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a6811666
SZ		 1/** @file\r
2 Implement authentication services for the authenticated variables.\r
3\r
4 Caution: This module requires additional review when modified.\r
5 This driver will have external input - variable data. It may be input in SMM mode.\r
6 This external input must be validated carefully to avoid security issue like\r
7 buffer overflow, integer overflow.\r
8 Variable attribute should also be checked to avoid authentication bypass.\r
9 The whole SMM authentication variable design relies on the integrity of flash part and SMM.\r
10 which is assumed to be protected by platform. All variable code and metadata in flash/SMM Memory\r
11 may not be modified without authorization. If platform fails to protect these resources,\r
12 the authentication service provided in this driver will be broken, and the behavior is undefined.\r
13\r
14 ProcessVarWithPk(), ProcessVarWithKek() and ProcessVariable() are the function to do\r
15 variable authentication.\r
16\r
17 VerifyTimeBasedPayloadAndUpdate() and VerifyCounterBasedPayload() are sub function to do verification.\r
18 They will do basic validation for authentication data structure, then call crypto library\r
19 to verify the signature.\r
20\r
21Copyright (c) 2009 - 2015, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>\r
22This program and the accompanying materials\r
23are licensed and made available under the terms and conditions of the BSD License\r
24which accompanies this distribution. The full text of the license may be found at\r
25http://opensource.org/licenses/bsd-license.php\r
26\r
27THE PROGRAM IS DISTRIBUTED UNDER THE BSD LICENSE ON AN "AS IS" BASIS,\r
28WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR REPRESENTATIONS OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED.\r
29\r
30**/\r
31\r
32#include "AuthServiceInternal.h"\r
33\r
34//\r
35// Public Exponent of RSA Key.\r
36//\r
37CONST UINT8 mRsaE[] = { 0x01, 0x00, 0x01 };\r
38\r
39//\r
40// Requirement for different signature type which have been defined in UEFI spec.\r
41// These data are used to perform SignatureList format check while setting PK/KEK variable.\r
42//\r
43EFI_SIGNATURE_ITEM mSupportSigItem[] = {\r
44//{SigType, SigHeaderSize, SigDataSize }\r
45 {EFI_CERT_SHA256_GUID, 0, 32 },\r
46 {EFI_CERT_RSA2048_GUID, 0, 256 },\r
47 {EFI_CERT_RSA2048_SHA256_GUID, 0, 256 },\r
48 {EFI_CERT_SHA1_GUID, 0, 20 },\r
49 {EFI_CERT_RSA2048_SHA1_GUID, 0, 256 },\r
50 {EFI_CERT_X509_GUID, 0, ((UINT32) ~0)},\r
51 {EFI_CERT_SHA224_GUID, 0, 28 },\r
52 {EFI_CERT_SHA384_GUID, 0, 48 },\r
53 {EFI_CERT_SHA512_GUID, 0, 64 },\r
54 {EFI_CERT_X509_SHA256_GUID, 0, 48 },\r
55 {EFI_CERT_X509_SHA384_GUID, 0, 64 },\r
56 {EFI_CERT_X509_SHA512_GUID, 0, 80 }\r
57};\r
58\r
59/**\r
60 Finds variable in storage blocks of volatile and non-volatile storage areas.\r
61\r
62 This code finds variable in storage blocks of volatile and non-volatile storage areas.\r
63 If VariableName is an empty string, then we just return the first\r
64 qualified variable without comparing VariableName and VendorGuid.\r
65\r
66 @param[in] VariableName Name of the variable to be found.\r
67 @param[in] VendorGuid Variable vendor GUID to be found.\r
68 @param[out] Data Pointer to data address.\r
69 @param[out] DataSize Pointer to data size.\r
70\r
71 @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER If VariableName is not an empty string,\r
72 while VendorGuid is NULL.\r
73 @retval EFI_SUCCESS Variable successfully found.\r
74 @retval EFI_NOT_FOUND Variable not found\r
75\r
76**/\r
77EFI_STATUS\r
78AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (\r
79 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r
80 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r
81 OUT VOID **Data,\r
82 OUT UINTN *DataSize\r
83 )\r
84{\r
85 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
86 AUTH_VARIABLE_INFO AuthVariableInfo;\r
87\r
88 ZeroMem (&AuthVariableInfo, sizeof (AuthVariableInfo));\r
89 Status = mAuthVarLibContextIn->FindVariable (\r
90 VariableName,\r
91 VendorGuid,\r
92 &AuthVariableInfo\r
93 );\r
94 *Data = AuthVariableInfo.Data;\r
95 *DataSize = AuthVariableInfo.DataSize;\r
96 return Status;\r
97}\r
98\r
99/**\r
100 Update the variable region with Variable information.\r
101\r
102 @param[in] VariableName Name of variable.\r
103 @param[in] VendorGuid Guid of variable.\r
104 @param[in] Data Data pointer.\r
105 @param[in] DataSize Size of Data.\r
106 @param[in] Attributes Attribute value of the variable.\r
107\r
108 @retval EFI_SUCCESS The update operation is success.\r
109 @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.\r
110 @retval EFI_WRITE_PROTECTED Variable is write-protected.\r
111 @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES There is not enough resource.\r
112\r
113**/\r
114EFI_STATUS\r
115AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariable (\r
116 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r
117 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r
118 IN VOID *Data,\r
119 IN UINTN DataSize,\r
120 IN UINT32 Attributes\r
121 )\r
122{\r
123 AUTH_VARIABLE_INFO AuthVariableInfo;\r
124\r
125 ZeroMem (&AuthVariableInfo, sizeof (AuthVariableInfo));\r
126 AuthVariableInfo.VariableName = VariableName;\r
127 AuthVariableInfo.VendorGuid = VendorGuid;\r
128 AuthVariableInfo.Data = Data;\r
129 AuthVariableInfo.DataSize = DataSize;\r
130 AuthVariableInfo.Attributes = Attributes;\r
131\r
132 return mAuthVarLibContextIn->UpdateVariable (\r
133 &AuthVariableInfo\r
134 );\r
135}\r
136\r
137/**\r
138 Update the variable region with Variable information.\r
139\r
140 @param[in] VariableName Name of variable.\r
141 @param[in] VendorGuid Guid of variable.\r
142 @param[in] Data Data pointer.\r
143 @param[in] DataSize Size of Data.\r
144 @param[in] Attributes Attribute value of the variable.\r
145 @param[in] KeyIndex Index of associated public key.\r
146 @param[in] MonotonicCount Value of associated monotonic count.\r
147\r
148 @retval EFI_SUCCESS The update operation is success.\r
149 @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.\r
150 @retval EFI_WRITE_PROTECTED Variable is write-protected.\r
151 @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES There is not enough resource.\r
152\r
153**/\r
154EFI_STATUS\r
155AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariableWithMonotonicCount (\r
156 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r
157 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r
158 IN VOID *Data,\r
159 IN UINTN DataSize,\r
160 IN UINT32 Attributes,\r
161 IN UINT32 KeyIndex,\r
162 IN UINT64 MonotonicCount\r
163 )\r
164{\r
165 AUTH_VARIABLE_INFO AuthVariableInfo;\r
166\r
167 ZeroMem (&AuthVariableInfo, sizeof (AuthVariableInfo));\r
168 AuthVariableInfo.VariableName = VariableName;\r
169 AuthVariableInfo.VendorGuid = VendorGuid;\r
170 AuthVariableInfo.Data = Data;\r
171 AuthVariableInfo.DataSize = DataSize;\r
172 AuthVariableInfo.Attributes = Attributes;\r
173 AuthVariableInfo.PubKeyIndex = KeyIndex;\r
174 AuthVariableInfo.MonotonicCount = MonotonicCount;\r
175\r
176 return mAuthVarLibContextIn->UpdateVariable (\r
177 &AuthVariableInfo\r
178 );\r
179}\r
180\r
181/**\r
182 Update the variable region with Variable information.\r
183\r
184 @param[in] VariableName Name of variable.\r
185 @param[in] VendorGuid Guid of variable.\r
186 @param[in] Data Data pointer.\r
187 @param[in] DataSize Size of Data.\r
188 @param[in] Attributes Attribute value of the variable.\r
189 @param[in] TimeStamp Value of associated TimeStamp.\r
190\r
191 @retval EFI_SUCCESS The update operation is success.\r
192 @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.\r
193 @retval EFI_WRITE_PROTECTED Variable is write-protected.\r
194 @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES There is not enough resource.\r
195\r
196**/\r
197EFI_STATUS\r
198AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariableWithTimeStamp (\r
199 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r
200 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r
201 IN VOID *Data,\r
202 IN UINTN DataSize,\r
203 IN UINT32 Attributes,\r
204 IN EFI_TIME *TimeStamp\r
205 )\r
206{\r
207 EFI_STATUS FindStatus;\r
208 VOID *OrgData;\r
209 UINTN OrgDataSize;\r
210 AUTH_VARIABLE_INFO AuthVariableInfo;\r
211\r
212 FindStatus = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (\r
213 VariableName,\r
214 VendorGuid,\r
215 &OrgData,\r
216 &OrgDataSize\r
217 );\r
218\r
219 //\r
220 // EFI_VARIABLE_APPEND_WRITE attribute only effects for existing variable\r
221 //\r
222 if (!EFI_ERROR (FindStatus) && ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_APPEND_WRITE) != 0)) {\r
223 if ((CompareGuid (VendorGuid, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid) &&\r
224 ((StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE) == 0) || (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1) == 0) ||\r
225 (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE2) == 0))) ||\r
226 (CompareGuid (VendorGuid, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid) && (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME) == 0))) {\r
227 //\r
228 // For variables with formatted as EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST, the driver shall not perform an append of\r
229 // EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA values that are already part of the existing variable value.\r
230 //\r
231 FilterSignatureList (\r
232 OrgData,\r
233 OrgDataSize,\r
234 Data,\r
235 &DataSize\r
236 );\r
237 }\r
238 }\r
239\r
240 ZeroMem (&AuthVariableInfo, sizeof (AuthVariableInfo));\r
241 AuthVariableInfo.VariableName = VariableName;\r
242 AuthVariableInfo.VendorGuid = VendorGuid;\r
243 AuthVariableInfo.Data = Data;\r
244 AuthVariableInfo.DataSize = DataSize;\r
245 AuthVariableInfo.Attributes = Attributes;\r
246 AuthVariableInfo.TimeStamp = TimeStamp;\r
247 return mAuthVarLibContextIn->UpdateVariable (\r
248 &AuthVariableInfo\r
249 );\r
250}\r
251\r
252/**\r
253 Determine whether this operation needs a physical present user.\r
254\r
255 @param[in] VariableName Name of the Variable.\r
256 @param[in] VendorGuid GUID of the Variable.\r
257\r
258 @retval TRUE This variable is protected, only a physical present user could set this variable.\r
259 @retval FALSE This variable is not protected.\r
260\r
261**/\r
262BOOLEAN\r
263NeedPhysicallyPresent(\r
264 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r
265 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid\r
266 )\r
267{\r
268 if ((CompareGuid (VendorGuid, &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid) && (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME) == 0))\r
269 || (CompareGuid (VendorGuid, &gEfiCustomModeEnableGuid) && (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_CUSTOM_MODE_NAME) == 0))) {\r
270 return TRUE;\r
271 }\r
272\r
273 return FALSE;\r
274}\r
275\r
276/**\r
277 Determine whether the platform is operating in Custom Secure Boot mode.\r
278\r
279 @retval TRUE The platform is operating in Custom mode.\r
280 @retval FALSE The platform is operating in Standard mode.\r
281\r
282**/\r
283BOOLEAN\r
284InCustomMode (\r
285 VOID\r
286 )\r
287{\r
288 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
289 VOID *Data;\r
290 UINTN DataSize;\r
291\r
