startup locality
+ ## Include/Guid/TcgEventHob.h
+ gTpm2StartupLocalityHobGuid = { 0x397b0c9, 0x22e8, 0x459e, { 0xa4, 0xff, 0x99, 0xbc, 0x65, 0x27, 0x9, 0x29 }}
+
+ ## HOB GUID used to pass all PEI measured FV info to DXE Driver.
+ # Include/Guid/MeasuredFvHob.h
gMeasuredFvHobGuid = { 0xb2360b42, 0x7173, 0x420a, { 0x86, 0x96, 0x46, 0xca, 0x6b, 0xab, 0x10, 0x60 }}
- ## Include/Guid/PhysicalPresenceData.h
+ ## GUID used to "PhysicalPresence" variable and "PhysicalPresenceFlags" variable for TPM request and response.
+ # Include/Guid/PhysicalPresenceData.h
gEfiPhysicalPresenceGuid = { 0xf6499b1, 0xe9ad, 0x493d, { 0xb9, 0xc2, 0x2f, 0x90, 0x81, 0x5c, 0x6c, 0xbc }}
-
- ## Include/Guid/PwdCredentialProviderHii.h
- gPwdCredentialProviderGuid = { 0x78b9ec8b, 0xc000, 0x46c5, { 0xac, 0x93, 0x24, 0xa0, 0xc1, 0xbb, 0x0, 0xce }}
- ## Include/Guid/UsbCredentialProviderHii.h
- gUsbCredentialProviderGuid = { 0xd0849ed1, 0xa88c, 0x4ba6, { 0xb1, 0xd6, 0xab, 0x50, 0xe2, 0x80, 0xb7, 0xa9 }}
+ ## GUID used to "Tcg2PhysicalPresence" variable and "Tcg2PhysicalPresenceFlags" variable for TPM2 request and response.
+ # Include/Guid/Tcg2PhysicalPresenceData.h
+ gEfiTcg2PhysicalPresenceGuid = { 0xaeb9c5c1, 0x94f1, 0x4d02, { 0xbf, 0xd9, 0x46, 0x2, 0xdb, 0x2d, 0x3c, 0x54 }}
- ## Include/Guid/UserIdentifyManagerHii.h
+ ## GUID used for FormSet guid and user profile variable.
+ # Include/Guid/UserIdentifyManagerHii.h
gUserIdentifyManagerGuid = { 0x3ccd3dd8, 0x8d45, 0x4fed, { 0x96, 0x2d, 0x2b, 0x38, 0xcd, 0x82, 0xb3, 0xc4 }}
- ## Include/Guid/UserProfileManagerHii.h
- gUserProfileManagerGuid = { 0xc35f272c, 0x97c2, 0x465a, { 0xa2, 0x16, 0x69, 0x6b, 0x66, 0x8a, 0x8c, 0xfe }}
-
- ## Include/Guid/TcgConfigHii.h
+ ## GUID used for FormSet.
+ # Include/Guid/TcgConfigHii.h
gTcgConfigFormSetGuid = { 0xb0f901e4, 0xc424, 0x45de, { 0x90, 0x81, 0x95, 0xe2, 0xb, 0xde, 0x6f, 0xb5 }}
-
- ## Include/Guid/SecureBootConfigHii.h
+
+ ## GUID used for FormSet and config variable.
+ # Include/Guid/Tcg2ConfigHii.h
+ gTcg2ConfigFormSetGuid = {0x6339d487, 0x26ba, 0x424b, { 0x9a, 0x5d, 0x68, 0x7e, 0x25, 0xd7, 0x40, 0xbc }}
+
+ ## GUID used for FormSet.
+ # Include/Guid/SecureBootConfigHii.h
gSecureBootConfigFormSetGuid = { 0x5daf50a5, 0xea81, 0x4de2, {0x8f, 0x9b, 0xca, 0xbd, 0xa9, 0xcf, 0x5c, 0x14}}
-
- ## Include/Guid/TrEEPhysicalPresenceData.h
- gEfiTrEEPhysicalPresenceGuid = { 0xf24643c2, 0xc622, 0x494e, { 0x8a, 0xd, 0x46, 0x32, 0x57, 0x9c, 0x2d, 0x5b }}
- ## Include/Guid/TpmInstance.h
+ ## GUID value used for PcdTpmInstanceGuid to indicate TPM is disabled.
