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[mirror_edk2.git] / SecurityPkg / Library / AuthVariableLib / AuthService.c
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a6811666
SZ		 1/** @file\r
2 Implement authentication services for the authenticated variables.\r
3\r
4 Caution: This module requires additional review when modified.\r
5 This driver will have external input - variable data. It may be input in SMM mode.\r
6 This external input must be validated carefully to avoid security issue like\r
7 buffer overflow, integer overflow.\r
8 Variable attribute should also be checked to avoid authentication bypass.\r
9 The whole SMM authentication variable design relies on the integrity of flash part and SMM.\r
10 which is assumed to be protected by platform. All variable code and metadata in flash/SMM Memory\r
11 may not be modified without authorization. If platform fails to protect these resources,\r
12 the authentication service provided in this driver will be broken, and the behavior is undefined.\r
13\r
14 ProcessVarWithPk(), ProcessVarWithKek() and ProcessVariable() are the function to do\r
15 variable authentication.\r
16\r
17 VerifyTimeBasedPayloadAndUpdate() and VerifyCounterBasedPayload() are sub function to do verification.\r
18 They will do basic validation for authentication data structure, then call crypto library\r
19 to verify the signature.\r
20\r
21Copyright (c) 2009 - 2015, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>\r
22This program and the accompanying materials\r
23are licensed and made available under the terms and conditions of the BSD License\r
24which accompanies this distribution. The full text of the license may be found at\r
25http://opensource.org/licenses/bsd-license.php\r
26\r
27THE PROGRAM IS DISTRIBUTED UNDER THE BSD LICENSE ON AN "AS IS" BASIS,\r
28WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR REPRESENTATIONS OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED.\r
29\r
30**/\r
31\r
32#include "AuthServiceInternal.h"\r
33\r
34//\r
35// Public Exponent of RSA Key.\r
36//\r
37CONST UINT8 mRsaE[] = { 0x01, 0x00, 0x01 };\r
38\r
39//\r
40// Requirement for different signature type which have been defined in UEFI spec.\r
41// These data are used to perform SignatureList format check while setting PK/KEK variable.\r
42//\r
43EFI_SIGNATURE_ITEM mSupportSigItem[] = {\r
44//{SigType, SigHeaderSize, SigDataSize }\r
45 {EFI_CERT_SHA256_GUID, 0, 32 },\r
46 {EFI_CERT_RSA2048_GUID, 0, 256 },\r
47 {EFI_CERT_RSA2048_SHA256_GUID, 0, 256 },\r
48 {EFI_CERT_SHA1_GUID, 0, 20 },\r
49 {EFI_CERT_RSA2048_SHA1_GUID, 0, 256 },\r
50 {EFI_CERT_X509_GUID, 0, ((UINT32) ~0)},\r
51 {EFI_CERT_SHA224_GUID, 0, 28 },\r
52 {EFI_CERT_SHA384_GUID, 0, 48 },\r
53 {EFI_CERT_SHA512_GUID, 0, 64 },\r
54 {EFI_CERT_X509_SHA256_GUID, 0, 48 },\r
55 {EFI_CERT_X509_SHA384_GUID, 0, 64 },\r
56 {EFI_CERT_X509_SHA512_GUID, 0, 80 }\r
57};\r
58\r
4fc08e8d
CZ		 59//\r
60// Secure Boot Mode state machine\r
61//\r
62SECURE_BOOT_MODE mSecureBootState[SecureBootModeTypeMax] = {\r
63 // USER MODE\r
64 {\r
65 AUDIT_MODE_DISABLE, // AuditMode\r
66 FALSE, // IsAuditModeRO, AuditMode is RW\r
67 DEPLOYED_MODE_DISABLE, // DeployedMode\r
68 FALSE, // IsDeployedModeRO, DeployedMode is RW\r
69 SETUP_MODE_DISABLE, // SetupMode\r
70 // SetupMode is always RO\r
71 SECURE_BOOT_MODE_ENABLE // SecureBoot\r
72 },\r
73 // SETUP MODE\r
74 {\r
75 AUDIT_MODE_DISABLE, // AuditMode\r
76 FALSE, // IsAuditModeRO, AuditMode is RW\r
77 DEPLOYED_MODE_DISABLE, // DeployedMode\r
78 TRUE, // IsDeployedModeRO, DeployedMode is RO\r
79 SETUP_MODE_ENABLE, // SetupMode\r
80 // SetupMode is always RO\r
81 SECURE_BOOT_MODE_DISABLE // SecureBoot\r
82 },\r
83 // AUDIT MODE\r
84 {\r
85 AUDIT_MODE_ENABLE, // AuditMode\r
86 TRUE, // AuditModeValAttr RO, AuditMode is RO\r
87 DEPLOYED_MODE_DISABLE, // DeployedMode\r
88 TRUE, // DeployedModeValAttr RO, DeployedMode is RO\r
89 SETUP_MODE_ENABLE, // SetupMode\r
90 // SetupMode is always RO\r
91 SECURE_BOOT_MODE_DISABLE // SecureBoot\r
92 },\r
93 // DEPLOYED MODE\r
94 {\r
95 AUDIT_MODE_DISABLE, // AuditMode, AuditMode is RO\r
96 TRUE, // AuditModeValAttr RO\r
97 DEPLOYED_MODE_ENABLE, // DeployedMode\r
98 TRUE, // DeployedModeValAttr RO, DeployedMode is RO\r
99 SETUP_MODE_DISABLE, // SetupMode\r
100 // SetupMode is always RO\r
101 SECURE_BOOT_MODE_ENABLE // SecureBoot\r
102 }\r
103};\r
104\r
105SECURE_BOOT_MODE_TYPE mSecureBootMode;\r
106\r
a6811666
SZ		 107/**\r
108 Finds variable in storage blocks of volatile and non-volatile storage areas.\r
109\r
110 This code finds variable in storage blocks of volatile and non-volatile storage areas.\r
111 If VariableName is an empty string, then we just return the first\r
112 qualified variable without comparing VariableName and VendorGuid.\r
113\r
114 @param[in] VariableName Name of the variable to be found.\r
115 @param[in] VendorGuid Variable vendor GUID to be found.\r
116 @param[out] Data Pointer to data address.\r
117 @param[out] DataSize Pointer to data size.\r
118\r
119 @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER If VariableName is not an empty string,\r
120 while VendorGuid is NULL.\r
121 @retval EFI_SUCCESS Variable successfully found.\r
122 @retval EFI_NOT_FOUND Variable not found\r
123\r
124**/\r
125EFI_STATUS\r
126AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (\r
127 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r
128 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r
129 OUT VOID **Data,\r
130 OUT UINTN *DataSize\r
131 )\r
132{\r
133 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
134 AUTH_VARIABLE_INFO AuthVariableInfo;\r
135\r
136 ZeroMem (&AuthVariableInfo, sizeof (AuthVariableInfo));\r
137 Status = mAuthVarLibContextIn->FindVariable (\r
138 VariableName,\r
139 VendorGuid,\r
140 &AuthVariableInfo\r
141 );\r
142 *Data = AuthVariableInfo.Data;\r
143 *DataSize = AuthVariableInfo.DataSize;\r
144 return Status;\r
145}\r
146\r
147/**\r
148 Update the variable region with Variable information.\r
149\r
150 @param[in] VariableName Name of variable.\r
151 @param[in] VendorGuid Guid of variable.\r
152 @param[in] Data Data pointer.\r
153 @param[in] DataSize Size of Data.\r
154 @param[in] Attributes Attribute value of the variable.\r
155\r
156 @retval EFI_SUCCESS The update operation is success.\r
157 @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.\r
158 @retval EFI_WRITE_PROTECTED Variable is write-protected.\r
159 @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES There is not enough resource.\r
160\r
161**/\r
162EFI_STATUS\r
163AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariable (\r
164 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r
165 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r
166 IN VOID *Data,\r
167 IN UINTN DataSize,\r
168 IN UINT32 Attributes\r
169 )\r
170{\r
171 AUTH_VARIABLE_INFO AuthVariableInfo;\r
172\r
173 ZeroMem (&AuthVariableInfo, sizeof (AuthVariableInfo));\r
174 AuthVariableInfo.VariableName = VariableName;\r
175 AuthVariableInfo.VendorGuid = VendorGuid;\r
176 AuthVariableInfo.Data = Data;\r
177 AuthVariableInfo.DataSize = DataSize;\r
178 AuthVariableInfo.Attributes = Attributes;\r
179\r
180 return mAuthVarLibContextIn->UpdateVariable (\r
181 &AuthVariableInfo\r
182 );\r
183}\r
184\r
185/**\r
186 Update the variable region with Variable information.\r
187\r
188 @param[in] VariableName Name of variable.\r
189 @param[in] VendorGuid Guid of variable.\r
190 @param[in] Data Data pointer.\r
191 @param[in] DataSize Size of Data.\r
192 @param[in] Attributes Attribute value of the variable.\r
193 @param[in] KeyIndex Index of associated public key.\r
194 @param[in] MonotonicCount Value of associated monotonic count.\r
195\r
196 @retval EFI_SUCCESS The update operation is success.\r
197 @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.\r
198 @retval EFI_WRITE_PROTECTED Variable is write-protected.\r
199 @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES There is not enough resource.\r
200\r
201**/\r
202EFI_STATUS\r
203AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariableWithMonotonicCount (\r
204 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r
205 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r
206 IN VOID *Data,\r
207 IN UINTN DataSize,\r
208 IN UINT32 Attributes,\r
209 IN UINT32 KeyIndex,\r
210 IN UINT64 MonotonicCount\r
211 )\r
212{\r
213 AUTH_VARIABLE_INFO AuthVariableInfo;\r
214\r
215 ZeroMem (&AuthVariableInfo, sizeof (AuthVariableInfo));\r
216 AuthVariableInfo.VariableName = VariableName;\r
217 AuthVariableInfo.VendorGuid = VendorGuid;\r
218 AuthVariableInfo.Data = Data;\r
219 AuthVariableInfo.DataSize = DataSize;\r
220 AuthVariableInfo.Attributes = Attributes;\r
221 AuthVariableInfo.PubKeyIndex = KeyIndex;\r
222 AuthVariableInfo.MonotonicCount = MonotonicCount;\r
223\r
4fc08e8d
CZ		 224 return mAuthVarLibContextIn->UpdateVariable (\r
225 &AuthVariableInfo\r
226 );\r
227}\r
228\r
229/**\r
230 Update the variable region with Variable information.\r
231\r
232 @param[in] VariableName Name of variable.\r
233 @param[in] VendorGuid Guid of variable.\r
234 @param[in] Data Data pointer.\r
235 @param[in] DataSize Size of Data.\r
236 @param[in] Attributes Attribute value of the variable.\r
237 @param[in] TimeStamp Value of associated TimeStamp.\r
238\r
239 @retval EFI_SUCCESS The update operation is success.\r
240 @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.\r
241 @retval EFI_WRITE_PROTECTED Variable is write-protected.\r
242 @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES There is not enough resource.\r
243\r
244**/\r
245EFI_STATUS\r
246AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariableWithTimeStamp (\r
247 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r
248 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r
249 IN VOID *Data,\r
250 IN UINTN DataSize,\r
251 IN UINT32 Attributes,\r
252 IN EFI_TIME *TimeStamp\r
253 )\r
254{\r
255 EFI_STATUS FindStatus;\r
256 VOID *OrgData;\r
257 UINTN OrgDataSize;\r
258 AUTH_VARIABLE_INFO AuthVariableInfo;\r
259\r
260 FindStatus = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (\r
261 VariableName,\r
262 VendorGuid,\r
263 &OrgData,\r
264 &OrgDataSize\r
265 );\r
266\r
267 //\r
268 // EFI_VARIABLE_APPEND_WRITE attribute only effects for existing variable\r
269 //\r
270 if (!EFI_ERROR (FindStatus) && ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_APPEND_WRITE) != 0)) {\r
271 if ((CompareGuid (VendorGuid, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid) &&\r
272 ((StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE) == 0) || (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1) == 0) ||\r
273 (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE2) == 0))) ||\r
274 (CompareGuid (VendorGuid, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid) && (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME) == 0))) {\r
275 //\r
276 // For variables with formatted as EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST, the driver shall not perform an append of\r
277 // EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA values that are already part of the existing variable value.\r
278 //\r
279 FilterSignatureList (\r
280 OrgData,\r
281 OrgDataSize,\r
282 Data,\r
283 &DataSize\r
284 );\r
285 }\r
286 }\r
287\r
288 ZeroMem (&AuthVariableInfo, sizeof (AuthVariableInfo));\r
289 AuthVariableInfo.VariableName = VariableName;\r
290 AuthVariableInfo.VendorGuid = VendorGuid;\r
291 AuthVariableInfo.Data = Data;\r
292 AuthVariableInfo.DataSize = DataSize;\r
293 AuthVariableInfo.Attributes = Attributes;\r
294 AuthVariableInfo.TimeStamp = TimeStamp;\r
295 return mAuthVarLibContextIn->UpdateVariable (\r
296 &AuthVariableInfo\r
297 );\r
298}\r
299\r
300/**\r
301 Initialize Secure Boot variables.\r
302\r
303 @retval EFI_SUCCESS The initialization operation is successful.\r
304 @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES There is not enough resource.\r
305\r
306**/\r
307EFI_STATUS\r
308InitSecureBootVariables (\r
309 VOID\r
310 )\r
311{\r
312 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
313 UINT8 *Data;\r
314 UINTN DataSize;\r
315 UINT32 SecureBoot;\r
316 UINT8 SecureBootEnable;\r
317 SECURE_BOOT_MODE_TYPE SecureBootMode;\r
318 BOOLEAN IsPkPresent;\r
319\r
320 //\r
321 // Find "PK" variable\r
322 //\r
323 Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, (VOID **) &Data, &DataSize);\r
324 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
325 IsPkPresent = FALSE;\r
326 DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Variable %s does not exist.\n", EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME));\r
327 } else {\r
328 IsPkPresent = TRUE;\r
329 DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Variable %s exists.\n", EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME));\r
330 }\r
331\r
332 //\r
333 // Init "SecureBootMode" variable.\r
334 // Initial case\r
335 // SecureBootMode doesn't exist. Init it with PK state\r
336 // 3 inconsistency cases need to sync\r
337 // 1.1 Add PK -> system break -> update SecureBootMode Var\r
338 // 1.2 Delete PK -> system break -> update SecureBootMode Var\r
339 // 1.3 Set AuditMode ->Delete PK -> system break -> Update SecureBootMode Var\r
340 //\r
341 Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (EDKII_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME, &gEdkiiSecureBootModeGuid, (VOID **)&Data, &DataSize);\r
342 if (EFI_ERROR(Status)) {\r
343 //\r
344 // Variable driver Initial Case\r
345 //\r
346 if (IsPkPresent) {\r
347 SecureBootMode = SecureBootModeTypeUserMode;\r
348 } else {\r
349 SecureBootMode = SecureBootModeTypeSetupMode;\r
350 }\r
351 } else {\r
352 //\r
353 // 3 inconsistency cases need to sync\r
354 //\r
355 SecureBootMode = (SECURE_BOOT_MODE_TYPE)*Data;\r
356 ASSERT(SecureBootMode < SecureBootModeTypeMax);\r
357\r
358 if (IsPkPresent) {\r
359 //\r
360 // 3.1 Add PK -> system break -> update SecureBootMode Var\r
361 //\r
362 if (SecureBootMode == SecureBootModeTypeSetupMode) {\r
363 SecureBootMode = SecureBootModeTypeUserMode;\r
364 } else if (SecureBootMode == SecureBootModeTypeAuditMode) {\r
365 SecureBootMode = SecureBootModeTypeDeployedMode;\r
366 }\r
367 } else {\r
368 //\r
369 // 3.2 Delete PK -> system break -> update SecureBootMode Var\r
370 // 3.3 Set AuditMode ->Delete PK -> system break -> Update SecureBootMode Var. Reinit to be SetupMode\r
371 //\r
372 if ((SecureBootMode == SecureBootModeTypeUserMode) || (SecureBootMode == SecureBootModeTypeDeployedMode)) {\r
373 SecureBootMode = SecureBootModeTypeSetupMode;\r
374 }\r
375 }\r
376 }\r
377\r
378 if (EFI_ERROR(Status) || (SecureBootMode != (SECURE_BOOT_MODE_TYPE)*Data)) {\r
379 //\r
380 // Update SecureBootMode Var\r
381 //\r
382 Status = AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariable (\r
383 EDKII_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME,\r
384 &gEdkiiSecureBootModeGuid,\r
385 &SecureBootMode,\r
386 sizeof (UINT8),\r
387 EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS\r
388 );\r
389 if (EFI_ERROR(Status)) {\r
390 return Status;\r
391 }\r
392 }\r
393\r
394 //\r
395 // Init "AuditMode"\r
396 //\r
397 Status = AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariable (\r
398 EFI_AUDIT_MODE_NAME,\r
399 &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
400 &mSecureBootState[SecureBootMode].AuditMode,\r
401 sizeof(UINT8),\r
402 EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS\r
403 );\r
404 if (EFI_ERROR(Status)) {\r
405 return Status;\r
406 }\r
407\r
408 //\r
409 // Init "DeployedMode"\r
410 //\r
411 Status = AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariable (\r
412 EFI_DEPLOYED_MODE_NAME,\r
413 &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
414 &mSecureBootState[SecureBootMode].DeployedMode,\r
415 sizeof(UINT8),\r
416 EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS\r
417 );\r
418 if (EFI_ERROR(Status)) {\r
419 return Status;\r
420 }\r
421\r
422 //\r
423 // Init "SetupMode"\r
424 //\r
425 Status = AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariable (\r
426 EFI_SETUP_MODE_NAME,\r
