X-Git-Url: https://git.proxmox.com/?a=blobdiff_plain;f=net%2Fbluetooth%2Fsmp.c;h=21f555b4df17c827da0c4ecf75cd3baad3746d11;hb=c0371da6047abd261bc483c744dbc7d81a116172;hp=f09b6b65cf6b22079d6ce60d53f2613ccf6a7745;hpb=3d430bdb74140224d90dd6253d67ff71d181cf64;p=mirror_ubuntu-bionic-kernel.git diff --git a/net/bluetooth/smp.c b/net/bluetooth/smp.c index f09b6b65cf6b..21f555b4df17 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/smp.c +++ b/net/bluetooth/smp.c @@ -191,16 +191,13 @@ int smp_generate_rpa(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 irk[16], bdaddr_t *rpa) return 0; } -static int smp_c1(struct smp_chan *smp, u8 k[16], u8 r[16], u8 preq[7], - u8 pres[7], u8 _iat, bdaddr_t *ia, u8 _rat, bdaddr_t *ra, - u8 res[16]) +static int smp_c1(struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm_aes, u8 k[16], u8 r[16], + u8 preq[7], u8 pres[7], u8 _iat, bdaddr_t *ia, u8 _rat, + bdaddr_t *ra, u8 res[16]) { - struct hci_dev *hdev = smp->conn->hcon->hdev; u8 p1[16], p2[16]; int err; - BT_DBG("%s", hdev->name); - memset(p1, 0, 16); /* p1 = pres || preq || _rat || _iat */ @@ -218,7 +215,7 @@ static int smp_c1(struct smp_chan *smp, u8 k[16], u8 r[16], u8 preq[7], u128_xor((u128 *) res, (u128 *) r, (u128 *) p1); /* res = e(k, res) */ - err = smp_e(smp->tfm_aes, k, res); + err = smp_e(tfm_aes, k, res); if (err) { BT_ERR("Encrypt data error"); return err; @@ -228,26 +225,23 @@ static int smp_c1(struct smp_chan *smp, u8 k[16], u8 r[16], u8 preq[7], u128_xor((u128 *) res, (u128 *) res, (u128 *) p2); /* res = e(k, res) */ - err = smp_e(smp->tfm_aes, k, res); + err = smp_e(tfm_aes, k, res); if (err) BT_ERR("Encrypt data error"); return err; } -static int smp_s1(struct smp_chan *smp, u8 k[16], u8 r1[16], u8 r2[16], - u8 _r[16]) +static int smp_s1(struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm_aes, u8 k[16], u8 r1[16], + u8 r2[16], u8 _r[16]) { - struct hci_dev *hdev = smp->conn->hcon->hdev; int err; - BT_DBG("%s", hdev->name); - /* Just least significant octets from r1 and r2 are considered */ memcpy(_r, r2, 8); memcpy(_r + 8, r1, 8); - err = smp_e(smp->tfm_aes, k, _r); + err = smp_e(tfm_aes, k, _r); if (err) BT_ERR("Encrypt data error"); @@ -274,8 +268,7 @@ static void smp_send_cmd(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 code, u16 len, void *data) memset(&msg, 0, sizeof(msg)); - msg.msg_iov = (struct iovec *) &iv; - msg.msg_iovlen = 2; + iov_iter_init(&msg.msg_iter, WRITE, (struct iovec *)iv, 2, 1 + len); l2cap_chan_send(chan, &msg, 1 + len); @@ -389,18 +382,18 @@ static void smp_chan_destroy(struct l2cap_conn *conn) /* If pairing failed clean up any keys we might have */ if (!complete) { if (smp->ltk) { - list_del(&smp->ltk->list); - kfree(smp->ltk); + list_del_rcu(&smp->ltk->list); + kfree_rcu(smp->ltk, rcu); } if (smp->slave_ltk) { - list_del(&smp->slave_ltk->list); - kfree(smp->slave_ltk); + list_del_rcu(&smp->slave_ltk->list); + kfree_rcu(smp->slave_ltk, rcu); } if (smp->remote_irk) { - list_del(&smp->remote_irk->list); - kfree(smp->remote_irk); + list_del_rcu(&smp->remote_irk->list); + kfree_rcu(smp->remote_irk, rcu); } } @@ -520,8 +513,6 @@ static int tk_request(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 remote_oob, u8 auth, set_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->flags); } - hci_dev_lock(hcon->hdev); - if (method == REQ_PASSKEY) ret = mgmt_user_passkey_request(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->type, hcon->dst_type); @@ -534,8 +525,6 @@ static int tk_request(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 remote_oob, u8 