X-Git-Url: https://git.proxmox.com/?a=blobdiff_plain;f=SecurityPkg%2FVariableAuthenticated%2FRuntimeDxe%2FAuthService.c;h=566c5e29a7866cc4248f01fc56df13fed3e08816;hb=36bdec3cd94346c9ccae4df02ae5890409498cf8;hp=566d398567f7070027d9b8be5e6af81bab955c0a;hpb=785d84ead0d7bdba8214f445612eff6d169dea14;p=mirror_edk2.git
diff --git a/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/RuntimeDxe/AuthService.c b/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/RuntimeDxe/AuthService.c
index 566d398567..566c5e29a7 100644
--- a/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/RuntimeDxe/AuthService.c
+++ b/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/RuntimeDxe/AuthService.c
@@ -7,6 +7,10 @@
This external input must be validated carefully to avoid security issue like
buffer overflow, integer overflow.
Variable attribute should also be checked to avoid authentication bypass.
+ The whole SMM authentication variable design relies on the integrity of flash part and SMM.
+ which is assumed to be protected by platform. All variable code and metadata in flash/SMM Memory
+ may not be modified without authorization. If platform fails to protect these resources,
+ the authentication service provided in this driver will be broken, and the behavior is undefined.
ProcessVarWithPk(), ProcessVarWithKek() and ProcessVariable() are the function to do
variable authentication.
@@ -15,7 +19,7 @@
They will do basic validation for authentication data structure, then call crypto library
to verify the signature.
-Copyright (c) 2009 - 2012, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.
+Copyright (c) 2009 - 2014, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.
This program and the accompanying materials
are licensed and made available under the terms and conditions of the BSD License
which accompanies this distribution. The full text of the license may be found at
@@ -32,9 +36,15 @@ WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR REPRESENTATIONS OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED.
///
/// Global database array for scratch
///
-UINT8 mPubKeyStore[MAX_KEYDB_SIZE];
+UINT8 *mPubKeyStore;
UINT32 mPubKeyNumber;
+UINT32 mMaxKeyNumber;
+UINT32 mMaxKeyDbSize;
+UINT8 *mCertDbStore;
+UINT32 mMaxCertDbSize;
UINT32 mPlatformMode;
+UINT8 mVendorKeyState;
+
EFI_GUID mSignatureSupport[] = {EFI_CERT_SHA1_GUID, EFI_CERT_SHA256_GUID, EFI_CERT_RSA2048_GUID, EFI_CERT_X509_GUID};
//
// Public Exponent of RSA Key.
@@ -45,14 +55,6 @@ CONST UINT8 mRsaE[] = { 0x01, 0x00, 0x01 };
//
VOID *mHashCtx = NULL;
-//
-// Pointer to runtime buffer.
-// For "Append" operation to an existing variable, a read/modify/write operation
-// is supported by firmware internally. Reserve runtime buffer to cache previous
-// variable data in runtime phase because memory allocation is forbidden in virtual mode.
-//
-VOID *mStorageArea = NULL;
-
//
// The serialization of the values of the VariableName, VendorGuid and Attributes
// parameters of the SetVariable() call and the TimeStamp component of the
@@ -189,10 +191,21 @@ AutenticatedVariableServiceInitialize (
}
//
- // Reserved runtime buffer for "Append" operation in virtual mode.
+ // Reserve runtime buffer for public key database. The size excludes variable header and name size.
+ //
+ mMaxKeyDbSize = PcdGet32 (PcdMaxVariableSize) - sizeof (VARIABLE_HEADER) - sizeof (AUTHVAR_KEYDB_NAME);
+ mMaxKeyNumber = mMaxKeyDbSize / EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE;
+ mPubKeyStore = AllocateRuntimePool (mMaxKeyDbSize);
+ if (mPubKeyStore == NULL) {
+ return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;
+ }
+
+ //
+ // Reserve runtime buffer for certificate database. The size excludes variable header and name size.
