0c18794e |
1 | /** @file\r |
2 | Implement image verification services for secure boot service in UEFI2.3.1.\r |
3 | \r |
4 | Copyright (c) 2009 - 2011, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>\r |
5 | This program and the accompanying materials \r |
6 | are licensed and made available under the terms and conditions of the BSD License \r |
7 | which accompanies this distribution. The full text of the license may be found at \r |
8 | http://opensource.org/licenses/bsd-license.php\r |
9 | \r |
10 | THE PROGRAM IS DISTRIBUTED UNDER THE BSD LICENSE ON AN "AS IS" BASIS, \r |
11 | WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR REPRESENTATIONS OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED.\r |
12 | \r |
13 | **/\r |
14 | \r |
15 | #include "DxeImageVerificationLib.h"\r |
16 | \r |
17 | EFI_IMAGE_OPTIONAL_HEADER_PTR_UNION mNtHeader;\r |
18 | UINTN mImageSize;\r |
19 | UINT32 mPeCoffHeaderOffset; \r |
20 | UINT8 mImageDigest[MAX_DIGEST_SIZE];\r |
21 | UINTN mImageDigestSize;\r |
22 | EFI_IMAGE_DATA_DIRECTORY *mSecDataDir = NULL;\r |
23 | UINT8 *mImageBase = NULL;\r |
24 | EFI_GUID mCertType;\r |
25 | \r |
26 | //\r |
27 | // Notify string for authorization UI.\r |
28 | //\r |
29 | CHAR16 mNotifyString1[MAX_NOTIFY_STRING_LEN] = L"Image verification pass but not found in authorized database!";\r |
30 | CHAR16 mNotifyString2[MAX_NOTIFY_STRING_LEN] = L"Launch this image anyway? (Yes/Defer/No)";\r |
31 | //\r |
32 | // Public Exponent of RSA Key.\r |
33 | //\r |
34 | CONST UINT8 mRsaE[] = { 0x01, 0x00, 0x01 };\r |
35 | \r |
36 | \r |
37 | //\r |
38 | // OID ASN.1 Value for Hash Algorithms\r |
39 | //\r |
40 | UINT8 mHashOidValue[] = {\r |
41 | 0x2A, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xF7, 0x0D, 0x02, 0x05, // OBJ_md5\r |
42 | 0x2B, 0x0E, 0x03, 0x02, 0x1A, // OBJ_sha1\r |
43 | 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x04, // OBJ_sha224\r |
44 | 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x01, // OBJ_sha256\r |
45 | 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x02, // OBJ_sha384\r |
46 | 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x03, // OBJ_sha512\r |
47 | };\r |
48 | \r |
49 | HASH_TABLE mHash[] = {\r |
50 | { L"SHA1", 20, &mHashOidValue[8], 5, Sha1GetContextSize, Sha1Init, Sha1Update, Sha1Final },\r |
51 | { L"SHA224", 28, &mHashOidValue[13], 9, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL },\r |
52 | { L"SHA256", 32, &mHashOidValue[22], 9, Sha256GetContextSize,Sha256Init, Sha256Update, Sha256Final},\r |
53 | { L"SHA384", 48, &mHashOidValue[31], 9, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL },\r |
54 | { L"SHA512", 64, &mHashOidValue[40], 9, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL }\r |
55 | };\r |
56 | \r |
57 | \r |
58 | /**\r |
59 | Get the image type.\r |
60 | \r |
61 | @param[in] File This is a pointer to the device path of the file that is\r |
62 | being dispatched. \r |
63 | \r |
64 | @return UINT32 Image Type \r |
65 | \r |
66 | **/\r |
67 | UINT32\r |
68 | GetImageType (\r |
69 | IN CONST EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *File\r |
70 | )\r |
71 | {\r |
72 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r |
73 | EFI_HANDLE DeviceHandle; \r |
74 | EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *TempDevicePath;\r |
75 | EFI_BLOCK_IO_PROTOCOL *BlockIo;\r |
76 | \r |
77 | //\r |
78 | // First check to see if File is from a Firmware Volume\r |
79 | //\r |
80 | DeviceHandle = NULL;\r |
81 | TempDevicePath = (EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *)File;\r |
82 | Status = gBS->LocateDevicePath (\r |
83 | &gEfiFirmwareVolume2ProtocolGuid,\r |
84 | &TempDevicePath,\r |
85 | &DeviceHandle\r |
86 | );\r |
87 | if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r |
88 | Status = gBS->OpenProtocol (\r |
89 | DeviceHandle,\r |
90 | &gEfiFirmwareVolume2ProtocolGuid,\r |
91 | NULL,\r |
92 | NULL,\r |
93 | NULL,\r |
94 | EFI_OPEN_PROTOCOL_TEST_PROTOCOL\r |
95 | );\r |
96 | if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r |
97 | return IMAGE_FROM_FV;\r |
98 | }\r |
99 | }\r |
100 | \r |
101 | //\r |
102 | // Next check to see if File is from a Block I/O device\r |
103 | //\r |
104 | DeviceHandle = NULL;\r |
105 | TempDevicePath = (EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *)File;\r |
106 | Status = gBS->LocateDevicePath (\r |
107 | &gEfiBlockIoProtocolGuid,\r |
108 | &TempDevicePath,\r |
109 | &DeviceHandle\r |
110 | );\r |
111 | if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r |
112 | BlockIo = NULL;\r |
113 | Status = gBS->OpenProtocol (\r |
114 | DeviceHandle,\r |
115 | &gEfiBlockIoProtocolGuid,\r |
116 | (VOID **) &BlockIo,\r |
117 | NULL,\r |
118 | NULL,\r |
119 | EFI_OPEN_PROTOCOL_GET_PROTOCOL\r |
120 | );\r |
121 | if (!EFI_ERROR (Status) && BlockIo != NULL) {\r |
122 | if (BlockIo->Media != NULL) {\r |
123 | if (BlockIo->Media->RemovableMedia) {\r |
124 | //\r |
125 | // Block I/O is present and specifies the media is removable\r |
126 | //\r |
127 | return IMAGE_FROM_REMOVABLE_MEDIA;\r |
128 | } else {\r |
129 | //\r |
130 | // Block I/O is present and specifies the media is not removable\r |
131 | //\r |
132 | return IMAGE_FROM_FIXED_MEDIA;\r |
133 | }\r |
134 | }\r |
135 | }\r |
136 | }\r |
137 | \r |
138 | //\r |
139 | // File is not in a Firmware Volume or on a Block I/O device, so check to see if \r |
140 | // the device path supports the Simple File System Protocol.\r |
141 | //\r |
142 | DeviceHandle = NULL;\r |
143 | TempDevicePath = (EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *)File;\r |
144 | Status = gBS->LocateDevicePath (\r |
145 | &gEfiSimpleFileSystemProtocolGuid,\r |
146 | &TempDevicePath,\r |
147 | &DeviceHandle\r |
148 | );\r |
149 | if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r |
150 | //\r |
151 | // Simple File System is present without Block I/O, so assume media is fixed.\r |
152 | //\r |
153 | return IMAGE_FROM_FIXED_MEDIA;\r |
154 | }\r |
155 | \r |
156 | //\r |
157 | // File is not from an FV, Block I/O or Simple File System, so the only options\r |
158 | // left are a PCI Option ROM and a Load File Protocol such as a PXE Boot from a NIC. \r |
159 | //\r |
160 | TempDevicePath = (EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *)File;\r |
161 | while (!IsDevicePathEndType (TempDevicePath)) {\r |
162 | switch (DevicePathType (TempDevicePath)) {\r |
163 | \r |
164 | case MEDIA_DEVICE_PATH:\r |
165 | if (DevicePathSubType (TempDevicePath) == MEDIA_RELATIVE_OFFSET_RANGE_DP) {\r |
166 | return IMAGE_FROM_OPTION_ROM;\r |
167 | }\r |
168 | break;\r |
169 | \r |
170 | case MESSAGING_DEVICE_PATH:\r |
171 | if (DevicePathSubType(TempDevicePath) == MSG_MAC_ADDR_DP) {\r |
172 | return IMAGE_FROM_REMOVABLE_MEDIA;\r |
173 | } \r |
174 | break;\r |
175 | \r |
176 | default:\r |
177 | break;\r |
178 | }\r |
179 | TempDevicePath = NextDevicePathNode (TempDevicePath);\r |
180 | }\r |
181 | return IMAGE_UNKNOWN; \r |
182 | }\r |
183 | \r |
184 | /**\r |
185 | Caculate hash of Pe/Coff image based on the authenticode image hashing in\r |
