]> git.proxmox.com Git - mirror_edk2.git/blame - SecurityPkg/Library/AuthVariableLib/AuthService.c
projects / mirror_edk2.git / blame
? search:
summary | shortlog | log | commit | commitdiff | tree
blob | blame (incremental) | history | HEAD
Ifconfig : Fixed False information about Media State.
[mirror_edk2.git] / SecurityPkg / Library / AuthVariableLib / AuthService.c
CommitLineData
a6811666
SZ		 1/** @file\r
2 Implement authentication services for the authenticated variables.\r
3\r
4 Caution: This module requires additional review when modified.\r
5 This driver will have external input - variable data. It may be input in SMM mode.\r
6 This external input must be validated carefully to avoid security issue like\r
7 buffer overflow, integer overflow.\r
8 Variable attribute should also be checked to avoid authentication bypass.\r
9 The whole SMM authentication variable design relies on the integrity of flash part and SMM.\r
10 which is assumed to be protected by platform. All variable code and metadata in flash/SMM Memory\r
11 may not be modified without authorization. If platform fails to protect these resources,\r
12 the authentication service provided in this driver will be broken, and the behavior is undefined.\r
13\r
14 ProcessVarWithPk(), ProcessVarWithKek() and ProcessVariable() are the function to do\r
15 variable authentication.\r
16\r
17 VerifyTimeBasedPayloadAndUpdate() and VerifyCounterBasedPayload() are sub function to do verification.\r
18 They will do basic validation for authentication data structure, then call crypto library\r
19 to verify the signature.\r
20\r
c035e373 21Copyright (c) 2009 - 2017, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>\r
a6811666
SZ		 22This program and the accompanying materials\r
23are licensed and made available under the terms and conditions of the BSD License\r
24which accompanies this distribution. The full text of the license may be found at\r
25http://opensource.org/licenses/bsd-license.php\r
26\r
27THE PROGRAM IS DISTRIBUTED UNDER THE BSD LICENSE ON AN "AS IS" BASIS,\r
28WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR REPRESENTATIONS OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED.\r
29\r
30**/\r
31\r
32#include "AuthServiceInternal.h"\r
33\r
34//\r
35// Public Exponent of RSA Key.\r
36//\r
37CONST UINT8 mRsaE[] = { 0x01, 0x00, 0x01 };\r
38\r
c035e373
ZL		 39CONST UINT8 mSha256OidValue[] = { 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x01 };\r
40\r
a6811666
SZ		 41//\r
42// Requirement for different signature type which have been defined in UEFI spec.\r
43// These data are used to perform SignatureList format check while setting PK/KEK variable.\r
44//\r
45EFI_SIGNATURE_ITEM mSupportSigItem[] = {\r
46//{SigType, SigHeaderSize, SigDataSize }\r
47 {EFI_CERT_SHA256_GUID, 0, 32 },\r
48 {EFI_CERT_RSA2048_GUID, 0, 256 },\r
49 {EFI_CERT_RSA2048_SHA256_GUID, 0, 256 },\r
50 {EFI_CERT_SHA1_GUID, 0, 20 },\r
51 {EFI_CERT_RSA2048_SHA1_GUID, 0, 256 },\r
52 {EFI_CERT_X509_GUID, 0, ((UINT32) ~0)},\r
53 {EFI_CERT_SHA224_GUID, 0, 28 },\r
54 {EFI_CERT_SHA384_GUID, 0, 48 },\r
55 {EFI_CERT_SHA512_GUID, 0, 64 },\r
56 {EFI_CERT_X509_SHA256_GUID, 0, 48 },\r
57 {EFI_CERT_X509_SHA384_GUID, 0, 64 },\r
58 {EFI_CERT_X509_SHA512_GUID, 0, 80 }\r
59};\r
60\r
61/**\r
62 Finds variable in storage blocks of volatile and non-volatile storage areas.\r
63\r
64 This code finds variable in storage blocks of volatile and non-volatile storage areas.\r
65 If VariableName is an empty string, then we just return the first\r
66 qualified variable without comparing VariableName and VendorGuid.\r
67\r
68 @param[in] VariableName Name of the variable to be found.\r
69 @param[in] VendorGuid Variable vendor GUID to be found.\r
70 @param[out] Data Pointer to data address.\r
71 @param[out] DataSize Pointer to data size.\r
72\r
73 @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER If VariableName is not an empty string,\r
74 while VendorGuid is NULL.\r
75 @retval EFI_SUCCESS Variable successfully found.\r
76 @retval EFI_NOT_FOUND Variable not found\r
77\r
78**/\r
79EFI_STATUS\r
80AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (\r
81 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r
82 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r
83 OUT VOID **Data,\r
84 OUT UINTN *DataSize\r
85 )\r
86{\r
87 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
88 AUTH_VARIABLE_INFO AuthVariableInfo;\r
89\r
90 ZeroMem (&AuthVariableInfo, sizeof (AuthVariableInfo));\r
91 Status = mAuthVarLibContextIn->FindVariable (\r
92 VariableName,\r
93 VendorGuid,\r
94 &AuthVariableInfo\r
95 );\r
96 *Data = AuthVariableInfo.Data;\r
97 *DataSize = AuthVariableInfo.DataSize;\r
98 return Status;\r
99}\r
100\r
101/**\r
102 Update the variable region with Variable information.\r
103\r
104 @param[in] VariableName Name of variable.\r
105 @param[in] VendorGuid Guid of variable.\r
106 @param[in] Data Data pointer.\r
107 @param[in] DataSize Size of Data.\r
108 @param[in] Attributes Attribute value of the variable.\r
109\r
110 @retval EFI_SUCCESS The update operation is success.\r
111 @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.\r
112 @retval EFI_WRITE_PROTECTED Variable is write-protected.\r
113 @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES There is not enough resource.\r
114\r
115**/\r
116EFI_STATUS\r
117AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariable (\r
118 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r
119 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r
120 IN VOID *Data,\r
121 IN UINTN DataSize,\r
122 IN UINT32 Attributes\r
123 )\r
124{\r
125 AUTH_VARIABLE_INFO AuthVariableInfo;\r
126\r
127 ZeroMem (&AuthVariableInfo, sizeof (AuthVariableInfo));\r
128 AuthVariableInfo.VariableName = VariableName;\r
129 AuthVariableInfo.VendorGuid = VendorGuid;\r
130 AuthVariableInfo.Data = Data;\r
131 AuthVariableInfo.DataSize = DataSize;\r
132 AuthVariableInfo.Attributes = Attributes;\r
133\r
134 return mAuthVarLibContextIn->UpdateVariable (\r
135 &AuthVariableInfo\r
136 );\r
137}\r
138\r
139/**\r
140 Update the variable region with Variable information.\r
141\r
142 @param[in] VariableName Name of variable.\r
143 @param[in] VendorGuid Guid of variable.\r
144 @param[in] Data Data pointer.\r
145 @param[in] DataSize Size of Data.\r
146 @param[in] Attributes Attribute value of the variable.\r
147 @param[in] KeyIndex Index of associated public key.\r
148 @param[in] MonotonicCount Value of associated monotonic count.\r
149\r
150 @retval EFI_SUCCESS The update operation is success.\r
151 @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.\r
152 @retval EFI_WRITE_PROTECTED Variable is write-protected.\r
153 @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES There is not enough resource.\r
154\r
155**/\r
156EFI_STATUS\r
157AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariableWithMonotonicCount (\r
158 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r
159 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r
160 IN VOID *Data,\r
161 IN UINTN DataSize,\r
162 IN UINT32 Attributes,\r
163 IN UINT32 KeyIndex,\r
164 IN UINT64 MonotonicCount\r
165 )\r
166{\r
167 AUTH_VARIABLE_INFO AuthVariableInfo;\r
168\r
560ac77e
ZC		 169 ZeroMem (&AuthVariableInfo, sizeof (AuthVariableInfo));\r
170 AuthVariableInfo.VariableName = VariableName;\r
171 AuthVariableInfo.VendorGuid = VendorGuid;\r
172 AuthVariableInfo.Data = Data;\r
173 AuthVariableInfo.DataSize = DataSize;\r
174 AuthVariableInfo.Attributes = Attributes;\r
175 AuthVariableInfo.PubKeyIndex = KeyIndex;\r
176 AuthVariableInfo.MonotonicCount = MonotonicCount;\r
4fc08e8d 177\r
560ac77e
ZC		 178 return mAuthVarLibContextIn->UpdateVariable (\r
179 &AuthVariableInfo\r
180 );\r
a6811666
SZ		 181}\r
182\r
183/**\r
560ac77e 184 Update the variable region with Variable information.\r
a6811666 185\r
560ac77e
ZC		 186 @param[in] VariableName Name of variable.\r
187 @param[in] VendorGuid Guid of variable.\r
188 @param[in] Data Data pointer.\r
189 @param[in] DataSize Size of Data.\r
190 @param[in] Attributes Attribute value of the variable.\r
191 @param[in] TimeStamp Value of associated TimeStamp.\r
a6811666 192\r
560ac77e
ZC		 193 @retval EFI_SUCCESS The update operation is success.\r
194 @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.\r
195 @retval EFI_WRITE_PROTECTED Variable is write-protected.\r
a6811666
SZ		 196 @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES There is not enough resource.\r
197\r
198**/\r
199EFI_STATUS\r
560ac77e
ZC		 200AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariableWithTimeStamp (\r
201 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r
202 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r
203 IN VOID *Data,\r
204 IN UINTN DataSize,\r
205 IN UINT32 Attributes,\r
206 IN EFI_TIME *TimeStamp\r
a6811666
SZ		 207 )\r
208{\r
560ac77e
ZC		 209 EFI_STATUS FindStatus;\r
210 VOID *OrgData;\r
211 UINTN OrgDataSize;\r
212 AUTH_VARIABLE_INFO AuthVariableInfo;\r
213\r
214 FindStatus = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (\r
215 VariableName,\r
216 VendorGuid,\r
217 &OrgData,\r
218 &OrgDataSize\r
219 );\r
a6811666
SZ		 220\r
221 //\r
560ac77e 222 // EFI_VARIABLE_APPEND_WRITE attribute only effects for existing variable\r
a6811666 223 //\r
560ac77e
ZC		 224 if (!EFI_ERROR (FindStatus) && ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_APPEND_WRITE) != 0)) {\r
225 if ((CompareGuid (VendorGuid, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid) &&\r
226 ((StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE) == 0) || (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1) == 0) ||\r
227 (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE2) == 0))) ||\r
228 (CompareGuid (VendorGuid, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid) && (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME) == 0))) {\r
229 //\r
230 // For variables with formatted as EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST, the driver shall not perform an append of\r
231 // EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA values that are already part of the existing variable value.\r
232 //\r
233 FilterSignatureList (\r
234 OrgData,\r
235 OrgDataSize,\r
236 Data,\r
237 &DataSize\r
238 );\r
239 }\r
a6811666
SZ		 240 }\r
241\r
560ac77e
ZC		 242 ZeroMem (&AuthVariableInfo, sizeof (AuthVariableInfo));\r
243 AuthVariableInfo.VariableName = VariableName;\r
244 AuthVariableInfo.VendorGuid = VendorGuid;\r
245 AuthVariableInfo.Data = Data;\r
246 AuthVariableInfo.DataSize = DataSize;\r
247 AuthVariableInfo.Attributes = Attributes;\r
248 AuthVariableInfo.TimeStamp = TimeStamp;\r
249 return mAuthVarLibContextIn->UpdateVariable (\r
250 &AuthVariableInfo\r
251 );\r
a6811666
SZ		 252}\r
253\r
254/**\r
255 Determine whether this operation needs a physical present user.\r
256\r
257 @param[in] VariableName Name of the Variable.\r
258 @param[in] VendorGuid GUID of the Variable.\r
259\r
260 @retval TRUE This variable is protected, only a physical present user could set this variable.\r
261 @retval FALSE This variable is not protected.\r
262\r
263**/\r
264BOOLEAN\r
265NeedPhysicallyPresent(\r
266 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r
267 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid\r
268 )\r
269{\r
270 if ((CompareGuid (VendorGuid, &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid) && (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME) == 0))\r
271 || (CompareGuid (VendorGuid, &gEfiCustomModeEnableGuid) && (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_CUSTOM_MODE_NAME) == 0))) {\r
272 return TRUE;\r
273 }\r
274\r
275 return FALSE;\r
276}\r
277\r
278/**\r
279 Determine whether the platform is operating in Custom Secure Boot mode.\r
280\r
281 @retval TRUE The platform is operating in Custom mode.\r
282 @retval FALSE The platform is operating in Standard mode.\r
283\r
284**/\r
285BOOLEAN\r
286InCustomMode (\r
287 VOID\r
288 )\r
289{\r
290 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
