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a6811666 SZ |
1 | /** @file\r |
2 | Implement authentication services for the authenticated variables.\r | |
3 | \r | |
4 | Caution: This module requires additional review when modified.\r | |
5 | This driver will have external input - variable data. It may be input in SMM mode.\r | |
6 | This external input must be validated carefully to avoid security issue like\r | |
7 | buffer overflow, integer overflow.\r | |
8 | Variable attribute should also be checked to avoid authentication bypass.\r | |
9 | The whole SMM authentication variable design relies on the integrity of flash part and SMM.\r | |
10 | which is assumed to be protected by platform. All variable code and metadata in flash/SMM Memory\r | |
11 | may not be modified without authorization. If platform fails to protect these resources,\r | |
12 | the authentication service provided in this driver will be broken, and the behavior is undefined.\r | |
13 | \r | |
14 | ProcessVarWithPk(), ProcessVarWithKek() and ProcessVariable() are the function to do\r | |
15 | variable authentication.\r | |
16 | \r | |
17 | VerifyTimeBasedPayloadAndUpdate() and VerifyCounterBasedPayload() are sub function to do verification.\r | |
18 | They will do basic validation for authentication data structure, then call crypto library\r | |
19 | to verify the signature.\r | |
20 | \r | |
b3548d32 | 21 | Copyright (c) 2009 - 2018, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>\r |
289b714b | 22 | SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent\r |
a6811666 SZ |
23 | \r |
24 | **/\r | |
25 | \r | |
26 | #include "AuthServiceInternal.h"\r | |
27 | \r | |
28 | //\r | |
29 | // Public Exponent of RSA Key.\r | |
30 | //\r | |
31 | CONST UINT8 mRsaE[] = { 0x01, 0x00, 0x01 };\r | |
32 | \r | |
c035e373 ZL |
33 | CONST UINT8 mSha256OidValue[] = { 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x01 };\r |
34 | \r | |
a6811666 SZ |
35 | //\r |
36 | // Requirement for different signature type which have been defined in UEFI spec.\r | |
37 | // These data are used to perform SignatureList format check while setting PK/KEK variable.\r | |
38 | //\r | |
39 | EFI_SIGNATURE_ITEM mSupportSigItem[] = {\r | |
40 | //{SigType, SigHeaderSize, SigDataSize }\r | |
41 | {EFI_CERT_SHA256_GUID, 0, 32 },\r | |
42 | {EFI_CERT_RSA2048_GUID, 0, 256 },\r | |
43 | {EFI_CERT_RSA2048_SHA256_GUID, 0, 256 },\r | |
44 | {EFI_CERT_SHA1_GUID, 0, 20 },\r | |
45 | {EFI_CERT_RSA2048_SHA1_GUID, 0, 256 },\r | |
46 | {EFI_CERT_X509_GUID, 0, ((UINT32) ~0)},\r | |
47 | {EFI_CERT_SHA224_GUID, 0, 28 },\r | |
48 | {EFI_CERT_SHA384_GUID, 0, 48 },\r | |
49 | {EFI_CERT_SHA512_GUID, 0, 64 },\r | |
50 | {EFI_CERT_X509_SHA256_GUID, 0, 48 },\r | |
51 | {EFI_CERT_X509_SHA384_GUID, 0, 64 },\r | |
52 | {EFI_CERT_X509_SHA512_GUID, 0, 80 }\r | |
53 | };\r | |
54 | \r | |
55 | /**\r | |
56 | Finds variable in storage blocks of volatile and non-volatile storage areas.\r | |
57 | \r | |
58 | This code finds variable in storage blocks of volatile and non-volatile storage areas.\r | |
59 | If VariableName is an empty string, then we just return the first\r | |
60 | qualified variable without comparing VariableName and VendorGuid.\r | |
61 | \r | |
62 | @param[in] VariableName Name of the variable to be found.\r | |
63 | @param[in] VendorGuid Variable vendor GUID to be found.\r | |
64 | @param[out] Data Pointer to data address.\r | |
65 | @param[out] DataSize Pointer to data size.\r | |
66 | \r | |
67 | @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER If VariableName is not an empty string,\r | |
68 | while VendorGuid is NULL.\r | |
69 | @retval EFI_SUCCESS Variable successfully found.\r | |
70 | @retval EFI_NOT_FOUND Variable not found\r | |
71 | \r | |
72 | **/\r | |
73 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
74 | AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (\r | |
75 | IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r | |
76 | IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r | |
77 | OUT VOID **Data,\r | |
78 | OUT UINTN *DataSize\r | |
79 | )\r | |
80 | {\r | |
81 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r | |
82 | AUTH_VARIABLE_INFO AuthVariableInfo;\r | |
83 | \r | |
84 | ZeroMem (&AuthVariableInfo, sizeof (AuthVariableInfo));\r | |
85 | Status = mAuthVarLibContextIn->FindVariable (\r | |
86 | VariableName,\r | |
87 | VendorGuid,\r | |
88 | &AuthVariableInfo\r | |
89 | );\r | |
90 | *Data = AuthVariableInfo.Data;\r | |
91 | *DataSize = AuthVariableInfo.DataSize;\r | |
92 | return Status;\r | |
93 | }\r | |
94 | \r | |
95 | /**\r | |
96 | Update the variable region with Variable information.\r | |
97 | \r | |
98 | @param[in] VariableName Name of variable.\r | |
99 | @param[in] VendorGuid Guid of variable.\r | |
100 | @param[in] Data Data pointer.\r | |
101 | @param[in] DataSize Size of Data.\r | |
102 | @param[in] Attributes Attribute value of the variable.\r | |
103 | \r | |
104 | @retval EFI_SUCCESS The update operation is success.\r | |
105 | @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.\r | |
106 | @retval EFI_WRITE_PROTECTED Variable is write-protected.\r | |
107 | @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES There is not enough resource.\r | |
108 | \r | |
109 | **/\r | |
110 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
111 | AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariable (\r | |
112 | IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r | |
113 | IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r | |
114 | IN VOID *Data,\r | |
115 | IN UINTN DataSize,\r | |
116 | IN UINT32 Attributes\r | |
117 | )\r | |
118 | {\r | |
119 | AUTH_VARIABLE_INFO AuthVariableInfo;\r | |
120 | \r | |
121 | ZeroMem (&AuthVariableInfo, sizeof (AuthVariableInfo));\r | |
122 | AuthVariableInfo.VariableName = VariableName;\r | |
123 | AuthVariableInfo.VendorGuid = VendorGuid;\r | |
124 | AuthVariableInfo.Data = Data;\r | |
125 | AuthVariableInfo.DataSize = DataSize;\r | |
126 | AuthVariableInfo.Attributes = Attributes;\r | |
127 | \r | |
128 | return mAuthVarLibContextIn->UpdateVariable (\r | |
129 | &AuthVariableInfo\r | |
130 | );\r | |
131 | }\r | |
132 | \r | |
a6811666 | 133 | /**\r |
560ac77e | 134 | Update the variable region with Variable information.\r |
a6811666 | 135 | \r |
560ac77e ZC |
136 | @param[in] VariableName Name of variable.\r |
137 | @param[in] VendorGuid Guid of variable.\r | |
138 | @param[in] Data Data pointer.\r | |
139 | @param[in] DataSize Size of Data.\r | |
140 | @param[in] Attributes Attribute value of the variable.\r | |
141 | @param[in] TimeStamp Value of associated TimeStamp.\r | |
a6811666 | 142 | \r |
560ac77e ZC |
143 | @retval EFI_SUCCESS The update operation is success.\r |
144 | @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.\r | |
145 | @retval EFI_WRITE_PROTECTED Variable is write-protected.\r | |
a6811666 SZ |
146 | @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES There is not enough resource.\r |
147 | \r | |
148 | **/\r | |
149 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
560ac77e ZC |
150 | AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariableWithTimeStamp (\r |
151 | IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r | |
152 | IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r | |
153 | IN VOID *Data,\r | |
154 | IN UINTN DataSize,\r | |
155 | IN UINT32 Attributes,\r | |
156 | IN EFI_TIME *TimeStamp\r | |
a6811666 SZ |
157 | )\r |
158 | {\r | |
560ac77e ZC |
159 | EFI_STATUS FindStatus;\r |
160 | VOID *OrgData;\r | |
161 | UINTN OrgDataSize;\r | |
162 | AUTH_VARIABLE_INFO AuthVariableInfo;\r | |
163 | \r | |
164 | FindStatus = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (\r | |
165 | VariableName,\r | |
166 | VendorGuid,\r | |
167 | &OrgData,\r | |
168 | &OrgDataSize\r | |
169 | );\r | |
a6811666 SZ |
170 | \r |
171 | //\r | |
560ac77e | 172 | // EFI_VARIABLE_APPEND_WRITE attribute only effects for existing variable\r |
a6811666 | 173 | //\r |
560ac77e ZC |
174 | if (!EFI_ERROR (FindStatus) && ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_APPEND_WRITE) != 0)) {\r |
175 | if ((CompareGuid (VendorGuid, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid) &&\r | |
176 | ((StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE) == 0) || (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1) == 0) ||\r | |
177 | (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE2) == 0))) ||\r | |
178 | (CompareGuid (VendorGuid, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid) && (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME) == 0))) {\r | |
179 | //\r | |
180 | // For variables with formatted as EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST, the driver shall not perform an append of\r | |
181 | // EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA values that are already part of the existing variable value.\r | |
182 | //\r | |
183 | FilterSignatureList (\r | |
184 | OrgData,\r | |
185 | OrgDataSize,\r | |
186 | Data,\r | |
187 | &DataSize\r | |
188 | );\r | |
189 | }\r | |
a6811666 SZ |
190 | }\r |
191 | \r | |
560ac77e ZC |
192 | ZeroMem (&AuthVariableInfo, sizeof (AuthVariableInfo));\r |
193 | AuthVariableInfo.VariableName = VariableName;\r | |
194 | AuthVariableInfo.VendorGuid = VendorGuid;\r | |
195 | AuthVariableInfo.Data = Data;\r | |
196 | AuthVariableInfo.DataSize = DataSize;\r | |
197 | AuthVariableInfo.Attributes = Attributes;\r | |
198 | AuthVariableInfo.TimeStamp = TimeStamp;\r | |
199 | return mAuthVarLibContextIn->UpdateVariable (\r | |
200 | &AuthVariableInfo\r | |
201 | );\r | |
a6811666 SZ |
202 | }\r |
203 | \r | |
204 | /**\r | |
205 | Determine whether this operation needs a physical present user.\r | |
206 | \r | |
207 | @param[in] VariableName Name of the Variable.\r | |
208 | @param[in] VendorGuid GUID of the Variable.\r | |
209 | \r | |
210 | @retval TRUE This variable is protected, only a physical present user could set this variable.\r | |
211 | @retval FALSE This variable is not protected.\r | |
212 | \r | |
213 | **/\r | |
214 | BOOLEAN\r | |
215 | NeedPhysicallyPresent(\r | |
216 | IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r | |
217 | IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid\r | |
218 | )\r | |
219 | {\r | |
220 | if ((CompareGuid (VendorGuid, &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid) && (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME) == 0))\r | |
221 | || (CompareGuid (VendorGuid, &gEfiCustomModeEnableGuid) && (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_CUSTOM_MODE_NAME) == 0))) {\r | |
222 | return TRUE;\r | |
223 | }\r | |
224 | \r | |
225 | return FALSE;\r | |
226 | }\r | |
227 | \r | |
228 | /**\r | |
229 | Determine whether the platform is operating in Custom Secure Boot mode.\r | |
230 | \r | |
231 | @retval TRUE The platform is operating in Custom mode.\r | |
232 | @retval FALSE The platform is operating in Standard mode.\r | |
233 | \r | |
234 | **/\r | |
235 | BOOLEAN\r | |
236 | InCustomMode (\r | |
237 | VOID\r | |
238 | )\r | |
239 | {\r | |
240 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r | |
241 | VOID *Data;\r | |
242 | UINTN DataSize;\r | |
243 | \r | |
244 | Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (EFI_CUSTOM_MODE_NAME, &gEfiCustomModeEnableGuid, &Data, &DataSize);\r | |
245 | if (!EFI_ERROR (Status) && (*(UINT8 *) Data == CUSTOM_SECURE_BOOT_MODE)) {\r | |
246 | return TRUE;\r | |
247 | }\r | |
248 | \r | |
249 | return FALSE;\r | |
250 | }\r | |
251 | \r | |
560ac77e ZC |
252 | /**\r |
253 | Update platform mode.\r | |
254 | \r | |
255 | @param[in] Mode SETUP_MODE or USER_MODE.\r | |
256 | \r | |
257 | @return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.\r | |
258 | @return EFI_SUCCESS Update platform mode successfully.\r | |
259 | \r | |
260 | **/\r | |
261 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
262 | UpdatePlatformMode (\r | |
263 | IN UINT32 Mode\r | |
264 | )\r | |
265 | {\r | |
266 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r | |
267 | VOID *Data;\r | |
268 | UINTN DataSize;\r | |
269 | UINT8 SecureBootMode;\r | |
270 | UINT8 SecureBootEnable;\r | |
271 | UINTN VariableDataSize;\r | |
272 | \r | |
273 | Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (\r | |
274 | EFI_SETUP_MODE_NAME,\r | |