186 | PE/COFF Specification 8.0 Appendix A\r |
187 | \r |
188 | @param[in] HashAlg Hash algorithm type.\r |
189 | \r |
190 | @retval TRUE Successfully hash image.\r |
191 | @retval FALSE Fail in hash image.\r |
192 | \r |
193 | **/\r |
194 | BOOLEAN \r |
195 | HashPeImage (\r |
196 | IN UINT32 HashAlg\r |
197 | )\r |
198 | {\r |
199 | BOOLEAN Status;\r |
200 | UINT16 Magic;\r |
201 | EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER *Section;\r |
202 | VOID *HashCtx;\r |
203 | UINTN CtxSize;\r |
204 | UINT8 *HashBase;\r |
205 | UINTN HashSize;\r |
206 | UINTN SumOfBytesHashed;\r |
207 | EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER *SectionHeader;\r |
208 | UINTN Index;\r |
209 | UINTN Pos;\r |
570b3d1a |
210 | UINTN SumOfSectionBytes;\r |
211 | EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER *SectionCache; \r |
212 | \r |
0c18794e |
213 | HashCtx = NULL;\r |
214 | SectionHeader = NULL;\r |
215 | Status = FALSE;\r |
216 | \r |
217 | if ((HashAlg != HASHALG_SHA1) && (HashAlg != HASHALG_SHA256)) {\r |
218 | return FALSE;\r |
219 | }\r |
220 | \r |
221 | //\r |
222 | // Initialize context of hash.\r |
223 | //\r |
224 | ZeroMem (mImageDigest, MAX_DIGEST_SIZE);\r |
225 | \r |
226 | if (HashAlg == HASHALG_SHA1) {\r |
227 | mImageDigestSize = SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE;\r |
228 | mCertType = gEfiCertSha1Guid;\r |
229 | } else if (HashAlg == HASHALG_SHA256) {\r |
230 | mImageDigestSize = SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE;\r |
231 | mCertType = gEfiCertSha256Guid;\r |
232 | } else {\r |
233 | return FALSE;\r |
234 | }\r |
235 | \r |
236 | CtxSize = mHash[HashAlg].GetContextSize();\r |
237 | \r |
238 | HashCtx = AllocatePool (CtxSize);\r |
570b3d1a |
239 | if (HashCtx == NULL) {\r |
240 | return FALSE;\r |
241 | }\r |
0c18794e |
242 | \r |
243 | // 1. Load the image header into memory.\r |
244 | \r |
245 | // 2. Initialize a SHA hash context.\r |
246 | Status = mHash[HashAlg].HashInit(HashCtx);\r |
247 | \r |
248 | if (!Status) {\r |
249 | goto Done;\r |
250 | }\r |
251 | //\r |
252 | // Measuring PE/COFF Image Header;\r |
253 | // But CheckSum field and SECURITY data directory (certificate) are excluded\r |
254 | //\r |
255 | Magic = mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.Magic;\r |
256 | //\r |
257 | // 3. Calculate the distance from the base of the image header to the image checksum address.\r |
258 | // 4. Hash the image header from its base to beginning of the image checksum.\r |
259 | //\r |
260 | HashBase = mImageBase;\r |
261 | if (Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {\r |
262 | //\r |
263 | // Use PE32 offset.\r |
264 | //\r |
265 | HashSize = (UINTN) ((UINT8 *) (&mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.CheckSum) - HashBase);\r |
570b3d1a |
266 | } else if (Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR64_MAGIC) {\r |
0c18794e |
267 | //\r |
268 | // Use PE32+ offset.\r |
269 | //\r |
270 | HashSize = (UINTN) ((UINT8 *) (&mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.CheckSum) - HashBase);\r |
570b3d1a |
271 | } else {\r |
272 | //\r |
273 | // Invalid header magic number.\r |
274 | //\r |
275 | Status = FALSE;\r |
276 | goto Done;\r |
0c18794e |
277 | }\r |
278 | \r |
279 | Status = mHash[HashAlg].HashUpdate(HashCtx, HashBase, HashSize);\r |
280 | if (!Status) {\r |
281 | goto Done;\r |
282 | }\r |
283 | //\r |
284 | // 5. Skip over the image checksum (it occupies a single ULONG).\r |
285 | // 6. Get the address of the beginning of the Cert Directory.\r |
286 | // 7. Hash everything from the end of the checksum to the start of the Cert Directory.\r |
287 | //\r |
288 | if (Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {\r |
289 | //\r |
290 | // Use PE32 offset.\r |
291 | //\r |
292 | HashBase = (UINT8 *) &mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.CheckSum + sizeof (UINT32);\r |
293 | HashSize = (UINTN) ((UINT8 *) (&mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY]) - HashBase);\r |
294 | } else {\r |
295 | //\r |
296 | // Use PE32+ offset.\r |
297 | // \r |
298 | HashBase = (UINT8 *) &mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.CheckSum + sizeof (UINT32);\r |
299 | HashSize = (UINTN) ((UINT8 *) (&mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY]) - HashBase);\r |
300 | }\r |
301 | \r |
302 | Status = mHash[HashAlg].HashUpdate(HashCtx, HashBase, HashSize);\r |
303 | if (!Status) {\r |
304 | goto Done;\r |
305 | }\r |
306 | //\r |
307 | // 8. Skip over the Cert Directory. (It is sizeof(IMAGE_DATA_DIRECTORY) bytes.)\r |
308 | // 9. Hash everything from the end of the Cert Directory to the end of image header.\r |
309 | //\r |
310 | if (Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {\r |
311 | //\r |
312 | // Use PE32 offset\r |
313 | //\r |
314 | HashBase = (UINT8 *) &mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY + 1];\r |
315 | HashSize = mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.SizeOfHeaders - (UINTN) ((UINT8 *) (&mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY + 1]) - mImageBase);\r |
316 | } else {\r |
317 | //\r |
318 | // Use PE32+ offset.\r |
319 | //\r |
320 | HashBase = (UINT8 *) &mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY + 1];\r |
321 | HashSize = mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.SizeOfHeaders - (UINTN) ((UINT8 *) (&mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY + 1]) - mImageBase);\r |
322 | }\r |
323 | \r |
324 | Status = mHash[HashAlg].HashUpdate(HashCtx, HashBase, HashSize);\r |
325 | if (!Status) {\r |
326 | goto Done;\r |
327 | }\r |
328 | //\r |
329 | // 10. Set the SUM_OF_BYTES_HASHED to the size of the header.\r |
330 | //\r |
331 | if (Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {\r |
332 | //\r |
333 | // Use PE32 offset.\r |
334 | //\r |
335 | SumOfBytesHashed = mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.SizeOfHeaders;\r |
336 | } else {\r |
337 | //\r |
338 | // Use PE32+ offset\r |
339 | //\r |
340 | SumOfBytesHashed = mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.SizeOfHeaders;\r |
341 | }\r |
342 | \r |
570b3d1a |
343 | \r |
344 | Section = (EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER *) (\r |
345 | mImageBase +\r |
346 | mPeCoffHeaderOffset +\r |
347 | sizeof (UINT32) +\r |
348 | sizeof (EFI_IMAGE_FILE_HEADER) +\r |
349 | mNtHeader.Pe32->FileHeader.SizeOfOptionalHeader\r |
350 | );\r |
351 | \r |
352 | SectionCache = Section;\r |
353 | for (Index = 0, SumOfSectionBytes = 0; Index < mNtHeader.Pe32->FileHeader.NumberOfSections; Index++, SectionCache++) {\r |
354 | SumOfSectionBytes += SectionCache->SizeOfRawData;\r |
355 | }\r |
356 | \r |
357 | //\r |
358 | // Sanity check for file corruption. Sections raw data size should be smaller\r |
359 | // than Image Size.\r |
360 | //\r |
361 | if (SumOfSectionBytes >= mImageSize) {\r |
362 | Status = FALSE;\r |
363 | goto Done;\r |
364 | }\r |
365 | \r |
0c18794e |
366 | //\r |