292 Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (EFI_CUSTOM_MODE_NAME, &gEfiCustomModeEnableGuid, &Data, &DataSize);\r
293 if (!EFI_ERROR (Status) && (*(UINT8 *) Data == CUSTOM_SECURE_BOOT_MODE)) {\r
294 return TRUE;\r
295 }\r
296\r
297 return FALSE;\r
298}\r
299\r
300/**\r
301 Get available public key index.\r
302\r
303 @param[in] PubKey Pointer to Public Key data.\r
304\r
305 @return Public key index, 0 if no any public key index available.\r
306\r
307**/\r
308UINT32\r
309GetAvailableKeyIndex (\r
310 IN UINT8 *PubKey\r
311 )\r
312{\r
313 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
314 UINT8 *Data;\r
315 UINTN DataSize;\r
316 UINT8 *Ptr;\r
317 UINT32 Index;\r
318 BOOLEAN IsFound;\r
319 EFI_GUID VendorGuid;\r
320 CHAR16 Name[1];\r
321 AUTH_VARIABLE_INFO AuthVariableInfo;\r
322 UINT32 KeyIndex;\r
323\r
324 Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (\r
325 AUTHVAR_KEYDB_NAME,\r
326 &gEfiAuthenticatedVariableGuid,\r
327 (VOID **) &Data,\r
328 &DataSize\r
329 );\r
330 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
331 DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Get public key database variable failure, Status = %r\n", Status));\r
332 return 0;\r
333 }\r
334\r
335 if (mPubKeyNumber == mMaxKeyNumber) {\r
336 Name[0] = 0;\r
337 AuthVariableInfo.VariableName = Name;\r
338 ZeroMem (&VendorGuid, sizeof (VendorGuid));\r
339 AuthVariableInfo.VendorGuid = &VendorGuid;\r
340 mPubKeyNumber = 0;\r
341 //\r
342 // Collect valid key data.\r
343 //\r
344 do {\r
345 Status = mAuthVarLibContextIn->FindNextVariable (AuthVariableInfo.VariableName, AuthVariableInfo.VendorGuid, &AuthVariableInfo);\r
346 if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
347 if (AuthVariableInfo.PubKeyIndex != 0) {\r
348 for (Ptr = Data; Ptr < (Data + DataSize); Ptr += sizeof (AUTHVAR_KEY_DB_DATA)) {\r
349 if (ReadUnaligned32 (&(((AUTHVAR_KEY_DB_DATA *) Ptr)->KeyIndex)) == AuthVariableInfo.PubKeyIndex) {\r
350 //\r
351 // Check if the key data has been collected.\r
352 //\r
353 for (Index = 0; Index < mPubKeyNumber; Index++) {\r
354 if (ReadUnaligned32 (&(((AUTHVAR_KEY_DB_DATA *) mPubKeyStore + Index)->KeyIndex)) == AuthVariableInfo.PubKeyIndex) {\r
355 break;\r
356 }\r
357 }\r
358 if (Index == mPubKeyNumber) {\r
359 //\r
360 // New key data.\r
361 //\r
362 CopyMem ((AUTHVAR_KEY_DB_DATA *) mPubKeyStore + mPubKeyNumber, Ptr, sizeof (AUTHVAR_KEY_DB_DATA));\r
363 mPubKeyNumber++;\r
364 }\r
365 break;\r
366 }\r
367 }\r
368 }\r
369 }\r
370 } while (Status != EFI_NOT_FOUND);\r
371\r
372 //\r
373 // No available space to add new public key.\r
374 //\r
375 if (mPubKeyNumber == mMaxKeyNumber) {\r
376 return 0;\r
377 }\r
378 }\r
379\r
380 //\r
381 // Find available public key index.\r
382 //\r
383 for (KeyIndex = 1; KeyIndex <= mMaxKeyNumber; KeyIndex++) {\r
384 IsFound = FALSE;\r
385 for (Ptr = mPubKeyStore; Ptr < (mPubKeyStore + mPubKeyNumber * sizeof (AUTHVAR_KEY_DB_DATA)); Ptr += sizeof (AUTHVAR_KEY_DB_DATA)) {\r
386 if (ReadUnaligned32 (&(((AUTHVAR_KEY_DB_DATA *) Ptr)->KeyIndex)) == KeyIndex) {\r
387 IsFound = TRUE;\r
388 break;\r
389 }\r
390 }\r
391 if (!IsFound) {\r
392 break;\r
393 }\r
394 }\r
395\r
396 return KeyIndex;\r
397}\r
398\r
399/**\r
400 Add public key in store and return its index.\r
401\r
402 @param[in] PubKey Input pointer to Public Key data.\r
403 @param[in] VariableDataEntry The variable data entry.\r
404\r
405 @return Index of new added public key.\r
406\r
407**/\r
408UINT32\r
409AddPubKeyInStore (\r
410 IN UINT8 *PubKey,\r
411 IN VARIABLE_ENTRY_CONSISTENCY *VariableDataEntry\r
412 )\r
413{\r
414 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
415 UINT32 Index;\r
416 VARIABLE_ENTRY_CONSISTENCY PublicKeyEntry;\r
417 UINT32 Attributes;\r
418 UINT32 KeyIndex;\r
419\r
420 if (PubKey == NULL) {\r
421 return 0;\r
422 }\r
423\r
424 //\r
425 // Check whether the public key entry does exist.\r
426 //\r
427 for (Index = 0; Index < mPubKeyNumber; Index++) {\r
428 if (CompareMem (((AUTHVAR_KEY_DB_DATA *) mPubKeyStore + Index)->KeyData, PubKey, EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE) == 0) {\r
429 return ReadUnaligned32 (&(((AUTHVAR_KEY_DB_DATA *) mPubKeyStore + Index)->KeyIndex));\r
430 }\r
431 }\r
432\r
433 KeyIndex = GetAvailableKeyIndex (PubKey);\r
434 if (KeyIndex == 0) {\r
435 return 0;\r
436 }\r
437\r
438 //\r
439 // Check the variable space for both public key and variable data.\r
440 //\r
441 PublicKeyEntry.VariableSize = (mPubKeyNumber + 1) * sizeof (AUTHVAR_KEY_DB_DATA);\r
442 PublicKeyEntry.Guid = &gEfiAuthenticatedVariableGuid;\r
443 PublicKeyEntry.Name = AUTHVAR_KEYDB_NAME;\r
444 Attributes = VARIABLE_ATTRIBUTE_NV_BS_RT | EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS;\r
445\r
446 if (!mAuthVarLibContextIn->CheckRemainingSpaceForConsistency (Attributes, &PublicKeyEntry, VariableDataEntry, NULL)) {\r
447 //\r
448 // No enough variable space.\r
449 //\r
450 return 0;\r
451 }\r
452\r
453 WriteUnaligned32 (&(((AUTHVAR_KEY_DB_DATA *) mPubKeyStore + mPubKeyNumber)->KeyIndex), KeyIndex);\r
454 CopyMem (((AUTHVAR_KEY_DB_DATA *) mPubKeyStore + mPubKeyNumber)->KeyData, PubKey, EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE);\r
455 mPubKeyNumber++;\r
456\r
457 //\r
458 // Update public key database variable.\r
459 //\r
460 Status = AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariable (\r
461 AUTHVAR_KEYDB_NAME,\r
462 &gEfiAuthenticatedVariableGuid,\r
463 mPubKeyStore,\r
464 mPubKeyNumber * sizeof (AUTHVAR_KEY_DB_DATA),\r
465 Attributes\r
466 );\r
467 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
468 DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Update public key database variable failure, Status = %r\n", Status));\r
469 return 0;\r
470 }\r
471\r
472 return KeyIndex;\r
473}\r
474\r
475/**\r
476 Verify data payload with AuthInfo in EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SHA256_GUID type.\r
477 Follow the steps in UEFI2.2.\r
478\r
479 Caution: This function may receive untrusted input.\r
480 This function may be invoked in SMM mode, and datasize and data are external input.\r
481 This function will do basic validation, before parse the data.\r
482 This function will parse the authentication carefully to avoid security issues, like\r
483 buffer overflow, integer overflow.\r
484\r
485 @param[in] Data Pointer to data with AuthInfo.\r
486 @param[in] DataSize Size of Data.\r
487 @param[in] PubKey Public key used for verification.\r
488\r
489 @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.\r
490 @retval EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION If authentication failed.\r
491 @retval EFI_SUCCESS Authentication successful.\r
492\r
493**/\r
494EFI_STATUS\r
495VerifyCounterBasedPayload (\r
496 IN UINT8 *Data,\r
497 IN UINTN DataSize,\r
498 IN UINT8 *PubKey\r
499 )\r
500{\r
501 BOOLEAN Status;\r
502 EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION *CertData;\r
503 EFI_CERT_BLOCK_RSA_2048_SHA256 *CertBlock;\r
504 UINT8 Digest[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE];\r
505 VOID *Rsa;\r
506 UINTN PayloadSize;\r
507\r
508 PayloadSize = DataSize - AUTHINFO_SIZE;\r
509 Rsa = NULL;\r
510 CertData = NULL;\r
511 CertBlock = NULL;\r
512\r
513 if (Data == NULL || PubKey == NULL) {\r
514 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
515 }\r
516\r
517 CertData = (EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION *) Data;\r
518 CertBlock = (EFI_CERT_BLOCK_RSA_2048_SHA256 *) (CertData->AuthInfo.CertData);\r
519\r
520 //\r
521 // wCertificateType should be WIN_CERT_TYPE_EFI_GUID.\r
522 // Cert type should be EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SHA256_GUID.\r
523 //\r
524 if ((CertData->AuthInfo.Hdr.wCertificateType != WIN_CERT_TYPE_EFI_GUID) ||\r
525 !CompareGuid (&CertData->AuthInfo.CertType, &gEfiCertTypeRsa2048Sha256Guid)) {\r
526 //\r
527 // Invalid AuthInfo type, return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION.\r
528 //\r
529 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r
530 }\r
531 //\r
532 // Hash data payload with SHA256.\r
533 //\r
534 ZeroMem (Digest, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE);\r
535 Status = Sha256Init (mHashCtx);\r
536 if (!Status) {\r
537 goto Done;\r
538 }\r
539 Status = Sha256Update (mHashCtx, Data + AUTHINFO_SIZE, PayloadSize);\r
540 if (!Status) {\r
541 goto Done;\r
542 }\r
543 //\r
544 // Hash Size.\r
545 //\r
546 Status = Sha256Update (mHashCtx, &PayloadSize, sizeof (UINTN));\r
547 if (!Status) {\r
548 goto Done;\r
549 }\r
550 //\r
551 // Hash Monotonic Count.\r
552 //\r
553 Status = Sha256Update (mHashCtx, &CertData->MonotonicCount, sizeof (UINT64));\r
554 if (!Status) {\r
555 goto Done;\r
556 }\r
557 Status = Sha256Final (mHashCtx, Digest);\r
558 if (!Status) {\r
559 goto Done;\r
560 }\r
561 //\r
562 // Generate & Initialize RSA Context.\r
563 //\r
564 Rsa = RsaNew ();\r
565 ASSERT (Rsa != NULL);\r
566 //\r
567 // Set RSA Key Components.\r
568 // NOTE: Only N and E are needed to be set as RSA public key for signature verification.\r
569 //\r
570 Status = RsaSetKey (Rsa, RsaKeyN, PubKey, EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE);\r
571 if (!Status) {\r
572 goto Done;\r
573 }\r
574 Status = RsaSetKey (Rsa, RsaKeyE, mRsaE, sizeof (mRsaE));\r
575 if (!Status) {\r
576 goto Done;\r
577 }\r
578 //\r
579 // Verify the signature.\r
580 //\r
581 Status = RsaPkcs1Verify (\r
582 Rsa,\r
583 Digest,\r
584 SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE,\r
585 CertBlock->Signature,\r
586 EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SHA256_SIZE\r
587 );\r
588\r
589Done:\r
590 if (Rsa != NULL) {\r
591 RsaFree (Rsa);\r
592 }\r
593 if (Status) {\r
594 return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
595 } else {\r
596 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r
597 }\r
598}\r
599\r
600/**\r
601 Update platform mode.\r
602\r
603 @param[in] Mode SETUP_MODE or USER_MODE.\r
604\r
605 @return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.\r
606 @return EFI_SUCCESS Update platform mode successfully.\r
607\r
608**/\r
609EFI_STATUS\r
610UpdatePlatformMode (\r
611 IN UINT32 Mode\r
612 )\r
613{\r
614 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
615 VOID *Data;\r
616 UINTN DataSize;\r
617 UINT8 SecureBootMode;\r
618 UINT8 SecureBootEnable;\r
619 UINTN VariableDataSize;\r
620\r
621 Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (\r
622 EFI_SETUP_MODE_NAME,\r
623 &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
624 &Data,\r
625 &DataSize\r
626 );\r
627 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
628 return Status;\r
629 }\r
630\r
631 //\r
632 // Update the value of SetupMode variable by a simple mem copy, this could avoid possible\r
633 // variable storage reclaim at runtime.\r
634 //\r
635 mPlatformMode = (UINT8) Mode;\r
636 CopyMem (Data, &mPlatformMode, sizeof(UINT8));\r
637\r
638 if (mAuthVarLibContextIn->AtRuntime ()) {\r
639 //\r
640 // SecureBoot Variable indicates whether the platform firmware is operating\r
641 // in Secure boot mode (1) or not (0), so we should not change SecureBoot\r
642 // Variable in runtime.\r
643 //\r
644 return Status;\r
645 }\r
646\r
647 //\r
648 // Check "SecureBoot" variable's existence.\r
649 // If it doesn't exist, firmware has no capability to perform driver signing verification,\r
650 // then set "SecureBoot" to 0.\r