+ # Include/Guid/TpmInstance.h
gEfiTpmDeviceInstanceNoneGuid = { 0x00000000, 0x0000, 0x0000, { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 } }
+
+ ## GUID value used for PcdTpmInstanceGuid to indicate TPM 1.2 device is selected to support.
+ # Include/Guid/TpmInstance.h
gEfiTpmDeviceInstanceTpm12Guid = { 0x8b01e5b6, 0x4f19, 0x46e8, { 0xab, 0x93, 0x1c, 0x53, 0x67, 0x1b, 0x90, 0xcc } }
+
+ ## GUID value used for PcdTpmInstanceGuid to indicate discrete TPM 2.0 device is selected to support.
+ # Include/Guid/TpmInstance.h
gEfiTpmDeviceInstanceTpm20DtpmGuid = { 0x286bf25a, 0xc2c3, 0x408c, { 0xb3, 0xb4, 0x25, 0xe6, 0x75, 0x8b, 0x73, 0x17 } }
+
+ ## GUID used to select supported TPM instance from UI.
+ # Include/Guid/TpmInstance.h
gEfiTpmDeviceSelectedGuid = { 0x7f4158d3, 0x74d, 0x456d, { 0x8c, 0xb2, 0x1, 0xf9, 0xc8, 0xf7, 0x9d, 0xaa } }
- ## Include/Guid/TrEEConfigHii.h
- gTrEEConfigFormSetGuid = {0xc54b425f, 0xaa79, 0x48b4, { 0x98, 0x1f, 0x99, 0x8b, 0x3c, 0x4b, 0x64, 0x1c }}
+ ## Include/OpalPasswordExtraInfoVariable.h
+ gOpalExtraInfoVariableGuid = {0x44a2ad5d, 0x612c, 0x47b3, {0xb0, 0x6e, 0xc8, 0xf5, 0x0b, 0xfb, 0xf0, 0x7d}}
+
[Ppis]
- ## Include/Ppi/LockPhysicalPresence.h
+ ## The PPI GUID for that TPM physical presence should be locked.
+ # Include/Ppi/LockPhysicalPresence.h
gPeiLockPhysicalPresencePpiGuid = { 0xef9aefe5, 0x2bd3, 0x4031, { 0xaf, 0x7d, 0x5e, 0xfe, 0x5a, 0xbb, 0x9a, 0xd } }
- ## Include/Ppi/TpmInitialized.h
+ ## The PPI GUID for that TPM is initialized.
+ # Include/Ppi/TpmInitialized.h
gPeiTpmInitializedPpiGuid = { 0xe9db0d58, 0xd48d, 0x47f6, { 0x9c, 0x6e, 0x6f, 0x40, 0xe8, 0x6c, 0x7b, 0x41 }}
+ ## The PPI GUID for that TPM initialization is done. TPM initialization may be success or fail.
+ # Include/Ppi/TpmInitialized.h
+ gPeiTpmInitializationDonePpiGuid = { 0xa030d115, 0x54dd, 0x447b, { 0x90, 0x64, 0xf2, 0x6, 0x88, 0x3d, 0x7c, 0xcc }}
+
## Include/Ppi/FirmwareVolumeInfoMeasurementExcluded.h
gEfiPeiFirmwareVolumeInfoMeasurementExcludedPpiGuid = { 0x6e056ff9, 0xc695, 0x4364, { 0x9e, 0x2c, 0x61, 0x26, 0xf5, 0xce, 0xea, 0xae } }
-[PcdsFixedAtBuild]
- ## Pcd for OptionRom.
- # Image verification policy settings:
- # ALWAYS_EXECUTE 0x00000000
- # NEVER_EXECUTE 0x00000001
- # ALLOW_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION 0x00000002
- # DEFER_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION 0x00000003
- # DENY_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION 0x00000004
- # QUERY_USER_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION 0x00000005
- # NOTE: Do NOT use QUERY_USER_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION and ALLOW_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION since
- # it violates the UEFI specification and has been removed.
- gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOptionRomImageVerificationPolicy|0x04|UINT32|0x00000001
-
- ## Pcd for removable media.