427 &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
428 &mSecureBootState[SecureBootMode].SetupMode,\r
429 sizeof(UINT8),\r
430 EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS\r
431 );\r
432 if (EFI_ERROR(Status)) {\r
433 return Status;\r
434 }\r
435\r
436 //\r
437 // If "SecureBootEnable" variable exists, then update "SecureBoot" variable.\r
438 // If "SecureBootEnable" variable is SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE and in User Mode or Deployed Mode, Set "SecureBoot" variable to SECURE_BOOT_MODE_ENABLE.\r
439 // If "SecureBootEnable" variable is SECURE_BOOT_DISABLE, Set "SecureBoot" variable to SECURE_BOOT_MODE_DISABLE.\r
440 //\r
441 SecureBootEnable = SECURE_BOOT_DISABLE;\r
442 Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME, &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid, (VOID **)&Data, &DataSize);\r
443 if (!EFI_ERROR(Status)) {\r
444 if (!IsPkPresent) {\r
445 //\r
446 // PK is cleared in runtime. "SecureBootMode" is not updated before reboot\r
447 // Delete "SecureBootMode"\r
448 //\r
449 Status = AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariable (\r
450 EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME,\r
451 &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid,\r
452 &SecureBootEnable,\r
453 0,\r
454 EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS\r
455 );\r
456 } else {\r
457 SecureBootEnable = *Data;\r
458 }\r
459 } else if ((SecureBootMode == SecureBootModeTypeUserMode) || (SecureBootMode == SecureBootModeTypeDeployedMode)) {\r
460 //\r
461 // "SecureBootEnable" not exist, initialize it in User Mode or Deployed Mode.\r
462 //\r
463 SecureBootEnable = SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE;\r
464 Status = AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariable (\r
465 EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME,\r
466 &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid,\r
467 &SecureBootEnable,\r
468 sizeof (UINT8),\r
469 EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS\r
470 );\r
471 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
472 return Status;\r
473 }\r
474 }\r
475\r
476 //\r
477 // Create "SecureBoot" variable with BS+RT attribute set.\r
478 //\r
479 if ((SecureBootEnable == SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE) \r
480 && ((SecureBootMode == SecureBootModeTypeUserMode) || (SecureBootMode == SecureBootModeTypeDeployedMode))) {\r
481 SecureBoot = SECURE_BOOT_MODE_ENABLE;\r
482 } else {\r
483 SecureBoot = SECURE_BOOT_MODE_DISABLE;\r
484 }\r
485 Status = AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariable (\r
486 EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME,\r
487 &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
488 &SecureBoot,\r
489 sizeof (UINT8),\r
490 EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS\r
491 );\r
492\r
493 DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "SecureBootMode is %x\n", SecureBootMode));\r
494 DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Variable %s is %x\n", EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME, SecureBoot));\r
495 DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Variable %s is %x\n", EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME, SecureBootEnable));\r
496\r
497 //\r
498 // Save SecureBootMode in global space\r
499 //\r
500 mSecureBootMode = SecureBootMode;\r
501\r
502 return Status;\r
503}\r
504\r
505/**\r
506 Update SecureBootMode variable.\r
507\r
508 @param[in] NewMode New Secure Boot Mode.\r
509\r
510 @retval EFI_SUCCESS The initialization operation is successful.\r
511 @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES There is not enough resource.\r
512\r
513**/\r
514EFI_STATUS\r
515UpdateSecureBootMode(\r
516 IN SECURE_BOOT_MODE_TYPE NewMode\r
517 )\r
518{\r
519 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
520\r
521 //\r
522 // Update "SecureBootMode" variable to new Secure Boot Mode\r
523 //\r
524 Status = AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariable (\r
525 EDKII_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME,\r
526 &gEdkiiSecureBootModeGuid,\r
527 &NewMode,\r
528 sizeof (UINT8),\r
529 EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS\r
530 );\r
531\r
532 if (!EFI_ERROR(Status)) {\r
533 DEBUG((EFI_D_INFO, "SecureBootMode Update to %x\n", NewMode));\r
534 mSecureBootMode = NewMode;\r
535 } else {\r
536 DEBUG((EFI_D_ERROR, "SecureBootMode Update failure %x\n", Status));\r
537 }\r
538\r
539 return Status;\r
540}\r
541\r
542/**\r
543 Current secure boot mode is AuditMode. This function performs secure boot mode transition\r
544 to a new mode.\r
545\r
546 @param[in] NewMode New Secure Boot Mode.\r
547\r
548 @retval EFI_SUCCESS The initialization operation is successful.\r
549 @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES There is not enough resource.\r
550\r
551**/\r
552EFI_STATUS\r
553TransitionFromAuditMode(\r
554 IN SECURE_BOOT_MODE_TYPE NewMode\r
555 )\r
556{\r
557 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
558 UINT8 *AuditVarData;\r
559 UINT8 *DeployedVarData;\r
560 UINT8 *SetupVarData;\r
561 UINT8 *SecureBootVarData;\r
562 UINT8 SecureBootEnable;\r
563 UINTN DataSize;\r
564\r
565 //\r
566 // AuditMode/DeployedMode/SetupMode/SecureBoot are all NON_NV variable maintained by Variable driver\r
567 // they can be RW. but can't be deleted. so they can always be found.\r
568 //\r
569 Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (\r
570 EFI_AUDIT_MODE_NAME,\r
571 &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
572 &AuditVarData,\r
573 &DataSize\r
574 );\r
575 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
576 ASSERT(FALSE);\r
577 }\r
578\r
579 Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (\r
580 EFI_DEPLOYED_MODE_NAME,\r
581 &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
582 &DeployedVarData,\r
583 &DataSize\r
584 );\r
585 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
586 ASSERT(FALSE);\r
587 }\r
588\r
589 Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (\r
590 EFI_SETUP_MODE_NAME,\r
591 &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
592 &SetupVarData,\r
593 &DataSize\r
594 );\r
595 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
596 ASSERT(FALSE);\r
597 }\r
598\r
599 Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (\r
600 EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME,\r
601 &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
602 &SecureBootVarData,\r
603 &DataSize\r
604 );\r
605 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
606 ASSERT(FALSE);\r
607 }\r
608\r
609 //\r
610 // Make Secure Boot Mode transition ATOMIC\r
611 // Update Private NV SecureBootMode Variable first, because it may fail due to NV range overflow.\r
612 // other tranisition logic are all memory operations.\r
613 //\r
614 Status = UpdateSecureBootMode(NewMode);\r
615 if (EFI_ERROR(Status)) {\r
616 DEBUG((EFI_D_ERROR, "Update SecureBootMode Variable fail %x\n", Status));\r
617 }\r
618\r
619 if (NewMode == SecureBootModeTypeDeployedMode) {\r
620 //\r
621 // Since PK is enrolled, can't rollback, always update SecureBootMode in memory\r
622 //\r
623 mSecureBootMode = NewMode;\r
624 Status = EFI_SUCCESS;\r
625\r
626 //\r
627 // AuditMode ----> DeployedMode\r
628 // Side Effects\r
629 // AuditMode =: 0 / DeployedMode := 1 / SetupMode := 0\r
630 //\r
631 // Update the value of AuditMode variable by a simple mem copy, this could avoid possible\r
632 // variable storage reclaim at runtime.\r
633 //\r
634 CopyMem (AuditVarData, &mSecureBootState[NewMode].AuditMode, sizeof(UINT8));\r
635 //\r
636 // Update the value of DeployedMode variable by a simple mem copy, this could avoid possible\r
637 // variable storage reclaim at runtime.\r
638 //\r
639 CopyMem (DeployedVarData, &mSecureBootState[NewMode].DeployedMode, sizeof(UINT8));\r
640 //\r
641 // Update the value of SetupMode variable by a simple mem copy, this could avoid possible\r
642 // variable storage reclaim at runtime.\r
643 //\r
644 CopyMem (SetupVarData, &mSecureBootState[NewMode].SetupMode, sizeof(UINT8));\r
645\r
646 if (mAuthVarLibContextIn->AtRuntime ()) {\r
647 //\r
648 // SecureBoot Variable indicates whether the platform firmware is operating\r
649 // in Secure boot mode (1) or not (0), so we should not change SecureBoot\r
650 // Variable in runtime.\r
651 //\r
652 return Status;\r
653 }\r
654\r
655 //\r
656 // Update the value of SecureBoot variable by a simple mem copy, this could avoid possible\r
657 // variable storage reclaim at runtime.\r
658 //\r
659 CopyMem (SecureBootVarData, &mSecureBootState[NewMode].SecureBoot, sizeof(UINT8));\r
660\r
661 //\r
662 // Create "SecureBootEnable" variable as secure boot is enabled.\r
663 //\r
664 SecureBootEnable = SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE;\r
665 AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariable (\r
666 EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME,\r
667 &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid,\r
668 &SecureBootEnable,\r
669 sizeof (SecureBootEnable),\r
670 EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS\r
671 );\r
672 } else {\r
673 DEBUG((EFI_D_ERROR, "Invalid state tranition from %x to %x\n", SecureBootModeTypeAuditMode, NewMode));\r
674 ASSERT(FALSE);\r
675 }\r
676\r
677 return Status;\r
678}\r
679\r
680/**\r
681 Current secure boot mode is DeployedMode. This function performs secure boot mode transition\r
682 to a new mode.\r
683\r
684 @param[in] NewMode New Secure Boot Mode.\r
685\r
686 @retval EFI_SUCCESS The initialization operation is successful.\r
687 @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES There is not enough resource.\r
688\r
689**/\r
690EFI_STATUS\r
691TransitionFromDeployedMode(\r
692 IN SECURE_BOOT_MODE_TYPE NewMode\r
693 )\r
694{\r
695 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
696 UINT8 *DeployedVarData;\r
697 UINT8 *SetupVarData;\r
698 UINT8 *SecureBootVarData;\r
699 UINT8 SecureBootEnable;\r
700 UINTN DataSize;\r
701\r
702 //\r
703 // AuditMode/DeployedMode/SetupMode/SecureBoot are all NON_NV variable maintained by Variable driver\r
704 // they can be RW. but can't be deleted. so they can always be found.\r
705 //\r
706 Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (\r
707 EFI_DEPLOYED_MODE_NAME,\r
708 &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
709 &DeployedVarData,\r
710 &DataSize\r
711 );\r
712 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
713 ASSERT(FALSE);\r
714 }\r
715\r
716 Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (\r
717 EFI_SETUP_MODE_NAME,\r
718 &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
719 &SetupVarData,\r
720 &DataSize\r
721 );\r
722 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
723 ASSERT(FALSE);\r
724 }\r
725\r
726 Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (\r
727 EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME,\r
728 &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
729 &SecureBootVarData,\r
730 &DataSize\r
731 );\r
732 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
733 ASSERT(FALSE);\r
734 }\r
735\r
736 //\r
737 // Make Secure Boot Mode transition ATOMIC\r
738 // Update Private NV SecureBootMode Variable first, because it may fail due to NV range overflow.\r
739 // other tranisition logic are all memory operations.\r
740 //\r
741 Status = UpdateSecureBootMode(NewMode);\r
742 if (EFI_ERROR(Status)) {\r
743 DEBUG((EFI_D_ERROR, "Update SecureBootMode Variable fail %x\n", Status));\r
744 }\r
745\r
746 switch(NewMode) {\r
747 case SecureBootModeTypeUserMode:\r
748 //\r
749 // DeployedMode ----> UserMode\r
750 // Side Effects\r
751 // DeployedMode := 0\r
752 //\r
753 // Platform Specific DeployedMode clear. UpdateSecureBootMode fails and no other variables are updated before. rollback this transition\r
754 //\r
755 if (EFI_ERROR(Status)) {\r
756 return Status;\r
757 }\r
758 CopyMem (DeployedVarData, &mSecureBootState[NewMode].DeployedMode, sizeof(UINT8));\r
759\r
760 break;\r
761\r
762 case SecureBootModeTypeSetupMode:\r
763 //\r
764 // Since PK is processed before, can't rollback, still update SecureBootMode in memory\r
765 //\r
766 mSecureBootMode = NewMode;\r
767 Status = EFI_SUCCESS;\r
768\r
769 //\r
770 // DeployedMode ----> SetupMode\r
771 //\r
772 // Platform Specific PKpub clear or Delete Pkpub\r
773 // Side Effects\r
774 // DeployedMode := 0 / SetupMode := 1 / SecureBoot := 0\r
775 //\r
776 // Update the value of DeployedMode variable by a simple mem copy, this could avoid possible\r
777 // variable storage reclaim at runtime.\r
778 //\r
779 CopyMem (DeployedVarData, &mSecureBootState[NewMode].DeployedMode, sizeof(UINT8));\r
780 //\r
781 // Update the value of SetupMode variable by a simple mem copy, this could avoid possible\r
782 // variable storage reclaim at runtime.\r
783 //\r
784 CopyMem (SetupVarData, &mSecureBootState[NewMode].SetupMode, sizeof(UINT8));\r
785\r
786 if (mAuthVarLibContextIn->AtRuntime ()) {\r
787 //\r
788 // SecureBoot Variable indicates whether the platform firmware is operating\r
789 // in Secure boot mode (1) or not (0), so we should not change SecureBoot\r
790 // Variable in runtime.\r
791 //\r
792 return Status;\r
793 }\r
794\r
795 //\r
796 // Update the value of SecureBoot variable by a simple mem copy, this could avoid possible\r
797 // variable storage reclaim at runtime.\r
798 //\r
799 CopyMem (SecureBootVarData, &mSecureBootState[NewMode].SecureBoot, sizeof(UINT8));\r
800\r
801 //\r
802 // Delete the "SecureBootEnable" variable as secure boot is Disabled.\r
803 //\r
804 SecureBootEnable = SECURE_BOOT_DISABLE;\r
805 AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariable (\r
806 EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME,\r
807 &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid,\r
808 &SecureBootEnable,\r
809 0,\r
810 EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS\r
811 );\r
812 break;\r
813\r
814 default:\r
815 DEBUG((EFI_D_ERROR, "Invalid state tranition from %x to %x\n", SecureBootModeTypeDeployedMode, NewMode));\r
816 ASSERT(FALSE);\r
817 }\r
818\r
819 return Status;\r
820}\r
821\r
822/**\r
823 Current secure boot mode is UserMode. This function performs secure boot mode transition\r
824 to a new mode.\r
825\r
826 @param[in] NewMode New Secure Boot Mode.\r
827\r
828 @retval EFI_SUCCESS The initialization operation is successful.\r
829 @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES There is not enough resource.\r
830\r
831**/\r
832EFI_STATUS\r
833TransitionFromUserMode(\r
834 IN SECURE_BOOT_MODE_TYPE NewMode\r
835 )\r
836{\r
837 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
838 UINT8 *AuditVarData;\r
839 UINT8 *DeployedVarData;\r
840 UINT8 *SetupVarData;\r
841 UINT8 *PkVarData;\r
842 UINT8 *SecureBootVarData;\r
843 UINT8 SecureBootEnable;\r
844 UINTN DataSize;\r
845 VARIABLE_ENTRY_CONSISTENCY VariableEntry;\r
846\r
847 //\r
848 // AuditMode/DeployedMode/SetupMode/SecureBoot are all NON_NV variable maintained by Variable driver\r
849 // they can be RW. but can't be deleted. so they can always be found.\r
850 //\r
851 Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (\r
852 EFI_AUDIT_MODE_NAME,\r
853 &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
854 &AuditVarData,\r
855 &DataSize\r
856 );\r
857 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
858 ASSERT(FALSE);\r
859 }\r
860\r
861 Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (\r
862 EFI_DEPLOYED_MODE_NAME,\r
863 &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
864 &DeployedVarData,\r
865 &DataSize\r
866 );\r
867 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
868 ASSERT(FALSE);\r
869 }\r
870\r
871 Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (\r
872 EFI_SETUP_MODE_NAME,\r
873 &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
874 &SetupVarData,\r
875 &DataSize\r
876 );\r
877 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
878 ASSERT(FALSE);\r
879 }\r
880\r
881 Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (\r
882 EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME,\r