291 VOID *Data;\r
292 UINTN DataSize;\r
293\r
294 Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (EFI_CUSTOM_MODE_NAME, &gEfiCustomModeEnableGuid, &Data, &DataSize);\r
295 if (!EFI_ERROR (Status) && (*(UINT8 *) Data == CUSTOM_SECURE_BOOT_MODE)) {\r
296 return TRUE;\r
297 }\r
298\r
299 return FALSE;\r
300}\r
301\r
302/**\r
303 Get available public key index.\r
304\r
305 @param[in] PubKey Pointer to Public Key data.\r
306\r
307 @return Public key index, 0 if no any public key index available.\r
308\r
309**/\r
310UINT32\r
311GetAvailableKeyIndex (\r
312 IN UINT8 *PubKey\r
313 )\r
314{\r
315 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
316 UINT8 *Data;\r
317 UINTN DataSize;\r
318 UINT8 *Ptr;\r
319 UINT32 Index;\r
320 BOOLEAN IsFound;\r
321 EFI_GUID VendorGuid;\r
322 CHAR16 Name[1];\r
323 AUTH_VARIABLE_INFO AuthVariableInfo;\r
324 UINT32 KeyIndex;\r
325\r
326 Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (\r
327 AUTHVAR_KEYDB_NAME,\r
328 &gEfiAuthenticatedVariableGuid,\r
329 (VOID **) &Data,\r
330 &DataSize\r
331 );\r
332 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
333 DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Get public key database variable failure, Status = %r\n", Status));\r
334 return 0;\r
335 }\r
336\r
337 if (mPubKeyNumber == mMaxKeyNumber) {\r
338 Name[0] = 0;\r
339 AuthVariableInfo.VariableName = Name;\r
340 ZeroMem (&VendorGuid, sizeof (VendorGuid));\r
341 AuthVariableInfo.VendorGuid = &VendorGuid;\r
342 mPubKeyNumber = 0;\r
343 //\r
344 // Collect valid key data.\r
345 //\r
346 do {\r
347 Status = mAuthVarLibContextIn->FindNextVariable (AuthVariableInfo.VariableName, AuthVariableInfo.VendorGuid, &AuthVariableInfo);\r
348 if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
349 if (AuthVariableInfo.PubKeyIndex != 0) {\r
350 for (Ptr = Data; Ptr < (Data + DataSize); Ptr += sizeof (AUTHVAR_KEY_DB_DATA)) {\r
351 if (ReadUnaligned32 (&(((AUTHVAR_KEY_DB_DATA *) Ptr)->KeyIndex)) == AuthVariableInfo.PubKeyIndex) {\r
352 //\r
353 // Check if the key data has been collected.\r
354 //\r
355 for (Index = 0; Index < mPubKeyNumber; Index++) {\r
356 if (ReadUnaligned32 (&(((AUTHVAR_KEY_DB_DATA *) mPubKeyStore + Index)->KeyIndex)) == AuthVariableInfo.PubKeyIndex) {\r
357 break;\r
358 }\r
359 }\r
360 if (Index == mPubKeyNumber) {\r
361 //\r
362 // New key data.\r
363 //\r
364 CopyMem ((AUTHVAR_KEY_DB_DATA *) mPubKeyStore + mPubKeyNumber, Ptr, sizeof (AUTHVAR_KEY_DB_DATA));\r
365 mPubKeyNumber++;\r
366 }\r
367 break;\r
368 }\r
369 }\r
370 }\r
371 }\r
372 } while (Status != EFI_NOT_FOUND);\r
373\r
374 //\r
375 // No available space to add new public key.\r
376 //\r
377 if (mPubKeyNumber == mMaxKeyNumber) {\r
378 return 0;\r
379 }\r
380 }\r
381\r
382 //\r
383 // Find available public key index.\r
384 //\r
385 for (KeyIndex = 1; KeyIndex <= mMaxKeyNumber; KeyIndex++) {\r
386 IsFound = FALSE;\r
387 for (Ptr = mPubKeyStore; Ptr < (mPubKeyStore + mPubKeyNumber * sizeof (AUTHVAR_KEY_DB_DATA)); Ptr += sizeof (AUTHVAR_KEY_DB_DATA)) {\r
388 if (ReadUnaligned32 (&(((AUTHVAR_KEY_DB_DATA *) Ptr)->KeyIndex)) == KeyIndex) {\r
389 IsFound = TRUE;\r
390 break;\r
391 }\r
392 }\r
393 if (!IsFound) {\r
394 break;\r
395 }\r
396 }\r
397\r
398 return KeyIndex;\r
399}\r
400\r
401/**\r
402 Add public key in store and return its index.\r
403\r
404 @param[in] PubKey Input pointer to Public Key data.\r
405 @param[in] VariableDataEntry The variable data entry.\r
406\r
407 @return Index of new added public key.\r
408\r
409**/\r
410UINT32\r
411AddPubKeyInStore (\r
412 IN UINT8 *PubKey,\r
413 IN VARIABLE_ENTRY_CONSISTENCY *VariableDataEntry\r
414 )\r
415{\r
416 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
417 UINT32 Index;\r
418 VARIABLE_ENTRY_CONSISTENCY PublicKeyEntry;\r
419 UINT32 Attributes;\r
420 UINT32 KeyIndex;\r
421\r
422 if (PubKey == NULL) {\r
423 return 0;\r
424 }\r
425\r
426 //\r
427 // Check whether the public key entry does exist.\r
428 //\r
429 for (Index = 0; Index < mPubKeyNumber; Index++) {\r
430 if (CompareMem (((AUTHVAR_KEY_DB_DATA *) mPubKeyStore + Index)->KeyData, PubKey, EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE) == 0) {\r
431 return ReadUnaligned32 (&(((AUTHVAR_KEY_DB_DATA *) mPubKeyStore + Index)->KeyIndex));\r
432 }\r
433 }\r
434\r
435 KeyIndex = GetAvailableKeyIndex (PubKey);\r
436 if (KeyIndex == 0) {\r
437 return 0;\r
438 }\r
439\r
440 //\r
441 // Check the variable space for both public key and variable data.\r
442 //\r
443 PublicKeyEntry.VariableSize = (mPubKeyNumber + 1) * sizeof (AUTHVAR_KEY_DB_DATA);\r
444 PublicKeyEntry.Guid = &gEfiAuthenticatedVariableGuid;\r
445 PublicKeyEntry.Name = AUTHVAR_KEYDB_NAME;\r
446 Attributes = VARIABLE_ATTRIBUTE_NV_BS_RT | EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS;\r
447\r
448 if (!mAuthVarLibContextIn->CheckRemainingSpaceForConsistency (Attributes, &PublicKeyEntry, VariableDataEntry, NULL)) {\r
449 //\r
450 // No enough variable space.\r
451 //\r
452 return 0;\r
453 }\r
454\r
455 WriteUnaligned32 (&(((AUTHVAR_KEY_DB_DATA *) mPubKeyStore + mPubKeyNumber)->KeyIndex), KeyIndex);\r
456 CopyMem (((AUTHVAR_KEY_DB_DATA *) mPubKeyStore + mPubKeyNumber)->KeyData, PubKey, EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE);\r
457 mPubKeyNumber++;\r
458\r
459 //\r
460 // Update public key database variable.\r
461 //\r
462 Status = AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariable (\r
463 AUTHVAR_KEYDB_NAME,\r
464 &gEfiAuthenticatedVariableGuid,\r
465 mPubKeyStore,\r
466 mPubKeyNumber * sizeof (AUTHVAR_KEY_DB_DATA),\r
467 Attributes\r
468 );\r
469 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
470 DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Update public key database variable failure, Status = %r\n", Status));\r
471 return 0;\r
472 }\r
473\r
474 return KeyIndex;\r
475}\r
476\r
477/**\r
478 Verify data payload with AuthInfo in EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SHA256_GUID type.\r
479 Follow the steps in UEFI2.2.\r
480\r
481 Caution: This function may receive untrusted input.\r
482 This function may be invoked in SMM mode, and datasize and data are external input.\r
483 This function will do basic validation, before parse the data.\r
484 This function will parse the authentication carefully to avoid security issues, like\r
485 buffer overflow, integer overflow.\r
486\r
487 @param[in] Data Pointer to data with AuthInfo.\r
488 @param[in] DataSize Size of Data.\r
489 @param[in] PubKey Public key used for verification.\r
490\r
491 @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.\r
492 @retval EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION If authentication failed.\r
493 @retval EFI_SUCCESS Authentication successful.\r
494\r
495**/\r
496EFI_STATUS\r
497VerifyCounterBasedPayload (\r
498 IN UINT8 *Data,\r
499 IN UINTN DataSize,\r
500 IN UINT8 *PubKey\r
501 )\r
502{\r
503 BOOLEAN Status;\r
504 EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION *CertData;\r
505 EFI_CERT_BLOCK_RSA_2048_SHA256 *CertBlock;\r
506 UINT8 Digest[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE];\r
507 VOID *Rsa;\r
508 UINTN PayloadSize;\r
509\r
510 PayloadSize = DataSize - AUTHINFO_SIZE;\r
511 Rsa = NULL;\r
512 CertData = NULL;\r
513 CertBlock = NULL;\r
514\r
515 if (Data == NULL || PubKey == NULL) {\r
516 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
517 }\r
518\r
519 CertData = (EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION *) Data;\r
520 CertBlock = (EFI_CERT_BLOCK_RSA_2048_SHA256 *) (CertData->AuthInfo.CertData);\r
521\r
522 //\r
523 // wCertificateType should be WIN_CERT_TYPE_EFI_GUID.\r
524 // Cert type should be EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SHA256_GUID.\r
525 //\r
526 if ((CertData->AuthInfo.Hdr.wCertificateType != WIN_CERT_TYPE_EFI_GUID) ||\r
527 !CompareGuid (&CertData->AuthInfo.CertType, &gEfiCertTypeRsa2048Sha256Guid)) {\r
528 //\r
529 // Invalid AuthInfo type, return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION.\r
530 //\r
531 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r
532 }\r
533 //\r
534 // Hash data payload with SHA256.\r
535 //\r
536 ZeroMem (Digest, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE);\r
537 Status = Sha256Init (mHashCtx);\r
538 if (!Status) {\r
539 goto Done;\r
540 }\r
541 Status = Sha256Update (mHashCtx, Data + AUTHINFO_SIZE, PayloadSize);\r
542 if (!Status) {\r
543 goto Done;\r
544 }\r
545 //\r
546 // Hash Size.\r
547 //\r
548 Status = Sha256Update (mHashCtx, &PayloadSize, sizeof (UINTN));\r
549 if (!Status) {\r
550 goto Done;\r
551 }\r
552 //\r
553 // Hash Monotonic Count.\r
554 //\r
555 Status = Sha256Update (mHashCtx, &CertData->MonotonicCount, sizeof (UINT64));\r
556 if (!Status) {\r
557 goto Done;\r
558 }\r
559 Status = Sha256Final (mHashCtx, Digest);\r
560 if (!Status) {\r
561 goto Done;\r
562 }\r
563 //\r
564 // Generate & Initialize RSA Context.\r
565 //\r
566 Rsa = RsaNew ();\r
567 ASSERT (Rsa != NULL);\r
568 //\r
569 // Set RSA Key Components.\r
570 // NOTE: Only N and E are needed to be set as RSA public key for signature verification.\r
571 //\r
572 Status = RsaSetKey (Rsa, RsaKeyN, PubKey, EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE);\r
573 if (!Status) {\r
574 goto Done;\r
575 }\r
576 Status = RsaSetKey (Rsa, RsaKeyE, mRsaE, sizeof (mRsaE));\r
577 if (!Status) {\r
578 goto Done;\r
579 }\r
580 //\r
581 // Verify the signature.\r
582 //\r
583 Status = RsaPkcs1Verify (\r
584 Rsa,\r
585 Digest,\r
586 SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE,\r
587 CertBlock->Signature,\r
588 EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SHA256_SIZE\r
589 );\r
590\r
591Done:\r
592 if (Rsa != NULL) {\r
593 RsaFree (Rsa);\r
594 }\r
595 if (Status) {\r
596 return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
597 } else {\r
598 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r
599 }\r
600}\r
601\r
560ac77e
ZC		 602/**\r
603 Update platform mode.\r
604\r
605 @param[in] Mode SETUP_MODE or USER_MODE.\r
606\r
607 @return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.\r
608 @return EFI_SUCCESS Update platform mode successfully.\r
609\r
610**/\r
611EFI_STATUS\r
612UpdatePlatformMode (\r
613 IN UINT32 Mode\r
614 )\r
615{\r
616 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
617 VOID *Data;\r
618 UINTN DataSize;\r
619 UINT8 SecureBootMode;\r
620 UINT8 SecureBootEnable;\r
621 UINTN VariableDataSize;\r
622\r
623 Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (\r
624 EFI_SETUP_MODE_NAME,\r
625 &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
626 &Data,\r
627 &DataSize\r
628 );\r
629 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
630 return Status;\r
631 }\r
632\r
633 //\r
634 // Update the value of SetupMode variable by a simple mem copy, this could avoid possible\r
635 // variable storage reclaim at runtime.\r
636 //\r
637 mPlatformMode = (UINT8) Mode;\r
638 CopyMem (Data, &mPlatformMode, sizeof(UINT8));\r
639\r
640 if (mAuthVarLibContextIn->AtRuntime ()) {\r
641 //\r
642 // SecureBoot Variable indicates whether the platform firmware is operating\r
643 // in Secure boot mode (1) or not (0), so we should not change SecureBoot\r
644 // Variable in runtime.\r
645 //\r
646 return Status;\r
647 }\r
648\r
649 //\r
650 // Check "SecureBoot" variable's existence.\r
651 // If it doesn't exist, firmware has no capability to perform driver signing verification,\r
652 // then set "SecureBoot" to 0.\r
653 //\r
654 Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (\r
655 EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME,\r
656 &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
657 &Data,\r
658 &DataSize\r
659 );\r
660 //\r
661 // If "SecureBoot" variable exists, then check "SetupMode" variable update.\r
662 // If "SetupMode" variable is USER_MODE, "SecureBoot" variable is set to 1.\r
663 // If "SetupMode" variable is SETUP_MODE, "SecureBoot" variable is set to 0.\r
664 //\r
665 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