651 //\r
652 Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (\r
653 EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME,\r
654 &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
655 &Data,\r
656 &DataSize\r
657 );\r
658 //\r
659 // If "SecureBoot" variable exists, then check "SetupMode" variable update.\r
660 // If "SetupMode" variable is USER_MODE, "SecureBoot" variable is set to 1.\r
661 // If "SetupMode" variable is SETUP_MODE, "SecureBoot" variable is set to 0.\r
662 //\r
663 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
664 SecureBootMode = SECURE_BOOT_MODE_DISABLE;\r
665 } else {\r
666 if (mPlatformMode == USER_MODE) {\r
667 SecureBootMode = SECURE_BOOT_MODE_ENABLE;\r
668 } else if (mPlatformMode == SETUP_MODE) {\r
669 SecureBootMode = SECURE_BOOT_MODE_DISABLE;\r
670 } else {\r
671 return EFI_NOT_FOUND;\r
672 }\r
673 }\r
674\r
675 Status = AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariable (\r
676 EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME,\r
677 &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
678 &SecureBootMode,\r
679 sizeof(UINT8),\r
680 EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS\r
681 );\r
682 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
683 return Status;\r
684 }\r
685\r
686 //\r
687 // Check "SecureBootEnable" variable's existence. It can enable/disable secure boot feature.\r
688 //\r
689 Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (\r
690 EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME,\r
691 &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid,\r
692 &Data,\r
693 &DataSize\r
694 );\r
695\r
696 if (SecureBootMode == SECURE_BOOT_MODE_ENABLE) {\r
697 //\r
698 // Create the "SecureBootEnable" variable as secure boot is enabled.\r
699 //\r
700 SecureBootEnable = SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE;\r
701 VariableDataSize = sizeof (SecureBootEnable);\r
702 } else {\r
703 //\r
704 // Delete the "SecureBootEnable" variable if this variable exist as "SecureBoot"\r
705 // variable is not in secure boot state.\r
706 //\r
707 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
708 return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
709 }\r
710 SecureBootEnable = SECURE_BOOT_DISABLE;\r
711 VariableDataSize = 0;\r
712 }\r
713\r
714 Status = AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariable (\r
715 EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME,\r
716 &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid,\r
717 &SecureBootEnable,\r
718 VariableDataSize,\r
719 EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS\r
720 );\r
721 return Status;\r
722}\r
723\r
724/**\r
725 Check input data form to make sure it is a valid EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST for PK/KEK/db/dbx/dbt variable.\r
726\r
727 @param[in] VariableName Name of Variable to be check.\r
728 @param[in] VendorGuid Variable vendor GUID.\r
729 @param[in] Data Point to the variable data to be checked.\r
730 @param[in] DataSize Size of Data.\r
731\r
732 @return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid signature list format.\r
733 @return EFI_SUCCESS Passed signature list format check successfully.\r
734\r
735**/\r
736EFI_STATUS\r
737CheckSignatureListFormat(\r
738 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r
739 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r
740 IN VOID *Data,\r
741 IN UINTN DataSize\r
742 )\r
743{\r
744 EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *SigList;\r
745 UINTN SigDataSize;\r
746 UINT32 Index;\r
747 UINT32 SigCount;\r
748 BOOLEAN IsPk;\r
749 VOID *RsaContext;\r
750 EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *CertData;\r
751 UINTN CertLen;\r
752\r
753 if (DataSize == 0) {\r
754 return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
755 }\r
756\r
757 ASSERT (VariableName != NULL && VendorGuid != NULL && Data != NULL);\r
758\r
759 if (CompareGuid (VendorGuid, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid) && (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME) == 0)){\r
760 IsPk = TRUE;\r
761 } else if ((CompareGuid (VendorGuid, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid) && (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME) == 0)) ||\r
762 (CompareGuid (VendorGuid, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid) &&\r
763 ((StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE) == 0) || (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1) == 0) ||\r
764 (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE2) == 0)))) {\r
765 IsPk = FALSE;\r
766 } else {\r
767 return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
768 }\r
769\r
770 SigCount = 0;\r
771 SigList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) Data;\r
772 SigDataSize = DataSize;\r
773 RsaContext = NULL;\r
774\r
775 //\r
776 // Walk throuth the input signature list and check the data format.\r
777 // If any signature is incorrectly formed, the whole check will fail.\r
778 //\r
779 while ((SigDataSize > 0) && (SigDataSize >= SigList->SignatureListSize)) {\r
780 for (Index = 0; Index < (sizeof (mSupportSigItem) / sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_ITEM)); Index++ ) {\r
781 if (CompareGuid (&SigList->SignatureType, &mSupportSigItem[Index].SigType)) {\r
782 //\r
783 // The value of SignatureSize should always be 16 (size of SignatureOwner\r
784 // component) add the data length according to signature type.\r
785 //\r
786 if (mSupportSigItem[Index].SigDataSize != ((UINT32) ~0) &&\r
787 (SigList->SignatureSize - sizeof (EFI_GUID)) != mSupportSigItem[Index].SigDataSize) {\r
788 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
789 }\r
790 if (mSupportSigItem[Index].SigHeaderSize != ((UINT32) ~0) &&\r
791 SigList->SignatureHeaderSize != mSupportSigItem[Index].SigHeaderSize) {\r
792 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
793 }\r
794 break;\r
795 }\r
796 }\r
797\r
798 if (Index == (sizeof (mSupportSigItem) / sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_ITEM))) {\r
799 //\r
800 // Undefined signature type.\r
801 //\r
802 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
803 }\r
804\r
805 if (CompareGuid (&SigList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Guid)) {\r
806 //\r
807 // Try to retrieve the RSA public key from the X.509 certificate.\r
808 // If this operation fails, it's not a valid certificate.\r
809 //\r
810 RsaContext = RsaNew ();\r
811 if (RsaContext == NULL) {\r
812 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
813 }\r
814 CertData = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) SigList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + SigList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r
815 CertLen = SigList->SignatureSize - sizeof (EFI_GUID);\r
816 if (!RsaGetPublicKeyFromX509 (CertData->SignatureData, CertLen, &RsaContext)) {\r
817 RsaFree (RsaContext);\r
818 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
819 }\r
820 RsaFree (RsaContext);\r
821 }\r
822\r
823 if ((SigList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - SigList->SignatureHeaderSize) % SigList->SignatureSize != 0) {\r
824 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
825 }\r
826 SigCount += (SigList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - SigList->SignatureHeaderSize) / SigList->SignatureSize;\r
827\r
828 SigDataSize -= SigList->SignatureListSize;\r
829 SigList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) SigList + SigList->SignatureListSize);\r
830 }\r
831\r
832 if (((UINTN) SigList - (UINTN) Data) != DataSize) {\r
833 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
834 }\r
835\r
836 if (IsPk && SigCount > 1) {\r
837 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
838 }\r
839\r
840 return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
841}\r
842\r
843/**\r
844 Update "VendorKeys" variable to record the out of band secure boot key modification.\r
845\r
846 @return EFI_SUCCESS Variable is updated successfully.\r
847 @return Others Failed to update variable.\r
848\r
849**/\r
850EFI_STATUS\r
851VendorKeyIsModified (\r
852 VOID\r
853 )\r
854{\r
855 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
856\r
857 if (mVendorKeyState == VENDOR_KEYS_MODIFIED) {\r
858 return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
859 }\r
860 mVendorKeyState = VENDOR_KEYS_MODIFIED;\r
861\r
862 Status = AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariable (\r
863 EFI_VENDOR_KEYS_NV_VARIABLE_NAME,\r
864 &gEfiVendorKeysNvGuid,\r
865 &mVendorKeyState,\r
866 sizeof (UINT8),\r
867 EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS\r
868 );\r
869 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
870 return Status;\r
871 }\r
872\r
873 return AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariable (\r
874 EFI_VENDOR_KEYS_VARIABLE_NAME,\r
875 &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
876 &mVendorKeyState,\r
877 sizeof (UINT8),\r
878 EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS\r
879 );\r
880}\r
881\r
882/**\r
883 Process variable with platform key for verification.\r
884\r
885 Caution: This function may receive untrusted input.\r
886 This function may be invoked in SMM mode, and datasize and data are external input.\r
887 This function will do basic validation, before parse the data.\r
888 This function will parse the authentication carefully to avoid security issues, like\r
889 buffer overflow, integer overflow.\r
890 This function will check attribute carefully to avoid authentication bypass.\r
891\r
892 @param[in] VariableName Name of Variable to be found.\r
893 @param[in] VendorGuid Variable vendor GUID.\r
894 @param[in] Data Data pointer.\r
895 @param[in] DataSize Size of Data found. If size is less than the\r
896 data, this value contains the required size.\r
897 @param[in] Attributes Attribute value of the variable\r
898 @param[in] IsPk Indicate whether it is to process pk.\r
899\r
900 @return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.\r
901 @return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION The variable does NOT pass the validation.\r
902 check carried out by the firmware.\r
903 @return EFI_SUCCESS Variable passed validation successfully.\r
904\r
905**/\r
906EFI_STATUS\r
907ProcessVarWithPk (\r
908 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r
909 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r
910 IN VOID *Data,\r
911 IN UINTN DataSize,\r
912 IN UINT32 Attributes OPTIONAL,\r
913 IN BOOLEAN IsPk\r
914 )\r
915{\r
916 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
917 BOOLEAN Del;\r
918 UINT8 *Payload;\r
919 UINTN PayloadSize;\r
920\r
921 if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE) == 0 ||\r
922 (Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) == 0) {\r
923 //\r
924 // PK, KEK and db/dbx/dbt should set EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE attribute and should be a time-based\r
925 // authenticated variable.\r
926 //\r
927 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
928 }\r
929\r
930 Del = FALSE;\r
931 if ((InCustomMode() && UserPhysicalPresent()) || (mPlatformMode == SETUP_MODE && !IsPk)) {\r
932 Payload = (UINT8 *) Data + AUTHINFO2_SIZE (Data);\r
933 PayloadSize = DataSize - AUTHINFO2_SIZE (Data);\r
934 if (PayloadSize == 0) {\r