883 &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
884 &SecureBootVarData,\r
885 &DataSize\r
886 );\r
887 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
888 ASSERT(FALSE);\r
889 }\r
890\r
891 //\r
892 // Make Secure Boot Mode transition ATOMIC\r
893 // Update Private NV SecureBootMode Variable first, because it may fail due to NV range overflow. \r
894 // Other tranisition logic are all memory operations and PK delete is assumed to be always successful.\r
895 //\r
896 if (NewMode != SecureBootModeTypeAuditMode) {\r
897 Status = UpdateSecureBootMode(NewMode);\r
898 if (EFI_ERROR(Status)) {\r
899 DEBUG((EFI_D_ERROR, "Update SecureBootMode Variable fail %x\n", Status));\r
900 }\r
901 } else {\r
902 //\r
903 // UserMode -----> AuditMode. Check RemainingSpace for SecureBootMode var first.\r
904 // Will update SecureBootMode after DeletePK logic\r
905 //\r
906 VariableEntry.VariableSize = sizeof(UINT8);\r
907 VariableEntry.Guid = &gEdkiiSecureBootModeGuid;\r
908 VariableEntry.Name = EDKII_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME;\r
909 if (!mAuthVarLibContextIn->CheckRemainingSpaceForConsistency (VARIABLE_ATTRIBUTE_NV_BS_RT, &VariableEntry, NULL)) {\r
910 return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
911 }\r
912 }\r
913\r
914 switch(NewMode) {\r
915 case SecureBootModeTypeDeployedMode:\r
916 //\r
917 // UpdateSecureBootMode fails and no other variables are updated before. rollback this transition\r
918 //\r
919 if (EFI_ERROR(Status)) {\r
920 return Status;\r
921 }\r
922\r
923 //\r
924 // UserMode ----> DeployedMode\r
925 // Side Effects\r
926 // DeployedMode := 1\r
927 //\r
928 CopyMem (DeployedVarData, &mSecureBootState[NewMode].DeployedMode, sizeof(UINT8));\r
929 break;\r
930\r
931 case SecureBootModeTypeAuditMode:\r
932 //\r
933 // UserMode ----> AuditMode\r
934 // Side Effects\r
935 // Delete PKpub / SetupMode := 1 / SecureBoot := 0\r
936 //\r
937 // Delete PKpub without verification. Should always succeed.\r
938 //\r
939 PkVarData = NULL;\r
940 Status = AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariable (\r
941 EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME,\r
942 &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
943 PkVarData,\r
944 0,\r
945 EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS\r
946 );\r
947 if (EFI_ERROR(Status)) {\r
948 DEBUG((EFI_D_ERROR, "UserMode -> AuditMode. Delete PK fail %x\n", Status));\r
949 ASSERT(FALSE);\r
950 }\r
951\r
952 //\r
953 // Update Private NV SecureBootMode Variable\r
954 //\r
955 Status = UpdateSecureBootMode(NewMode);\r
956 if (EFI_ERROR(Status)) {\r
957 //\r
958 // Since PK is deleted successfully, Doesn't break, continue to update other variable.\r
959 //\r
960 DEBUG((EFI_D_ERROR, "Update SecureBootMode Variable fail %x\n", Status));\r
961 }\r
962 CopyMem (AuditVarData, &mSecureBootState[NewMode].AuditMode, sizeof(UINT8));\r
963\r
964 //\r
965 // Fall into SetupMode logic\r
966 //\r
967 case SecureBootModeTypeSetupMode:\r
968 //\r
969 // Since PK is deleted before , can't rollback, still update SecureBootMode in memory\r
970 //\r
971 mSecureBootMode = NewMode;\r
972 Status = EFI_SUCCESS;\r
973\r
974 //\r
975 // UserMode ----> SetupMode\r
976 // Side Effects\r
977 // DeployedMode :=0 / SetupMode :=1 / SecureBoot :=0\r
978 //\r
979 // Update the value of SetupMode variable by a simple mem copy, this could avoid possible\r
980 // variable storage reclaim at runtime.\r
981 //\r
982 CopyMem (SetupVarData, &mSecureBootState[NewMode].SetupMode, sizeof(UINT8));\r
983\r
984 if (mAuthVarLibContextIn->AtRuntime ()) {\r
985 //\r
986 // SecureBoot Variable indicates whether the platform firmware is operating\r
987 // in Secure boot mode (1) or not (0), so we should not change SecureBoot\r
988 // Variable in runtime.\r
989 //\r
990 return Status;\r
991 }\r
992\r
993 //\r
994 // Update the value of SecureBoot variable by a simple mem copy, this could avoid possible\r
995 // variable storage reclaim at runtime.\r
996 //\r
997 CopyMem (SecureBootVarData, &mSecureBootState[NewMode].SecureBoot, sizeof(UINT8));\r
998\r
999 //\r
1000 // Delete the "SecureBootEnable" variable as secure boot is Disabled.\r
1001 //\r
1002 SecureBootEnable = SECURE_BOOT_DISABLE;\r
1003 AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariable (\r
1004 EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME,\r
1005 &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid,\r
1006 &SecureBootEnable,\r
1007 0,\r
1008 EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS\r
1009 );\r
1010\r
1011 break;\r
1012\r
1013 default:\r
1014 DEBUG((EFI_D_ERROR, "Invalid state tranition from %x to %x\n", SecureBootModeTypeUserMode, NewMode));\r
1015 ASSERT(FALSE);\r
1016 }\r
1017\r
1018 return Status;\r
1019}\r
1020\r
1021/**\r
1022 Current secure boot mode is SetupMode. This function performs secure boot mode transition\r
1023 to a new mode.\r
1024\r
1025 @param[in] NewMode New Secure Boot Mode.\r
1026\r
1027 @retval EFI_SUCCESS The initialization operation is successful.\r
1028 @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES There is not enough resource.\r
1029\r
1030**/\r
1031EFI_STATUS\r
1032TransitionFromSetupMode(\r
1033 IN SECURE_BOOT_MODE_TYPE NewMode\r
1034 )\r
1035{\r
1036 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
1037 UINT8 *AuditVarData;\r
1038 UINT8 *SetupVarData;\r
1039 UINT8 *SecureBootVarData;\r
1040 UINT8 SecureBootEnable;\r
1041 UINTN DataSize;\r
1042\r
1043 //\r
1044 // AuditMode/DeployedMode/SetupMode/SecureBoot are all NON_NV variable maintained by Variable driver\r
1045 // they can be RW. but can't be deleted. so they can always be found.\r
1046 //\r
1047 Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (\r
1048 EFI_AUDIT_MODE_NAME,\r
1049 &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
1050 &AuditVarData,\r
1051 &DataSize\r
1052 );\r
1053 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
1054 ASSERT(FALSE);\r
1055 }\r
1056\r
1057 Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (\r
1058 EFI_SETUP_MODE_NAME,\r
1059 &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
1060 &SetupVarData,\r
1061 &DataSize\r
1062 );\r
1063 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
1064 ASSERT(FALSE);\r
1065 }\r
1066\r
1067 Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (\r
1068 EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME,\r
1069 &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
1070 &SecureBootVarData,\r
1071 &DataSize\r
1072 );\r
1073 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
1074 ASSERT(FALSE);\r
1075 }\r
1076\r
1077 //\r
1078 // Make Secure Boot Mode transition ATOMIC\r
1079 // Update Private NV SecureBootMode Variable first, because it may fail due to NV range overflow.\r
1080 // Other tranisition logic are all memory operations and PK delete is assumed to be always successful.\r
1081 //\r
1082 Status = UpdateSecureBootMode(NewMode);\r
1083 if (EFI_ERROR(Status)) {\r
1084 DEBUG((EFI_D_ERROR, "Update SecureBootMode Variable fail %x\n", Status));\r
1085 }\r
1086\r
1087 switch(NewMode) {\r
1088 case SecureBootModeTypeAuditMode:\r
1089 //\r
1090 // UpdateSecureBootMode fails and no other variables are updated before. rollback this transition\r
1091 //\r
1092 if (EFI_ERROR(Status)) {\r
1093 return Status;\r
1094 }\r
1095\r
1096 //\r
1097 // SetupMode ----> AuditMode\r
1098 // Side Effects\r
1099 // AuditMode := 1\r
1100 //\r
1101 // Update the value of AuditMode variable by a simple mem copy, this could avoid possible\r
1102 // variable storage reclaim at runtime.\r
1103 //\r
1104 CopyMem (AuditVarData, &mSecureBootState[NewMode].AuditMode, sizeof(UINT8));\r
1105 break;\r
1106\r
1107 case SecureBootModeTypeUserMode:\r
1108 //\r
1109 // Since PK is enrolled before, can't rollback, still update SecureBootMode in memory\r
1110 //\r
1111 mSecureBootMode = NewMode;\r
1112 Status = EFI_SUCCESS;\r
1113\r
1114 //\r
1115 // SetupMode ----> UserMode\r
1116 // Side Effects\r
1117 // SetupMode := 0 / SecureBoot := 1\r
1118 //\r
1119 // Update the value of AuditMode variable by a simple mem copy, this could avoid possible\r
1120 // variable storage reclaim at runtime.\r
1121 //\r
1122 CopyMem (SetupVarData, &mSecureBootState[NewMode].SetupMode, sizeof(UINT8));\r
1123\r
1124 if (mAuthVarLibContextIn->AtRuntime ()) {\r
1125 //\r
1126 // SecureBoot Variable indicates whether the platform firmware is operating\r
1127 // in Secure boot mode (1) or not (0), so we should not change SecureBoot\r
1128 // Variable in runtime.\r
1129 //\r
1130 return Status;\r
1131 }\r
1132\r
1133 //\r
1134 // Update the value of SecureBoot variable by a simple mem copy, this could avoid possible\r
1135 // variable storage reclaim at runtime.\r
1136 //\r
1137 CopyMem (SecureBootVarData, &mSecureBootState[NewMode].SecureBoot, sizeof(UINT8));\r
1138\r
1139 //\r
1140 // Create the "SecureBootEnable" variable as secure boot is enabled.\r
1141 //\r
1142 SecureBootEnable = SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE;\r
1143 AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariable (\r
1144 EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME,\r
1145 &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid,\r
1146 &SecureBootEnable,\r
1147 sizeof (SecureBootEnable),\r
1148 EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS\r
1149 );\r
1150 break;\r
1151\r
1152 default:\r
1153 DEBUG((EFI_D_ERROR, "Invalid state tranition from %x to %x\n", SecureBootModeTypeSetupMode, NewMode));\r
1154 ASSERT(FALSE);\r
1155 }\r
1156\r
1157 return Status;\r
a6811666
SZ		 1158}\r
1159\r
1160/**\r
4fc08e8d 1161 This function performs main secure boot mode transition logic.\r
a6811666 1162\r
4fc08e8d
CZ		 1163 @param[in] CurMode Current Secure Boot Mode.\r
1164 @param[in] NewMode New Secure Boot Mode.\r
a6811666 1165\r
4fc08e8d 1166 @retval EFI_SUCCESS The initialization operation is successful.\r
a6811666 1167 @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES There is not enough resource.\r
4fc08e8d 1168 @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER The Current Secure Boot Mode is wrong.\r
a6811666
SZ		 1169\r
1170**/\r
1171EFI_STATUS\r
4fc08e8d
CZ		 1172SecureBootModeTransition(\r
1173 IN SECURE_BOOT_MODE_TYPE CurMode,\r
1174 IN SECURE_BOOT_MODE_TYPE NewMode\r
a6811666
SZ		 1175 )\r
1176{\r
4fc08e8d 1177 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
a6811666
SZ		 1178\r
1179 //\r
4fc08e8d 1180 // SecureBootMode transition\r
a6811666 1181 //\r
4fc08e8d
CZ		 1182 switch (CurMode) {\r
1183 case SecureBootModeTypeUserMode:\r
1184 Status = TransitionFromUserMode(NewMode);\r
1185 break;\r
1186\r
1187 case SecureBootModeTypeSetupMode:\r
1188 Status = TransitionFromSetupMode(NewMode);\r
1189 break;\r
1190\r
1191 case SecureBootModeTypeAuditMode:\r
1192 Status = TransitionFromAuditMode(NewMode);\r
1193 break;\r
1194\r
1195 case SecureBootModeTypeDeployedMode:\r
1196 Status = TransitionFromDeployedMode(NewMode);\r
1197 break;\r
1198\r
1199 default:\r
1200 Status = EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
1201 ASSERT(FALSE);\r
a6811666
SZ		 1202 }\r
1203\r
4fc08e8d
CZ		 1204 return Status;\r
1205\r
a6811666
SZ		 1206}\r
1207\r
1208/**\r
1209 Determine whether this operation needs a physical present user.\r
1210\r
1211 @param[in] VariableName Name of the Variable.\r
1212 @param[in] VendorGuid GUID of the Variable.\r
1213\r
1214 @retval TRUE This variable is protected, only a physical present user could set this variable.\r
1215 @retval FALSE This variable is not protected.\r
1216\r
1217**/\r
1218BOOLEAN\r
1219NeedPhysicallyPresent(\r
1220 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r
1221 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid\r
1222 )\r
1223{\r
1224 if ((CompareGuid (VendorGuid, &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid) && (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME) == 0))\r
1225 || (CompareGuid (VendorGuid, &gEfiCustomModeEnableGuid) && (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_CUSTOM_MODE_NAME) == 0))) {\r
1226 return TRUE;\r
1227 }\r
1228\r
1229 return FALSE;\r
1230}\r
1231\r
1232/**\r
1233 Determine whether the platform is operating in Custom Secure Boot mode.\r
1234\r
1235 @retval TRUE The platform is operating in Custom mode.\r
1236 @retval FALSE The platform is operating in Standard mode.\r
1237\r
1238**/\r
1239BOOLEAN\r
1240InCustomMode (\r
1241 VOID\r
1242 )\r
1243{\r
1244 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
1245 VOID *Data;\r
1246 UINTN DataSize;\r
1247\r
1248 Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (EFI_CUSTOM_MODE_NAME, &gEfiCustomModeEnableGuid, &Data, &DataSize);\r
1249 if (!EFI_ERROR (Status) && (*(UINT8 *) Data == CUSTOM_SECURE_BOOT_MODE)) {\r
1250 return TRUE;\r
1251 }\r
1252\r
1253 return FALSE;\r
1254}\r
1255\r
1256/**\r
1257 Get available public key index.\r
1258\r
1259 @param[in] PubKey Pointer to Public Key data.\r
1260\r
1261 @return Public key index, 0 if no any public key index available.\r
1262\r
1263**/\r
1264UINT32\r
1265GetAvailableKeyIndex (\r
1266 IN UINT8 *PubKey\r
1267 )\r
1268{\r
1269 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
1270 UINT8 *Data;\r
1271 UINTN DataSize;\r
1272 UINT8 *Ptr;\r
1273 UINT32 Index;\r
1274 BOOLEAN IsFound;\r
1275 EFI_GUID VendorGuid;\r
1276 CHAR16 Name[1];\r
1277 AUTH_VARIABLE_INFO AuthVariableInfo;\r
1278 UINT32 KeyIndex;\r
1279\r
1280 Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (\r
1281 AUTHVAR_KEYDB_NAME,\r
1282 &gEfiAuthenticatedVariableGuid,\r
1283 (VOID **) &Data,\r
1284 &DataSize\r
1285 );\r
1286 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
1287 DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Get public key database variable failure, Status = %r\n", Status));\r
1288 return 0;\r
1289 }\r
1290\r
1291 if (mPubKeyNumber == mMaxKeyNumber) {\r
1292 Name[0] = 0;\r
1293 AuthVariableInfo.VariableName = Name;\r
1294 ZeroMem (&VendorGuid, sizeof (VendorGuid));\r
1295 AuthVariableInfo.VendorGuid = &VendorGuid;\r
1296 mPubKeyNumber = 0;\r
1297 //\r
1298 // Collect valid key data.\r
1299 //\r
1300 do {\r
1301 Status = mAuthVarLibContextIn->FindNextVariable (AuthVariableInfo.VariableName, AuthVariableInfo.VendorGuid, &AuthVariableInfo);\r
1302 if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
1303 if (AuthVariableInfo.PubKeyIndex != 0) {\r
1304 for (Ptr = Data; Ptr < (Data + DataSize); Ptr += sizeof (AUTHVAR_KEY_DB_DATA)) {\r
1305 if (ReadUnaligned32 (&(((AUTHVAR_KEY_DB_DATA *) Ptr)->KeyIndex)) == AuthVariableInfo.PubKeyIndex) {\r
1306 //\r
1307 // Check if the key data has been collected.\r
1308 //\r
1309 for (Index = 0; Index < mPubKeyNumber; Index++) {\r
1310 if (ReadUnaligned32 (&(((AUTHVAR_KEY_DB_DATA *) mPubKeyStore + Index)->KeyIndex)) == AuthVariableInfo.PubKeyIndex) {\r
1311 break;\r
1312 }\r
1313 }\r
1314 if (Index == mPubKeyNumber) {\r
1315 //\r
1316 // New key data.\r
1317 //\r
1318 CopyMem ((AUTHVAR_KEY_DB_DATA *) mPubKeyStore + mPubKeyNumber, Ptr, sizeof (AUTHVAR_KEY_DB_DATA));\r
1319 mPubKeyNumber++;\r
1320 }\r
1321 break;\r
1322 }\r
1323 }\r
1324 }\r
1325 }\r
1326 } while (Status != EFI_NOT_FOUND);\r
1327\r
1328 //\r
1329 // No available space to add new public key.\r
1330 //\r
1331 if (mPubKeyNumber == mMaxKeyNumber) {\r
1332 return 0;\r
1333 }\r
1334 }\r
1335\r
1336 //\r
1337 // Find available public key index.\r
1338 //\r
1339 for (KeyIndex = 1; KeyIndex <= mMaxKeyNumber; KeyIndex++) {\r
1340 IsFound = FALSE;\r
1341 for (Ptr = mPubKeyStore; Ptr < (mPubKeyStore + mPubKeyNumber * sizeof (AUTHVAR_KEY_DB_DATA)); Ptr += sizeof (AUTHVAR_KEY_DB_DATA)) {\r
1342 if (ReadUnaligned32 (&(((AUTHVAR_KEY_DB_DATA *) Ptr)->KeyIndex)) == KeyIndex) {\r
1343 IsFound = TRUE;\r
1344 break;\r
1345 }\r
1346 }\r
1347 if (!IsFound) {\r
1348 break;\r
1349 }\r
1350 }\r
1351\r
1352 return KeyIndex;\r
1353}\r
1354\r
1355/**\r
1356 Add public key in store and return its index.\r
1357\r
1358 @param[in] PubKey Input pointer to Public Key data.\r
1359 @param[in] VariableDataEntry The variable data entry.\r
1360\r
1361 @return Index of new added public key.\r
1362\r
1363**/\r
1364UINT32\r