666 SecureBootMode = SECURE_BOOT_MODE_DISABLE;\r
667 } else {\r
668 if (mPlatformMode == USER_MODE) {\r
669 SecureBootMode = SECURE_BOOT_MODE_ENABLE;\r
670 } else if (mPlatformMode == SETUP_MODE) {\r
671 SecureBootMode = SECURE_BOOT_MODE_DISABLE;\r
672 } else {\r
673 return EFI_NOT_FOUND;\r
674 }\r
675 }\r
676\r
677 Status = AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariable (\r
678 EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME,\r
679 &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
680 &SecureBootMode,\r
681 sizeof(UINT8),\r
682 EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS\r
683 );\r
684 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
685 return Status;\r
686 }\r
687\r
688 //\r
689 // Check "SecureBootEnable" variable's existence. It can enable/disable secure boot feature.\r
690 //\r
691 Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (\r
692 EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME,\r
693 &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid,\r
694 &Data,\r
695 &DataSize\r
696 );\r
697\r
698 if (SecureBootMode == SECURE_BOOT_MODE_ENABLE) {\r
699 //\r
700 // Create the "SecureBootEnable" variable as secure boot is enabled.\r
701 //\r
702 SecureBootEnable = SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE;\r
703 VariableDataSize = sizeof (SecureBootEnable);\r
704 } else {\r
705 //\r
706 // Delete the "SecureBootEnable" variable if this variable exist as "SecureBoot"\r
707 // variable is not in secure boot state.\r
708 //\r
709 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
710 return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
711 }\r
712 SecureBootEnable = SECURE_BOOT_DISABLE;\r
713 VariableDataSize = 0;\r
714 }\r
715\r
716 Status = AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariable (\r
717 EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME,\r
718 &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid,\r
719 &SecureBootEnable,\r
720 VariableDataSize,\r
721 EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS\r
722 );\r
723 return Status;\r
724}\r
a6811666
SZ		 725\r
726/**\r
727 Check input data form to make sure it is a valid EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST for PK/KEK/db/dbx/dbt variable.\r
728\r
729 @param[in] VariableName Name of Variable to be check.\r
730 @param[in] VendorGuid Variable vendor GUID.\r
731 @param[in] Data Point to the variable data to be checked.\r
732 @param[in] DataSize Size of Data.\r
733\r
734 @return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid signature list format.\r
735 @return EFI_SUCCESS Passed signature list format check successfully.\r
736\r
737**/\r
738EFI_STATUS\r
739CheckSignatureListFormat(\r
740 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r
741 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r
742 IN VOID *Data,\r
743 IN UINTN DataSize\r
744 )\r
745{\r
746 EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *SigList;\r
747 UINTN SigDataSize;\r
748 UINT32 Index;\r
749 UINT32 SigCount;\r
750 BOOLEAN IsPk;\r
751 VOID *RsaContext;\r
752 EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *CertData;\r
753 UINTN CertLen;\r
754\r
755 if (DataSize == 0) {\r
756 return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
757 }\r
758\r
759 ASSERT (VariableName != NULL && VendorGuid != NULL && Data != NULL);\r
760\r
761 if (CompareGuid (VendorGuid, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid) && (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME) == 0)){\r
762 IsPk = TRUE;\r
763 } else if ((CompareGuid (VendorGuid, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid) && (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME) == 0)) ||\r
764 (CompareGuid (VendorGuid, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid) &&\r
765 ((StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE) == 0) || (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1) == 0) ||\r
766 (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE2) == 0)))) {\r
767 IsPk = FALSE;\r
768 } else {\r
769 return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
770 }\r
771\r
772 SigCount = 0;\r
773 SigList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) Data;\r
774 SigDataSize = DataSize;\r
775 RsaContext = NULL;\r
776\r
777 //\r
778 // Walk throuth the input signature list and check the data format.\r
779 // If any signature is incorrectly formed, the whole check will fail.\r
780 //\r
781 while ((SigDataSize > 0) && (SigDataSize >= SigList->SignatureListSize)) {\r
782 for (Index = 0; Index < (sizeof (mSupportSigItem) / sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_ITEM)); Index++ ) {\r
783 if (CompareGuid (&SigList->SignatureType, &mSupportSigItem[Index].SigType)) {\r
784 //\r
785 // The value of SignatureSize should always be 16 (size of SignatureOwner\r
786 // component) add the data length according to signature type.\r
787 //\r
788 if (mSupportSigItem[Index].SigDataSize != ((UINT32) ~0) &&\r
789 (SigList->SignatureSize - sizeof (EFI_GUID)) != mSupportSigItem[Index].SigDataSize) {\r
790 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
791 }\r
792 if (mSupportSigItem[Index].SigHeaderSize != ((UINT32) ~0) &&\r
793 SigList->SignatureHeaderSize != mSupportSigItem[Index].SigHeaderSize) {\r
794 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
795 }\r
796 break;\r
797 }\r
798 }\r
799\r
800 if (Index == (sizeof (mSupportSigItem) / sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_ITEM))) {\r
801 //\r
802 // Undefined signature type.\r
803 //\r
804 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
805 }\r
806\r
807 if (CompareGuid (&SigList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Guid)) {\r
808 //\r
809 // Try to retrieve the RSA public key from the X.509 certificate.\r
810 // If this operation fails, it's not a valid certificate.\r
811 //\r
812 RsaContext = RsaNew ();\r
813 if (RsaContext == NULL) {\r
814 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
815 }\r
816 CertData = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) SigList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + SigList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r
817 CertLen = SigList->SignatureSize - sizeof (EFI_GUID);\r
818 if (!RsaGetPublicKeyFromX509 (CertData->SignatureData, CertLen, &RsaContext)) {\r
819 RsaFree (RsaContext);\r
820 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
821 }\r
822 RsaFree (RsaContext);\r
823 }\r
824\r
825 if ((SigList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - SigList->SignatureHeaderSize) % SigList->SignatureSize != 0) {\r
826 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
827 }\r
828 SigCount += (SigList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - SigList->SignatureHeaderSize) / SigList->SignatureSize;\r
829\r
830 SigDataSize -= SigList->SignatureListSize;\r
831 SigList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) SigList + SigList->SignatureListSize);\r
832 }\r
833\r
834 if (((UINTN) SigList - (UINTN) Data) != DataSize) {\r
835 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
836 }\r
837\r
838 if (IsPk && SigCount > 1) {\r
839 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
840 }\r
841\r
842 return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
843}\r
844\r
845/**\r
846 Update "VendorKeys" variable to record the out of band secure boot key modification.\r
847\r
848 @return EFI_SUCCESS Variable is updated successfully.\r
849 @return Others Failed to update variable.\r
850\r
851**/\r
852EFI_STATUS\r
853VendorKeyIsModified (\r
854 VOID\r
855 )\r
856{\r
857 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
858\r
859 if (mVendorKeyState == VENDOR_KEYS_MODIFIED) {\r
860 return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
861 }\r
862 mVendorKeyState = VENDOR_KEYS_MODIFIED;\r
863\r
864 Status = AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariable (\r
865 EFI_VENDOR_KEYS_NV_VARIABLE_NAME,\r
866 &gEfiVendorKeysNvGuid,\r
867 &mVendorKeyState,\r
868 sizeof (UINT8),\r
869 EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS\r
870 );\r
871 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
872 return Status;\r
873 }\r
874\r
875 return AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariable (\r
876 EFI_VENDOR_KEYS_VARIABLE_NAME,\r
877 &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
878 &mVendorKeyState,\r
879 sizeof (UINT8),\r
880 EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS\r
881 );\r
882}\r
883\r
884/**\r
885 Process variable with platform key for verification.\r
886\r
887 Caution: This function may receive untrusted input.\r
888 This function may be invoked in SMM mode, and datasize and data are external input.\r
889 This function will do basic validation, before parse the data.\r
890 This function will parse the authentication carefully to avoid security issues, like\r
891 buffer overflow, integer overflow.\r
892 This function will check attribute carefully to avoid authentication bypass.\r
893\r
894 @param[in] VariableName Name of Variable to be found.\r
895 @param[in] VendorGuid Variable vendor GUID.\r
896 @param[in] Data Data pointer.\r
897 @param[in] DataSize Size of Data found. If size is less than the\r
898 data, this value contains the required size.\r
899 @param[in] Attributes Attribute value of the variable\r
900 @param[in] IsPk Indicate whether it is to process pk.\r
901\r
902 @return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.\r
903 @return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION The variable does NOT pass the validation.\r
904 check carried out by the firmware.\r
905 @return EFI_SUCCESS Variable passed validation successfully.\r
906\r
907**/\r
908EFI_STATUS\r
909ProcessVarWithPk (\r
910 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r
911 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r
912 IN VOID *Data,\r
913 IN UINTN DataSize,\r
914 IN UINT32 Attributes OPTIONAL,\r
915 IN BOOLEAN IsPk\r
916 )\r
917{\r
918 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
919 BOOLEAN Del;\r
920 UINT8 *Payload;\r
921 UINTN PayloadSize;\r
922\r
923 if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE) == 0 ||\r
924 (Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) == 0) {\r
925 //\r
926 // PK, KEK and db/dbx/dbt should set EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE attribute and should be a time-based\r
927 // authenticated variable.\r
928 //\r
929 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
930 }\r
931\r
4fc08e8d
CZ		 932 //\r
933 // Init state of Del. State may change due to secure check\r
934 //\r
a6811666 935 Del = FALSE;\r
76bfc7e3 936 if ((InCustomMode() && UserPhysicalPresent()) || (mPlatformMode == SETUP_MODE && !IsPk)) {\r
560ac77e
ZC		 937 Payload = (UINT8 *) Data + AUTHINFO2_SIZE (Data);\r
938 PayloadSize = DataSize - AUTHINFO2_SIZE (Data);\r
939 if (PayloadSize == 0) {\r
940 Del = TRUE;\r
941 }\r
a6811666
SZ		 942\r
943 Status = CheckSignatureListFormat(VariableName, VendorGuid, Payload, PayloadSize);\r
944 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
945 return Status;\r
946 }\r
947\r
948 Status = AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariableWithTimeStamp (\r
949 VariableName,\r
950 VendorGuid,\r
951 Payload,\r
952 PayloadSize,\r
953 Attributes,\r
954 &((EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 *) Data)->TimeStamp\r
955 );\r
956 if (EFI_ERROR(Status)) {\r
957 return Status;\r
958 }\r
959\r
560ac77e 960 if ((mPlatformMode != SETUP_MODE) || IsPk) {\r
a6811666
SZ		 961 Status = VendorKeyIsModified ();\r
962 }\r
560ac77e 963 } else if (mPlatformMode == USER_MODE) {\r
a6811666
SZ		 964 //\r
965 // Verify against X509 Cert in PK database.\r
966 //\r
967 Status = VerifyTimeBasedPayloadAndUpdate (\r
968 VariableName,\r
969 VendorGuid,\r
970 Data,\r
971 DataSize,\r
972 Attributes,\r
973 AuthVarTypePk,\r
974 &Del\r
975 );\r
976 } else {\r
977 //\r
978 // Verify against the certificate in data payload.\r