935 Del = TRUE;\r
936 }\r
937\r
938 Status = CheckSignatureListFormat(VariableName, VendorGuid, Payload, PayloadSize);\r
939 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
940 return Status;\r
941 }\r
942\r
943 Status = AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariableWithTimeStamp (\r
944 VariableName,\r
945 VendorGuid,\r
946 Payload,\r
947 PayloadSize,\r
948 Attributes,\r
949 &((EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 *) Data)->TimeStamp\r
950 );\r
951 if (EFI_ERROR(Status)) {\r
952 return Status;\r
953 }\r
954\r
955 if ((mPlatformMode != SETUP_MODE) || IsPk) {\r
956 Status = VendorKeyIsModified ();\r
957 }\r
958 } else if (mPlatformMode == USER_MODE) {\r
959 //\r
960 // Verify against X509 Cert in PK database.\r
961 //\r
962 Status = VerifyTimeBasedPayloadAndUpdate (\r
963 VariableName,\r
964 VendorGuid,\r
965 Data,\r
966 DataSize,\r
967 Attributes,\r
968 AuthVarTypePk,\r
969 &Del\r
970 );\r
971 } else {\r
972 //\r
973 // Verify against the certificate in data payload.\r
974 //\r
975 Status = VerifyTimeBasedPayloadAndUpdate (\r
976 VariableName,\r
977 VendorGuid,\r
978 Data,\r
979 DataSize,\r
980 Attributes,\r
981 AuthVarTypePayload,\r
982 &Del\r
983 );\r
984 }\r
985\r
986 if (!EFI_ERROR(Status) && IsPk) {\r
987 if (mPlatformMode == SETUP_MODE && !Del) {\r
988 //\r
989 // If enroll PK in setup mode, need change to user mode.\r
990 //\r
991 Status = UpdatePlatformMode (USER_MODE);\r
992 } else if (mPlatformMode == USER_MODE && Del){\r
993 //\r
994 // If delete PK in user mode, need change to setup mode.\r
995 //\r
996 Status = UpdatePlatformMode (SETUP_MODE);\r
997 }\r
998 }\r
999\r
1000 return Status;\r
1001}\r
1002\r
1003/**\r
1004 Process variable with key exchange key for verification.\r
1005\r
1006 Caution: This function may receive untrusted input.\r
1007 This function may be invoked in SMM mode, and datasize and data are external input.\r
1008 This function will do basic validation, before parse the data.\r
1009 This function will parse the authentication carefully to avoid security issues, like\r
1010 buffer overflow, integer overflow.\r
1011 This function will check attribute carefully to avoid authentication bypass.\r
1012\r
1013 @param[in] VariableName Name of Variable to be found.\r
1014 @param[in] VendorGuid Variable vendor GUID.\r
1015 @param[in] Data Data pointer.\r
1016 @param[in] DataSize Size of Data found. If size is less than the\r
1017 data, this value contains the required size.\r
1018 @param[in] Attributes Attribute value of the variable.\r
1019\r
1020 @return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.\r
1021 @return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION The variable does NOT pass the validation\r
1022 check carried out by the firmware.\r
1023 @return EFI_SUCCESS Variable pass validation successfully.\r
1024\r
1025**/\r
1026EFI_STATUS\r
1027ProcessVarWithKek (\r
1028 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r
1029 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r
1030 IN VOID *Data,\r
1031 IN UINTN DataSize,\r
1032 IN UINT32 Attributes OPTIONAL\r
1033 )\r
1034{\r
1035 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
1036 UINT8 *Payload;\r
1037 UINTN PayloadSize;\r
1038\r
1039 if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE) == 0 ||\r
1040 (Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) == 0) {\r
1041 //\r
1042 // DB, DBX and DBT should set EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE attribute and should be a time-based\r
1043 // authenticated variable.\r
1044 //\r
1045 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
1046 }\r
1047\r
1048 Status = EFI_SUCCESS;\r
1049 if (mPlatformMode == USER_MODE && !(InCustomMode() && UserPhysicalPresent())) {\r
1050 //\r
1051 // Time-based, verify against X509 Cert KEK.\r
1052 //\r
1053 return VerifyTimeBasedPayloadAndUpdate (\r
1054 VariableName,\r
1055 VendorGuid,\r
1056 Data,\r
1057 DataSize,\r
1058 Attributes,\r
1059 AuthVarTypeKek,\r
1060 NULL\r
1061 );\r
1062 } else {\r
1063 //\r
1064 // If in setup mode or custom secure boot mode, no authentication needed.\r
1065 //\r
1066 Payload = (UINT8 *) Data + AUTHINFO2_SIZE (Data);\r
1067 PayloadSize = DataSize - AUTHINFO2_SIZE (Data);\r
1068\r
1069 Status = CheckSignatureListFormat(VariableName, VendorGuid, Payload, PayloadSize);\r
1070 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
1071 return Status;\r
1072 }\r
1073\r
1074 Status = AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariableWithTimeStamp (\r
1075 VariableName,\r
1076 VendorGuid,\r
1077 Payload,\r
1078 PayloadSize,\r
1079 Attributes,\r
1080 &((EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 *) Data)->TimeStamp\r
1081 );\r
1082 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
1083 return Status;\r
1084 }\r
1085\r
1086 if (mPlatformMode != SETUP_MODE) {\r
1087 Status = VendorKeyIsModified ();\r
1088 }\r
1089 }\r
1090\r
1091 return Status;\r
1092}\r
1093\r
1094/**\r
1095 Check if it is to delete auth variable.\r
1096\r
1097 @param[in] OrgAttributes Original attribute value of the variable.\r
1098 @param[in] Data Data pointer.\r
1099 @param[in] DataSize Size of Data.\r
1100 @param[in] Attributes Attribute value of the variable.\r
1101\r
1102 @retval TRUE It is to delete auth variable.\r
1103 @retval FALSE It is not to delete auth variable.\r
1104\r
1105**/\r
1106BOOLEAN\r
1107IsDeleteAuthVariable (\r
1108 IN UINT32 OrgAttributes,\r
1109 IN VOID *Data,\r
1110 IN UINTN DataSize,\r
1111 IN UINT32 Attributes\r
1112 )\r
1113{\r
1114 BOOLEAN Del;\r
1115 UINTN PayloadSize;\r
1116\r
1117 Del = FALSE;\r
1118\r
1119 //\r
1120 // To delete a variable created with the EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS\r
1121 // or the EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS attribute,\r
1122 // SetVariable must be used with attributes matching the existing variable\r
1123 // and the DataSize set to the size of the AuthInfo descriptor.\r
1124 //\r
1125 if ((Attributes == OrgAttributes) &&\r
1126 ((Attributes & (EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS)) != 0)) {\r
1127 if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0) {\r
1128 PayloadSize = DataSize - AUTHINFO2_SIZE (Data);\r
1129 if (PayloadSize == 0) {\r
1130 Del = TRUE;\r
1131 }\r
1132 } else {\r
1133 PayloadSize = DataSize - AUTHINFO_SIZE;\r
1134 if (PayloadSize == 0) {\r
1135 Del = TRUE;\r
1136 }\r
1137 }\r
1138 }\r
1139\r
1140 return Del;\r
1141}\r
1142\r
1143/**\r
1144 Process variable with EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS/EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS set\r
1145\r
1146 Caution: This function may receive untrusted input.\r
1147 This function may be invoked in SMM mode, and datasize and data are external input.\r
1148 This function will do basic validation, before parse the data.\r
1149 This function will parse the authentication carefully to avoid security issues, like\r
1150 buffer overflow, integer overflow.\r
1151 This function will check attribute carefully to avoid authentication bypass.\r
1152\r
1153 @param[in] VariableName Name of the variable.\r
1154 @param[in] VendorGuid Variable vendor GUID.\r
1155 @param[in] Data Data pointer.\r
1156 @param[in] DataSize Size of Data.\r
1157 @param[in] Attributes Attribute value of the variable.\r
1158\r
1159 @return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.\r
1160 @return EFI_WRITE_PROTECTED Variable is write-protected and needs authentication with\r
1161 EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS set.\r
1162 @return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES The Database to save the public key is full.\r
1163 @return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION The variable is with EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS\r
1164 set, but the AuthInfo does NOT pass the validation\r
1165 check carried out by the firmware.\r
1166 @return EFI_SUCCESS Variable is not write-protected or pass validation successfully.\r
1167\r
1168**/\r
1169EFI_STATUS\r
1170ProcessVariable (\r
1171 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r
1172 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r
1173 IN VOID *Data,\r
1174 IN UINTN DataSize,\r
1175 IN UINT32 Attributes OPTIONAL\r
1176 )\r
1177{\r
1178 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
1179 BOOLEAN IsDeletion;\r
1180 BOOLEAN IsFirstTime;\r
1181 UINT8 *PubKey;\r
1182 EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION *CertData;\r
1183 EFI_CERT_BLOCK_RSA_2048_SHA256 *CertBlock;\r
1184 UINT32 KeyIndex;\r
1185 UINT64 MonotonicCount;\r
1186 VARIABLE_ENTRY_CONSISTENCY VariableDataEntry;\r
1187 UINT32 Index;\r
1188 AUTH_VARIABLE_INFO OrgVariableInfo;\r
1189\r
1190 KeyIndex = 0;\r
1191 CertData = NULL;\r
1192 CertBlock = NULL;\r
1193 PubKey = NULL;\r
1194 IsDeletion = FALSE;\r
1195 Status = EFI_SUCCESS;\r
1196\r
1197 ZeroMem (&OrgVariableInfo, sizeof (OrgVariableInfo));\r
1198 Status = mAuthVarLibContextIn->FindVariable (\r
1199 VariableName,\r
1200 VendorGuid,\r
1201 &OrgVariableInfo\r
1202 );\r
1203\r
1204 if ((!EFI_ERROR (Status)) && IsDeleteAuthVariable (OrgVariableInfo.Attributes, Data, DataSize, Attributes) && UserPhysicalPresent()) {\r
1205 //\r
1206 // Allow the delete operation of common authenticated variable at user physical presence.\r
1207 //\r
64b6a3ff
CZ		 1208 Status = AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariable (\r
1209 VariableName,\r
1210 VendorGuid,\r
1211 NULL,\r
1212 0,\r
1213 0\r
1214 );\r
1215 if (!EFI_ERROR (Status) && ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0)) {\r
a6811666
SZ		 1216 Status = DeleteCertsFromDb (VariableName, VendorGuid);\r
1217 }\r
64b6a3ff 1218\r
a6811666
SZ		 1219 return Status;\r
1220 }\r
1221\r
1222 if (NeedPhysicallyPresent (VariableName, VendorGuid) && !UserPhysicalPresent()) {\r
1223 //\r
1224 // This variable is protected, only physical present user could modify its value.\r
1225 //\r
1226 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r
1227 }\r
1228\r
1229 //\r
1230 // A time-based authenticated variable and a count-based authenticated variable\r
1231 // can't be updated by each other.\r
1232 //\r
1233 if (OrgVariableInfo.Data != NULL) {\r
1234 if (((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0) &&\r
1235 ((OrgVariableInfo.Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0)) {\r
1236 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r
1237 }\r
1238\r
1239 if (((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0) &&\r
1240 ((OrgVariableInfo.Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0)) {\r
1241 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r
1242 }\r
1243 }\r
1244\r
1245 //\r
1246 // Process Time-based Authenticated variable.\r
1247 //\r
1248 if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0) {\r
1249 return VerifyTimeBasedPayloadAndUpdate (\r
1250 VariableName,\r
1251 VendorGuid,\r
1252 Data,\r
1253 DataSize,\r
1254 Attributes,\r
1255 AuthVarTypePriv,\r
1256 NULL\r
1257 );\r
1258 }\r
1259\r
1260 //\r
1261 // Determine if first time SetVariable with the EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS.\r
1262 //\r
1263 if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0) {\r
1264 //\r
1265 // Determine current operation type.\r
1266 //\r
1267 if (DataSize == AUTHINFO_SIZE) {\r