275 | &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r | |
276 | &Data,\r | |
277 | &DataSize\r | |
278 | );\r | |
279 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
280 | return Status;\r | |
281 | }\r | |
282 | \r | |
283 | //\r | |
284 | // Update the value of SetupMode variable by a simple mem copy, this could avoid possible\r | |
285 | // variable storage reclaim at runtime.\r | |
286 | //\r | |
287 | mPlatformMode = (UINT8) Mode;\r | |
288 | CopyMem (Data, &mPlatformMode, sizeof(UINT8));\r | |
289 | \r | |
290 | if (mAuthVarLibContextIn->AtRuntime ()) {\r | |
291 | //\r | |
292 | // SecureBoot Variable indicates whether the platform firmware is operating\r | |
293 | // in Secure boot mode (1) or not (0), so we should not change SecureBoot\r | |
294 | // Variable in runtime.\r | |
295 | //\r | |
296 | return Status;\r | |
297 | }\r | |
298 | \r | |
299 | //\r | |
300 | // Check "SecureBoot" variable's existence.\r | |
301 | // If it doesn't exist, firmware has no capability to perform driver signing verification,\r | |
302 | // then set "SecureBoot" to 0.\r | |
303 | //\r | |
304 | Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (\r | |
305 | EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME,\r | |
306 | &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r | |
307 | &Data,\r | |
308 | &DataSize\r | |
309 | );\r | |
310 | //\r | |
311 | // If "SecureBoot" variable exists, then check "SetupMode" variable update.\r | |
312 | // If "SetupMode" variable is USER_MODE, "SecureBoot" variable is set to 1.\r | |
313 | // If "SetupMode" variable is SETUP_MODE, "SecureBoot" variable is set to 0.\r | |
314 | //\r | |
315 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
316 | SecureBootMode = SECURE_BOOT_MODE_DISABLE;\r | |
317 | } else {\r | |
318 | if (mPlatformMode == USER_MODE) {\r | |
319 | SecureBootMode = SECURE_BOOT_MODE_ENABLE;\r | |
320 | } else if (mPlatformMode == SETUP_MODE) {\r | |
321 | SecureBootMode = SECURE_BOOT_MODE_DISABLE;\r | |
322 | } else {\r | |
323 | return EFI_NOT_FOUND;\r | |
324 | }\r | |
325 | }\r | |
326 | \r | |
327 | Status = AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariable (\r | |
328 | EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME,\r | |
329 | &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r | |
330 | &SecureBootMode,\r | |
331 | sizeof(UINT8),\r | |
332 | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS\r | |
333 | );\r | |
334 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
335 | return Status;\r | |
336 | }\r | |
337 | \r | |
338 | //\r | |
339 | // Check "SecureBootEnable" variable's existence. It can enable/disable secure boot feature.\r | |
340 | //\r | |
341 | Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (\r | |
342 | EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME,\r | |
343 | &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid,\r | |
344 | &Data,\r | |
345 | &DataSize\r | |
346 | );\r | |
347 | \r | |
348 | if (SecureBootMode == SECURE_BOOT_MODE_ENABLE) {\r | |
349 | //\r | |
350 | // Create the "SecureBootEnable" variable as secure boot is enabled.\r | |
351 | //\r | |
352 | SecureBootEnable = SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE;\r | |
353 | VariableDataSize = sizeof (SecureBootEnable);\r | |
354 | } else {\r | |
355 | //\r | |
356 | // Delete the "SecureBootEnable" variable if this variable exist as "SecureBoot"\r | |
357 | // variable is not in secure boot state.\r | |
358 | //\r | |
359 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
360 | return EFI_SUCCESS;\r | |
361 | }\r | |
362 | SecureBootEnable = SECURE_BOOT_DISABLE;\r | |
363 | VariableDataSize = 0;\r | |
364 | }\r | |
365 | \r | |
366 | Status = AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariable (\r | |
367 | EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME,\r | |
368 | &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid,\r | |
369 | &SecureBootEnable,\r | |
370 | VariableDataSize,\r | |
371 | EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS\r | |
372 | );\r | |
373 | return Status;\r | |
374 | }\r | |
a6811666 SZ |
375 | \r |
376 | /**\r | |
377 | Check input data form to make sure it is a valid EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST for PK/KEK/db/dbx/dbt variable.\r | |
378 | \r | |
379 | @param[in] VariableName Name of Variable to be check.\r | |
380 | @param[in] VendorGuid Variable vendor GUID.\r | |
381 | @param[in] Data Point to the variable data to be checked.\r | |
382 | @param[in] DataSize Size of Data.\r | |
383 | \r | |
384 | @return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid signature list format.\r | |
385 | @return EFI_SUCCESS Passed signature list format check successfully.\r | |
386 | \r | |
387 | **/\r | |
388 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
389 | CheckSignatureListFormat(\r | |
390 | IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r | |
391 | IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r | |
392 | IN VOID *Data,\r | |
393 | IN UINTN DataSize\r | |
394 | )\r | |
395 | {\r | |
396 | EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *SigList;\r | |
397 | UINTN SigDataSize;\r | |
398 | UINT32 Index;\r | |
399 | UINT32 SigCount;\r | |
400 | BOOLEAN IsPk;\r | |
401 | VOID *RsaContext;\r | |
402 | EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *CertData;\r | |
403 | UINTN CertLen;\r | |
404 | \r | |
405 | if (DataSize == 0) {\r | |
406 | return EFI_SUCCESS;\r | |
407 | }\r | |
408 | \r | |
409 | ASSERT (VariableName != NULL && VendorGuid != NULL && Data != NULL);\r | |
410 | \r | |
411 | if (CompareGuid (VendorGuid, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid) && (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME) == 0)){\r | |
412 | IsPk = TRUE;\r | |
413 | } else if ((CompareGuid (VendorGuid, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid) && (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME) == 0)) ||\r | |
414 | (CompareGuid (VendorGuid, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid) &&\r | |
415 | ((StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE) == 0) || (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1) == 0) ||\r | |
416 | (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE2) == 0)))) {\r | |
417 | IsPk = FALSE;\r | |
418 | } else {\r | |
419 | return EFI_SUCCESS;\r | |
420 | }\r | |
421 | \r | |
422 | SigCount = 0;\r | |
423 | SigList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) Data;\r | |
424 | SigDataSize = DataSize;\r | |
425 | RsaContext = NULL;\r | |
426 | \r | |
427 | //\r | |
428 | // Walk throuth the input signature list and check the data format.\r | |
429 | // If any signature is incorrectly formed, the whole check will fail.\r | |
430 | //\r | |
431 | while ((SigDataSize > 0) && (SigDataSize >= SigList->SignatureListSize)) {\r | |
432 | for (Index = 0; Index < (sizeof (mSupportSigItem) / sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_ITEM)); Index++ ) {\r | |
433 | if (CompareGuid (&SigList->SignatureType, &mSupportSigItem[Index].SigType)) {\r | |
434 | //\r | |
435 | // The value of SignatureSize should always be 16 (size of SignatureOwner\r | |
436 | // component) add the data length according to signature type.\r | |
437 | //\r | |
438 | if (mSupportSigItem[Index].SigDataSize != ((UINT32) ~0) &&\r | |
439 | (SigList->SignatureSize - sizeof (EFI_GUID)) != mSupportSigItem[Index].SigDataSize) {\r | |
440 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r | |
441 | }\r | |
442 | if (mSupportSigItem[Index].SigHeaderSize != ((UINT32) ~0) &&\r | |
443 | SigList->SignatureHeaderSize != mSupportSigItem[Index].SigHeaderSize) {\r | |
444 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r | |
445 | }\r | |
446 | break;\r | |
447 | }\r | |
448 | }\r | |
449 | \r | |
450 | if (Index == (sizeof (mSupportSigItem) / sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_ITEM))) {\r | |
451 | //\r | |
452 | // Undefined signature type.\r | |
453 | //\r | |
454 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r | |
455 | }\r | |
456 | \r | |
457 | if (CompareGuid (&SigList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Guid)) {\r | |
458 | //\r | |
459 | // Try to retrieve the RSA public key from the X.509 certificate.\r | |
460 | // If this operation fails, it's not a valid certificate.\r | |
461 | //\r | |
462 | RsaContext = RsaNew ();\r | |
463 | if (RsaContext == NULL) {\r | |
464 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r | |
465 | }\r | |
466 | CertData = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) SigList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + SigList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r | |
467 | CertLen = SigList->SignatureSize - sizeof (EFI_GUID);\r | |
468 | if (!RsaGetPublicKeyFromX509 (CertData->SignatureData, CertLen, &RsaContext)) {\r | |
469 | RsaFree (RsaContext);\r | |
470 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r | |
471 | }\r | |
472 | RsaFree (RsaContext);\r | |
473 | }\r | |
474 | \r | |
475 | if ((SigList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - SigList->SignatureHeaderSize) % SigList->SignatureSize != 0) {\r | |
476 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r | |
477 | }\r | |
478 | SigCount += (SigList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - SigList->SignatureHeaderSize) / SigList->SignatureSize;\r | |
479 | \r | |
480 | SigDataSize -= SigList->SignatureListSize;\r | |
481 | SigList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) SigList + SigList->SignatureListSize);\r | |
482 | }\r | |
483 | \r | |
484 | if (((UINTN) SigList - (UINTN) Data) != DataSize) {\r | |
485 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r | |
486 | }\r | |
487 | \r | |
488 | if (IsPk && SigCount > 1) {\r | |
489 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r | |
490 | }\r | |
491 | \r | |
492 | return EFI_SUCCESS;\r | |
493 | }\r | |
494 | \r | |
495 | /**\r | |
496 | Update "VendorKeys" variable to record the out of band secure boot key modification.\r | |
497 | \r | |
498 | @return EFI_SUCCESS Variable is updated successfully.\r | |
499 | @return Others Failed to update variable.\r | |
500 | \r | |
501 | **/\r | |
502 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
503 | VendorKeyIsModified (\r | |
504 | VOID\r | |
505 | )\r | |
506 | {\r | |
507 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r | |
508 | \r | |
509 | if (mVendorKeyState == VENDOR_KEYS_MODIFIED) {\r | |
510 | return EFI_SUCCESS;\r | |
511 | }\r | |
512 | mVendorKeyState = VENDOR_KEYS_MODIFIED;\r | |
513 | \r | |
514 | Status = AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariable (\r | |
515 | EFI_VENDOR_KEYS_NV_VARIABLE_NAME,\r | |
516 | &gEfiVendorKeysNvGuid,\r | |
517 | &mVendorKeyState,\r | |
518 | sizeof (UINT8),\r | |
519 | EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS\r | |
520 | );\r | |
521 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
522 | return Status;\r | |
523 | }\r | |
524 | \r | |
525 | return AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariable (\r | |
526 | EFI_VENDOR_KEYS_VARIABLE_NAME,\r | |
527 | &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r | |
528 | &mVendorKeyState,\r | |
529 | sizeof (UINT8),\r | |
530 | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS\r | |
531 | );\r | |
532 | }\r | |
533 | \r | |
534 | /**\r | |
535 | Process variable with platform key for verification.\r | |
536 | \r | |
537 | Caution: This function may receive untrusted input.\r | |
538 | This function may be invoked in SMM mode, and datasize and data are external input.\r | |
539 | This function will do basic validation, before parse the data.\r | |
540 | This function will parse the authentication carefully to avoid security issues, like\r | |
541 | buffer overflow, integer overflow.\r | |
542 | This function will check attribute carefully to avoid authentication bypass.\r | |
543 | \r | |
544 | @param[in] VariableName Name of Variable to be found.\r | |
545 | @param[in] VendorGuid Variable vendor GUID.\r | |
546 | @param[in] Data Data pointer.\r | |
547 | @param[in] DataSize Size of Data found. If size is less than the\r | |
548 | data, this value contains the required size.\r | |
549 | @param[in] Attributes Attribute value of the variable\r | |