1365AddPubKeyInStore (\r
1366 IN UINT8 *PubKey,\r
1367 IN VARIABLE_ENTRY_CONSISTENCY *VariableDataEntry\r
1368 )\r
1369{\r
1370 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
1371 UINT32 Index;\r
1372 VARIABLE_ENTRY_CONSISTENCY PublicKeyEntry;\r
1373 UINT32 Attributes;\r
1374 UINT32 KeyIndex;\r
1375\r
1376 if (PubKey == NULL) {\r
1377 return 0;\r
1378 }\r
1379\r
1380 //\r
1381 // Check whether the public key entry does exist.\r
1382 //\r
1383 for (Index = 0; Index < mPubKeyNumber; Index++) {\r
1384 if (CompareMem (((AUTHVAR_KEY_DB_DATA *) mPubKeyStore + Index)->KeyData, PubKey, EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE) == 0) {\r
1385 return ReadUnaligned32 (&(((AUTHVAR_KEY_DB_DATA *) mPubKeyStore + Index)->KeyIndex));\r
1386 }\r
1387 }\r
1388\r
1389 KeyIndex = GetAvailableKeyIndex (PubKey);\r
1390 if (KeyIndex == 0) {\r
1391 return 0;\r
1392 }\r
1393\r
1394 //\r
1395 // Check the variable space for both public key and variable data.\r
1396 //\r
1397 PublicKeyEntry.VariableSize = (mPubKeyNumber + 1) * sizeof (AUTHVAR_KEY_DB_DATA);\r
1398 PublicKeyEntry.Guid = &gEfiAuthenticatedVariableGuid;\r
1399 PublicKeyEntry.Name = AUTHVAR_KEYDB_NAME;\r
1400 Attributes = VARIABLE_ATTRIBUTE_NV_BS_RT | EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS;\r
1401\r
1402 if (!mAuthVarLibContextIn->CheckRemainingSpaceForConsistency (Attributes, &PublicKeyEntry, VariableDataEntry, NULL)) {\r
1403 //\r
1404 // No enough variable space.\r
1405 //\r
1406 return 0;\r
1407 }\r
1408\r
1409 WriteUnaligned32 (&(((AUTHVAR_KEY_DB_DATA *) mPubKeyStore + mPubKeyNumber)->KeyIndex), KeyIndex);\r
1410 CopyMem (((AUTHVAR_KEY_DB_DATA *) mPubKeyStore + mPubKeyNumber)->KeyData, PubKey, EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE);\r
1411 mPubKeyNumber++;\r
1412\r
1413 //\r
1414 // Update public key database variable.\r
1415 //\r
1416 Status = AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariable (\r
1417 AUTHVAR_KEYDB_NAME,\r
1418 &gEfiAuthenticatedVariableGuid,\r
1419 mPubKeyStore,\r
1420 mPubKeyNumber * sizeof (AUTHVAR_KEY_DB_DATA),\r
1421 Attributes\r
1422 );\r
1423 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
1424 DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Update public key database variable failure, Status = %r\n", Status));\r
1425 return 0;\r
1426 }\r
1427\r
1428 return KeyIndex;\r
1429}\r
1430\r
1431/**\r
1432 Verify data payload with AuthInfo in EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SHA256_GUID type.\r
1433 Follow the steps in UEFI2.2.\r
1434\r
1435 Caution: This function may receive untrusted input.\r
1436 This function may be invoked in SMM mode, and datasize and data are external input.\r
1437 This function will do basic validation, before parse the data.\r
1438 This function will parse the authentication carefully to avoid security issues, like\r
1439 buffer overflow, integer overflow.\r
1440\r
1441 @param[in] Data Pointer to data with AuthInfo.\r
1442 @param[in] DataSize Size of Data.\r
1443 @param[in] PubKey Public key used for verification.\r
1444\r
1445 @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.\r
1446 @retval EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION If authentication failed.\r
1447 @retval EFI_SUCCESS Authentication successful.\r
1448\r
1449**/\r
1450EFI_STATUS\r
1451VerifyCounterBasedPayload (\r
1452 IN UINT8 *Data,\r
1453 IN UINTN DataSize,\r
1454 IN UINT8 *PubKey\r
1455 )\r
1456{\r
1457 BOOLEAN Status;\r
1458 EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION *CertData;\r
1459 EFI_CERT_BLOCK_RSA_2048_SHA256 *CertBlock;\r
1460 UINT8 Digest[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE];\r
1461 VOID *Rsa;\r
1462 UINTN PayloadSize;\r
1463\r
1464 PayloadSize = DataSize - AUTHINFO_SIZE;\r
1465 Rsa = NULL;\r
1466 CertData = NULL;\r
1467 CertBlock = NULL;\r
1468\r
1469 if (Data == NULL || PubKey == NULL) {\r
1470 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
1471 }\r
1472\r
1473 CertData = (EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION *) Data;\r
1474 CertBlock = (EFI_CERT_BLOCK_RSA_2048_SHA256 *) (CertData->AuthInfo.CertData);\r
1475\r
1476 //\r
1477 // wCertificateType should be WIN_CERT_TYPE_EFI_GUID.\r
1478 // Cert type should be EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SHA256_GUID.\r
1479 //\r
1480 if ((CertData->AuthInfo.Hdr.wCertificateType != WIN_CERT_TYPE_EFI_GUID) ||\r
1481 !CompareGuid (&CertData->AuthInfo.CertType, &gEfiCertTypeRsa2048Sha256Guid)) {\r
1482 //\r
1483 // Invalid AuthInfo type, return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION.\r
1484 //\r
1485 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r
1486 }\r
1487 //\r
1488 // Hash data payload with SHA256.\r
1489 //\r
1490 ZeroMem (Digest, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE);\r
1491 Status = Sha256Init (mHashCtx);\r
1492 if (!Status) {\r
1493 goto Done;\r
1494 }\r
1495 Status = Sha256Update (mHashCtx, Data + AUTHINFO_SIZE, PayloadSize);\r
1496 if (!Status) {\r
1497 goto Done;\r
1498 }\r
1499 //\r
1500 // Hash Size.\r
1501 //\r
1502 Status = Sha256Update (mHashCtx, &PayloadSize, sizeof (UINTN));\r
1503 if (!Status) {\r
1504 goto Done;\r
1505 }\r
1506 //\r
1507 // Hash Monotonic Count.\r
1508 //\r
1509 Status = Sha256Update (mHashCtx, &CertData->MonotonicCount, sizeof (UINT64));\r
1510 if (!Status) {\r
1511 goto Done;\r
1512 }\r
1513 Status = Sha256Final (mHashCtx, Digest);\r
1514 if (!Status) {\r
1515 goto Done;\r
1516 }\r
1517 //\r
1518 // Generate & Initialize RSA Context.\r
1519 //\r
1520 Rsa = RsaNew ();\r
1521 ASSERT (Rsa != NULL);\r
1522 //\r
1523 // Set RSA Key Components.\r
1524 // NOTE: Only N and E are needed to be set as RSA public key for signature verification.\r
1525 //\r
1526 Status = RsaSetKey (Rsa, RsaKeyN, PubKey, EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE);\r
1527 if (!Status) {\r
1528 goto Done;\r
1529 }\r
1530 Status = RsaSetKey (Rsa, RsaKeyE, mRsaE, sizeof (mRsaE));\r
1531 if (!Status) {\r
1532 goto Done;\r
1533 }\r
1534 //\r
1535 // Verify the signature.\r
1536 //\r
1537 Status = RsaPkcs1Verify (\r
1538 Rsa,\r
1539 Digest,\r
1540 SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE,\r
1541 CertBlock->Signature,\r
1542 EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SHA256_SIZE\r
1543 );\r
1544\r
1545Done:\r
1546 if (Rsa != NULL) {\r
1547 RsaFree (Rsa);\r
1548 }\r
1549 if (Status) {\r
1550 return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
1551 } else {\r
1552 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r
1553 }\r
1554}\r
1555\r
a6811666
SZ		 1556\r
1557/**\r
1558 Check input data form to make sure it is a valid EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST for PK/KEK/db/dbx/dbt variable.\r
1559\r
1560 @param[in] VariableName Name of Variable to be check.\r
1561 @param[in] VendorGuid Variable vendor GUID.\r
1562 @param[in] Data Point to the variable data to be checked.\r
1563 @param[in] DataSize Size of Data.\r
1564\r
1565 @return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid signature list format.\r
1566 @return EFI_SUCCESS Passed signature list format check successfully.\r
1567\r
1568**/\r
1569EFI_STATUS\r
1570CheckSignatureListFormat(\r
1571 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r
1572 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r
1573 IN VOID *Data,\r
1574 IN UINTN DataSize\r
1575 )\r
1576{\r
1577 EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *SigList;\r
1578 UINTN SigDataSize;\r
1579 UINT32 Index;\r
1580 UINT32 SigCount;\r
1581 BOOLEAN IsPk;\r
1582 VOID *RsaContext;\r
1583 EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *CertData;\r
1584 UINTN CertLen;\r
1585\r
1586 if (DataSize == 0) {\r
1587 return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
1588 }\r
1589\r
1590 ASSERT (VariableName != NULL && VendorGuid != NULL && Data != NULL);\r
1591\r
1592 if (CompareGuid (VendorGuid, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid) && (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME) == 0)){\r
1593 IsPk = TRUE;\r
1594 } else if ((CompareGuid (VendorGuid, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid) && (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME) == 0)) ||\r
1595 (CompareGuid (VendorGuid, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid) &&\r
1596 ((StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE) == 0) || (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1) == 0) ||\r
1597 (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE2) == 0)))) {\r
1598 IsPk = FALSE;\r
1599 } else {\r
1600 return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
1601 }\r
1602\r
1603 SigCount = 0;\r
1604 SigList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) Data;\r
1605 SigDataSize = DataSize;\r
1606 RsaContext = NULL;\r
1607\r
1608 //\r
1609 // Walk throuth the input signature list and check the data format.\r
1610 // If any signature is incorrectly formed, the whole check will fail.\r
1611 //\r
1612 while ((SigDataSize > 0) && (SigDataSize >= SigList->SignatureListSize)) {\r
1613 for (Index = 0; Index < (sizeof (mSupportSigItem) / sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_ITEM)); Index++ ) {\r
1614 if (CompareGuid (&SigList->SignatureType, &mSupportSigItem[Index].SigType)) {\r
1615 //\r
1616 // The value of SignatureSize should always be 16 (size of SignatureOwner\r
1617 // component) add the data length according to signature type.\r
1618 //\r
1619 if (mSupportSigItem[Index].SigDataSize != ((UINT32) ~0) &&\r
1620 (SigList->SignatureSize - sizeof (EFI_GUID)) != mSupportSigItem[Index].SigDataSize) {\r
1621 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
1622 }\r
1623 if (mSupportSigItem[Index].SigHeaderSize != ((UINT32) ~0) &&\r
1624 SigList->SignatureHeaderSize != mSupportSigItem[Index].SigHeaderSize) {\r
1625 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
1626 }\r
1627 break;\r
1628 }\r
1629 }\r
1630\r
1631 if (Index == (sizeof (mSupportSigItem) / sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_ITEM))) {\r
1632 //\r
1633 // Undefined signature type.\r
1634 //\r
1635 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
1636 }\r
1637\r
1638 if (CompareGuid (&SigList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Guid)) {\r
1639 //\r
1640 // Try to retrieve the RSA public key from the X.509 certificate.\r
1641 // If this operation fails, it's not a valid certificate.\r
1642 //\r
1643 RsaContext = RsaNew ();\r
1644 if (RsaContext == NULL) {\r
1645 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
1646 }\r
1647 CertData = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) SigList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + SigList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r
1648 CertLen = SigList->SignatureSize - sizeof (EFI_GUID);\r
1649 if (!RsaGetPublicKeyFromX509 (CertData->SignatureData, CertLen, &RsaContext)) {\r
1650 RsaFree (RsaContext);\r
1651 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
1652 }\r
1653 RsaFree (RsaContext);\r
1654 }\r
1655\r
1656 if ((SigList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - SigList->SignatureHeaderSize) % SigList->SignatureSize != 0) {\r
1657 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
1658 }\r
1659 SigCount += (SigList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - SigList->SignatureHeaderSize) / SigList->SignatureSize;\r
1660\r
1661 SigDataSize -= SigList->SignatureListSize;\r
1662 SigList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) SigList + SigList->SignatureListSize);\r
1663 }\r
1664\r
1665 if (((UINTN) SigList - (UINTN) Data) != DataSize) {\r
1666 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
1667 }\r
1668\r
1669 if (IsPk && SigCount > 1) {\r
1670 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
1671 }\r
1672\r
1673 return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
1674}\r
1675\r
1676/**\r
1677 Update "VendorKeys" variable to record the out of band secure boot key modification.\r
1678\r
1679 @return EFI_SUCCESS Variable is updated successfully.\r
1680 @return Others Failed to update variable.\r
1681\r
1682**/\r
1683EFI_STATUS\r
1684VendorKeyIsModified (\r
1685 VOID\r
1686 )\r
1687{\r
1688 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
1689\r
1690 if (mVendorKeyState == VENDOR_KEYS_MODIFIED) {\r
1691 return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
1692 }\r
1693 mVendorKeyState = VENDOR_KEYS_MODIFIED;\r
1694\r
1695 Status = AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariable (\r
1696 EFI_VENDOR_KEYS_NV_VARIABLE_NAME,\r
1697 &gEfiVendorKeysNvGuid,\r
1698 &mVendorKeyState,\r
1699 sizeof (UINT8),\r
1700 EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS\r
1701 );\r
1702 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
1703 return Status;\r
1704 }\r
1705\r
1706 return AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariable (\r
1707 EFI_VENDOR_KEYS_VARIABLE_NAME,\r
1708 &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
1709 &mVendorKeyState,\r
1710 sizeof (UINT8),\r
1711 EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS\r
1712 );\r
1713}\r
1714\r
4fc08e8d
CZ		 1715/**\r
1716 Process Secure Boot Mode variable.\r
1717\r
1718 Caution: This function may receive untrusted input.\r
1719 This function may be invoked in SMM mode, and datasize and data are external input.\r
1720 This function will do basic validation, before parse the data.\r
1721 This function will parse the authentication carefully to avoid security issues, like\r
1722 buffer overflow, integer overflow.\r
1723 This function will check attribute carefully to avoid authentication bypass.\r
1724\r
1725 @param[in] VariableName Name of Variable to be found.\r
1726 @param[in] VendorGuid Variable vendor GUID.\r
1727 @param[in] Data Data pointer.\r
1728 @param[in] DataSize Size of Data found. If size is less than the\r
1729 data, this value contains the required size.\r
1730 @param[in] Attributes Attribute value of the variable\r
1731\r
1732 @return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter\r
1733 @return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION The variable does NOT pass the validation\r
1734 check carried out by the firmware.\r
1735 @return EFI_WRITE_PROTECTED Variable is Read-Only.\r
1736 @return EFI_SUCCESS Variable passed validation successfully.\r
1737\r
1738**/\r
1739EFI_STATUS\r
1740ProcessSecureBootModeVar (\r
1741 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r
1742 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r
1743 IN VOID *Data,\r
1744 IN UINTN DataSize,\r
1745 IN UINT32 Attributes OPTIONAL\r
1746 )\r
1747{\r
1748 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
1749 UINT8 *VarData;\r
1750 UINTN VarDataSize;\r
1751\r
1752 //\r
1753 // Check "AuditMode", "DeployedMode" Variable ReadWrite Attributes\r
1754 // if in Runtime, Always RO\r
1755 // if in Boottime, Depends on current Secure Boot Mode\r
1756 //\r
1757 if (mAuthVarLibContextIn->AtRuntime()) {\r
1758 return EFI_WRITE_PROTECTED;\r
1759 }\r
1760\r
1761 //\r
1762 // Delete not OK\r
1763 //\r
1764 if ((DataSize != sizeof(UINT8)) || (Attributes == 0)) {\r
1765 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
1766 }\r
1767\r
1768 if (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_AUDIT_MODE_NAME) == 0) {\r
1769 if(mSecureBootState[mSecureBootMode].IsAuditModeRO) {\r
1770 return EFI_WRITE_PROTECTED;\r
1771 }\r
1772 } else {\r
1773 //\r
1774 // Platform specific deployedMode clear. Set DeployedMode = RW\r
1775 //\r
1776 if (!InCustomMode() || !UserPhysicalPresent() || mSecureBootMode != SecureBootModeTypeDeployedMode) {\r
1777 if(mSecureBootState[mSecureBootMode].IsDeployedModeRO) {\r
1778 return EFI_WRITE_PROTECTED;\r
1779 }\r
1780 }\r
1781 }\r
1782\r
1783 if (*(UINT8 *)Data != 0 && *(UINT8 *)Data != 1) {\r
1784 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
1785 }\r
1786\r
1787 //\r
1788 // AuditMode/DeployedMode/SetupMode/SecureBoot are all NON_NV variable maintained by Variable driver\r
1789 // they can be RW. but can't be deleted. so they can always be found.\r
1790 //\r