1268 IsDeletion = TRUE;\r
1269 }\r
1270 //\r
1271 // Determine whether this is the first time with EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS set.\r
1272 //\r
1273 if (OrgVariableInfo.Data == NULL) {\r
1274 IsFirstTime = TRUE;\r
1275 } else if ((OrgVariableInfo.Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) == 0) {\r
1276 IsFirstTime = TRUE;\r
1277 } else {\r
1278 KeyIndex = OrgVariableInfo.PubKeyIndex;\r
1279 IsFirstTime = FALSE;\r
1280 }\r
1281 } else if ((OrgVariableInfo.Data != NULL) &&\r
1282 ((OrgVariableInfo.Attributes & (EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS)) != 0)\r
1283 ) {\r
1284 //\r
1285 // If the variable is already write-protected, it always needs authentication before update.\r
1286 //\r
1287 return EFI_WRITE_PROTECTED;\r
1288 } else {\r
1289 //\r
1290 // If without EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS, set and attributes collision.\r
1291 // That means it is not authenticated variable, just update variable as usual.\r
1292 //\r
1293 Status = AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariable (VariableName, VendorGuid, Data, DataSize, Attributes);\r
1294 return Status;\r
1295 }\r
1296\r
1297 //\r
1298 // Get PubKey and check Monotonic Count value corresponding to the variable.\r
1299 //\r
1300 CertData = (EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION *) Data;\r
1301 CertBlock = (EFI_CERT_BLOCK_RSA_2048_SHA256 *) (CertData->AuthInfo.CertData);\r
1302 PubKey = CertBlock->PublicKey;\r
1303\r
1304 //\r
1305 // Update Monotonic Count value.\r
1306 //\r
1307 MonotonicCount = CertData->MonotonicCount;\r
1308\r
1309 if (!IsFirstTime) {\r
1310 //\r
1311 // 2 cases need to check here\r
1312 // 1. Internal PubKey variable. PubKeyIndex is always 0\r
1313 // 2. Other counter-based AuthVariable. Check input PubKey.\r
1314 //\r
1315 if (KeyIndex == 0) {\r
1316 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r
1317 }\r
1318 for (Index = 0; Index < mPubKeyNumber; Index++) {\r
1319 if (ReadUnaligned32 (&(((AUTHVAR_KEY_DB_DATA *) mPubKeyStore + Index)->KeyIndex)) == KeyIndex) {\r
1320 if (CompareMem (((AUTHVAR_KEY_DB_DATA *) mPubKeyStore + Index)->KeyData, PubKey, EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE) == 0) {\r
1321 break;\r
1322 } else {\r
1323 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r
1324 }\r
1325 }\r
1326 }\r
1327 if (Index == mPubKeyNumber) {\r
1328 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r
1329 }\r
1330\r
1331 //\r
1332 // Compare the current monotonic count and ensure that it is greater than the last SetVariable\r
1333 // operation with the EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS attribute set.\r
1334 //\r
1335 if (MonotonicCount <= OrgVariableInfo.MonotonicCount) {\r
1336 //\r
1337 // Monotonic count check fail, suspicious replay attack, return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION.\r
1338 //\r
1339 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r
1340 }\r
1341 }\r
1342 //\r
1343 // Verify the certificate in Data payload.\r
1344 //\r
1345 Status = VerifyCounterBasedPayload (Data, DataSize, PubKey);\r
1346 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
1347 return Status;\r
1348 }\r
1349\r
1350 //\r
1351 // Now, the signature has been verified!\r
1352 //\r
1353 if (IsFirstTime && !IsDeletion) {\r
1354 VariableDataEntry.VariableSize = DataSize - AUTHINFO_SIZE;\r
1355 VariableDataEntry.Guid = VendorGuid;\r
1356 VariableDataEntry.Name = VariableName;\r
1357\r
1358 //\r
1359 // Update public key database variable if need.\r
1360 //\r
1361 KeyIndex = AddPubKeyInStore (PubKey, &VariableDataEntry);\r
1362 if (KeyIndex == 0) {\r
1363 return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
1364 }\r
1365 }\r
1366\r
1367 //\r
1368 // Verification pass.\r
1369 //\r
1370 return AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariableWithMonotonicCount (VariableName, VendorGuid, (UINT8*)Data + AUTHINFO_SIZE, DataSize - AUTHINFO_SIZE, Attributes, KeyIndex, MonotonicCount);\r
1371}\r
1372\r
1373/**\r
1374 Filter out the duplicated EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA from the new data by comparing to the original data.\r
1375\r
1376 @param[in] Data Pointer to original EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST.\r
1377 @param[in] DataSize Size of Data buffer.\r
1378 @param[in, out] NewData Pointer to new EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST.\r
1379 @param[in, out] NewDataSize Size of NewData buffer.\r
1380\r
1381**/\r
1382EFI_STATUS\r
1383FilterSignatureList (\r
1384 IN VOID *Data,\r
1385 IN UINTN DataSize,\r
1386 IN OUT VOID *NewData,\r
1387 IN OUT UINTN *NewDataSize\r
1388 )\r
1389{\r
1390 EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *CertList;\r
1391 EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *Cert;\r
1392 UINTN CertCount;\r
1393 EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *NewCertList;\r
1394 EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *NewCert;\r
1395 UINTN NewCertCount;\r
1396 UINTN Index;\r
1397 UINTN Index2;\r
1398 UINTN Size;\r
1399 UINT8 *Tail;\r
1400 UINTN CopiedCount;\r
1401 UINTN SignatureListSize;\r
1402 BOOLEAN IsNewCert;\r
1403 UINT8 *TempData;\r
1404 UINTN TempDataSize;\r
1405 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
1406\r
1407 if (*NewDataSize == 0) {\r
1408 return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
1409 }\r
1410\r
1411 TempDataSize = *NewDataSize;\r
1412 Status = mAuthVarLibContextIn->GetScratchBuffer (&TempDataSize, (VOID **) &TempData);\r
1413 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
1414 return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
1415 }\r
1416\r
1417 Tail = TempData;\r
1418\r
1419 NewCertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) NewData;\r
1420 while ((*NewDataSize > 0) && (*NewDataSize >= NewCertList->SignatureListSize)) {\r
1421 NewCert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) NewCertList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + NewCertList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r
1422 NewCertCount = (NewCertList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - NewCertList->SignatureHeaderSize) / NewCertList->SignatureSize;\r
1423\r
1424 CopiedCount = 0;\r
1425 for (Index = 0; Index < NewCertCount; Index++) {\r
1426 IsNewCert = TRUE;\r
1427\r
1428 Size = DataSize;\r
1429 CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) Data;\r
1430 while ((Size > 0) && (Size >= CertList->SignatureListSize)) {\r
1431 if (CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &NewCertList->SignatureType) &&\r
1432 (CertList->SignatureSize == NewCertList->SignatureSize)) {\r
1433 Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r
1434 CertCount = (CertList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - CertList->SignatureHeaderSize) / CertList->SignatureSize;\r
1435 for (Index2 = 0; Index2 < CertCount; Index2++) {\r
1436 //\r
1437 // Iterate each Signature Data in this Signature List.\r
1438 //\r
1439 if (CompareMem (NewCert, Cert, CertList->SignatureSize) == 0) {\r
1440 IsNewCert = FALSE;\r
1441 break;\r
1442 }\r
1443 Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) Cert + CertList->SignatureSize);\r
1444 }\r
1445 }\r
1446\r
1447 if (!IsNewCert) {\r
1448 break;\r
1449 }\r
1450 Size -= CertList->SignatureListSize;\r
1451 CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + CertList->SignatureListSize);\r
1452 }\r
1453\r
1454 if (IsNewCert) {\r
1455 //\r
1456 // New EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA, keep it.\r
1457 //\r
1458 if (CopiedCount == 0) {\r
1459 //\r
1460 // Copy EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST header for only once.\r
1461 //\r
1462 CopyMem (Tail, NewCertList, sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + NewCertList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r
1463 Tail = Tail + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + NewCertList->SignatureHeaderSize;\r
1464 }\r
1465\r
1466 CopyMem (Tail, NewCert, NewCertList->SignatureSize);\r
1467 Tail += NewCertList->SignatureSize;\r
1468 CopiedCount++;\r
1469 }\r
1470\r
1471 NewCert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) NewCert + NewCertList->SignatureSize);\r
1472 }\r
1473\r
1474 //\r
1475 // Update SignatureListSize in the kept EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST.\r
1476 //\r
1477 if (CopiedCount != 0) {\r
1478 SignatureListSize = sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + NewCertList->SignatureHeaderSize + (CopiedCount * NewCertList->SignatureSize);\r
1479 CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) (Tail - SignatureListSize);\r
1480 CertList->SignatureListSize = (UINT32) SignatureListSize;\r
1481 }\r
1482\r
1483 *NewDataSize -= NewCertList->SignatureListSize;\r
1484 NewCertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) NewCertList + NewCertList->SignatureListSize);\r
1485 }\r
1486\r
1487 TempDataSize = (Tail - (UINT8 *) TempData);\r
1488\r
1489 CopyMem (NewData, TempData, TempDataSize);\r
1490 *NewDataSize = TempDataSize;\r
1491\r
1492 return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
1493}\r
1494\r
1495/**\r
1496 Compare two EFI_TIME data.\r
1497\r
1498\r
1499 @param FirstTime A pointer to the first EFI_TIME data.\r
1500 @param SecondTime A pointer to the second EFI_TIME data.\r
1501\r
1502 @retval TRUE The FirstTime is not later than the SecondTime.\r
1503 @retval FALSE The FirstTime is later than the SecondTime.\r
1504\r
1505**/\r
1506BOOLEAN\r
1507AuthServiceInternalCompareTimeStamp (\r
1508 IN EFI_TIME *FirstTime,\r
1509 IN EFI_TIME *SecondTime\r
1510 )\r
1511{\r
1512 if (FirstTime->Year != SecondTime->Year) {\r
1513 return (BOOLEAN) (FirstTime->Year < SecondTime->Year);\r
1514 } else if (FirstTime->Month != SecondTime->Month) {\r
1515 return (BOOLEAN) (FirstTime->Month < SecondTime->Month);\r
1516 } else if (FirstTime->Day != SecondTime->Day) {\r
1517 return (BOOLEAN) (FirstTime->Day < SecondTime->Day);\r
1518 } else if (FirstTime->Hour != SecondTime->Hour) {\r
1519 return (BOOLEAN) (FirstTime->Hour < SecondTime->Hour);\r
1520 } else if (FirstTime->Minute != SecondTime->Minute) {\r
1521 return (BOOLEAN) (FirstTime->Minute < SecondTime->Minute);\r
1522 }\r
1523\r
1524 return (BOOLEAN) (FirstTime->Second <= SecondTime->Second);\r
1525}\r
1526\r
1527/**\r
1528 Find matching signer's certificates for common authenticated variable\r
1529 by corresponding VariableName and VendorGuid from "certdb".\r
1530\r
1531 The data format of "certdb":\r
1532 //\r
1533 // UINT32 CertDbListSize;\r
1534 // /// AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA Certs1[];\r
1535 // /// AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA Certs2[];\r
1536 // /// ...\r
1537 // /// AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA Certsn[];\r
1538 //\r
1539\r
1540 @param[in] VariableName Name of authenticated Variable.\r
1541 @param[in] VendorGuid Vendor GUID of authenticated Variable.\r
1542 @param[in] Data Pointer to variable "certdb".\r
1543 @param[in] DataSize Size of variable "certdb".\r
1544 @param[out] CertOffset Offset of matching CertData, from starting of Data.\r
1545 @param[out] CertDataSize Length of CertData in bytes.\r
1546 @param[out] CertNodeOffset Offset of matching AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA , from\r