- # Removable media include CD-ROM, Floppy, USB and network.
- # Image verification policy settings:
- # ALWAYS_EXECUTE 0x00000000
- # NEVER_EXECUTE 0x00000001
- # ALLOW_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION 0x00000002
- # DEFER_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION 0x00000003
- # DENY_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION 0x00000004
- # QUERY_USER_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION 0x00000005
- # NOTE: Do NOT use QUERY_USER_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION and ALLOW_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION since
- # it violates the UEFI specification and has been removed.
+ ## Include/Ppi/FirmwareVolumeInfoPrehashedFV.h
+ gEdkiiPeiFirmwareVolumeInfoPrehashedFvPpiGuid = { 0x3ce1e631, 0x7008, 0x477c, { 0xad, 0xa7, 0x5d, 0xcf, 0xc7, 0xc1, 0x49, 0x4b } }
+
+#
+# [Error.gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid]
+# 0x80000001 | Invalid value provided.
+# 0x80000002 | Reserved bits must be set to zero.
+# 0x80000003 | Incorrect progress or error code provided.
+#
+
+[PcdsFixedAtBuild, PcdsPatchableInModule]
+ ## Image verification policy for removable media which includes CD-ROM, Floppy, USB and network.
+ # Only following values are valid:
+ # NOTE: Do NOT use 0x5 and 0x2 since it violates the UEFI specification and has been removed.
+ # 0x00000000 Always trust the image.
+ # 0x00000001 Never trust the image.
+ # 0x00000002 Allow execution when there is security violation.
+ # 0x00000003 Defer execution when there is security violation.
+ # 0x00000004 Deny execution when there is security violation.
+ # 0x00000005 Query user when there is security violation.
+ # @Prompt Set policy for the image from removable media.
+ # @ValidRange 0x80000001 | 0x00000000 - 0x00000005
gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdRemovableMediaImageVerificationPolicy|0x04|UINT32|0x00000002
-
- ## Pcd for fixed media.
- # Fixed media include hard disk.
- # Image verification policy settings:
- # ALWAYS_EXECUTE 0x00000000
- # NEVER_EXECUTE 0x00000001
- # ALLOW_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION 0x00000002
- # DEFER_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION 0x00000003
- # DENY_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION 0x00000004
- # QUERY_USER_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION 0x00000005
- # NOTE: Do NOT use QUERY_USER_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION and ALLOW_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION since
- # it violates the UEFI specification and has been removed.
+
+ ## Image verification policy for fixed media which includes hard disk.
+ # Only following values are valid:
+ # NOTE: Do NOT use 0x5 and 0x2 since it violates the UEFI specification and has been removed.
+ # 0x00000000 Always trust the image.
+ # 0x00000001 Never trust the image.
+ # 0x00000002 Allow execution when there is security violation.
+ # 0x00000003 Defer execution when there is security violation.
+ # 0x00000004 Deny execution when there is security violation.
+ # 0x00000005 Query user when there is security violation.
+ # @Prompt Set policy for the image from fixed media.
+ # @ValidRange 0x80000001 | 0x00000000 - 0x00000005
gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdFixedMediaImageVerificationPolicy|0x04|UINT32|0x00000003
-
- ## Defer Image Load policy settings.
- # The policy is bitwise.
- # If bit is set, the image from corresponding device will be trust when loading.
- #
- # IMAGE_UNKNOWN 0x00000001
- # IMAGE_FROM_FV 0x00000002
- # IMAGE_FROM_OPTION_ROM 0x00000004
- # IMAGE_FROM_REMOVABLE_MEDIA 0x00000008
- # IMAGE_FROM_FIXED_MEDIA 0x00000010
+
+ ## Defer Image Load policy settings. The policy is bitwise.
+ # If a bit is set, the image from corresponding device will be trusted when loading. Or
+ # the image will be deferred. The deferred image will be checked after user is identified.
+ # BIT0 - Image from unknown device.
+ # BIT1 - Image from firmware volume.
+ # BIT2 - Image from OptionRom.
+ # BIT3 - Image from removable media which includes CD-ROM, Floppy, USB and network.
+ # BIT4 - Image from fixed media device which includes hard disk.