1791 Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (\r
1792 VariableName,\r
1793 VendorGuid,\r
1794 &VarData,\r
1795 &VarDataSize\r
1796 );\r
1797 if (EFI_ERROR(Status)) {\r
1798 ASSERT(FALSE);\r
1799 }\r
1800\r
1801 //\r
1802 // If AuditMode/DeployedMode is assigned same value. Simply return EFI_SUCCESS\r
1803 //\r
1804 if (*VarData == *(UINT8 *)Data) {\r
1805 return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
1806 }\r
1807\r
1808 //\r
1809 // Perform SecureBootMode transition\r
1810 //\r
1811 if (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_AUDIT_MODE_NAME) == 0) {\r
1812 DEBUG((EFI_D_INFO, "Current SecureBootMode %x Transfer to SecureBootMode %x\n", mSecureBootMode, SecureBootModeTypeAuditMode));\r
1813 return SecureBootModeTransition(mSecureBootMode, SecureBootModeTypeAuditMode);\r
1814 } else if (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_DEPLOYED_MODE_NAME) == 0) {\r
1815 if (mSecureBootMode == SecureBootModeTypeDeployedMode) {\r
1816 //\r
1817 // Platform specific DeployedMode clear. InCustomMode() && UserPhysicalPresent() is checked before\r
1818 //\r
1819 DEBUG((EFI_D_INFO, "Current SecureBootMode %x. Transfer to SecureBootMode %x\n", mSecureBootMode, SecureBootModeTypeUserMode));\r
1820 return SecureBootModeTransition(mSecureBootMode, SecureBootModeTypeUserMode);\r
1821 } else {\r
1822 DEBUG((EFI_D_INFO, "Current SecureBootMode %x. Transfer to SecureBootMode %x\n", mSecureBootMode, SecureBootModeTypeDeployedMode));\r
1823 return SecureBootModeTransition(mSecureBootMode, SecureBootModeTypeDeployedMode);\r
1824 }\r
1825 }\r
1826\r
1827 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
1828}\r
1829\r
a6811666
SZ		 1830/**\r
1831 Process variable with platform key for verification.\r
1832\r
1833 Caution: This function may receive untrusted input.\r
1834 This function may be invoked in SMM mode, and datasize and data are external input.\r
1835 This function will do basic validation, before parse the data.\r
1836 This function will parse the authentication carefully to avoid security issues, like\r
1837 buffer overflow, integer overflow.\r
1838 This function will check attribute carefully to avoid authentication bypass.\r
1839\r
1840 @param[in] VariableName Name of Variable to be found.\r
1841 @param[in] VendorGuid Variable vendor GUID.\r
1842 @param[in] Data Data pointer.\r
1843 @param[in] DataSize Size of Data found. If size is less than the\r
1844 data, this value contains the required size.\r
1845 @param[in] Attributes Attribute value of the variable\r
1846 @param[in] IsPk Indicate whether it is to process pk.\r
1847\r
1848 @return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.\r
1849 @return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION The variable does NOT pass the validation.\r
1850 check carried out by the firmware.\r
1851 @return EFI_SUCCESS Variable passed validation successfully.\r
1852\r
1853**/\r
1854EFI_STATUS\r
1855ProcessVarWithPk (\r
1856 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r
1857 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r
1858 IN VOID *Data,\r
1859 IN UINTN DataSize,\r
1860 IN UINT32 Attributes OPTIONAL,\r
1861 IN BOOLEAN IsPk\r
1862 )\r
1863{\r
1864 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
1865 BOOLEAN Del;\r
1866 UINT8 *Payload;\r
1867 UINTN PayloadSize;\r
4fc08e8d 1868 VARIABLE_ENTRY_CONSISTENCY VariableEntry[2];\r
a6811666
SZ		 1869\r
1870 if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE) == 0 ||\r
1871 (Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) == 0) {\r
1872 //\r
1873 // PK, KEK and db/dbx/dbt should set EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE attribute and should be a time-based\r
1874 // authenticated variable.\r
1875 //\r
1876 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
1877 }\r
1878\r
4fc08e8d
CZ		 1879 //\r
1880 // Init state of Del. State may change due to secure check\r
1881 //\r
a6811666 1882 Del = FALSE;\r
4fc08e8d
CZ		 1883 Payload = (UINT8 *) Data + AUTHINFO2_SIZE (Data);\r
1884 PayloadSize = DataSize - AUTHINFO2_SIZE (Data);\r
1885 if (PayloadSize == 0) {\r
1886 Del = TRUE;\r
1887 }\r
1888\r
1889 //\r
1890 // Check the variable space for both PKpub and SecureBootMode variable.\r
1891 //\r
1892 VariableEntry[0].VariableSize = PayloadSize;\r
1893 VariableEntry[0].Guid = &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid;\r
1894 VariableEntry[0].Name = EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME;\r
1895\r
1896 VariableEntry[1].VariableSize = sizeof(UINT8);\r
1897 VariableEntry[1].Guid = &gEdkiiSecureBootModeGuid;\r
1898 VariableEntry[1].Name = EDKII_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME;\r
1899\r
1900 if ((InCustomMode() && UserPhysicalPresent()) || \r
1901 (((mSecureBootMode == SecureBootModeTypeSetupMode) || (mSecureBootMode == SecureBootModeTypeAuditMode)) && !IsPk)) {\r
a6811666
SZ		 1902\r
1903 Status = CheckSignatureListFormat(VariableName, VendorGuid, Payload, PayloadSize);\r
1904 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
1905 return Status;\r
1906 }\r
1907\r
4fc08e8d
CZ		 1908 //\r
1909 // If delete PKpub, only check for "SecureBootMode" only\r
1910 // if update / add PKpub, check both NewPKpub & "SecureBootMode"\r
1911 //\r
1912 if (IsPk) {\r
1913 //\r
1914 // Delete PKpub\r
1915 //\r
1916 if (Del && ((mSecureBootMode == SecureBootModeTypeUserMode) || (mSecureBootMode == SecureBootModeTypeDeployedMode)) \r
1917 && !mAuthVarLibContextIn->CheckRemainingSpaceForConsistency (VARIABLE_ATTRIBUTE_NV_BS_RT, &VariableEntry[1], NULL)){\r
1918 return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
1919 //\r
1920 // Add PKpub\r
1921 //\r
1922 } else if (!Del && ((mSecureBootMode == SecureBootModeTypeSetupMode) || (mSecureBootMode == SecureBootModeTypeAuditMode))\r
1923 && !mAuthVarLibContextIn->CheckRemainingSpaceForConsistency (VARIABLE_ATTRIBUTE_NV_BS_RT, &VariableEntry[0], &VariableEntry[1], NULL)) {\r
1924 return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
1925 }\r
1926 }\r
1927\r
a6811666
SZ		 1928 Status = AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariableWithTimeStamp (\r
1929 VariableName,\r
1930 VendorGuid,\r
1931 Payload,\r
1932 PayloadSize,\r
1933 Attributes,\r
1934 &((EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 *) Data)->TimeStamp\r
1935 );\r
1936 if (EFI_ERROR(Status)) {\r
1937 return Status;\r
1938 }\r
1939\r
4fc08e8d 1940 if (((mSecureBootMode != SecureBootModeTypeSetupMode) && (mSecureBootMode != SecureBootModeTypeAuditMode)) || IsPk) {\r
a6811666
SZ		 1941 Status = VendorKeyIsModified ();\r
1942 }\r
4fc08e8d
CZ		 1943 } else if (mSecureBootMode == SecureBootModeTypeUserMode || mSecureBootMode == SecureBootModeTypeDeployedMode) {\r
1944 //\r
1945 // If delete PKpub, check "SecureBootMode" only\r
1946 //\r
1947 if (IsPk && Del && !mAuthVarLibContextIn->CheckRemainingSpaceForConsistency (VARIABLE_ATTRIBUTE_NV_BS_RT, &VariableEntry[1], NULL)){\r
1948 return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
1949 }\r
1950\r
a6811666
SZ		 1951 //\r
1952 // Verify against X509 Cert in PK database.\r
1953 //\r
1954 Status = VerifyTimeBasedPayloadAndUpdate (\r
1955 VariableName,\r
1956 VendorGuid,\r
1957 Data,\r
1958 DataSize,\r
1959 Attributes,\r
1960 AuthVarTypePk,\r
1961 &Del\r
1962 );\r
1963 } else {\r
1964 //\r
4fc08e8d 1965 // SetupMode or AuditMode to add PK\r
a6811666
SZ		 1966 // Verify against the certificate in data payload.\r
1967 //\r
4fc08e8d
CZ		 1968 //\r
1969 // Check PKpub & SecureBootMode variable space consistency\r
1970 //\r
1971 if (!mAuthVarLibContextIn->CheckRemainingSpaceForConsistency (VARIABLE_ATTRIBUTE_NV_BS_RT, &VariableEntry[0], &VariableEntry[1], NULL)) {\r
1972 //\r
1973 // No enough variable space to set PK successfully.\r
1974 //\r
1975 return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
1976 }\r
1977\r
a6811666
SZ		 1978 Status = VerifyTimeBasedPayloadAndUpdate (\r
1979 VariableName,\r
1980 VendorGuid,\r
1981 Data,\r
1982 DataSize,\r
1983 Attributes,\r
1984 AuthVarTypePayload,\r
1985 &Del\r
1986 );\r
1987 }\r
1988\r
1989 if (!EFI_ERROR(Status) && IsPk) {\r
4fc08e8d
CZ		 1990 //\r
1991 // Delete or Enroll PK causes SecureBootMode change\r
1992 //\r
1993 if (!Del) {\r
1994 if (mSecureBootMode == SecureBootModeTypeSetupMode) {\r
1995 //\r
1996 // If enroll PK in setup mode, change to user mode.\r
1997 //\r
1998 Status = SecureBootModeTransition (mSecureBootMode, SecureBootModeTypeUserMode);\r
1999 } else if (mSecureBootMode == SecureBootModeTypeAuditMode) {\r
2000 //\r
2001 // If enroll PK in Audit mode, change to Deployed mode.\r
2002 //\r
2003 Status = SecureBootModeTransition (mSecureBootMode, SecureBootModeTypeDeployedMode);\r
2004 } else {\r
2005 DEBUG((EFI_D_INFO, "PK is updated in %x mode. No SecureBootMode change.\n", mSecureBootMode));\r
2006 }\r
2007 } else {\r
2008 if ((mSecureBootMode == SecureBootModeTypeUserMode) || (mSecureBootMode == SecureBootModeTypeDeployedMode)) {\r
2009 //\r
2010 // If delete PK in User Mode or DeployedMode, change to Setup Mode.\r
2011 //\r
2012 Status = SecureBootModeTransition (mSecureBootMode, SecureBootModeTypeSetupMode);\r
2013 }\r
a6811666
SZ		 2014 }\r
2015 }\r
2016\r
2017 return Status;\r
2018}\r
2019\r
2020/**\r
2021 Process variable with key exchange key for verification.\r
2022\r
2023 Caution: This function may receive untrusted input.\r
2024 This function may be invoked in SMM mode, and datasize and data are external input.\r
2025 This function will do basic validation, before parse the data.\r
2026 This function will parse the authentication carefully to avoid security issues, like\r
2027 buffer overflow, integer overflow.\r
2028 This function will check attribute carefully to avoid authentication bypass.\r
2029\r
2030 @param[in] VariableName Name of Variable to be found.\r
2031 @param[in] VendorGuid Variable vendor GUID.\r
2032 @param[in] Data Data pointer.\r
2033 @param[in] DataSize Size of Data found. If size is less than the\r
2034 data, this value contains the required size.\r
2035 @param[in] Attributes Attribute value of the variable.\r
2036\r
2037 @return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.\r
2038 @return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION The variable does NOT pass the validation\r
2039 check carried out by the firmware.\r
2040 @return EFI_SUCCESS Variable pass validation successfully.\r
2041\r
2042**/\r
2043EFI_STATUS\r
2044ProcessVarWithKek (\r
2045 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r
2046 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r
2047 IN VOID *Data,\r
2048 IN UINTN DataSize,\r
2049 IN UINT32 Attributes OPTIONAL\r
2050 )\r
2051{\r
2052 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
2053 UINT8 *Payload;\r
2054 UINTN PayloadSize;\r
2055\r
2056 if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE) == 0 ||\r
2057 (Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) == 0) {\r
2058 //\r
2059 // DB, DBX and DBT should set EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE attribute and should be a time-based\r
2060 // authenticated variable.\r
2061 //\r
2062 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
2063 }\r
2064\r
2065 Status = EFI_SUCCESS;\r
4fc08e8d
CZ		 2066 if ((mSecureBootMode == SecureBootModeTypeUserMode || mSecureBootMode == SecureBootModeTypeDeployedMode)\r
2067 && !(InCustomMode() && UserPhysicalPresent())) {\r
a6811666
SZ		 2068 //\r
2069 // Time-based, verify against X509 Cert KEK.\r
2070 //\r
2071 return VerifyTimeBasedPayloadAndUpdate (\r
2072 VariableName,\r
2073 VendorGuid,\r
2074 Data,\r
2075 DataSize,\r
2076 Attributes,\r
2077 AuthVarTypeKek,\r
2078 NULL\r
2079 );\r
2080 } else {\r
2081 //\r
2082 // If in setup mode or custom secure boot mode, no authentication needed.\r
2083 //\r
2084 Payload = (UINT8 *) Data + AUTHINFO2_SIZE (Data);\r
2085 PayloadSize = DataSize - AUTHINFO2_SIZE (Data);\r
2086\r
2087 Status = CheckSignatureListFormat(VariableName, VendorGuid, Payload, PayloadSize);\r
2088 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
2089 return Status;\r
2090 }\r
2091\r
2092 Status = AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariableWithTimeStamp (\r
2093 VariableName,\r
2094 VendorGuid,\r
2095 Payload,\r
2096 PayloadSize,\r
2097 Attributes,\r
2098 &((EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 *) Data)->TimeStamp\r
2099 );\r
2100 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
2101 return Status;\r
2102 }\r
2103\r
4fc08e8d 2104 if ((mSecureBootMode != SecureBootModeTypeSetupMode) && (mSecureBootMode != SecureBootModeTypeAuditMode)) {\r
a6811666
SZ		 2105 Status = VendorKeyIsModified ();\r
2106 }\r
2107 }\r
2108\r
2109 return Status;\r
2110}\r
2111\r
2112/**\r
2113 Check if it is to delete auth variable.\r
2114\r
2115 @param[in] OrgAttributes Original attribute value of the variable.\r
2116 @param[in] Data Data pointer.\r
2117 @param[in] DataSize Size of Data.\r
2118 @param[in] Attributes Attribute value of the variable.\r
2119\r
2120 @retval TRUE It is to delete auth variable.\r
2121 @retval FALSE It is not to delete auth variable.\r
2122\r
2123**/\r
2124BOOLEAN\r
2125IsDeleteAuthVariable (\r
2126 IN UINT32 OrgAttributes,\r
2127 IN VOID *Data,\r
2128 IN UINTN DataSize,\r
2129 IN UINT32 Attributes\r
2130 )\r
2131{\r
2132 BOOLEAN Del;\r
2133 UINTN PayloadSize;\r
2134\r
2135 Del = FALSE;\r
2136\r
2137 //\r
2138 // To delete a variable created with the EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS\r
2139 // or the EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS attribute,\r
2140 // SetVariable must be used with attributes matching the existing variable\r
2141 // and the DataSize set to the size of the AuthInfo descriptor.\r
2142 //\r
2143 if ((Attributes == OrgAttributes) &&\r
2144 ((Attributes & (EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS)) != 0)) {\r
2145 if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0) {\r
2146 PayloadSize = DataSize - AUTHINFO2_SIZE (Data);\r
2147 if (PayloadSize == 0) {\r
2148 Del = TRUE;\r
2149 }\r
2150 } else {\r
2151 PayloadSize = DataSize - AUTHINFO_SIZE;\r
2152 if (PayloadSize == 0) {\r
2153 Del = TRUE;\r
2154 }\r
2155 }\r
2156 }\r
2157\r
2158 return Del;\r
2159}\r
2160\r
2161/**\r
2162 Process variable with EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS/EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS set\r
2163\r
2164 Caution: This function may receive untrusted input.\r
2165 This function may be invoked in SMM mode, and datasize and data are external input.\r
2166 This function will do basic validation, before parse the data.\r
2167 This function will parse the authentication carefully to avoid security issues, like\r
2168 buffer overflow, integer overflow.\r
2169 This function will check attribute carefully to avoid authentication bypass.\r
2170\r
2171 @param[in] VariableName Name of the variable.\r
2172 @param[in] VendorGuid Variable vendor GUID.\r
2173 @param[in] Data Data pointer.\r
2174 @param[in] DataSize Size of Data.\r
2175 @param[in] Attributes Attribute value of the variable.\r
2176\r
2177 @return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.\r
2178 @return EFI_WRITE_PROTECTED Variable is write-protected and needs authentication with\r
2179 EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS set.\r
2180 @return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES The Database to save the public key is full.\r
2181 @return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION The variable is with EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS\r
2182 set, but the AuthInfo does NOT pass the validation\r
2183 check carried out by the firmware.\r
2184 @return EFI_SUCCESS Variable is not write-protected or pass validation successfully.\r
2185\r
2186**/\r
2187EFI_STATUS\r
2188ProcessVariable (\r
2189 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r
2190 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r
2191 IN VOID *Data,\r
2192 IN UINTN DataSize,\r
2193 IN UINT32 Attributes OPTIONAL\r
2194 )\r
2195{\r
2196 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
2197 BOOLEAN IsDeletion;\r
