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a6811666
SZ		 1/** @file\r
2 Implement authentication services for the authenticated variables.\r
3\r
4 Caution: This module requires additional review when modified.\r
5 This driver will have external input - variable data. It may be input in SMM mode.\r
6 This external input must be validated carefully to avoid security issue like\r
7 buffer overflow, integer overflow.\r
8 Variable attribute should also be checked to avoid authentication bypass.\r
9 The whole SMM authentication variable design relies on the integrity of flash part and SMM.\r
10 which is assumed to be protected by platform. All variable code and metadata in flash/SMM Memory\r
11 may not be modified without authorization. If platform fails to protect these resources,\r
12 the authentication service provided in this driver will be broken, and the behavior is undefined.\r
13\r
14 ProcessVarWithPk(), ProcessVarWithKek() and ProcessVariable() are the function to do\r
15 variable authentication.\r
16\r
17 VerifyTimeBasedPayloadAndUpdate() and VerifyCounterBasedPayload() are sub function to do verification.\r
18 They will do basic validation for authentication data structure, then call crypto library\r
19 to verify the signature.\r
20\r
e90ea947 21Copyright (c) 2009 - 2019, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>\r
289b714b 22SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent\r
a6811666
SZ		 23\r
24**/\r
25\r
26#include "AuthServiceInternal.h"\r
27\r
28//\r
29// Public Exponent of RSA Key.\r
30//\r
31CONST UINT8 mRsaE[] = { 0x01, 0x00, 0x01 };\r
32\r
c035e373
ZL		 33CONST UINT8 mSha256OidValue[] = { 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x01 };\r
34\r
a6811666
SZ		 35//\r
36// Requirement for different signature type which have been defined in UEFI spec.\r
37// These data are used to perform SignatureList format check while setting PK/KEK variable.\r
38//\r
39EFI_SIGNATURE_ITEM mSupportSigItem[] = {\r
40//{SigType, SigHeaderSize, SigDataSize }\r
41 {EFI_CERT_SHA256_GUID, 0, 32 },\r
42 {EFI_CERT_RSA2048_GUID, 0, 256 },\r
43 {EFI_CERT_RSA2048_SHA256_GUID, 0, 256 },\r
44 {EFI_CERT_SHA1_GUID, 0, 20 },\r
45 {EFI_CERT_RSA2048_SHA1_GUID, 0, 256 },\r
46 {EFI_CERT_X509_GUID, 0, ((UINT32) ~0)},\r
47 {EFI_CERT_SHA224_GUID, 0, 28 },\r
48 {EFI_CERT_SHA384_GUID, 0, 48 },\r
49 {EFI_CERT_SHA512_GUID, 0, 64 },\r
50 {EFI_CERT_X509_SHA256_GUID, 0, 48 },\r
51 {EFI_CERT_X509_SHA384_GUID, 0, 64 },\r
52 {EFI_CERT_X509_SHA512_GUID, 0, 80 }\r
53};\r
54\r
55/**\r
56 Finds variable in storage blocks of volatile and non-volatile storage areas.\r
57\r
58 This code finds variable in storage blocks of volatile and non-volatile storage areas.\r
59 If VariableName is an empty string, then we just return the first\r
60 qualified variable without comparing VariableName and VendorGuid.\r
61\r
62 @param[in] VariableName Name of the variable to be found.\r
63 @param[in] VendorGuid Variable vendor GUID to be found.\r
64 @param[out] Data Pointer to data address.\r
65 @param[out] DataSize Pointer to data size.\r
66\r
67 @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER If VariableName is not an empty string,\r
68 while VendorGuid is NULL.\r
69 @retval EFI_SUCCESS Variable successfully found.\r
70 @retval EFI_NOT_FOUND Variable not found\r
71\r
72**/\r
73EFI_STATUS\r
74AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (\r
75 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r
76 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r
77 OUT VOID **Data,\r
78 OUT UINTN *DataSize\r
79 )\r
80{\r
81 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
82 AUTH_VARIABLE_INFO AuthVariableInfo;\r
83\r
84 ZeroMem (&AuthVariableInfo, sizeof (AuthVariableInfo));\r
85 Status = mAuthVarLibContextIn->FindVariable (\r
86 VariableName,\r
87 VendorGuid,\r
88 &AuthVariableInfo\r
89 );\r
90 *Data = AuthVariableInfo.Data;\r
91 *DataSize = AuthVariableInfo.DataSize;\r
92 return Status;\r
93}\r
94\r
95/**\r
96 Update the variable region with Variable information.\r
97\r
98 @param[in] VariableName Name of variable.\r
99 @param[in] VendorGuid Guid of variable.\r
100 @param[in] Data Data pointer.\r
101 @param[in] DataSize Size of Data.\r
102 @param[in] Attributes Attribute value of the variable.\r
103\r
104 @retval EFI_SUCCESS The update operation is success.\r
105 @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.\r
106 @retval EFI_WRITE_PROTECTED Variable is write-protected.\r
107 @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES There is not enough resource.\r
108\r
109**/\r
110EFI_STATUS\r
111AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariable (\r
112 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r
113 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r
114 IN VOID *Data,\r
115 IN UINTN DataSize,\r
116 IN UINT32 Attributes\r
117 )\r
118{\r
119 AUTH_VARIABLE_INFO AuthVariableInfo;\r
120\r
121 ZeroMem (&AuthVariableInfo, sizeof (AuthVariableInfo));\r
122 AuthVariableInfo.VariableName = VariableName;\r
123 AuthVariableInfo.VendorGuid = VendorGuid;\r
124 AuthVariableInfo.Data = Data;\r
125 AuthVariableInfo.DataSize = DataSize;\r
126 AuthVariableInfo.Attributes = Attributes;\r
127\r
128 return mAuthVarLibContextIn->UpdateVariable (\r
129 &AuthVariableInfo\r
130 );\r
131}\r
132\r
a6811666 133/**\r
560ac77e 134 Update the variable region with Variable information.\r
a6811666 135\r
560ac77e
ZC		 136 @param[in] VariableName Name of variable.\r
137 @param[in] VendorGuid Guid of variable.\r
138 @param[in] Data Data pointer.\r
139 @param[in] DataSize Size of Data.\r
140 @param[in] Attributes Attribute value of the variable.\r
141 @param[in] TimeStamp Value of associated TimeStamp.\r
a6811666 142\r
560ac77e
ZC		 143 @retval EFI_SUCCESS The update operation is success.\r
144 @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.\r
145 @retval EFI_WRITE_PROTECTED Variable is write-protected.\r
a6811666
SZ		 146 @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES There is not enough resource.\r
147\r
148**/\r
149EFI_STATUS\r
560ac77e
ZC		 150AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariableWithTimeStamp (\r
151 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r
152 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r
153 IN VOID *Data,\r
154 IN UINTN DataSize,\r
155 IN UINT32 Attributes,\r
156 IN EFI_TIME *TimeStamp\r
a6811666
SZ		 157 )\r
158{\r
560ac77e
ZC		 159 EFI_STATUS FindStatus;\r
160 VOID *OrgData;\r
161 UINTN OrgDataSize;\r
162 AUTH_VARIABLE_INFO AuthVariableInfo;\r
163\r
164 FindStatus = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (\r
165 VariableName,\r
166 VendorGuid,\r
167 &OrgData,\r
168 &OrgDataSize\r
169 );\r
a6811666
SZ		 170\r
171 //\r
560ac77e 172 // EFI_VARIABLE_APPEND_WRITE attribute only effects for existing variable\r
a6811666 173 //\r
560ac77e
ZC		 174 if (!EFI_ERROR (FindStatus) && ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_APPEND_WRITE) != 0)) {\r
175 if ((CompareGuid (VendorGuid, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid) &&\r
176 ((StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE) == 0) || (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1) == 0) ||\r
177 (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE2) == 0))) ||\r
178 (CompareGuid (VendorGuid, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid) && (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME) == 0))) {\r
179 //\r
180 // For variables with formatted as EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST, the driver shall not perform an append of\r
181 // EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA values that are already part of the existing variable value.\r
182 //\r
183 FilterSignatureList (\r
184 OrgData,\r
185 OrgDataSize,\r
186 Data,\r
187 &DataSize\r
188 );\r
189 }\r
a6811666
SZ		 190 }\r
191\r
560ac77e
ZC		 192 ZeroMem (&AuthVariableInfo, sizeof (AuthVariableInfo));\r
193 AuthVariableInfo.VariableName = VariableName;\r
194 AuthVariableInfo.VendorGuid = VendorGuid;\r
195 AuthVariableInfo.Data = Data;\r
196 AuthVariableInfo.DataSize = DataSize;\r
197 AuthVariableInfo.Attributes = Attributes;\r
198 AuthVariableInfo.TimeStamp = TimeStamp;\r
199 return mAuthVarLibContextIn->UpdateVariable (\r
200 &AuthVariableInfo\r
201 );\r
a6811666
SZ		 202}\r
203\r
204/**\r
205 Determine whether this operation needs a physical present user.\r
206\r
207 @param[in] VariableName Name of the Variable.\r
208 @param[in] VendorGuid GUID of the Variable.\r
209\r
210 @retval TRUE This variable is protected, only a physical present user could set this variable.\r
211 @retval FALSE This variable is not protected.\r
212\r
213**/\r
214BOOLEAN\r
215NeedPhysicallyPresent(\r
216 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r
217 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid\r
218 )\r
219{\r
220 if ((CompareGuid (VendorGuid, &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid) && (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME) == 0))\r
221 || (CompareGuid (VendorGuid, &gEfiCustomModeEnableGuid) && (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_CUSTOM_MODE_NAME) == 0))) {\r
222 return TRUE;\r
223 }\r
224\r
225 return FALSE;\r
226}\r
227\r
228/**\r
229 Determine whether the platform is operating in Custom Secure Boot mode.\r
230\r
231 @retval TRUE The platform is operating in Custom mode.\r
232 @retval FALSE The platform is operating in Standard mode.\r
233\r
234**/\r
235BOOLEAN\r
236InCustomMode (\r
237 VOID\r
238 )\r
239{\r
240 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
241 VOID *Data;\r
242 UINTN DataSize;\r
243\r
244 Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (EFI_CUSTOM_MODE_NAME, &gEfiCustomModeEnableGuid, &Data, &DataSize);\r
245 if (!EFI_ERROR (Status) && (*(UINT8 *) Data == CUSTOM_SECURE_BOOT_MODE)) {\r
246 return TRUE;\r
247 }\r
248\r
249 return FALSE;\r
250}\r
251\r
560ac77e
ZC		 252/**\r
253 Update platform mode.\r
254\r
255 @param[in] Mode SETUP_MODE or USER_MODE.\r
256\r
257 @return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.\r
258 @return EFI_SUCCESS Update platform mode successfully.\r
259\r
260**/\r
261EFI_STATUS\r
262UpdatePlatformMode (\r
263 IN UINT32 Mode\r
264 )\r
265{\r
266 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
267 VOID *Data;\r
268 UINTN DataSize;\r
269 UINT8 SecureBootMode;\r
270 UINT8 SecureBootEnable;\r
271 UINTN VariableDataSize;\r
272\r
273 Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (\r
274 EFI_SETUP_MODE_NAME,\r
275 &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
276 &Data,\r
277 &DataSize\r
278 );\r
279 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