+ # @Prompt Set policy whether trust image before user identification.
+ # @ValidRange 0x80000002 | 0x00000000 - 0x0000001F
gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdDeferImageLoadPolicy|0x0000001F|UINT32|0x0000004
-
- ## The token file name used to save credential in USB credential provider driver.
+
+ ## Null-terminated Unicode string of the file name that is the default name to save USB credential.
# The specified file should be saved at the root directory of USB storage disk.
+ # @Prompt File name to save credential.
gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdFixedUsbCredentialProviderTokenFileName|L"Token.bin"|VOID*|0x00000005
## The size of Append variable buffer. This buffer is reserved for runtime use, OS can append data into one existing variable.
- gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdMaxAppendVariableSize|0x2000|UINT32|0x30000005
-
- ## This PCD specifies the type of TCG platform that contains TPM chip.
- # This PCD is only avaiable when PcdTpmPhysicalPresence is TRUE.
- # If 0, TCG platform type is PC client.
- # If 1, TCG platform type is server.
+ # Note: This PCD is not been used.
+ # @Prompt Max variable size for append operation.
+ gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdMaxAppendVariableSize|0x2000|UINT32|0x30000005
+
+ ## Specifies the type of TCG platform that contains TPM chip.
+ # If 0, TCG platform type is PC client.
+ # If 1, TCG platform type is PC server.
+ # @Prompt Select platform type.
+ # @ValidRange 0x80000001 | 0x00 - 0x1
gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTpmPlatformClass|0|UINT8|0x00000006
- ## The PCD is used to control whether to support hiding the TPM.
- # If TRUE, PcdHideTpm controls whether to hide the TPM.
- gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdHideTpmSupport|FALSE|BOOLEAN|0x00000007
-
-[PcdsDynamic, PcdsDynamicEx]
- ## The PCD is used to control whether to hide the TPM.
- gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdHideTpm|FALSE|BOOLEAN|0x00010002
+ ## Progress Code for TPM device subclass definitions.
+ # EFI_PERIPHERAL_TPM = (EFI_PERIPHERAL | 0x000D0000) = 0x010D0000
+ # @Prompt Status Code for TPM device definitions
+ # @ValidList 0x80000003 | 0x010D0000
+ gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdStatusCodeSubClassTpmDevice|0x010D0000|UINT32|0x00000007
[PcdsFixedAtBuild, PcdsPatchableInModule, PcdsDynamic, PcdsDynamicEx]
- ## This PCD indicates the presence or absence of the platform operator.
+ ## Image verification policy for OptionRom. Only following values are valid:
+ # NOTE: Do NOT use 0x5 and 0x2 since it violates the UEFI specification and has been removed.
+ # 0x00000000 Always trust the image.
+ # 0x00000001 Never trust the image.
+ # 0x00000002 Allow execution when there is security violation.
+ # 0x00000003 Defer execution when there is security violation.
+ # 0x00000004 Deny execution when there is security violation.
+ # 0x00000005 Query user when there is security violation.
+ # @Prompt Set policy for the image from OptionRom.
+ # @ValidRange 0x80000001 | 0x00000000 - 0x00000005
+ gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOptionRomImageVerificationPolicy|0x04|UINT32|0x00000001
+
+ ## Indicates the presence or absence of the platform operator during firmware booting.
+ # If platform operator is not physical presence during boot. TPM will be locked and the TPM commands
+ # that required operator physical presence can not run.
+ # TRUE - The platform operator is physically present.
+ # FALSE - The platform operator is not physically present.
+ # @Prompt Physical presence of the platform operator.
gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTpmPhysicalPresence|TRUE|BOOLEAN|0x00010001
[PcdsFixedAtBuild, PcdsPatchableInModule, PcdsDynamic, PcdsDynamicEx]
- ## This PCD indicates whether to set TPM physicalPresenceLifetimeLock bit.
- ## Once this bit is set, it can not be cleared (It is locked for TPM life time).
+ ## Indicates whether TPM physical presence is locked during platform initialization.
+ # Once it is locked, it can not be unlocked for TPM life time.
+ # TRUE - Lock TPM physical presence asserting method.
+ # FALSE - Not lock TPM physical presence asserting method.