979 //\r
980 Status = VerifyTimeBasedPayloadAndUpdate (\r
981 VariableName,\r
982 VendorGuid,\r
983 Data,\r
984 DataSize,\r
985 Attributes,\r
986 AuthVarTypePayload,\r
987 &Del\r
988 );\r
989 }\r
990\r
991 if (!EFI_ERROR(Status) && IsPk) {\r
560ac77e
ZC		 992 if (mPlatformMode == SETUP_MODE && !Del) {\r
993 //\r
994 // If enroll PK in setup mode, need change to user mode.\r
995 //\r
996 Status = UpdatePlatformMode (USER_MODE);\r
997 } else if (mPlatformMode == USER_MODE && Del){\r
998 //\r
999 // If delete PK in user mode, need change to setup mode.\r
1000 //\r
1001 Status = UpdatePlatformMode (SETUP_MODE);\r
a6811666
SZ		 1002 }\r
1003 }\r
1004\r
1005 return Status;\r
1006}\r
1007\r
1008/**\r
1009 Process variable with key exchange key for verification.\r
1010\r
1011 Caution: This function may receive untrusted input.\r
1012 This function may be invoked in SMM mode, and datasize and data are external input.\r
1013 This function will do basic validation, before parse the data.\r
1014 This function will parse the authentication carefully to avoid security issues, like\r
1015 buffer overflow, integer overflow.\r
1016 This function will check attribute carefully to avoid authentication bypass.\r
1017\r
1018 @param[in] VariableName Name of Variable to be found.\r
1019 @param[in] VendorGuid Variable vendor GUID.\r
1020 @param[in] Data Data pointer.\r
1021 @param[in] DataSize Size of Data found. If size is less than the\r
1022 data, this value contains the required size.\r
1023 @param[in] Attributes Attribute value of the variable.\r
1024\r
1025 @return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.\r
1026 @return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION The variable does NOT pass the validation\r
1027 check carried out by the firmware.\r
1028 @return EFI_SUCCESS Variable pass validation successfully.\r
1029\r
1030**/\r
1031EFI_STATUS\r
1032ProcessVarWithKek (\r
1033 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r
1034 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r
1035 IN VOID *Data,\r
1036 IN UINTN DataSize,\r
1037 IN UINT32 Attributes OPTIONAL\r
1038 )\r
1039{\r
1040 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
1041 UINT8 *Payload;\r
1042 UINTN PayloadSize;\r
1043\r
1044 if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE) == 0 ||\r
1045 (Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) == 0) {\r
1046 //\r
1047 // DB, DBX and DBT should set EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE attribute and should be a time-based\r
1048 // authenticated variable.\r
1049 //\r
1050 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
1051 }\r
1052\r
1053 Status = EFI_SUCCESS;\r
76bfc7e3 1054 if (mPlatformMode == USER_MODE && !(InCustomMode() && UserPhysicalPresent())) {\r
a6811666
SZ		 1055 //\r
1056 // Time-based, verify against X509 Cert KEK.\r
1057 //\r
1058 return VerifyTimeBasedPayloadAndUpdate (\r
1059 VariableName,\r
1060 VendorGuid,\r
1061 Data,\r
1062 DataSize,\r
1063 Attributes,\r
1064 AuthVarTypeKek,\r
1065 NULL\r
1066 );\r
1067 } else {\r
1068 //\r
1069 // If in setup mode or custom secure boot mode, no authentication needed.\r
1070 //\r
1071 Payload = (UINT8 *) Data + AUTHINFO2_SIZE (Data);\r
1072 PayloadSize = DataSize - AUTHINFO2_SIZE (Data);\r
1073\r
1074 Status = CheckSignatureListFormat(VariableName, VendorGuid, Payload, PayloadSize);\r
1075 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
1076 return Status;\r
1077 }\r
1078\r
1079 Status = AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariableWithTimeStamp (\r
1080 VariableName,\r
1081 VendorGuid,\r
1082 Payload,\r
1083 PayloadSize,\r
1084 Attributes,\r
1085 &((EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 *) Data)->TimeStamp\r
1086 );\r
1087 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
1088 return Status;\r
1089 }\r
1090\r
560ac77e 1091 if (mPlatformMode != SETUP_MODE) {\r
a6811666
SZ		 1092 Status = VendorKeyIsModified ();\r
1093 }\r
1094 }\r
1095\r
1096 return Status;\r
1097}\r
1098\r
1099/**\r
1100 Check if it is to delete auth variable.\r
1101\r
1102 @param[in] OrgAttributes Original attribute value of the variable.\r
1103 @param[in] Data Data pointer.\r
1104 @param[in] DataSize Size of Data.\r
1105 @param[in] Attributes Attribute value of the variable.\r
1106\r
1107 @retval TRUE It is to delete auth variable.\r
1108 @retval FALSE It is not to delete auth variable.\r
1109\r
1110**/\r
1111BOOLEAN\r
1112IsDeleteAuthVariable (\r
1113 IN UINT32 OrgAttributes,\r
1114 IN VOID *Data,\r
1115 IN UINTN DataSize,\r
1116 IN UINT32 Attributes\r
1117 )\r
1118{\r
1119 BOOLEAN Del;\r
1120 UINTN PayloadSize;\r
1121\r
1122 Del = FALSE;\r
1123\r
1124 //\r
1125 // To delete a variable created with the EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS\r
1126 // or the EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS attribute,\r
1127 // SetVariable must be used with attributes matching the existing variable\r
1128 // and the DataSize set to the size of the AuthInfo descriptor.\r
1129 //\r
1130 if ((Attributes == OrgAttributes) &&\r
1131 ((Attributes & (EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS)) != 0)) {\r
1132 if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0) {\r
1133 PayloadSize = DataSize - AUTHINFO2_SIZE (Data);\r
1134 if (PayloadSize == 0) {\r
1135 Del = TRUE;\r
1136 }\r
1137 } else {\r
1138 PayloadSize = DataSize - AUTHINFO_SIZE;\r
1139 if (PayloadSize == 0) {\r
1140 Del = TRUE;\r
1141 }\r
1142 }\r
1143 }\r
1144\r
1145 return Del;\r
1146}\r
1147\r
1148/**\r
1149 Process variable with EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS/EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS set\r
1150\r
1151 Caution: This function may receive untrusted input.\r
1152 This function may be invoked in SMM mode, and datasize and data are external input.\r
1153 This function will do basic validation, before parse the data.\r
1154 This function will parse the authentication carefully to avoid security issues, like\r
1155 buffer overflow, integer overflow.\r
1156 This function will check attribute carefully to avoid authentication bypass.\r
1157\r
1158 @param[in] VariableName Name of the variable.\r
1159 @param[in] VendorGuid Variable vendor GUID.\r
1160 @param[in] Data Data pointer.\r
1161 @param[in] DataSize Size of Data.\r
1162 @param[in] Attributes Attribute value of the variable.\r
1163\r
1164 @return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.\r
1165 @return EFI_WRITE_PROTECTED Variable is write-protected and needs authentication with\r
1166 EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS set.\r
1167 @return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES The Database to save the public key is full.\r
1168 @return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION The variable is with EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS\r
1169 set, but the AuthInfo does NOT pass the validation\r
1170 check carried out by the firmware.\r
1171 @return EFI_SUCCESS Variable is not write-protected or pass validation successfully.\r
1172\r
1173**/\r
1174EFI_STATUS\r
1175ProcessVariable (\r
1176 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r
1177 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r
1178 IN VOID *Data,\r
1179 IN UINTN DataSize,\r
98c2d961 1180 IN UINT32 Attributes\r
a6811666
SZ		 1181 )\r
1182{\r
1183 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
1184 BOOLEAN IsDeletion;\r
1185 BOOLEAN IsFirstTime;\r
1186 UINT8 *PubKey;\r
1187 EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION *CertData;\r
1188 EFI_CERT_BLOCK_RSA_2048_SHA256 *CertBlock;\r
1189 UINT32 KeyIndex;\r
1190 UINT64 MonotonicCount;\r
1191 VARIABLE_ENTRY_CONSISTENCY VariableDataEntry;\r
1192 UINT32 Index;\r
1193 AUTH_VARIABLE_INFO OrgVariableInfo;\r
1194\r
1195 KeyIndex = 0;\r
1196 CertData = NULL;\r
1197 CertBlock = NULL;\r
1198 PubKey = NULL;\r
1199 IsDeletion = FALSE;\r
1200 Status = EFI_SUCCESS;\r
1201\r
1202 ZeroMem (&OrgVariableInfo, sizeof (OrgVariableInfo));\r
1203 Status = mAuthVarLibContextIn->FindVariable (\r
1204 VariableName,\r
1205 VendorGuid,\r
1206 &OrgVariableInfo\r
1207 );\r
1208\r
76bfc7e3 1209 if ((!EFI_ERROR (Status)) && IsDeleteAuthVariable (OrgVariableInfo.Attributes, Data, DataSize, Attributes) && UserPhysicalPresent()) {\r
a6811666
SZ		 1210 //\r
1211 // Allow the delete operation of common authenticated variable at user physical presence.\r
1212 //\r
64b6a3ff
CZ		 1213 Status = AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariable (\r
1214 VariableName,\r
1215 VendorGuid,\r
1216 NULL,\r
1217 0,\r
1218 0\r
1219 );\r
1220 if (!EFI_ERROR (Status) && ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0)) {\r
98c2d961 1221 Status = DeleteCertsFromDb (VariableName, VendorGuid, Attributes);\r
a6811666 1222 }\r
64b6a3ff 1223\r
a6811666
SZ		 1224 return Status;\r
1225 }\r
1226\r
76bfc7e3 1227 if (NeedPhysicallyPresent (VariableName, VendorGuid) && !UserPhysicalPresent()) {\r
a6811666
SZ		 1228 //\r
1229 // This variable is protected, only physical present user could modify its value.\r
1230 //\r
1231 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r
1232 }\r
1233\r
1234 //\r
1235 // A time-based authenticated variable and a count-based authenticated variable\r
1236 // can't be updated by each other.\r
1237 //\r
1238 if (OrgVariableInfo.Data != NULL) {\r
1239 if (((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0) &&\r
1240 ((OrgVariableInfo.Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0)) {\r
1241 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r
1242 }\r
1243\r
1244 if (((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0) &&\r
1245 ((OrgVariableInfo.Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0)) {\r
1246 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r
1247 }\r
1248 }\r
1249\r
1250 //\r
1251 // Process Time-based Authenticated variable.\r
1252 //\r
1253 if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0) {\r
1254 return VerifyTimeBasedPayloadAndUpdate (\r
1255 VariableName,\r
1256 VendorGuid,\r
1257 Data,\r
1258 DataSize,\r
1259 Attributes,\r
1260 AuthVarTypePriv,\r
1261 NULL\r
1262 );\r
1263 }\r
1264\r
1265 //\r
1266 // Determine if first time SetVariable with the EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS.\r
1267 //\r
1268 if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0) {\r
1269 //\r
1270 // Determine current operation type.\r
1271 //\r
1272 if (DataSize == AUTHINFO_SIZE) {\r
1273 IsDeletion = TRUE;\r
1274 }\r
1275 //\r
1276 // Determine whether this is the first time with EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS set.\r
1277 //\r
1278 if (OrgVariableInfo.Data == NULL) {\r
1279 IsFirstTime = TRUE;\r
1280 } else if ((OrgVariableInfo.Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) == 0) {\r
1281 IsFirstTime = TRUE;\r
1282 } else {\r
1283 KeyIndex = OrgVariableInfo.PubKeyIndex;\r
1284 IsFirstTime = FALSE;\r
1285 }\r
1286 } else if ((OrgVariableInfo.Data != NULL) &&\r
1287 ((OrgVariableInfo.Attributes & (EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS)) != 0)\r
1288 ) {\r
1289 //\r
1290 // If the variable is already write-protected, it always needs authentication before update.\r
1291 //\r
1292 return EFI_WRITE_PROTECTED;\r
1293 } else {\r
1294 //\r
1295 // If without EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS, set and attributes collision.\r
1296 // That means it is not authenticated variable, just update variable as usual.\r
1297 //\r
1298 Status = AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariable (VariableName, VendorGuid, Data, DataSize, Attributes);\r
1299 return Status;\r
1300 }\r
1301\r
1302 //\r
1303 // Get PubKey and check Monotonic Count value corresponding to the variable.\r
1304 //\r
1305 CertData = (EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION *) Data;\r
1306 CertBlock = (EFI_CERT_BLOCK_RSA_2048_SHA256 *) (CertData->AuthInfo.CertData);\r
1307 PubKey = CertBlock->PublicKey;\r
1308\r