550 | @param[in] IsPk Indicate whether it is to process pk.\r | |
551 | \r | |
552 | @return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.\r | |
553 | @return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION The variable does NOT pass the validation.\r | |
554 | check carried out by the firmware.\r | |
555 | @return EFI_SUCCESS Variable passed validation successfully.\r | |
556 | \r | |
557 | **/\r | |
558 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
559 | ProcessVarWithPk (\r | |
560 | IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r | |
561 | IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r | |
562 | IN VOID *Data,\r | |
563 | IN UINTN DataSize,\r | |
564 | IN UINT32 Attributes OPTIONAL,\r | |
565 | IN BOOLEAN IsPk\r | |
566 | )\r | |
567 | {\r | |
568 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r | |
569 | BOOLEAN Del;\r | |
570 | UINT8 *Payload;\r | |
571 | UINTN PayloadSize;\r | |
572 | \r | |
573 | if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE) == 0 ||\r | |
574 | (Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) == 0) {\r | |
575 | //\r | |
576 | // PK, KEK and db/dbx/dbt should set EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE attribute and should be a time-based\r | |
577 | // authenticated variable.\r | |
578 | //\r | |
579 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r | |
580 | }\r | |
581 | \r | |
4fc08e8d CZ |
582 | //\r |
583 | // Init state of Del. State may change due to secure check\r | |
584 | //\r | |
a6811666 | 585 | Del = FALSE;\r |
76bfc7e3 | 586 | if ((InCustomMode() && UserPhysicalPresent()) || (mPlatformMode == SETUP_MODE && !IsPk)) {\r |
560ac77e ZC |
587 | Payload = (UINT8 *) Data + AUTHINFO2_SIZE (Data);\r |
588 | PayloadSize = DataSize - AUTHINFO2_SIZE (Data);\r | |
589 | if (PayloadSize == 0) {\r | |
590 | Del = TRUE;\r | |
591 | }\r | |
a6811666 SZ |
592 | \r |
593 | Status = CheckSignatureListFormat(VariableName, VendorGuid, Payload, PayloadSize);\r | |
594 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
595 | return Status;\r | |
596 | }\r | |
597 | \r | |
598 | Status = AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariableWithTimeStamp (\r | |
599 | VariableName,\r | |
600 | VendorGuid,\r | |
601 | Payload,\r | |
602 | PayloadSize,\r | |
603 | Attributes,\r | |
604 | &((EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 *) Data)->TimeStamp\r | |
605 | );\r | |
606 | if (EFI_ERROR(Status)) {\r | |
607 | return Status;\r | |
608 | }\r | |
609 | \r | |
560ac77e | 610 | if ((mPlatformMode != SETUP_MODE) || IsPk) {\r |
a6811666 SZ |
611 | Status = VendorKeyIsModified ();\r |
612 | }\r | |
560ac77e | 613 | } else if (mPlatformMode == USER_MODE) {\r |
a6811666 SZ |
614 | //\r |
615 | // Verify against X509 Cert in PK database.\r | |
616 | //\r | |
617 | Status = VerifyTimeBasedPayloadAndUpdate (\r | |
618 | VariableName,\r | |
619 | VendorGuid,\r | |
620 | Data,\r | |
621 | DataSize,\r | |
622 | Attributes,\r | |
623 | AuthVarTypePk,\r | |
624 | &Del\r | |
625 | );\r | |
626 | } else {\r | |
627 | //\r | |
628 | // Verify against the certificate in data payload.\r | |
629 | //\r | |
630 | Status = VerifyTimeBasedPayloadAndUpdate (\r | |
631 | VariableName,\r | |
632 | VendorGuid,\r | |
633 | Data,\r | |
634 | DataSize,\r | |
635 | Attributes,\r | |
636 | AuthVarTypePayload,\r | |
637 | &Del\r | |
638 | );\r | |
639 | }\r | |
640 | \r | |
641 | if (!EFI_ERROR(Status) && IsPk) {\r | |
560ac77e ZC |
642 | if (mPlatformMode == SETUP_MODE && !Del) {\r |
643 | //\r | |
644 | // If enroll PK in setup mode, need change to user mode.\r | |
645 | //\r | |
646 | Status = UpdatePlatformMode (USER_MODE);\r | |
647 | } else if (mPlatformMode == USER_MODE && Del){\r | |
648 | //\r | |
649 | // If delete PK in user mode, need change to setup mode.\r | |
650 | //\r | |
651 | Status = UpdatePlatformMode (SETUP_MODE);\r | |
a6811666 SZ |
652 | }\r |
653 | }\r | |
654 | \r | |
655 | return Status;\r | |
656 | }\r | |
657 | \r | |
658 | /**\r | |
659 | Process variable with key exchange key for verification.\r | |
660 | \r | |
661 | Caution: This function may receive untrusted input.\r | |
662 | This function may be invoked in SMM mode, and datasize and data are external input.\r | |
663 | This function will do basic validation, before parse the data.\r | |
664 | This function will parse the authentication carefully to avoid security issues, like\r | |
665 | buffer overflow, integer overflow.\r | |
666 | This function will check attribute carefully to avoid authentication bypass.\r | |
667 | \r | |
668 | @param[in] VariableName Name of Variable to be found.\r | |
669 | @param[in] VendorGuid Variable vendor GUID.\r | |
670 | @param[in] Data Data pointer.\r | |
671 | @param[in] DataSize Size of Data found. If size is less than the\r | |
672 | data, this value contains the required size.\r | |
673 | @param[in] Attributes Attribute value of the variable.\r | |
674 | \r | |
675 | @return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.\r | |
676 | @return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION The variable does NOT pass the validation\r | |
677 | check carried out by the firmware.\r | |
678 | @return EFI_SUCCESS Variable pass validation successfully.\r | |
679 | \r | |
680 | **/\r | |
681 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
682 | ProcessVarWithKek (\r | |
683 | IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r | |
684 | IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r | |
685 | IN VOID *Data,\r | |
686 | IN UINTN DataSize,\r | |
687 | IN UINT32 Attributes OPTIONAL\r | |
688 | )\r | |
689 | {\r | |
690 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r | |
691 | UINT8 *Payload;\r | |
692 | UINTN PayloadSize;\r | |
693 | \r | |
694 | if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE) == 0 ||\r | |
695 | (Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) == 0) {\r | |
696 | //\r | |
697 | // DB, DBX and DBT should set EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE attribute and should be a time-based\r | |
698 | // authenticated variable.\r | |
699 | //\r | |
700 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r | |
701 | }\r | |
702 | \r | |
703 | Status = EFI_SUCCESS;\r | |
76bfc7e3 | 704 | if (mPlatformMode == USER_MODE && !(InCustomMode() && UserPhysicalPresent())) {\r |
a6811666 SZ |
705 | //\r |
706 | // Time-based, verify against X509 Cert KEK.\r | |
707 | //\r | |
708 | return VerifyTimeBasedPayloadAndUpdate (\r | |
709 | VariableName,\r | |
710 | VendorGuid,\r | |
711 | Data,\r | |
712 | DataSize,\r | |
713 | Attributes,\r | |
714 | AuthVarTypeKek,\r | |
715 | NULL\r | |
716 | );\r | |
717 | } else {\r | |
718 | //\r | |
719 | // If in setup mode or custom secure boot mode, no authentication needed.\r | |
720 | //\r | |
721 | Payload = (UINT8 *) Data + AUTHINFO2_SIZE (Data);\r | |
722 | PayloadSize = DataSize - AUTHINFO2_SIZE (Data);\r | |
723 | \r | |
724 | Status = CheckSignatureListFormat(VariableName, VendorGuid, Payload, PayloadSize);\r | |
725 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
726 | return Status;\r | |
727 | }\r | |
728 | \r | |
729 | Status = AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariableWithTimeStamp (\r | |
730 | VariableName,\r | |
731 | VendorGuid,\r | |
732 | Payload,\r | |
733 | PayloadSize,\r | |
734 | Attributes,\r | |
735 | &((EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 *) Data)->TimeStamp\r | |
736 | );\r | |
737 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
738 | return Status;\r | |
739 | }\r | |
740 | \r | |
560ac77e | 741 | if (mPlatformMode != SETUP_MODE) {\r |
a6811666 SZ |
742 | Status = VendorKeyIsModified ();\r |
743 | }\r | |
744 | }\r | |
745 | \r | |
746 | return Status;\r | |
747 | }\r | |
748 | \r | |
749 | /**\r | |
750 | Check if it is to delete auth variable.\r | |
751 | \r | |
752 | @param[in] OrgAttributes Original attribute value of the variable.\r | |
753 | @param[in] Data Data pointer.\r | |
754 | @param[in] DataSize Size of Data.\r | |
755 | @param[in] Attributes Attribute value of the variable.\r | |
756 | \r | |
757 | @retval TRUE It is to delete auth variable.\r | |
758 | @retval FALSE It is not to delete auth variable.\r | |
759 | \r | |
760 | **/\r | |
761 | BOOLEAN\r | |
762 | IsDeleteAuthVariable (\r | |
763 | IN UINT32 OrgAttributes,\r | |
764 | IN VOID *Data,\r | |
765 | IN UINTN DataSize,\r | |
766 | IN UINT32 Attributes\r | |
767 | )\r | |
768 | {\r | |
769 | BOOLEAN Del;\r | |
770 | UINTN PayloadSize;\r | |
771 | \r | |
772 | Del = FALSE;\r | |
773 | \r | |
774 | //\r | |
775 | // To delete a variable created with the EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS\r | |
776 | // or the EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS attribute,\r | |
777 | // SetVariable must be used with attributes matching the existing variable\r | |
778 | // and the DataSize set to the size of the AuthInfo descriptor.\r | |
779 | //\r | |
780 | if ((Attributes == OrgAttributes) &&\r | |
781 | ((Attributes & (EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS)) != 0)) {\r | |
782 | if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0) {\r | |
783 | PayloadSize = DataSize - AUTHINFO2_SIZE (Data);\r | |
784 | if (PayloadSize == 0) {\r | |
785 | Del = TRUE;\r | |
786 | }\r | |
787 | } else {\r | |
788 | PayloadSize = DataSize - AUTHINFO_SIZE;\r | |
789 | if (PayloadSize == 0) {\r | |
790 | Del = TRUE;\r | |
791 | }\r | |
792 | }\r | |
793 | }\r | |
794 | \r | |
795 | return Del;\r | |
796 | }\r | |
797 | \r | |
798 | /**\r | |
0130fdde | 799 | Process variable with EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS set\r |
a6811666 SZ |
800 | \r |
801 | Caution: This function may receive untrusted input.\r | |
802 | This function may be invoked in SMM mode, and datasize and data are external input.\r | |
803 | This function will do basic validation, before parse the data.\r | |
804 | This function will parse the authentication carefully to avoid security issues, like\r | |
805 | buffer overflow, integer overflow.\r | |
806 | This function will check attribute carefully to avoid authentication bypass.\r | |
807 | \r | |
808 | @param[in] VariableName Name of the variable.\r | |
809 | @param[in] VendorGuid Variable vendor GUID.\r | |
810 | @param[in] Data Data pointer.\r | |
811 | @param[in] DataSize Size of Data.\r | |
812 | @param[in] Attributes Attribute value of the variable.\r | |
813 | \r | |
814 | @return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.\r | |
815 | @return EFI_WRITE_PROTECTED Variable is write-protected and needs authentication with\r | |
0130fdde | 816 | EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS or EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS set.\r |
a6811666 | 817 | @return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES The Database to save the public key is full.\r |
0130fdde | 818 | @return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION The variable is with EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS\r |
a6811666 SZ |
819 | set, but the AuthInfo does NOT pass the validation\r |
820 | check carried out by the firmware.\r | |
821 | @return EFI_SUCCESS Variable is not write-protected or pass validation successfully.\r | |
822 | \r | |
823 | **/\r | |
824 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
825 | ProcessVariable (\r | |
826 | IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r | |
827 | IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r | |
828 | IN VOID *Data,\r | |
829 | IN UINTN DataSize,\r | |
98c2d961 | 830 | IN UINT32 Attributes\r |
a6811666 SZ |
831 | )\r |
832 | {\r | |
833 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r | |
a6811666 SZ |
834 | AUTH_VARIABLE_INFO OrgVariableInfo;\r |
835 | \r | |
a6811666 SZ |
836 | Status = EFI_SUCCESS;\r |
837 | \r | |
838 | ZeroMem (&OrgVariableInfo, sizeof (OrgVariableInfo));\r | |
839 | Status = mAuthVarLibContextIn->FindVariable (\r | |
840 | VariableName,\r | |
841 | VendorGuid,\r | |
842 | &OrgVariableInfo\r | |
843 | );\r | |
844 | \r | |
76bfc7e3 | 845 | if ((!EFI_ERROR (Status)) && IsDeleteAuthVariable (OrgVariableInfo.Attributes, Data, DataSize, Attributes) && UserPhysicalPresent()) {\r |
a6811666 | 846 | //\r |
