MdeModulePkg: Clean up source files

[mirror_edk2.git] / MdeModulePkg / Universal / SecurityStubDxe / SecurityStub.c

/** @file\r
  This driver produces Security2 and Security architectural protocol based on SecurityManagementLib.\r
\r
  Copyright (c) 2006 - 2018, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>\r
  This program and the accompanying materials\r
  are licensed and made available under the terms and conditions of the BSD License\r
  which accompanies this distribution.  The full text of the license may be found at\r
  http://opensource.org/licenses/bsd-license.php\r
\r
  THE PROGRAM IS DISTRIBUTED UNDER THE BSD LICENSE ON AN "AS IS" BASIS,\r
  WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR REPRESENTATIONS OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED.\r
\r
**/\r
\r
\r
#include <Uefi.h>\r
#include <Protocol/Security.h>\r
#include <Protocol/Security2.h>\r
#include <Library/DebugLib.h>\r
#include <Library/UefiBootServicesTableLib.h>\r
#include <Library/UefiDriverEntryPoint.h>\r
#include <Library/SecurityManagementLib.h>\r
#include "Defer3rdPartyImageLoad.h"\r
\r
//\r
// Handle for the Security Architectural Protocol instance produced by this driver\r
//\r
EFI_HANDLE                  mSecurityArchProtocolHandle = NULL;\r
\r
/**\r
  The EFI_SECURITY_ARCH_PROTOCOL (SAP) is used to abstract platform-specific\r
  policy from the DXE core response to an attempt to use a file that returns a\r
  given status for the authentication check from the section extraction protocol.\r
\r
  The possible responses in a given SAP implementation may include locking\r
  flash upon failure to authenticate, attestation logging for all signed drivers,\r
  and other exception operations.  The File parameter allows for possible logging\r
  within the SAP of the driver.\r
\r
  If File is NULL, then EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER is returned.\r
\r
  If the file specified by File with an authentication status specified by\r
  AuthenticationStatus is safe for the DXE Core to use, then EFI_SUCCESS is returned.\r
\r
  If the file specified by File with an authentication status specified by\r
  AuthenticationStatus is not safe for the DXE Core to use under any circumstances,\r
  then EFI_ACCESS_DENIED is returned.\r
\r
  If the file specified by File with an authentication status specified by\r
  AuthenticationStatus is not safe for the DXE Core to use right now, but it\r
  might be possible to use it at a future time, then EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION is\r
  returned.\r
\r
  @param  This             The EFI_SECURITY_ARCH_PROTOCOL instance.\r
  @param  AuthenticationStatus\r
                           This is the authentication type returned from the Section\r
                           Extraction protocol. See the Section Extraction Protocol\r
                           Specification for details on this type.\r
  @param  File             This is a pointer to the device path of the file that is\r
                           being dispatched. This will optionally be used for logging.\r
\r
  @retval EFI_SUCCESS            Do nothing and return success.\r
  @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER  File is NULL.\r
**/\r
EFI_STATUS\r
EFIAPI\r
SecurityStubAuthenticateState (\r
  IN CONST EFI_SECURITY_ARCH_PROTOCOL  *This,\r
  IN UINT32                            AuthenticationStatus,\r
  IN CONST EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL    *File\r
  )\r
{\r
  EFI_STATUS Status;\r
\r
  Status = ExecuteSecurity2Handlers (EFI_AUTH_OPERATION_AUTHENTICATION_STATE,\r
                                   AuthenticationStatus,\r
                                   File,\r
                                   NULL,\r
                                   0,\r
                                   FALSE\r
                                   );\r
  if (Status == EFI_SUCCESS) {\r
    Status = ExecuteSecurityHandlers (AuthenticationStatus, File);\r
  }\r
\r
  return Status;\r
}\r
\r
/**\r
  The DXE Foundation uses this service to measure and/or verify a UEFI image.\r
\r
  This service abstracts the invocation of Trusted Computing Group (TCG) measured boot, UEFI\r
  Secure boot, and UEFI User Identity infrastructure. For the former two, the DXE Foundation\r
  invokes the FileAuthentication() with a DevicePath and corresponding image in\r
  FileBuffer memory. The TCG measurement code will record the FileBuffer contents into the\r
  appropriate PCR. The image verification logic will confirm the integrity and provenance of the\r
  image in FileBuffer of length FileSize . The origin of the image will be DevicePath in\r
  these cases.\r
  If the FileBuffer is NULL, the interface will determine if the DevicePath can be connected\r
  in order to support the User Identification policy.\r
\r
  @param  This             The EFI_SECURITY2_ARCH_PROTOCOL instance.\r
  @param  File             A pointer to the device path of the file that is\r
                           being dispatched. This will optionally be used for logging.\r