+ # @Prompt Lock TPM physical presence asserting method.
gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdPhysicalPresenceLifetimeLock|FALSE|BOOLEAN|0x00010003
-
+
[PcdsFixedAtBuild, PcdsPatchableInModule, PcdsDynamic, PcdsDynamicEx]
- ## This PCD is used to specify the default value for physicalPresenceCMDEnable bit when setting physicalPresenceLifetimeLock bit.
- ## If PcdPhysicalPresenceCmdEnable is set to TRUE, physicalPresenceCMDEnable bit will be set, else this bit will be cleared.
+ ## Indicates whether the platform supports the software method of asserting physical presence.
+ # TRUE - Supports the software method of asserting physical presence.
+ # FALSE - Does not support the software method of asserting physical presence.
+ # @Prompt Enable software method of asserting physical presence.
gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdPhysicalPresenceCmdEnable|TRUE|BOOLEAN|0x00010004
-
+
[PcdsFixedAtBuild, PcdsPatchableInModule, PcdsDynamic, PcdsDynamicEx]
- ## This PCD is used to specify the default value for physicalPresenceHWEnable bit when setting physicalPresenceLifetimeLock bit.
- ## If PcdPhysicalPresenceHwEnable is set to TRUE, physicalPresenceHWEnable bit will be set, else this bit will be cleared.
+ ## Indicates whether the platform supports the hardware method of asserting physical presence.
+ # TRUE - Supports the hardware method of asserting physical presence.
+ # FALSE - Does not support the hardware method of asserting physical presence.
+ # @Prompt Enable hardware method of asserting physical presence.
gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdPhysicalPresenceHwEnable|TRUE|BOOLEAN|0x00010005
[PcdsFixedAtBuild, PcdsPatchableInModule, PcdsDynamic, PcdsDynamicEx]
- ## This PCD indicates if debugger exists.
+ ## This PCD indicates if debugger exists.
+ # TRUE - Firmware debugger exists.
+ # FALSE - Firmware debugger doesn't exist.
+ # @Prompt Firmware debugger status.
gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdFirmwareDebuggerInitialized|FALSE|BOOLEAN|0x00010009
- ## This PCD indicates the TPM2 initializatin policy.
- ## 0: No initialization needed - most likely used for chipset SRTM sloution, in which TPM is already initialized.
- ## 1: Initialization needed.
+ ## This PCD indicates the initialization policy for TPM 2.0.
+ # If 0, no initialization needed - most likely used for chipset SRTM solution, in which TPM is already initialized.
+ # If 1, initialization needed.
+ # @Prompt TPM 2.0 device initialization policy.
+ # @ValidRange 0x80000001 | 0x00 - 0x1
gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTpm2InitializationPolicy|1|UINT8|0x0001000A
- ## This PCD indicates the TPM initializatin policy.
- ## 0: No initialization needed - most likely used for chipset SRTM sloution, in which TPM is already initialized.
- ## 1: Initialization needed.
+ ## This PCD indicates the initialization policy for TPM 1.2.
+ # If 0, no initialization needed - most likely used for chipset SRTM solution, in which TPM is already initialized.
+ # If 1, initialization needed.
+ # @Prompt TPM 1.2 device initialization policy.
+ # @ValidRange 0x80000001 | 0x00 - 0x1
gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTpmInitializationPolicy|1|UINT8|0x0001000B
- ## This PCD indicates the TPM2 SelfTest policy.
- ## 0: No SelfTest needed - most likely used for fTPM, because it might already be tested.
- ## 1: SelfTest needed.
+ ## This PCD indicates the TPM 2.0 SelfTest policy.
+ # if 0, no SelfTest needed - most likely used for fTPM, because it might already be tested.
+ # if 1, SelfTest needed.
+ # @Prompt TPM 2.0 device selftest.
+ # @ValidRange 0x80000001 | 0x00 - 0x1
gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTpm2SelfTestPolicy|1|UINT8|0x0001000C
- ## This PCD indicates the TPM2 SCRTM policy.
- ## 0: No SCRTM needed - In this case, it is already done.
- ## 1: SCRTM done by BIOS.
+ ## This PCD indicates Static Core Root of Trust for Measurement (SCRTM) policy using TPM 2.0.