auth, hcon->type, hcon->dst_type, passkey, 0); - hci_dev_unlock(hcon->hdev); - return ret; } @@ -547,7 +536,7 @@ static u8 smp_confirm(struct smp_chan *smp) BT_DBG("conn %p", conn); - ret = smp_c1(smp, smp->tk, smp->prnd, smp->preq, smp->prsp, + ret = smp_c1(smp->tfm_aes, smp->tk, smp->prnd, smp->preq, smp->prsp, conn->hcon->init_addr_type, &conn->hcon->init_addr, conn->hcon->resp_addr_type, &conn->hcon->resp_addr, cp.confirm_val); @@ -578,7 +567,7 @@ static u8 smp_random(struct smp_chan *smp) BT_DBG("conn %p %s", conn, conn->hcon->out ? "master" : "slave"); - ret = smp_c1(smp, smp->tk, smp->rrnd, smp->preq, smp->prsp, + ret = smp_c1(smp->tfm_aes, smp->tk, smp->rrnd, smp->preq, smp->prsp, hcon->init_addr_type, &hcon->init_addr, hcon->resp_addr_type, &hcon->resp_addr, confirm); if (ret) @@ -594,7 +583,7 @@ static u8 smp_random(struct smp_chan *smp) __le64 rand = 0; __le16 ediv = 0; - smp_s1(smp, smp->tk, smp->rrnd, smp->prnd, stk); + smp_s1(smp->tfm_aes, smp->tk, smp->rrnd, smp->prnd, stk); memset(stk + smp->enc_key_size, 0, SMP_MAX_ENC_KEY_SIZE - smp->enc_key_size); @@ -613,7 +602,7 @@ static u8 smp_random(struct smp_chan *smp) smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM, sizeof(smp->prnd), smp->prnd); - smp_s1(smp, smp->tk, smp->prnd, smp->rrnd, stk); + smp_s1(smp->tfm_aes, smp->tk, smp->prnd, smp->rrnd, stk); memset(stk + smp->enc_key_size, 0, SMP_MAX_ENC_KEY_SIZE - smp->enc_key_size); @@ -665,8 +654,8 @@ static void smp_notify_keys(struct l2cap_conn *conn) * just remove it. */ if (!bacmp(&smp->remote_irk->rpa, BDADDR_ANY)) { - list_del(&smp->remote_irk->list); - kfree(smp->remote_irk); + list_del_rcu(&smp->remote_irk->list); + kfree_rcu(smp->remote_irk, rcu); smp->remote_irk = NULL; } } @@ -970,7 +959,7 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) if (sec_level > conn->hcon->pending_sec_level) conn->hcon->pending_sec_level = sec_level; - /* If we need MITM check that it can be acheived */ + /* If we need MITM check that it can be achieved */ if (conn->hcon->pending_sec_level >= BT_SECURITY_HIGH) { u8 method; @@ -1028,7 +1017,7 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_rsp(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) auth = rsp->auth_req & AUTH_REQ_MASK; - /* If we need MITM check that it can be acheived */ + /* If we need MITM check that it can be achieved */ if (conn->hcon->pending_sec_level >= BT_SECURITY_HIGH) { u8 method; @@ -1132,18 +1121,20 @@ static bool smp_ltk_encrypt(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 sec_level) return true; } -bool smp_sufficient_security(struct hci_conn *hcon, u8 sec_level) +bool smp_sufficient_security(struct hci_conn *hcon, u8 sec_level, + enum smp_key_pref key_pref) { if (sec_level == BT_SECURITY_LOW) return true; - /* If we're encrypted with an STK always claim insufficient - * security. This way we allow the connection to be re-encrypted - * with an LTK, even if the LTK provides the same level of - * security. Only exception is if we don't have an LTK (e.g. - * because of key distribution bits). + /* If we're encrypted with an STK but the caller prefers using + * LTK claim insufficient security. This way we allow the + * connection to be re-encrypted with an LTK, even if the LTK + * provides the same level of security. Only exception is if we + * don't have an LTK (e.g. because of key distribution bits). */ - if (test_bit(HCI_CONN_STK_ENCRYPT, &hcon->flags) && + if (key_pref == SMP_USE_LTK && + test_bit(HCI_CONN_STK_ENCRYPT, &hcon->flags) && hci_find_ltk_by_addr(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type, hcon->role)) return