280 return Status;\r
281 }\r
282\r
283 //\r
284 // Update the value of SetupMode variable by a simple mem copy, this could avoid possible\r
285 // variable storage reclaim at runtime.\r
286 //\r
287 mPlatformMode = (UINT8) Mode;\r
288 CopyMem (Data, &mPlatformMode, sizeof(UINT8));\r
289\r
290 if (mAuthVarLibContextIn->AtRuntime ()) {\r
291 //\r
292 // SecureBoot Variable indicates whether the platform firmware is operating\r
293 // in Secure boot mode (1) or not (0), so we should not change SecureBoot\r
294 // Variable in runtime.\r
295 //\r
296 return Status;\r
297 }\r
298\r
299 //\r
300 // Check "SecureBoot" variable's existence.\r
301 // If it doesn't exist, firmware has no capability to perform driver signing verification,\r
302 // then set "SecureBoot" to 0.\r
303 //\r
304 Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (\r
305 EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME,\r
306 &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
307 &Data,\r
308 &DataSize\r
309 );\r
310 //\r
311 // If "SecureBoot" variable exists, then check "SetupMode" variable update.\r
312 // If "SetupMode" variable is USER_MODE, "SecureBoot" variable is set to 1.\r
313 // If "SetupMode" variable is SETUP_MODE, "SecureBoot" variable is set to 0.\r
314 //\r
315 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
316 SecureBootMode = SECURE_BOOT_MODE_DISABLE;\r
317 } else {\r
318 if (mPlatformMode == USER_MODE) {\r
319 SecureBootMode = SECURE_BOOT_MODE_ENABLE;\r
320 } else if (mPlatformMode == SETUP_MODE) {\r
321 SecureBootMode = SECURE_BOOT_MODE_DISABLE;\r
322 } else {\r
323 return EFI_NOT_FOUND;\r
324 }\r
325 }\r
326\r
327 Status = AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariable (\r
328 EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME,\r
329 &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
330 &SecureBootMode,\r
331 sizeof(UINT8),\r
332 EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS\r
333 );\r
334 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
335 return Status;\r
336 }\r
337\r
338 //\r
339 // Check "SecureBootEnable" variable's existence. It can enable/disable secure boot feature.\r
340 //\r
341 Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (\r
342 EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME,\r
343 &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid,\r
344 &Data,\r
345 &DataSize\r
346 );\r
347\r
348 if (SecureBootMode == SECURE_BOOT_MODE_ENABLE) {\r
349 //\r
350 // Create the "SecureBootEnable" variable as secure boot is enabled.\r
351 //\r
352 SecureBootEnable = SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE;\r
353 VariableDataSize = sizeof (SecureBootEnable);\r
354 } else {\r
355 //\r
356 // Delete the "SecureBootEnable" variable if this variable exist as "SecureBoot"\r
357 // variable is not in secure boot state.\r
358 //\r
359 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
360 return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
361 }\r
362 SecureBootEnable = SECURE_BOOT_DISABLE;\r
363 VariableDataSize = 0;\r
364 }\r
365\r
366 Status = AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariable (\r
367 EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME,\r
368 &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid,\r
369 &SecureBootEnable,\r
370 VariableDataSize,\r
371 EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS\r
372 );\r
373 return Status;\r
374}\r
a6811666
SZ		 375\r
376/**\r
377 Check input data form to make sure it is a valid EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST for PK/KEK/db/dbx/dbt variable.\r
378\r
379 @param[in] VariableName Name of Variable to be check.\r
380 @param[in] VendorGuid Variable vendor GUID.\r
381 @param[in] Data Point to the variable data to be checked.\r
382 @param[in] DataSize Size of Data.\r
383\r
384 @return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid signature list format.\r
385 @return EFI_SUCCESS Passed signature list format check successfully.\r
386\r
387**/\r
388EFI_STATUS\r
389CheckSignatureListFormat(\r
390 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r
391 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r
392 IN VOID *Data,\r
393 IN UINTN DataSize\r
394 )\r
395{\r
396 EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *SigList;\r
397 UINTN SigDataSize;\r
398 UINT32 Index;\r
399 UINT32 SigCount;\r
400 BOOLEAN IsPk;\r
401 VOID *RsaContext;\r
402 EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *CertData;\r
403 UINTN CertLen;\r
404\r
405 if (DataSize == 0) {\r
406 return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
407 }\r
408\r
409 ASSERT (VariableName != NULL && VendorGuid != NULL && Data != NULL);\r
410\r
411 if (CompareGuid (VendorGuid, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid) && (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME) == 0)){\r
412 IsPk = TRUE;\r
413 } else if ((CompareGuid (VendorGuid, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid) && (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME) == 0)) ||\r
414 (CompareGuid (VendorGuid, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid) &&\r
415 ((StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE) == 0) || (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1) == 0) ||\r
416 (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE2) == 0)))) {\r
417 IsPk = FALSE;\r
418 } else {\r
419 return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
420 }\r
421\r
422 SigCount = 0;\r
423 SigList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) Data;\r
424 SigDataSize = DataSize;\r
425 RsaContext = NULL;\r
426\r
427 //\r
d6b926e7 428 // Walk through the input signature list and check the data format.\r
a6811666
SZ		 429 // If any signature is incorrectly formed, the whole check will fail.\r
430 //\r
431 while ((SigDataSize > 0) && (SigDataSize >= SigList->SignatureListSize)) {\r
432 for (Index = 0; Index < (sizeof (mSupportSigItem) / sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_ITEM)); Index++ ) {\r
433 if (CompareGuid (&SigList->SignatureType, &mSupportSigItem[Index].SigType)) {\r
434 //\r
435 // The value of SignatureSize should always be 16 (size of SignatureOwner\r
436 // component) add the data length according to signature type.\r
437 //\r
438 if (mSupportSigItem[Index].SigDataSize != ((UINT32) ~0) &&\r
439 (SigList->SignatureSize - sizeof (EFI_GUID)) != mSupportSigItem[Index].SigDataSize) {\r
440 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
441 }\r
442 if (mSupportSigItem[Index].SigHeaderSize != ((UINT32) ~0) &&\r
443 SigList->SignatureHeaderSize != mSupportSigItem[Index].SigHeaderSize) {\r
444 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
445 }\r
446 break;\r
447 }\r
448 }\r
449\r
450 if (Index == (sizeof (mSupportSigItem) / sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_ITEM))) {\r
451 //\r
452 // Undefined signature type.\r
453 //\r
454 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
455 }\r
456\r
457 if (CompareGuid (&SigList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Guid)) {\r
458 //\r
459 // Try to retrieve the RSA public key from the X.509 certificate.\r
460 // If this operation fails, it's not a valid certificate.\r
461 //\r
462 RsaContext = RsaNew ();\r
463 if (RsaContext == NULL) {\r
464 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
465 }\r
466 CertData = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) SigList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + SigList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r
467 CertLen = SigList->SignatureSize - sizeof (EFI_GUID);\r
468 if (!RsaGetPublicKeyFromX509 (CertData->SignatureData, CertLen, &RsaContext)) {\r
469 RsaFree (RsaContext);\r
470 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
471 }\r
472 RsaFree (RsaContext);\r
473 }\r
474\r
475 if ((SigList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - SigList->SignatureHeaderSize) % SigList->SignatureSize != 0) {\r
476 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
477 }\r
478 SigCount += (SigList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - SigList->SignatureHeaderSize) / SigList->SignatureSize;\r
479\r
480 SigDataSize -= SigList->SignatureListSize;\r
481 SigList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) SigList + SigList->SignatureListSize);\r
482 }\r
483\r
484 if (((UINTN) SigList - (UINTN) Data) != DataSize) {\r
485 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
486 }\r
487\r
488 if (IsPk && SigCount > 1) {\r
489 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
490 }\r
491\r
492 return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
493}\r
494\r
495/**\r
496 Update "VendorKeys" variable to record the out of band secure boot key modification.\r
497\r
498 @return EFI_SUCCESS Variable is updated successfully.\r
499 @return Others Failed to update variable.\r
500\r
501**/\r
502EFI_STATUS\r
503VendorKeyIsModified (\r
504 VOID\r
505 )\r
506{\r
507 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
508\r
509 if (mVendorKeyState == VENDOR_KEYS_MODIFIED) {\r
510 return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
511 }\r
512 mVendorKeyState = VENDOR_KEYS_MODIFIED;\r
513\r
514 Status = AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariable (\r
515 EFI_VENDOR_KEYS_NV_VARIABLE_NAME,\r
516 &gEfiVendorKeysNvGuid,\r
517 &mVendorKeyState,\r
518 sizeof (UINT8),\r
519 EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS\r
520 );\r
521 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
522 return Status;\r
523 }\r
524\r
525 return AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariable (\r
526 EFI_VENDOR_KEYS_VARIABLE_NAME,\r
527 &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
528 &mVendorKeyState,\r
529 sizeof (UINT8),\r
530 EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS\r
531 );\r
532}\r
533\r
534/**\r
535 Process variable with platform key for verification.\r
536\r
537 Caution: This function may receive untrusted input.\r
538 This function may be invoked in SMM mode, and datasize and data are external input.\r
539 This function will do basic validation, before parse the data.\r
540 This function will parse the authentication carefully to avoid security issues, like\r
541 buffer overflow, integer overflow.\r
542 This function will check attribute carefully to avoid authentication bypass.\r
543\r
544 @param[in] VariableName Name of Variable to be found.\r
545 @param[in] VendorGuid Variable vendor GUID.\r
546 @param[in] Data Data pointer.\r
547 @param[in] DataSize Size of Data found. If size is less than the\r
548 data, this value contains the required size.\r
