From: Eric Dumazet Date: Wed, 22 Mar 2017 02:22:28 +0000 (-0700) Subject: ipv4: provide stronger user input validation in nl_fib_input() X-Git-Tag: Ubuntu-4.10.0-16.18~93 X-Git-Url: https://git.proxmox.com/?a=commitdiff_plain;h=df7bfb4ca4ee6cd5a4267e4f9a545eb24ee14dc1;p=mirror_ubuntu-zesty-kernel.git ipv4: provide stronger user input validation in nl_fib_input() BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1677589 [ Upstream commit c64c0b3cac4c5b8cb093727d2c19743ea3965c0b ] Alexander reported a KMSAN splat caused by reads of uninitialized field (tb_id_in) from user provided struct fib_result_nl It turns out nl_fib_input() sanity tests on user input is a bit wrong : User can pretend nlh->nlmsg_len is big enough, but provide at sendmsg() time a too small buffer. Reported-by: Alexander Potapenko Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman Signed-off-by: Tim Gardner --- diff --git a/net/ipv4/fib_frontend.c b/net/ipv4/fib_frontend.c index b39a791f6756..091de0b93d5d 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/fib_frontend.c +++ b/net/ipv4/fib_frontend.c @@ -1082,7 +1082,8 @@ static void nl_fib_input(struct sk_buff *skb) net = sock_net(skb->sk); nlh = nlmsg_hdr(skb); - if (skb->len < NLMSG_HDRLEN || skb->len < nlh->nlmsg_len || + if (skb->len < nlmsg_total_size(sizeof(*frn)) || + skb->len < nlh->nlmsg_len || nlmsg_len(nlh) < sizeof(*frn)) return;