+ # if 0, no SCRTM measurement needed - In this case, it is already done.
+ # if 1, SCRTM measurement done by BIOS.
+ # @Prompt SCRTM policy setting for TPM 2.0 device.
+ # @ValidRange 0x80000001 | 0x00 - 0x1
gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTpm2ScrtmPolicy|1|UINT8|0x0001000D
- ## This PCD indicates the TPM SCRTM policy.
- ## 0: No SCRTM needed - In this case, it is already done.
- ## 1: SCRTM done by BIOS.
+ ## This PCD indicates Static Core Root of Trust for Measurement (SCRTM) policy using TPM 1.2.
+ # if 0, no SCRTM measurement needed - In this case, it is already done.
+ # if 1, SCRTM measurement done by BIOS.
+ # @Prompt SCRTM policy setting for TPM 1.2 device
+ # @ValidRange 0x80000001 | 0x00 - 0x1
gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTpmScrtmPolicy|1|UINT8|0x0001000E
- ## Guid name to identify TPM instance
- ## TPM_DEVICE_INTERFACE_NONE means disable
- ## TPM_DEVICE_INTERFACE_TPM12 means TPM1.2 DTPM
- ## TPM_DEVICE_INTERFACE_DTPM2 means TPM2 DTPM
+ ## Guid name to identify TPM instance.
+ # TPM_DEVICE_INTERFACE_NONE means disable.
+ # TPM_DEVICE_INTERFACE_TPM12 means TPM 1.2 DTPM.
+ # TPM_DEVICE_INTERFACE_DTPM2 means TPM 2.0 DTPM.
+ # Other GUID value means other TPM 2.0 device.
+ # @Prompt TPM device type identifier
gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTpmInstanceGuid |{ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 }|VOID*|0x0001000F
- ## This PCD indicates the TPM2 Hash mask.
- ## BIT0: SHA1
- ## BIT1: SHA256
- ## BIT2: SHA384
- ## BIT3: SHA512
- ## If this bit is set, that means this algorithm is needed to extend to PCR.
- ## If this bit is clear, that means this algorithm is NOT needed to extend to PCR.
- ## 0xFFFFFFFF means extend all.
- gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTpm2HashMask|0xFFFFFFFF|UINT32|0x00010010
-
- ## This PCD indicates if BIOS auto detect TPM1.2 or dTPM2.0.
- ## 0: No auto detection.
- ## 1: Auto detection.
+ ## This PCD indicates if BIOS auto detect TPM1.2 or dTPM2.0.
+ # FALSE - No auto detection.
+ # TRUE - Auto detection.
+ # @Prompt TPM type detection.
gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTpmAutoDetection|TRUE|BOOLEAN|0x00010011
- ## This PCD indicates TPM base address.
+ ## This PCD indicates TPM base address.
+ # @Prompt TPM device address.
gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTpmBaseAddress|0xFED40000|UINT64|0x00010012
+
+ ## This PCR means the OEM configurated number of PCR banks.
+ # 0 means dynamic get from supported HASH algorithm
+ # @Prompt OEM configurated number of PCR banks.
+ gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTcg2NumberOfPCRBanks|0x0|UINT32|0x00010015
+
+ ## Provides one or more SHA 256 Hashes of the RSA 2048 public keys used to verify Recovery and Capsule Update images
+ # WARNING: The default value is treated as test key. Please do not use default value in the production.
+ # @Prompt One or more SHA 256 Hashes of RSA 2048 bit public keys used to verify Recovery and Capsule Update images
+ #
+ gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdRsa2048Sha256PublicKeyBuffer|{0x91, 0x29, 0xc4, 0xbd, 0xea, 0x6d, 0xda, 0xb3, 0xaa, 0x6f, 0x50, 0x16, 0xfc, 0xdb, 0x4b, 0x7e, 0x3c, 0xd6, 0xdc, 0xa4, 0x7a, 0x0e, 0xdd, 0xe6, 0x15, 0x8c, 0x73, 0x96, 0xa2, 0xd4, 0xa6, 0x4d}|VOID*|0x00010013
+
+ ## Provides one PKCS7 cert used to verify Recovery and Capsule Update images
+ # WARNING: The default value is treated as test key. Please do not use default value in the production.