549 @param[in] Attributes Attribute value of the variable\r
550 @param[in] IsPk Indicate whether it is to process pk.\r
551\r
552 @return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.\r
553 @return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION The variable does NOT pass the validation.\r
554 check carried out by the firmware.\r
555 @return EFI_SUCCESS Variable passed validation successfully.\r
556\r
557**/\r
558EFI_STATUS\r
559ProcessVarWithPk (\r
560 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r
561 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r
562 IN VOID *Data,\r
563 IN UINTN DataSize,\r
564 IN UINT32 Attributes OPTIONAL,\r
565 IN BOOLEAN IsPk\r
566 )\r
567{\r
568 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
569 BOOLEAN Del;\r
570 UINT8 *Payload;\r
571 UINTN PayloadSize;\r
572\r
573 if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE) == 0 ||\r
574 (Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) == 0) {\r
575 //\r
576 // PK, KEK and db/dbx/dbt should set EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE attribute and should be a time-based\r
577 // authenticated variable.\r
578 //\r
579 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
580 }\r
581\r
4fc08e8d
CZ		 582 //\r
583 // Init state of Del. State may change due to secure check\r
584 //\r
a6811666 585 Del = FALSE;\r
76bfc7e3 586 if ((InCustomMode() && UserPhysicalPresent()) || (mPlatformMode == SETUP_MODE && !IsPk)) {\r
560ac77e
ZC		 587 Payload = (UINT8 *) Data + AUTHINFO2_SIZE (Data);\r
588 PayloadSize = DataSize - AUTHINFO2_SIZE (Data);\r
589 if (PayloadSize == 0) {\r
590 Del = TRUE;\r
591 }\r
a6811666
SZ		 592\r
593 Status = CheckSignatureListFormat(VariableName, VendorGuid, Payload, PayloadSize);\r
594 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
595 return Status;\r
596 }\r
597\r
598 Status = AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariableWithTimeStamp (\r
599 VariableName,\r
600 VendorGuid,\r
601 Payload,\r
602 PayloadSize,\r
603 Attributes,\r
604 &((EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 *) Data)->TimeStamp\r
605 );\r
606 if (EFI_ERROR(Status)) {\r
607 return Status;\r
608 }\r
609\r
560ac77e 610 if ((mPlatformMode != SETUP_MODE) || IsPk) {\r
a6811666
SZ		 611 Status = VendorKeyIsModified ();\r
612 }\r
560ac77e 613 } else if (mPlatformMode == USER_MODE) {\r
a6811666
SZ		 614 //\r
615 // Verify against X509 Cert in PK database.\r
616 //\r
617 Status = VerifyTimeBasedPayloadAndUpdate (\r
618 VariableName,\r
619 VendorGuid,\r
620 Data,\r
621 DataSize,\r
622 Attributes,\r
623 AuthVarTypePk,\r
624 &Del\r
625 );\r
626 } else {\r
627 //\r
628 // Verify against the certificate in data payload.\r
629 //\r
630 Status = VerifyTimeBasedPayloadAndUpdate (\r
631 VariableName,\r
632 VendorGuid,\r
633 Data,\r
634 DataSize,\r
635 Attributes,\r
636 AuthVarTypePayload,\r
637 &Del\r
638 );\r
639 }\r
640\r
641 if (!EFI_ERROR(Status) && IsPk) {\r
560ac77e
ZC		 642 if (mPlatformMode == SETUP_MODE && !Del) {\r
643 //\r
644 // If enroll PK in setup mode, need change to user mode.\r
645 //\r
646 Status = UpdatePlatformMode (USER_MODE);\r
647 } else if (mPlatformMode == USER_MODE && Del){\r
648 //\r
649 // If delete PK in user mode, need change to setup mode.\r
650 //\r
651 Status = UpdatePlatformMode (SETUP_MODE);\r
a6811666
SZ		 652 }\r
653 }\r
654\r
655 return Status;\r
656}\r
657\r
658/**\r
659 Process variable with key exchange key for verification.\r
660\r
661 Caution: This function may receive untrusted input.\r
662 This function may be invoked in SMM mode, and datasize and data are external input.\r
663 This function will do basic validation, before parse the data.\r
664 This function will parse the authentication carefully to avoid security issues, like\r
665 buffer overflow, integer overflow.\r
666 This function will check attribute carefully to avoid authentication bypass.\r
667\r
668 @param[in] VariableName Name of Variable to be found.\r
669 @param[in] VendorGuid Variable vendor GUID.\r
670 @param[in] Data Data pointer.\r
671 @param[in] DataSize Size of Data found. If size is less than the\r
672 data, this value contains the required size.\r
673 @param[in] Attributes Attribute value of the variable.\r
674\r
675 @return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.\r
676 @return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION The variable does NOT pass the validation\r
677 check carried out by the firmware.\r
678 @return EFI_SUCCESS Variable pass validation successfully.\r
679\r
680**/\r
681EFI_STATUS\r
682ProcessVarWithKek (\r
683 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r
684 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r
685 IN VOID *Data,\r
686 IN UINTN DataSize,\r
687 IN UINT32 Attributes OPTIONAL\r
688 )\r
689{\r
690 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
691 UINT8 *Payload;\r
692 UINTN PayloadSize;\r
693\r
694 if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE) == 0 ||\r
695 (Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) == 0) {\r
696 //\r
697 // DB, DBX and DBT should set EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE attribute and should be a time-based\r
698 // authenticated variable.\r
699 //\r
700 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
701 }\r
702\r
703 Status = EFI_SUCCESS;\r
76bfc7e3 704 if (mPlatformMode == USER_MODE && !(InCustomMode() && UserPhysicalPresent())) {\r
a6811666
SZ		 705 //\r
706 // Time-based, verify against X509 Cert KEK.\r
707 //\r
708 return VerifyTimeBasedPayloadAndUpdate (\r
709 VariableName,\r
710 VendorGuid,\r
711 Data,\r
712 DataSize,\r
713 Attributes,\r
714 AuthVarTypeKek,\r
715 NULL\r
716 );\r
717 } else {\r
718 //\r
719 // If in setup mode or custom secure boot mode, no authentication needed.\r
720 //\r
721 Payload = (UINT8 *) Data + AUTHINFO2_SIZE (Data);\r
722 PayloadSize = DataSize - AUTHINFO2_SIZE (Data);\r
723\r
724 Status = CheckSignatureListFormat(VariableName, VendorGuid, Payload, PayloadSize);\r
725 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
726 return Status;\r
727 }\r
728\r
729 Status = AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariableWithTimeStamp (\r
730 VariableName,\r
731 VendorGuid,\r
732 Payload,\r
733 PayloadSize,\r
734 Attributes,\r
735 &((EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 *) Data)->TimeStamp\r
736 );\r
737 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
738 return Status;\r
739 }\r
740\r
560ac77e 741 if (mPlatformMode != SETUP_MODE) {\r
a6811666
SZ		 742 Status = VendorKeyIsModified ();\r
743 }\r
744 }\r
745\r
746 return Status;\r
747}\r
748\r
749/**\r
750 Check if it is to delete auth variable.\r
751\r
752 @param[in] OrgAttributes Original attribute value of the variable.\r
753 @param[in] Data Data pointer.\r
754 @param[in] DataSize Size of Data.\r
755 @param[in] Attributes Attribute value of the variable.\r
756\r
757 @retval TRUE It is to delete auth variable.\r
758 @retval FALSE It is not to delete auth variable.\r
759\r
760**/\r
761BOOLEAN\r
762IsDeleteAuthVariable (\r
763 IN UINT32 OrgAttributes,\r
764 IN VOID *Data,\r
765 IN UINTN DataSize,\r
766 IN UINT32 Attributes\r
767 )\r
768{\r
769 BOOLEAN Del;\r
770 UINTN PayloadSize;\r
771\r
772 Del = FALSE;\r
773\r
774 //\r
775 // To delete a variable created with the EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS\r
776 // or the EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS attribute,\r
777 // SetVariable must be used with attributes matching the existing variable\r
778 // and the DataSize set to the size of the AuthInfo descriptor.\r
779 //\r
780 if ((Attributes == OrgAttributes) &&\r
781 ((Attributes & (EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS)) != 0)) {\r
782 if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0) {\r
783 PayloadSize = DataSize - AUTHINFO2_SIZE (Data);\r
784 if (PayloadSize == 0) {\r
785 Del = TRUE;\r
786 }\r
787 } else {\r
788 PayloadSize = DataSize - AUTHINFO_SIZE;\r
789 if (PayloadSize == 0) {\r
790 Del = TRUE;\r
791 }\r
792 }\r
793 }\r
794\r
795 return Del;\r
796}\r
797\r
798/**\r
0130fdde 799 Process variable with EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS set\r
a6811666
SZ		 800\r
801 Caution: This function may receive untrusted input.\r
802 This function may be invoked in SMM mode, and datasize and data are external input.\r
803 This function will do basic validation, before parse the data.\r
804 This function will parse the authentication carefully to avoid security issues, like\r
805 buffer overflow, integer overflow.\r
806 This function will check attribute carefully to avoid authentication bypass.\r
807\r
808 @param[in] VariableName Name of the variable.\r
809 @param[in] VendorGuid Variable vendor GUID.\r
810 @param[in] Data Data pointer.\r
811 @param[in] DataSize Size of Data.\r
812 @param[in] Attributes Attribute value of the variable.\r
813\r
814 @return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.\r
815 @return EFI_WRITE_PROTECTED Variable is write-protected and needs authentication with\r
0130fdde 816 EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS or EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS set.\r
a6811666 817 @return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES The Database to save the public key is full.\r
0130fdde 818 @return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION The variable is with EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS\r
a6811666
SZ		 819 set, but the AuthInfo does NOT pass the validation\r
820 check carried out by the firmware.\r
821 @return EFI_SUCCESS Variable is not write-protected or pass validation successfully.\r
822\r
823**/\r
824EFI_STATUS\r
825ProcessVariable (\r
826 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r
827 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r
828 IN VOID *Data,\r
829 IN UINTN DataSize,\r
98c2d961 830 IN UINT32 Attributes\r
a6811666
SZ		 831 )\r
832{\r
833 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
a6811666
SZ		 834 AUTH_VARIABLE_INFO OrgVariableInfo;\r
835\r
a6811666
SZ		 836 Status = EFI_SUCCESS;\r
837\r
838 ZeroMem (&OrgVariableInfo, sizeof (OrgVariableInfo));\r
839 Status = mAuthVarLibContextIn->FindVariable (\r
840 VariableName,\r
841 VendorGuid,\r
842 &OrgVariableInfo\r
843 );\r
844\r
76bfc7e3 845 if ((!EFI_ERROR (Status)) && IsDeleteAuthVariable (OrgVariableInfo.Attributes, Data, DataSize, Attributes) && UserPhysicalPresent()) {\r
a6811666 846 //\r
0130fdde 847 // Allow the delete operation of common authenticated variable(AT or AW) at user physical presence.\r
a6811666 848 //\r
64b6a3ff