367 | // 11. Build a temporary table of pointers to all the IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER\r |
368 | // structures in the image. The 'NumberOfSections' field of the image\r |
369 | // header indicates how big the table should be. Do not include any\r |
370 | // IMAGE_SECTION_HEADERs in the table whose 'SizeOfRawData' field is zero.\r |
371 | //\r |
372 | SectionHeader = (EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER *) AllocateZeroPool (sizeof (EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER) * mNtHeader.Pe32->FileHeader.NumberOfSections);\r |
570b3d1a |
373 | if (SectionHeader == NULL) {\r |
374 | Status = FALSE;\r |
375 | goto Done;\r |
376 | }\r |
0c18794e |
377 | //\r |
378 | // 12. Using the 'PointerToRawData' in the referenced section headers as\r |
379 | // a key, arrange the elements in the table in ascending order. In other\r |
380 | // words, sort the section headers according to the disk-file offset of\r |
381 | // the section.\r |
382 | //\r |
0c18794e |
383 | for (Index = 0; Index < mNtHeader.Pe32->FileHeader.NumberOfSections; Index++) {\r |
384 | Pos = Index;\r |
385 | while ((Pos > 0) && (Section->PointerToRawData < SectionHeader[Pos - 1].PointerToRawData)) {\r |
386 | CopyMem (&SectionHeader[Pos], &SectionHeader[Pos - 1], sizeof (EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER));\r |
387 | Pos--;\r |
388 | }\r |
389 | CopyMem (&SectionHeader[Pos], Section, sizeof (EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER));\r |
390 | Section += 1;\r |
391 | }\r |
392 | \r |
393 | //\r |
394 | // 13. Walk through the sorted table, bring the corresponding section\r |
395 | // into memory, and hash the entire section (using the 'SizeOfRawData'\r |
396 | // field in the section header to determine the amount of data to hash).\r |
397 | // 14. Add the section's 'SizeOfRawData' to SUM_OF_BYTES_HASHED .\r |
398 | // 15. Repeat steps 13 and 14 for all the sections in the sorted table.\r |
399 | //\r |
400 | for (Index = 0; Index < mNtHeader.Pe32->FileHeader.NumberOfSections; Index++) {\r |
401 | Section = &SectionHeader[Index];\r |
402 | if (Section->SizeOfRawData == 0) {\r |
403 | continue;\r |
404 | }\r |
405 | HashBase = mImageBase + Section->PointerToRawData;\r |
406 | HashSize = (UINTN) Section->SizeOfRawData;\r |
407 | \r |
408 | Status = mHash[HashAlg].HashUpdate(HashCtx, HashBase, HashSize);\r |
409 | if (!Status) {\r |
410 | goto Done;\r |
411 | }\r |
412 | \r |
413 | SumOfBytesHashed += HashSize;\r |
414 | }\r |
415 | \r |
416 | //\r |
417 | // 16. If the file size is greater than SUM_OF_BYTES_HASHED, there is extra\r |
418 | // data in the file that needs to be added to the hash. This data begins\r |
419 | // at file offset SUM_OF_BYTES_HASHED and its length is:\r |
420 | // FileSize - (CertDirectory->Size)\r |
421 | //\r |
422 | if (mImageSize > SumOfBytesHashed) {\r |
423 | HashBase = mImageBase + SumOfBytesHashed;\r |
424 | if (Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {\r |
425 | //\r |
426 | // Use PE32 offset.\r |
427 | //\r |
428 | HashSize = (UINTN)(\r |
429 | mImageSize -\r |
430 | mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY].Size -\r |
431 | SumOfBytesHashed);\r |
432 | } else {\r |
433 | //\r |
434 | // Use PE32+ offset.\r |
435 | //\r |
436 | HashSize = (UINTN)(\r |
437 | mImageSize -\r |
438 | mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY].Size -\r |
439 | SumOfBytesHashed); \r |
440 | }\r |
441 | \r |
442 | Status = mHash[HashAlg].HashUpdate(HashCtx, HashBase, HashSize);\r |
443 | if (!Status) {\r |
444 | goto Done;\r |
445 | }\r |
446 | }\r |
447 | Status = mHash[HashAlg].HashFinal(HashCtx, mImageDigest);\r |
448 | \r |
449 | Done:\r |
450 | if (HashCtx != NULL) {\r |
451 | FreePool (HashCtx);\r |
452 | }\r |
453 | if (SectionHeader != NULL) {\r |
454 | FreePool (SectionHeader);\r |
455 | }\r |
456 | return Status;\r |
457 | }\r |
458 | \r |
459 | /**\r |
460 | Recognize the Hash algorithm in PE/COFF Authenticode and caculate hash of \r |
461 | Pe/Coff image based on the authenticode image hashing in PE/COFF Specification \r |
462 | 8.0 Appendix A\r |
463 | \r |
464 | @retval EFI_UNSUPPORTED Hash algorithm is not supported.\r |
465 | @retval EFI_SUCCESS Hash successfully.\r |
466 | \r |
467 | **/\r |
468 | EFI_STATUS \r |
469 | HashPeImageByType (\r |
470 | VOID\r |
471 | )\r |
472 | {\r |
473 | UINT8 Index;\r |
474 | WIN_CERTIFICATE_EFI_PKCS *PkcsCertData;\r |
475 | \r |
476 | PkcsCertData = (WIN_CERTIFICATE_EFI_PKCS *) (mImageBase + mSecDataDir->VirtualAddress);\r |
477 | \r |
478 | for (Index = 0; Index < HASHALG_MAX; Index++) { \r |
479 | //\r |
480 | // Check the Hash algorithm in PE/COFF Authenticode.\r |
481 | // According to PKCS#7 Definition: \r |
482 | // SignedData ::= SEQUENCE {\r |
483 | // version Version,\r |
484 | // digestAlgorithms DigestAlgorithmIdentifiers,\r |
485 | // contentInfo ContentInfo,\r |
486 | // .... }\r |
487 | // The DigestAlgorithmIdentifiers can be used to determine the hash algorithm in PE/COFF hashing\r |
488 | // This field has the fixed offset (+32) in final Authenticode ASN.1 data.\r |
489 | // \r |
490 | if (CompareMem (PkcsCertData->CertData + 32, mHash[Index].OidValue, mHash[Index].OidLength) == 0) {\r |
491 | break;\r |
492 | }\r |
493 | }\r |
494 | \r |
495 | if (Index == HASHALG_MAX) {\r |
496 | return EFI_UNSUPPORTED;\r |
497 | }\r |
498 | \r |
499 | //\r |
500 | // HASH PE Image based on Hash algorithm in PE/COFF Authenticode.\r |
501 | //\r |
502 | if (!HashPeImage(Index)) {\r |
503 | return EFI_UNSUPPORTED;\r |
504 | }\r |
505 | \r |
506 | return EFI_SUCCESS;\r |
507 | }\r |
508 | \r |
509 | \r |
510 | /**\r |
511 | Returns the size of a given image execution info table in bytes.\r |
512 | \r |
513 | This function returns the size, in bytes, of the image execution info table specified by\r |
514 | ImageExeInfoTable. If ImageExeInfoTable is NULL, then 0 is returned.\r |
515 | \r |
516 | @param ImageExeInfoTable A pointer to a image execution info table structure.\r |
517 | \r |
518 | @retval 0 If ImageExeInfoTable is NULL.\r |
519 | @retval Others The size of a image execution info table in bytes.\r |
520 | \r |
521 | **/\r |
522 | UINTN\r |
523 | GetImageExeInfoTableSize (\r |
524 | EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO_TABLE *ImageExeInfoTable\r |
525 | )\r |
526 | {\r |
527 | UINTN Index;\r |
528 | EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO *ImageExeInfoItem;\r |
529 | UINTN TotalSize;\r |
530 | \r |
531 | if (ImageExeInfoTable == NULL) {\r |
532 | return 0;\r |
533 | }\r |
534 | \r |
535 | ImageExeInfoItem = (EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO *) ((UINT8 *) ImageExeInfoTable + sizeof (EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO_TABLE));\r |
536 | TotalSize = sizeof (EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO_TABLE);\r |
537 | for (Index = 0; Index < ImageExeInfoTable->NumberOfImages; Index++) {\r |
538 | TotalSize += ReadUnaligned32 ((UINT32 *) &ImageExeInfoItem->InfoSize);\r |