2198 BOOLEAN IsFirstTime;\r
2199 UINT8 *PubKey;\r
2200 EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION *CertData;\r
2201 EFI_CERT_BLOCK_RSA_2048_SHA256 *CertBlock;\r
2202 UINT32 KeyIndex;\r
2203 UINT64 MonotonicCount;\r
2204 VARIABLE_ENTRY_CONSISTENCY VariableDataEntry;\r
2205 UINT32 Index;\r
2206 AUTH_VARIABLE_INFO OrgVariableInfo;\r
2207\r
2208 KeyIndex = 0;\r
2209 CertData = NULL;\r
2210 CertBlock = NULL;\r
2211 PubKey = NULL;\r
2212 IsDeletion = FALSE;\r
2213 Status = EFI_SUCCESS;\r
2214\r
2215 ZeroMem (&OrgVariableInfo, sizeof (OrgVariableInfo));\r
2216 Status = mAuthVarLibContextIn->FindVariable (\r
2217 VariableName,\r
2218 VendorGuid,\r
2219 &OrgVariableInfo\r
2220 );\r
2221\r
2222 if ((!EFI_ERROR (Status)) && IsDeleteAuthVariable (OrgVariableInfo.Attributes, Data, DataSize, Attributes) && UserPhysicalPresent()) {\r
2223 //\r
2224 // Allow the delete operation of common authenticated variable at user physical presence.\r
2225 //\r
64b6a3ff
CZ		 2226 Status = AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariable (\r
2227 VariableName,\r
2228 VendorGuid,\r
2229 NULL,\r
2230 0,\r
2231 0\r
2232 );\r
2233 if (!EFI_ERROR (Status) && ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0)) {\r
a6811666
SZ		 2234 Status = DeleteCertsFromDb (VariableName, VendorGuid);\r
2235 }\r
64b6a3ff 2236\r
a6811666
SZ		 2237 return Status;\r
2238 }\r
2239\r
2240 if (NeedPhysicallyPresent (VariableName, VendorGuid) && !UserPhysicalPresent()) {\r
2241 //\r
2242 // This variable is protected, only physical present user could modify its value.\r
2243 //\r
2244 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r
2245 }\r
2246\r
2247 //\r
2248 // A time-based authenticated variable and a count-based authenticated variable\r
2249 // can't be updated by each other.\r
2250 //\r
2251 if (OrgVariableInfo.Data != NULL) {\r
2252 if (((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0) &&\r
2253 ((OrgVariableInfo.Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0)) {\r
2254 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r
2255 }\r
2256\r
2257 if (((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0) &&\r
2258 ((OrgVariableInfo.Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0)) {\r
2259 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r
2260 }\r
2261 }\r
2262\r
2263 //\r
2264 // Process Time-based Authenticated variable.\r
2265 //\r
2266 if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0) {\r
2267 return VerifyTimeBasedPayloadAndUpdate (\r
2268 VariableName,\r
2269 VendorGuid,\r
2270 Data,\r
2271 DataSize,\r
2272 Attributes,\r
2273 AuthVarTypePriv,\r
2274 NULL\r
2275 );\r
2276 }\r
2277\r
2278 //\r
2279 // Determine if first time SetVariable with the EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS.\r
2280 //\r
2281 if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0) {\r
2282 //\r
2283 // Determine current operation type.\r
2284 //\r
2285 if (DataSize == AUTHINFO_SIZE) {\r
2286 IsDeletion = TRUE;\r
2287 }\r
2288 //\r
2289 // Determine whether this is the first time with EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS set.\r
2290 //\r
2291 if (OrgVariableInfo.Data == NULL) {\r
2292 IsFirstTime = TRUE;\r
2293 } else if ((OrgVariableInfo.Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) == 0) {\r
2294 IsFirstTime = TRUE;\r
2295 } else {\r
2296 KeyIndex = OrgVariableInfo.PubKeyIndex;\r
2297 IsFirstTime = FALSE;\r
2298 }\r
2299 } else if ((OrgVariableInfo.Data != NULL) &&\r
2300 ((OrgVariableInfo.Attributes & (EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS)) != 0)\r
2301 ) {\r
2302 //\r
2303 // If the variable is already write-protected, it always needs authentication before update.\r
2304 //\r
2305 return EFI_WRITE_PROTECTED;\r
2306 } else {\r
2307 //\r
2308 // If without EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS, set and attributes collision.\r
2309 // That means it is not authenticated variable, just update variable as usual.\r
2310 //\r
2311 Status = AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariable (VariableName, VendorGuid, Data, DataSize, Attributes);\r
2312 return Status;\r
2313 }\r
2314\r
2315 //\r
2316 // Get PubKey and check Monotonic Count value corresponding to the variable.\r
2317 //\r
2318 CertData = (EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION *) Data;\r
2319 CertBlock = (EFI_CERT_BLOCK_RSA_2048_SHA256 *) (CertData->AuthInfo.CertData);\r
2320 PubKey = CertBlock->PublicKey;\r
2321\r
2322 //\r
2323 // Update Monotonic Count value.\r
2324 //\r
2325 MonotonicCount = CertData->MonotonicCount;\r
2326\r
2327 if (!IsFirstTime) {\r
2328 //\r
2329 // 2 cases need to check here\r
2330 // 1. Internal PubKey variable. PubKeyIndex is always 0\r
2331 // 2. Other counter-based AuthVariable. Check input PubKey.\r
2332 //\r
2333 if (KeyIndex == 0) {\r
2334 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r
2335 }\r
2336 for (Index = 0; Index < mPubKeyNumber; Index++) {\r
2337 if (ReadUnaligned32 (&(((AUTHVAR_KEY_DB_DATA *) mPubKeyStore + Index)->KeyIndex)) == KeyIndex) {\r
2338 if (CompareMem (((AUTHVAR_KEY_DB_DATA *) mPubKeyStore + Index)->KeyData, PubKey, EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE) == 0) {\r
2339 break;\r
2340 } else {\r
2341 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r
2342 }\r
2343 }\r
2344 }\r
2345 if (Index == mPubKeyNumber) {\r
2346 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r
2347 }\r
2348\r
2349 //\r
2350 // Compare the current monotonic count and ensure that it is greater than the last SetVariable\r
2351 // operation with the EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS attribute set.\r
2352 //\r
2353 if (MonotonicCount <= OrgVariableInfo.MonotonicCount) {\r
2354 //\r
2355 // Monotonic count check fail, suspicious replay attack, return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION.\r
2356 //\r
2357 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r
2358 }\r
2359 }\r
2360 //\r
2361 // Verify the certificate in Data payload.\r
2362 //\r
2363 Status = VerifyCounterBasedPayload (Data, DataSize, PubKey);\r
2364 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
2365 return Status;\r
2366 }\r
2367\r
2368 //\r
2369 // Now, the signature has been verified!\r
2370 //\r
2371 if (IsFirstTime && !IsDeletion) {\r
2372 VariableDataEntry.VariableSize = DataSize - AUTHINFO_SIZE;\r
2373 VariableDataEntry.Guid = VendorGuid;\r
2374 VariableDataEntry.Name = VariableName;\r
2375\r
2376 //\r
2377 // Update public key database variable if need.\r
2378 //\r
2379 KeyIndex = AddPubKeyInStore (PubKey, &VariableDataEntry);\r
2380 if (KeyIndex == 0) {\r
2381 return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
2382 }\r
2383 }\r
2384\r
2385 //\r
2386 // Verification pass.\r
2387 //\r
2388 return AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariableWithMonotonicCount (VariableName, VendorGuid, (UINT8*)Data + AUTHINFO_SIZE, DataSize - AUTHINFO_SIZE, Attributes, KeyIndex, MonotonicCount);\r
2389}\r
2390\r
2391/**\r
2392 Filter out the duplicated EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA from the new data by comparing to the original data.\r
2393\r
2394 @param[in] Data Pointer to original EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST.\r
2395 @param[in] DataSize Size of Data buffer.\r
2396 @param[in, out] NewData Pointer to new EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST.\r
2397 @param[in, out] NewDataSize Size of NewData buffer.\r
2398\r
2399**/\r
2400EFI_STATUS\r
2401FilterSignatureList (\r
2402 IN VOID *Data,\r
2403 IN UINTN DataSize,\r
2404 IN OUT VOID *NewData,\r
2405 IN OUT UINTN *NewDataSize\r
2406 )\r
2407{\r
2408 EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *CertList;\r
2409 EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *Cert;\r
2410 UINTN CertCount;\r
2411 EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *NewCertList;\r
2412 EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *NewCert;\r
2413 UINTN NewCertCount;\r
2414 UINTN Index;\r
2415 UINTN Index2;\r
2416 UINTN Size;\r
2417 UINT8 *Tail;\r
2418 UINTN CopiedCount;\r
2419 UINTN SignatureListSize;\r
2420 BOOLEAN IsNewCert;\r
2421 UINT8 *TempData;\r
2422 UINTN TempDataSize;\r
2423 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
2424\r
2425 if (*NewDataSize == 0) {\r
2426 return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
2427 }\r
2428\r
2429 TempDataSize = *NewDataSize;\r
2430 Status = mAuthVarLibContextIn->GetScratchBuffer (&TempDataSize, (VOID **) &TempData);\r
2431 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
2432 return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
2433 }\r
2434\r
2435 Tail = TempData;\r
2436\r
2437 NewCertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) NewData;\r
2438 while ((*NewDataSize > 0) && (*NewDataSize >= NewCertList->SignatureListSize)) {\r
2439 NewCert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) NewCertList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + NewCertList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r
2440 NewCertCount = (NewCertList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - NewCertList->SignatureHeaderSize) / NewCertList->SignatureSize;\r
2441\r
2442 CopiedCount = 0;\r
2443 for (Index = 0; Index < NewCertCount; Index++) {\r
2444 IsNewCert = TRUE;\r
2445\r
2446 Size = DataSize;\r
2447 CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) Data;\r
2448 while ((Size > 0) && (Size >= CertList->SignatureListSize)) {\r
2449 if (CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &NewCertList->SignatureType) &&\r
2450 (CertList->SignatureSize == NewCertList->SignatureSize)) {\r
2451 Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r
2452 CertCount = (CertList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - CertList->SignatureHeaderSize) / CertList->SignatureSize;\r
2453 for (Index2 = 0; Index2 < CertCount; Index2++) {\r
2454 //\r
2455 // Iterate each Signature Data in this Signature List.\r
2456 //\r
2457 if (CompareMem (NewCert, Cert, CertList->SignatureSize) == 0) {\r
2458 IsNewCert = FALSE;\r
2459 break;\r
2460 }\r
2461 Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) Cert + CertList->SignatureSize);\r
2462 }\r
2463 }\r
2464\r
2465 if (!IsNewCert) {\r
2466 break;\r
2467 }\r
2468 Size -= CertList->SignatureListSize;\r
2469 CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + CertList->SignatureListSize);\r
2470 }\r
2471\r
2472 if (IsNewCert) {\r
2473 //\r
2474 // New EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA, keep it.\r
2475 //\r
2476 if (CopiedCount == 0) {\r
2477 //\r
2478 // Copy EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST header for only once.\r
2479 //\r
2480 CopyMem (Tail, NewCertList, sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + NewCertList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r
2481 Tail = Tail + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + NewCertList->SignatureHeaderSize;\r
2482 }\r
2483\r
2484 CopyMem (Tail, NewCert, NewCertList->SignatureSize);\r
2485 Tail += NewCertList->SignatureSize;\r
2486 CopiedCount++;\r
2487 }\r
2488\r
2489 NewCert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) NewCert + NewCertList->SignatureSize);\r
2490 }\r
2491\r
2492 //\r
2493 // Update SignatureListSize in the kept EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST.\r
2494 //\r
2495 if (CopiedCount != 0) {\r
2496 SignatureListSize = sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + NewCertList->SignatureHeaderSize + (CopiedCount * NewCertList->SignatureSize);\r
2497 CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) (Tail - SignatureListSize);\r
2498 CertList->SignatureListSize = (UINT32) SignatureListSize;\r
2499 }\r
2500\r
2501 *NewDataSize -= NewCertList->SignatureListSize;\r
2502 NewCertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) NewCertList + NewCertList->SignatureListSize);\r
2503 }\r
2504\r
2505 TempDataSize = (Tail - (UINT8 *) TempData);\r
2506\r
2507 CopyMem (NewData, TempData, TempDataSize);\r
2508 *NewDataSize = TempDataSize;\r
2509\r
2510 return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
2511}\r
2512\r
2513/**\r
2514 Compare two EFI_TIME data.\r
2515\r
2516\r
2517 @param FirstTime A pointer to the first EFI_TIME data.\r
2518 @param SecondTime A pointer to the second EFI_TIME data.\r
2519\r
2520 @retval TRUE The FirstTime is not later than the SecondTime.\r
2521 @retval FALSE The FirstTime is later than the SecondTime.\r
2522\r
2523**/\r
2524BOOLEAN\r
2525AuthServiceInternalCompareTimeStamp (\r
2526 IN EFI_TIME *FirstTime,\r
2527 IN EFI_TIME *SecondTime\r
2528 )\r
2529{\r
2530 if (FirstTime->Year != SecondTime->Year) {\r
2531 return (BOOLEAN) (FirstTime->Year < SecondTime->Year);\r
2532 } else if (FirstTime->Month != SecondTime->Month) {\r
2533 return (BOOLEAN) (FirstTime->Month < SecondTime->Month);\r
2534 } else if (FirstTime->Day != SecondTime->Day) {\r
2535 return (BOOLEAN) (FirstTime->Day < SecondTime->Day);\r
2536 } else if (FirstTime->Hour != SecondTime->Hour) {\r
2537 return (BOOLEAN) (FirstTime->Hour < SecondTime->Hour);\r
2538 } else if (FirstTime->Minute != SecondTime->Minute) {\r
2539 return (BOOLEAN) (FirstTime->Minute < SecondTime->Minute);\r
2540 }\r
2541\r
2542 return (BOOLEAN) (FirstTime->Second <= SecondTime->Second);\r
2543}\r
2544\r
2545/**\r
2546 Find matching signer's certificates for common authenticated variable\r
2547 by corresponding VariableName and VendorGuid from "certdb".\r
2548\r
2549 The data format of "certdb":\r
2550 //\r
2551 // UINT32 CertDbListSize;\r
2552 // /// AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA Certs1[];\r
2553 // /// AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA Certs2[];\r
2554 // /// ...\r
2555 // /// AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA Certsn[];\r
2556 //\r
2557\r
2558 @param[in] VariableName Name of authenticated Variable.\r
2559 @param[in] VendorGuid Vendor GUID of authenticated Variable.\r
2560 @param[in] Data Pointer to variable "certdb".\r
2561 @param[in] DataSize Size of variable "certdb".\r
2562 @param[out] CertOffset Offset of matching CertData, from starting of Data.\r
2563 @param[out] CertDataSize Length of CertData in bytes.\r
2564 @param[out] CertNodeOffset Offset of matching AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA , from\r
2565 starting of Data.\r
2566 @param[out] CertNodeSize Length of AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA in bytes.\r
2567\r
2568 @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Any input parameter is invalid.\r
2569 @retval EFI_NOT_FOUND Fail to find matching certs.\r
2570 @retval EFI_SUCCESS Find matching certs and output parameters.\r
2571\r
2572**/\r
2573EFI_STATUS\r
2574FindCertsFromDb (\r
2575 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r
2576 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r
2577 IN UINT8 *Data,\r
2578 IN UINTN DataSize,\r
2579 OUT UINT32 *CertOffset, OPTIONAL\r
2580 OUT UINT32 *CertDataSize, OPTIONAL\r
2581 OUT UINT32 *CertNodeOffset,OPTIONAL\r
2582 OUT UINT32 *CertNodeSize OPTIONAL\r
2583 )\r
2584{\r
2585 UINT32 Offset;\r
2586 AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA *Ptr;\r
2587 UINT32 CertSize;\r
2588 UINT32 NameSize;\r
2589 UINT32 NodeSize;\r
2590 UINT32 CertDbListSize;\r
2591\r
2592 if ((VariableName == NULL) || (VendorGuid == NULL) || (Data == NULL)) {\r
2593 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
2594 }\r
2595\r
2596 //\r
2597 // Check whether DataSize matches recorded CertDbListSize.\r
2598 //\r
2599 if (DataSize < sizeof (UINT32)) {\r
2600 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
2601 }\r
2602\r
2603 CertDbListSize = ReadUnaligned32 ((UINT32 *) Data);\r
2604\r
2605 if (CertDbListSize != (UINT32) DataSize) {\r
2606 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
2607 }\r
2608\r
2609 Offset = sizeof (UINT32);\r
2610\r
2611 //\r
2612 // Get corresponding certificates by VendorGuid and VariableName.\r
2613 //\r
2614 while (Offset < (UINT32) DataSize) {\r
2615 Ptr = (AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA *) (Data + Offset);\r