false; @@ -1177,7 +1168,7 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_security_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) else sec_level = authreq_to_seclevel(auth); - if (smp_sufficient_security(hcon, sec_level)) + if (smp_sufficient_security(hcon, sec_level, SMP_USE_LTK)) return 0; if (sec_level > hcon->pending_sec_level) @@ -1227,7 +1218,7 @@ int smp_conn_security(struct hci_conn *hcon, __u8 sec_level) if (!test_bit(HCI_LE_ENABLED, &hcon->hdev->dev_flags)) return 1; - if (smp_sufficient_security(hcon, sec_level)) + if (smp_sufficient_security(hcon, sec_level, SMP_USE_LTK)) return 1; if (sec_level > hcon->pending_sec_level) @@ -1329,7 +1320,6 @@ static int smp_cmd_master_ident(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rp)); - hci_dev_lock(hdev); authenticated = (hcon->sec_level == BT_SECURITY_HIGH); ltk = hci_add_ltk(hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type, SMP_LTK, authenticated, smp->tk, smp->enc_key_size, @@ -1337,7 +1327,6 @@ static int smp_cmd_master_ident(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) smp->ltk = ltk; if (!(smp->remote_key_dist & KEY_DIST_MASK)) smp_distribute_keys(smp); - hci_dev_unlock(hdev); return 0; } @@ -1384,8 +1373,6 @@ static int smp_cmd_ident_addr_info(struct l2cap_conn *conn, skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*info)); - hci_dev_lock(hcon->hdev); - /* Strictly speaking the Core Specification (4.1) allows sending * an empty address which would force us to rely on just the IRK * as "identity information". However, since such @@ -1413,8 +1400,6 @@ distribute: if (!(smp->remote_key_dist & KEY_DIST_MASK)) smp_distribute_keys(smp); - hci_dev_unlock(hcon->hdev); - return 0; } @@ -1423,7 +1408,6 @@ static int smp_cmd_sign_info(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) struct smp_cmd_sign_info *rp = (void *) skb->data; struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp; struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data; - struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hcon->hdev; struct smp_csrk *csrk; BT_DBG("conn %p", conn); @@ -1436,7 +1420,6 @@ static int smp_cmd_sign_info(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rp)); - hci_dev_lock(hdev); csrk = kzalloc(sizeof(*csrk), GFP_KERNEL); if (csrk) { csrk->master = 0x01; @@ -1444,7 +1427,6 @@ static int smp_cmd_sign_info(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) } smp->csrk = csrk; smp_distribute_keys(smp); - hci_dev_unlock(hdev); return 0; } @@ -1668,6 +1650,13 @@ static inline struct l2cap_chan *smp_new_conn_cb(struct l2cap_chan *pchan) chan->omtu = pchan->omtu; chan->mode = pchan->mode; + /* Other L2CAP channels may request SMP routines in order to + * change the security level. This means that the SMP channel + * lock must be considered in its own category to avoid lockdep + * warnings. + */ + atomic_set(&chan->nesting, L2CAP_NESTING_SMP); + BT_DBG("created chan %p", chan); return chan; @@ -1699,7 +1688,7 @@ int smp_register(struct hci_dev *hdev) BT_DBG("%s", hdev->name); - tfm_aes = crypto_alloc_blkcipher("ecb(aes)", 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC); + tfm_aes = crypto_alloc_blkcipher("ecb(aes)", 0, 0); if (IS_ERR(tfm_aes)) { int err = PTR_ERR(tfm_aes); BT_ERR("Unable to create crypto context"); @@ -1725,6 +1714,9 @@ int smp_register(struct hci_dev *hdev) chan->imtu = L2CAP_DEFAULT_MTU; chan->ops = &smp_root_chan_ops; + /* Set correct nesting level for a parent/listening channel */ + atomic_set(&chan->nesting, L2CAP_NESTING_PARENT); + hdev->smp_data = chan; return 0;