1309 //\r
1310 // Update Monotonic Count value.\r
1311 //\r
1312 MonotonicCount = CertData->MonotonicCount;\r
1313\r
1314 if (!IsFirstTime) {\r
1315 //\r
1316 // 2 cases need to check here\r
1317 // 1. Internal PubKey variable. PubKeyIndex is always 0\r
1318 // 2. Other counter-based AuthVariable. Check input PubKey.\r
1319 //\r
1320 if (KeyIndex == 0) {\r
1321 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r
1322 }\r
1323 for (Index = 0; Index < mPubKeyNumber; Index++) {\r
1324 if (ReadUnaligned32 (&(((AUTHVAR_KEY_DB_DATA *) mPubKeyStore + Index)->KeyIndex)) == KeyIndex) {\r
1325 if (CompareMem (((AUTHVAR_KEY_DB_DATA *) mPubKeyStore + Index)->KeyData, PubKey, EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE) == 0) {\r
1326 break;\r
1327 } else {\r
1328 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r
1329 }\r
1330 }\r
1331 }\r
1332 if (Index == mPubKeyNumber) {\r
1333 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r
1334 }\r
1335\r
1336 //\r
1337 // Compare the current monotonic count and ensure that it is greater than the last SetVariable\r
1338 // operation with the EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS attribute set.\r
1339 //\r
1340 if (MonotonicCount <= OrgVariableInfo.MonotonicCount) {\r
1341 //\r
1342 // Monotonic count check fail, suspicious replay attack, return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION.\r
1343 //\r
1344 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r
1345 }\r
1346 }\r
1347 //\r
1348 // Verify the certificate in Data payload.\r
1349 //\r
1350 Status = VerifyCounterBasedPayload (Data, DataSize, PubKey);\r
1351 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
1352 return Status;\r
1353 }\r
1354\r
1355 //\r
1356 // Now, the signature has been verified!\r
1357 //\r
1358 if (IsFirstTime && !IsDeletion) {\r
1359 VariableDataEntry.VariableSize = DataSize - AUTHINFO_SIZE;\r
1360 VariableDataEntry.Guid = VendorGuid;\r
1361 VariableDataEntry.Name = VariableName;\r
1362\r
1363 //\r
1364 // Update public key database variable if need.\r
1365 //\r
1366 KeyIndex = AddPubKeyInStore (PubKey, &VariableDataEntry);\r
1367 if (KeyIndex == 0) {\r
1368 return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
1369 }\r
1370 }\r
1371\r
1372 //\r
1373 // Verification pass.\r
1374 //\r
1375 return AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariableWithMonotonicCount (VariableName, VendorGuid, (UINT8*)Data + AUTHINFO_SIZE, DataSize - AUTHINFO_SIZE, Attributes, KeyIndex, MonotonicCount);\r
1376}\r
1377\r
1378/**\r
1379 Filter out the duplicated EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA from the new data by comparing to the original data.\r
1380\r
1381 @param[in] Data Pointer to original EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST.\r
1382 @param[in] DataSize Size of Data buffer.\r
1383 @param[in, out] NewData Pointer to new EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST.\r
1384 @param[in, out] NewDataSize Size of NewData buffer.\r
1385\r
1386**/\r
1387EFI_STATUS\r
1388FilterSignatureList (\r
1389 IN VOID *Data,\r
1390 IN UINTN DataSize,\r
1391 IN OUT VOID *NewData,\r
1392 IN OUT UINTN *NewDataSize\r
1393 )\r
1394{\r
1395 EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *CertList;\r
1396 EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *Cert;\r
1397 UINTN CertCount;\r
1398 EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *NewCertList;\r
1399 EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *NewCert;\r
1400 UINTN NewCertCount;\r
1401 UINTN Index;\r
1402 UINTN Index2;\r
1403 UINTN Size;\r
1404 UINT8 *Tail;\r
1405 UINTN CopiedCount;\r
1406 UINTN SignatureListSize;\r
1407 BOOLEAN IsNewCert;\r
1408 UINT8 *TempData;\r
1409 UINTN TempDataSize;\r
1410 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
1411\r
1412 if (*NewDataSize == 0) {\r
1413 return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
1414 }\r
1415\r
1416 TempDataSize = *NewDataSize;\r
1417 Status = mAuthVarLibContextIn->GetScratchBuffer (&TempDataSize, (VOID **) &TempData);\r
1418 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
1419 return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
1420 }\r
1421\r
1422 Tail = TempData;\r
1423\r
1424 NewCertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) NewData;\r
1425 while ((*NewDataSize > 0) && (*NewDataSize >= NewCertList->SignatureListSize)) {\r
1426 NewCert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) NewCertList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + NewCertList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r
1427 NewCertCount = (NewCertList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - NewCertList->SignatureHeaderSize) / NewCertList->SignatureSize;\r
1428\r
1429 CopiedCount = 0;\r
1430 for (Index = 0; Index < NewCertCount; Index++) {\r
1431 IsNewCert = TRUE;\r
1432\r
1433 Size = DataSize;\r
1434 CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) Data;\r
1435 while ((Size > 0) && (Size >= CertList->SignatureListSize)) {\r
1436 if (CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &NewCertList->SignatureType) &&\r
1437 (CertList->SignatureSize == NewCertList->SignatureSize)) {\r
1438 Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r
1439 CertCount = (CertList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - CertList->SignatureHeaderSize) / CertList->SignatureSize;\r
1440 for (Index2 = 0; Index2 < CertCount; Index2++) {\r
1441 //\r
1442 // Iterate each Signature Data in this Signature List.\r
1443 //\r
1444 if (CompareMem (NewCert, Cert, CertList->SignatureSize) == 0) {\r
1445 IsNewCert = FALSE;\r
1446 break;\r
1447 }\r
1448 Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) Cert + CertList->SignatureSize);\r
1449 }\r
1450 }\r
1451\r
1452 if (!IsNewCert) {\r
1453 break;\r
1454 }\r
1455 Size -= CertList->SignatureListSize;\r
1456 CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + CertList->SignatureListSize);\r
1457 }\r
1458\r
1459 if (IsNewCert) {\r
1460 //\r
1461 // New EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA, keep it.\r
1462 //\r
1463 if (CopiedCount == 0) {\r
1464 //\r
1465 // Copy EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST header for only once.\r
1466 //\r
1467 CopyMem (Tail, NewCertList, sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + NewCertList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r
1468 Tail = Tail + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + NewCertList->SignatureHeaderSize;\r
1469 }\r
1470\r
1471 CopyMem (Tail, NewCert, NewCertList->SignatureSize);\r
1472 Tail += NewCertList->SignatureSize;\r
1473 CopiedCount++;\r
1474 }\r
1475\r
1476 NewCert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) NewCert + NewCertList->SignatureSize);\r
1477 }\r
1478\r
1479 //\r
1480 // Update SignatureListSize in the kept EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST.\r
1481 //\r
1482 if (CopiedCount != 0) {\r
1483 SignatureListSize = sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + NewCertList->SignatureHeaderSize + (CopiedCount * NewCertList->SignatureSize);\r
1484 CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) (Tail - SignatureListSize);\r
1485 CertList->SignatureListSize = (UINT32) SignatureListSize;\r
1486 }\r
1487\r
1488 *NewDataSize -= NewCertList->SignatureListSize;\r
1489 NewCertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) NewCertList + NewCertList->SignatureListSize);\r
1490 }\r
1491\r
1492 TempDataSize = (Tail - (UINT8 *) TempData);\r
1493\r
1494 CopyMem (NewData, TempData, TempDataSize);\r
1495 *NewDataSize = TempDataSize;\r
1496\r
1497 return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
1498}\r
1499\r
1500/**\r
1501 Compare two EFI_TIME data.\r
1502\r
1503\r
1504 @param FirstTime A pointer to the first EFI_TIME data.\r
1505 @param SecondTime A pointer to the second EFI_TIME data.\r
1506\r
1507 @retval TRUE The FirstTime is not later than the SecondTime.\r
1508 @retval FALSE The FirstTime is later than the SecondTime.\r
1509\r
1510**/\r
1511BOOLEAN\r
1512AuthServiceInternalCompareTimeStamp (\r
1513 IN EFI_TIME *FirstTime,\r
1514 IN EFI_TIME *SecondTime\r
1515 )\r
1516{\r
1517 if (FirstTime->Year != SecondTime->Year) {\r
1518 return (BOOLEAN) (FirstTime->Year < SecondTime->Year);\r
1519 } else if (FirstTime->Month != SecondTime->Month) {\r
1520 return (BOOLEAN) (FirstTime->Month < SecondTime->Month);\r
1521 } else if (FirstTime->Day != SecondTime->Day) {\r
1522 return (BOOLEAN) (FirstTime->Day < SecondTime->Day);\r
1523 } else if (FirstTime->Hour != SecondTime->Hour) {\r
1524 return (BOOLEAN) (FirstTime->Hour < SecondTime->Hour);\r
1525 } else if (FirstTime->Minute != SecondTime->Minute) {\r
1526 return (BOOLEAN) (FirstTime->Minute < SecondTime->Minute);\r
1527 }\r
1528\r
1529 return (BOOLEAN) (FirstTime->Second <= SecondTime->Second);\r
1530}\r
1531\r
1532/**\r
1533 Find matching signer's certificates for common authenticated variable\r
98c2d961 1534 by corresponding VariableName and VendorGuid from "certdb" or "certdbv".\r
a6811666 1535\r
98c2d961 1536 The data format of "certdb" or "certdbv":\r
a6811666
SZ		 1537 //\r
1538 // UINT32 CertDbListSize;\r
1539 // /// AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA Certs1[];\r
1540 // /// AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA Certs2[];\r
1541 // /// ...\r
1542 // /// AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA Certsn[];\r
1543 //\r
1544\r
1545 @param[in] VariableName Name of authenticated Variable.\r
1546 @param[in] VendorGuid Vendor GUID of authenticated Variable.\r
98c2d961
CZ		 1547 @param[in] Data Pointer to variable "certdb" or "certdbv".\r
1548 @param[in] DataSize Size of variable "certdb" or "certdbv".\r
a6811666
SZ		 1549 @param[out] CertOffset Offset of matching CertData, from starting of Data.\r
1550 @param[out] CertDataSize Length of CertData in bytes.\r
1551 @param[out] CertNodeOffset Offset of matching AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA , from\r
1552 starting of Data.\r
1553 @param[out] CertNodeSize Length of AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA in bytes.\r
1554\r
1555 @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Any input parameter is invalid.\r
1556 @retval EFI_NOT_FOUND Fail to find matching certs.\r
1557 @retval EFI_SUCCESS Find matching certs and output parameters.\r
1558\r
1559**/\r
1560EFI_STATUS\r
1561FindCertsFromDb (\r
1562 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r
1563 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r
1564 IN UINT8 *Data,\r
1565 IN UINTN DataSize,\r
1566 OUT UINT32 *CertOffset, OPTIONAL\r
1567 OUT UINT32 *CertDataSize, OPTIONAL\r
1568 OUT UINT32 *CertNodeOffset,OPTIONAL\r
1569 OUT UINT32 *CertNodeSize OPTIONAL\r
1570 )\r
1571{\r
1572 UINT32 Offset;\r
1573 AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA *Ptr;\r
1574 UINT32 CertSize;\r
1575 UINT32 NameSize;\r
1576 UINT32 NodeSize;\r
1577 UINT32 CertDbListSize;\r
1578\r
1579 if ((VariableName == NULL) || (VendorGuid == NULL) || (Data == NULL)) {\r
1580 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
1581 }\r
1582\r
1583 //\r
1584 // Check whether DataSize matches recorded CertDbListSize.\r
1585 //\r
1586 if (DataSize < sizeof (UINT32)) {\r
1587 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
1588 }\r
1589\r
1590 CertDbListSize = ReadUnaligned32 ((UINT32 *) Data);\r
1591\r
1592 if (CertDbListSize != (UINT32) DataSize) {\r
1593 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
1594 }\r
1595\r
1596 Offset = sizeof (UINT32);\r
1597\r
1598 //\r
1599 // Get corresponding certificates by VendorGuid and VariableName.\r
1600 //\r
1601 while (Offset < (UINT32) DataSize) {\r
1602 Ptr = (AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA *) (Data + Offset);\r
1603 //\r
1604 // Check whether VendorGuid matches.\r
1605 //\r
1606 if (CompareGuid (&Ptr->VendorGuid, VendorGuid)) {\r
1607 NodeSize = ReadUnaligned32 (&Ptr->CertNodeSize);\r
1608 NameSize = ReadUnaligned32 (&Ptr->NameSize);\r