539 | ImageExeInfoItem = (EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO *) ((UINT8 *) ImageExeInfoItem + ReadUnaligned32 ((UINT32 *) &ImageExeInfoItem->InfoSize));\r |
540 | }\r |
541 | \r |
542 | return TotalSize;\r |
543 | }\r |
544 | \r |
545 | /**\r |
546 | Create an Image Execution Information Table entry and add it to system configuration table.\r |
547 | \r |
548 | @param[in] Action Describes the action taken by the firmware regarding this image.\r |
549 | @param[in] Name Input a null-terminated, user-friendly name.\r |
550 | @param[in] DevicePath Input device path pointer.\r |
551 | @param[in] Signature Input signature info in EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST data structure.\r |
552 | @param[in] SignatureSize Size of signature.\r |
553 | \r |
554 | **/\r |
555 | VOID\r |
556 | AddImageExeInfo (\r |
557 | IN EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_ACTION Action, \r |
558 | IN CHAR16 *Name OPTIONAL, \r |
559 | IN CONST EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *DevicePath,\r |
560 | IN EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *Signature OPTIONAL,\r |
561 | IN UINTN SignatureSize\r |
562 | )\r |
563 | {\r |
0c18794e |
564 | EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO_TABLE *ImageExeInfoTable;\r |
565 | EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO_TABLE *NewImageExeInfoTable;\r |
566 | EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO *ImageExeInfoEntry;\r |
567 | UINTN ImageExeInfoTableSize;\r |
568 | UINTN NewImageExeInfoEntrySize;\r |
569 | UINTN NameStringLen;\r |
570 | UINTN DevicePathSize;\r |
571 | \r |
0c18794e |
572 | ImageExeInfoTable = NULL;\r |
573 | NewImageExeInfoTable = NULL;\r |
574 | ImageExeInfoEntry = NULL;\r |
575 | NameStringLen = 0;\r |
576 | \r |
570b3d1a |
577 | if (DevicePath == NULL) {\r |
578 | return ;\r |
579 | }\r |
580 | \r |
0c18794e |
581 | if (Name != NULL) {\r |
582 | NameStringLen = StrSize (Name);\r |
583 | }\r |
584 | \r |
585 | ImageExeInfoTable = NULL;\r |
586 | EfiGetSystemConfigurationTable (&gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, (VOID**)&ImageExeInfoTable);\r |
587 | if (ImageExeInfoTable != NULL) {\r |
588 | //\r |
589 | // The table has been found!\r |
590 | // We must enlarge the table to accmodate the new exe info entry.\r |
591 | //\r |
592 | ImageExeInfoTableSize = GetImageExeInfoTableSize (ImageExeInfoTable);\r |
593 | } else {\r |
594 | //\r |
595 | // Not Found!\r |
596 | // We should create a new table to append to the configuration table.\r |
597 | //\r |
598 | ImageExeInfoTableSize = sizeof (EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO_TABLE);\r |
599 | }\r |
600 | \r |
601 | DevicePathSize = GetDevicePathSize (DevicePath);\r |
602 | NewImageExeInfoEntrySize = sizeof (EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO) + NameStringLen + DevicePathSize + SignatureSize;\r |
603 | NewImageExeInfoTable = (EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO_TABLE *) AllocateRuntimePool (ImageExeInfoTableSize + NewImageExeInfoEntrySize);\r |
570b3d1a |
604 | if (NewImageExeInfoTable == NULL) {\r |
605 | return ;\r |
606 | }\r |
0c18794e |
607 | \r |
608 | if (ImageExeInfoTable != NULL) {\r |
609 | CopyMem (NewImageExeInfoTable, ImageExeInfoTable, ImageExeInfoTableSize);\r |
610 | } else {\r |
611 | NewImageExeInfoTable->NumberOfImages = 0;\r |
612 | }\r |
613 | NewImageExeInfoTable->NumberOfImages++;\r |
614 | ImageExeInfoEntry = (EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO *) ((UINT8 *) NewImageExeInfoTable + ImageExeInfoTableSize);\r |
615 | //\r |
616 | // Update new item's infomation.\r |
617 | //\r |
618 | WriteUnaligned32 ((UINT32 *) &ImageExeInfoEntry->Action, Action);\r |
619 | WriteUnaligned32 ((UINT32 *) &ImageExeInfoEntry->InfoSize, (UINT32) NewImageExeInfoEntrySize);\r |
620 | \r |
621 | if (Name != NULL) {\r |
622 | CopyMem ((UINT8 *) &ImageExeInfoEntry->InfoSize + sizeof (UINT32), Name, NameStringLen);\r |
623 | }\r |
624 | CopyMem (\r |
625 | (UINT8 *) &ImageExeInfoEntry->InfoSize + sizeof (UINT32) + NameStringLen,\r |
626 | DevicePath,\r |
627 | DevicePathSize\r |
628 | );\r |
629 | if (Signature != NULL) {\r |
630 | CopyMem (\r |
631 | (UINT8 *) &ImageExeInfoEntry->InfoSize + sizeof (UINT32) + NameStringLen + DevicePathSize,\r |
632 | Signature,\r |
633 | SignatureSize\r |
634 | );\r |
635 | }\r |
636 | //\r |
637 | // Update/replace the image execution table.\r |
638 | //\r |
570b3d1a |
639 | gBS->InstallConfigurationTable (&gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, (VOID *) NewImageExeInfoTable);\r |
640 | \r |
0c18794e |
641 | //\r |
642 | // Free Old table data!\r |
643 | //\r |
644 | if (ImageExeInfoTable != NULL) {\r |
645 | FreePool (ImageExeInfoTable);\r |
646 | }\r |
647 | }\r |
648 | \r |
649 | /**\r |
650 | Discover if the UEFI image is authorized by user's policy setting.\r |
651 | \r |
652 | @param[in] Policy Specify platform's policy setting. \r |
653 | \r |
654 | @retval EFI_ACCESS_DENIED Image is not allowed to run.\r |
655 | @retval EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION Image is deferred.\r |
656 | @retval EFI_SUCCESS Image is authorized to run.\r |
657 | \r |
658 | **/\r |
659 | EFI_STATUS\r |
660 | ImageAuthorization (\r |
661 | IN UINT32 Policy\r |
662 | )\r |
663 | {\r |
664 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r |
665 | EFI_INPUT_KEY Key;\r |
666 | \r |
667 | Status = EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;\r |
668 | \r |
669 | switch (Policy) {\r |
670 | \r |
671 | case QUERY_USER_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION:\r |
672 | do {\r |
673 | CreatePopUp (EFI_LIGHTGRAY | EFI_BACKGROUND_BLUE, &Key, mNotifyString1, mNotifyString2, NULL);\r |
674 | if (Key.UnicodeChar == L'Y' || Key.UnicodeChar == L'y') {\r |
675 | Status = EFI_SUCCESS;\r |
676 | break;\r |
677 | } else if (Key.UnicodeChar == L'N' || Key.UnicodeChar == L'n') {\r |
678 | Status = EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;\r |
679 | break;\r |
680 | } else if (Key.UnicodeChar == L'D' || Key.UnicodeChar == L'd') {\r |
681 | Status = EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r |
682 | break;\r |
683 | }\r |
684 | } while (TRUE);\r |
685 | break;\r |
686 | \r |
687 | case ALLOW_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION:\r |
688 | Status = EFI_SUCCESS;\r |
689 | break;\r |
690 | \r |
691 | case DEFER_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION:\r |
692 | Status = EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r |
693 | break;\r |
694 | \r |
695 | case DENY_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION:\r |
696 | Status = EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;\r |
697 | break;\r |
698 | }\r |
699 | \r |
700 | return Status;\r |
701 | }\r |
702 | \r |
703 | /**\r |
704 | Check whether signature is in specified database.\r |
705 | \r |
706 | @param[in] VariableName Name of database variable that is searched in.\r |
707 | @param[in] Signature Pointer to signature that is searched for.\r |
