From: Josh Poimboeuf Date: Tue, 14 Jun 2022 21:16:16 +0000 (+0200) Subject: KVM: VMX: Prevent RSB underflow before vmenter X-Git-Tag: Ubuntu-5.15.0-45.48~20 X-Git-Url: https://git.proxmox.com/?a=commitdiff_plain;h=85561a53259b267e75ba4bb3a02ef0185502bf3f;p=mirror_ubuntu-jammy-kernel.git KVM: VMX: Prevent RSB underflow before vmenter commit 07853adc29a058c5fd143c14e5ac528448a72ed9 upstream. On VMX, there are some balanced returns between the time the guest's SPEC_CTRL value is written, and the vmenter. Balanced returns (matched by a preceding call) are usually ok, but it's at least theoretically possible an NMI with a deep call stack could empty the RSB before one of the returns. For maximum paranoia, don't allow *any* returns (balanced or otherwise) between the SPEC_CTRL write and the vmenter. [ bp: Fix 32-bit build. ] Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov [cascardo: header conflict fixup at arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets.c] [cascardo: header conflict fixup at arch/x86/kvm/vmx/capabilities.h] CVE-2022-29900 CVE-2022-29901 Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo --- diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets.c b/arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets.c index ecd3fd6993d1..173e3295d3d7 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets.c @@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include "../kvm/vmx/vmx.h" #ifdef CONFIG_XEN #include @@ -93,4 +94,9 @@ static void __used common(void) OFFSET(TSS_sp0, tss_struct, x86_tss.sp0); OFFSET(TSS_sp1, tss_struct, x86_tss.sp1); OFFSET(TSS_sp2, tss_struct, x86_tss.sp2); + + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM_INTEL)) { + BLANK(); + OFFSET(VMX_spec_ctrl, vcpu_vmx, spec_ctrl); + } } diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index ba520f065251..8bc493c72e05 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -196,8 +196,8 @@ void __init check_bugs(void) } /* - * NOTE: For VMX, this function is not called in the vmexit path. - * It uses vmx_spec_ctrl_restore_host() instead. + * NOTE: This function is *only* called for SVM. VMX spec_ctrl handling is + * done in vmenter.S. */ void x86_virt_spec_ctrl(u64 guest_spec_ctrl, u64 guest_virt_spec_ctrl, bool setguest) diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/capabilities.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/capabilities.h index 4705ad55abb5..d72c572df3fb 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/capabilities.h +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/capabilities.h @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ #include -#include "lapic.h" +#include "../lapic.h" extern bool __read_mostly enable_vpid; extern bool __read_mostly flexpriority_enabled; diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S index 857fa0fc49fa..8a37ca74d9cf 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S @@ -1,9 +1,11 @@ /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ #include #include +#include #include #include #include +#include #include #include "run_flags.h" @@ -73,6 +75,33 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__vmx_vcpu_run) lea (%_ASM_SP), %_ASM_ARG2 call vmx_update_host_rsp + ALTERNATIVE "jmp .Lspec_ctrl_done", "", X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL + + /* + * SPEC_CTRL handling: if the guest's SPEC_CTRL value differs from the + * host's, write the MSR. + * + * IMPORTANT: To avoid RSB underflow attacks and any other nastiness, + * there must not be any returns or indirect branches between this code + * and vmentry. + */ + mov 2*WORD_SIZE(%_ASM_SP), %_ASM_DI + movl VMX_spec_ctrl(%_ASM_DI), %edi + movl PER_CPU_VAR(x86_spec_ctrl_current), %esi + cmp %edi, %esi + je .Lspec_ctrl_done + mov $MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, %ecx + xor %edx, %edx + mov %edi, %eax + wrmsr + +.Lspec_ctrl_done: + + /* + * Since vmentry is serializing on affected CPUs, there's no need for + * an LFENCE to stop speculation from skipping the wrmsr. + */ + /* Load @regs to RAX. */ mov (%_ASM_SP), %_ASM_AX diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c index f7497ca2c9dc..417176817d80 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c @@ -6821,14 +6821,6 @@ static fastpath_t vmx_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) kvm_wait_lapic_expire(vcpu); - /* - * If this vCPU has touched SPEC_CTRL, restore the guest's value if - * it's non-zero. Since vmentry is serialising on affected CPUs, there - * is no need to worry about the conditional branch over the wrmsr - * being speculatively taken. - */ - x86_spec_ctrl_set_guest(vmx->spec_ctrl, 0); - /* The actual VMENTER/EXIT is in the .noinstr.text section. */ vmx_vcpu_enter_exit(vcpu, vmx, __vmx_vcpu_run_flags(vmx)); diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h index a8b8150252bb..eb4568a3814a 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h @@ -8,11 +8,11 @@ #include #include "capabilities.h" -#include "kvm_cache_regs.h" +#include "../kvm_cache_regs.h" #include "posted_intr.h" #include "vmcs.h" #include "vmx_ops.h" -#include "cpuid.h" +#include "../cpuid.h" #include "run_flags.h" #define MSR_TYPE_R 1 diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx_ops.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx_ops.h index 9e9ef47e988c..5621805feafa 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx_ops.h +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx_ops.h @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ #include "evmcs.h" #include "vmcs.h" -#include "x86.h" +#include "../x86.h" asmlinkage void vmread_error(unsigned long field, bool fault); __attribute__((regparm(0))) void vmread_error_trampoline(unsigned long field,