1609 CertSize = ReadUnaligned32 (&Ptr->CertDataSize);\r
1610\r
1611 if (NodeSize != sizeof (EFI_GUID) + sizeof (UINT32) * 3 + CertSize +\r
1612 sizeof (CHAR16) * NameSize) {\r
1613 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
1614 }\r
1615\r
1616 Offset = Offset + sizeof (EFI_GUID) + sizeof (UINT32) * 3;\r
1617 //\r
1618 // Check whether VariableName matches.\r
1619 //\r
1620 if ((NameSize == StrLen (VariableName)) &&\r
1621 (CompareMem (Data + Offset, VariableName, NameSize * sizeof (CHAR16)) == 0)) {\r
1622 Offset = Offset + NameSize * sizeof (CHAR16);\r
1623\r
1624 if (CertOffset != NULL) {\r
1625 *CertOffset = Offset;\r
1626 }\r
1627\r
1628 if (CertDataSize != NULL) {\r
1629 *CertDataSize = CertSize;\r
1630 }\r
1631\r
1632 if (CertNodeOffset != NULL) {\r
1633 *CertNodeOffset = (UINT32) ((UINT8 *) Ptr - Data);\r
1634 }\r
1635\r
1636 if (CertNodeSize != NULL) {\r
1637 *CertNodeSize = NodeSize;\r
1638 }\r
1639\r
1640 return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
1641 } else {\r
1642 Offset = Offset + NameSize * sizeof (CHAR16) + CertSize;\r
1643 }\r
1644 } else {\r
1645 NodeSize = ReadUnaligned32 (&Ptr->CertNodeSize);\r
1646 Offset = Offset + NodeSize;\r
1647 }\r
1648 }\r
1649\r
1650 return EFI_NOT_FOUND;\r
1651}\r
1652\r
1653/**\r
1654 Retrieve signer's certificates for common authenticated variable\r
98c2d961
CZ		 1655 by corresponding VariableName and VendorGuid from "certdb"\r
1656 or "certdbv" according to authenticated variable attributes.\r
a6811666
SZ		 1657\r
1658 @param[in] VariableName Name of authenticated Variable.\r
1659 @param[in] VendorGuid Vendor GUID of authenticated Variable.\r
98c2d961 1660 @param[in] Attributes Attributes of authenticated variable.\r
a6811666
SZ		 1661 @param[out] CertData Pointer to signer's certificates.\r
1662 @param[out] CertDataSize Length of CertData in bytes.\r
1663\r
1664 @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Any input parameter is invalid.\r
98c2d961 1665 @retval EFI_NOT_FOUND Fail to find "certdb"/"certdbv" or matching certs.\r
a6811666
SZ		 1666 @retval EFI_SUCCESS Get signer's certificates successfully.\r
1667\r
1668**/\r
1669EFI_STATUS\r
1670GetCertsFromDb (\r
1671 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r
1672 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r
98c2d961 1673 IN UINT32 Attributes,\r
a6811666
SZ		 1674 OUT UINT8 **CertData,\r
1675 OUT UINT32 *CertDataSize\r
1676 )\r
1677{\r
1678 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
1679 UINT8 *Data;\r
1680 UINTN DataSize;\r
1681 UINT32 CertOffset;\r
98c2d961 1682 CHAR16 *DbName;\r
a6811666
SZ		 1683\r
1684 if ((VariableName == NULL) || (VendorGuid == NULL) || (CertData == NULL) || (CertDataSize == NULL)) {\r
1685 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
1686 }\r
1687\r
98c2d961
CZ		 1688 \r
1689 if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE) != 0) {\r
1690 //\r
1691 // Get variable "certdb".\r
1692 //\r
1693 DbName = EFI_CERT_DB_NAME;\r
1694 } else {\r
1695 //\r
1696 // Get variable "certdbv".\r
1697 //\r
1698 DbName = EFI_CERT_DB_VOLATILE_NAME;\r
1699 }\r
1700\r
a6811666 1701 //\r
98c2d961 1702 // Get variable "certdb" or "certdbv".\r
a6811666
SZ		 1703 //\r
1704 Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (\r
98c2d961 1705 DbName,\r
a6811666
SZ		 1706 &gEfiCertDbGuid,\r
1707 (VOID **) &Data,\r
1708 &DataSize\r
1709 );\r
1710 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
1711 return Status;\r
1712 }\r
1713\r
1714 if ((DataSize == 0) || (Data == NULL)) {\r
1715 ASSERT (FALSE);\r
1716 return EFI_NOT_FOUND;\r
1717 }\r
1718\r
1719 Status = FindCertsFromDb (\r
1720 VariableName,\r
1721 VendorGuid,\r
1722 Data,\r
1723 DataSize,\r
1724 &CertOffset,\r
1725 CertDataSize,\r
1726 NULL,\r
1727 NULL\r
1728 );\r
1729\r
1730 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
1731 return Status;\r
1732 }\r
1733\r
1734 *CertData = Data + CertOffset;\r
1735 return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
1736}\r
1737\r
1738/**\r
1739 Delete matching signer's certificates when deleting common authenticated\r
98c2d961
CZ		 1740 variable by corresponding VariableName and VendorGuid from "certdb" or \r
1741 "certdbv" according to authenticated variable attributes.\r
a6811666
SZ		 1742\r
1743 @param[in] VariableName Name of authenticated Variable.\r
1744 @param[in] VendorGuid Vendor GUID of authenticated Variable.\r
98c2d961 1745 @param[in] Attributes Attributes of authenticated variable.\r
a6811666
SZ		 1746\r
1747 @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Any input parameter is invalid.\r
98c2d961 1748 @retval EFI_NOT_FOUND Fail to find "certdb"/"certdbv" or matching certs.\r
a6811666
SZ		 1749 @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES The operation is failed due to lack of resources.\r
1750 @retval EFI_SUCCESS The operation is completed successfully.\r
1751\r
1752**/\r
1753EFI_STATUS\r
1754DeleteCertsFromDb (\r
1755 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r
98c2d961
CZ		 1756 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r
1757 IN UINT32 Attributes\r
a6811666
SZ		 1758 )\r
1759{\r
1760 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
1761 UINT8 *Data;\r
1762 UINTN DataSize;\r
1763 UINT32 VarAttr;\r
1764 UINT32 CertNodeOffset;\r
1765 UINT32 CertNodeSize;\r
1766 UINT8 *NewCertDb;\r
1767 UINT32 NewCertDbSize;\r
98c2d961 1768 CHAR16 *DbName;\r
a6811666
SZ		 1769\r
1770 if ((VariableName == NULL) || (VendorGuid == NULL)) {\r
1771 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
1772 }\r
1773\r
98c2d961
CZ		 1774 if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE) != 0) {\r
1775 //\r
1776 // Get variable "certdb".\r
1777 //\r
1778 DbName = EFI_CERT_DB_NAME;\r
1779 VarAttr = EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS;\r
1780 } else {\r
1781 //\r
1782 // Get variable "certdbv".\r
1783 //\r
1784 DbName = EFI_CERT_DB_VOLATILE_NAME;\r
1785 VarAttr = EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS;\r
1786 }\r
1787\r
a6811666 1788 Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (\r
98c2d961 1789 DbName,\r
a6811666
SZ		 1790 &gEfiCertDbGuid,\r
1791 (VOID **) &Data,\r
1792 &DataSize\r
1793 );\r
98c2d961 1794\r
a6811666
SZ		 1795 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
1796 return Status;\r
1797 }\r
1798\r
1799 if ((DataSize == 0) || (Data == NULL)) {\r
1800 ASSERT (FALSE);\r
1801 return EFI_NOT_FOUND;\r
1802 }\r
1803\r
1804 if (DataSize == sizeof (UINT32)) {\r
1805 //\r
98c2d961 1806 // There is no certs in "certdb" or "certdbv".\r
a6811666
SZ		 1807 //\r
1808 return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
1809 }\r
1810\r
1811 //\r
98c2d961 1812 // Get corresponding cert node from "certdb" or "certdbv".\r
a6811666
SZ		 1813 //\r
1814 Status = FindCertsFromDb (\r
1815 VariableName,\r
1816 VendorGuid,\r
1817 Data,\r
1818 DataSize,\r
1819 NULL,\r
1820 NULL,\r
1821 &CertNodeOffset,\r
1822 &CertNodeSize\r
1823 );\r
1824\r
1825 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
1826 return Status;\r
1827 }\r
1828\r
1829 if (DataSize < (CertNodeOffset + CertNodeSize)) {\r
1830 return EFI_NOT_FOUND;\r
1831 }\r
1832\r
1833 //\r
98c2d961 1834 // Construct new data content of variable "certdb" or "certdbv".\r
a6811666
SZ		 1835 //\r
1836 NewCertDbSize = (UINT32) DataSize - CertNodeSize;\r
1837 NewCertDb = (UINT8*) mCertDbStore;\r
1838\r
1839 //\r
1840 // Copy the DB entries before deleting node.\r
1841 //\r
1842 CopyMem (NewCertDb, Data, CertNodeOffset);\r
1843 //\r
1844 // Update CertDbListSize.\r
1845 //\r
1846 CopyMem (NewCertDb, &NewCertDbSize, sizeof (UINT32));\r
1847 //\r
1848 // Copy the DB entries after deleting node.\r
1849 //\r
1850 if (DataSize > (CertNodeOffset + CertNodeSize)) {\r
1851 CopyMem (\r
1852 NewCertDb + CertNodeOffset,\r
1853 Data + CertNodeOffset + CertNodeSize,\r
1854 DataSize - CertNodeOffset - CertNodeSize\r
1855 );\r
1856 }\r
1857\r
1858 //\r
98c2d961 1859 // Set "certdb" or "certdbv".\r
a6811666 1860 //\r
a6811666 1861 Status = AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariable (\r
98c2d961 1862 DbName,\r
a6811666
SZ		 1863 &gEfiCertDbGuid,\r
1864 NewCertDb,\r
1865 NewCertDbSize,\r
1866 VarAttr\r
1867 );\r
1868\r
1869 return Status;\r
1870}\r
1871\r
1872/**\r
1873 Insert signer's certificates for common authenticated variable with VariableName\r
98c2d961
CZ		 1874 and VendorGuid in AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA to "certdb" or "certdbv" according to\r
1875 time based authenticated variable attributes.\r
a6811666
SZ		 1876\r
1877 @param[in] VariableName Name of authenticated Variable.\r
1878 @param[in] VendorGuid Vendor GUID of authenticated Variable.\r
98c2d961 1879 @param[in] Attributes Attributes of authenticated variable.\r
a6811666
SZ		 1880 @param[in] CertData Pointer to signer's certificates.\r
1881 @param[in] CertDataSize Length of CertData in bytes.\r
1882\r
1883 @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Any input parameter is invalid.\r
1884 @retval EFI_ACCESS_DENIED An AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA entry with same VariableName\r
1885 and VendorGuid already exists.\r
1886 @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES The operation is failed due to lack of resources.\r
98c2d961 1887 @retval EFI_SUCCESS Insert an AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA entry to "certdb" or "certdbv"\r
a6811666
SZ		 1888\r
1889**/\r
1890EFI_STATUS\r
1891InsertCertsToDb (\r
1892 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r
1893 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r
98c2d961 1894 IN UINT32 Attributes,\r
a6811666
SZ		 1895 IN UINT8 *CertData,\r
1896 IN UINTN CertDataSize\r
1897 )\r
1898{\r
1899 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
1900 UINT8 *Data;\r
1901 UINTN DataSize;\r
1902 UINT32 VarAttr;\r
1903 UINT8 *NewCertDb;\r
1904 UINT32 NewCertDbSize;\r
1905 UINT32 CertNodeSize;\r
1906 UINT32 NameSize;\r
1907 AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA *Ptr;\r
98c2d961 1908 CHAR16 *DbName;\r
a6811666
SZ		 1909\r
1910 if ((VariableName == NULL) || (VendorGuid == NULL) || (CertData == NULL)) {\r
1911 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
1912 }\r
1913\r
98c2d961
CZ		 1914 if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE) != 0) {\r
1915 //\r
1916 // Get variable "certdb".\r
1917 //\r
1918 DbName = EFI_CERT_DB_NAME;\r
1919 VarAttr = EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS;\r
1920 } else {\r
1921 //\r
1922 // Get variable "certdbv".\r
1923 //\r
1924 DbName = EFI_CERT_DB_VOLATILE_NAME;\r
1925 VarAttr = EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS;\r
1926 }\r
1927\r
a6811666 1928 //\r
98c2d961 1929 // Get variable "certdb" or "certdbv".\r
a6811666
SZ		 1930 //\r
1931 Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (\r
98c2d961 1932 DbName,\r
a6811666
SZ		 1933 &gEfiCertDbGuid,\r
1934 (VOID **) &Data,\r
1935 &DataSize\r
1936 );\r
1937 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
1938 return Status;\r
1939 }\r
1940\r
1941 if ((DataSize == 0) || (Data == NULL)) {\r
1942 ASSERT (FALSE);\r
1943 return EFI_NOT_FOUND;\r
1944 }\r
1945\r
1946 //\r
98c2d961 1947 // Find whether matching cert node already exists in "certdb" or "certdbv".\r
a6811666
SZ		 1948 // If yes return error.\r
1949 //\r
1950 Status = FindCertsFromDb (\r
1951 VariableName,\r
1952 VendorGuid,\r
1953 Data,\r
1954 DataSize,\r
1955 NULL,\r
1956 NULL,\r
1957 NULL,\r
1958 NULL\r
1959 );\r
1960\r
1961 if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
1962 ASSERT (FALSE);\r
1963 return EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;\r
1964 }\r
1965\r
1966 //\r
98c2d961 1967 // Construct new data content of variable "certdb" or "certdbv".\r
a6811666
SZ		 1968 //\r
1969 NameSize = (UINT32) StrLen (VariableName);\r
1970 CertNodeSize = sizeof (AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA) + (UINT32) CertDataSize + NameSize * sizeof (CHAR16);\r