//
- mStorageArea = AllocateRuntimePool (PcdGet32 (PcdMaxVariableSize));
- if (mStorageArea == NULL) {
+ mMaxCertDbSize = PcdGet32 (PcdMaxVariableSize) - sizeof (VARIABLE_HEADER) - sizeof (EFI_CERT_DB_NAME);
+ mCertDbStore = AllocateRuntimePool (mMaxCertDbSize);
+ if (mCertDbStore == NULL) {
return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;
}
@@ -242,6 +255,10 @@ AutenticatedVariableServiceInitialize (
DataSize = DataSizeOfVariable (Variable.CurrPtr);
Data = GetVariableDataPtr (Variable.CurrPtr);
ASSERT ((DataSize != 0) && (Data != NULL));
+ //
+ // "AuthVarKeyDatabase" is an internal variable. Its DataSize is always ensured not to exceed mPubKeyStore buffer size(See definition before)
+ // Therefore, there is no memory overflow in underlying CopyMem.
+ //
CopyMem (mPubKeyStore, (UINT8 *) Data, DataSize);
mPubKeyNumber = (UINT32) (DataSize / EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE);
}
@@ -254,68 +271,46 @@ AutenticatedVariableServiceInitialize (
}
//
- // Check "SetupMode" variable's existence.
- // If it doesn't exist, check PK database's existence to determine the value.
- // Then create a new one with EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS set.
+ // Create "SetupMode" variable with BS+RT attribute set.
//
- Status = FindVariable (
+ FindVariable (EFI_SETUP_MODE_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, &Variable, &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal, FALSE);
+ if (PkVariable.CurrPtr == NULL) {
+ mPlatformMode = SETUP_MODE;
+ } else {
+ mPlatformMode = USER_MODE;
+ }
+ Status = UpdateVariable (
EFI_SETUP_MODE_NAME,
&gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,
+ &mPlatformMode,
+ sizeof(UINT8),
+ EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS,
+ 0,
+ 0,
&Variable,
- &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,
- FALSE
+ NULL
);
-
- if (Variable.CurrPtr == NULL) {
- if (PkVariable.CurrPtr == NULL) {
- mPlatformMode = SETUP_MODE;
- } else {
- mPlatformMode = USER_MODE;
- }
-
- VarAttr = EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS;
- Status = UpdateVariable (
- EFI_SETUP_MODE_NAME,
- &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,
- &mPlatformMode,
- sizeof(UINT8),
- VarAttr,
- 0,
- 0,
- &Variable,
- NULL
- );
- if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
- return Status;
- }
- } else {
- mPlatformMode = *(GetVariableDataPtr (Variable.CurrPtr));
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ return Status;
}
+
//
- // Check "SignatureSupport" variable's existence.
- // If it doesn't exist, then create a new one with EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS set.
+ // Create "SignatureSupport" variable with BS+RT attribute set.
//
- Status = FindVariable (
- EFI_SIGNATURE_SUPPORT_NAME,
- &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,
- &Variable,
- &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,
- FALSE
- );
-
- if (Variable.CurrPtr == NULL) {
- VarAttr = EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS;
- Status = UpdateVariable (
- EFI_SIGNATURE_SUPPORT_NAME,
- &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,
- mSignatureSupport,
- sizeof(mSignatureSupport),
- VarAttr,
- 0,
- 0,
- &Variable,
- NULL
- );
+ FindVariable (EFI_SIGNATURE_SUPPORT_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, &Variable, &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal, FALSE);
+ Status = UpdateVariable (
+ EFI_SIGNATURE_SUPPORT_NAME,
+ &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,
+ mSignatureSupport,
+ sizeof(mSignatureSupport),
+ EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS,
+ 0,
+ 0,
+ &Variable,
+ NULL
+ );
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ return Status;
}
//
@@ -348,6 +343,9 @@ AutenticatedVariableServiceInitialize (
}
}
+ //
+ // Create "SecureBoot" variable with BS+RT attribute set.
+ //
if (SecureBootEnable == SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE && mPlatformMode == USER_MODE) {
SecureBootMode = SECURE_BOOT_MODE_ENABLE;
} else {
@@ -359,7 +357,7 @@ AutenticatedVariableServiceInitialize (
&gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,
&SecureBootMode,
sizeof (UINT8),
- EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS,
+ EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS,
0,
0,
&Variable,
@@ -374,30 +372,23 @@ AutenticatedVariableServiceInitialize (
DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Variable %s is %x\n", EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME, SecureBootEnable));
//
- // Check "CustomMode" variable's existence.