708 | @param[in] CertType Pointer to hash algrithom.\r |
709 | @param[in] SignatureSize Size of Signature.\r |
710 | \r |
711 | @return TRUE Found the signature in the variable database.\r |
712 | @return FALSE Not found the signature in the variable database.\r |
713 | \r |
714 | **/\r |
715 | BOOLEAN\r |
716 | IsSignatureFoundInDatabase (\r |
717 | IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r |
718 | IN UINT8 *Signature, \r |
719 | IN EFI_GUID *CertType,\r |
720 | IN UINTN SignatureSize\r |
721 | )\r |
722 | {\r |
723 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r |
724 | EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *CertList;\r |
725 | EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *Cert;\r |
726 | UINTN DataSize;\r |
727 | UINT8 *Data;\r |
728 | UINTN Index;\r |
729 | UINTN CertCount;\r |
730 | BOOLEAN IsFound;\r |
731 | //\r |
732 | // Read signature database variable.\r |
733 | //\r |
734 | IsFound = FALSE;\r |
735 | Data = NULL;\r |
736 | DataSize = 0;\r |
737 | Status = gRT->GetVariable (VariableName, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, NULL, &DataSize, NULL);\r |
738 | if (Status != EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {\r |
739 | return FALSE;\r |
740 | }\r |
741 | \r |
742 | Data = (UINT8 *) AllocateZeroPool (DataSize);\r |
570b3d1a |
743 | if (Data == NULL) {\r |
744 | return FALSE;\r |
745 | }\r |
0c18794e |
746 | \r |
747 | Status = gRT->GetVariable (VariableName, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, NULL, &DataSize, Data);\r |
748 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r |
749 | goto Done;\r |
750 | }\r |
751 | //\r |
752 | // Enumerate all signature data in SigDB to check if executable's signature exists.\r |
753 | //\r |
754 | CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) Data;\r |
755 | while ((DataSize > 0) && (DataSize >= CertList->SignatureListSize)) {\r |
756 | CertCount = (CertList->SignatureListSize - CertList->SignatureHeaderSize) / CertList->SignatureSize;\r |
757 | Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r |
758 | if ((CertList->SignatureSize == sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1 + SignatureSize) && (CompareGuid(&CertList->SignatureType, CertType))) {\r |
759 | for (Index = 0; Index < CertCount; Index++) {\r |
760 | if (CompareMem (Cert->SignatureData, Signature, SignatureSize) == 0) {\r |
761 | //\r |
762 | // Find the signature in database.\r |
763 | //\r |
764 | IsFound = TRUE;\r |
765 | break;\r |
766 | }\r |
767 | \r |
768 | Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) Cert + CertList->SignatureSize);\r |
769 | }\r |
770 | \r |
771 | if (IsFound) {\r |
772 | break;\r |
773 | }\r |
774 | }\r |
775 | \r |
776 | DataSize -= CertList->SignatureListSize;\r |
777 | CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + CertList->SignatureListSize);\r |
778 | }\r |
779 | \r |
780 | Done:\r |
781 | if (Data != NULL) {\r |
782 | FreePool (Data);\r |
783 | }\r |
784 | \r |
785 | return IsFound;\r |
786 | }\r |
787 | \r |
788 | /**\r |
789 | Verify certificate in WIN_CERT_TYPE_PKCS_SIGNED_DATA format .\r |
790 | \r |
791 | @retval EFI_SUCCESS Image pass verification.\r |
792 | @retval EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION Image fail verification.\r |
570b3d1a |
793 | @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCE Fail to allocate memory.\r |
0c18794e |
794 | \r |
795 | **/\r |
796 | EFI_STATUS \r |
797 | VerifyCertPkcsSignedData (\r |
798 | VOID\r |
799 | )\r |
800 | {\r |
801 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r |
802 | BOOLEAN VerifyStatus;\r |
803 | WIN_CERTIFICATE_EFI_PKCS *PkcsCertData;\r |
804 | EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *CertList;\r |
805 | EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *Cert;\r |
806 | UINTN DataSize;\r |
570b3d1a |
807 | UINT8 *KekData;\r |
808 | UINT8 *DbData;\r |
0c18794e |
809 | UINT8 *RootCert;\r |
810 | UINTN RootCertSize;\r |
811 | UINTN Index;\r |
812 | UINTN CertCount;\r |
813 | \r |
570b3d1a |
814 | KekData = NULL;\r |
815 | DbData = NULL;\r |
0c18794e |
816 | CertList = NULL;\r |
817 | Cert = NULL;\r |
818 | RootCert = NULL;\r |
819 | RootCertSize = 0;\r |
820 | VerifyStatus = FALSE;\r |
821 | PkcsCertData = (WIN_CERTIFICATE_EFI_PKCS *) (mImageBase + mSecDataDir->VirtualAddress);\r |
822 | \r |
823 | //\r |
824 | // 1: Find certificate from KEK database and try to verify authenticode struct.\r |
825 | //\r |
826 | DataSize = 0;\r |
827 | Status = gRT->GetVariable (EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, NULL, &DataSize, NULL);\r |
828 | if (Status == EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {\r |
570b3d1a |
829 | KekData = (UINT8 *)AllocateZeroPool (DataSize);\r |
830 | if (KekData == NULL) {\r |
831 | return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r |
832 | }\r |
0c18794e |
833 | \r |
570b3d1a |
834 | Status = gRT->GetVariable (EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, NULL, &DataSize, (VOID *)KekData);\r |
0c18794e |
835 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r |
836 | goto Done;\r |
837 | }\r |
838 | \r |
839 | //\r |
840 | // Find Cert Enrolled in KEK database to verify the signature in pkcs7 signed data.\r |
841 | // \r |
570b3d1a |
842 | CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) KekData;\r |
0c18794e |
843 | while ((DataSize > 0) && (DataSize >= CertList->SignatureListSize)) {\r |
844 | if (CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Guid)) {\r |
845 | Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r |
846 | CertCount = (CertList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - CertList->SignatureHeaderSize) / CertList->SignatureSize;\r |
847 | for (Index = 0; Index < CertCount; Index++) {\r |
848 | //\r |
849 | // Iterate each Signature Data Node within this CertList for a verify\r |
850 | // \r |
851 | RootCert = Cert->SignatureData;\r |
852 | RootCertSize = CertList->SignatureSize;\r |
853 | \r |
854 | //\r |
855 | // Call AuthenticodeVerify library to Verify Authenticode struct. \r |
856 | //\r |
857 | VerifyStatus = AuthenticodeVerify (\r |
858 | PkcsCertData->CertData,\r |
859 | mSecDataDir->Size - sizeof(PkcsCertData->Hdr),\r |
860 | RootCert,\r |
861 | RootCertSize,\r |
862 | mImageDigest,\r |
863 | mImageDigestSize\r |
864 | );\r |
865 | \r |
866 | if (VerifyStatus) {\r |
867 | goto Done;\r |
868 | }\r |
869 | Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) Cert + CertList->SignatureSize);\r |
870 | } \r |
871 | }\r |
872 | DataSize -= CertList->SignatureListSize;\r |
873 | CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + CertList->SignatureListSize);\r |
874 | }\r |
875 | }\r |
876 | \r |
877 | \r |
878 | \r |
879 | //\r |
880 | // 2: Find certificate from DB database and try to verify authenticode struct.\r |
881 | //\r |
882 | DataSize = 0;\r |
883 | Status = gRT->GetVariable (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, NULL, &DataSize, NULL);\r |
884 | if (Status == EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {\r |