1547 starting of Data.\r
1548 @param[out] CertNodeSize Length of AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA in bytes.\r
1549\r
1550 @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Any input parameter is invalid.\r
1551 @retval EFI_NOT_FOUND Fail to find matching certs.\r
1552 @retval EFI_SUCCESS Find matching certs and output parameters.\r
1553\r
1554**/\r
1555EFI_STATUS\r
1556FindCertsFromDb (\r
1557 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r
1558 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r
1559 IN UINT8 *Data,\r
1560 IN UINTN DataSize,\r
1561 OUT UINT32 *CertOffset, OPTIONAL\r
1562 OUT UINT32 *CertDataSize, OPTIONAL\r
1563 OUT UINT32 *CertNodeOffset,OPTIONAL\r
1564 OUT UINT32 *CertNodeSize OPTIONAL\r
1565 )\r
1566{\r
1567 UINT32 Offset;\r
1568 AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA *Ptr;\r
1569 UINT32 CertSize;\r
1570 UINT32 NameSize;\r
1571 UINT32 NodeSize;\r
1572 UINT32 CertDbListSize;\r
1573\r
1574 if ((VariableName == NULL) || (VendorGuid == NULL) || (Data == NULL)) {\r
1575 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
1576 }\r
1577\r
1578 //\r
1579 // Check whether DataSize matches recorded CertDbListSize.\r
1580 //\r
1581 if (DataSize < sizeof (UINT32)) {\r
1582 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
1583 }\r
1584\r
1585 CertDbListSize = ReadUnaligned32 ((UINT32 *) Data);\r
1586\r
1587 if (CertDbListSize != (UINT32) DataSize) {\r
1588 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
1589 }\r
1590\r
1591 Offset = sizeof (UINT32);\r
1592\r
1593 //\r
1594 // Get corresponding certificates by VendorGuid and VariableName.\r
1595 //\r
1596 while (Offset < (UINT32) DataSize) {\r
1597 Ptr = (AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA *) (Data + Offset);\r
1598 //\r
1599 // Check whether VendorGuid matches.\r
1600 //\r
1601 if (CompareGuid (&Ptr->VendorGuid, VendorGuid)) {\r
1602 NodeSize = ReadUnaligned32 (&Ptr->CertNodeSize);\r
1603 NameSize = ReadUnaligned32 (&Ptr->NameSize);\r
1604 CertSize = ReadUnaligned32 (&Ptr->CertDataSize);\r
1605\r
1606 if (NodeSize != sizeof (EFI_GUID) + sizeof (UINT32) * 3 + CertSize +\r
1607 sizeof (CHAR16) * NameSize) {\r
1608 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
1609 }\r
1610\r
1611 Offset = Offset + sizeof (EFI_GUID) + sizeof (UINT32) * 3;\r
1612 //\r
1613 // Check whether VariableName matches.\r
1614 //\r
1615 if ((NameSize == StrLen (VariableName)) &&\r
1616 (CompareMem (Data + Offset, VariableName, NameSize * sizeof (CHAR16)) == 0)) {\r
1617 Offset = Offset + NameSize * sizeof (CHAR16);\r
1618\r
1619 if (CertOffset != NULL) {\r
1620 *CertOffset = Offset;\r
1621 }\r
1622\r
1623 if (CertDataSize != NULL) {\r
1624 *CertDataSize = CertSize;\r
1625 }\r
1626\r
1627 if (CertNodeOffset != NULL) {\r
1628 *CertNodeOffset = (UINT32) ((UINT8 *) Ptr - Data);\r
1629 }\r
1630\r
1631 if (CertNodeSize != NULL) {\r
1632 *CertNodeSize = NodeSize;\r
1633 }\r
1634\r
1635 return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
1636 } else {\r
1637 Offset = Offset + NameSize * sizeof (CHAR16) + CertSize;\r
1638 }\r
1639 } else {\r
1640 NodeSize = ReadUnaligned32 (&Ptr->CertNodeSize);\r
1641 Offset = Offset + NodeSize;\r
1642 }\r
1643 }\r
1644\r
1645 return EFI_NOT_FOUND;\r
1646}\r
1647\r
1648/**\r
1649 Retrieve signer's certificates for common authenticated variable\r
1650 by corresponding VariableName and VendorGuid from "certdb".\r
1651\r
1652 @param[in] VariableName Name of authenticated Variable.\r
1653 @param[in] VendorGuid Vendor GUID of authenticated Variable.\r
1654 @param[out] CertData Pointer to signer's certificates.\r
1655 @param[out] CertDataSize Length of CertData in bytes.\r
1656\r
1657 @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Any input parameter is invalid.\r
1658 @retval EFI_NOT_FOUND Fail to find "certdb" or matching certs.\r
1659 @retval EFI_SUCCESS Get signer's certificates successfully.\r
1660\r
1661**/\r
1662EFI_STATUS\r
1663GetCertsFromDb (\r
1664 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r
1665 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r
1666 OUT UINT8 **CertData,\r
1667 OUT UINT32 *CertDataSize\r
1668 )\r
1669{\r
1670 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
1671 UINT8 *Data;\r
1672 UINTN DataSize;\r
1673 UINT32 CertOffset;\r
1674\r
1675 if ((VariableName == NULL) || (VendorGuid == NULL) || (CertData == NULL) || (CertDataSize == NULL)) {\r
1676 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
1677 }\r
1678\r
1679 //\r
1680 // Get variable "certdb".\r
1681 //\r
1682 Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (\r
1683 EFI_CERT_DB_NAME,\r
1684 &gEfiCertDbGuid,\r
1685 (VOID **) &Data,\r
1686 &DataSize\r
1687 );\r
1688 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
1689 return Status;\r
1690 }\r
1691\r
1692 if ((DataSize == 0) || (Data == NULL)) {\r
1693 ASSERT (FALSE);\r
1694 return EFI_NOT_FOUND;\r
1695 }\r
1696\r
1697 Status = FindCertsFromDb (\r
1698 VariableName,\r
1699 VendorGuid,\r
1700 Data,\r
1701 DataSize,\r
1702 &CertOffset,\r
1703 CertDataSize,\r
1704 NULL,\r
1705 NULL\r
1706 );\r
1707\r
1708 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
1709 return Status;\r
1710 }\r
1711\r
1712 *CertData = Data + CertOffset;\r
1713 return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
1714}\r
1715\r
1716/**\r
1717 Delete matching signer's certificates when deleting common authenticated\r
1718 variable by corresponding VariableName and VendorGuid from "certdb".\r
1719\r
1720 @param[in] VariableName Name of authenticated Variable.\r
1721 @param[in] VendorGuid Vendor GUID of authenticated Variable.\r
1722\r
1723 @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Any input parameter is invalid.\r
1724 @retval EFI_NOT_FOUND Fail to find "certdb" or matching certs.\r
1725 @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES The operation is failed due to lack of resources.\r
1726 @retval EFI_SUCCESS The operation is completed successfully.\r
1727\r
1728**/\r
1729EFI_STATUS\r
1730DeleteCertsFromDb (\r
1731 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r
1732 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid\r
1733 )\r
1734{\r
1735 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
1736 UINT8 *Data;\r
1737 UINTN DataSize;\r
1738 UINT32 VarAttr;\r
1739 UINT32 CertNodeOffset;\r
1740 UINT32 CertNodeSize;\r
1741 UINT8 *NewCertDb;\r
1742 UINT32 NewCertDbSize;\r
1743\r
1744 if ((VariableName == NULL) || (VendorGuid == NULL)) {\r
1745 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
1746 }\r
1747\r
1748 //\r
1749 // Get variable "certdb".\r
1750 //\r
1751 Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (\r
1752 EFI_CERT_DB_NAME,\r
1753 &gEfiCertDbGuid,\r
1754 (VOID **) &Data,\r
1755 &DataSize\r
1756 );\r
1757 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
1758 return Status;\r
1759 }\r
1760\r
1761 if ((DataSize == 0) || (Data == NULL)) {\r
1762 ASSERT (FALSE);\r
1763 return EFI_NOT_FOUND;\r
1764 }\r
1765\r
1766 if (DataSize == sizeof (UINT32)) {\r
1767 //\r
1768 // There is no certs in certdb.\r
1769 //\r
1770 return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
1771 }\r
1772\r
1773 //\r
1774 // Get corresponding cert node from certdb.\r
1775 //\r
1776 Status = FindCertsFromDb (\r
1777 VariableName,\r
1778 VendorGuid,\r
1779 Data,\r
1780 DataSize,\r
1781 NULL,\r
1782 NULL,\r
1783 &CertNodeOffset,\r
1784 &CertNodeSize\r
1785 );\r
1786\r
1787 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
1788 return Status;\r
1789 }\r
1790\r
1791 if (DataSize < (CertNodeOffset + CertNodeSize)) {\r
1792 return EFI_NOT_FOUND;\r
1793 }\r
1794\r
1795 //\r
1796 // Construct new data content of variable "certdb".\r
1797 //\r
1798 NewCertDbSize = (UINT32) DataSize - CertNodeSize;\r
1799 NewCertDb = (UINT8*) mCertDbStore;\r
1800\r
1801 //\r
1802 // Copy the DB entries before deleting node.\r
1803 //\r
1804 CopyMem (NewCertDb, Data, CertNodeOffset);\r
1805 //\r
1806 // Update CertDbListSize.\r
1807 //\r
1808 CopyMem (NewCertDb, &NewCertDbSize, sizeof (UINT32));\r
1809 //\r
1810 // Copy the DB entries after deleting node.\r
1811 //\r
1812 if (DataSize > (CertNodeOffset + CertNodeSize)) {\r
1813 CopyMem (\r
1814 NewCertDb + CertNodeOffset,\r
1815 Data + CertNodeOffset + CertNodeSize,\r
1816 DataSize - CertNodeOffset - CertNodeSize\r
1817 );\r
1818 }\r
1819\r
1820 //\r
1821 // Set "certdb".\r
1822 //\r
1823 VarAttr = EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS;\r
1824 Status = AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariable (\r
1825 EFI_CERT_DB_NAME,\r
1826 &gEfiCertDbGuid,\r
1827 NewCertDb,\r
1828 NewCertDbSize,\r
1829 VarAttr\r
1830 );\r
1831\r
1832 return Status;\r
1833}\r
1834\r
1835/**\r
1836 Insert signer's certificates for common authenticated variable with VariableName\r
1837 and VendorGuid in AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA to "certdb".\r
1838\r
1839 @param[in] VariableName Name of authenticated Variable.\r
1840 @param[in] VendorGuid Vendor GUID of authenticated Variable.\r
1841 @param[in] CertData Pointer to signer's certificates.\r
1842 @param[in] CertDataSize Length of CertData in bytes.\r
1843\r
1844 @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Any input parameter is invalid.\r
1845 @retval EFI_ACCESS_DENIED An AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA entry with same VariableName\r
1846 and VendorGuid already exists.\r
1847 @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES The operation is failed due to lack of resources.\r
1848 @retval EFI_SUCCESS Insert an AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA entry to "certdb"\r
1849\r
1850**/\r
1851EFI_STATUS\r
1852InsertCertsToDb (\r
1853 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r
1854 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r
1855 IN UINT8 *CertData,\r
1856 IN UINTN CertDataSize\r
1857 )\r
1858{\r
1859 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
1860 UINT8 *Data;\r
1861 UINTN DataSize;\r
1862 UINT32 VarAttr;\r
1863 UINT8 *NewCertDb;\r
1864 UINT32 NewCertDbSize;\r
1865 UINT32 CertNodeSize;\r
1866 UINT32 NameSize;\r
1867 AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA *Ptr;\r
1868\r
1869 if ((VariableName == NULL) || (VendorGuid == NULL) || (CertData == NULL)) {\r
1870 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
1871 }\r
1872\r
1873 //\r
1874 // Get variable "certdb".\r
1875 //\r
1876 Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (\r
1877 EFI_CERT_DB_NAME,\r
1878 &gEfiCertDbGuid,\r
1879 (VOID **) &Data,\r
1880 &DataSize\r
1881 );\r
1882 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
1883 return Status;\r
1884 }\r
1885\r
1886 if ((DataSize == 0) || (Data == NULL)) {\r
1887 ASSERT (FALSE);\r
1888 return EFI_NOT_FOUND;\r
1889 }\r
1890\r
1891 //\r
1892 // Find whether matching cert node already exists in "certdb".\r
1893 // If yes return error.\r
1894 //\r
1895 Status = FindCertsFromDb (\r
1896 VariableName,\r
1897 VendorGuid,\r
1898 Data,\r
1899 DataSize,\r
1900 NULL,\r
1901 NULL,\r
1902 NULL,\r
1903 NULL\r
1904 );\r
1905\r
1906 if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
1907 ASSERT (FALSE);\r
1908 return EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;\r
1909 }\r
1910\r
1911 //\r