+ // Initialize "CustomMode" in STANDARD_SECURE_BOOT_MODE state.
//
FindVariable (EFI_CUSTOM_MODE_NAME, &gEfiCustomModeEnableGuid, &Variable, &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal, FALSE);
- if (Variable.CurrPtr != NULL) {
- CustomMode = *(GetVariableDataPtr (Variable.CurrPtr));
- } else {
- //
- // "CustomMode" not exist, initialize it in STANDARD_SECURE_BOOT_MODE.
- //
- CustomMode = STANDARD_SECURE_BOOT_MODE;
- Status = UpdateVariable (
- EFI_CUSTOM_MODE_NAME,
- &gEfiCustomModeEnableGuid,
- &CustomMode,
- sizeof (UINT8),
- EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS,
- 0,
- 0,
- &Variable,
- NULL
- );
- if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
- return Status;
- }
+ CustomMode = STANDARD_SECURE_BOOT_MODE;
+ Status = UpdateVariable (
+ EFI_CUSTOM_MODE_NAME,
+ &gEfiCustomModeEnableGuid,
+ &CustomMode,
+ sizeof (UINT8),
+ EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS,
+ 0,
+ 0,
+ &Variable,
+ NULL
+ );
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ return Status;
}
DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Variable %s is %x\n", EFI_CUSTOM_MODE_NAME, CustomMode));
@@ -417,7 +408,7 @@ AutenticatedVariableServiceInitialize (
if (Variable.CurrPtr == NULL) {
VarAttr = EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS;
- ListSize = 0;
+ ListSize = sizeof (UINT32);
Status = UpdateVariable (
EFI_CERT_DB_NAME,
&gEfiCertDbGuid,
@@ -429,9 +420,59 @@ AutenticatedVariableServiceInitialize (
&Variable,
NULL
);
-
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ return Status;
+ }
}
+ //
+ // Check "VendorKeysNv" variable's existence and create "VendorKeys" variable accordingly.
+ //
+ FindVariable (EFI_VENDOR_KEYS_NV_VARIABLE_NAME, &gEfiVendorKeysNvGuid, &Variable, &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal, FALSE);
+ if (Variable.CurrPtr != NULL) {
+ mVendorKeyState = *(GetVariableDataPtr (Variable.CurrPtr));
+ } else {
+ //
+ // "VendorKeysNv" not exist, initialize it in VENDOR_KEYS_VALID state.
+ //
+ mVendorKeyState = VENDOR_KEYS_VALID;
+ Status = UpdateVariable (
+ EFI_VENDOR_KEYS_NV_VARIABLE_NAME,
+ &gEfiVendorKeysNvGuid,
+ &mVendorKeyState,
+ sizeof (UINT8),
+ EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS,
+ 0,
+ 0,
+ &Variable,
+ NULL
+ );
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ return Status;
+ }
+ }
+
+ //
+ // Create "VendorKeys" variable with BS+RT attribute set.
+ //
+ FindVariable (EFI_VENDOR_KEYS_VARIABLE_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, &Variable, &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal, FALSE);
+ Status = UpdateVariable (
+ EFI_VENDOR_KEYS_VARIABLE_NAME,
+ &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,
+ &mVendorKeyState,
+ sizeof (UINT8),
+ EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS,
+ 0,
+ 0,
+ &Variable,
+ NULL
+ );
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ return Status;
+ }
+
+ DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Variable %s is %x\n", EFI_VENDOR_KEYS_VARIABLE_NAME, mVendorKeyState));
+
return Status;
}
@@ -439,20 +480,26 @@ AutenticatedVariableServiceInitialize (
Add public key in store and return its index.
