From: Eric Dumazet Date: Thu, 6 Aug 2009 22:09:28 +0000 (-0700) Subject: execve: must clear current->clear_child_tid X-Git-Tag: Ubuntu-5.2.0-15.16~28474 X-Git-Url: https://git.proxmox.com/?a=commitdiff_plain;h=9c8a8228d0827e0d91d28527209988f672f97d28;p=mirror_ubuntu-eoan-kernel.git execve: must clear current->clear_child_tid While looking at Jens Rosenboom bug report (http://lkml.org/lkml/2009/7/27/35) about strange sys_futex call done from a dying "ps" program, we found following problem. clone() syscall has special support for TID of created threads. This support includes two features. One (CLONE_CHILD_SETTID) is to set an integer into user memory with the TID value. One (CLONE_CHILD_CLEARTID) is to clear this same integer once the created thread dies. The integer location is a user provided pointer, provided at clone() time. kernel keeps this pointer value into current->clear_child_tid. At execve() time, we should make sure kernel doesnt keep this user provided pointer, as full user memory is replaced by a new one. As glibc fork() actually uses clone() syscall with CLONE_CHILD_SETTID and CLONE_CHILD_CLEARTID set, chances are high that we might corrupt user memory in forked processes. Following sequence could happen: 1) bash (or any program) starts a new process, by a fork() call that glibc maps to a clone( ... CLONE_CHILD_SETTID | CLONE_CHILD_CLEARTID ...) syscall 2) When new process starts, its current->clear_child_tid is set to a location that has a meaning only in bash (or initial program) context (&THREAD_SELF->tid) 3) This new process does the execve() syscall to start a new program. current->clear_child_tid is left unchanged (a non NULL value) 4) If this new program creates some threads, and initial thread exits, kernel will attempt to clear the integer pointed by current->clear_child_tid from mm_release() : if (tsk->clear_child_tid && !(tsk->flags & PF_SIGNALED) && atomic_read(&mm->mm_users) > 1) { u32 __user * tidptr = tsk->clear_child_tid; tsk->clear_child_tid = NULL; /* * We don't check the error code - if userspace has * not set up a proper pointer then tough luck. */ << here >> put_user(0, tidptr); sys_futex(tidptr, FUTEX_WAKE, 1, NULL, NULL, 0); } 5) OR : if new program is not multi-threaded, but spied by /proc/pid users (ps command for example), mm_users > 1, and the exiting program could corrupt 4 bytes in a persistent memory area (shm or memory mapped file) If current->clear_child_tid points to a writeable portion of memory of the new program, kernel happily and silently corrupts 4 bytes of memory, with unexpected effects. Fix is straightforward and should not break any sane program. Reported-by: Jens Rosenboom Acked-by: Linus Torvalds Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Sonny Rao Cc: Ingo Molnar Cc: Thomas Gleixner Cc: Ulrich Drepper Cc: Oleg Nesterov Cc: Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds --- diff --git a/kernel/fork.c b/kernel/fork.c index 466531eb92cc..021e1138556e 100644 --- a/kernel/fork.c +++ b/kernel/fork.c @@ -568,18 +568,18 @@ void mm_release(struct task_struct *tsk, struct mm_struct *mm) * the value intact in a core dump, and to save the unnecessary * trouble otherwise. Userland only wants this done for a sys_exit. */ - if (tsk->clear_child_tid - && !(tsk->flags & PF_SIGNALED) - && atomic_read(&mm->mm_users) > 1) { - u32 __user * tidptr = tsk->clear_child_tid; + if (tsk->clear_child_tid) { + if (!(tsk->flags & PF_SIGNALED) && + atomic_read(&mm->mm_users) > 1) { + /* + * We don't check the error code - if userspace has + * not set up a proper pointer then tough luck. + */ + put_user(0, tsk->clear_child_tid); + sys_futex(tsk->clear_child_tid, FUTEX_WAKE, + 1, NULL, NULL, 0); + } tsk->clear_child_tid = NULL; - - /* - * We don't check the error code - if userspace has - * not set up a proper pointer then tough luck. - */ - put_user(0, tidptr); - sys_futex(tidptr, FUTEX_WAKE, 1, NULL, NULL, 0); } }