CZ		 849 Status = AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariable (\r
850 VariableName,\r
851 VendorGuid,\r
852 NULL,\r
853 0,\r
854 0\r
855 );\r
856 if (!EFI_ERROR (Status) && ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0)) {\r
98c2d961 857 Status = DeleteCertsFromDb (VariableName, VendorGuid, Attributes);\r
a6811666 858 }\r
64b6a3ff 859\r
a6811666
SZ		 860 return Status;\r
861 }\r
862\r
76bfc7e3 863 if (NeedPhysicallyPresent (VariableName, VendorGuid) && !UserPhysicalPresent()) {\r
a6811666
SZ		 864 //\r
865 // This variable is protected, only physical present user could modify its value.\r
866 //\r
867 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r
868 }\r
869\r
870 //\r
0130fdde
ZC		 871 if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0) {\r
872 //\r
873 // Reject Counter Based Auth Variable processing request.\r
874 //\r
875 return EFI_UNSUPPORTED;\r
876 } else if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0) {\r
877 //\r
878 // Process Time-based Authenticated variable.\r
879 //\r
a6811666
SZ		 880 return VerifyTimeBasedPayloadAndUpdate (\r
881 VariableName,\r
882 VendorGuid,\r
883 Data,\r
884 DataSize,\r
885 Attributes,\r
886 AuthVarTypePriv,\r
887 NULL\r
888 );\r
889 }\r
890\r
0130fdde
ZC		 891 if ((OrgVariableInfo.Data != NULL) &&\r
892 ((OrgVariableInfo.Attributes & (EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS)) != 0)) {\r
a6811666
SZ		 893 //\r
894 // If the variable is already write-protected, it always needs authentication before update.\r
895 //\r
896 return EFI_WRITE_PROTECTED;\r
a6811666
SZ		 897 }\r
898\r
899 //\r
0130fdde 900 // Not authenticated variable, just update variable as usual.\r
a6811666 901 //\r
0130fdde
ZC		 902 Status = AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariable (VariableName, VendorGuid, Data, DataSize, Attributes);\r
903 return Status;\r
a6811666 904\r
a6811666
SZ		 905}\r
906\r
907/**\r
908 Filter out the duplicated EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA from the new data by comparing to the original data.\r
909\r
910 @param[in] Data Pointer to original EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST.\r
911 @param[in] DataSize Size of Data buffer.\r
912 @param[in, out] NewData Pointer to new EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST.\r
913 @param[in, out] NewDataSize Size of NewData buffer.\r
914\r
915**/\r
916EFI_STATUS\r
917FilterSignatureList (\r
918 IN VOID *Data,\r
919 IN UINTN DataSize,\r
920 IN OUT VOID *NewData,\r
921 IN OUT UINTN *NewDataSize\r
922 )\r
923{\r
924 EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *CertList;\r
925 EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *Cert;\r
926 UINTN CertCount;\r
927 EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *NewCertList;\r
928 EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *NewCert;\r
929 UINTN NewCertCount;\r
930 UINTN Index;\r
931 UINTN Index2;\r
932 UINTN Size;\r
933 UINT8 *Tail;\r
934 UINTN CopiedCount;\r
935 UINTN SignatureListSize;\r
936 BOOLEAN IsNewCert;\r
937 UINT8 *TempData;\r
938 UINTN TempDataSize;\r
939 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
940\r
941 if (*NewDataSize == 0) {\r
942 return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
943 }\r
944\r
945 TempDataSize = *NewDataSize;\r
946 Status = mAuthVarLibContextIn->GetScratchBuffer (&TempDataSize, (VOID **) &TempData);\r
947 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
948 return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
949 }\r
950\r
951 Tail = TempData;\r
952\r
953 NewCertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) NewData;\r
954 while ((*NewDataSize > 0) && (*NewDataSize >= NewCertList->SignatureListSize)) {\r
955 NewCert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) NewCertList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + NewCertList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r
956 NewCertCount = (NewCertList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - NewCertList->SignatureHeaderSize) / NewCertList->SignatureSize;\r
957\r
958 CopiedCount = 0;\r
959 for (Index = 0; Index < NewCertCount; Index++) {\r
960 IsNewCert = TRUE;\r
961\r
962 Size = DataSize;\r
963 CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) Data;\r
964 while ((Size > 0) && (Size >= CertList->SignatureListSize)) {\r
965 if (CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &NewCertList->SignatureType) &&\r
966 (CertList->SignatureSize == NewCertList->SignatureSize)) {\r
967 Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r
968 CertCount = (CertList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - CertList->SignatureHeaderSize) / CertList->SignatureSize;\r
969 for (Index2 = 0; Index2 < CertCount; Index2++) {\r
970 //\r
971 // Iterate each Signature Data in this Signature List.\r
972 //\r
973 if (CompareMem (NewCert, Cert, CertList->SignatureSize) == 0) {\r
974 IsNewCert = FALSE;\r
975 break;\r
976 }\r
977 Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) Cert + CertList->SignatureSize);\r
978 }\r
979 }\r
980\r
981 if (!IsNewCert) {\r
982 break;\r
983 }\r
984 Size -= CertList->SignatureListSize;\r
985 CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + CertList->SignatureListSize);\r
986 }\r
987\r
988 if (IsNewCert) {\r
989 //\r
990 // New EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA, keep it.\r
991 //\r
992 if (CopiedCount == 0) {\r
993 //\r
994 // Copy EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST header for only once.\r
995 //\r
996 CopyMem (Tail, NewCertList, sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + NewCertList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r
997 Tail = Tail + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + NewCertList->SignatureHeaderSize;\r
998 }\r
999\r
1000 CopyMem (Tail, NewCert, NewCertList->SignatureSize);\r
1001 Tail += NewCertList->SignatureSize;\r
1002 CopiedCount++;\r
1003 }\r
1004\r
1005 NewCert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) NewCert + NewCertList->SignatureSize);\r
1006 }\r
1007\r
1008 //\r
1009 // Update SignatureListSize in the kept EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST.\r
1010 //\r
1011 if (CopiedCount != 0) {\r
1012 SignatureListSize = sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + NewCertList->SignatureHeaderSize + (CopiedCount * NewCertList->SignatureSize);\r
1013 CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) (Tail - SignatureListSize);\r
1014 CertList->SignatureListSize = (UINT32) SignatureListSize;\r
1015 }\r
1016\r
1017 *NewDataSize -= NewCertList->SignatureListSize;\r
1018 NewCertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) NewCertList + NewCertList->SignatureListSize);\r
1019 }\r
1020\r
1021 TempDataSize = (Tail - (UINT8 *) TempData);\r
1022\r
1023 CopyMem (NewData, TempData, TempDataSize);\r
1024 *NewDataSize = TempDataSize;\r
1025\r
1026 return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
1027}\r
1028\r
1029/**\r
1030 Compare two EFI_TIME data.\r
1031\r
1032\r
1033 @param FirstTime A pointer to the first EFI_TIME data.\r
1034 @param SecondTime A pointer to the second EFI_TIME data.\r
1035\r
1036 @retval TRUE The FirstTime is not later than the SecondTime.\r
1037 @retval FALSE The FirstTime is later than the SecondTime.\r
1038\r
1039**/\r
1040BOOLEAN\r
1041AuthServiceInternalCompareTimeStamp (\r
1042 IN EFI_TIME *FirstTime,\r
1043 IN EFI_TIME *SecondTime\r
1044 )\r
1045{\r
1046 if (FirstTime->Year != SecondTime->Year) {\r
1047 return (BOOLEAN) (FirstTime->Year < SecondTime->Year);\r
1048 } else if (FirstTime->Month != SecondTime->Month) {\r
1049 return (BOOLEAN) (FirstTime->Month < SecondTime->Month);\r
1050 } else if (FirstTime->Day != SecondTime->Day) {\r
1051 return (BOOLEAN) (FirstTime->Day < SecondTime->Day);\r
1052 } else if (FirstTime->Hour != SecondTime->Hour) {\r
1053 return (BOOLEAN) (FirstTime->Hour < SecondTime->Hour);\r
1054 } else if (FirstTime->Minute != SecondTime->Minute) {\r
1055 return (BOOLEAN) (FirstTime->Minute < SecondTime->Minute);\r
1056 }\r
1057\r
1058 return (BOOLEAN) (FirstTime->Second <= SecondTime->Second);\r
1059}\r
1060\r
53c6ff18
ZC		 1061/**\r
1062 Calculate SHA256 digest of SignerCert CommonName + ToplevelCert tbsCertificate\r
1063 SignerCert and ToplevelCert are inside the signer certificate chain.\r
1064\r
1065 @param[in] SignerCert A pointer to SignerCert data.\r
1066 @param[in] SignerCertSize Length of SignerCert data.\r
1067 @param[in] TopLevelCert A pointer to TopLevelCert data.\r
1068 @param[in] TopLevelCertSize Length of TopLevelCert data.\r
1069 @param[out] Sha256Digest Sha256 digest calculated.\r
1070\r
1071 @return EFI_ABORTED Digest process failed.\r
d6b926e7 1072 @return EFI_SUCCESS SHA256 Digest is successfully calculated.\r
53c6ff18
ZC		 1073\r
1074**/\r
1075EFI_STATUS\r
1076CalculatePrivAuthVarSignChainSHA256Digest(\r
1077 IN UINT8 *SignerCert,\r
1078 IN UINTN SignerCertSize,\r
1079 IN UINT8 *TopLevelCert,\r
1080 IN UINTN TopLevelCertSize,\r
1081 OUT UINT8 *Sha256Digest\r
1082 )\r
1083{\r
1084 UINT8 *TbsCert;\r
1085 UINTN TbsCertSize;\r
11b74aa4 1086 CHAR8 CertCommonName[128];\r
53c6ff18
ZC		 1087 UINTN CertCommonNameSize;\r
1088 BOOLEAN CryptoStatus;\r
1089 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
1090\r
1091 CertCommonNameSize = sizeof(CertCommonName);\r
1092\r
1093 //\r
1094 // Get SignerCert CommonName\r
1095 //\r
1096 Status = X509GetCommonName(SignerCert, SignerCertSize, CertCommonName, &CertCommonNameSize);\r
1097 if (EFI_ERROR(Status)) {\r
1098 DEBUG((DEBUG_INFO, "%a Get SignerCert CommonName failed with status %x\n", __FUNCTION__, Status));\r
1099 return EFI_ABORTED;\r
1100 }\r
1101\r
1102 //\r
1103 // Get TopLevelCert tbsCertificate\r
1104 //\r
1105 if (!X509GetTBSCert(TopLevelCert, TopLevelCertSize, &TbsCert, &TbsCertSize)) {\r
1106 DEBUG((DEBUG_INFO, "%a Get Top-level Cert tbsCertificate failed!\n", __FUNCTION__));\r
1107 return EFI_ABORTED;\r
1108 }\r
1109\r
1110 //\r
1111 // Digest SignerCert CN + TopLevelCert tbsCertificate\r
1112 //\r
1113 ZeroMem (Sha256Digest, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE);\r
1114 CryptoStatus = Sha256Init (mHashCtx);\r
1115 if (!CryptoStatus) {\r
1116 return EFI_ABORTED;\r
1117 }\r
1118\r
1119 //\r
1120 // '\0' is forced in CertCommonName. No overflow issue\r
1121 //\r
11b74aa4
LE		 1122 CryptoStatus = Sha256Update (\r
1123 mHashCtx,\r
1124 CertCommonName,\r
1125 AsciiStrLen (CertCommonName)\r
1126 );\r
53c6ff18
ZC		 1127 if (!CryptoStatus) {\r
1128 return EFI_ABORTED;\r
1129 }\r
1130\r
1131 CryptoStatus = Sha256Update (mHashCtx, TbsCert, TbsCertSize);\r
1132 if (!CryptoStatus) {\r
1133 return EFI_ABORTED;\r