@param[in] PubKey Input pointer to Public Key data
+ @param[in] VariableDataEntry The variable data entry
@return Index of new added item
**/
UINT32
AddPubKeyInStore (
- IN UINT8 *PubKey
+ IN UINT8 *PubKey,
+ IN VARIABLE_ENTRY_CONSISTENCY *VariableDataEntry
)
{
- EFI_STATUS Status;
- BOOLEAN IsFound;
- UINT32 Index;
- VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK Variable;
- UINT8 *Ptr;
+ EFI_STATUS Status;
+ BOOLEAN IsFound;
+ UINT32 Index;
+ VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK Variable;
+ UINT8 *Ptr;
+ UINT8 *Data;
+ UINTN DataSize;
+ VARIABLE_ENTRY_CONSISTENCY PublicKeyEntry;
+ UINT32 Attributes;
if (PubKey == NULL) {
return 0;
@@ -465,7 +512,11 @@ AddPubKeyInStore (
&mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,
FALSE
);
- ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status);
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Get public key database variable failure, Status = %r\n", Status));
+ return 0;
+ }
+
//
// Check whether the public key entry does exist.
//
@@ -482,9 +533,68 @@ AddPubKeyInStore (
//
// Add public key in database.
//
- if (mPubKeyNumber == MAX_KEY_NUM) {
+ if (mPubKeyNumber == mMaxKeyNumber) {
+ //
+ // Public key dadatase is full, try to reclaim invalid key.
+ //
+ if (AtRuntime ()) {
+ //
+ // NV storage can't reclaim at runtime.
+ //
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ Status = Reclaim (
+ mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal.NonVolatileVariableBase,
+ &mVariableModuleGlobal->NonVolatileLastVariableOffset,
+ FALSE,
+ NULL,
+ NULL,
+ 0,
+ TRUE
+ );
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ Status = FindVariable (
+ AUTHVAR_KEYDB_NAME,
+ &gEfiAuthenticatedVariableGuid,
+ &Variable,
+ &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,
+ FALSE
+ );
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Get public key database variable failure, Status = %r\n", Status));
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ DataSize = DataSizeOfVariable (Variable.CurrPtr);
+ Data = GetVariableDataPtr (Variable.CurrPtr);
+ ASSERT ((DataSize != 0) && (Data != NULL));
+ //
+ // "AuthVarKeyDatabase" is an internal used variable. Its DataSize is always ensured not to exceed mPubKeyStore buffer size(See definition before)
+ // Therefore, there is no memory overflow in underlying CopyMem.
+ //
+ CopyMem (mPubKeyStore, (UINT8 *) Data, DataSize);
+ mPubKeyNumber = (UINT32) (DataSize / EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE);
+
+ if (mPubKeyNumber == mMaxKeyNumber) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ //
+ // Check the variable space for both public key and variable data.
+ //
+ PublicKeyEntry.VariableSize = (mPubKeyNumber + 1) * EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE;
+ PublicKeyEntry.Guid = &gEfiAuthenticatedVariableGuid;
+ PublicKeyEntry.Name = AUTHVAR_KEYDB_NAME;
+ Attributes = VARIABLE_ATTRIBUTE_NV_BS_RT | EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS;
+
+ if (!CheckRemainingSpaceForConsistency (Attributes, &PublicKeyEntry, VariableDataEntry, NULL)) {
//
- // Notes: Database is full, need enhancement here, currently just return 0.
+ // No enough variable space.
//
return 0;
}
@@ -499,13 +609,16 @@ AddPubKeyInStore (
&gEfiAuthenticatedVariableGuid,
mPubKeyStore,
mPubKeyNumber * EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE,
- EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS,
+ Attributes,
0,
0,
&Variable,
NULL
);
- ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status);
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Update public key database variable failure, Status = %r\n", Status));
+ return 0;
+ }
}
return Index;
@@ -542,7 +655,9 @@ VerifyCounterBasedPayload (
EFI_CERT_BLOCK_RSA_2048_SHA256 *CertBlock;
UINT8 Digest[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE];
VOID *Rsa;
-
+ UINTN PayloadSize;
+
+ PayloadSize = DataSize - AUTHINFO_SIZE;
Rsa = NULL;
CertData = NULL;
CertBlock = NULL;
@@ -574,7 +689,14 @@ VerifyCounterBasedPayload (
if (!Status) {
goto Done;
}
- Status = Sha256Update (mHashCtx, Data + AUTHINFO_SIZE, (UINTN) (DataSize - AUTHINFO_SIZE));
+ Status = Sha256Update (mHashCtx, Data + AUTHINFO_SIZE, PayloadSize);
+ if (!Status) {
+ goto Done;
+ }
+ //
+ // Hash Size.