1971 NewCertDbSize = (UINT32) DataSize + CertNodeSize;\r
1972 if (NewCertDbSize > mMaxCertDbSize) {\r
1973 return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
1974 }\r
1975 NewCertDb = (UINT8*) mCertDbStore;\r
1976\r
1977 //\r
1978 // Copy the DB entries before inserting node.\r
1979 //\r
1980 CopyMem (NewCertDb, Data, DataSize);\r
1981 //\r
1982 // Update CertDbListSize.\r
1983 //\r
1984 CopyMem (NewCertDb, &NewCertDbSize, sizeof (UINT32));\r
1985 //\r
1986 // Construct new cert node.\r
1987 //\r
1988 Ptr = (AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA *) (NewCertDb + DataSize);\r
1989 CopyGuid (&Ptr->VendorGuid, VendorGuid);\r
1990 CopyMem (&Ptr->CertNodeSize, &CertNodeSize, sizeof (UINT32));\r
1991 CopyMem (&Ptr->NameSize, &NameSize, sizeof (UINT32));\r
1992 CopyMem (&Ptr->CertDataSize, &CertDataSize, sizeof (UINT32));\r
1993\r
1994 CopyMem (\r
1995 (UINT8 *) Ptr + sizeof (AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA),\r
1996 VariableName,\r
1997 NameSize * sizeof (CHAR16)\r
1998 );\r
1999\r
2000 CopyMem (\r
2001 (UINT8 *) Ptr + sizeof (AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA) + NameSize * sizeof (CHAR16),\r
2002 CertData,\r
2003 CertDataSize\r
2004 );\r
2005\r
2006 //\r
98c2d961 2007 // Set "certdb" or "certdbv".\r
a6811666 2008 //\r
a6811666 2009 Status = AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariable (\r
98c2d961 2010 DbName,\r
a6811666
SZ		 2011 &gEfiCertDbGuid,\r
2012 NewCertDb,\r
2013 NewCertDbSize,\r
2014 VarAttr\r
2015 );\r
2016\r
2017 return Status;\r
2018}\r
2019\r
64b6a3ff
CZ		 2020/**\r
2021 Clean up signer's certificates for common authenticated variable\r
2022 by corresponding VariableName and VendorGuid from "certdb".\r
f3964772
SZ		 2023 System may break down during Timebased Variable update & certdb update,\r
2024 make them inconsistent, this function is called in AuthVariable Init\r
2025 to ensure consistency.\r
2026\r
2027 @retval EFI_NOT_FOUND Fail to find variable "certdb".\r
2028 @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES The operation is failed due to lack of resources.\r
2029 @retval EFI_SUCCESS The operation is completed successfully.\r
64b6a3ff
CZ		 2030\r
2031**/\r
2032EFI_STATUS\r
2033CleanCertsFromDb (\r
2034 VOID\r
72362a75
CZ		 2035 )\r
2036{\r
64b6a3ff
CZ		 2037 UINT32 Offset;\r
2038 AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA *Ptr;\r
2039 UINT32 NameSize;\r
2040 UINT32 NodeSize;\r
2041 CHAR16 *VariableName;\r
2042 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
2043 BOOLEAN CertCleaned;\r
2044 UINT8 *Data;\r
2045 UINTN DataSize;\r
64b6a3ff 2046 EFI_GUID AuthVarGuid;\r
98c2d961 2047 AUTH_VARIABLE_INFO AuthVariableInfo;\r
64b6a3ff
CZ		 2048\r
2049 Status = EFI_SUCCESS;\r
2050\r
2051 //\r
2052 // Get corresponding certificates by VendorGuid and VariableName.\r
2053 //\r
2054 do {\r
2055 CertCleaned = FALSE;\r
2056\r
2057 //\r
2058 // Get latest variable "certdb"\r
2059 //\r
2060 Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (\r
2061 EFI_CERT_DB_NAME,\r
2062 &gEfiCertDbGuid,\r
2063 (VOID **) &Data,\r
2064 &DataSize\r
2065 );\r
2066 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
2067 return Status;\r
2068 }\r
2069\r
2070 if ((DataSize == 0) || (Data == NULL)) {\r
2071 ASSERT (FALSE);\r
2072 return EFI_NOT_FOUND;\r
2073 }\r
2074\r
2075 Offset = sizeof (UINT32);\r
2076\r
2077 while (Offset < (UINT32) DataSize) {\r
2078 Ptr = (AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA *) (Data + Offset);\r
64b6a3ff
CZ		 2079 NodeSize = ReadUnaligned32 (&Ptr->CertNodeSize);\r
2080 NameSize = ReadUnaligned32 (&Ptr->NameSize);\r
2081\r
2082 //\r
2083 // Get VarName tailed with '\0'\r
2084 //\r
2085 VariableName = AllocateZeroPool((NameSize + 1) * sizeof(CHAR16));\r
2086 if (VariableName == NULL) {\r
2087 return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
2088 }\r
2089 CopyMem (VariableName, (UINT8 *) Ptr + sizeof (AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA), NameSize * sizeof(CHAR16));\r
2090 //\r
2091 // Keep VarGuid aligned\r
2092 //\r
2093 CopyMem (&AuthVarGuid, &Ptr->VendorGuid, sizeof(EFI_GUID));\r
2094\r
2095 //\r
2096 // Find corresponding time auth variable\r
2097 //\r
98c2d961
CZ		 2098 ZeroMem (&AuthVariableInfo, sizeof (AuthVariableInfo));\r
2099 Status = mAuthVarLibContextIn->FindVariable (\r
2100 VariableName,\r
2101 &AuthVarGuid,\r
2102 &AuthVariableInfo\r
2103 );\r
64b6a3ff 2104\r
fd4d9c64 2105 if (EFI_ERROR(Status) || (AuthVariableInfo.Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) == 0) {\r
98c2d961
CZ		 2106 Status = DeleteCertsFromDb(\r
2107 VariableName,\r
2108 &AuthVarGuid,\r
2109 AuthVariableInfo.Attributes\r
2110 );\r
64b6a3ff
CZ		 2111 CertCleaned = TRUE;\r
2112 DEBUG((EFI_D_INFO, "Recovery!! Cert for Auth Variable %s Guid %g is removed for consistency\n", VariableName, &AuthVarGuid));\r
2113 FreePool(VariableName);\r
2114 break;\r
2115 }\r
2116\r
2117 FreePool(VariableName);\r
2118 Offset = Offset + NodeSize;\r
2119 }\r
2120 } while (CertCleaned);\r
2121\r
2122 return Status;\r
2123}\r
2124\r
a6811666
SZ		 2125/**\r
2126 Process variable with EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS set\r
2127\r
2128 Caution: This function may receive untrusted input.\r
2129 This function may be invoked in SMM mode, and datasize and data are external input.\r
2130 This function will do basic validation, before parse the data.\r
2131 This function will parse the authentication carefully to avoid security issues, like\r
2132 buffer overflow, integer overflow.\r
2133\r
2134 @param[in] VariableName Name of Variable to be found.\r
2135 @param[in] VendorGuid Variable vendor GUID.\r
2136 @param[in] Data Data pointer.\r
2137 @param[in] DataSize Size of Data found. If size is less than the\r
2138 data, this value contains the required size.\r
2139 @param[in] Attributes Attribute value of the variable.\r
2140 @param[in] AuthVarType Verify against PK, KEK database, private database or certificate in data payload.\r
2141 @param[in] OrgTimeStamp Pointer to original time stamp,\r
2142 original variable is not found if NULL.\r
2143 @param[out] VarPayloadPtr Pointer to variable payload address.\r
2144 @param[out] VarPayloadSize Pointer to variable payload size.\r
2145\r
2146 @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.\r
2147 @retval EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION The variable does NOT pass the validation\r
2148 check carried out by the firmware.\r
2149 @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES Failed to process variable due to lack\r
2150 of resources.\r
2151 @retval EFI_SUCCESS Variable pass validation successfully.\r
2152\r
2153**/\r
2154EFI_STATUS\r
2155VerifyTimeBasedPayload (\r
2156 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r
2157 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r
2158 IN VOID *Data,\r
2159 IN UINTN DataSize,\r
2160 IN UINT32 Attributes,\r
2161 IN AUTHVAR_TYPE AuthVarType,\r
2162 IN EFI_TIME *OrgTimeStamp,\r
2163 OUT UINT8 **VarPayloadPtr,\r
2164 OUT UINTN *VarPayloadSize\r
2165 )\r
2166{\r
2167 EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 *CertData;\r
2168 UINT8 *SigData;\r
2169 UINT32 SigDataSize;\r
2170 UINT8 *PayloadPtr;\r
2171 UINTN PayloadSize;\r
2172 UINT32 Attr;\r
2173 BOOLEAN VerifyStatus;\r
2174 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
2175 EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *CertList;\r
2176 EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *Cert;\r
2177 UINTN Index;\r
2178 UINTN CertCount;\r
2179 UINT32 KekDataSize;\r
2180 UINT8 *NewData;\r
2181 UINTN NewDataSize;\r
2182 UINT8 *Buffer;\r
2183 UINTN Length;\r
2184 UINT8 *RootCert;\r
2185 UINTN RootCertSize;\r
2186 UINT8 *SignerCerts;\r
2187 UINTN CertStackSize;\r
2188 UINT8 *CertsInCertDb;\r
2189 UINT32 CertsSizeinDb;\r
2190\r
2191 VerifyStatus = FALSE;\r
2192 CertData = NULL;\r
2193 NewData = NULL;\r
2194 Attr = Attributes;\r
2195 SignerCerts = NULL;\r
2196 RootCert = NULL;\r
2197 CertsInCertDb = NULL;\r
2198\r
2199 //\r
2200 // When the attribute EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS is\r
2201 // set, then the Data buffer shall begin with an instance of a complete (and serialized)\r
2202 // EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 descriptor. The descriptor shall be followed by the new\r
2203 // variable value and DataSize shall reflect the combined size of the descriptor and the new\r
2204 // variable value. The authentication descriptor is not part of the variable data and is not\r
2205 // returned by subsequent calls to GetVariable().\r
2206 //\r
2207 CertData = (EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 *) Data;\r
2208\r
2209 //\r
2210 // Verify that Pad1, Nanosecond, TimeZone, Daylight and Pad2 components of the\r
2211 // TimeStamp value are set to zero.\r
2212 //\r
2213 if ((CertData->TimeStamp.Pad1 != 0) ||\r
2214 (CertData->TimeStamp.Nanosecond != 0) ||\r
2215 (CertData->TimeStamp.TimeZone != 0) ||\r
2216 (CertData->TimeStamp.Daylight != 0) ||\r
2217 (CertData->TimeStamp.Pad2 != 0)) {\r
2218 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r
2219 }\r
2220\r
2221 if ((OrgTimeStamp != NULL) && ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_APPEND_WRITE) == 0)) {\r
2222 if (AuthServiceInternalCompareTimeStamp (&CertData->TimeStamp, OrgTimeStamp)) {\r
2223 //\r
2224 // TimeStamp check fail, suspicious replay attack, return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION.\r
2225 //\r
2226 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r
2227 }\r
2228 }\r
2229\r
2230 //\r
2231 // wCertificateType should be WIN_CERT_TYPE_EFI_GUID.\r
2232 // Cert type should be EFI_CERT_TYPE_PKCS7_GUID.\r
2233 //\r
2234 if ((CertData->AuthInfo.Hdr.wCertificateType != WIN_CERT_TYPE_EFI_GUID) ||\r
2235 !CompareGuid (&CertData->AuthInfo.CertType, &gEfiCertPkcs7Guid)) {\r
2236 //\r
2237 // Invalid AuthInfo type, return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION.\r
2238 //\r
2239 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r
2240 }\r
2241\r
2242 //\r
2243 // Find out Pkcs7 SignedData which follows the EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 descriptor.\r
2244 // AuthInfo.Hdr.dwLength is the length of the entire certificate, including the length of the header.\r
2245 //\r
2246 SigData = CertData->AuthInfo.CertData;\r
2247 SigDataSize = CertData->AuthInfo.Hdr.dwLength - (UINT32) (OFFSET_OF (WIN_CERTIFICATE_UEFI_GUID, CertData));\r
2248\r
c035e373
ZL		 2249 //\r
2250 // SignedData.digestAlgorithms shall contain the digest algorithm used when preparing the\r
2251 // signature. Only a digest algorithm of SHA-256 is accepted.\r
2252 //\r
2253 // According to PKCS#7 Definition:\r
2254 // SignedData ::= SEQUENCE {\r
2255 // version Version,\r
2256 // digestAlgorithms DigestAlgorithmIdentifiers,\r
2257 // contentInfo ContentInfo,\r
2258 // .... }\r
2259 // The DigestAlgorithmIdentifiers can be used to determine the hash algorithm \r
2260 // in VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 descriptor.\r
2261 // This field has the fixed offset (+13) and be calculated based on two bytes of length encoding.\r
2262 //\r
2263 if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0) {\r
2264 if (SigDataSize >= (13 + sizeof (mSha256OidValue))) {\r
2265 if (((*(SigData + 1) & TWO_BYTE_ENCODE) != TWO_BYTE_ENCODE) || \r
2266 (CompareMem (SigData + 13, &mSha256OidValue, sizeof (mSha256OidValue)) != 0)) {\r
2267 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r
2268 }\r
2269 }\r
2270 }\r
2271\r
a6811666
SZ		 2272 //\r
2273 // Find out the new data payload which follows Pkcs7 SignedData directly.\r
2274 //\r
2275 PayloadPtr = SigData + SigDataSize;\r
2276 PayloadSize = DataSize - OFFSET_OF_AUTHINFO2_CERT_DATA - (UINTN) SigDataSize;\r
2277\r
2278 //\r
2279 // Construct a serialization buffer of the values of the VariableName, VendorGuid and Attributes\r
2280 // parameters of the SetVariable() call and the TimeStamp component of the\r