1134 }\r
1135\r
1136 CryptoStatus = Sha256Final (mHashCtx, Sha256Digest);\r
1137 if (!CryptoStatus) {\r
1138 return EFI_ABORTED;\r
1139 }\r
1140\r
1141 return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
1142}\r
1143\r
a6811666
SZ		 1144/**\r
1145 Find matching signer's certificates for common authenticated variable\r
98c2d961 1146 by corresponding VariableName and VendorGuid from "certdb" or "certdbv".\r
a6811666 1147\r
98c2d961 1148 The data format of "certdb" or "certdbv":\r
a6811666
SZ		 1149 //\r
1150 // UINT32 CertDbListSize;\r
1151 // /// AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA Certs1[];\r
1152 // /// AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA Certs2[];\r
1153 // /// ...\r
1154 // /// AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA Certsn[];\r
1155 //\r
1156\r
1157 @param[in] VariableName Name of authenticated Variable.\r
1158 @param[in] VendorGuid Vendor GUID of authenticated Variable.\r
98c2d961
CZ		 1159 @param[in] Data Pointer to variable "certdb" or "certdbv".\r
1160 @param[in] DataSize Size of variable "certdb" or "certdbv".\r
a6811666
SZ		 1161 @param[out] CertOffset Offset of matching CertData, from starting of Data.\r
1162 @param[out] CertDataSize Length of CertData in bytes.\r
1163 @param[out] CertNodeOffset Offset of matching AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA , from\r
1164 starting of Data.\r
1165 @param[out] CertNodeSize Length of AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA in bytes.\r
1166\r
1167 @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Any input parameter is invalid.\r
1168 @retval EFI_NOT_FOUND Fail to find matching certs.\r
1169 @retval EFI_SUCCESS Find matching certs and output parameters.\r
1170\r
1171**/\r
1172EFI_STATUS\r
1173FindCertsFromDb (\r
1174 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r
1175 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r
1176 IN UINT8 *Data,\r
1177 IN UINTN DataSize,\r
1178 OUT UINT32 *CertOffset, OPTIONAL\r
1179 OUT UINT32 *CertDataSize, OPTIONAL\r
1180 OUT UINT32 *CertNodeOffset,OPTIONAL\r
1181 OUT UINT32 *CertNodeSize OPTIONAL\r
1182 )\r
1183{\r
1184 UINT32 Offset;\r
1185 AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA *Ptr;\r
1186 UINT32 CertSize;\r
1187 UINT32 NameSize;\r
1188 UINT32 NodeSize;\r
1189 UINT32 CertDbListSize;\r
1190\r
1191 if ((VariableName == NULL) || (VendorGuid == NULL) || (Data == NULL)) {\r
1192 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
1193 }\r
1194\r
1195 //\r
1196 // Check whether DataSize matches recorded CertDbListSize.\r
1197 //\r
1198 if (DataSize < sizeof (UINT32)) {\r
1199 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
1200 }\r
1201\r
1202 CertDbListSize = ReadUnaligned32 ((UINT32 *) Data);\r
1203\r
1204 if (CertDbListSize != (UINT32) DataSize) {\r
1205 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
1206 }\r
1207\r
1208 Offset = sizeof (UINT32);\r
1209\r
1210 //\r
1211 // Get corresponding certificates by VendorGuid and VariableName.\r
1212 //\r
1213 while (Offset < (UINT32) DataSize) {\r
1214 Ptr = (AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA *) (Data + Offset);\r
1215 //\r
1216 // Check whether VendorGuid matches.\r
1217 //\r
1218 if (CompareGuid (&Ptr->VendorGuid, VendorGuid)) {\r
1219 NodeSize = ReadUnaligned32 (&Ptr->CertNodeSize);\r
1220 NameSize = ReadUnaligned32 (&Ptr->NameSize);\r
1221 CertSize = ReadUnaligned32 (&Ptr->CertDataSize);\r
1222\r
1223 if (NodeSize != sizeof (EFI_GUID) + sizeof (UINT32) * 3 + CertSize +\r
1224 sizeof (CHAR16) * NameSize) {\r
1225 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
1226 }\r
1227\r
1228 Offset = Offset + sizeof (EFI_GUID) + sizeof (UINT32) * 3;\r
1229 //\r
1230 // Check whether VariableName matches.\r
1231 //\r
1232 if ((NameSize == StrLen (VariableName)) &&\r
1233 (CompareMem (Data + Offset, VariableName, NameSize * sizeof (CHAR16)) == 0)) {\r
1234 Offset = Offset + NameSize * sizeof (CHAR16);\r
1235\r
1236 if (CertOffset != NULL) {\r
1237 *CertOffset = Offset;\r
1238 }\r
1239\r
1240 if (CertDataSize != NULL) {\r
1241 *CertDataSize = CertSize;\r
1242 }\r
1243\r
1244 if (CertNodeOffset != NULL) {\r
1245 *CertNodeOffset = (UINT32) ((UINT8 *) Ptr - Data);\r
1246 }\r
1247\r
1248 if (CertNodeSize != NULL) {\r
1249 *CertNodeSize = NodeSize;\r
1250 }\r
1251\r
1252 return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
1253 } else {\r
1254 Offset = Offset + NameSize * sizeof (CHAR16) + CertSize;\r
1255 }\r
1256 } else {\r
1257 NodeSize = ReadUnaligned32 (&Ptr->CertNodeSize);\r
1258 Offset = Offset + NodeSize;\r
1259 }\r
1260 }\r
1261\r
1262 return EFI_NOT_FOUND;\r
1263}\r
1264\r
1265/**\r
1266 Retrieve signer's certificates for common authenticated variable\r
98c2d961
CZ		 1267 by corresponding VariableName and VendorGuid from "certdb"\r
1268 or "certdbv" according to authenticated variable attributes.\r
a6811666
SZ		 1269\r
1270 @param[in] VariableName Name of authenticated Variable.\r
1271 @param[in] VendorGuid Vendor GUID of authenticated Variable.\r
98c2d961 1272 @param[in] Attributes Attributes of authenticated variable.\r
a6811666
SZ		 1273 @param[out] CertData Pointer to signer's certificates.\r
1274 @param[out] CertDataSize Length of CertData in bytes.\r
1275\r
1276 @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Any input parameter is invalid.\r
98c2d961 1277 @retval EFI_NOT_FOUND Fail to find "certdb"/"certdbv" or matching certs.\r
a6811666
SZ		 1278 @retval EFI_SUCCESS Get signer's certificates successfully.\r
1279\r
1280**/\r
1281EFI_STATUS\r
1282GetCertsFromDb (\r
1283 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r
1284 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r
98c2d961 1285 IN UINT32 Attributes,\r
a6811666
SZ		 1286 OUT UINT8 **CertData,\r
1287 OUT UINT32 *CertDataSize\r
1288 )\r
1289{\r
1290 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
1291 UINT8 *Data;\r
1292 UINTN DataSize;\r
1293 UINT32 CertOffset;\r
98c2d961 1294 CHAR16 *DbName;\r
a6811666
SZ		 1295\r
1296 if ((VariableName == NULL) || (VendorGuid == NULL) || (CertData == NULL) || (CertDataSize == NULL)) {\r
1297 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
1298 }\r
1299\r
b3548d32 1300\r
98c2d961
CZ		 1301 if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE) != 0) {\r
1302 //\r
1303 // Get variable "certdb".\r
1304 //\r
1305 DbName = EFI_CERT_DB_NAME;\r
1306 } else {\r
1307 //\r
1308 // Get variable "certdbv".\r
1309 //\r
1310 DbName = EFI_CERT_DB_VOLATILE_NAME;\r
1311 }\r
1312\r
a6811666 1313 //\r
98c2d961 1314 // Get variable "certdb" or "certdbv".\r
a6811666
SZ		 1315 //\r
1316 Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (\r
98c2d961 1317 DbName,\r
a6811666
SZ		 1318 &gEfiCertDbGuid,\r
1319 (VOID **) &Data,\r
1320 &DataSize\r
1321 );\r
1322 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
1323 return Status;\r
1324 }\r
1325\r
1326 if ((DataSize == 0) || (Data == NULL)) {\r
1327 ASSERT (FALSE);\r
1328 return EFI_NOT_FOUND;\r
1329 }\r
1330\r
1331 Status = FindCertsFromDb (\r
1332 VariableName,\r
1333 VendorGuid,\r
1334 Data,\r
1335 DataSize,\r
1336 &CertOffset,\r
1337 CertDataSize,\r
1338 NULL,\r
1339 NULL\r
1340 );\r
1341\r
1342 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
1343 return Status;\r
1344 }\r
1345\r
1346 *CertData = Data + CertOffset;\r
1347 return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
1348}\r
1349\r
1350/**\r
1351 Delete matching signer's certificates when deleting common authenticated\r
b3548d32 1352 variable by corresponding VariableName and VendorGuid from "certdb" or\r
98c2d961 1353 "certdbv" according to authenticated variable attributes.\r
a6811666
SZ		 1354\r
1355 @param[in] VariableName Name of authenticated Variable.\r
1356 @param[in] VendorGuid Vendor GUID of authenticated Variable.\r
98c2d961 1357 @param[in] Attributes Attributes of authenticated variable.\r
a6811666
SZ		 1358\r
1359 @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Any input parameter is invalid.\r
98c2d961 1360 @retval EFI_NOT_FOUND Fail to find "certdb"/"certdbv" or matching certs.\r
a6811666
SZ		 1361 @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES The operation is failed due to lack of resources.\r
1362 @retval EFI_SUCCESS The operation is completed successfully.\r
1363\r
1364**/\r
1365EFI_STATUS\r
1366DeleteCertsFromDb (\r
1367 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r
98c2d961
CZ		 1368 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r
1369 IN UINT32 Attributes\r
a6811666
SZ		 1370 )\r
1371{\r
1372 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
1373 UINT8 *Data;\r
1374 UINTN DataSize;\r
1375 UINT32 VarAttr;\r
1376 UINT32 CertNodeOffset;\r
1377 UINT32 CertNodeSize;\r
1378 UINT8 *NewCertDb;\r
1379 UINT32 NewCertDbSize;\r
98c2d961 1380 CHAR16 *DbName;\r
a6811666
SZ		 1381\r
1382 if ((VariableName == NULL) || (VendorGuid == NULL)) {\r
1383 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
1384 }\r
1385\r
98c2d961
CZ		 1386 if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE) != 0) {\r
1387 //\r
1388 // Get variable "certdb".\r
1389 //\r
1390 DbName = EFI_CERT_DB_NAME;\r
1391 VarAttr = EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS;\r
1392 } else {\r
1393 //\r
1394 // Get variable "certdbv".\r
1395 //\r
1396 DbName = EFI_CERT_DB_VOLATILE_NAME;\r
1397 VarAttr = EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS;\r
1398 }\r
1399\r
a6811666 1400 Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (\r
98c2d961 1401 DbName,\r
a6811666
SZ		 1402 &gEfiCertDbGuid,\r
1403 (VOID **) &Data,\r
1404 &DataSize\r
1405 );\r
98c2d961 1406\r
a6811666
SZ		 1407 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
1408 return Status;\r
1409 }\r
1410\r
1411 if ((DataSize == 0) || (Data == NULL)) {\r
1412 ASSERT (FALSE);\r
1413 return EFI_NOT_FOUND;\r
1414 }\r
1415\r
1416 if (DataSize == sizeof (UINT32)) {\r
1417 //\r
98c2d961 1418 // There is no certs in "certdb" or "certdbv".\r
a6811666
SZ		 1419 //\r
1420 return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
1421 }\r
1422\r
1423 //\r
98c2d961 1424 // Get corresponding cert node from "certdb" or "certdbv".\r
a6811666
SZ		 1425 //\r
1426 Status = FindCertsFromDb (\r
1427 VariableName,\r
1428 VendorGuid,\r
1429 Data,\r
1430 DataSize,\r
1431 NULL,\r
1432 NULL,\r
1433 &CertNodeOffset,\r
1434 &CertNodeSize\r
1435 );\r
1436\r
1437 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
1438 return Status;\r
1439 }\r
1440\r
1441 if (DataSize < (CertNodeOffset + CertNodeSize)) {\r
1442 return EFI_NOT_FOUND;\r
1443 }\r
1444\r
1445 //\r
98c2d961 1446 // Construct new data content of variable "certdb" or "certdbv".\r
a6811666