570b3d1a |
885 | DbData = (UINT8 *)AllocateZeroPool (DataSize);\r |
886 | if (DbData == NULL) {\r |
887 | goto Done;\r |
888 | }\r |
0c18794e |
889 | \r |
570b3d1a |
890 | Status = gRT->GetVariable (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, NULL, &DataSize, (VOID *)DbData);\r |
0c18794e |
891 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r |
892 | goto Done;\r |
893 | }\r |
894 | \r |
895 | //\r |
896 | // Find Cert Enrolled in DB database to verify the signature in pkcs7 signed data.\r |
897 | // \r |
570b3d1a |
898 | CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) DbData;\r |
0c18794e |
899 | while ((DataSize > 0) && (DataSize >= CertList->SignatureListSize)) {\r |
900 | if (CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Guid)) {\r |
901 | Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r |
902 | CertCount = (CertList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - CertList->SignatureHeaderSize) / CertList->SignatureSize;\r |
903 | for (Index = 0; Index < CertCount; Index++) {\r |
904 | //\r |
905 | // Iterate each Signature Data Node within this CertList for a verify\r |
906 | // \r |
907 | RootCert = Cert->SignatureData;\r |
908 | RootCertSize = CertList->SignatureSize;\r |
909 | \r |
910 | //\r |
911 | // Call AuthenticodeVerify library to Verify Authenticode struct. \r |
912 | //\r |
913 | VerifyStatus = AuthenticodeVerify (\r |
914 | PkcsCertData->CertData,\r |
915 | mSecDataDir->Size - sizeof(PkcsCertData->Hdr),\r |
916 | RootCert,\r |
917 | RootCertSize,\r |
918 | mImageDigest,\r |
919 | mImageDigestSize\r |
920 | );\r |
921 | \r |
922 | if (VerifyStatus) {\r |
923 | goto Done;\r |
924 | }\r |
925 | Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) Cert + CertList->SignatureSize);\r |
926 | } \r |
927 | }\r |
928 | DataSize -= CertList->SignatureListSize;\r |
929 | CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + CertList->SignatureListSize);\r |
930 | }\r |
931 | }\r |
932 | \r |
933 | Done:\r |
570b3d1a |
934 | if (KekData != NULL) {\r |
935 | FreePool (KekData);\r |
936 | }\r |
937 | \r |
938 | if (DbData != NULL) {\r |
939 | FreePool (DbData);\r |
0c18794e |
940 | }\r |
941 | \r |
942 | if (VerifyStatus) {\r |
943 | return EFI_SUCCESS;\r |
944 | } else {\r |
945 | return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r |
946 | }\r |
947 | }\r |
948 | \r |
949 | /**\r |
950 | Verify certificate in WIN_CERTIFICATE_UEFI_GUID format. \r |
951 | \r |
952 | @retval EFI_SUCCESS Image pass verification.\r |
953 | @retval EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION Image fail verification.\r |
954 | @retval other error value\r |
955 | \r |
956 | **/\r |
957 | EFI_STATUS \r |
958 | VerifyCertUefiGuid (\r |
959 | VOID\r |
960 | )\r |
961 | {\r |
962 | BOOLEAN Status;\r |
963 | WIN_CERTIFICATE_UEFI_GUID *EfiCert;\r |
964 | EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *KekList;\r |
965 | EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *KekItem;\r |
966 | EFI_CERT_BLOCK_RSA_2048_SHA256 *CertBlock;\r |
967 | VOID *Rsa;\r |
968 | UINTN KekCount;\r |
969 | UINTN Index;\r |
970 | UINTN KekDataSize;\r |
971 | BOOLEAN IsFound;\r |
972 | EFI_STATUS Result;\r |
973 | \r |
974 | EfiCert = NULL;\r |
975 | KekList = NULL;\r |
976 | KekItem = NULL;\r |
977 | CertBlock = NULL;\r |
978 | Rsa = NULL;\r |
979 | Status = FALSE;\r |
980 | IsFound = FALSE;\r |
981 | KekDataSize = 0;\r |
982 | \r |
983 | EfiCert = (WIN_CERTIFICATE_UEFI_GUID *) (mImageBase + mSecDataDir->VirtualAddress);\r |
984 | CertBlock = (EFI_CERT_BLOCK_RSA_2048_SHA256 *) EfiCert->CertData;\r |
985 | if (!CompareGuid (&EfiCert->CertType, &gEfiCertTypeRsa2048Sha256Guid)) {\r |
986 | //\r |
987 | // Invalid Certificate Data Type.\r |
988 | //\r |
989 | return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r |
990 | }\r |
991 | \r |
992 | //\r |
993 | // Get KEK database variable data size\r |
994 | //\r |
995 | Result = gRT->GetVariable (EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, NULL, &KekDataSize, NULL);\r |
996 | if (Result != EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {\r |
997 | return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r |
998 | }\r |
999 | \r |
1000 | //\r |
1001 | // Get KEK database variable.\r |
1002 | //\r |
1003 | KekList = GetEfiGlobalVariable (EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME);\r |
1004 | if (KekList == NULL) {\r |
1005 | return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r |
1006 | }\r |
1007 | \r |
1008 | //\r |
1009 | // Enumerate all Kek items in this list to verify the variable certificate data.\r |
1010 | // If anyone is authenticated successfully, it means the variable is correct!\r |
1011 | //\r |
1012 | while ((KekDataSize > 0) && (KekDataSize >= KekList->SignatureListSize)) {\r |
1013 | if (CompareGuid (&KekList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertRsa2048Guid)) {\r |
1014 | KekItem = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) KekList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + KekList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r |
1015 | KekCount = (KekList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - KekList->SignatureHeaderSize) / KekList->SignatureSize;\r |
1016 | for (Index = 0; Index < KekCount; Index++) {\r |
1017 | if (CompareMem (KekItem->SignatureData, CertBlock->PublicKey, EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE) == 0) {\r |
1018 | IsFound = TRUE;\r |
1019 | break;\r |
1020 | }\r |
1021 | KekItem = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) KekItem + KekList->SignatureSize);\r |
1022 | }\r |
1023 | }\r |
1024 | KekDataSize -= KekList->SignatureListSize;\r |
1025 | KekList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) KekList + KekList->SignatureListSize);\r |
1026 | }\r |
1027 | \r |
1028 | if (!IsFound) {\r |
1029 | //\r |
1030 | // Signed key is not a trust one.\r |
1031 | //\r |
1032 | goto Done;\r |
1033 | }\r |
1034 | \r |
1035 | //\r |
1036 | // Now, we found the corresponding security policy.\r |
1037 | // Verify the data payload.\r |
1038 | //\r |
1039 | Rsa = RsaNew ();\r |
570b3d1a |
1040 | if (Rsa == NULL) {\r |
1041 | Status = FALSE;\r |
1042 | goto Done;\r |
1043 | }\r |
1044 | \r |
0c18794e |
1045 | // \r |
1046 | // Set RSA Key Components.\r |
1047 | // NOTE: Only N and E are needed to be set as RSA public key for signature verification.\r |
1048 | //\r |
1049 | Status = RsaSetKey (Rsa, RsaKeyN, CertBlock->PublicKey, EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE);\r |
1050 | if (!Status) {\r |
1051 | goto Done;\r |
1052 | }\r |
1053 | Status = RsaSetKey (Rsa, RsaKeyE, mRsaE, sizeof (mRsaE));\r |
1054 | if (!Status) {\r |
1055 | goto Done;\r |
1056 | }\r |
1057 | //\r |
1058 | // Verify the signature.\r |
1059 | //\r |
1060 | Status = RsaPkcs1Verify (\r |
1061 | Rsa, \r |
1062 | mImageDigest, \r |
1063 | mImageDigestSize, \r |
1064 | CertBlock->Signature, \r |
1065 | EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SHA256_SIZE\r |