+ //
+ Status = Sha256Update (mHashCtx, &PayloadSize, sizeof (UINTN));
if (!Status) {
goto Done;
}
@@ -644,7 +766,6 @@ UpdatePlatformMode (
{
EFI_STATUS Status;
VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK Variable;
- UINT32 VarAttr;
UINT8 SecureBootMode;
UINT8 SecureBootEnable;
UINTN VariableDataSize;
@@ -660,22 +781,12 @@ UpdatePlatformMode (
return Status;
}
- mPlatformMode = Mode;
- VarAttr = EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS;
- Status = UpdateVariable (
- EFI_SETUP_MODE_NAME,
- &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,
- &mPlatformMode,
- sizeof(UINT8),
- VarAttr,
- 0,
- 0,
- &Variable,
- NULL
- );
- if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
- return Status;
- }
+ //
+ // Update the value of SetupMode variable by a simple mem copy, this could avoid possible
+ // variable storage reclaim at runtime.
+ //
+ mPlatformMode = (UINT8) Mode;
+ CopyMem (GetVariableDataPtr (Variable.CurrPtr), &mPlatformMode, sizeof(UINT8));
if (AtRuntime ()) {
//
@@ -715,13 +826,12 @@ UpdatePlatformMode (
}
}
- VarAttr = EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS;
Status = UpdateVariable (
EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME,
&gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,
&SecureBootMode,
sizeof(UINT8),
- VarAttr,
+ EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS,
0,
0,
&Variable,
@@ -775,7 +885,7 @@ UpdatePlatformMode (
}
/**
- Check input data form to make sure it is a valid EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST for PK/KEK variable.
+ Check input data form to make sure it is a valid EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST for PK/KEK/db/dbx variable.
@param[in] VariableName Name of Variable to be check.
@param[in] VendorGuid Variable vendor GUID.
@@ -799,6 +909,9 @@ CheckSignatureListFormat(
UINT32 Index;
UINT32 SigCount;
BOOLEAN IsPk;
+ VOID *RsaContext;
+ EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *CertData;
+ UINTN CertLen;
if (DataSize == 0) {
return EFI_SUCCESS;
@@ -808,7 +921,9 @@ CheckSignatureListFormat(
if (CompareGuid (VendorGuid, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid) && (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME) == 0)){
IsPk = TRUE;
- } else if (CompareGuid (VendorGuid, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid) && (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME) == 0)) {
+ } else if ((CompareGuid (VendorGuid, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid) && StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME) == 0) ||
+ (CompareGuid (VendorGuid, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid) &&
+ (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE) == 0 || StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1) == 0))){
IsPk = FALSE;
} else {
return EFI_SUCCESS;
@@ -817,6 +932,7 @@ CheckSignatureListFormat(
SigCount = 0;
SigList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) Data;
SigDataSize = DataSize;
+ RsaContext = NULL;
//
// Walk throuth the input signature list and check the data format.
@@ -848,6 +964,24 @@ CheckSignatureListFormat(
return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
}
+ if (CompareGuid (&SigList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Guid)) {
+ //
+ // Try to retrieve the RSA public key from the X.509 certificate.
+ // If this operation fails, it's not a valid certificate.
+ //
+ RsaContext = RsaNew ();
+ if (RsaContext == NULL) {
+ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+ }
+ CertData = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) SigList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + SigList->SignatureHeaderSize);
+ CertLen = SigList->SignatureSize - sizeof (EFI_GUID);
+ if (!RsaGetPublicKeyFromX509 (CertData->SignatureData, CertLen, &RsaContext)) {
+ RsaFree (RsaContext);
+ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+ }
+ RsaFree (RsaContext);
+ }
+
if ((SigList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - SigList->SignatureHeaderSize) % SigList->SignatureSize != 0) {
return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
}
@@ -868,6 +1002,56 @@ CheckSignatureListFormat(
return EFI_SUCCESS;
}
+/**
+ Update "VendorKeys" variable to record the out of band secure boot key modification.
