From caeebefc7242dc2259f9992642dee0ea19429521 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Stefan Priebe Date: Wed, 13 May 2015 19:14:17 +0200 Subject: [PATCH] pve-qemu-kvm: fix VENOM qemu security flaw (CVE-2015-3456) Signed-off-by: Stefan Priebe --- ...fo-access-to-be-in-bounds-of-the-all.patch | 87 +++++++++++++++++++ debian/patches/series | 1 + 2 files changed, 88 insertions(+) create mode 100644 debian/patches/0001-fdc-force-the-fifo-access-to-be-in-bounds-of-the-all.patch diff --git a/debian/patches/0001-fdc-force-the-fifo-access-to-be-in-bounds-of-the-all.patch b/debian/patches/0001-fdc-force-the-fifo-access-to-be-in-bounds-of-the-all.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d28b0ea --- /dev/null +++ b/debian/patches/0001-fdc-force-the-fifo-access-to-be-in-bounds-of-the-all.patch @@ -0,0 +1,87 @@ +From 8cb8ea32396f52e01cdb38c00b5b7f5a0141f97f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Petr Matousek +Date: Wed, 6 May 2015 09:48:59 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] fdc: force the fifo access to be in bounds of the allocated + buffer + +During processing of certain commands such as FD_CMD_READ_ID and +FD_CMD_DRIVE_SPECIFICATION_COMMAND the fifo memory access could +get out of bounds leading to memory corruption with values coming +from the guest. + +Fix this by making sure that the index is always bounded by the +allocated memory. + +This is CVE-2015-3456. + +Signed-off-by: Petr Matousek +Reviewed-by: John Snow +Signed-off-by: John Snow +(cherry picked from commit e907746266721f305d67bc0718795fedee2e824c) +Signed-off-by: Stefan Priebe +--- + hw/block/fdc.c | 17 +++++++++++------ + 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/hw/block/fdc.c b/hw/block/fdc.c +index 739a03e..1168e8c 100644 +--- a/hw/block/fdc.c ++++ b/hw/block/fdc.c +@@ -1512,7 +1512,7 @@ static uint32_t fdctrl_read_data(FDCtrl *fdctrl) + { + FDrive *cur_drv; + uint32_t retval = 0; +- int pos; ++ uint32_t pos; + + cur_drv = get_cur_drv(fdctrl); + fdctrl->dsr &= ~FD_DSR_PWRDOWN; +@@ -1521,8 +1521,8 @@ static uint32_t fdctrl_read_data(FDCtrl *fdctrl) + return 0; + } + pos = fdctrl->data_pos; ++ pos %= FD_SECTOR_LEN; + if (fdctrl->msr & FD_MSR_NONDMA) { +- pos %= FD_SECTOR_LEN; + if (pos == 0) { + if (fdctrl->data_pos != 0) + if (!fdctrl_seek_to_next_sect(fdctrl, cur_drv)) { +@@ -1867,10 +1867,13 @@ static void fdctrl_handle_option(FDCtrl *fdctrl, int direction) + static void fdctrl_handle_drive_specification_command(FDCtrl *fdctrl, int direction) + { + FDrive *cur_drv = get_cur_drv(fdctrl); ++ uint32_t pos; + +- if (fdctrl->fifo[fdctrl->data_pos - 1] & 0x80) { ++ pos = fdctrl->data_pos - 1; ++ pos %= FD_SECTOR_LEN; ++ if (fdctrl->fifo[pos] & 0x80) { + /* Command parameters done */ +- if (fdctrl->fifo[fdctrl->data_pos - 1] & 0x40) { ++ if (fdctrl->fifo[pos] & 0x40) { + fdctrl->fifo[0] = fdctrl->fifo[1]; + fdctrl->fifo[2] = 0; + fdctrl->fifo[3] = 0; +@@ -1970,7 +1973,7 @@ static uint8_t command_to_handler[256]; + static void fdctrl_write_data(FDCtrl *fdctrl, uint32_t value) + { + FDrive *cur_drv; +- int pos; ++ uint32_t pos; + + /* Reset mode */ + if (!(fdctrl->dor & FD_DOR_nRESET)) { +@@ -2019,7 +2022,9 @@ static void fdctrl_write_data(FDCtrl *fdctrl, uint32_t value) + } + + FLOPPY_DPRINTF("%s: %02x\n", __func__, value); +- fdctrl->fifo[fdctrl->data_pos++] = value; ++ pos = fdctrl->data_pos++; ++ pos %= FD_SECTOR_LEN; ++ fdctrl->fifo[pos] = value; + if (fdctrl->data_pos == fdctrl->data_len) { + /* We now have all parameters + * and will be able to treat the command +-- +1.7.10.4 + diff --git a/debian/patches/series b/debian/patches/series index 51b8c2f..436a07d 100644 --- a/debian/patches/series +++ b/debian/patches/series @@ -34,3 +34,4 @@ virtio-balloon-dimmfix2.patch virtio-balloon-dimmfix3.patch add-qmp-get-link-status.patch virtio-scsi_fix_assert.patch +0001-fdc-force-the-fifo-access-to-be-in-bounds-of-the-all.patch -- 2.39.2