  @param  FileBuffer       A pointer to the buffer with the UEFI file image.\r
  @param  FileSize         The size of the file.\r
  @param  BootPolicy       A boot policy that was used to call LoadImage() UEFI service. If\r
                           FileAuthentication() is invoked not from the LoadImage(),\r
                           BootPolicy must be set to FALSE.\r
\r
  @retval EFI_SUCCESS             The file specified by DevicePath and non-NULL\r
                                  FileBuffer did authenticate, and the platform policy dictates\r
                                  that the DXE Foundation may use the file.\r
  @retval EFI_SUCCESS             The device path specified by NULL device path DevicePath\r
                                  and non-NULL FileBuffer did authenticate, and the platform\r
                                  policy dictates that the DXE Foundation may execute the image in\r
                                  FileBuffer.\r
  @retval EFI_SUCCESS             FileBuffer is NULL and current user has permission to start\r
                                  UEFI device drivers on the device path specified by DevicePath.\r
  @retval EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION  The file specified by DevicePath and FileBuffer did not\r
                                  authenticate, and the platform policy dictates that the file should be\r
                                  placed in the untrusted state. The image has been added to the file\r
                                  execution table.\r
  @retval EFI_ACCESS_DENIED       The file specified by File and FileBuffer did not\r
                                  authenticate, and the platform policy dictates that the DXE\r
                                  Foundation many not use File.\r
  @retval EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION  FileBuffer is NULL and the user has no\r
                                  permission to start UEFI device drivers on the device path specified\r
                                  by DevicePath.\r
  @retval EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION  FileBuffer is not NULL and the user has no permission to load\r
                                  drivers from the device path specified by DevicePath. The\r
                                  image has been added into the list of the deferred images.\r
**/\r
EFI_STATUS\r
EFIAPI\r
Security2StubAuthenticate (\r
  IN CONST EFI_SECURITY2_ARCH_PROTOCOL *This,\r
  IN CONST EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL    *File,\r
  IN VOID                              *FileBuffer,\r
  IN UINTN                             FileSize,\r
  IN BOOLEAN                           BootPolicy\r
  )\r
{\r
  EFI_STATUS                           Status;\r
\r
  if (FileBuffer != NULL) {\r
    Status = Defer3rdPartyImageLoad (File, BootPolicy);\r
    if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
      return Status;\r
    }\r
  }\r
\r
  return ExecuteSecurity2Handlers (EFI_AUTH_OPERATION_VERIFY_IMAGE |\r
                                   EFI_AUTH_OPERATION_DEFER_IMAGE_LOAD |\r
                                   EFI_AUTH_OPERATION_MEASURE_IMAGE |\r
                                   EFI_AUTH_OPERATION_CONNECT_POLICY,\r
                                   0,\r
                                   File,\r
                                   FileBuffer,\r
                                   FileSize,\r
                                   BootPolicy\r
                                   );\r
}\r
\r
//\r
// Security2 and Security Architectural Protocol instance produced by this driver\r
//\r
EFI_SECURITY_ARCH_PROTOCOL  mSecurityStub = {\r
  SecurityStubAuthenticateState\r
};\r
\r
EFI_SECURITY2_ARCH_PROTOCOL mSecurity2Stub = {\r
  Security2StubAuthenticate\r
};\r
\r
/**\r
  Installs Security2 and Security Architectural Protocol.\r
\r
  @param  ImageHandle  The image handle of this driver.\r
  @param  SystemTable  A pointer to the EFI System Table.\r
\r
  @retval EFI_SUCCESS   Install the sample Security Architectural Protocol successfully.\r
\r
**/\r
EFI_STATUS\r
EFIAPI\r
SecurityStubInitialize (\r
  IN EFI_HANDLE        ImageHandle,\r
  IN EFI_SYSTEM_TABLE  *SystemTable\r
  )\r
{\r
  EFI_STATUS  Status;\r
\r
  //\r
  // Make sure the Security Architectural Protocol is not already installed in the system\r
  //\r
  ASSERT_PROTOCOL_ALREADY_INSTALLED (NULL, &gEfiSecurity2ArchProtocolGuid);\r
  ASSERT_PROTOCOL_ALREADY_INSTALLED (NULL, &gEfiSecurityArchProtocolGuid);\r
\r
  //\r
  // Install the Security Architectural Protocol onto a new handle\r
  //\r
  Status = gBS->InstallMultipleProtocolInterfaces (\r
                  &mSecurityArchProtocolHandle,\r
                  &gEfiSecurity2ArchProtocolGuid,\r
                  &mSecurity2Stub,\r
                  &gEfiSecurityArchProtocolGuid,\r
                  &mSecurityStub,\r
                  NULL\r
                  );\r
  ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status);\r
\r
  Defer3rdPartyImageLoadInitialize ();\r
\r
  return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
}\r