1066 | );\r |
1067 | \r |
1068 | Done:\r |
1069 | if (KekList != NULL) {\r |
1070 | FreePool (KekList);\r |
1071 | }\r |
1072 | if (Rsa != NULL ) {\r |
1073 | RsaFree (Rsa);\r |
1074 | }\r |
1075 | if (Status) {\r |
1076 | return EFI_SUCCESS;\r |
1077 | } else {\r |
1078 | return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r |
1079 | }\r |
1080 | }\r |
1081 | \r |
1082 | /**\r |
1083 | Provide verification service for signed images, which include both signature validation\r |
1084 | and platform policy control. For signature types, both UEFI WIN_CERTIFICATE_UEFI_GUID and \r |
1085 | MSFT Authenticode type signatures are supported.\r |
1086 | \r |
1087 | In this implementation, only verify external executables when in USER MODE.\r |
1088 | Executables from FV is bypass, so pass in AuthenticationStatus is ignored. \r |
1089 | \r |
1090 | @param[in] AuthenticationStatus \r |
1091 | This is the authentication status returned from the security\r |
1092 | measurement services for the input file.\r |
1093 | @param[in] File This is a pointer to the device path of the file that is\r |
1094 | being dispatched. This will optionally be used for logging.\r |
1095 | @param[in] FileBuffer File buffer matches the input file device path.\r |
1096 | @param[in] FileSize Size of File buffer matches the input file device path.\r |
1097 | \r |
1098 | @retval EFI_SUCCESS The file specified by File did authenticate, and the\r |
1099 | platform policy dictates that the DXE Core may use File.\r |
570b3d1a |
1100 | @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Input argument is incorrect.\r |
1101 | @retval EFI_OUT_RESOURCE Fail to allocate memory.\r |
0c18794e |
1102 | @retval EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION The file specified by File did not authenticate, and\r |
1103 | the platform policy dictates that File should be placed\r |
1104 | in the untrusted state. A file may be promoted from\r |
1105 | the untrusted to the trusted state at a future time\r |
1106 | with a call to the Trust() DXE Service.\r |
1107 | @retval EFI_ACCESS_DENIED The file specified by File did not authenticate, and\r |
1108 | the platform policy dictates that File should not be\r |
1109 | used for any purpose.\r |
1110 | \r |
1111 | **/\r |
1112 | EFI_STATUS\r |
1113 | EFIAPI\r |
1114 | DxeImageVerificationHandler (\r |
1115 | IN UINT32 AuthenticationStatus,\r |
1116 | IN CONST EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *File,\r |
1117 | IN VOID *FileBuffer,\r |
1118 | IN UINTN FileSize\r |
1119 | )\r |
1120 | \r |
1121 | {\r |
1122 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r |
1123 | UINT16 Magic;\r |
1124 | EFI_IMAGE_DOS_HEADER *DosHdr;\r |
1125 | EFI_STATUS VerifyStatus;\r |
1126 | UINT8 *SetupMode;\r |
1127 | EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *SignatureList;\r |
1128 | UINTN SignatureListSize;\r |
1129 | EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *Signature;\r |
1130 | EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_ACTION Action;\r |
1131 | WIN_CERTIFICATE *WinCertificate;\r |
1132 | UINT32 Policy;\r |
1133 | \r |
1134 | if (File == NULL) {\r |
1135 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r |
1136 | }\r |
1137 | \r |
1138 | SignatureList = NULL;\r |
1139 | SignatureListSize = 0;\r |
1140 | WinCertificate = NULL;\r |
1141 | Action = EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_AUTH_UNTESTED;\r |
1142 | Status = EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;\r |
1143 | //\r |
1144 | // Check the image type and get policy setting.\r |
1145 | //\r |
1146 | switch (GetImageType (File)) {\r |
1147 | \r |
1148 | case IMAGE_FROM_FV:\r |
1149 | Policy = ALWAYS_EXECUTE;\r |
1150 | break;\r |
1151 | \r |
1152 | case IMAGE_FROM_OPTION_ROM:\r |
1153 | Policy = PcdGet32 (PcdOptionRomImageVerificationPolicy);\r |
1154 | break;\r |
1155 | \r |
1156 | case IMAGE_FROM_REMOVABLE_MEDIA:\r |
1157 | Policy = PcdGet32 (PcdRemovableMediaImageVerificationPolicy);\r |
1158 | break;\r |
1159 | \r |
1160 | case IMAGE_FROM_FIXED_MEDIA:\r |
1161 | Policy = PcdGet32 (PcdFixedMediaImageVerificationPolicy);\r |
1162 | break;\r |
1163 | \r |
1164 | default:\r |
1165 | Policy = DENY_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION; \r |
1166 | break;\r |
1167 | }\r |
1168 | //\r |
1169 | // If policy is always/never execute, return directly.\r |
1170 | //\r |
1171 | if (Policy == ALWAYS_EXECUTE) {\r |
1172 | return EFI_SUCCESS;\r |
1173 | } else if (Policy == NEVER_EXECUTE) {\r |
1174 | return EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;\r |
1175 | }\r |
1176 | SetupMode = GetEfiGlobalVariable (EFI_SETUP_MODE_NAME);\r |
1177 | \r |
1178 | //\r |
1179 | // SetupMode doesn't exist means no AuthVar driver is dispatched,\r |
1180 | // skip verification.\r |
1181 | //\r |
1182 | if (SetupMode == NULL) {\r |
1183 | return EFI_SUCCESS;\r |
1184 | }\r |
1185 | \r |
1186 | //\r |
1187 | // If platform is in SETUP MODE, skip verification.\r |
1188 | //\r |
1189 | if (*SetupMode == SETUP_MODE) {\r |
1190 | FreePool (SetupMode);\r |
1191 | return EFI_SUCCESS;\r |
1192 | }\r |
1193 | //\r |
1194 | // Read the Dos header.\r |
1195 | //\r |
570b3d1a |
1196 | if (FileBuffer == NULL) {\r |
1197 | FreePool (SetupMode);\r |
1198 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r |
1199 | }\r |
0c18794e |
1200 | mImageBase = (UINT8 *) FileBuffer;\r |
1201 | mImageSize = FileSize;\r |
1202 | DosHdr = (EFI_IMAGE_DOS_HEADER *) (mImageBase);\r |
1203 | if (DosHdr->e_magic == EFI_IMAGE_DOS_SIGNATURE) {\r |
1204 | //\r |
1205 | // DOS image header is present, \r |
1206 | // so read the PE header after the DOS image header.\r |
1207 | //\r |
1208 | mPeCoffHeaderOffset = DosHdr->e_lfanew;\r |
1209 | } else {\r |
1210 | mPeCoffHeaderOffset = 0;\r |
1211 | }\r |
1212 | //\r |
1213 | // Check PE/COFF image.\r |
1214 | //\r |
1215 | mNtHeader.Pe32 = (EFI_IMAGE_NT_HEADERS32 *) (mImageBase + mPeCoffHeaderOffset);\r |
1216 | if (mNtHeader.Pe32->Signature != EFI_IMAGE_NT_SIGNATURE) {\r |
1217 | //\r |
1218 | // It is not a valid Pe/Coff file.\r |
1219 | //\r |
1220 | return EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;\r |
1221 | }\r |
1222 | \r |
1223 | Magic = mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.Magic;\r |
1224 | if (Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {\r |
1225 | //\r |
1226 | // Use PE32 offset.\r |
1227 | //\r |
1228 | mSecDataDir = (EFI_IMAGE_DATA_DIRECTORY *)&mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY];\r |
570b3d1a |
1229 | } else if (Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR64_MAGIC) {\r |
0c18794e |
1230 | //\r |
1231 | // Use PE32+ offset.\r |
1232 | //\r |
1233 | mSecDataDir = (EFI_IMAGE_DATA_DIRECTORY *)&mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY];\r |
570b3d1a |
1234 | } else {\r |
1235 | //\r |
1236 | // Invalid header magic number.\r |
1237 | //\r |
1238 | Status = EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r |
1239 | goto Done;\r |
1240 | }\r |
1241 | \r |