0130fdde | 847 | // Allow the delete operation of common authenticated variable(AT or AW) at user physical presence.\r |
a6811666 | 848 | //\r |
64b6a3ff CZ |
849 | Status = AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariable (\r |
850 | VariableName,\r | |
851 | VendorGuid,\r | |
852 | NULL,\r | |
853 | 0,\r | |
854 | 0\r | |
855 | );\r | |
856 | if (!EFI_ERROR (Status) && ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0)) {\r | |
98c2d961 | 857 | Status = DeleteCertsFromDb (VariableName, VendorGuid, Attributes);\r |
a6811666 | 858 | }\r |
64b6a3ff | 859 | \r |
a6811666 SZ |
860 | return Status;\r |
861 | }\r | |
862 | \r | |
76bfc7e3 | 863 | if (NeedPhysicallyPresent (VariableName, VendorGuid) && !UserPhysicalPresent()) {\r |
a6811666 SZ |
864 | //\r |
865 | // This variable is protected, only physical present user could modify its value.\r | |
866 | //\r | |
867 | return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r | |
868 | }\r | |
869 | \r | |
870 | //\r | |
0130fdde ZC |
871 | if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0) {\r |
872 | //\r | |
873 | // Reject Counter Based Auth Variable processing request.\r | |
874 | //\r | |
875 | return EFI_UNSUPPORTED;\r | |
876 | } else if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0) {\r | |
877 | //\r | |
878 | // Process Time-based Authenticated variable.\r | |
879 | //\r | |
a6811666 SZ |
880 | return VerifyTimeBasedPayloadAndUpdate (\r |
881 | VariableName,\r | |
882 | VendorGuid,\r | |
883 | Data,\r | |
884 | DataSize,\r | |
885 | Attributes,\r | |
886 | AuthVarTypePriv,\r | |
887 | NULL\r | |
888 | );\r | |
889 | }\r | |
890 | \r | |
0130fdde ZC |
891 | if ((OrgVariableInfo.Data != NULL) &&\r |
892 | ((OrgVariableInfo.Attributes & (EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS)) != 0)) {\r | |
a6811666 SZ |
893 | //\r |
894 | // If the variable is already write-protected, it always needs authentication before update.\r | |
895 | //\r | |
896 | return EFI_WRITE_PROTECTED;\r | |
a6811666 SZ |
897 | }\r |
898 | \r | |
899 | //\r | |
0130fdde | 900 | // Not authenticated variable, just update variable as usual.\r |
a6811666 | 901 | //\r |
0130fdde ZC |
902 | Status = AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariable (VariableName, VendorGuid, Data, DataSize, Attributes);\r |
903 | return Status;\r | |
a6811666 | 904 | \r |
a6811666 SZ |
905 | }\r |
906 | \r | |
907 | /**\r | |
908 | Filter out the duplicated EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA from the new data by comparing to the original data.\r | |
909 | \r | |
910 | @param[in] Data Pointer to original EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST.\r | |
911 | @param[in] DataSize Size of Data buffer.\r | |
912 | @param[in, out] NewData Pointer to new EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST.\r | |
913 | @param[in, out] NewDataSize Size of NewData buffer.\r | |
914 | \r | |
915 | **/\r | |
916 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
917 | FilterSignatureList (\r | |
918 | IN VOID *Data,\r | |
919 | IN UINTN DataSize,\r | |
920 | IN OUT VOID *NewData,\r | |
921 | IN OUT UINTN *NewDataSize\r | |
922 | )\r | |
923 | {\r | |
924 | EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *CertList;\r | |
925 | EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *Cert;\r | |
926 | UINTN CertCount;\r | |
927 | EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *NewCertList;\r | |
928 | EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *NewCert;\r | |
929 | UINTN NewCertCount;\r | |
930 | UINTN Index;\r | |
931 | UINTN Index2;\r | |
932 | UINTN Size;\r | |
933 | UINT8 *Tail;\r | |
934 | UINTN CopiedCount;\r | |
935 | UINTN SignatureListSize;\r | |
936 | BOOLEAN IsNewCert;\r | |
937 | UINT8 *TempData;\r | |
938 | UINTN TempDataSize;\r | |
939 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r | |
940 | \r | |
941 | if (*NewDataSize == 0) {\r | |
942 | return EFI_SUCCESS;\r | |
943 | }\r | |
944 | \r | |
945 | TempDataSize = *NewDataSize;\r | |
946 | Status = mAuthVarLibContextIn->GetScratchBuffer (&TempDataSize, (VOID **) &TempData);\r | |
947 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
948 | return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r | |
949 | }\r | |
950 | \r | |
951 | Tail = TempData;\r | |
952 | \r | |
953 | NewCertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) NewData;\r | |
954 | while ((*NewDataSize > 0) && (*NewDataSize >= NewCertList->SignatureListSize)) {\r | |
955 | NewCert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) NewCertList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + NewCertList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r | |
956 | NewCertCount = (NewCertList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - NewCertList->SignatureHeaderSize) / NewCertList->SignatureSize;\r | |
957 | \r | |
958 | CopiedCount = 0;\r | |
959 | for (Index = 0; Index < NewCertCount; Index++) {\r | |
960 | IsNewCert = TRUE;\r | |
961 | \r | |
962 | Size = DataSize;\r | |
963 | CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) Data;\r | |
964 | while ((Size > 0) && (Size >= CertList->SignatureListSize)) {\r | |
965 | if (CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &NewCertList->SignatureType) &&\r | |
966 | (CertList->SignatureSize == NewCertList->SignatureSize)) {\r | |
967 | Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r | |
968 | CertCount = (CertList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - CertList->SignatureHeaderSize) / CertList->SignatureSize;\r | |
969 | for (Index2 = 0; Index2 < CertCount; Index2++) {\r | |
970 | //\r | |
971 | // Iterate each Signature Data in this Signature List.\r | |
972 | //\r | |
973 | if (CompareMem (NewCert, Cert, CertList->SignatureSize) == 0) {\r | |
974 | IsNewCert = FALSE;\r | |
975 | break;\r | |
976 | }\r | |
977 | Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) Cert + CertList->SignatureSize);\r | |
978 | }\r | |
979 | }\r | |
980 | \r | |
981 | if (!IsNewCert) {\r | |
982 | break;\r | |
983 | }\r | |
984 | Size -= CertList->SignatureListSize;\r | |
985 | CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + CertList->SignatureListSize);\r | |
986 | }\r | |
987 | \r | |
988 | if (IsNewCert) {\r | |
989 | //\r | |
990 | // New EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA, keep it.\r | |
991 | //\r | |
992 | if (CopiedCount == 0) {\r | |
993 | //\r | |
994 | // Copy EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST header for only once.\r | |
995 | //\r | |
996 | CopyMem (Tail, NewCertList, sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + NewCertList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r | |
997 | Tail = Tail + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + NewCertList->SignatureHeaderSize;\r | |
998 | }\r | |
999 | \r | |
1000 | CopyMem (Tail, NewCert, NewCertList->SignatureSize);\r | |
1001 | Tail += NewCertList->SignatureSize;\r | |
1002 | CopiedCount++;\r | |
1003 | }\r | |
1004 | \r | |
1005 | NewCert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) NewCert + NewCertList->SignatureSize);\r | |
1006 | }\r | |
1007 | \r | |
1008 | //\r | |
1009 | // Update SignatureListSize in the kept EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST.\r | |
1010 | //\r | |
1011 | if (CopiedCount != 0) {\r | |
1012 | SignatureListSize = sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + NewCertList->SignatureHeaderSize + (CopiedCount * NewCertList->SignatureSize);\r | |
1013 | CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) (Tail - SignatureListSize);\r | |
1014 | CertList->SignatureListSize = (UINT32) SignatureListSize;\r | |
1015 | }\r | |
1016 | \r | |
1017 | *NewDataSize -= NewCertList->SignatureListSize;\r | |
1018 | NewCertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) NewCertList + NewCertList->SignatureListSize);\r | |
1019 | }\r | |
1020 | \r | |
1021 | TempDataSize = (Tail - (UINT8 *) TempData);\r | |
1022 | \r | |
1023 | CopyMem (NewData, TempData, TempDataSize);\r | |
1024 | *NewDataSize = TempDataSize;\r | |
1025 | \r | |
1026 | return EFI_SUCCESS;\r | |
1027 | }\r | |
1028 | \r | |
1029 | /**\r | |
1030 | Compare two EFI_TIME data.\r | |
1031 | \r | |
1032 | \r | |
1033 | @param FirstTime A pointer to the first EFI_TIME data.\r | |
1034 | @param SecondTime A pointer to the second EFI_TIME data.\r | |
1035 | \r | |
1036 | @retval TRUE The FirstTime is not later than the SecondTime.\r | |
1037 | @retval FALSE The FirstTime is later than the SecondTime.\r | |
1038 | \r | |
1039 | **/\r | |
1040 | BOOLEAN\r | |
1041 | AuthServiceInternalCompareTimeStamp (\r | |
1042 | IN EFI_TIME *FirstTime,\r | |
1043 | IN EFI_TIME *SecondTime\r | |
1044 | )\r | |
1045 | {\r | |
1046 | if (FirstTime->Year != SecondTime->Year) {\r | |
1047 | return (BOOLEAN) (FirstTime->Year < SecondTime->Year);\r | |
1048 | } else if (FirstTime->Month != SecondTime->Month) {\r | |
1049 | return (BOOLEAN) (FirstTime->Month < SecondTime->Month);\r | |
1050 | } else if (FirstTime->Day != SecondTime->Day) {\r | |
1051 | return (BOOLEAN) (FirstTime->Day < SecondTime->Day);\r | |
1052 | } else if (FirstTime->Hour != SecondTime->Hour) {\r | |
1053 | return (BOOLEAN) (FirstTime->Hour < SecondTime->Hour);\r | |
1054 | } else if (FirstTime->Minute != SecondTime->Minute) {\r | |
1055 | return (BOOLEAN) (FirstTime->Minute < SecondTime->Minute);\r | |
1056 | }\r | |
1057 | \r | |
1058 | return (BOOLEAN) (FirstTime->Second <= SecondTime->Second);\r | |
1059 | }\r | |
1060 | \r | |
53c6ff18 ZC |
1061 | /**\r |
1062 | Calculate SHA256 digest of SignerCert CommonName + ToplevelCert tbsCertificate\r | |
1063 | SignerCert and ToplevelCert are inside the signer certificate chain.\r | |
1064 | \r | |
1065 | @param[in] SignerCert A pointer to SignerCert data.\r | |
1066 | @param[in] SignerCertSize Length of SignerCert data.\r | |
1067 | @param[in] TopLevelCert A pointer to TopLevelCert data.\r | |
1068 | @param[in] TopLevelCertSize Length of TopLevelCert data.\r | |
1069 | @param[out] Sha256Digest Sha256 digest calculated.\r | |
1070 | \r | |
1071 | @return EFI_ABORTED Digest process failed.\r | |
1072 | @return EFI_SUCCESS SHA256 Digest is succesfully calculated.\r | |
1073 | \r | |
1074 | **/\r | |
1075 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
1076 | CalculatePrivAuthVarSignChainSHA256Digest(\r | |
1077 | IN UINT8 *SignerCert,\r | |
1078 | IN UINTN SignerCertSize,\r | |
1079 | IN UINT8 *TopLevelCert,\r | |
1080 | IN UINTN TopLevelCertSize,\r | |
1081 | OUT UINT8 *Sha256Digest\r | |
1082 | )\r | |
1083 | {\r | |
1084 | UINT8 *TbsCert;\r | |
1085 | UINTN TbsCertSize;\r | |
11b74aa4 | 1086 | CHAR8 CertCommonName[128];\r |
53c6ff18 ZC |
1087 | UINTN CertCommonNameSize;\r |
1088 | BOOLEAN CryptoStatus;\r | |
1089 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r | |
1090 | \r | |
1091 | CertCommonNameSize = sizeof(CertCommonName);\r | |
1092 | \r | |
1093 | //\r | |
1094 | // Get SignerCert CommonName\r | |
1095 | //\r | |
1096 | Status = X509GetCommonName(SignerCert, SignerCertSize, CertCommonName, &CertCommonNameSize);\r | |
1097 | if (EFI_ERROR(Status)) {\r | |
1098 | DEBUG((DEBUG_INFO, "%a Get SignerCert CommonName failed with status %x\n", __FUNCTION__, Status));\r | |
1099 | return EFI_ABORTED;\r | |
1100 | }\r | |
1101 | \r | |
1102 | //\r | |
1103 | // Get TopLevelCert tbsCertificate\r | |
1104 | //\r | |
1105 | if (!X509GetTBSCert(TopLevelCert, TopLevelCertSize, &TbsCert, &TbsCertSize)) {\r | |
1106 | DEBUG((DEBUG_INFO, "%a Get Top-level Cert tbsCertificate failed!\n", __FUNCTION__));\r | |
1107 | return EFI_ABORTED;\r | |
1108 | }\r | |
1109 | \r | |
1110 | //\r | |
1111 | // Digest SignerCert CN + TopLevelCert tbsCertificate\r | |
1112 | //\r | |
1113 | ZeroMem (Sha256Digest, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE);\r | |
1114 | CryptoStatus = Sha256Init (mHashCtx);\r | |
1115 | if (!CryptoStatus) {\r | |
1116 | return EFI_ABORTED;\r | |
1117 | }\r | |
1118 | \r | |
1119 | //\r | |
1120 | // '\0' is forced in CertCommonName. No overflow issue\r | |
1121 | //\r | |
11b74aa4 LE |
1122 | CryptoStatus = Sha256Update (\r |
1123 | mHashCtx,\r | |
1124 | CertCommonName,\r | |
1125 | AsciiStrLen (CertCommonName)\r | |
1126 | );\r | |
53c6ff18 ZC |
1127 | if (!CryptoStatus) {\r |
1128 | return EFI_ABORTED;\r | |
1129 | }\r | |
1130 | \r | |