2281 // EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 descriptor followed by the variable's new value\r
2282 // i.e. (VariableName, VendorGuid, Attributes, TimeStamp, Data)\r
2283 //\r
2284 NewDataSize = PayloadSize + sizeof (EFI_TIME) + sizeof (UINT32) +\r
2285 sizeof (EFI_GUID) + StrSize (VariableName) - sizeof (CHAR16);\r
2286\r
2287 //\r
2288 // Here is to reuse scratch data area(at the end of volatile variable store)\r
2289 // to reduce SMRAM consumption for SMM variable driver.\r
2290 // The scratch buffer is enough to hold the serialized data and safe to use,\r
2291 // because it is only used at here to do verification temporarily first\r
2292 // and then used in UpdateVariable() for a time based auth variable set.\r
2293 //\r
2294 Status = mAuthVarLibContextIn->GetScratchBuffer (&NewDataSize, (VOID **) &NewData);\r
2295 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
2296 return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
2297 }\r
2298\r
2299 Buffer = NewData;\r
2300 Length = StrLen (VariableName) * sizeof (CHAR16);\r
2301 CopyMem (Buffer, VariableName, Length);\r
2302 Buffer += Length;\r
2303\r
2304 Length = sizeof (EFI_GUID);\r
2305 CopyMem (Buffer, VendorGuid, Length);\r
2306 Buffer += Length;\r
2307\r
2308 Length = sizeof (UINT32);\r
2309 CopyMem (Buffer, &Attr, Length);\r
2310 Buffer += Length;\r
2311\r
2312 Length = sizeof (EFI_TIME);\r
2313 CopyMem (Buffer, &CertData->TimeStamp, Length);\r
2314 Buffer += Length;\r
2315\r
2316 CopyMem (Buffer, PayloadPtr, PayloadSize);\r
2317\r
2318 if (AuthVarType == AuthVarTypePk) {\r
2319 //\r
2320 // Verify that the signature has been made with the current Platform Key (no chaining for PK).\r
2321 // First, get signer's certificates from SignedData.\r
2322 //\r
2323 VerifyStatus = Pkcs7GetSigners (\r
2324 SigData,\r
2325 SigDataSize,\r
2326 &SignerCerts,\r
2327 &CertStackSize,\r
2328 &RootCert,\r
2329 &RootCertSize\r
2330 );\r
2331 if (!VerifyStatus) {\r
2332 goto Exit;\r
2333 }\r
2334\r
2335 //\r
2336 // Second, get the current platform key from variable. Check whether it's identical with signer's certificates\r
2337 // in SignedData. If not, return error immediately.\r
2338 //\r
2339 Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (\r
2340 EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME,\r
2341 &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
2342 &Data,\r
2343 &DataSize\r
2344 );\r
2345 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
2346 VerifyStatus = FALSE;\r
2347 goto Exit;\r
2348 }\r
2349 CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) Data;\r
2350 Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r
2351 if ((RootCertSize != (CertList->SignatureSize - (sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1))) ||\r
2352 (CompareMem (Cert->SignatureData, RootCert, RootCertSize) != 0)) {\r
2353 VerifyStatus = FALSE;\r
2354 goto Exit;\r
2355 }\r
2356\r
2357 //\r
2358 // Verify Pkcs7 SignedData via Pkcs7Verify library.\r
2359 //\r
2360 VerifyStatus = Pkcs7Verify (\r
2361 SigData,\r
2362 SigDataSize,\r
2363 RootCert,\r
2364 RootCertSize,\r
2365 NewData,\r
2366 NewDataSize\r
2367 );\r
2368\r
2369 } else if (AuthVarType == AuthVarTypeKek) {\r
2370\r
2371 //\r
2372 // Get KEK database from variable.\r
2373 //\r
2374 Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (\r
2375 EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME,\r
2376 &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
2377 &Data,\r
2378 &DataSize\r
2379 );\r
2380 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
2381 return Status;\r
2382 }\r
2383\r
2384 //\r
2385 // Ready to verify Pkcs7 SignedData. Go through KEK Signature Database to find out X.509 CertList.\r
2386 //\r
2387 KekDataSize = (UINT32) DataSize;\r
2388 CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) Data;\r
2389 while ((KekDataSize > 0) && (KekDataSize >= CertList->SignatureListSize)) {\r
2390 if (CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Guid)) {\r
2391 Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r
2392 CertCount = (CertList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - CertList->SignatureHeaderSize) / CertList->SignatureSize;\r
2393 for (Index = 0; Index < CertCount; Index++) {\r
2394 //\r
2395 // Iterate each Signature Data Node within this CertList for a verify\r
2396 //\r
2397 RootCert = Cert->SignatureData;\r
2398 RootCertSize = CertList->SignatureSize - (sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1);\r
2399\r
2400 //\r
2401 // Verify Pkcs7 SignedData via Pkcs7Verify library.\r
2402 //\r
2403 VerifyStatus = Pkcs7Verify (\r
2404 SigData,\r
2405 SigDataSize,\r
2406 RootCert,\r
2407 RootCertSize,\r
2408 NewData,\r
2409 NewDataSize\r
2410 );\r
2411 if (VerifyStatus) {\r
2412 goto Exit;\r
2413 }\r
2414 Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) Cert + CertList->SignatureSize);\r
2415 }\r
2416 }\r
2417 KekDataSize -= CertList->SignatureListSize;\r
2418 CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + CertList->SignatureListSize);\r
2419 }\r
2420 } else if (AuthVarType == AuthVarTypePriv) {\r
2421\r
2422 //\r
2423 // Process common authenticated variable except PK/KEK/DB/DBX/DBT.\r
2424 // Get signer's certificates from SignedData.\r
2425 //\r
2426 VerifyStatus = Pkcs7GetSigners (\r
2427 SigData,\r
2428 SigDataSize,\r
2429 &SignerCerts,\r
2430 &CertStackSize,\r
2431 &RootCert,\r
2432 &RootCertSize\r
2433 );\r
2434 if (!VerifyStatus) {\r
2435 goto Exit;\r
2436 }\r
2437\r
2438 //\r
98c2d961 2439 // Get previously stored signer's certificates from certdb or certdbv for existing\r
a6811666
SZ		 2440 // variable. Check whether they are identical with signer's certificates\r
2441 // in SignedData. If not, return error immediately.\r
2442 //\r
2443 if (OrgTimeStamp != NULL) {\r
2444 VerifyStatus = FALSE;\r
2445\r
98c2d961 2446 Status = GetCertsFromDb (VariableName, VendorGuid, Attributes, &CertsInCertDb, &CertsSizeinDb);\r
a6811666
SZ		 2447 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
2448 goto Exit;\r
2449 }\r
2450\r
2451 if ((CertStackSize != CertsSizeinDb) ||\r
2452 (CompareMem (SignerCerts, CertsInCertDb, CertsSizeinDb) != 0)) {\r
2453 goto Exit;\r
2454 }\r
2455 }\r
2456\r
2457 VerifyStatus = Pkcs7Verify (\r
2458 SigData,\r
2459 SigDataSize,\r
2460 RootCert,\r
2461 RootCertSize,\r
2462 NewData,\r
2463 NewDataSize\r
2464 );\r
2465 if (!VerifyStatus) {\r
2466 goto Exit;\r
2467 }\r
2468\r
64b6a3ff 2469 if ((OrgTimeStamp == NULL) && (PayloadSize != 0)) {\r
a6811666
SZ		 2470 //\r
2471 // Insert signer's certificates when adding a new common authenticated variable.\r
2472 //\r
98c2d961 2473 Status = InsertCertsToDb (VariableName, VendorGuid, Attributes, SignerCerts, CertStackSize);\r
a6811666
SZ		 2474 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
2475 VerifyStatus = FALSE;\r
2476 goto Exit;\r
2477 }\r
2478 }\r
2479 } else if (AuthVarType == AuthVarTypePayload) {\r
2480 CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) PayloadPtr;\r
2481 Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r
2482 RootCert = Cert->SignatureData;\r
2483 RootCertSize = CertList->SignatureSize - (sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1);\r
2484 //\r
2485 // Verify Pkcs7 SignedData via Pkcs7Verify library.\r
2486 //\r
2487 VerifyStatus = Pkcs7Verify (\r
2488 SigData,\r
2489 SigDataSize,\r
2490 RootCert,\r
2491 RootCertSize,\r
2492 NewData,\r
2493 NewDataSize\r
2494 );\r
2495 } else {\r
2496 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r
2497 }\r
2498\r
2499Exit:\r
2500\r
2501 if (AuthVarType == AuthVarTypePk || AuthVarType == AuthVarTypePriv) {\r
2502 Pkcs7FreeSigners (RootCert);\r
2503 Pkcs7FreeSigners (SignerCerts);\r
2504 }\r
2505\r
2506 if (!VerifyStatus) {\r
2507 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r
2508 }\r
2509\r
2510 Status = CheckSignatureListFormat(VariableName, VendorGuid, PayloadPtr, PayloadSize);\r
2511 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
2512 return Status;\r
2513 }\r
2514\r
2515 *VarPayloadPtr = PayloadPtr;\r
2516 *VarPayloadSize = PayloadSize;\r
2517\r
2518 return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
2519}\r
2520\r
2521/**\r
2522 Process variable with EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS set\r
2523\r
2524 Caution: This function may receive untrusted input.\r
2525 This function may be invoked in SMM mode, and datasize and data are external input.\r
2526 This function will do basic validation, before parse the data.\r
2527 This function will parse the authentication carefully to avoid security issues, like\r
2528 buffer overflow, integer overflow.\r
2529\r
2530 @param[in] VariableName Name of Variable to be found.\r
2531 @param[in] VendorGuid Variable vendor GUID.\r
2532 @param[in] Data Data pointer.\r
2533 @param[in] DataSize Size of Data found. If size is less than the\r
2534 data, this value contains the required size.\r
2535 @param[in] Attributes Attribute value of the variable.\r
2536 @param[in] AuthVarType Verify against PK, KEK database, private database or certificate in data payload.\r
2537 @param[out] VarDel Delete the variable or not.\r
2538\r
2539 @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.\r
2540 @retval EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION The variable does NOT pass the validation\r
2541 check carried out by the firmware.\r
2542 @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES Failed to process variable due to lack\r
2543 of resources.\r
2544 @retval EFI_SUCCESS Variable pass validation successfully.\r
2545\r
2546**/\r
2547EFI_STATUS\r
2548VerifyTimeBasedPayloadAndUpdate (\r
2549 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r
2550 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r
2551 IN VOID *Data,\r
2552 IN UINTN DataSize,\r
2553 IN UINT32 Attributes,\r
2554 IN AUTHVAR_TYPE AuthVarType,\r
2555 OUT BOOLEAN *VarDel\r
2556 )\r
2557{\r
2558 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
2559 EFI_STATUS FindStatus;\r
2560 UINT8 *PayloadPtr;\r
2561 UINTN PayloadSize;\r
2562 EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 *CertData;\r
2563 AUTH_VARIABLE_INFO OrgVariableInfo;\r
64b6a3ff 2564 BOOLEAN IsDel;\r
a6811666
SZ		 2565\r
2566 ZeroMem (&OrgVariableInfo, sizeof (OrgVariableInfo));\r
2567 FindStatus = mAuthVarLibContextIn->FindVariable (\r
2568 VariableName,\r
2569 VendorGuid,\r
2570 &OrgVariableInfo\r
2571 );\r
2572\r
2573 Status = VerifyTimeBasedPayload (\r
2574 VariableName,\r
2575 VendorGuid,\r
2576 Data,\r
2577 DataSize,\r
2578 Attributes,\r
2579 AuthVarType,\r
2580 (!EFI_ERROR (FindStatus)) ? OrgVariableInfo.TimeStamp : NULL,\r
2581 &PayloadPtr,\r
2582 &PayloadSize\r
2583 );\r
2584 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
2585 return Status;\r
2586 }\r
2587\r
64b6a3ff
CZ		 2588 if (!EFI_ERROR(FindStatus)\r
2589 && (PayloadSize == 0)\r
2590 && ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_APPEND_WRITE) == 0)) {\r
2591 IsDel = TRUE;\r
2592 } else {\r
2593 IsDel = FALSE;\r
a6811666
SZ		 2594 }\r
2595\r
2596 CertData = (EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 *) Data;\r
2597\r
2598 //\r
2599 // Final step: Update/Append Variable if it pass Pkcs7Verify\r
2600 //\r
64b6a3ff
CZ		 2601 Status = AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariableWithTimeStamp (\r
2602 VariableName,\r
2603 VendorGuid,\r
2604 PayloadPtr,\r
2605 PayloadSize,\r
2606 Attributes,\r
2607 &CertData->TimeStamp\r
2608 );\r
2609\r
2610 //\r
2611 // Delete signer's certificates when delete the common authenticated variable.\r
2612 //\r
2613 if (IsDel && AuthVarType == AuthVarTypePriv && !EFI_ERROR(Status) ) {\r
98c2d961 2614 Status = DeleteCertsFromDb (VariableName, VendorGuid, Attributes);\r
64b6a3ff
CZ		 2615 }\r
2616\r
2617 if (VarDel != NULL) {\r
2618 if (IsDel && !EFI_ERROR(Status)) {\r
2619 *VarDel = TRUE;\r
2620 } else {\r
2621 *VarDel = FALSE;\r
2622 }\r
2623 }\r
2624\r
2625 return Status;\r
a6811666 2626}\r
EFI Development Kit II mirror for PVE