1912 // Construct new data content of variable "certdb".\r
1913 //\r
1914 NameSize = (UINT32) StrLen (VariableName);\r
1915 CertNodeSize = sizeof (AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA) + (UINT32) CertDataSize + NameSize * sizeof (CHAR16);\r
1916 NewCertDbSize = (UINT32) DataSize + CertNodeSize;\r
1917 if (NewCertDbSize > mMaxCertDbSize) {\r
1918 return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
1919 }\r
1920 NewCertDb = (UINT8*) mCertDbStore;\r
1921\r
1922 //\r
1923 // Copy the DB entries before inserting node.\r
1924 //\r
1925 CopyMem (NewCertDb, Data, DataSize);\r
1926 //\r
1927 // Update CertDbListSize.\r
1928 //\r
1929 CopyMem (NewCertDb, &NewCertDbSize, sizeof (UINT32));\r
1930 //\r
1931 // Construct new cert node.\r
1932 //\r
1933 Ptr = (AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA *) (NewCertDb + DataSize);\r
1934 CopyGuid (&Ptr->VendorGuid, VendorGuid);\r
1935 CopyMem (&Ptr->CertNodeSize, &CertNodeSize, sizeof (UINT32));\r
1936 CopyMem (&Ptr->NameSize, &NameSize, sizeof (UINT32));\r
1937 CopyMem (&Ptr->CertDataSize, &CertDataSize, sizeof (UINT32));\r
1938\r
1939 CopyMem (\r
1940 (UINT8 *) Ptr + sizeof (AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA),\r
1941 VariableName,\r
1942 NameSize * sizeof (CHAR16)\r
1943 );\r
1944\r
1945 CopyMem (\r
1946 (UINT8 *) Ptr + sizeof (AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA) + NameSize * sizeof (CHAR16),\r
1947 CertData,\r
1948 CertDataSize\r
1949 );\r
1950\r
1951 //\r
1952 // Set "certdb".\r
1953 //\r
1954 VarAttr = EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS;\r
1955 Status = AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariable (\r
1956 EFI_CERT_DB_NAME,\r
1957 &gEfiCertDbGuid,\r
1958 NewCertDb,\r
1959 NewCertDbSize,\r
1960 VarAttr\r
1961 );\r
1962\r
1963 return Status;\r
1964}\r
1965\r
64b6a3ff
CZ		 1966/**\r
1967 Clean up signer's certificates for common authenticated variable\r
1968 by corresponding VariableName and VendorGuid from "certdb".\r
1969 Sytem may break down during Timebased Variable update & certdb update,\r
1970 make them inconsistent, this function is called in AuthVariable Init to ensure \r
1971 consistency\r
1972 \r
1973 @retval EFI_NOT_FOUND Fail to find matching certs.\r
1974 @retval EFI_SUCCESS Find matching certs and output parameters.\r
1975\r
1976**/\r
1977EFI_STATUS\r
1978CleanCertsFromDb (\r
1979 VOID\r
1980 ){\r
1981 UINT32 Offset;\r
1982 AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA *Ptr;\r
1983 UINT32 NameSize;\r
1984 UINT32 NodeSize;\r
1985 CHAR16 *VariableName;\r
1986 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
1987 BOOLEAN CertCleaned;\r
1988 UINT8 *Data;\r
1989 UINTN DataSize;\r
1990 UINT8 *AuthVarData;\r
1991 UINTN AuthVarDataSize;\r
1992 EFI_GUID AuthVarGuid;\r
1993\r
1994 Status = EFI_SUCCESS;\r
1995\r
1996 //\r
1997 // Get corresponding certificates by VendorGuid and VariableName.\r
1998 //\r
1999 do {\r
2000 CertCleaned = FALSE;\r
2001\r
2002 //\r
2003 // Get latest variable "certdb"\r
2004 //\r
2005 Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (\r
2006 EFI_CERT_DB_NAME,\r
2007 &gEfiCertDbGuid,\r
2008 (VOID **) &Data,\r
2009 &DataSize\r
2010 );\r
2011 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
2012 return Status;\r
2013 }\r
2014\r
2015 if ((DataSize == 0) || (Data == NULL)) {\r
2016 ASSERT (FALSE);\r
2017 return EFI_NOT_FOUND;\r
2018 }\r
2019\r
2020 Offset = sizeof (UINT32);\r
2021\r
2022 while (Offset < (UINT32) DataSize) {\r
2023 Ptr = (AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA *) (Data + Offset);\r
2024 //\r
2025 // Check whether VendorGuid matches.\r
2026 //\r
2027 NodeSize = ReadUnaligned32 (&Ptr->CertNodeSize);\r
2028 NameSize = ReadUnaligned32 (&Ptr->NameSize);\r
2029\r
2030 //\r
2031 // Get VarName tailed with '\0'\r
2032 //\r
2033 VariableName = AllocateZeroPool((NameSize + 1) * sizeof(CHAR16));\r
2034 if (VariableName == NULL) {\r
2035 return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
2036 }\r
2037 CopyMem (VariableName, (UINT8 *) Ptr + sizeof (AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA), NameSize * sizeof(CHAR16));\r
2038 //\r
2039 // Keep VarGuid aligned\r
2040 //\r
2041 CopyMem (&AuthVarGuid, &Ptr->VendorGuid, sizeof(EFI_GUID));\r
2042\r
2043 //\r
2044 // Find corresponding time auth variable\r
2045 //\r
2046 Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (\r
2047 VariableName,\r
2048 &AuthVarGuid,\r
2049 (VOID **) &AuthVarData,\r
2050 &AuthVarDataSize\r
2051 );\r
2052\r
2053 if (EFI_ERROR(Status)) {\r
2054 Status = DeleteCertsFromDb(VariableName, &AuthVarGuid);\r
2055 CertCleaned = TRUE;\r
2056 DEBUG((EFI_D_INFO, "Recovery!! Cert for Auth Variable %s Guid %g is removed for consistency\n", VariableName, &AuthVarGuid));\r
2057 FreePool(VariableName);\r
2058 break;\r
2059 }\r
2060\r
2061 FreePool(VariableName);\r
2062 Offset = Offset + NodeSize;\r
2063 }\r
2064 } while (CertCleaned);\r
2065\r
2066 return Status;\r
2067}\r
2068\r
a6811666
SZ		 2069/**\r
2070 Process variable with EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS set\r
2071\r
2072 Caution: This function may receive untrusted input.\r
2073 This function may be invoked in SMM mode, and datasize and data are external input.\r
2074 This function will do basic validation, before parse the data.\r
2075 This function will parse the authentication carefully to avoid security issues, like\r
2076 buffer overflow, integer overflow.\r
2077\r
2078 @param[in] VariableName Name of Variable to be found.\r
2079 @param[in] VendorGuid Variable vendor GUID.\r
2080 @param[in] Data Data pointer.\r
2081 @param[in] DataSize Size of Data found. If size is less than the\r
2082 data, this value contains the required size.\r
2083 @param[in] Attributes Attribute value of the variable.\r
2084 @param[in] AuthVarType Verify against PK, KEK database, private database or certificate in data payload.\r
2085 @param[in] OrgTimeStamp Pointer to original time stamp,\r
2086 original variable is not found if NULL.\r
2087 @param[out] VarPayloadPtr Pointer to variable payload address.\r
2088 @param[out] VarPayloadSize Pointer to variable payload size.\r
2089\r
2090 @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.\r
2091 @retval EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION The variable does NOT pass the validation\r
2092 check carried out by the firmware.\r
2093 @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES Failed to process variable due to lack\r
2094 of resources.\r
2095 @retval EFI_SUCCESS Variable pass validation successfully.\r
2096\r
2097**/\r
2098EFI_STATUS\r
2099VerifyTimeBasedPayload (\r
2100 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r
2101 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r
2102 IN VOID *Data,\r
2103 IN UINTN DataSize,\r
2104 IN UINT32 Attributes,\r
2105 IN AUTHVAR_TYPE AuthVarType,\r
2106 IN EFI_TIME *OrgTimeStamp,\r
2107 OUT UINT8 **VarPayloadPtr,\r
2108 OUT UINTN *VarPayloadSize\r
2109 )\r
2110{\r
2111 EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 *CertData;\r
2112 UINT8 *SigData;\r
2113 UINT32 SigDataSize;\r
2114 UINT8 *PayloadPtr;\r
2115 UINTN PayloadSize;\r
2116 UINT32 Attr;\r
2117 BOOLEAN VerifyStatus;\r
2118 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
2119 EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *CertList;\r
2120 EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *Cert;\r
2121 UINTN Index;\r
2122 UINTN CertCount;\r
2123 UINT32 KekDataSize;\r
2124 UINT8 *NewData;\r
2125 UINTN NewDataSize;\r
2126 UINT8 *Buffer;\r
2127 UINTN Length;\r
2128 UINT8 *RootCert;\r
2129 UINTN RootCertSize;\r
2130 UINT8 *SignerCerts;\r
2131 UINTN CertStackSize;\r
2132 UINT8 *CertsInCertDb;\r
2133 UINT32 CertsSizeinDb;\r
2134\r
2135 VerifyStatus = FALSE;\r
2136 CertData = NULL;\r
2137 NewData = NULL;\r
2138 Attr = Attributes;\r
2139 SignerCerts = NULL;\r
2140 RootCert = NULL;\r
2141 CertsInCertDb = NULL;\r
2142\r
2143 //\r
2144 // When the attribute EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS is\r
2145 // set, then the Data buffer shall begin with an instance of a complete (and serialized)\r
2146 // EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 descriptor. The descriptor shall be followed by the new\r
2147 // variable value and DataSize shall reflect the combined size of the descriptor and the new\r
2148 // variable value. The authentication descriptor is not part of the variable data and is not\r
2149 // returned by subsequent calls to GetVariable().\r
2150 //\r
2151 CertData = (EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 *) Data;\r
2152\r
2153 //\r
2154 // Verify that Pad1, Nanosecond, TimeZone, Daylight and Pad2 components of the\r
2155 // TimeStamp value are set to zero.\r
2156 //\r
2157 if ((CertData->TimeStamp.Pad1 != 0) ||\r
2158 (CertData->TimeStamp.Nanosecond != 0) ||\r
2159 (CertData->TimeStamp.TimeZone != 0) ||\r
2160 (CertData->TimeStamp.Daylight != 0) ||\r
2161 (CertData->TimeStamp.Pad2 != 0)) {\r
2162 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r
2163 }\r
2164\r
2165 if ((OrgTimeStamp != NULL) && ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_APPEND_WRITE) == 0)) {\r
2166 if (AuthServiceInternalCompareTimeStamp (&CertData->TimeStamp, OrgTimeStamp)) {\r
2167 //\r
2168 // TimeStamp check fail, suspicious replay attack, return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION.\r
2169 //\r
2170 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r
2171 }\r
2172 }\r
2173\r
2174 //\r
2175 // wCertificateType should be WIN_CERT_TYPE_EFI_GUID.\r
2176 // Cert type should be EFI_CERT_TYPE_PKCS7_GUID.\r
2177 //\r
2178 if ((CertData->AuthInfo.Hdr.wCertificateType != WIN_CERT_TYPE_EFI_GUID) ||\r
2179 !CompareGuid (&CertData->AuthInfo.CertType, &gEfiCertPkcs7Guid)) {\r
2180 //\r
2181 // Invalid AuthInfo type, return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION.\r
2182 //\r
2183 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r
2184 }\r
2185\r
2186 //\r
2187 // Find out Pkcs7 SignedData which follows the EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 descriptor.\r
2188 // AuthInfo.Hdr.dwLength is the length of the entire certificate, including the length of the header.\r
2189 //\r
2190 SigData = CertData->AuthInfo.CertData;\r
2191 SigDataSize = CertData->AuthInfo.Hdr.dwLength - (UINT32) (OFFSET_OF (WIN_CERTIFICATE_UEFI_GUID, CertData));\r
2192\r
2193 //\r
2194 // Find out the new data payload which follows Pkcs7 SignedData directly.\r
2195 //\r
2196 PayloadPtr = SigData + SigDataSize;\r
2197 PayloadSize = DataSize - OFFSET_OF_AUTHINFO2_CERT_DATA - (UINTN) SigDataSize;\r
2198\r
2199 //\r
2200 // Construct a serialization buffer of the values of the VariableName, VendorGuid and Attributes\r
2201 // parameters of the SetVariable() call and the TimeStamp component of the\r
2202 // EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 descriptor followed by the variable's new value\r
2203 // i.e. (VariableName, VendorGuid, Attributes, TimeStamp, Data)\r
2204 //\r
2205 NewDataSize = PayloadSize + sizeof (EFI_TIME) + sizeof (UINT32) +\r
2206 sizeof (EFI_GUID) + StrSize (VariableName) - sizeof (CHAR16);\r
2207\r
2208 //\r
2209 // Here is to reuse scratch data area(at the end of volatile variable store)\r
2210 // to reduce SMRAM consumption for SMM variable driver.\r
