From: Seth Forshee Date: Mon, 1 Aug 2016 13:19:10 +0000 (-0500) Subject: security/integrity: Harden against malformed xattrs X-Git-Tag: Ubuntu-5.10.0-12.13~11284^2~34^2 X-Git-Url: https://git.proxmox.com/?a=commitdiff_plain;h=b4bfec7f4a86424b114f94f41c4e1841ec102df3;p=mirror_ubuntu-hirsute-kernel.git security/integrity: Harden against malformed xattrs In general the handling of IMA/EVM xattrs is good, but I found a few locations where either the xattr size or the value of the type field in the xattr are not checked. Add a few simple checks to these locations to prevent malformed or malicious xattrs from causing problems. Signed-off-by: Seth Forshee Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar --- diff --git a/security/integrity/digsig.c b/security/integrity/digsig.c index 4304372b323f..106e855e2d9d 100644 --- a/security/integrity/digsig.c +++ b/security/integrity/digsig.c @@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ static bool init_keyring __initdata; int integrity_digsig_verify(const unsigned int id, const char *sig, int siglen, const char *digest, int digestlen) { - if (id >= INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MAX) + if (id >= INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MAX || siglen < 2) return -EINVAL; if (!keyring[id]) { diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c index ba8615576d4d..e2ed498c0f5f 100644 --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c @@ -145,6 +145,10 @@ static enum integrity_status evm_verify_hmac(struct dentry *dentry, /* check value type */ switch (xattr_data->type) { case EVM_XATTR_HMAC: + if (xattr_len != sizeof(struct evm_ima_xattr_data)) { + evm_status = INTEGRITY_FAIL; + goto out; + } rc = evm_calc_hmac(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value, xattr_value_len, calc.digest); if (rc) diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c index a705598ced5f..1fd9539a969d 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c @@ -130,6 +130,7 @@ enum hash_algo ima_get_hash_algo(struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, int xattr_len) { struct signature_v2_hdr *sig; + enum hash_algo ret; if (!xattr_value || xattr_len < 2) /* return default hash algo */ @@ -143,7 +144,9 @@ enum hash_algo ima_get_hash_algo(struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, return sig->hash_algo; break; case IMA_XATTR_DIGEST_NG: - return xattr_value->digest[0]; + ret = xattr_value->digest[0]; + if (ret < HASH_ALGO__LAST) + return ret; break; case IMA_XATTR_DIGEST: /* this is for backward compatibility */