1131 | CryptoStatus = Sha256Update (mHashCtx, TbsCert, TbsCertSize);\r | |
1132 | if (!CryptoStatus) {\r | |
1133 | return EFI_ABORTED;\r | |
1134 | }\r | |
1135 | \r | |
1136 | CryptoStatus = Sha256Final (mHashCtx, Sha256Digest);\r | |
1137 | if (!CryptoStatus) {\r | |
1138 | return EFI_ABORTED;\r | |
1139 | }\r | |
1140 | \r | |
1141 | return EFI_SUCCESS;\r | |
1142 | }\r | |
1143 | \r | |
a6811666 SZ |
1144 | /**\r |
1145 | Find matching signer's certificates for common authenticated variable\r | |
98c2d961 | 1146 | by corresponding VariableName and VendorGuid from "certdb" or "certdbv".\r |
a6811666 | 1147 | \r |
98c2d961 | 1148 | The data format of "certdb" or "certdbv":\r |
a6811666 SZ |
1149 | //\r |
1150 | // UINT32 CertDbListSize;\r | |
1151 | // /// AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA Certs1[];\r | |
1152 | // /// AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA Certs2[];\r | |
1153 | // /// ...\r | |
1154 | // /// AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA Certsn[];\r | |
1155 | //\r | |
1156 | \r | |
1157 | @param[in] VariableName Name of authenticated Variable.\r | |
1158 | @param[in] VendorGuid Vendor GUID of authenticated Variable.\r | |
98c2d961 CZ |
1159 | @param[in] Data Pointer to variable "certdb" or "certdbv".\r |
1160 | @param[in] DataSize Size of variable "certdb" or "certdbv".\r | |
a6811666 SZ |
1161 | @param[out] CertOffset Offset of matching CertData, from starting of Data.\r |
1162 | @param[out] CertDataSize Length of CertData in bytes.\r | |
1163 | @param[out] CertNodeOffset Offset of matching AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA , from\r | |
1164 | starting of Data.\r | |
1165 | @param[out] CertNodeSize Length of AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA in bytes.\r | |
1166 | \r | |
1167 | @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Any input parameter is invalid.\r | |
1168 | @retval EFI_NOT_FOUND Fail to find matching certs.\r | |
1169 | @retval EFI_SUCCESS Find matching certs and output parameters.\r | |
1170 | \r | |
1171 | **/\r | |
1172 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
1173 | FindCertsFromDb (\r | |
1174 | IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r | |
1175 | IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r | |
1176 | IN UINT8 *Data,\r | |
1177 | IN UINTN DataSize,\r | |
1178 | OUT UINT32 *CertOffset, OPTIONAL\r | |
1179 | OUT UINT32 *CertDataSize, OPTIONAL\r | |
1180 | OUT UINT32 *CertNodeOffset,OPTIONAL\r | |
1181 | OUT UINT32 *CertNodeSize OPTIONAL\r | |
1182 | )\r | |
1183 | {\r | |
1184 | UINT32 Offset;\r | |
1185 | AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA *Ptr;\r | |
1186 | UINT32 CertSize;\r | |
1187 | UINT32 NameSize;\r | |
1188 | UINT32 NodeSize;\r | |
1189 | UINT32 CertDbListSize;\r | |
1190 | \r | |
1191 | if ((VariableName == NULL) || (VendorGuid == NULL) || (Data == NULL)) {\r | |
1192 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r | |
1193 | }\r | |
1194 | \r | |
1195 | //\r | |
1196 | // Check whether DataSize matches recorded CertDbListSize.\r | |
1197 | //\r | |
1198 | if (DataSize < sizeof (UINT32)) {\r | |
1199 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r | |
1200 | }\r | |
1201 | \r | |
1202 | CertDbListSize = ReadUnaligned32 ((UINT32 *) Data);\r | |
1203 | \r | |
1204 | if (CertDbListSize != (UINT32) DataSize) {\r | |
1205 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r | |
1206 | }\r | |
1207 | \r | |
1208 | Offset = sizeof (UINT32);\r | |
1209 | \r | |
1210 | //\r | |
1211 | // Get corresponding certificates by VendorGuid and VariableName.\r | |
1212 | //\r | |
1213 | while (Offset < (UINT32) DataSize) {\r | |
1214 | Ptr = (AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA *) (Data + Offset);\r | |
1215 | //\r | |
1216 | // Check whether VendorGuid matches.\r | |
1217 | //\r | |
1218 | if (CompareGuid (&Ptr->VendorGuid, VendorGuid)) {\r | |
1219 | NodeSize = ReadUnaligned32 (&Ptr->CertNodeSize);\r | |
1220 | NameSize = ReadUnaligned32 (&Ptr->NameSize);\r | |
1221 | CertSize = ReadUnaligned32 (&Ptr->CertDataSize);\r | |
1222 | \r | |
1223 | if (NodeSize != sizeof (EFI_GUID) + sizeof (UINT32) * 3 + CertSize +\r | |
1224 | sizeof (CHAR16) * NameSize) {\r | |
1225 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r | |
1226 | }\r | |
1227 | \r | |
1228 | Offset = Offset + sizeof (EFI_GUID) + sizeof (UINT32) * 3;\r | |
1229 | //\r | |
1230 | // Check whether VariableName matches.\r | |
1231 | //\r | |
1232 | if ((NameSize == StrLen (VariableName)) &&\r | |
1233 | (CompareMem (Data + Offset, VariableName, NameSize * sizeof (CHAR16)) == 0)) {\r | |
1234 | Offset = Offset + NameSize * sizeof (CHAR16);\r | |
1235 | \r | |
1236 | if (CertOffset != NULL) {\r | |
1237 | *CertOffset = Offset;\r | |
1238 | }\r | |
1239 | \r | |
1240 | if (CertDataSize != NULL) {\r | |
1241 | *CertDataSize = CertSize;\r | |
1242 | }\r | |
1243 | \r | |
1244 | if (CertNodeOffset != NULL) {\r | |
1245 | *CertNodeOffset = (UINT32) ((UINT8 *) Ptr - Data);\r | |
1246 | }\r | |
1247 | \r | |
1248 | if (CertNodeSize != NULL) {\r | |
1249 | *CertNodeSize = NodeSize;\r | |
1250 | }\r | |
1251 | \r | |
1252 | return EFI_SUCCESS;\r | |
1253 | } else {\r | |
1254 | Offset = Offset + NameSize * sizeof (CHAR16) + CertSize;\r | |
1255 | }\r | |
1256 | } else {\r | |
1257 | NodeSize = ReadUnaligned32 (&Ptr->CertNodeSize);\r | |
1258 | Offset = Offset + NodeSize;\r | |
1259 | }\r | |
1260 | }\r | |
1261 | \r | |
1262 | return EFI_NOT_FOUND;\r | |
1263 | }\r | |
1264 | \r | |
1265 | /**\r | |
1266 | Retrieve signer's certificates for common authenticated variable\r | |
98c2d961 CZ |
1267 | by corresponding VariableName and VendorGuid from "certdb"\r |
1268 | or "certdbv" according to authenticated variable attributes.\r | |
a6811666 SZ |
1269 | \r |
1270 | @param[in] VariableName Name of authenticated Variable.\r | |
1271 | @param[in] VendorGuid Vendor GUID of authenticated Variable.\r | |
98c2d961 | 1272 | @param[in] Attributes Attributes of authenticated variable.\r |
a6811666 SZ |
1273 | @param[out] CertData Pointer to signer's certificates.\r |
1274 | @param[out] CertDataSize Length of CertData in bytes.\r | |
1275 | \r | |
1276 | @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Any input parameter is invalid.\r | |
98c2d961 | 1277 | @retval EFI_NOT_FOUND Fail to find "certdb"/"certdbv" or matching certs.\r |
a6811666 SZ |
1278 | @retval EFI_SUCCESS Get signer's certificates successfully.\r |
1279 | \r | |
1280 | **/\r | |
1281 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
1282 | GetCertsFromDb (\r | |
1283 | IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r | |
1284 | IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r | |
98c2d961 | 1285 | IN UINT32 Attributes,\r |
a6811666 SZ |
1286 | OUT UINT8 **CertData,\r |
1287 | OUT UINT32 *CertDataSize\r | |
1288 | )\r | |
1289 | {\r | |
1290 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r | |
1291 | UINT8 *Data;\r | |
1292 | UINTN DataSize;\r | |
1293 | UINT32 CertOffset;\r | |
98c2d961 | 1294 | CHAR16 *DbName;\r |
a6811666 SZ |
1295 | \r |
1296 | if ((VariableName == NULL) || (VendorGuid == NULL) || (CertData == NULL) || (CertDataSize == NULL)) {\r | |
1297 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r | |
1298 | }\r | |
1299 | \r | |
b3548d32 | 1300 | \r |
98c2d961 CZ |
1301 | if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE) != 0) {\r |
1302 | //\r | |
1303 | // Get variable "certdb".\r | |
1304 | //\r | |
1305 | DbName = EFI_CERT_DB_NAME;\r | |
1306 | } else {\r | |
1307 | //\r | |
1308 | // Get variable "certdbv".\r | |
1309 | //\r | |
1310 | DbName = EFI_CERT_DB_VOLATILE_NAME;\r | |
1311 | }\r | |
1312 | \r | |
a6811666 | 1313 | //\r |
98c2d961 | 1314 | // Get variable "certdb" or "certdbv".\r |
a6811666 SZ |
1315 | //\r |
1316 | Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (\r | |
98c2d961 | 1317 | DbName,\r |
a6811666 SZ |
1318 | &gEfiCertDbGuid,\r |
1319 | (VOID **) &Data,\r | |
1320 | &DataSize\r | |
1321 | );\r | |
1322 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
1323 | return Status;\r | |
1324 | }\r | |
1325 | \r | |
1326 | if ((DataSize == 0) || (Data == NULL)) {\r | |
1327 | ASSERT (FALSE);\r | |
1328 | return EFI_NOT_FOUND;\r | |
1329 | }\r | |
1330 | \r | |
1331 | Status = FindCertsFromDb (\r | |
1332 | VariableName,\r | |
1333 | VendorGuid,\r | |
1334 | Data,\r | |
1335 | DataSize,\r | |
1336 | &CertOffset,\r | |
1337 | CertDataSize,\r | |
1338 | NULL,\r | |
1339 | NULL\r | |
1340 | );\r | |
1341 | \r | |
1342 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
1343 | return Status;\r | |
1344 | }\r | |
1345 | \r | |
1346 | *CertData = Data + CertOffset;\r | |
1347 | return EFI_SUCCESS;\r | |
1348 | }\r | |
1349 | \r | |
1350 | /**\r | |
1351 | Delete matching signer's certificates when deleting common authenticated\r | |
b3548d32 | 1352 | variable by corresponding VariableName and VendorGuid from "certdb" or\r |
98c2d961 | 1353 | "certdbv" according to authenticated variable attributes.\r |
a6811666 SZ |
1354 | \r |
1355 | @param[in] VariableName Name of authenticated Variable.\r | |
1356 | @param[in] VendorGuid Vendor GUID of authenticated Variable.\r | |
98c2d961 | 1357 | @param[in] Attributes Attributes of authenticated variable.\r |
a6811666 SZ |
1358 | \r |
1359 | @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Any input parameter is invalid.\r | |
98c2d961 | 1360 | @retval EFI_NOT_FOUND Fail to find "certdb"/"certdbv" or matching certs.\r |
a6811666 SZ |
1361 | @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES The operation is failed due to lack of resources.\r |
1362 | @retval EFI_SUCCESS The operation is completed successfully.\r | |
1363 | \r | |
1364 | **/\r | |
1365 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
1366 | DeleteCertsFromDb (\r | |
1367 | IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r | |
98c2d961 CZ |
1368 | IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r |
1369 | IN UINT32 Attributes\r | |
a6811666 SZ |
1370 | )\r |
1371 | {\r | |
1372 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r | |
1373 | UINT8 *Data;\r | |
1374 | UINTN DataSize;\r | |
1375 | UINT32 VarAttr;\r | |
1376 | UINT32 CertNodeOffset;\r | |
1377 | UINT32 CertNodeSize;\r | |
1378 | UINT8 *NewCertDb;\r | |
1379 | UINT32 NewCertDbSize;\r | |
98c2d961 | 1380 | CHAR16 *DbName;\r |
a6811666 SZ |
1381 | \r |
1382 | if ((VariableName == NULL) || (VendorGuid == NULL)) {\r | |
1383 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r | |
1384 | }\r | |
1385 | \r | |
98c2d961 CZ |
1386 | if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE) != 0) {\r |
1387 | //\r | |
1388 | // Get variable "certdb".\r | |
1389 | //\r | |
1390 | DbName = EFI_CERT_DB_NAME;\r | |
1391 | VarAttr = EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS;\r | |
1392 | } else {\r | |
1393 | //\r | |
1394 | // Get variable "certdbv".\r | |
1395 | //\r | |
1396 | DbName = EFI_CERT_DB_VOLATILE_NAME;\r | |
1397 | VarAttr = EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS;\r | |
1398 | }\r | |
1399 | \r | |
a6811666 | 1400 | Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (\r |
98c2d961 | 1401 | DbName,\r |
a6811666 SZ |
1402 | &gEfiCertDbGuid,\r |
1403 | (VOID **) &Data,\r | |
1404 | &DataSize\r | |
1405 | );\r | |
98c2d961 | 1406 | \r |
a6811666 SZ |
1407 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r |
1408 | return Status;\r | |
1409 | }\r | |
1410 | \r | |
1411 | if ((DataSize == 0) || (Data == NULL)) {\r | |
1412 | ASSERT (FALSE);\r | |
1413 | return EFI_NOT_FOUND;\r | |
1414 | }\r | |
1415 | \r | |
1416 | if (DataSize == sizeof (UINT32)) {\r | |
1417 | //\r | |
98c2d961 | 1418 | // There is no certs in "certdb" or "certdbv".\r |
a6811666 SZ |
1419 | //\r |
1420 | return EFI_SUCCESS;\r | |
1421 | }\r | |
1422 | \r | |
1423 | //\r | |
98c2d961 | 1424 | // Get corresponding cert node from "certdb" or "certdbv".\r |
a6811666 SZ |
1425 | //\r |
1426 | Status = FindCertsFromDb (\r | |
1427 | VariableName,\r | |
1428 | VendorGuid,\r | |
1429 | Data,\r | |
1430 | DataSize,\r | |
1431 | NULL,\r | |
1432 | NULL,\r | |
1433 | &CertNodeOffset,\r | |
1434 | &CertNodeSize\r | |
1435 | );\r | |
1436 | \r | |
1437 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
1438 | return Status;\r | |
1439 | }\r | |
1440 | \r | |