2211 // The scratch buffer is enough to hold the serialized data and safe to use,\r
2212 // because it is only used at here to do verification temporarily first\r
2213 // and then used in UpdateVariable() for a time based auth variable set.\r
2214 //\r
2215 Status = mAuthVarLibContextIn->GetScratchBuffer (&NewDataSize, (VOID **) &NewData);\r
2216 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
2217 return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
2218 }\r
2219\r
2220 Buffer = NewData;\r
2221 Length = StrLen (VariableName) * sizeof (CHAR16);\r
2222 CopyMem (Buffer, VariableName, Length);\r
2223 Buffer += Length;\r
2224\r
2225 Length = sizeof (EFI_GUID);\r
2226 CopyMem (Buffer, VendorGuid, Length);\r
2227 Buffer += Length;\r
2228\r
2229 Length = sizeof (UINT32);\r
2230 CopyMem (Buffer, &Attr, Length);\r
2231 Buffer += Length;\r
2232\r
2233 Length = sizeof (EFI_TIME);\r
2234 CopyMem (Buffer, &CertData->TimeStamp, Length);\r
2235 Buffer += Length;\r
2236\r
2237 CopyMem (Buffer, PayloadPtr, PayloadSize);\r
2238\r
2239 if (AuthVarType == AuthVarTypePk) {\r
2240 //\r
2241 // Verify that the signature has been made with the current Platform Key (no chaining for PK).\r
2242 // First, get signer's certificates from SignedData.\r
2243 //\r
2244 VerifyStatus = Pkcs7GetSigners (\r
2245 SigData,\r
2246 SigDataSize,\r
2247 &SignerCerts,\r
2248 &CertStackSize,\r
2249 &RootCert,\r
2250 &RootCertSize\r
2251 );\r
2252 if (!VerifyStatus) {\r
2253 goto Exit;\r
2254 }\r
2255\r
2256 //\r
2257 // Second, get the current platform key from variable. Check whether it's identical with signer's certificates\r
2258 // in SignedData. If not, return error immediately.\r
2259 //\r
2260 Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (\r
2261 EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME,\r
2262 &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
2263 &Data,\r
2264 &DataSize\r
2265 );\r
2266 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
2267 VerifyStatus = FALSE;\r
2268 goto Exit;\r
2269 }\r
2270 CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) Data;\r
2271 Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r
2272 if ((RootCertSize != (CertList->SignatureSize - (sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1))) ||\r
2273 (CompareMem (Cert->SignatureData, RootCert, RootCertSize) != 0)) {\r
2274 VerifyStatus = FALSE;\r
2275 goto Exit;\r
2276 }\r
2277\r
2278 //\r
2279 // Verify Pkcs7 SignedData via Pkcs7Verify library.\r
2280 //\r
2281 VerifyStatus = Pkcs7Verify (\r
2282 SigData,\r
2283 SigDataSize,\r
2284 RootCert,\r
2285 RootCertSize,\r
2286 NewData,\r
2287 NewDataSize\r
2288 );\r
2289\r
2290 } else if (AuthVarType == AuthVarTypeKek) {\r
2291\r
2292 //\r
2293 // Get KEK database from variable.\r
2294 //\r
2295 Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (\r
2296 EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME,\r
2297 &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
2298 &Data,\r
2299 &DataSize\r
2300 );\r
2301 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
2302 return Status;\r
2303 }\r
2304\r
2305 //\r
2306 // Ready to verify Pkcs7 SignedData. Go through KEK Signature Database to find out X.509 CertList.\r
2307 //\r
2308 KekDataSize = (UINT32) DataSize;\r
2309 CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) Data;\r
2310 while ((KekDataSize > 0) && (KekDataSize >= CertList->SignatureListSize)) {\r
2311 if (CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Guid)) {\r
2312 Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r
2313 CertCount = (CertList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - CertList->SignatureHeaderSize) / CertList->SignatureSize;\r
2314 for (Index = 0; Index < CertCount; Index++) {\r
2315 //\r
2316 // Iterate each Signature Data Node within this CertList for a verify\r
2317 //\r
2318 RootCert = Cert->SignatureData;\r
2319 RootCertSize = CertList->SignatureSize - (sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1);\r
2320\r
2321 //\r
2322 // Verify Pkcs7 SignedData via Pkcs7Verify library.\r
2323 //\r
2324 VerifyStatus = Pkcs7Verify (\r
2325 SigData,\r
2326 SigDataSize,\r
2327 RootCert,\r
2328 RootCertSize,\r
2329 NewData,\r
2330 NewDataSize\r
2331 );\r
2332 if (VerifyStatus) {\r
2333 goto Exit;\r
2334 }\r
2335 Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) Cert + CertList->SignatureSize);\r
2336 }\r
2337 }\r
2338 KekDataSize -= CertList->SignatureListSize;\r
2339 CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + CertList->SignatureListSize);\r
2340 }\r
2341 } else if (AuthVarType == AuthVarTypePriv) {\r
2342\r
2343 //\r
2344 // Process common authenticated variable except PK/KEK/DB/DBX/DBT.\r
2345 // Get signer's certificates from SignedData.\r
2346 //\r
2347 VerifyStatus = Pkcs7GetSigners (\r
2348 SigData,\r
2349 SigDataSize,\r
2350 &SignerCerts,\r
2351 &CertStackSize,\r
2352 &RootCert,\r
2353 &RootCertSize\r
2354 );\r
2355 if (!VerifyStatus) {\r
2356 goto Exit;\r
2357 }\r
2358\r
2359 //\r
2360 // Get previously stored signer's certificates from certdb for existing\r
2361 // variable. Check whether they are identical with signer's certificates\r
2362 // in SignedData. If not, return error immediately.\r
2363 //\r
2364 if (OrgTimeStamp != NULL) {\r
2365 VerifyStatus = FALSE;\r
2366\r
2367 Status = GetCertsFromDb (VariableName, VendorGuid, &CertsInCertDb, &CertsSizeinDb);\r
2368 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
2369 goto Exit;\r
2370 }\r
2371\r
2372 if ((CertStackSize != CertsSizeinDb) ||\r
2373 (CompareMem (SignerCerts, CertsInCertDb, CertsSizeinDb) != 0)) {\r
2374 goto Exit;\r
2375 }\r
2376 }\r
2377\r
2378 VerifyStatus = Pkcs7Verify (\r
2379 SigData,\r
2380 SigDataSize,\r
2381 RootCert,\r
2382 RootCertSize,\r
2383 NewData,\r
2384 NewDataSize\r
2385 );\r
2386 if (!VerifyStatus) {\r
2387 goto Exit;\r
2388 }\r
2389\r
64b6a3ff 2390 if ((OrgTimeStamp == NULL) && (PayloadSize != 0)) {\r
a6811666
SZ		 2391 //\r
2392 // Insert signer's certificates when adding a new common authenticated variable.\r
2393 //\r
2394 Status = InsertCertsToDb (VariableName, VendorGuid, SignerCerts, CertStackSize);\r
2395 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
2396 VerifyStatus = FALSE;\r
2397 goto Exit;\r
2398 }\r
2399 }\r
2400 } else if (AuthVarType == AuthVarTypePayload) {\r
2401 CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) PayloadPtr;\r
2402 Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r
2403 RootCert = Cert->SignatureData;\r
2404 RootCertSize = CertList->SignatureSize - (sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1);\r
2405 //\r
2406 // Verify Pkcs7 SignedData via Pkcs7Verify library.\r
2407 //\r
2408 VerifyStatus = Pkcs7Verify (\r
2409 SigData,\r
2410 SigDataSize,\r
2411 RootCert,\r
2412 RootCertSize,\r
2413 NewData,\r
2414 NewDataSize\r
2415 );\r
2416 } else {\r
2417 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r
2418 }\r
2419\r
2420Exit:\r
2421\r
2422 if (AuthVarType == AuthVarTypePk || AuthVarType == AuthVarTypePriv) {\r
2423 Pkcs7FreeSigners (RootCert);\r
2424 Pkcs7FreeSigners (SignerCerts);\r
2425 }\r
2426\r
2427 if (!VerifyStatus) {\r
2428 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r
2429 }\r
2430\r
2431 Status = CheckSignatureListFormat(VariableName, VendorGuid, PayloadPtr, PayloadSize);\r
2432 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
2433 return Status;\r
2434 }\r
2435\r
2436 *VarPayloadPtr = PayloadPtr;\r
2437 *VarPayloadSize = PayloadSize;\r
2438\r
2439 return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
2440}\r
2441\r
2442/**\r
2443 Process variable with EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS set\r
2444\r
2445 Caution: This function may receive untrusted input.\r
2446 This function may be invoked in SMM mode, and datasize and data are external input.\r
2447 This function will do basic validation, before parse the data.\r
2448 This function will parse the authentication carefully to avoid security issues, like\r
2449 buffer overflow, integer overflow.\r
2450\r
2451 @param[in] VariableName Name of Variable to be found.\r
2452 @param[in] VendorGuid Variable vendor GUID.\r
2453 @param[in] Data Data pointer.\r
2454 @param[in] DataSize Size of Data found. If size is less than the\r
2455 data, this value contains the required size.\r
2456 @param[in] Attributes Attribute value of the variable.\r
2457 @param[in] AuthVarType Verify against PK, KEK database, private database or certificate in data payload.\r
2458 @param[out] VarDel Delete the variable or not.\r
2459\r
2460 @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.\r
2461 @retval EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION The variable does NOT pass the validation\r
2462 check carried out by the firmware.\r
2463 @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES Failed to process variable due to lack\r
2464 of resources.\r
2465 @retval EFI_SUCCESS Variable pass validation successfully.\r
2466\r
2467**/\r
2468EFI_STATUS\r
2469VerifyTimeBasedPayloadAndUpdate (\r
2470 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r
2471 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r
2472 IN VOID *Data,\r
2473 IN UINTN DataSize,\r
2474 IN UINT32 Attributes,\r
2475 IN AUTHVAR_TYPE AuthVarType,\r
2476 OUT BOOLEAN *VarDel\r
2477 )\r
2478{\r
2479 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
2480 EFI_STATUS FindStatus;\r
2481 UINT8 *PayloadPtr;\r
2482 UINTN PayloadSize;\r
2483 EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 *CertData;\r
2484 AUTH_VARIABLE_INFO OrgVariableInfo;\r
64b6a3ff 2485 BOOLEAN IsDel;\r
a6811666
SZ		 2486\r
2487 ZeroMem (&OrgVariableInfo, sizeof (OrgVariableInfo));\r
2488 FindStatus = mAuthVarLibContextIn->FindVariable (\r
2489 VariableName,\r
2490 VendorGuid,\r
2491 &OrgVariableInfo\r
2492 );\r
2493\r
2494 Status = VerifyTimeBasedPayload (\r
2495 VariableName,\r
2496 VendorGuid,\r
2497 Data,\r
2498 DataSize,\r
2499 Attributes,\r
2500 AuthVarType,\r
2501 (!EFI_ERROR (FindStatus)) ? OrgVariableInfo.TimeStamp : NULL,\r
2502 &PayloadPtr,\r
2503 &PayloadSize\r
2504 );\r
2505 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
2506 return Status;\r
2507 }\r
2508\r
64b6a3ff
CZ		 2509 if (!EFI_ERROR(FindStatus)\r
2510 && (PayloadSize == 0)\r
2511 && ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_APPEND_WRITE) == 0)) {\r
2512 IsDel = TRUE;\r
2513 } else {\r
2514 IsDel = FALSE;\r
a6811666
SZ		 2515 }\r
2516\r
2517 CertData = (EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 *) Data;\r
2518\r
2519 //\r
2520 // Final step: Update/Append Variable if it pass Pkcs7Verify\r
2521 //\r
64b6a3ff
CZ		 2522 Status = AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariableWithTimeStamp (\r
2523 VariableName,\r
2524 VendorGuid,\r
2525 PayloadPtr,\r
2526 PayloadSize,\r
2527 Attributes,\r
2528 &CertData->TimeStamp\r
2529 );\r
2530\r
2531 //\r
2532 // Delete signer's certificates when delete the common authenticated variable.\r
2533 //\r
2534 if (IsDel && AuthVarType == AuthVarTypePriv && !EFI_ERROR(Status) ) {\r
2535 Status = DeleteCertsFromDb (VariableName, VendorGuid);\r
2536 }\r
2537\r
2538 if (VarDel != NULL) {\r
2539 if (IsDel && !EFI_ERROR(Status)) {\r
2540 *VarDel = TRUE;\r
2541 } else {\r
2542 *VarDel = FALSE;\r
2543 }\r
2544 }\r
2545\r
2546 return Status;\r
a6811666 2547}\r
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