+
+ @return EFI_SUCCESS Variable is updated successfully.
+ @return Others Failed to update variable.
+
+**/
+EFI_STATUS
+VendorKeyIsModified (
+ VOID
+ )
+{
+ EFI_STATUS Status;
+ VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK Variable;
+
+ if (mVendorKeyState == VENDOR_KEYS_MODIFIED) {
+ return EFI_SUCCESS;
+ }
+ mVendorKeyState = VENDOR_KEYS_MODIFIED;
+
+ FindVariable (EFI_VENDOR_KEYS_NV_VARIABLE_NAME, &gEfiVendorKeysNvGuid, &Variable, &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal, FALSE);
+ Status = UpdateVariable (
+ EFI_VENDOR_KEYS_NV_VARIABLE_NAME,
+ &gEfiVendorKeysNvGuid,
+ &mVendorKeyState,
+ sizeof (UINT8),
+ EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS,
+ 0,
+ 0,
+ &Variable,
+ NULL
+ );
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ return Status;
+ }
+
+ FindVariable (EFI_VENDOR_KEYS_VARIABLE_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, &Variable, &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal, FALSE);
+ return UpdateVariable (
+ EFI_VENDOR_KEYS_VARIABLE_NAME,
+ &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,
+ &mVendorKeyState,
+ sizeof (UINT8),
+ EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS,
+ 0,
+ 0,
+ &Variable,
+ NULL
+ );
+}
+
/**
Process variable with platform key for verification.
@@ -912,7 +1096,7 @@ ProcessVarWithPk (
if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE) == 0 ||
(Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) == 0) {
//
- // PK and KEK should set EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE attribute and should be a time-based
+ // PK, KEK and db/dbx should set EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE attribute and should be a time-based
// authenticated variable.
//
return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
@@ -942,6 +1126,13 @@ ProcessVarWithPk (
Variable,
&((EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 *) Data)->TimeStamp
);
+ if (EFI_ERROR(Status)) {
+ return Status;
+ }
+
+ if ((mPlatformMode != SETUP_MODE) || IsPk) {
+ Status = VendorKeyIsModified ();
+ }
} else if (mPlatformMode == USER_MODE) {
//
// Verify against X509 Cert in PK database.
@@ -1058,6 +1249,11 @@ ProcessVarWithKek (
Payload = (UINT8 *) Data + AUTHINFO2_SIZE (Data);
PayloadSize = DataSize - AUTHINFO2_SIZE (Data);
+ Status = CheckSignatureListFormat(VariableName, VendorGuid, Payload, PayloadSize);
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ return Status;
+ }
+
Status = UpdateVariable (
VariableName,
VendorGuid,
@@ -1069,6 +1265,13 @@ ProcessVarWithKek (
Variable,
&((EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 *) Data)->TimeStamp
);
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ return Status;
+ }
+
+ if (mPlatformMode != SETUP_MODE) {
+ Status = VendorKeyIsModified ();
+ }
}
return Status;
@@ -1096,6 +1299,7 @@ ProcessVarWithKek (
@return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.
@return EFI_WRITE_PROTECTED Variable is write-protected and needs authentication with
EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS set.
+ @return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES The Database to save the public key is full.
@return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION The variable is with EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS
set, but the AuthInfo does NOT pass the validation
check carried out by the firmware.
@@ -1120,6 +1324,7 @@ ProcessVariable (
EFI_CERT_BLOCK_RSA_2048_SHA256 *CertBlock;
UINT32 KeyIndex;
UINT64 MonotonicCount;
+ VARIABLE_ENTRY_CONSISTENCY VariableDataEntry;
KeyIndex = 0;
CertData = NULL;
@@ -1134,6 +1339,22 @@ ProcessVariable (
return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;
}
+ //
+ // A time-based authenticated variable and a count-based authenticated variable
+ // can't be updated by each other.
+ //
+ if (Variable->CurrPtr != NULL) {
+ if (((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0) &&
+ ((Variable->CurrPtr->Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0)) {
+ return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;
+ }
+
+ if (((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0) &&
+ ((Variable->CurrPtr->Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0)) {
+ return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;
+ }
+ }
+
//
// Process Time-based Authenticated variable.