1441 | if (DataSize < (CertNodeOffset + CertNodeSize)) {\r | |
1442 | return EFI_NOT_FOUND;\r | |
1443 | }\r | |
1444 | \r | |
1445 | //\r | |
98c2d961 | 1446 | // Construct new data content of variable "certdb" or "certdbv".\r |
a6811666 SZ |
1447 | //\r |
1448 | NewCertDbSize = (UINT32) DataSize - CertNodeSize;\r | |
1449 | NewCertDb = (UINT8*) mCertDbStore;\r | |
1450 | \r | |
1451 | //\r | |
1452 | // Copy the DB entries before deleting node.\r | |
1453 | //\r | |
1454 | CopyMem (NewCertDb, Data, CertNodeOffset);\r | |
1455 | //\r | |
1456 | // Update CertDbListSize.\r | |
1457 | //\r | |
1458 | CopyMem (NewCertDb, &NewCertDbSize, sizeof (UINT32));\r | |
1459 | //\r | |
1460 | // Copy the DB entries after deleting node.\r | |
1461 | //\r | |
1462 | if (DataSize > (CertNodeOffset + CertNodeSize)) {\r | |
1463 | CopyMem (\r | |
1464 | NewCertDb + CertNodeOffset,\r | |
1465 | Data + CertNodeOffset + CertNodeSize,\r | |
1466 | DataSize - CertNodeOffset - CertNodeSize\r | |
1467 | );\r | |
1468 | }\r | |
1469 | \r | |
1470 | //\r | |
98c2d961 | 1471 | // Set "certdb" or "certdbv".\r |
a6811666 | 1472 | //\r |
a6811666 | 1473 | Status = AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariable (\r |
98c2d961 | 1474 | DbName,\r |
a6811666 SZ |
1475 | &gEfiCertDbGuid,\r |
1476 | NewCertDb,\r | |
1477 | NewCertDbSize,\r | |
1478 | VarAttr\r | |
1479 | );\r | |
1480 | \r | |
1481 | return Status;\r | |
1482 | }\r | |
1483 | \r | |
1484 | /**\r | |
1485 | Insert signer's certificates for common authenticated variable with VariableName\r | |
98c2d961 | 1486 | and VendorGuid in AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA to "certdb" or "certdbv" according to\r |
53c6ff18 ZC |
1487 | time based authenticated variable attributes. CertData is the SHA256 digest of\r |
1488 | SignerCert CommonName + TopLevelCert tbsCertificate.\r | |
a6811666 | 1489 | \r |
53c6ff18 ZC |
1490 | @param[in] VariableName Name of authenticated Variable.\r |
1491 | @param[in] VendorGuid Vendor GUID of authenticated Variable.\r | |
1492 | @param[in] Attributes Attributes of authenticated variable.\r | |
1493 | @param[in] SignerCert Signer certificate data.\r | |
1494 | @param[in] SignerCertSize Length of signer certificate.\r | |
1495 | @param[in] TopLevelCert Top-level certificate data.\r | |
1496 | @param[in] TopLevelCertSize Length of top-level certificate.\r | |
a6811666 SZ |
1497 | \r |
1498 | @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Any input parameter is invalid.\r | |
1499 | @retval EFI_ACCESS_DENIED An AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA entry with same VariableName\r | |
1500 | and VendorGuid already exists.\r | |
1501 | @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES The operation is failed due to lack of resources.\r | |
98c2d961 | 1502 | @retval EFI_SUCCESS Insert an AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA entry to "certdb" or "certdbv"\r |
a6811666 SZ |
1503 | \r |
1504 | **/\r | |
1505 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
1506 | InsertCertsToDb (\r | |
1507 | IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r | |
1508 | IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r | |
98c2d961 | 1509 | IN UINT32 Attributes,\r |
53c6ff18 ZC |
1510 | IN UINT8 *SignerCert,\r |
1511 | IN UINTN SignerCertSize,\r | |
1512 | IN UINT8 *TopLevelCert,\r | |
1513 | IN UINTN TopLevelCertSize\r | |
a6811666 SZ |
1514 | )\r |
1515 | {\r | |
1516 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r | |
1517 | UINT8 *Data;\r | |
1518 | UINTN DataSize;\r | |
1519 | UINT32 VarAttr;\r | |
1520 | UINT8 *NewCertDb;\r | |
1521 | UINT32 NewCertDbSize;\r | |
1522 | UINT32 CertNodeSize;\r | |
1523 | UINT32 NameSize;\r | |
53c6ff18 | 1524 | UINT32 CertDataSize;\r |
a6811666 | 1525 | AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA *Ptr;\r |
98c2d961 | 1526 | CHAR16 *DbName;\r |
53c6ff18 | 1527 | UINT8 Sha256Digest[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE];\r |
a6811666 | 1528 | \r |
53c6ff18 | 1529 | if ((VariableName == NULL) || (VendorGuid == NULL) || (SignerCert == NULL) ||(TopLevelCert == NULL)) {\r |
a6811666 SZ |
1530 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r |
1531 | }\r | |
1532 | \r | |
98c2d961 CZ |
1533 | if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE) != 0) {\r |
1534 | //\r | |
1535 | // Get variable "certdb".\r | |
1536 | //\r | |
1537 | DbName = EFI_CERT_DB_NAME;\r | |
1538 | VarAttr = EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS;\r | |
1539 | } else {\r | |
1540 | //\r | |
1541 | // Get variable "certdbv".\r | |
1542 | //\r | |
1543 | DbName = EFI_CERT_DB_VOLATILE_NAME;\r | |
1544 | VarAttr = EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS;\r | |
1545 | }\r | |
1546 | \r | |
a6811666 | 1547 | //\r |
98c2d961 | 1548 | // Get variable "certdb" or "certdbv".\r |
a6811666 SZ |
1549 | //\r |
1550 | Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (\r | |
98c2d961 | 1551 | DbName,\r |
a6811666 SZ |
1552 | &gEfiCertDbGuid,\r |
1553 | (VOID **) &Data,\r | |
1554 | &DataSize\r | |
1555 | );\r | |
1556 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
1557 | return Status;\r | |
1558 | }\r | |
1559 | \r | |
1560 | if ((DataSize == 0) || (Data == NULL)) {\r | |
1561 | ASSERT (FALSE);\r | |
1562 | return EFI_NOT_FOUND;\r | |
1563 | }\r | |
1564 | \r | |
1565 | //\r | |
98c2d961 | 1566 | // Find whether matching cert node already exists in "certdb" or "certdbv".\r |
a6811666 SZ |
1567 | // If yes return error.\r |
1568 | //\r | |
1569 | Status = FindCertsFromDb (\r | |
1570 | VariableName,\r | |
1571 | VendorGuid,\r | |
1572 | Data,\r | |
1573 | DataSize,\r | |
1574 | NULL,\r | |
1575 | NULL,\r | |
1576 | NULL,\r | |
1577 | NULL\r | |
1578 | );\r | |
1579 | \r | |
1580 | if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
1581 | ASSERT (FALSE);\r | |
1582 | return EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;\r | |
1583 | }\r | |
1584 | \r | |
1585 | //\r | |
98c2d961 | 1586 | // Construct new data content of variable "certdb" or "certdbv".\r |
a6811666 SZ |
1587 | //\r |
1588 | NameSize = (UINT32) StrLen (VariableName);\r | |
53c6ff18 | 1589 | CertDataSize = sizeof(Sha256Digest);\r |
a6811666 SZ |
1590 | CertNodeSize = sizeof (AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA) + (UINT32) CertDataSize + NameSize * sizeof (CHAR16);\r |
1591 | NewCertDbSize = (UINT32) DataSize + CertNodeSize;\r | |
1592 | if (NewCertDbSize > mMaxCertDbSize) {\r | |
1593 | return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r | |
1594 | }\r | |
53c6ff18 ZC |
1595 | \r |
1596 | Status = CalculatePrivAuthVarSignChainSHA256Digest(\r | |
1597 | SignerCert,\r | |
1598 | SignerCertSize,\r | |
1599 | TopLevelCert,\r | |
1600 | TopLevelCertSize,\r | |
1601 | Sha256Digest\r | |
1602 | );\r | |
1603 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
1604 | return Status;\r | |
1605 | }\r | |
1606 | \r | |
a6811666 SZ |
1607 | NewCertDb = (UINT8*) mCertDbStore;\r |
1608 | \r | |
1609 | //\r | |
1610 | // Copy the DB entries before inserting node.\r | |
1611 | //\r | |
1612 | CopyMem (NewCertDb, Data, DataSize);\r | |
1613 | //\r | |
1614 | // Update CertDbListSize.\r | |
1615 | //\r | |
1616 | CopyMem (NewCertDb, &NewCertDbSize, sizeof (UINT32));\r | |
1617 | //\r | |
1618 | // Construct new cert node.\r | |
1619 | //\r | |
1620 | Ptr = (AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA *) (NewCertDb + DataSize);\r | |
1621 | CopyGuid (&Ptr->VendorGuid, VendorGuid);\r | |
1622 | CopyMem (&Ptr->CertNodeSize, &CertNodeSize, sizeof (UINT32));\r | |
1623 | CopyMem (&Ptr->NameSize, &NameSize, sizeof (UINT32));\r | |
1624 | CopyMem (&Ptr->CertDataSize, &CertDataSize, sizeof (UINT32));\r | |
1625 | \r | |
1626 | CopyMem (\r | |
1627 | (UINT8 *) Ptr + sizeof (AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA),\r | |
1628 | VariableName,\r | |
1629 | NameSize * sizeof (CHAR16)\r | |
1630 | );\r | |
1631 | \r | |
1632 | CopyMem (\r | |
1633 | (UINT8 *) Ptr + sizeof (AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA) + NameSize * sizeof (CHAR16),\r | |
53c6ff18 | 1634 | Sha256Digest,\r |
a6811666 SZ |
1635 | CertDataSize\r |
1636 | );\r | |
1637 | \r | |
1638 | //\r | |
98c2d961 | 1639 | // Set "certdb" or "certdbv".\r |
a6811666 | 1640 | //\r |
a6811666 | 1641 | Status = AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariable (\r |
98c2d961 | 1642 | DbName,\r |
a6811666 SZ |
1643 | &gEfiCertDbGuid,\r |
1644 | NewCertDb,\r | |
1645 | NewCertDbSize,\r | |
1646 | VarAttr\r | |
1647 | );\r | |
1648 | \r | |
1649 | return Status;\r | |
1650 | }\r | |
1651 | \r | |
64b6a3ff CZ |
1652 | /**\r |
1653 | Clean up signer's certificates for common authenticated variable\r | |
1654 | by corresponding VariableName and VendorGuid from "certdb".\r | |
f3964772 SZ |
1655 | System may break down during Timebased Variable update & certdb update,\r |
1656 | make them inconsistent, this function is called in AuthVariable Init\r | |
1657 | to ensure consistency.\r | |
1658 | \r | |
1659 | @retval EFI_NOT_FOUND Fail to find variable "certdb".\r | |
1660 | @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES The operation is failed due to lack of resources.\r | |
1661 | @retval EFI_SUCCESS The operation is completed successfully.\r | |
64b6a3ff CZ |
1662 | \r |
1663 | **/\r | |
1664 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
1665 | CleanCertsFromDb (\r | |
1666 | VOID\r | |
72362a75 CZ |
1667 | )\r |
1668 | {\r | |
64b6a3ff CZ |
1669 | UINT32 Offset;\r |
1670 | AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA *Ptr;\r | |
1671 | UINT32 NameSize;\r | |
1672 | UINT32 NodeSize;\r | |
1673 | CHAR16 *VariableName;\r | |
1674 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r | |
1675 | BOOLEAN CertCleaned;\r | |
1676 | UINT8 *Data;\r | |
1677 | UINTN DataSize;\r | |
64b6a3ff | 1678 | EFI_GUID AuthVarGuid;\r |
98c2d961 | 1679 | AUTH_VARIABLE_INFO AuthVariableInfo;\r |
64b6a3ff CZ |
1680 | \r |
1681 | Status = EFI_SUCCESS;\r | |
1682 | \r | |
1683 | //\r | |
1684 | // Get corresponding certificates by VendorGuid and VariableName.\r | |
1685 | //\r | |
1686 | do {\r | |
1687 | CertCleaned = FALSE;\r | |
1688 | \r | |
1689 | //\r | |
1690 | // Get latest variable "certdb"\r | |
1691 | //\r | |
1692 | Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (\r | |
1693 | EFI_CERT_DB_NAME,\r | |
1694 | &gEfiCertDbGuid,\r | |
1695 | (VOID **) &Data,\r | |
1696 | &DataSize\r | |
1697 | );\r | |
1698 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
1699 | return Status;\r | |
1700 | }\r | |
1701 | \r | |
1702 | if ((DataSize == 0) || (Data == NULL)) {\r | |
1703 | ASSERT (FALSE);\r | |
1704 | return EFI_NOT_FOUND;\r | |
1705 | }\r | |
1706 | \r | |
1707 | Offset = sizeof (UINT32);\r | |
1708 | \r | |
1709 | while (Offset < (UINT32) DataSize) {\r | |
1710 | Ptr = (AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA *) (Data + Offset);\r | |
64b6a3ff CZ |
1711 | NodeSize = ReadUnaligned32 (&Ptr->CertNodeSize);\r |
1712 | NameSize = ReadUnaligned32 (&Ptr->NameSize);\r | |
1713 | \r | |
1714 | //\r | |
1715 | // Get VarName tailed with '\0'\r | |
1716 | //\r | |
1717 | VariableName = AllocateZeroPool((NameSize + 1) * sizeof(CHAR16));\r | |
1718 | if (VariableName == NULL) {\r | |
1719 | return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r | |
1720 | }\r | |
1721 | CopyMem (VariableName, (UINT8 *) Ptr + sizeof (AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA), NameSize * sizeof(CHAR16));\r | |
1722 | //\r | |
1723 | // Keep VarGuid aligned\r | |
1724 | //\r | |
1725 | CopyMem (&AuthVarGuid, &Ptr->VendorGuid, sizeof(EFI_GUID));\r | |
1726 | \r | |
1727 | //\r | |
1728 | // Find corresponding time auth variable\r | |
1729 | //\r | |
98c2d961 CZ |
1730 | ZeroMem (&AuthVariableInfo, sizeof (AuthVariableInfo));\r |
1731 | Status = mAuthVarLibContextIn->FindVariable (\r | |
1732 | VariableName,\r | |
1733 | &AuthVarGuid,\r | |
1734 | &AuthVariableInfo\r | |
1735 | );\r | |
64b6a3ff | 1736 | \r |
fd4d9c64 | 1737 | if (EFI_ERROR(Status) || (AuthVariableInfo.Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) == 0) {\r |
98c2d961 CZ |
1738 | Status = DeleteCertsFromDb(\r |
1739 | VariableName,\r | |
1740 | &AuthVarGuid,\r | |
1741 | AuthVariableInfo.Attributes\r | |
1742 | );\r | |
64b6a3ff CZ |