+ # @Prompt One PKCS7 cert used to verify Recovery and Capsule Update images
+ #
+ gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdPkcs7CertBuffer|{0x30, 0x82, 0x03, 0xec, 0x30, 0x82, 0x02, 0xd4, 0xa0, 0x03, 0x02, 0x01, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x00, 0xc0, 0x91, 0xc5, 0xe2, 0xb7, 0x66, 0xc0, 0xf8, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x01, 0x0b, 0x05, 0x00, 0x30, 0x81, 0x82, 0x31, 0x0b, 0x30, 0x09, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x06, 0x13, 0x02, 0x43, 0x4e, 0x31, 0x0b, 0x30, 0x09, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x08, 0x0c, 0x02, 0x53, 0x48, 0x31, 0x0b, 0x30, 0x09, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x07, 0x0c, 0x02, 0x53, 0x48, 0x31, 0x12, 0x30, 0x10, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x0a, 0x0c, 0x09, 0x54, 0x69, 0x61, 0x6e, 0x6f, 0x43, 0x6f, 0x72, 0x65, 0x31, 0x0e, 0x30, 0x0c, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x05, 0x45, 0x44, 0x4b, 0x49, 0x49, 0x31, 0x11, 0x30, 0x0f, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x03, 0x0c, 0x08, 0x54, 0x65, 0x73, 0x74, 0x52, 0x6f, 0x6f, 0x74, 0x31, 0x22, 0x30, 0x20, 0x06, 0x09, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x09, 0x01, 0x16, 0x13, 0x65, 0x64, 0x6b, 0x69, 0x69, 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0x62, 0x68, 0xdd, 0x53, 0xc6, 0xdc, 0xa5, 0xdd, 0x9a, 0x2d, 0x8e, 0x79, 0x7c, 0x2e, 0x9c, 0xe4, 0x66, 0x80, 0x8c, 0x1d}|VOID*|0x00010014
+
+ ## This PCD defines minimum length(in bytes) of the system preboot TCG event log area(LAML).
+ # For PC Client Implementation spec up to and including 1.2 the minimum log size is 64KB.
+ # @Prompt Minimum length(in bytes) of the system preboot TCG event log area(LAML).
+ gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTcgLogAreaMinLen|0x10000|UINT32|0x00010017
+
+ ## This PCD defines length(in bytes) of the TCG2 Final event log area.
+ # @Prompt Length(in bytes) of the TCG2 Final event log area.
+ gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTcg2FinalLogAreaLen|0x8000|UINT32|0x00010018
+
+ ## Null-terminated string of the Version of Physical Presence interface supported by platform.
+ # To support configuring from setup page, this PCD can be DynamicHii type and map to a setup option.
+ # For example, map to TCG2_VERSION.PpiVersion to be configured by Tcg2ConfigDxe driver.
+ # gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTcgPhysicalPresenceInterfaceVer|L"TCG2_VERSION"|gTcg2ConfigFormSetGuid|0x0|"1.3"|NV,BS
+ # @Prompt Version of Physical Presence interface supported by platform.
+ gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTcgPhysicalPresenceInterfaceVer|"1.3"|VOID*|0x00000008
+
+ ## Indicate whether a physical presence user exist.
+ # When it is configured to Dynamic or DynamicEx, it can be set through detection using
+ # a platform-specific method (e.g. Button pressed) in a actual platform in early boot phase.
+ # @Prompt A physical presence user status
+ gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdUserPhysicalPresence|FALSE|BOOLEAN|0x00010019
+
+ ## Indicate the TPM2 ACPI table revision. Rev 4 has been defined since TCG ACPI Specification Rev 00.37.
+ # To support configuring from setup page, this PCD can be DynamicHii type and map to a setup option.
+ # For example, map to TCG2_VERSION.Tpm2AcpiTableRev to be configured by Tcg2ConfigDxe driver.
+ # gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTpm2AcpiTableRev|L"TCG2_VERSION"|gTcg2ConfigFormSetGuid|0x8|3|NV,BS
+ # @Prompt Revision of TPM2 ACPI table.
+ gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTpm2AcpiTableRev|3|UINT8|0x0001001A
+
+ ## This PCD defines initial setting of TCG2 Persistent Firmware Management Flags
+ # PCD can be configured for different settings in different scenarios
+ # Default setting is TCG2_BIOS_TPM_MANAGEMENT_FLAG_DEFAULT | TCG2_BIOS_STORAGE_MANAGEMENT_FLAG_DEFAULT
+ # @Prompt Initial setting of TCG2 Persistent Firmware Management Flags
+ gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTcg2PhysicalPresenceFlags|0x300E2|UINT32|0x0001001B
+
+ ## Indicate current TPM2 Interrupt Number reported by _CRS control method.
+ # TPM2 Interrupt feature is disabled If the pcd is set to 0.
+ # @Prompt Current TPM2 Interrupt Number
+ gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTpm2CurrentIrqNum|0x00|UINT32|0x0001001C
+
+ ## Indicate platform possible TPM2 Interrupt Number reported by _PRS control method.
+ # Possible TPM2 Interrupt Number Buffer will not be reported if TPM2 Interrupt feature is disabled.
+ # @Prompt Possible TPM2 Interrupt Number buffer
+ gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTpm2PossibleIrqNumBuf|{0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00}|VOID*|0x0001001D
+
+ ## Indicates if Opal DXE driver skip unlock device flow.
+ # TRUE - Skip unlock device flow.
+ # FALSE - Does not skip unlock device flow.
+ # @Prompt Skip Opal DXE driver unlock device flow.
+ gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdSkipOpalDxeUnlock|FALSE|BOOLEAN|0x00010020
+
+[PcdsDynamic, PcdsDynamicEx]
+
+ ## This PCD indicates Hash mask for TPM 2.0. Bit definition strictly follows TCG Algorithm Registry.
+ # If this bit is set, that means this algorithm is needed to extend to PCR.
+ # If this bit is clear, that means this algorithm is NOT needed to extend to PCR.
+ # If all the bits are clear, that means hash algorithm is determined by current Active PCR Banks.
+ # BIT0 - SHA1.
+ # BIT1 - SHA256.
+ # BIT2 - SHA384.
+ # BIT3 - SHA512.
+ # @Prompt Hash mask for TPM 2.0
+ # @ValidRange 0x80000001 | 0x00000000 - 0x0000000F
+ gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTpm2HashMask|0x0000000F|UINT32|0x00010010
+
+ ## This PCD indicated final BIOS supported Hash mask.
+ # Bios may choose to register a subset of PcdTpm2HashMask.
+ # So this PCD is final value of how many hash algo is extended to PCR.
+ # If software HashLib(HashLibBaseCryptoRouter) solution is chosen, this PCD
+ # has no need to be configured in platform dsc and will be set to correct
+ # value by the HashLib instance according to the HashInstanceLib instances
+ # linked, and the value of this PCD should be got in module entrypoint.
+ # @Prompt Hash Algorithm bitmap.
+ gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTcg2HashAlgorithmBitmap|0xFFFFFFFF|UINT32|0x00010016
+
+ ## This PCD indicates current active TPM interface type.
+ # Accodingt to TCG PTP spec 1.3, there are 3 types defined in TPM2_PTP_INTERFACE_TYPE.
+ # 0x00 - FIFO interface as defined in TIS 1.3 is active.
+ # 0x01 - FIFO interface as defined in PTP for TPM 2.0 is active.
+ # 0x02 - CRB interface is active.
+ # 0xFF - Contains no current active TPM interface type.
+ #
+ # @Prompt current active TPM interface type.
+ gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdActiveTpmInterfaceType|0xFF|UINT8|0x0001001E
+
+ ## This PCD records IdleByass status supported by current active TPM interface.
+ # Accodingt to TCG PTP spec 1.3, TPM with CRB interface can skip idle state and
+ # diretcly move to CmdReady state.
+ # 0x00 - Do not support IdleByPass.
+ # 0x01 - Support IdleByPass.
+ # 0xFF - IdleByPass State is not synced with TPM hardware.
+ #
+ # @Prompt IdleByass status supported by current active TPM interface.
+ gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdCRBIdleByPass|0xFF|UINT8|0x0001001F
+
+[UserExtensions.TianoCore."ExtraFiles"]
+ SecurityPkgExtra.uni