SZ		 1447 //\r
1448 NewCertDbSize = (UINT32) DataSize - CertNodeSize;\r
1449 NewCertDb = (UINT8*) mCertDbStore;\r
1450\r
1451 //\r
1452 // Copy the DB entries before deleting node.\r
1453 //\r
1454 CopyMem (NewCertDb, Data, CertNodeOffset);\r
1455 //\r
1456 // Update CertDbListSize.\r
1457 //\r
1458 CopyMem (NewCertDb, &NewCertDbSize, sizeof (UINT32));\r
1459 //\r
1460 // Copy the DB entries after deleting node.\r
1461 //\r
1462 if (DataSize > (CertNodeOffset + CertNodeSize)) {\r
1463 CopyMem (\r
1464 NewCertDb + CertNodeOffset,\r
1465 Data + CertNodeOffset + CertNodeSize,\r
1466 DataSize - CertNodeOffset - CertNodeSize\r
1467 );\r
1468 }\r
1469\r
1470 //\r
98c2d961 1471 // Set "certdb" or "certdbv".\r
a6811666 1472 //\r
a6811666 1473 Status = AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariable (\r
98c2d961 1474 DbName,\r
a6811666
SZ		 1475 &gEfiCertDbGuid,\r
1476 NewCertDb,\r
1477 NewCertDbSize,\r
1478 VarAttr\r
1479 );\r
1480\r
1481 return Status;\r
1482}\r
1483\r
1484/**\r
1485 Insert signer's certificates for common authenticated variable with VariableName\r
98c2d961 1486 and VendorGuid in AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA to "certdb" or "certdbv" according to\r
53c6ff18
ZC		 1487 time based authenticated variable attributes. CertData is the SHA256 digest of\r
1488 SignerCert CommonName + TopLevelCert tbsCertificate.\r
a6811666 1489\r
53c6ff18
ZC		 1490 @param[in] VariableName Name of authenticated Variable.\r
1491 @param[in] VendorGuid Vendor GUID of authenticated Variable.\r
1492 @param[in] Attributes Attributes of authenticated variable.\r
1493 @param[in] SignerCert Signer certificate data.\r
1494 @param[in] SignerCertSize Length of signer certificate.\r
1495 @param[in] TopLevelCert Top-level certificate data.\r
1496 @param[in] TopLevelCertSize Length of top-level certificate.\r
a6811666
SZ		 1497\r
1498 @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Any input parameter is invalid.\r
1499 @retval EFI_ACCESS_DENIED An AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA entry with same VariableName\r
1500 and VendorGuid already exists.\r
1501 @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES The operation is failed due to lack of resources.\r
98c2d961 1502 @retval EFI_SUCCESS Insert an AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA entry to "certdb" or "certdbv"\r
a6811666
SZ		 1503\r
1504**/\r
1505EFI_STATUS\r
1506InsertCertsToDb (\r
1507 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r
1508 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r
98c2d961 1509 IN UINT32 Attributes,\r
53c6ff18
ZC		 1510 IN UINT8 *SignerCert,\r
1511 IN UINTN SignerCertSize,\r
1512 IN UINT8 *TopLevelCert,\r
1513 IN UINTN TopLevelCertSize\r
a6811666
SZ		 1514 )\r
1515{\r
1516 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
1517 UINT8 *Data;\r
1518 UINTN DataSize;\r
1519 UINT32 VarAttr;\r
1520 UINT8 *NewCertDb;\r
1521 UINT32 NewCertDbSize;\r
1522 UINT32 CertNodeSize;\r
1523 UINT32 NameSize;\r
53c6ff18 1524 UINT32 CertDataSize;\r
a6811666 1525 AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA *Ptr;\r
98c2d961 1526 CHAR16 *DbName;\r
53c6ff18 1527 UINT8 Sha256Digest[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE];\r
a6811666 1528\r
53c6ff18 1529 if ((VariableName == NULL) || (VendorGuid == NULL) || (SignerCert == NULL) ||(TopLevelCert == NULL)) {\r
a6811666
SZ		 1530 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
1531 }\r
1532\r
98c2d961
CZ		 1533 if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE) != 0) {\r
1534 //\r
1535 // Get variable "certdb".\r
1536 //\r
1537 DbName = EFI_CERT_DB_NAME;\r
1538 VarAttr = EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS;\r
1539 } else {\r
1540 //\r
1541 // Get variable "certdbv".\r
1542 //\r
1543 DbName = EFI_CERT_DB_VOLATILE_NAME;\r
1544 VarAttr = EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS;\r
1545 }\r
1546\r
a6811666 1547 //\r
98c2d961 1548 // Get variable "certdb" or "certdbv".\r
a6811666
SZ		 1549 //\r
1550 Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (\r
98c2d961 1551 DbName,\r
a6811666
SZ		 1552 &gEfiCertDbGuid,\r
1553 (VOID **) &Data,\r
1554 &DataSize\r
1555 );\r
1556 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
1557 return Status;\r
1558 }\r
1559\r
1560 if ((DataSize == 0) || (Data == NULL)) {\r
1561 ASSERT (FALSE);\r
1562 return EFI_NOT_FOUND;\r
1563 }\r
1564\r
1565 //\r
98c2d961 1566 // Find whether matching cert node already exists in "certdb" or "certdbv".\r
a6811666
SZ		 1567 // If yes return error.\r
1568 //\r
1569 Status = FindCertsFromDb (\r
1570 VariableName,\r
1571 VendorGuid,\r
1572 Data,\r
1573 DataSize,\r
1574 NULL,\r
1575 NULL,\r
1576 NULL,\r
1577 NULL\r
1578 );\r
1579\r
1580 if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
1581 ASSERT (FALSE);\r
1582 return EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;\r
1583 }\r
1584\r
1585 //\r
98c2d961 1586 // Construct new data content of variable "certdb" or "certdbv".\r
a6811666
SZ		 1587 //\r
1588 NameSize = (UINT32) StrLen (VariableName);\r
53c6ff18 1589 CertDataSize = sizeof(Sha256Digest);\r
a6811666
SZ		 1590 CertNodeSize = sizeof (AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA) + (UINT32) CertDataSize + NameSize * sizeof (CHAR16);\r
1591 NewCertDbSize = (UINT32) DataSize + CertNodeSize;\r
1592 if (NewCertDbSize > mMaxCertDbSize) {\r
1593 return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
1594 }\r
53c6ff18
ZC		 1595\r
1596 Status = CalculatePrivAuthVarSignChainSHA256Digest(\r
1597 SignerCert,\r
1598 SignerCertSize,\r
1599 TopLevelCert,\r
1600 TopLevelCertSize,\r
1601 Sha256Digest\r
1602 );\r
1603 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
1604 return Status;\r
1605 }\r
1606\r
a6811666
SZ		 1607 NewCertDb = (UINT8*) mCertDbStore;\r
1608\r
1609 //\r
1610 // Copy the DB entries before inserting node.\r
1611 //\r
1612 CopyMem (NewCertDb, Data, DataSize);\r
1613 //\r
1614 // Update CertDbListSize.\r
1615 //\r
1616 CopyMem (NewCertDb, &NewCertDbSize, sizeof (UINT32));\r
1617 //\r
1618 // Construct new cert node.\r
1619 //\r
1620 Ptr = (AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA *) (NewCertDb + DataSize);\r
1621 CopyGuid (&Ptr->VendorGuid, VendorGuid);\r
1622 CopyMem (&Ptr->CertNodeSize, &CertNodeSize, sizeof (UINT32));\r
1623 CopyMem (&Ptr->NameSize, &NameSize, sizeof (UINT32));\r
1624 CopyMem (&Ptr->CertDataSize, &CertDataSize, sizeof (UINT32));\r
1625\r
1626 CopyMem (\r
1627 (UINT8 *) Ptr + sizeof (AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA),\r
1628 VariableName,\r
1629 NameSize * sizeof (CHAR16)\r
1630 );\r
1631\r
1632 CopyMem (\r
1633 (UINT8 *) Ptr + sizeof (AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA) + NameSize * sizeof (CHAR16),\r
53c6ff18 1634 Sha256Digest,\r
a6811666
SZ		 1635 CertDataSize\r
1636 );\r
1637\r
1638 //\r
98c2d961 1639 // Set "certdb" or "certdbv".\r
a6811666 1640 //\r
a6811666 1641 Status = AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariable (\r
98c2d961 1642 DbName,\r
a6811666
SZ		 1643 &gEfiCertDbGuid,\r
1644 NewCertDb,\r
1645 NewCertDbSize,\r
1646 VarAttr\r
1647 );\r
1648\r
1649 return Status;\r
1650}\r
1651\r
64b6a3ff
CZ		 1652/**\r
1653 Clean up signer's certificates for common authenticated variable\r
1654 by corresponding VariableName and VendorGuid from "certdb".\r
f3964772
SZ		 1655 System may break down during Timebased Variable update & certdb update,\r
1656 make them inconsistent, this function is called in AuthVariable Init\r
1657 to ensure consistency.\r
1658\r
1659 @retval EFI_NOT_FOUND Fail to find variable "certdb".\r
1660 @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES The operation is failed due to lack of resources.\r
1661 @retval EFI_SUCCESS The operation is completed successfully.\r
64b6a3ff
CZ		 1662\r
1663**/\r
1664EFI_STATUS\r
1665CleanCertsFromDb (\r
1666 VOID\r
72362a75
CZ		 1667 )\r
1668{\r
64b6a3ff
CZ		 1669 UINT32 Offset;\r
1670 AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA *Ptr;\r
1671 UINT32 NameSize;\r
1672 UINT32 NodeSize;\r
1673 CHAR16 *VariableName;\r
1674 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
1675 BOOLEAN CertCleaned;\r
1676 UINT8 *Data;\r
1677 UINTN DataSize;\r
64b6a3ff 1678 EFI_GUID AuthVarGuid;\r
98c2d961 1679 AUTH_VARIABLE_INFO AuthVariableInfo;\r
64b6a3ff
CZ		 1680\r
1681 Status = EFI_SUCCESS;\r
1682\r
1683 //\r
1684 // Get corresponding certificates by VendorGuid and VariableName.\r
1685 //\r
1686 do {\r
1687 CertCleaned = FALSE;\r
1688\r
1689 //\r
1690 // Get latest variable "certdb"\r
1691 //\r
1692 Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (\r
1693 EFI_CERT_DB_NAME,\r
1694 &gEfiCertDbGuid,\r
1695 (VOID **) &Data,\r
1696 &DataSize\r
1697 );\r
1698 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
1699 return Status;\r
1700 }\r
1701\r
1702 if ((DataSize == 0) || (Data == NULL)) {\r
1703 ASSERT (FALSE);\r
1704 return EFI_NOT_FOUND;\r
1705 }\r
1706\r
1707 Offset = sizeof (UINT32);\r
1708\r
1709 while (Offset < (UINT32) DataSize) {\r
1710 Ptr = (AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA *) (Data + Offset);\r
64b6a3ff
CZ		 1711 NodeSize = ReadUnaligned32 (&Ptr->CertNodeSize);\r
1712 NameSize = ReadUnaligned32 (&Ptr->NameSize);\r
1713\r
1714 //\r
1715 // Get VarName tailed with '\0'\r
1716 //\r
1717 VariableName = AllocateZeroPool((NameSize + 1) * sizeof(CHAR16));\r
1718 if (VariableName == NULL) {\r
1719 return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
1720 }\r
1721 CopyMem (VariableName, (UINT8 *) Ptr + sizeof (AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA), NameSize * sizeof(CHAR16));\r
1722 //\r
1723 // Keep VarGuid aligned\r
1724 //\r
1725 CopyMem (&AuthVarGuid, &Ptr->VendorGuid, sizeof(EFI_GUID));\r
1726\r
1727 //\r
1728 // Find corresponding time auth variable\r
1729 //\r
98c2d961
CZ		 1730 ZeroMem (&AuthVariableInfo, sizeof (AuthVariableInfo));\r
1731 Status = mAuthVarLibContextIn->FindVariable (\r
1732 VariableName,\r
1733 &AuthVarGuid,\r
1734 &AuthVariableInfo\r
1735 );\r
64b6a3ff 1736\r
fd4d9c64 1737 if (EFI_ERROR(Status) || (AuthVariableInfo.Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) == 0) {\r
e90ea947
ZG		 1738 //\r
1739 // While cleaning certdb, always delete the variable in certdb regardless of it attributes.\r
1740 //\r
98c2d961
CZ		 1741 Status = DeleteCertsFromDb(\r
1742 VariableName,\r
1743 &AuthVarGuid,\r
e90ea947 1744 AuthVariableInfo.Attributes | EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE\r
98c2d961 1745 );\r
64b6a3ff
CZ		 1746 CertCleaned = TRUE;\r
1747 DEBUG((EFI_D_INFO, "Recovery!! Cert for Auth Variable %s Guid %g is removed for consistency\n", VariableName, &AuthVarGuid));\r