2616 //\r
2617 // Check whether VendorGuid matches.\r
2618 //\r
2619 if (CompareGuid (&Ptr->VendorGuid, VendorGuid)) {\r
2620 NodeSize = ReadUnaligned32 (&Ptr->CertNodeSize);\r
2621 NameSize = ReadUnaligned32 (&Ptr->NameSize);\r
2622 CertSize = ReadUnaligned32 (&Ptr->CertDataSize);\r
2623\r
2624 if (NodeSize != sizeof (EFI_GUID) + sizeof (UINT32) * 3 + CertSize +\r
2625 sizeof (CHAR16) * NameSize) {\r
2626 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
2627 }\r
2628\r
2629 Offset = Offset + sizeof (EFI_GUID) + sizeof (UINT32) * 3;\r
2630 //\r
2631 // Check whether VariableName matches.\r
2632 //\r
2633 if ((NameSize == StrLen (VariableName)) &&\r
2634 (CompareMem (Data + Offset, VariableName, NameSize * sizeof (CHAR16)) == 0)) {\r
2635 Offset = Offset + NameSize * sizeof (CHAR16);\r
2636\r
2637 if (CertOffset != NULL) {\r
2638 *CertOffset = Offset;\r
2639 }\r
2640\r
2641 if (CertDataSize != NULL) {\r
2642 *CertDataSize = CertSize;\r
2643 }\r
2644\r
2645 if (CertNodeOffset != NULL) {\r
2646 *CertNodeOffset = (UINT32) ((UINT8 *) Ptr - Data);\r
2647 }\r
2648\r
2649 if (CertNodeSize != NULL) {\r
2650 *CertNodeSize = NodeSize;\r
2651 }\r
2652\r
2653 return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
2654 } else {\r
2655 Offset = Offset + NameSize * sizeof (CHAR16) + CertSize;\r
2656 }\r
2657 } else {\r
2658 NodeSize = ReadUnaligned32 (&Ptr->CertNodeSize);\r
2659 Offset = Offset + NodeSize;\r
2660 }\r
2661 }\r
2662\r
2663 return EFI_NOT_FOUND;\r
2664}\r
2665\r
2666/**\r
2667 Retrieve signer's certificates for common authenticated variable\r
2668 by corresponding VariableName and VendorGuid from "certdb".\r
2669\r
2670 @param[in] VariableName Name of authenticated Variable.\r
2671 @param[in] VendorGuid Vendor GUID of authenticated Variable.\r
2672 @param[out] CertData Pointer to signer's certificates.\r
2673 @param[out] CertDataSize Length of CertData in bytes.\r
2674\r
2675 @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Any input parameter is invalid.\r
2676 @retval EFI_NOT_FOUND Fail to find "certdb" or matching certs.\r
2677 @retval EFI_SUCCESS Get signer's certificates successfully.\r
2678\r
2679**/\r
2680EFI_STATUS\r
2681GetCertsFromDb (\r
2682 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r
2683 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r
2684 OUT UINT8 **CertData,\r
2685 OUT UINT32 *CertDataSize\r
2686 )\r
2687{\r
2688 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
2689 UINT8 *Data;\r
2690 UINTN DataSize;\r
2691 UINT32 CertOffset;\r
2692\r
2693 if ((VariableName == NULL) || (VendorGuid == NULL) || (CertData == NULL) || (CertDataSize == NULL)) {\r
2694 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
2695 }\r
2696\r
2697 //\r
2698 // Get variable "certdb".\r
2699 //\r
2700 Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (\r
2701 EFI_CERT_DB_NAME,\r
2702 &gEfiCertDbGuid,\r
2703 (VOID **) &Data,\r
2704 &DataSize\r
2705 );\r
2706 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
2707 return Status;\r
2708 }\r
2709\r
2710 if ((DataSize == 0) || (Data == NULL)) {\r
2711 ASSERT (FALSE);\r
2712 return EFI_NOT_FOUND;\r
2713 }\r
2714\r
2715 Status = FindCertsFromDb (\r
2716 VariableName,\r
2717 VendorGuid,\r
2718 Data,\r
2719 DataSize,\r
2720 &CertOffset,\r
2721 CertDataSize,\r
2722 NULL,\r
2723 NULL\r
2724 );\r
2725\r
2726 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
2727 return Status;\r
2728 }\r
2729\r
2730 *CertData = Data + CertOffset;\r
2731 return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
2732}\r
2733\r
2734/**\r
2735 Delete matching signer's certificates when deleting common authenticated\r
2736 variable by corresponding VariableName and VendorGuid from "certdb".\r
2737\r
2738 @param[in] VariableName Name of authenticated Variable.\r
2739 @param[in] VendorGuid Vendor GUID of authenticated Variable.\r
2740\r
2741 @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Any input parameter is invalid.\r
2742 @retval EFI_NOT_FOUND Fail to find "certdb" or matching certs.\r
2743 @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES The operation is failed due to lack of resources.\r
2744 @retval EFI_SUCCESS The operation is completed successfully.\r
2745\r
2746**/\r
2747EFI_STATUS\r
2748DeleteCertsFromDb (\r
2749 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r
2750 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid\r
2751 )\r
2752{\r
2753 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
2754 UINT8 *Data;\r
2755 UINTN DataSize;\r
2756 UINT32 VarAttr;\r
2757 UINT32 CertNodeOffset;\r
2758 UINT32 CertNodeSize;\r
2759 UINT8 *NewCertDb;\r
2760 UINT32 NewCertDbSize;\r
2761\r
2762 if ((VariableName == NULL) || (VendorGuid == NULL)) {\r
2763 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
2764 }\r
2765\r
2766 //\r
2767 // Get variable "certdb".\r
2768 //\r
2769 Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (\r
2770 EFI_CERT_DB_NAME,\r
2771 &gEfiCertDbGuid,\r
2772 (VOID **) &Data,\r
2773 &DataSize\r
2774 );\r
2775 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
2776 return Status;\r
2777 }\r
2778\r
2779 if ((DataSize == 0) || (Data == NULL)) {\r
2780 ASSERT (FALSE);\r
2781 return EFI_NOT_FOUND;\r
2782 }\r
2783\r
2784 if (DataSize == sizeof (UINT32)) {\r
2785 //\r
2786 // There is no certs in certdb.\r
2787 //\r
2788 return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
2789 }\r
2790\r
2791 //\r
2792 // Get corresponding cert node from certdb.\r
2793 //\r
2794 Status = FindCertsFromDb (\r
2795 VariableName,\r
2796 VendorGuid,\r
2797 Data,\r
2798 DataSize,\r
2799 NULL,\r
2800 NULL,\r
2801 &CertNodeOffset,\r
2802 &CertNodeSize\r
2803 );\r
2804\r
2805 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
2806 return Status;\r
2807 }\r
2808\r
2809 if (DataSize < (CertNodeOffset + CertNodeSize)) {\r
2810 return EFI_NOT_FOUND;\r
2811 }\r
2812\r
2813 //\r
2814 // Construct new data content of variable "certdb".\r
2815 //\r
2816 NewCertDbSize = (UINT32) DataSize - CertNodeSize;\r
2817 NewCertDb = (UINT8*) mCertDbStore;\r
2818\r
2819 //\r
2820 // Copy the DB entries before deleting node.\r
2821 //\r
2822 CopyMem (NewCertDb, Data, CertNodeOffset);\r
2823 //\r
2824 // Update CertDbListSize.\r
2825 //\r
2826 CopyMem (NewCertDb, &NewCertDbSize, sizeof (UINT32));\r
2827 //\r
2828 // Copy the DB entries after deleting node.\r
2829 //\r
2830 if (DataSize > (CertNodeOffset + CertNodeSize)) {\r
2831 CopyMem (\r
2832 NewCertDb + CertNodeOffset,\r
2833 Data + CertNodeOffset + CertNodeSize,\r
2834 DataSize - CertNodeOffset - CertNodeSize\r
2835 );\r
2836 }\r
2837\r
2838 //\r
2839 // Set "certdb".\r
2840 //\r
2841 VarAttr = EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS;\r
2842 Status = AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariable (\r
2843 EFI_CERT_DB_NAME,\r
2844 &gEfiCertDbGuid,\r
2845 NewCertDb,\r
2846 NewCertDbSize,\r
2847 VarAttr\r
2848 );\r
2849\r
2850 return Status;\r
2851}\r
2852\r
2853/**\r
2854 Insert signer's certificates for common authenticated variable with VariableName\r
2855 and VendorGuid in AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA to "certdb".\r
2856\r
2857 @param[in] VariableName Name of authenticated Variable.\r
2858 @param[in] VendorGuid Vendor GUID of authenticated Variable.\r
2859 @param[in] CertData Pointer to signer's certificates.\r
2860 @param[in] CertDataSize Length of CertData in bytes.\r
2861\r
2862 @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Any input parameter is invalid.\r
2863 @retval EFI_ACCESS_DENIED An AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA entry with same VariableName\r
2864 and VendorGuid already exists.\r
2865 @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES The operation is failed due to lack of resources.\r
2866 @retval EFI_SUCCESS Insert an AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA entry to "certdb"\r
2867\r
2868**/\r
2869EFI_STATUS\r
2870InsertCertsToDb (\r
2871 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r
2872 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r
2873 IN UINT8 *CertData,\r
2874 IN UINTN CertDataSize\r
2875 )\r
2876{\r
2877 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
2878 UINT8 *Data;\r
2879 UINTN DataSize;\r
2880 UINT32 VarAttr;\r
2881 UINT8 *NewCertDb;\r
2882 UINT32 NewCertDbSize;\r
2883 UINT32 CertNodeSize;\r
2884 UINT32 NameSize;\r
2885 AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA *Ptr;\r
2886\r
2887 if ((VariableName == NULL) || (VendorGuid == NULL) || (CertData == NULL)) {\r
2888 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
2889 }\r
2890\r
2891 //\r
2892 // Get variable "certdb".\r
2893 //\r
2894 Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (\r
2895 EFI_CERT_DB_NAME,\r
2896 &gEfiCertDbGuid,\r
2897 (VOID **) &Data,\r
2898 &DataSize\r
2899 );\r
2900 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
2901 return Status;\r
2902 }\r
2903\r
2904 if ((DataSize == 0) || (Data == NULL)) {\r
2905 ASSERT (FALSE);\r
2906 return EFI_NOT_FOUND;\r
2907 }\r
2908\r
2909 //\r
2910 // Find whether matching cert node already exists in "certdb".\r
2911 // If yes return error.\r
2912 //\r
2913 Status = FindCertsFromDb (\r
2914 VariableName,\r
2915 VendorGuid,\r
2916 Data,\r
2917 DataSize,\r
2918 NULL,\r
2919 NULL,\r
2920 NULL,\r
2921 NULL\r
2922 );\r
2923\r
2924 if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
2925 ASSERT (FALSE);\r
2926 return EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;\r
2927 }\r
2928\r
2929 //\r
2930 // Construct new data content of variable "certdb".\r
2931 //\r
2932 NameSize = (UINT32) StrLen (VariableName);\r
2933 CertNodeSize = sizeof (AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA) + (UINT32) CertDataSize + NameSize * sizeof (CHAR16);\r
2934 NewCertDbSize = (UINT32) DataSize + CertNodeSize;\r
2935 if (NewCertDbSize > mMaxCertDbSize) {\r
2936 return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
2937 }\r
2938 NewCertDb = (UINT8*) mCertDbStore;\r
2939\r
2940 //\r
2941 // Copy the DB entries before inserting node.\r
2942 //\r
2943 CopyMem (NewCertDb, Data, DataSize);\r
2944 //\r
2945 // Update CertDbListSize.\r
2946 //\r
2947 CopyMem (NewCertDb, &NewCertDbSize, sizeof (UINT32));\r
2948 //\r
2949 // Construct new cert node.\r
2950 //\r
2951 Ptr = (AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA *) (NewCertDb + DataSize);\r
2952 CopyGuid (&Ptr->VendorGuid, VendorGuid);\r
2953 CopyMem (&Ptr->CertNodeSize, &CertNodeSize, sizeof (UINT32));\r
2954 CopyMem (&Ptr->NameSize, &NameSize, sizeof (UINT32));\r
2955 CopyMem (&Ptr->CertDataSize, &CertDataSize, sizeof (UINT32));\r
2956\r
2957 CopyMem (\r
2958 (UINT8 *) Ptr + sizeof (AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA),\r
2959 VariableName,\r
2960 NameSize * sizeof (CHAR16)\r
2961 );\r
2962\r
2963 CopyMem (\r
2964 (UINT8 *) Ptr + sizeof (AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA) + NameSize * sizeof (CHAR16),\r
2965 CertData,\r
2966 CertDataSize\r
2967 );\r
2968\r
2969 //\r
2970 // Set "certdb".\r
2971 //\r
2972 VarAttr = EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS;\r
2973 Status = AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariable (\r
2974 EFI_CERT_DB_NAME,\r
2975 &gEfiCertDbGuid,\r
2976 NewCertDb,\r
2977 NewCertDbSize,\r
2978 VarAttr\r
2979 );\r
2980\r
2981 return Status;\r
2982}\r
2983\r
64b6a3ff
CZ		 2984/**\r
2985 Clean up signer's certificates for common authenticated variable\r
2986 by corresponding VariableName and VendorGuid from "certdb".\r
2987 Sytem may break down during Timebased Variable update & certdb update,\r
2988 make them inconsistent, this function is called in AuthVariable Init to ensure \r
2989 consistency\r
2990 \r
2991 @retval EFI_NOT_FOUND Fail to find matching certs.\r
2992 @retval EFI_SUCCESS Find matching certs and output parameters.\r
2993\r
2994**/\r
2995EFI_STATUS\r
2996CleanCertsFromDb (\r
2997 VOID\r
72362a75
CZ		 2998 )\r
2999{\r
64b6a3ff
CZ		 3000 UINT32 Offset;\r
3001 AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA *Ptr;\r
3002 UINT32 NameSize;\r
3003 UINT32 NodeSize;\r
3004 CHAR16 *VariableName;\r
3005 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
3006 BOOLEAN CertCleaned;\r
3007 UINT8 *Data;\r
3008 UINTN DataSize;\r
3009 UINT8 *AuthVarData;\r
3010 UINTN AuthVarDataSize;\r
3011 EFI_GUID AuthVarGuid;\r
3012\r
3013 Status = EFI_SUCCESS;\r
3014\r
3015 //\r
3016 // Get corresponding certificates by VendorGuid and VariableName.\r
3017 //\r
3018 do {\r
3019 CertCleaned = FALSE;\r
3020\r
3021 //\r
3022 // Get latest variable "certdb"\r
3023 //\r
3024 Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (\r
3025 EFI_CERT_DB_NAME,\r
3026 &gEfiCertDbGuid,\r
3027 (VOID **) &Data,\r
3028 &DataSize\r
3029 );\r
3030 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
3031 return Status;\r
3032 }\r
3033\r
3034 if ((DataSize == 0) || (Data == NULL)) {\r
3035 ASSERT (FALSE);\r
3036 return EFI_NOT_FOUND;\r
3037 }\r
3038\r
3039 Offset = sizeof (UINT32);\r
3040\r
3041 while (Offset < (UINT32) DataSize) {\r
3042 Ptr = (AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA *) (Data + Offset);\r
3043 //\r
3044 // Check whether VendorGuid matches.\r
3045 //\r
3046 NodeSize = ReadUnaligned32 (&Ptr->CertNodeSize);\r
3047 NameSize = ReadUnaligned32 (&Ptr->NameSize);\r
3048\r
3049 //\r
3050 // Get VarName tailed with '\0'\r
3051 //\r
3052 VariableName = AllocateZeroPool((NameSize + 1) * sizeof(CHAR16));\r
3053 if (VariableName == NULL) {\r
3054 return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
3055 }\r
3056 CopyMem (VariableName, (UINT8 *) Ptr + sizeof (AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA), NameSize * sizeof(CHAR16));\r
3057 //\r
3058 // Keep VarGuid aligned\r
3059 //\r
3060 CopyMem (&AuthVarGuid, &Ptr->VendorGuid, sizeof(EFI_GUID));\r
3061\r
3062 //\r
3063 // Find corresponding time auth variable\r
3064 //\r
3065 Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (\r
3066 VariableName,\r
3067 &AuthVarGuid,\r
3068 (VOID **) &AuthVarData,\r
3069 &AuthVarDataSize\r
3070 );\r
3071\r
3072 if (EFI_ERROR(Status)) {\r
3073 Status = DeleteCertsFromDb(VariableName, &AuthVarGuid);\r
3074 CertCleaned = TRUE;\r
3075 DEBUG((EFI_D_INFO, "Recovery!! Cert for Auth Variable %s Guid %g is removed for consistency\n", VariableName, &AuthVarGuid));\r
3076 FreePool(VariableName);\r
3077 break;\r
3078 }\r
3079\r
3080 FreePool(VariableName);\r
3081 Offset = Offset + NodeSize;\r
3082 }\r
3083 } while (CertCleaned);\r
3084\r
3085 return Status;\r
3086}\r
3087\r
a6811666
SZ		 3088/**\r
3089 Process variable with EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS set\r
3090\r
3091 Caution: This function may receive untrusted input.\r
3092 This function may be invoked in SMM mode, and datasize and data are external input.\r
3093 This function will do basic validation, before parse the data.\r
3094 This function will parse the authentication carefully to avoid security issues, like\r
3095 buffer overflow, integer overflow.\r
3096\r
3097 @param[in] VariableName Name of Variable to be found.\r
3098 @param[in] VendorGuid Variable vendor GUID.\r
3099 @param[in] Data Data pointer.\r
3100 @param[in] DataSize Size of Data found. If size is less than the\r
3101 data, this value contains the required size.\r
3102 @param[in] Attributes Attribute value of the variable.\r
3103 @param[in] AuthVarType Verify against PK, KEK database, private database or certificate in data payload.\r
3104 @param[in] OrgTimeStamp Pointer to original time stamp,\r
3105 original variable is not found if NULL.\r
3106 @param[out] VarPayloadPtr Pointer to variable payload address.\r
3107 @param[out] VarPayloadSize Pointer to variable payload size.\r
3108\r
3109 @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.\r
3110 @retval EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION The variable does NOT pass the validation\r
3111 check carried out by the firmware.\r
3112 @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES Failed to process variable due to lack\r
3113 of resources.\r
3114 @retval EFI_SUCCESS Variable pass validation successfully.\r
3115\r
3116**/\r