//
@@ -1201,9 +1422,11 @@ ProcessVariable (
if (!IsFirstTime) {
//
- // Check input PubKey.
+ // 2 cases need to check here
+ // 1. Internal PubKey variable. PubKeyIndex is always 0
+ // 2. Other counter-based AuthVariable. Check input PubKey.
//
- if (CompareMem (PubKey, mPubKeyStore + (KeyIndex - 1) * EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE, EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE) != 0) {
+ if (KeyIndex == 0 || CompareMem (PubKey, mPubKeyStore + (KeyIndex - 1) * EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE, EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE) != 0) {
return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;
}
//
@@ -1229,12 +1452,16 @@ ProcessVariable (
// Now, the signature has been verified!
//
if (IsFirstTime && !IsDeletion) {
+ VariableDataEntry.VariableSize = DataSize - AUTHINFO_SIZE;
+ VariableDataEntry.Guid = VendorGuid;
+ VariableDataEntry.Name = VariableName;
+
//
// Update public key database variable if need.
//
- KeyIndex = AddPubKeyInStore (PubKey);
+ KeyIndex = AddPubKeyInStore (PubKey, &VariableDataEntry);
if (KeyIndex == 0) {
- return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;
+ return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;
}
}
@@ -1249,20 +1476,24 @@ ProcessVariable (
will be appended to the original EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST, duplicate EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA
will be ignored.
- @param[in, out] Data Pointer to original EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST.
- @param[in] DataSize Size of Data buffer.
- @param[in] NewData Pointer to new EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST to be appended.
- @param[in] NewDataSize Size of NewData buffer.
+ @param[in, out] Data Pointer to original EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST.
+ @param[in] DataSize Size of Data buffer.
+ @param[in] FreeBufSize Size of free data buffer
+ @param[in] NewData Pointer to new EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST to be appended.
+ @param[in] NewDataSize Size of NewData buffer.
+ @param[out] MergedBufSize Size of the merged buffer
- @return Size of the merged buffer.
+ @return EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL if input Data buffer overflowed
**/
-UINTN
+EFI_STATUS
AppendSignatureList (
IN OUT VOID *Data,
IN UINTN DataSize,
+ IN UINTN FreeBufSize,
IN VOID *NewData,
- IN UINTN NewDataSize
+ IN UINTN NewDataSize,
+ OUT UINTN *MergedBufSize
)
{
EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *CertList;
@@ -1321,15 +1552,25 @@ AppendSignatureList (
// New EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA, append it.
//
if (CopiedCount == 0) {
+ if (FreeBufSize < sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + NewCertList->SignatureHeaderSize) {
+ return EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
+ }
+
//
// Copy EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST header for only once.
//
+
CopyMem (Tail, NewCertList, sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + NewCertList->SignatureHeaderSize);
Tail = Tail + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + NewCertList->SignatureHeaderSize;
+ FreeBufSize -= sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + NewCertList->SignatureHeaderSize;
}
+ if (FreeBufSize < NewCertList->SignatureSize) {
+ return EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
+ }
CopyMem (Tail, NewCert, NewCertList->SignatureSize);
Tail += NewCertList->SignatureSize;
+ FreeBufSize -= NewCertList->SignatureSize;
CopiedCount++;
}
@@ -1349,7 +1590,8 @@ AppendSignatureList (
NewCertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) NewCertList + NewCertList->SignatureListSize);
}
- return (Tail - (UINT8 *) Data);
+ *MergedBufSize = (Tail - (UINT8 *) Data);
+ return EFI_SUCCESS;
}
/**
@@ -1378,7 +1620,7 @@ CompareTimeStamp (
} else if (FirstTime->Hour != SecondTime->Hour) {
return (BOOLEAN) (FirstTime->Hour < SecondTime->Hour);
} else if (FirstTime->Minute != SecondTime->Minute) {
- return (BOOLEAN) (FirstTime->Minute < FirstTime->Minute);
+ return (BOOLEAN) (FirstTime->Minute < SecondTime->Minute);
}
return (BOOLEAN) (FirstTime->Second <= SecondTime->Second);
@@ -1664,10 +1906,7 @@ DeleteCertsFromDb (
// Construct new data content of variable "certdb".