1748 FreePool(VariableName);\r
1749 break;\r
1750 }\r
1751\r
1752 FreePool(VariableName);\r
1753 Offset = Offset + NodeSize;\r
1754 }\r
1755 } while (CertCleaned);\r
1756\r
1757 return Status;\r
1758}\r
1759\r
a6811666
SZ		 1760/**\r
1761 Process variable with EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS set\r
1762\r
1763 Caution: This function may receive untrusted input.\r
1764 This function may be invoked in SMM mode, and datasize and data are external input.\r
1765 This function will do basic validation, before parse the data.\r
1766 This function will parse the authentication carefully to avoid security issues, like\r
1767 buffer overflow, integer overflow.\r
1768\r
1769 @param[in] VariableName Name of Variable to be found.\r
1770 @param[in] VendorGuid Variable vendor GUID.\r
1771 @param[in] Data Data pointer.\r
1772 @param[in] DataSize Size of Data found. If size is less than the\r
1773 data, this value contains the required size.\r
1774 @param[in] Attributes Attribute value of the variable.\r
1775 @param[in] AuthVarType Verify against PK, KEK database, private database or certificate in data payload.\r
1776 @param[in] OrgTimeStamp Pointer to original time stamp,\r
1777 original variable is not found if NULL.\r
1778 @param[out] VarPayloadPtr Pointer to variable payload address.\r
1779 @param[out] VarPayloadSize Pointer to variable payload size.\r
1780\r
1781 @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.\r
1782 @retval EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION The variable does NOT pass the validation\r
1783 check carried out by the firmware.\r
1784 @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES Failed to process variable due to lack\r
1785 of resources.\r
1786 @retval EFI_SUCCESS Variable pass validation successfully.\r
1787\r
1788**/\r
1789EFI_STATUS\r
1790VerifyTimeBasedPayload (\r
1791 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r
1792 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r
1793 IN VOID *Data,\r
1794 IN UINTN DataSize,\r
1795 IN UINT32 Attributes,\r
1796 IN AUTHVAR_TYPE AuthVarType,\r
1797 IN EFI_TIME *OrgTimeStamp,\r
1798 OUT UINT8 **VarPayloadPtr,\r
1799 OUT UINTN *VarPayloadSize\r
1800 )\r
1801{\r
1802 EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 *CertData;\r
1803 UINT8 *SigData;\r
1804 UINT32 SigDataSize;\r
1805 UINT8 *PayloadPtr;\r
1806 UINTN PayloadSize;\r
1807 UINT32 Attr;\r
1808 BOOLEAN VerifyStatus;\r
1809 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
1810 EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *CertList;\r
1811 EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *Cert;\r
1812 UINTN Index;\r
1813 UINTN CertCount;\r
1814 UINT32 KekDataSize;\r
1815 UINT8 *NewData;\r
1816 UINTN NewDataSize;\r
1817 UINT8 *Buffer;\r
1818 UINTN Length;\r
53c6ff18
ZC		 1819 UINT8 *TopLevelCert;\r
1820 UINTN TopLevelCertSize;\r
1821 UINT8 *TrustedCert;\r
1822 UINTN TrustedCertSize;\r
a6811666
SZ		 1823 UINT8 *SignerCerts;\r
1824 UINTN CertStackSize;\r
1825 UINT8 *CertsInCertDb;\r
1826 UINT32 CertsSizeinDb;\r
53c6ff18 1827 UINT8 Sha256Digest[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE];\r
62ba0feb 1828 EFI_CERT_DATA *CertDataPtr;\r
a6811666 1829\r
53c6ff18
ZC		 1830 //\r
1831 // 1. TopLevelCert is the top-level issuer certificate in signature Signer Cert Chain\r
1832 // 2. TrustedCert is the certificate which firmware trusts. It could be saved in protected\r
1833 // storage or PK payload on PK init\r
1834 //\r
a6811666
SZ		 1835 VerifyStatus = FALSE;\r
1836 CertData = NULL;\r
1837 NewData = NULL;\r
1838 Attr = Attributes;\r
1839 SignerCerts = NULL;\r
53c6ff18 1840 TopLevelCert = NULL;\r
a6811666 1841 CertsInCertDb = NULL;\r
62ba0feb 1842 CertDataPtr = NULL;\r
a6811666
SZ		 1843\r
1844 //\r
1845 // When the attribute EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS is\r
1846 // set, then the Data buffer shall begin with an instance of a complete (and serialized)\r
1847 // EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 descriptor. The descriptor shall be followed by the new\r
1848 // variable value and DataSize shall reflect the combined size of the descriptor and the new\r
1849 // variable value. The authentication descriptor is not part of the variable data and is not\r
1850 // returned by subsequent calls to GetVariable().\r
1851 //\r
1852 CertData = (EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 *) Data;\r
1853\r
1854 //\r
1855 // Verify that Pad1, Nanosecond, TimeZone, Daylight and Pad2 components of the\r
1856 // TimeStamp value are set to zero.\r
1857 //\r
1858 if ((CertData->TimeStamp.Pad1 != 0) ||\r
1859 (CertData->TimeStamp.Nanosecond != 0) ||\r
1860 (CertData->TimeStamp.TimeZone != 0) ||\r
1861 (CertData->TimeStamp.Daylight != 0) ||\r
1862 (CertData->TimeStamp.Pad2 != 0)) {\r
1863 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r
1864 }\r
1865\r
1866 if ((OrgTimeStamp != NULL) && ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_APPEND_WRITE) == 0)) {\r
1867 if (AuthServiceInternalCompareTimeStamp (&CertData->TimeStamp, OrgTimeStamp)) {\r
1868 //\r
1869 // TimeStamp check fail, suspicious replay attack, return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION.\r
1870 //\r
1871 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r
1872 }\r
1873 }\r
1874\r
1875 //\r
1876 // wCertificateType should be WIN_CERT_TYPE_EFI_GUID.\r
1877 // Cert type should be EFI_CERT_TYPE_PKCS7_GUID.\r
1878 //\r
1879 if ((CertData->AuthInfo.Hdr.wCertificateType != WIN_CERT_TYPE_EFI_GUID) ||\r
1880 !CompareGuid (&CertData->AuthInfo.CertType, &gEfiCertPkcs7Guid)) {\r
1881 //\r
1882 // Invalid AuthInfo type, return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION.\r
1883 //\r
1884 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r
1885 }\r
1886\r
1887 //\r
1888 // Find out Pkcs7 SignedData which follows the EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 descriptor.\r
1889 // AuthInfo.Hdr.dwLength is the length of the entire certificate, including the length of the header.\r
1890 //\r
1891 SigData = CertData->AuthInfo.CertData;\r
1892 SigDataSize = CertData->AuthInfo.Hdr.dwLength - (UINT32) (OFFSET_OF (WIN_CERTIFICATE_UEFI_GUID, CertData));\r
1893\r
c035e373
ZL		 1894 //\r
1895 // SignedData.digestAlgorithms shall contain the digest algorithm used when preparing the\r
1896 // signature. Only a digest algorithm of SHA-256 is accepted.\r
1897 //\r
1898 // According to PKCS#7 Definition:\r
1899 // SignedData ::= SEQUENCE {\r
1900 // version Version,\r
1901 // digestAlgorithms DigestAlgorithmIdentifiers,\r
1902 // contentInfo ContentInfo,\r
1903 // .... }\r
b3548d32 1904 // The DigestAlgorithmIdentifiers can be used to determine the hash algorithm\r
c035e373
ZL		 1905 // in VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 descriptor.\r
1906 // This field has the fixed offset (+13) and be calculated based on two bytes of length encoding.\r
1907 //\r
1908 if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0) {\r
1909 if (SigDataSize >= (13 + sizeof (mSha256OidValue))) {\r
b3548d32 1910 if (((*(SigData + 1) & TWO_BYTE_ENCODE) != TWO_BYTE_ENCODE) ||\r
c035e373
ZL		 1911 (CompareMem (SigData + 13, &mSha256OidValue, sizeof (mSha256OidValue)) != 0)) {\r
1912 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r
1913 }\r
1914 }\r
1915 }\r
1916\r
a6811666
SZ		 1917 //\r
1918 // Find out the new data payload which follows Pkcs7 SignedData directly.\r
1919 //\r
1920 PayloadPtr = SigData + SigDataSize;\r
1921 PayloadSize = DataSize - OFFSET_OF_AUTHINFO2_CERT_DATA - (UINTN) SigDataSize;\r
1922\r
1923 //\r
1924 // Construct a serialization buffer of the values of the VariableName, VendorGuid and Attributes\r
1925 // parameters of the SetVariable() call and the TimeStamp component of the\r
1926 // EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 descriptor followed by the variable's new value\r
1927 // i.e. (VariableName, VendorGuid, Attributes, TimeStamp, Data)\r
1928 //\r
1929 NewDataSize = PayloadSize + sizeof (EFI_TIME) + sizeof (UINT32) +\r
1930 sizeof (EFI_GUID) + StrSize (VariableName) - sizeof (CHAR16);\r
1931\r
1932 //\r
1933 // Here is to reuse scratch data area(at the end of volatile variable store)\r
1934 // to reduce SMRAM consumption for SMM variable driver.\r
1935 // The scratch buffer is enough to hold the serialized data and safe to use,\r
1936 // because it is only used at here to do verification temporarily first\r
1937 // and then used in UpdateVariable() for a time based auth variable set.\r
1938 //\r
1939 Status = mAuthVarLibContextIn->GetScratchBuffer (&NewDataSize, (VOID **) &NewData);\r
1940 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
1941 return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
1942 }\r
1943\r
1944 Buffer = NewData;\r
1945 Length = StrLen (VariableName) * sizeof (CHAR16);\r
1946 CopyMem (Buffer, VariableName, Length);\r
1947 Buffer += Length;\r
1948\r
1949 Length = sizeof (EFI_GUID);\r
1950 CopyMem (Buffer, VendorGuid, Length);\r
1951 Buffer += Length;\r
1952\r
1953 Length = sizeof (UINT32);\r
1954 CopyMem (Buffer, &Attr, Length);\r
1955 Buffer += Length;\r
1956\r
1957 Length = sizeof (EFI_TIME);\r
1958 CopyMem (Buffer, &CertData->TimeStamp, Length);\r
1959 Buffer += Length;\r
1960\r
1961 CopyMem (Buffer, PayloadPtr, PayloadSize);\r
1962\r
1963 if (AuthVarType == AuthVarTypePk) {\r
1964 //\r
1965 // Verify that the signature has been made with the current Platform Key (no chaining for PK).\r
1966 // First, get signer's certificates from SignedData.\r
1967 //\r
1968 VerifyStatus = Pkcs7GetSigners (\r
1969 SigData,\r
1970 SigDataSize,\r
1971 &SignerCerts,\r
1972 &CertStackSize,\r
53c6ff18
ZC		 1973 &TopLevelCert,\r
1974 &TopLevelCertSize\r
a6811666
SZ		 1975 );\r
1976 if (!VerifyStatus) {\r
1977 goto Exit;\r
1978 }\r
1979\r
1980 //\r
1981 // Second, get the current platform key from variable. Check whether it's identical with signer's certificates\r
1982 // in SignedData. If not, return error immediately.\r
1983 //\r
1984 Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (\r
1985 EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME,\r
1986 &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
1987 &Data,\r
1988 &DataSize\r
1989 );\r
1990 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
1991 VerifyStatus = FALSE;\r
1992 goto Exit;\r
1993 }\r
1994 CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) Data;\r
1995 Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r
53c6ff18
ZC		 1996 if ((TopLevelCertSize != (CertList->SignatureSize - (sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1))) ||\r