1743 | CertCleaned = TRUE;\r |
1744 | DEBUG((EFI_D_INFO, "Recovery!! Cert for Auth Variable %s Guid %g is removed for consistency\n", VariableName, &AuthVarGuid));\r | |
1745 | FreePool(VariableName);\r | |
1746 | break;\r | |
1747 | }\r | |
1748 | \r | |
1749 | FreePool(VariableName);\r | |
1750 | Offset = Offset + NodeSize;\r | |
1751 | }\r | |
1752 | } while (CertCleaned);\r | |
1753 | \r | |
1754 | return Status;\r | |
1755 | }\r | |
1756 | \r | |
a6811666 SZ |
1757 | /**\r |
1758 | Process variable with EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS set\r | |
1759 | \r | |
1760 | Caution: This function may receive untrusted input.\r | |
1761 | This function may be invoked in SMM mode, and datasize and data are external input.\r | |
1762 | This function will do basic validation, before parse the data.\r | |
1763 | This function will parse the authentication carefully to avoid security issues, like\r | |
1764 | buffer overflow, integer overflow.\r | |
1765 | \r | |
1766 | @param[in] VariableName Name of Variable to be found.\r | |
1767 | @param[in] VendorGuid Variable vendor GUID.\r | |
1768 | @param[in] Data Data pointer.\r | |
1769 | @param[in] DataSize Size of Data found. If size is less than the\r | |
1770 | data, this value contains the required size.\r | |
1771 | @param[in] Attributes Attribute value of the variable.\r | |
1772 | @param[in] AuthVarType Verify against PK, KEK database, private database or certificate in data payload.\r | |
1773 | @param[in] OrgTimeStamp Pointer to original time stamp,\r | |
1774 | original variable is not found if NULL.\r | |
1775 | @param[out] VarPayloadPtr Pointer to variable payload address.\r | |
1776 | @param[out] VarPayloadSize Pointer to variable payload size.\r | |
1777 | \r | |
1778 | @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.\r | |
1779 | @retval EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION The variable does NOT pass the validation\r | |
1780 | check carried out by the firmware.\r | |
1781 | @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES Failed to process variable due to lack\r | |
1782 | of resources.\r | |
1783 | @retval EFI_SUCCESS Variable pass validation successfully.\r | |
1784 | \r | |
1785 | **/\r | |
1786 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
1787 | VerifyTimeBasedPayload (\r | |
1788 | IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r | |
1789 | IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r | |
1790 | IN VOID *Data,\r | |
1791 | IN UINTN DataSize,\r | |
1792 | IN UINT32 Attributes,\r | |
1793 | IN AUTHVAR_TYPE AuthVarType,\r | |
1794 | IN EFI_TIME *OrgTimeStamp,\r | |
1795 | OUT UINT8 **VarPayloadPtr,\r | |
1796 | OUT UINTN *VarPayloadSize\r | |
1797 | )\r | |
1798 | {\r | |
1799 | EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 *CertData;\r | |
1800 | UINT8 *SigData;\r | |
1801 | UINT32 SigDataSize;\r | |
1802 | UINT8 *PayloadPtr;\r | |
1803 | UINTN PayloadSize;\r | |
1804 | UINT32 Attr;\r | |
1805 | BOOLEAN VerifyStatus;\r | |
1806 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r | |
1807 | EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *CertList;\r | |
1808 | EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *Cert;\r | |
1809 | UINTN Index;\r | |
1810 | UINTN CertCount;\r | |
1811 | UINT32 KekDataSize;\r | |
1812 | UINT8 *NewData;\r | |
1813 | UINTN NewDataSize;\r | |
1814 | UINT8 *Buffer;\r | |
1815 | UINTN Length;\r | |
53c6ff18 ZC |
1816 | UINT8 *TopLevelCert;\r |
1817 | UINTN TopLevelCertSize;\r | |
1818 | UINT8 *TrustedCert;\r | |
1819 | UINTN TrustedCertSize;\r | |
a6811666 SZ |
1820 | UINT8 *SignerCerts;\r |
1821 | UINTN CertStackSize;\r | |
1822 | UINT8 *CertsInCertDb;\r | |
1823 | UINT32 CertsSizeinDb;\r | |
53c6ff18 | 1824 | UINT8 Sha256Digest[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE];\r |
62ba0feb | 1825 | EFI_CERT_DATA *CertDataPtr;\r |
a6811666 | 1826 | \r |
53c6ff18 ZC |
1827 | //\r |
1828 | // 1. TopLevelCert is the top-level issuer certificate in signature Signer Cert Chain\r | |
1829 | // 2. TrustedCert is the certificate which firmware trusts. It could be saved in protected\r | |
1830 | // storage or PK payload on PK init\r | |
1831 | //\r | |
a6811666 SZ |
1832 | VerifyStatus = FALSE;\r |
1833 | CertData = NULL;\r | |
1834 | NewData = NULL;\r | |
1835 | Attr = Attributes;\r | |
1836 | SignerCerts = NULL;\r | |
53c6ff18 | 1837 | TopLevelCert = NULL;\r |
a6811666 | 1838 | CertsInCertDb = NULL;\r |
62ba0feb | 1839 | CertDataPtr = NULL;\r |
a6811666 SZ |
1840 | \r |
1841 | //\r | |
1842 | // When the attribute EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS is\r | |
1843 | // set, then the Data buffer shall begin with an instance of a complete (and serialized)\r | |
1844 | // EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 descriptor. The descriptor shall be followed by the new\r | |
1845 | // variable value and DataSize shall reflect the combined size of the descriptor and the new\r | |
1846 | // variable value. The authentication descriptor is not part of the variable data and is not\r | |
1847 | // returned by subsequent calls to GetVariable().\r | |
1848 | //\r | |
1849 | CertData = (EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 *) Data;\r | |
1850 | \r | |
1851 | //\r | |
1852 | // Verify that Pad1, Nanosecond, TimeZone, Daylight and Pad2 components of the\r | |
1853 | // TimeStamp value are set to zero.\r | |
1854 | //\r | |
1855 | if ((CertData->TimeStamp.Pad1 != 0) ||\r | |
1856 | (CertData->TimeStamp.Nanosecond != 0) ||\r | |
1857 | (CertData->TimeStamp.TimeZone != 0) ||\r | |
1858 | (CertData->TimeStamp.Daylight != 0) ||\r | |
1859 | (CertData->TimeStamp.Pad2 != 0)) {\r | |
1860 | return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r | |
1861 | }\r | |
1862 | \r | |
1863 | if ((OrgTimeStamp != NULL) && ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_APPEND_WRITE) == 0)) {\r | |
1864 | if (AuthServiceInternalCompareTimeStamp (&CertData->TimeStamp, OrgTimeStamp)) {\r | |
1865 | //\r | |
1866 | // TimeStamp check fail, suspicious replay attack, return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION.\r | |
1867 | //\r | |
1868 | return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r | |
1869 | }\r | |
1870 | }\r | |
1871 | \r | |
1872 | //\r | |
1873 | // wCertificateType should be WIN_CERT_TYPE_EFI_GUID.\r | |
1874 | // Cert type should be EFI_CERT_TYPE_PKCS7_GUID.\r | |
1875 | //\r | |
1876 | if ((CertData->AuthInfo.Hdr.wCertificateType != WIN_CERT_TYPE_EFI_GUID) ||\r | |
1877 | !CompareGuid (&CertData->AuthInfo.CertType, &gEfiCertPkcs7Guid)) {\r | |
1878 | //\r | |
1879 | // Invalid AuthInfo type, return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION.\r | |
1880 | //\r | |
1881 | return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r | |
1882 | }\r | |
1883 | \r | |
1884 | //\r | |
1885 | // Find out Pkcs7 SignedData which follows the EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 descriptor.\r | |
1886 | // AuthInfo.Hdr.dwLength is the length of the entire certificate, including the length of the header.\r | |
1887 | //\r | |
1888 | SigData = CertData->AuthInfo.CertData;\r | |
1889 | SigDataSize = CertData->AuthInfo.Hdr.dwLength - (UINT32) (OFFSET_OF (WIN_CERTIFICATE_UEFI_GUID, CertData));\r | |
1890 | \r | |
c035e373 ZL |
1891 | //\r |
1892 | // SignedData.digestAlgorithms shall contain the digest algorithm used when preparing the\r | |
1893 | // signature. Only a digest algorithm of SHA-256 is accepted.\r | |
1894 | //\r | |
1895 | // According to PKCS#7 Definition:\r | |
1896 | // SignedData ::= SEQUENCE {\r | |
1897 | // version Version,\r | |
1898 | // digestAlgorithms DigestAlgorithmIdentifiers,\r | |
1899 | // contentInfo ContentInfo,\r | |
1900 | // .... }\r | |
b3548d32 | 1901 | // The DigestAlgorithmIdentifiers can be used to determine the hash algorithm\r |
c035e373 ZL |
1902 | // in VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 descriptor.\r |
1903 | // This field has the fixed offset (+13) and be calculated based on two bytes of length encoding.\r | |
1904 | //\r | |
1905 | if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0) {\r | |
1906 | if (SigDataSize >= (13 + sizeof (mSha256OidValue))) {\r | |
b3548d32 | 1907 | if (((*(SigData + 1) & TWO_BYTE_ENCODE) != TWO_BYTE_ENCODE) ||\r |
c035e373 ZL |
1908 | (CompareMem (SigData + 13, &mSha256OidValue, sizeof (mSha256OidValue)) != 0)) {\r |
1909 | return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r | |
1910 | }\r | |
1911 | }\r | |
1912 | }\r | |
1913 | \r | |
a6811666 SZ |
1914 | //\r |
1915 | // Find out the new data payload which follows Pkcs7 SignedData directly.\r | |
1916 | //\r | |
1917 | PayloadPtr = SigData + SigDataSize;\r | |
1918 | PayloadSize = DataSize - OFFSET_OF_AUTHINFO2_CERT_DATA - (UINTN) SigDataSize;\r | |
1919 | \r | |
1920 | //\r | |
1921 | // Construct a serialization buffer of the values of the VariableName, VendorGuid and Attributes\r | |
1922 | // parameters of the SetVariable() call and the TimeStamp component of the\r | |
1923 | // EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 descriptor followed by the variable's new value\r | |
1924 | // i.e. (VariableName, VendorGuid, Attributes, TimeStamp, Data)\r | |
1925 | //\r | |
1926 | NewDataSize = PayloadSize + sizeof (EFI_TIME) + sizeof (UINT32) +\r | |
1927 | sizeof (EFI_GUID) + StrSize (VariableName) - sizeof (CHAR16);\r | |
1928 | \r | |
1929 | //\r | |
1930 | // Here is to reuse scratch data area(at the end of volatile variable store)\r | |
1931 | // to reduce SMRAM consumption for SMM variable driver.\r | |
1932 | // The scratch buffer is enough to hold the serialized data and safe to use,\r | |
1933 | // because it is only used at here to do verification temporarily first\r | |
1934 | // and then used in UpdateVariable() for a time based auth variable set.\r | |
1935 | //\r | |
1936 | Status = mAuthVarLibContextIn->GetScratchBuffer (&NewDataSize, (VOID **) &NewData);\r | |
1937 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
1938 | return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r | |
1939 | }\r | |
1940 | \r | |
1941 | Buffer = NewData;\r | |
1942 | Length = StrLen (VariableName) * sizeof (CHAR16);\r | |
1943 | CopyMem (Buffer, VariableName, Length);\r | |
1944 | Buffer += Length;\r | |
1945 | \r | |
1946 | Length = sizeof (EFI_GUID);\r | |
1947 | CopyMem (Buffer, VendorGuid, Length);\r | |
1948 | Buffer += Length;\r | |
1949 | \r | |
1950 | Length = sizeof (UINT32);\r | |
1951 | CopyMem (Buffer, &Attr, Length);\r | |
1952 | Buffer += Length;\r | |
1953 | \r | |
1954 | Length = sizeof (EFI_TIME);\r | |
1955 | CopyMem (Buffer, &CertData->TimeStamp, Length);\r | |
1956 | Buffer += Length;\r | |
1957 | \r | |
1958 | CopyMem (Buffer, PayloadPtr, PayloadSize);\r | |
1959 | \r | |
1960 | if (AuthVarType == AuthVarTypePk) {\r | |
1961 | //\r | |
1962 | // Verify that the signature has been made with the current Platform Key (no chaining for PK).\r | |
1963 | // First, get signer's certificates from SignedData.\r | |
1964 | //\r | |
1965 | VerifyStatus = Pkcs7GetSigners (\r | |
1966 | SigData,\r | |
1967 | SigDataSize,\r | |
1968 | &SignerCerts,\r | |
1969 | &CertStackSize,\r | |
53c6ff18 ZC |
1970 | &TopLevelCert,\r |
1971 | &TopLevelCertSize\r | |
a6811666 SZ |
1972 | );\r |
1973 | if (!VerifyStatus) {\r | |
1974 | goto Exit;\r | |
1975 | }\r | |
1976 | \r | |
1977 | //\r | |
1978 | // Second, get the current platform key from variable. Check whether it's identical with signer's certificates\r | |
1979 | // in SignedData. If not, return error immediately.\r | |
1980 | //\r | |
1981 | Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (\r | |
1982 | EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME,\r | |
1983 | &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r | |
1984 | &Data,\r | |
1985 | &DataSize\r | |
1986 | );\r | |
1987 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
1988 | VerifyStatus = FALSE;\r | |
1989 | goto Exit;\r | |
1990 | }\r | |
1991 | CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) Data;\r | |
1992 | Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r | |
53c6ff18 ZC |
1993 | if ((TopLevelCertSize != (CertList->SignatureSize - (sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1))) ||\r |
1994 | (CompareMem (Cert->SignatureData, TopLevelCert, TopLevelCertSize) != 0)) {\r | |