//
NewCertDbSize = (UINT32) DataSize - CertNodeSize;
- NewCertDb = AllocateZeroPool (NewCertDbSize);
- if (NewCertDb == NULL) {
- return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;
- }
+ NewCertDb = (UINT8*) mCertDbStore;
//
// Copy the DB entries before deleting node.
@@ -1704,7 +1943,6 @@ DeleteCertsFromDb (
NULL
);
- FreePool (NewCertDb);
return Status;
}
@@ -1793,11 +2031,11 @@ InsertCertsToDb (
//
NameSize = (UINT32) StrLen (VariableName);
CertNodeSize = sizeof (AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA) + (UINT32) CertDataSize + NameSize * sizeof (CHAR16);
- NewCertDbSize = (UINT32) DataSize + CertNodeSize;
- NewCertDb = AllocateZeroPool (NewCertDbSize);
- if (NewCertDb == NULL) {
+ NewCertDbSize = (UINT32) DataSize + CertNodeSize;
+ if (NewCertDbSize > mMaxCertDbSize) {
return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;
}
+ NewCertDb = (UINT8*) mCertDbStore;
//
// Copy the DB entries before deleting node.
@@ -1844,7 +2082,6 @@ InsertCertsToDb (
NULL
);
- FreePool (NewCertDb);
return Status;
}
@@ -1921,6 +2158,7 @@ VerifyTimeBasedPayload (
WrapSigData = NULL;
SignerCerts = NULL;
RootCert = NULL;
+ CertsInCertDb = NULL;
//
// When the attribute EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS is
@@ -2006,7 +2244,24 @@ VerifyTimeBasedPayload (
if (AuthVarType == AuthVarTypePk) {
//
- // Get platform key from variable.
+ // Verify that the signature has been made with the current Platform Key (no chaining for PK).
+ // First, get signer's certificates from SignedData.
+ //
+ VerifyStatus = Pkcs7GetSigners (
+ SigData,
+ SigDataSize,
+ &SignerCerts,
+ &CertStackSize,
+ &RootCert,
+ &RootCertSize
+ );
+ if (!VerifyStatus) {
+ goto Exit;
+ }
+
+ //
+ // Second, get the current platform key from variable. Check whether it's identical with signer's certificates
+ // in SignedData. If not, return error immediately.
//
Status = FindVariable (
EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME,
@@ -2016,14 +2271,16 @@ VerifyTimeBasedPayload (
FALSE
);
if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
- return Status;
+ VerifyStatus = FALSE;
+ goto Exit;
}
-
CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) GetVariableDataPtr (PkVariable.CurrPtr);
Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize);
- RootCert = Cert->SignatureData;
- RootCertSize = CertList->SignatureSize - (sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1);
-
+ if ((RootCertSize != (CertList->SignatureSize - (sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1))) ||
+ (CompareMem (Cert->SignatureData, RootCert, RootCertSize) != 0)) {
+ VerifyStatus = FALSE;
+ goto Exit;
+ }
//
// Verify Pkcs7 SignedData via Pkcs7Verify library.
@@ -2141,13 +2398,13 @@ VerifyTimeBasedPayload (
//
// Delete signer's certificates when delete the common authenticated variable.
//
- if ((PayloadSize == 0) && (Variable->CurrPtr != NULL)) {
+ if ((PayloadSize == 0) && (Variable->CurrPtr != NULL) && ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_APPEND_WRITE) == 0)) {
Status = DeleteCertsFromDb (VariableName, VendorGuid);
if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
VerifyStatus = FALSE;
goto Exit;
}
- } else if (Variable->CurrPtr == NULL) {
+ } else if (Variable->CurrPtr == NULL && PayloadSize != 0) {
//
// Insert signer's certificates when adding a new common authenticated variable.
//
@@ -2179,7 +2436,7 @@ VerifyTimeBasedPayload (
Exit:
- if (AuthVarType == AuthVarTypePriv) {
+ if (AuthVarType == AuthVarTypePk || AuthVarType == AuthVarTypePriv) {
Pkcs7FreeSigners (RootCert);
Pkcs7FreeSigners (SignerCerts);
}