3117EFI_STATUS\r
3118VerifyTimeBasedPayload (\r
3119 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r
3120 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r
3121 IN VOID *Data,\r
3122 IN UINTN DataSize,\r
3123 IN UINT32 Attributes,\r
3124 IN AUTHVAR_TYPE AuthVarType,\r
3125 IN EFI_TIME *OrgTimeStamp,\r
3126 OUT UINT8 **VarPayloadPtr,\r
3127 OUT UINTN *VarPayloadSize\r
3128 )\r
3129{\r
3130 EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 *CertData;\r
3131 UINT8 *SigData;\r
3132 UINT32 SigDataSize;\r
3133 UINT8 *PayloadPtr;\r
3134 UINTN PayloadSize;\r
3135 UINT32 Attr;\r
3136 BOOLEAN VerifyStatus;\r
3137 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
3138 EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *CertList;\r
3139 EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *Cert;\r
3140 UINTN Index;\r
3141 UINTN CertCount;\r
3142 UINT32 KekDataSize;\r
3143 UINT8 *NewData;\r
3144 UINTN NewDataSize;\r
3145 UINT8 *Buffer;\r
3146 UINTN Length;\r
3147 UINT8 *RootCert;\r
3148 UINTN RootCertSize;\r
3149 UINT8 *SignerCerts;\r
3150 UINTN CertStackSize;\r
3151 UINT8 *CertsInCertDb;\r
3152 UINT32 CertsSizeinDb;\r
3153\r
3154 VerifyStatus = FALSE;\r
3155 CertData = NULL;\r
3156 NewData = NULL;\r
3157 Attr = Attributes;\r
3158 SignerCerts = NULL;\r
3159 RootCert = NULL;\r
3160 CertsInCertDb = NULL;\r
3161\r
3162 //\r
3163 // When the attribute EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS is\r
3164 // set, then the Data buffer shall begin with an instance of a complete (and serialized)\r
3165 // EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 descriptor. The descriptor shall be followed by the new\r
3166 // variable value and DataSize shall reflect the combined size of the descriptor and the new\r
3167 // variable value. The authentication descriptor is not part of the variable data and is not\r
3168 // returned by subsequent calls to GetVariable().\r
3169 //\r
3170 CertData = (EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 *) Data;\r
3171\r
3172 //\r
3173 // Verify that Pad1, Nanosecond, TimeZone, Daylight and Pad2 components of the\r
3174 // TimeStamp value are set to zero.\r
3175 //\r
3176 if ((CertData->TimeStamp.Pad1 != 0) ||\r
3177 (CertData->TimeStamp.Nanosecond != 0) ||\r
3178 (CertData->TimeStamp.TimeZone != 0) ||\r
3179 (CertData->TimeStamp.Daylight != 0) ||\r
3180 (CertData->TimeStamp.Pad2 != 0)) {\r
3181 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r
3182 }\r
3183\r
3184 if ((OrgTimeStamp != NULL) && ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_APPEND_WRITE) == 0)) {\r
3185 if (AuthServiceInternalCompareTimeStamp (&CertData->TimeStamp, OrgTimeStamp)) {\r
3186 //\r
3187 // TimeStamp check fail, suspicious replay attack, return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION.\r
3188 //\r
3189 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r
3190 }\r
3191 }\r
3192\r
3193 //\r
3194 // wCertificateType should be WIN_CERT_TYPE_EFI_GUID.\r
3195 // Cert type should be EFI_CERT_TYPE_PKCS7_GUID.\r
3196 //\r
3197 if ((CertData->AuthInfo.Hdr.wCertificateType != WIN_CERT_TYPE_EFI_GUID) ||\r
3198 !CompareGuid (&CertData->AuthInfo.CertType, &gEfiCertPkcs7Guid)) {\r
3199 //\r
3200 // Invalid AuthInfo type, return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION.\r
3201 //\r
3202 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r
3203 }\r
3204\r
3205 //\r
3206 // Find out Pkcs7 SignedData which follows the EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 descriptor.\r
3207 // AuthInfo.Hdr.dwLength is the length of the entire certificate, including the length of the header.\r
3208 //\r
3209 SigData = CertData->AuthInfo.CertData;\r
3210 SigDataSize = CertData->AuthInfo.Hdr.dwLength - (UINT32) (OFFSET_OF (WIN_CERTIFICATE_UEFI_GUID, CertData));\r
3211\r
3212 //\r
3213 // Find out the new data payload which follows Pkcs7 SignedData directly.\r
3214 //\r
3215 PayloadPtr = SigData + SigDataSize;\r
3216 PayloadSize = DataSize - OFFSET_OF_AUTHINFO2_CERT_DATA - (UINTN) SigDataSize;\r
3217\r
3218 //\r
3219 // Construct a serialization buffer of the values of the VariableName, VendorGuid and Attributes\r
3220 // parameters of the SetVariable() call and the TimeStamp component of the\r
3221 // EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 descriptor followed by the variable's new value\r
3222 // i.e. (VariableName, VendorGuid, Attributes, TimeStamp, Data)\r
3223 //\r
3224 NewDataSize = PayloadSize + sizeof (EFI_TIME) + sizeof (UINT32) +\r
3225 sizeof (EFI_GUID) + StrSize (VariableName) - sizeof (CHAR16);\r
3226\r
3227 //\r
3228 // Here is to reuse scratch data area(at the end of volatile variable store)\r
3229 // to reduce SMRAM consumption for SMM variable driver.\r
3230 // The scratch buffer is enough to hold the serialized data and safe to use,\r
3231 // because it is only used at here to do verification temporarily first\r
3232 // and then used in UpdateVariable() for a time based auth variable set.\r
3233 //\r
3234 Status = mAuthVarLibContextIn->GetScratchBuffer (&NewDataSize, (VOID **) &NewData);\r
3235 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
3236 return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
3237 }\r
3238\r
3239 Buffer = NewData;\r
3240 Length = StrLen (VariableName) * sizeof (CHAR16);\r
3241 CopyMem (Buffer, VariableName, Length);\r
3242 Buffer += Length;\r
3243\r
3244 Length = sizeof (EFI_GUID);\r
3245 CopyMem (Buffer, VendorGuid, Length);\r
3246 Buffer += Length;\r
3247\r
3248 Length = sizeof (UINT32);\r
3249 CopyMem (Buffer, &Attr, Length);\r
3250 Buffer += Length;\r
3251\r
3252 Length = sizeof (EFI_TIME);\r
3253 CopyMem (Buffer, &CertData->TimeStamp, Length);\r
3254 Buffer += Length;\r
3255\r
3256 CopyMem (Buffer, PayloadPtr, PayloadSize);\r
3257\r
3258 if (AuthVarType == AuthVarTypePk) {\r
3259 //\r
3260 // Verify that the signature has been made with the current Platform Key (no chaining for PK).\r
3261 // First, get signer's certificates from SignedData.\r
3262 //\r
3263 VerifyStatus = Pkcs7GetSigners (\r
3264 SigData,\r
3265 SigDataSize,\r
3266 &SignerCerts,\r
3267 &CertStackSize,\r
3268 &RootCert,\r
3269 &RootCertSize\r
3270 );\r
3271 if (!VerifyStatus) {\r
3272 goto Exit;\r
3273 }\r
3274\r
3275 //\r
3276 // Second, get the current platform key from variable. Check whether it's identical with signer's certificates\r
3277 // in SignedData. If not, return error immediately.\r
3278 //\r
3279 Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (\r
3280 EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME,\r
3281 &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
3282 &Data,\r
3283 &DataSize\r
3284 );\r
3285 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
3286 VerifyStatus = FALSE;\r
3287 goto Exit;\r
3288 }\r
3289 CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) Data;\r
3290 Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r
3291 if ((RootCertSize != (CertList->SignatureSize - (sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1))) ||\r
3292 (CompareMem (Cert->SignatureData, RootCert, RootCertSize) != 0)) {\r
3293 VerifyStatus = FALSE;\r
3294 goto Exit;\r
3295 }\r
3296\r
3297 //\r
3298 // Verify Pkcs7 SignedData via Pkcs7Verify library.\r
3299 //\r
3300 VerifyStatus = Pkcs7Verify (\r
3301 SigData,\r
3302 SigDataSize,\r
3303 RootCert,\r
3304 RootCertSize,\r
3305 NewData,\r
3306 NewDataSize\r
3307 );\r
3308\r
3309 } else if (AuthVarType == AuthVarTypeKek) {\r
3310\r
3311 //\r
3312 // Get KEK database from variable.\r
3313 //\r
3314 Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (\r
3315 EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME,\r
3316 &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
3317 &Data,\r
3318 &DataSize\r
3319 );\r
3320 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
3321 return Status;\r
3322 }\r
3323\r
3324 //\r
3325 // Ready to verify Pkcs7 SignedData. Go through KEK Signature Database to find out X.509 CertList.\r
3326 //\r
3327 KekDataSize = (UINT32) DataSize;\r
3328 CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) Data;\r
3329 while ((KekDataSize > 0) && (KekDataSize >= CertList->SignatureListSize)) {\r
3330 if (CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Guid)) {\r
3331 Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r
3332 CertCount = (CertList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - CertList->SignatureHeaderSize) / CertList->SignatureSize;\r
3333 for (Index = 0; Index < CertCount; Index++) {\r
3334 //\r
3335 // Iterate each Signature Data Node within this CertList for a verify\r
3336 //\r
3337 RootCert = Cert->SignatureData;\r
3338 RootCertSize = CertList->SignatureSize - (sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1);\r
3339\r
3340 //\r
3341 // Verify Pkcs7 SignedData via Pkcs7Verify library.\r
3342 //\r
3343 VerifyStatus = Pkcs7Verify (\r
3344 SigData,\r
3345 SigDataSize,\r
3346 RootCert,\r
3347 RootCertSize,\r
3348 NewData,\r
3349 NewDataSize\r
3350 );\r
3351 if (VerifyStatus) {\r
3352 goto Exit;\r
3353 }\r
3354 Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) Cert + CertList->SignatureSize);\r
3355 }\r
3356 }\r
3357 KekDataSize -= CertList->SignatureListSize;\r
3358 CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + CertList->SignatureListSize);\r
3359 }\r
3360 } else if (AuthVarType == AuthVarTypePriv) {\r
3361\r
3362 //\r
3363 // Process common authenticated variable except PK/KEK/DB/DBX/DBT.\r
3364 // Get signer's certificates from SignedData.\r
3365 //\r
3366 VerifyStatus = Pkcs7GetSigners (\r
3367 SigData,\r
3368 SigDataSize,\r
3369 &SignerCerts,\r
3370 &CertStackSize,\r
3371 &RootCert,\r
3372 &RootCertSize\r
3373 );\r
3374 if (!VerifyStatus) {\r
3375 goto Exit;\r
3376 }\r
3377\r
3378 //\r
3379 // Get previously stored signer's certificates from certdb for existing\r
3380 // variable. Check whether they are identical with signer's certificates\r
3381 // in SignedData. If not, return error immediately.\r
3382 //\r
3383 if (OrgTimeStamp != NULL) {\r
3384 VerifyStatus = FALSE;\r
3385\r
3386 Status = GetCertsFromDb (VariableName, VendorGuid, &CertsInCertDb, &CertsSizeinDb);\r
3387 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
3388 goto Exit;\r
3389 }\r
3390\r
3391 if ((CertStackSize != CertsSizeinDb) ||\r
3392 (CompareMem (SignerCerts, CertsInCertDb, CertsSizeinDb) != 0)) {\r
3393 goto Exit;\r
3394 }\r
3395 }\r
3396\r
3397 VerifyStatus = Pkcs7Verify (\r
3398 SigData,\r
3399 SigDataSize,\r
3400 RootCert,\r
3401 RootCertSize,\r
3402 NewData,\r
3403 NewDataSize\r
3404 );\r
3405 if (!VerifyStatus) {\r
3406 goto Exit;\r
3407 }\r
3408\r
64b6a3ff 3409 if ((OrgTimeStamp == NULL) && (PayloadSize != 0)) {\r
a6811666
SZ		 3410 //\r
3411 // Insert signer's certificates when adding a new common authenticated variable.\r
3412 //\r
3413 Status = InsertCertsToDb (VariableName, VendorGuid, SignerCerts, CertStackSize);\r
3414 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
3415 VerifyStatus = FALSE;\r
3416 goto Exit;\r
3417 }\r
3418 }\r
3419 } else if (AuthVarType == AuthVarTypePayload) {\r
3420 CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) PayloadPtr;\r
3421 Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r
3422 RootCert = Cert->SignatureData;\r
3423 RootCertSize = CertList->SignatureSize - (sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1);\r
3424 //\r
3425 // Verify Pkcs7 SignedData via Pkcs7Verify library.\r
3426 //\r
3427 VerifyStatus = Pkcs7Verify (\r
3428 SigData,\r
3429 SigDataSize,\r
3430 RootCert,\r
3431 RootCertSize,\r
3432 NewData,\r
3433 NewDataSize\r
3434 );\r
3435 } else {\r
3436 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r
3437 }\r
3438\r
3439Exit:\r
3440\r
3441 if (AuthVarType == AuthVarTypePk || AuthVarType == AuthVarTypePriv) {\r
3442 Pkcs7FreeSigners (RootCert);\r
3443 Pkcs7FreeSigners (SignerCerts);\r
3444 }\r
3445\r
3446 if (!VerifyStatus) {\r
3447 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r
3448 }\r
3449\r
3450 Status = CheckSignatureListFormat(VariableName, VendorGuid, PayloadPtr, PayloadSize);\r
3451 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
3452 return Status;\r
3453 }\r
3454\r
3455 *VarPayloadPtr = PayloadPtr;\r
3456 *VarPayloadSize = PayloadSize;\r
3457\r
3458 return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
3459}\r
3460\r
3461/**\r
3462 Process variable with EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS set\r
3463\r
3464 Caution: This function may receive untrusted input.\r
3465 This function may be invoked in SMM mode, and datasize and data are external input.\r
3466 This function will do basic validation, before parse the data.\r
3467 This function will parse the authentication carefully to avoid security issues, like\r
3468 buffer overflow, integer overflow.\r
3469\r
3470 @param[in] VariableName Name of Variable to be found.\r
3471 @param[in] VendorGuid Variable vendor GUID.\r
3472 @param[in] Data Data pointer.\r
3473 @param[in] DataSize Size of Data found. If size is less than the\r
3474 data, this value contains the required size.\r
3475 @param[in] Attributes Attribute value of the variable.\r
3476 @param[in] AuthVarType Verify against PK, KEK database, private database or certificate in data payload.\r
3477 @param[out] VarDel Delete the variable or not.\r
3478\r
3479 @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.\r
3480 @retval EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION The variable does NOT pass the validation\r
3481 check carried out by the firmware.\r
3482 @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES Failed to process variable due to lack\r
3483 of resources.\r
3484 @retval EFI_SUCCESS Variable pass validation successfully.\r
3485\r
3486**/\r
3487EFI_STATUS\r
3488VerifyTimeBasedPayloadAndUpdate (\r
3489 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r
3490 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r
3491 IN VOID *Data,\r
3492 IN UINTN DataSize,\r
3493 IN UINT32 Attributes,\r
3494 IN AUTHVAR_TYPE AuthVarType,\r
3495 OUT BOOLEAN *VarDel\r
3496 )\r
3497{\r
3498 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
3499 EFI_STATUS FindStatus;\r
3500 UINT8 *PayloadPtr;\r
3501 UINTN PayloadSize;\r
3502 EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 *CertData;\r
3503 AUTH_VARIABLE_INFO OrgVariableInfo;\r
64b6a3ff 3504 BOOLEAN IsDel;\r
a6811666
SZ		 3505\r
3506 ZeroMem (&OrgVariableInfo, sizeof (OrgVariableInfo));\r
3507 FindStatus = mAuthVarLibContextIn->FindVariable (\r
3508 VariableName,\r
3509 VendorGuid,\r
3510 &OrgVariableInfo\r
3511 );\r
3512\r
3513 Status = VerifyTimeBasedPayload (\r
3514 VariableName,\r
3515 VendorGuid,\r
3516 Data,\r
3517 DataSize,\r
3518 Attributes,\r
3519 AuthVarType,\r
3520 (!EFI_ERROR (FindStatus)) ? OrgVariableInfo.TimeStamp : NULL,\r
3521 &PayloadPtr,\r
3522 &PayloadSize\r
3523 );\r
3524 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
3525 return Status;\r
3526 }\r
3527\r
64b6a3ff
CZ		 3528 if (!EFI_ERROR(FindStatus)\r
3529 && (PayloadSize == 0)\r
3530 && ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_APPEND_WRITE) == 0)) {\r
3531 IsDel = TRUE;\r
3532 } else {\r
3533 IsDel = FALSE;\r
a6811666
SZ		 3534 }\r
3535\r
3536 CertData = (EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 *) Data;\r
3537\r
3538 //\r
3539 // Final step: Update/Append Variable if it pass Pkcs7Verify\r
3540 //\r
64b6a3ff
CZ		 3541 Status = AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariableWithTimeStamp (\r
3542 VariableName,\r
3543 VendorGuid,\r
3544 PayloadPtr,\r
3545 PayloadSize,\r
3546 Attributes,\r
3547 &CertData->TimeStamp\r
3548 );\r
3549\r
3550 //\r
3551 // Delete signer's certificates when delete the common authenticated variable.\r
3552 //\r
3553 if (IsDel && AuthVarType == AuthVarTypePriv && !EFI_ERROR(Status) ) {\r
3554 Status = DeleteCertsFromDb (VariableName, VendorGuid);\r
3555 }\r
3556\r
3557 if (VarDel != NULL) {\r
3558 if (IsDel && !EFI_ERROR(Status)) {\r
3559 *VarDel = TRUE;\r
3560 } else {\r
3561 *VarDel = FALSE;\r
3562 }\r
3563 }\r
3564\r
3565 return Status;\r
a6811666 3566}\r
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