a6811666 SZ |
1995 | VerifyStatus = FALSE;\r |
1996 | goto Exit;\r | |
1997 | }\r | |
1998 | \r | |
1999 | //\r | |
2000 | // Verify Pkcs7 SignedData via Pkcs7Verify library.\r | |
2001 | //\r | |
2002 | VerifyStatus = Pkcs7Verify (\r | |
2003 | SigData,\r | |
2004 | SigDataSize,\r | |
53c6ff18 ZC |
2005 | TopLevelCert,\r |
2006 | TopLevelCertSize,\r | |
a6811666 SZ |
2007 | NewData,\r |
2008 | NewDataSize\r | |
2009 | );\r | |
2010 | \r | |
2011 | } else if (AuthVarType == AuthVarTypeKek) {\r | |
2012 | \r | |
2013 | //\r | |
2014 | // Get KEK database from variable.\r | |
2015 | //\r | |
2016 | Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (\r | |
2017 | EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME,\r | |
2018 | &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r | |
2019 | &Data,\r | |
2020 | &DataSize\r | |
2021 | );\r | |
2022 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
2023 | return Status;\r | |
2024 | }\r | |
2025 | \r | |
2026 | //\r | |
2027 | // Ready to verify Pkcs7 SignedData. Go through KEK Signature Database to find out X.509 CertList.\r | |
2028 | //\r | |
2029 | KekDataSize = (UINT32) DataSize;\r | |
2030 | CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) Data;\r | |
2031 | while ((KekDataSize > 0) && (KekDataSize >= CertList->SignatureListSize)) {\r | |
2032 | if (CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Guid)) {\r | |
2033 | Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r | |
2034 | CertCount = (CertList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - CertList->SignatureHeaderSize) / CertList->SignatureSize;\r | |
2035 | for (Index = 0; Index < CertCount; Index++) {\r | |
2036 | //\r | |
2037 | // Iterate each Signature Data Node within this CertList for a verify\r | |
2038 | //\r | |
53c6ff18 ZC |
2039 | TrustedCert = Cert->SignatureData;\r |
2040 | TrustedCertSize = CertList->SignatureSize - (sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1);\r | |
a6811666 SZ |
2041 | \r |
2042 | //\r | |
2043 | // Verify Pkcs7 SignedData via Pkcs7Verify library.\r | |
2044 | //\r | |
2045 | VerifyStatus = Pkcs7Verify (\r | |
2046 | SigData,\r | |
2047 | SigDataSize,\r | |
53c6ff18 ZC |
2048 | TrustedCert,\r |
2049 | TrustedCertSize,\r | |
a6811666 SZ |
2050 | NewData,\r |
2051 | NewDataSize\r | |
2052 | );\r | |
2053 | if (VerifyStatus) {\r | |
2054 | goto Exit;\r | |
2055 | }\r | |
2056 | Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) Cert + CertList->SignatureSize);\r | |
2057 | }\r | |
2058 | }\r | |
2059 | KekDataSize -= CertList->SignatureListSize;\r | |
2060 | CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + CertList->SignatureListSize);\r | |
2061 | }\r | |
2062 | } else if (AuthVarType == AuthVarTypePriv) {\r | |
2063 | \r | |
2064 | //\r | |
2065 | // Process common authenticated variable except PK/KEK/DB/DBX/DBT.\r | |
2066 | // Get signer's certificates from SignedData.\r | |
2067 | //\r | |
2068 | VerifyStatus = Pkcs7GetSigners (\r | |
2069 | SigData,\r | |
2070 | SigDataSize,\r | |
2071 | &SignerCerts,\r | |
2072 | &CertStackSize,\r | |
53c6ff18 ZC |
2073 | &TopLevelCert,\r |
2074 | &TopLevelCertSize\r | |
a6811666 SZ |
2075 | );\r |
2076 | if (!VerifyStatus) {\r | |
2077 | goto Exit;\r | |
2078 | }\r | |
2079 | \r | |
2080 | //\r | |
98c2d961 | 2081 | // Get previously stored signer's certificates from certdb or certdbv for existing\r |
a6811666 SZ |
2082 | // variable. Check whether they are identical with signer's certificates\r |
2083 | // in SignedData. If not, return error immediately.\r | |
2084 | //\r | |
2085 | if (OrgTimeStamp != NULL) {\r | |
2086 | VerifyStatus = FALSE;\r | |
2087 | \r | |
98c2d961 | 2088 | Status = GetCertsFromDb (VariableName, VendorGuid, Attributes, &CertsInCertDb, &CertsSizeinDb);\r |
a6811666 SZ |
2089 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r |
2090 | goto Exit;\r | |
2091 | }\r | |
2092 | \r | |
53c6ff18 ZC |
2093 | if (CertsSizeinDb == SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE) {\r |
2094 | //\r | |
2095 | // Check hash of signer cert CommonName + Top-level issuer tbsCertificate against data in CertDb\r | |
2096 | //\r | |
62ba0feb | 2097 | CertDataPtr = (EFI_CERT_DATA *)(SignerCerts + 1);\r |
53c6ff18 | 2098 | Status = CalculatePrivAuthVarSignChainSHA256Digest(\r |
62ba0feb | 2099 | CertDataPtr->CertDataBuffer,\r |
2100 | ReadUnaligned32 ((UINT32 *)&(CertDataPtr->CertDataLength)),\r | |
53c6ff18 ZC |
2101 | TopLevelCert,\r |
2102 | TopLevelCertSize,\r | |
2103 | Sha256Digest\r | |
2104 | );\r | |
2105 | if (EFI_ERROR(Status) || CompareMem (Sha256Digest, CertsInCertDb, CertsSizeinDb) != 0){\r | |
2106 | goto Exit;\r | |
2107 | }\r | |
2108 | } else {\r | |
2109 | //\r | |
2110 | // Keep backward compatible with previous solution which saves whole signer certs stack in CertDb\r | |
2111 | //\r | |
2112 | if ((CertStackSize != CertsSizeinDb) ||\r | |
2113 | (CompareMem (SignerCerts, CertsInCertDb, CertsSizeinDb) != 0)) {\r | |
2114 | goto Exit;\r | |
2115 | }\r | |
a6811666 SZ |
2116 | }\r |
2117 | }\r | |
2118 | \r | |
2119 | VerifyStatus = Pkcs7Verify (\r | |
2120 | SigData,\r | |
2121 | SigDataSize,\r | |
53c6ff18 ZC |
2122 | TopLevelCert,\r |
2123 | TopLevelCertSize,\r | |
a6811666 SZ |
2124 | NewData,\r |
2125 | NewDataSize\r | |
2126 | );\r | |
2127 | if (!VerifyStatus) {\r | |
2128 | goto Exit;\r | |
2129 | }\r | |
2130 | \r | |
64b6a3ff | 2131 | if ((OrgTimeStamp == NULL) && (PayloadSize != 0)) {\r |
a6811666 | 2132 | //\r |
53c6ff18 | 2133 | // When adding a new common authenticated variable, always save Hash of cn of signer cert + tbsCertificate of Top-level issuer\r |
a6811666 | 2134 | //\r |
62ba0feb | 2135 | CertDataPtr = (EFI_CERT_DATA *)(SignerCerts + 1);\r |
53c6ff18 ZC |
2136 | Status = InsertCertsToDb (\r |
2137 | VariableName,\r | |
2138 | VendorGuid,\r | |
2139 | Attributes,\r | |
62ba0feb | 2140 | CertDataPtr->CertDataBuffer,\r |
2141 | ReadUnaligned32 ((UINT32 *)&(CertDataPtr->CertDataLength)),\r | |
53c6ff18 ZC |
2142 | TopLevelCert,\r |
2143 | TopLevelCertSize\r | |
2144 | );\r | |
a6811666 SZ |
2145 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r |
2146 | VerifyStatus = FALSE;\r | |
2147 | goto Exit;\r | |
2148 | }\r | |
2149 | }\r | |
2150 | } else if (AuthVarType == AuthVarTypePayload) {\r | |
2151 | CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) PayloadPtr;\r | |
2152 | Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r | |
53c6ff18 ZC |
2153 | TrustedCert = Cert->SignatureData;\r |
2154 | TrustedCertSize = CertList->SignatureSize - (sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1);\r | |
a6811666 SZ |
2155 | //\r |
2156 | // Verify Pkcs7 SignedData via Pkcs7Verify library.\r | |
2157 | //\r | |
2158 | VerifyStatus = Pkcs7Verify (\r | |
2159 | SigData,\r | |
2160 | SigDataSize,\r | |
53c6ff18 ZC |
2161 | TrustedCert,\r |
2162 | TrustedCertSize,\r | |
a6811666 SZ |
2163 | NewData,\r |
2164 | NewDataSize\r | |
2165 | );\r | |
2166 | } else {\r | |
2167 | return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r | |
2168 | }\r | |
2169 | \r | |
2170 | Exit:\r | |
2171 | \r | |
2172 | if (AuthVarType == AuthVarTypePk || AuthVarType == AuthVarTypePriv) {\r | |
53c6ff18 | 2173 | Pkcs7FreeSigners (TopLevelCert);\r |
a6811666 SZ |
2174 | Pkcs7FreeSigners (SignerCerts);\r |
2175 | }\r | |
2176 | \r | |
2177 | if (!VerifyStatus) {\r | |
2178 | return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r | |
2179 | }\r | |
2180 | \r | |
2181 | Status = CheckSignatureListFormat(VariableName, VendorGuid, PayloadPtr, PayloadSize);\r | |
2182 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
2183 | return Status;\r | |
2184 | }\r | |
2185 | \r | |
2186 | *VarPayloadPtr = PayloadPtr;\r | |
2187 | *VarPayloadSize = PayloadSize;\r | |
2188 | \r | |
2189 | return EFI_SUCCESS;\r | |
2190 | }\r | |
2191 | \r | |
2192 | /**\r | |
2193 | Process variable with EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS set\r | |
2194 | \r | |
2195 | Caution: This function may receive untrusted input.\r | |
2196 | This function may be invoked in SMM mode, and datasize and data are external input.\r | |
2197 | This function will do basic validation, before parse the data.\r | |
2198 | This function will parse the authentication carefully to avoid security issues, like\r | |
2199 | buffer overflow, integer overflow.\r | |
2200 | \r | |
2201 | @param[in] VariableName Name of Variable to be found.\r | |
2202 | @param[in] VendorGuid Variable vendor GUID.\r | |
2203 | @param[in] Data Data pointer.\r | |
2204 | @param[in] DataSize Size of Data found. If size is less than the\r | |
2205 | data, this value contains the required size.\r | |
2206 | @param[in] Attributes Attribute value of the variable.\r | |
2207 | @param[in] AuthVarType Verify against PK, KEK database, private database or certificate in data payload.\r | |
2208 | @param[out] VarDel Delete the variable or not.\r | |
2209 | \r | |
2210 | @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.\r | |
2211 | @retval EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION The variable does NOT pass the validation\r | |
2212 | check carried out by the firmware.\r | |
2213 | @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES Failed to process variable due to lack\r | |
2214 | of resources.\r | |
2215 | @retval EFI_SUCCESS Variable pass validation successfully.\r | |
2216 | \r | |
2217 | **/\r | |
2218 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
2219 | VerifyTimeBasedPayloadAndUpdate (\r | |
2220 | IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r | |
2221 | IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r | |
2222 | IN VOID *Data,\r | |
2223 | IN UINTN DataSize,\r | |
2224 | IN UINT32 Attributes,\r | |
2225 | IN AUTHVAR_TYPE AuthVarType,\r | |
2226 | OUT BOOLEAN *VarDel\r | |
2227 | )\r | |
2228 | {\r | |
2229 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r | |
2230 | EFI_STATUS FindStatus;\r | |
2231 | UINT8 *PayloadPtr;\r | |
2232 | UINTN PayloadSize;\r | |
2233 | EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 *CertData;\r | |
2234 | AUTH_VARIABLE_INFO OrgVariableInfo;\r | |
64b6a3ff | 2235 | BOOLEAN IsDel;\r |
a6811666 SZ |
2236 | \r |
2237 | ZeroMem (&OrgVariableInfo, sizeof (OrgVariableInfo));\r | |
2238 | FindStatus = mAuthVarLibContextIn->FindVariable (\r | |
2239 | VariableName,\r | |
2240 | VendorGuid,\r | |
2241 | &OrgVariableInfo\r | |
2242 | );\r | |
2243 | \r | |
2244 | Status = VerifyTimeBasedPayload (\r | |
2245 | VariableName,\r | |
2246 | VendorGuid,\r | |
2247 | Data,\r | |
2248 | DataSize,\r | |
2249 | Attributes,\r | |
2250 | AuthVarType,\r | |
2251 | (!EFI_ERROR (FindStatus)) ? OrgVariableInfo.TimeStamp : NULL,\r | |
2252 | &PayloadPtr,\r | |
2253 | &PayloadSize\r | |
2254 | );\r | |
2255 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
2256 | return Status;\r | |
2257 | }\r | |
2258 | \r | |
64b6a3ff CZ |
2259 | if (!EFI_ERROR(FindStatus)\r |
2260 | && (PayloadSize == 0)\r | |
2261 | && ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_APPEND_WRITE) == 0)) {\r | |
2262 | IsDel = TRUE;\r | |
2263 | } else {\r | |
2264 | IsDel = FALSE;\r | |
a6811666 SZ |
2265 | }\r |
2266 | \r | |
2267 | CertData = (EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 *) Data;\r | |
2268 | \r | |
2269 | //\r | |
2270 | // Final step: Update/Append Variable if it pass Pkcs7Verify\r | |
2271 | //\r | |
64b6a3ff CZ |
2272 | Status = AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariableWithTimeStamp (\r |
2273 | VariableName,\r | |
2274 | VendorGuid,\r | |
2275 | PayloadPtr,\r | |
2276 | PayloadSize,\r | |
2277 | Attributes,\r | |
2278 | &CertData->TimeStamp\r | |
2279 | );\r | |
2280 | \r | |
2281 | //\r | |
2282 | // Delete signer's certificates when delete the common authenticated variable.\r | |
2283 | //\r | |
2284 | if (IsDel && AuthVarType == AuthVarTypePriv && !EFI_ERROR(Status) ) {\r | |
98c2d961 | 2285 | Status = DeleteCertsFromDb (VariableName, VendorGuid, Attributes);\r |
64b6a3ff CZ |
2286 | }\r |
2287 | \r | |
2288 | if (VarDel != NULL) {\r | |
2289 | if (IsDel && !EFI_ERROR(Status)) {\r | |
2290 | *VarDel = TRUE;\r | |
2291 | } else {\r | |
2292 | *VarDel = FALSE;\r | |
2293 | }\r | |
2294 | }\r | |
2295 | \r | |
2296 | return Status;\r | |
a6811666 | 2297 | }\r |