1997 (CompareMem (Cert->SignatureData, TopLevelCert, TopLevelCertSize) != 0)) {\r
a6811666
SZ		 1998 VerifyStatus = FALSE;\r
1999 goto Exit;\r
2000 }\r
2001\r
2002 //\r
2003 // Verify Pkcs7 SignedData via Pkcs7Verify library.\r
2004 //\r
2005 VerifyStatus = Pkcs7Verify (\r
2006 SigData,\r
2007 SigDataSize,\r
53c6ff18
ZC		 2008 TopLevelCert,\r
2009 TopLevelCertSize,\r
a6811666
SZ		 2010 NewData,\r
2011 NewDataSize\r
2012 );\r
2013\r
2014 } else if (AuthVarType == AuthVarTypeKek) {\r
2015\r
2016 //\r
2017 // Get KEK database from variable.\r
2018 //\r
2019 Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (\r
2020 EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME,\r
2021 &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
2022 &Data,\r
2023 &DataSize\r
2024 );\r
2025 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
2026 return Status;\r
2027 }\r
2028\r
2029 //\r
2030 // Ready to verify Pkcs7 SignedData. Go through KEK Signature Database to find out X.509 CertList.\r
2031 //\r
2032 KekDataSize = (UINT32) DataSize;\r
2033 CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) Data;\r
2034 while ((KekDataSize > 0) && (KekDataSize >= CertList->SignatureListSize)) {\r
2035 if (CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Guid)) {\r
2036 Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r
2037 CertCount = (CertList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - CertList->SignatureHeaderSize) / CertList->SignatureSize;\r
2038 for (Index = 0; Index < CertCount; Index++) {\r
2039 //\r
2040 // Iterate each Signature Data Node within this CertList for a verify\r
2041 //\r
53c6ff18
ZC		 2042 TrustedCert = Cert->SignatureData;\r
2043 TrustedCertSize = CertList->SignatureSize - (sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1);\r
a6811666
SZ		 2044\r
2045 //\r
2046 // Verify Pkcs7 SignedData via Pkcs7Verify library.\r
2047 //\r
2048 VerifyStatus = Pkcs7Verify (\r
2049 SigData,\r
2050 SigDataSize,\r
53c6ff18
ZC		 2051 TrustedCert,\r
2052 TrustedCertSize,\r
a6811666
SZ		 2053 NewData,\r
2054 NewDataSize\r
2055 );\r
2056 if (VerifyStatus) {\r
2057 goto Exit;\r
2058 }\r
2059 Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) Cert + CertList->SignatureSize);\r
2060 }\r
2061 }\r
2062 KekDataSize -= CertList->SignatureListSize;\r
2063 CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + CertList->SignatureListSize);\r
2064 }\r
2065 } else if (AuthVarType == AuthVarTypePriv) {\r
2066\r
2067 //\r
2068 // Process common authenticated variable except PK/KEK/DB/DBX/DBT.\r
2069 // Get signer's certificates from SignedData.\r
2070 //\r
2071 VerifyStatus = Pkcs7GetSigners (\r
2072 SigData,\r
2073 SigDataSize,\r
2074 &SignerCerts,\r
2075 &CertStackSize,\r
53c6ff18
ZC		 2076 &TopLevelCert,\r
2077 &TopLevelCertSize\r
a6811666
SZ		 2078 );\r
2079 if (!VerifyStatus) {\r
2080 goto Exit;\r
2081 }\r
2082\r
2083 //\r
98c2d961 2084 // Get previously stored signer's certificates from certdb or certdbv for existing\r
a6811666
SZ		 2085 // variable. Check whether they are identical with signer's certificates\r
2086 // in SignedData. If not, return error immediately.\r
2087 //\r
2088 if (OrgTimeStamp != NULL) {\r
2089 VerifyStatus = FALSE;\r
2090\r
98c2d961 2091 Status = GetCertsFromDb (VariableName, VendorGuid, Attributes, &CertsInCertDb, &CertsSizeinDb);\r
a6811666
SZ		 2092 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
2093 goto Exit;\r
2094 }\r
2095\r
53c6ff18
ZC		 2096 if (CertsSizeinDb == SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE) {\r
2097 //\r
2098 // Check hash of signer cert CommonName + Top-level issuer tbsCertificate against data in CertDb\r
2099 //\r
62ba0feb 2100 CertDataPtr = (EFI_CERT_DATA *)(SignerCerts + 1);\r
53c6ff18 2101 Status = CalculatePrivAuthVarSignChainSHA256Digest(\r
62ba0feb 2102 CertDataPtr->CertDataBuffer,\r
2103 ReadUnaligned32 ((UINT32 *)&(CertDataPtr->CertDataLength)),\r
53c6ff18
ZC		 2104 TopLevelCert,\r
2105 TopLevelCertSize,\r
2106 Sha256Digest\r
2107 );\r
2108 if (EFI_ERROR(Status) || CompareMem (Sha256Digest, CertsInCertDb, CertsSizeinDb) != 0){\r
2109 goto Exit;\r
2110 }\r
2111 } else {\r
2112 //\r
2113 // Keep backward compatible with previous solution which saves whole signer certs stack in CertDb\r
2114 //\r
2115 if ((CertStackSize != CertsSizeinDb) ||\r
2116 (CompareMem (SignerCerts, CertsInCertDb, CertsSizeinDb) != 0)) {\r
2117 goto Exit;\r
2118 }\r
a6811666
SZ		 2119 }\r
2120 }\r
2121\r
2122 VerifyStatus = Pkcs7Verify (\r
2123 SigData,\r
2124 SigDataSize,\r
53c6ff18
ZC		 2125 TopLevelCert,\r
2126 TopLevelCertSize,\r
a6811666
SZ		 2127 NewData,\r
2128 NewDataSize\r
2129 );\r
2130 if (!VerifyStatus) {\r
2131 goto Exit;\r
2132 }\r
2133\r
64b6a3ff 2134 if ((OrgTimeStamp == NULL) && (PayloadSize != 0)) {\r
a6811666 2135 //\r
53c6ff18 2136 // When adding a new common authenticated variable, always save Hash of cn of signer cert + tbsCertificate of Top-level issuer\r
a6811666 2137 //\r
62ba0feb 2138 CertDataPtr = (EFI_CERT_DATA *)(SignerCerts + 1);\r
53c6ff18
ZC		 2139 Status = InsertCertsToDb (\r
2140 VariableName,\r
2141 VendorGuid,\r
2142 Attributes,\r
62ba0feb 2143 CertDataPtr->CertDataBuffer,\r
2144 ReadUnaligned32 ((UINT32 *)&(CertDataPtr->CertDataLength)),\r
53c6ff18
ZC		 2145 TopLevelCert,\r
2146 TopLevelCertSize\r
2147 );\r
a6811666
SZ		 2148 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
2149 VerifyStatus = FALSE;\r
2150 goto Exit;\r
2151 }\r
2152 }\r
2153 } else if (AuthVarType == AuthVarTypePayload) {\r
2154 CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) PayloadPtr;\r
2155 Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r
53c6ff18
ZC		 2156 TrustedCert = Cert->SignatureData;\r
2157 TrustedCertSize = CertList->SignatureSize - (sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1);\r
a6811666
SZ		 2158 //\r
2159 // Verify Pkcs7 SignedData via Pkcs7Verify library.\r
2160 //\r
2161 VerifyStatus = Pkcs7Verify (\r
2162 SigData,\r
2163 SigDataSize,\r
53c6ff18
ZC		 2164 TrustedCert,\r
2165 TrustedCertSize,\r
a6811666
SZ		 2166 NewData,\r
2167 NewDataSize\r
2168 );\r
2169 } else {\r
2170 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r
2171 }\r
2172\r
2173Exit:\r
2174\r
2175 if (AuthVarType == AuthVarTypePk || AuthVarType == AuthVarTypePriv) {\r
53c6ff18 2176 Pkcs7FreeSigners (TopLevelCert);\r
a6811666
SZ		 2177 Pkcs7FreeSigners (SignerCerts);\r
2178 }\r
2179\r
2180 if (!VerifyStatus) {\r
2181 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r
2182 }\r
2183\r
2184 Status = CheckSignatureListFormat(VariableName, VendorGuid, PayloadPtr, PayloadSize);\r
2185 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
2186 return Status;\r
2187 }\r
2188\r
2189 *VarPayloadPtr = PayloadPtr;\r
2190 *VarPayloadSize = PayloadSize;\r
2191\r
2192 return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
2193}\r
2194\r
2195/**\r
2196 Process variable with EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS set\r
2197\r
2198 Caution: This function may receive untrusted input.\r
2199 This function may be invoked in SMM mode, and datasize and data are external input.\r
2200 This function will do basic validation, before parse the data.\r
2201 This function will parse the authentication carefully to avoid security issues, like\r
2202 buffer overflow, integer overflow.\r
2203\r
2204 @param[in] VariableName Name of Variable to be found.\r
2205 @param[in] VendorGuid Variable vendor GUID.\r
2206 @param[in] Data Data pointer.\r
2207 @param[in] DataSize Size of Data found. If size is less than the\r
2208 data, this value contains the required size.\r
2209 @param[in] Attributes Attribute value of the variable.\r
2210 @param[in] AuthVarType Verify against PK, KEK database, private database or certificate in data payload.\r
2211 @param[out] VarDel Delete the variable or not.\r
2212\r
2213 @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.\r
2214 @retval EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION The variable does NOT pass the validation\r
2215 check carried out by the firmware.\r
2216 @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES Failed to process variable due to lack\r
2217 of resources.\r
2218 @retval EFI_SUCCESS Variable pass validation successfully.\r
2219\r
2220**/\r
2221EFI_STATUS\r
2222VerifyTimeBasedPayloadAndUpdate (\r
2223 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r
2224 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r
2225 IN VOID *Data,\r
2226 IN UINTN DataSize,\r
2227 IN UINT32 Attributes,\r
2228 IN AUTHVAR_TYPE AuthVarType,\r
2229 OUT BOOLEAN *VarDel\r
2230 )\r
2231{\r
2232 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
2233 EFI_STATUS FindStatus;\r
2234 UINT8 *PayloadPtr;\r
2235 UINTN PayloadSize;\r
2236 EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 *CertData;\r
2237 AUTH_VARIABLE_INFO OrgVariableInfo;\r
64b6a3ff 2238 BOOLEAN IsDel;\r
a6811666
SZ		 2239\r
2240 ZeroMem (&OrgVariableInfo, sizeof (OrgVariableInfo));\r
2241 FindStatus = mAuthVarLibContextIn->FindVariable (\r
2242 VariableName,\r
2243 VendorGuid,\r
2244 &OrgVariableInfo\r
2245 );\r
2246\r
2247 Status = VerifyTimeBasedPayload (\r
2248 VariableName,\r
2249 VendorGuid,\r
2250 Data,\r
2251 DataSize,\r
2252 Attributes,\r
2253 AuthVarType,\r
2254 (!EFI_ERROR (FindStatus)) ? OrgVariableInfo.TimeStamp : NULL,\r
2255 &PayloadPtr,\r
2256 &PayloadSize\r
2257 );\r
2258 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
2259 return Status;\r
2260 }\r
2261\r
64b6a3ff
CZ		 2262 if (!EFI_ERROR(FindStatus)\r
2263 && (PayloadSize == 0)\r
2264 && ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_APPEND_WRITE) == 0)) {\r
2265 IsDel = TRUE;\r
2266 } else {\r
2267 IsDel = FALSE;\r
a6811666
SZ		 2268 }\r
2269\r
2270 CertData = (EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 *) Data;\r
2271\r
2272 //\r
2273 // Final step: Update/Append Variable if it pass Pkcs7Verify\r
2274 //\r
64b6a3ff
CZ		 2275 Status = AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariableWithTimeStamp (\r
2276 VariableName,\r
2277 VendorGuid,\r
2278 PayloadPtr,\r
2279 PayloadSize,\r
2280 Attributes,\r
2281 &CertData->TimeStamp\r
2282 );\r
2283\r
2284 //\r
2285 // Delete signer's certificates when delete the common authenticated variable.\r
2286 //\r
2287 if (IsDel && AuthVarType == AuthVarTypePriv && !EFI_ERROR(Status) ) {\r
98c2d961 2288 Status = DeleteCertsFromDb (VariableName, VendorGuid, Attributes);\r
64b6a3ff
CZ		 2289 }\r
2290\r
2291 if (VarDel != NULL) {\r
2292 if (IsDel && !EFI_ERROR(Status)) {\r
2293 *VarDel = TRUE;\r
2294 } else {\r
2295 *VarDel = FALSE;\r
2296 }\r
2297 }\r
2298\r
2299 return Status;\r
a6811666 2300}\r
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