1242 | if (mSecDataDir->VirtualAddress >= mImageSize) {\r |
1243 | //\r |
1244 | // Sanity check to see if this file is corrupted.\r |
1245 | //\r |
1246 | Status = EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r |
1247 | goto Done;\r |
0c18794e |
1248 | }\r |
1249 | \r |
1250 | if (mSecDataDir->Size == 0) {\r |
1251 | //\r |
1252 | // This image is not signed.\r |
1253 | //\r |
1254 | Action = EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_AUTH_UNTESTED;\r |
1255 | Status = EFI_ACCESS_DENIED; \r |
1256 | goto Done; \r |
1257 | }\r |
1258 | //\r |
1259 | // Verify signature of executables.\r |
1260 | //\r |
1261 | WinCertificate = (WIN_CERTIFICATE *) (mImageBase + mSecDataDir->VirtualAddress);\r |
1262 | \r |
1263 | switch (WinCertificate->wCertificateType) {\r |
1264 | \r |
1265 | case WIN_CERT_TYPE_EFI_GUID:\r |
1266 | //\r |
1267 | // Verify UEFI GUID type.\r |
1268 | // \r |
1269 | if (!HashPeImage (HASHALG_SHA256)) {\r |
1270 | goto Done;\r |
1271 | }\r |
1272 | \r |
1273 | VerifyStatus = VerifyCertUefiGuid ();\r |
1274 | break;\r |
1275 | \r |
1276 | case WIN_CERT_TYPE_PKCS_SIGNED_DATA:\r |
1277 | //\r |
1278 | // Verify Pkcs signed data type.\r |
1279 | //\r |
1280 | Status = HashPeImageByType();\r |
1281 | if (EFI_ERROR(Status)) {\r |
1282 | goto Done;\r |
1283 | }\r |
1284 | \r |
1285 | VerifyStatus = VerifyCertPkcsSignedData ();\r |
1286 | \r |
1287 | //\r |
1288 | // For image verification against enrolled certificate(root or intermediate),\r |
1289 | // no need to check image's hash in the allowed database.\r |
1290 | //\r |
1291 | if (!EFI_ERROR (VerifyStatus)) {\r |
1292 | return EFI_SUCCESS;\r |
1293 | }\r |
1294 | \r |
1295 | default:\r |
1296 | return EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;\r |
1297 | }\r |
1298 | //\r |
1299 | // Get image hash value as executable's signature.\r |
1300 | //\r |
1301 | SignatureListSize = sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1 + mImageDigestSize;\r |
1302 | SignatureList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) AllocateZeroPool (SignatureListSize);\r |
570b3d1a |
1303 | if (SignatureList == NULL) {\r |
1304 | Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r |
1305 | goto Done;\r |
1306 | }\r |
0c18794e |
1307 | SignatureList->SignatureHeaderSize = 0;\r |
1308 | SignatureList->SignatureListSize = (UINT32) SignatureListSize;\r |
1309 | SignatureList->SignatureSize = (UINT32) mImageDigestSize;\r |
1310 | CopyMem (&SignatureList->SignatureType, &mCertType, sizeof (EFI_GUID));\r |
1311 | Signature = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) SignatureList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST));\r |
1312 | CopyMem (Signature->SignatureData, mImageDigest, mImageDigestSize);\r |
1313 | //\r |
1314 | // Signature database check after verification.\r |
1315 | //\r |
1316 | if (EFI_ERROR (VerifyStatus)) {\r |
1317 | //\r |
1318 | // Verification failure.\r |
1319 | //\r |
1320 | Action = EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_AUTH_SIG_FAILED;\r |
1321 | Status = EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;\r |
1322 | } else if (IsSignatureFoundInDatabase (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1, Signature->SignatureData, &mCertType, mImageDigestSize)) {\r |
1323 | //\r |
1324 | // Executable signature verification passes, but is found in forbidden signature database.\r |
1325 | //\r |
1326 | Action = EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_AUTH_SIG_FOUND;\r |
1327 | Status = EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;\r |
1328 | } else if (IsSignatureFoundInDatabase (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE, Signature->SignatureData, &mCertType, mImageDigestSize)) {\r |
1329 | //\r |
1330 | // Executable signature is found in authorized signature database.\r |
1331 | //\r |
1332 | Status = EFI_SUCCESS;\r |
1333 | } else {\r |
1334 | //\r |
1335 | // Executable signature verification passes, but cannot be found in authorized signature database.\r |
1336 | // Get platform policy to determine the action.\r |
1337 | //\r |
1338 | Action = EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_AUTH_SIG_PASSED;\r |
1339 | Status = ImageAuthorization (Policy);\r |
1340 | }\r |
1341 | \r |
1342 | Done:\r |
1343 | if (Status != EFI_SUCCESS) {\r |
1344 | //\r |
1345 | // Policy decides to defer or reject the image; add its information in image executable information table.\r |
1346 | //\r |
1347 | AddImageExeInfo (Action, NULL, File, SignatureList, SignatureListSize);\r |
1348 | }\r |
1349 | \r |
1350 | if (SignatureList != NULL) {\r |
1351 | FreePool (SignatureList);\r |
1352 | }\r |
1353 | \r |
1354 | FreePool (SetupMode);\r |
1355 | \r |
1356 | return Status;\r |
1357 | }\r |
1358 | \r |
1359 | /**\r |
1360 | When VariableWriteArchProtocol install, create "SecureBoot" variable.\r |
1361 | \r |
1362 | @param[in] Event Event whose notification function is being invoked.\r |
1363 | @param[in] Context Pointer to the notification function's context.\r |
1364 | \r |
1365 | **/\r |
1366 | VOID\r |
1367 | EFIAPI\r |
1368 | VariableWriteCallBack (\r |
1369 | IN EFI_EVENT Event,\r |
1370 | IN VOID *Context\r |
1371 | )\r |
1372 | {\r |
1373 | UINT8 SecureBootMode;\r |
1374 | UINT8 *SecureBootModePtr;\r |
1375 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r |
1376 | VOID *ProtocolPointer;\r |
1377 | \r |
1378 | Status = gBS->LocateProtocol (&gEfiVariableWriteArchProtocolGuid, NULL, &ProtocolPointer);\r |
1379 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r |
1380 | return;\r |
1381 | }\r |
1382 | \r |
1383 | //\r |
1384 | // Check whether "SecureBoot" variable exists.\r |
1385 | // If this library is built-in, it means firmware has capability to perform\r |
1386 | // driver signing verification.\r |
1387 | //\r |
1388 | SecureBootModePtr = GetEfiGlobalVariable (EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME);\r |
1389 | if (SecureBootModePtr == NULL) {\r |
1390 | SecureBootMode = SECURE_BOOT_MODE_DISABLE;\r |
1391 | //\r |
1392 | // Authenticated variable driver will update "SecureBoot" depending on SetupMode variable.\r |
1393 | //\r |
1394 | gRT->SetVariable (\r |
1395 | EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME,\r |
1396 | &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r |
1397 | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE,\r |
1398 | sizeof (UINT8),\r |
1399 | &SecureBootMode\r |
1400 | );\r |
1401 | } else {\r |
1402 | FreePool (SecureBootModePtr);\r |
1403 | }\r |
1404 | } \r |
1405 | \r |
1406 | /**\r |
1407 | Register security measurement handler.\r |
1408 | \r |
1409 | @param ImageHandle ImageHandle of the loaded driver.\r |
1410 | @param SystemTable Pointer to the EFI System Table.\r |
1411 | \r |
1412 | @retval EFI_SUCCESS The handlers were registered successfully.\r |
1413 | **/\r |
1414 | EFI_STATUS\r |
1415 | EFIAPI\r |
1416 | DxeImageVerificationLibConstructor (\r |
1417 | IN EFI_HANDLE ImageHandle,\r |
1418 | IN EFI_SYSTEM_TABLE *SystemTable\r |
1419 | )\r |
1420 | {\r |
1421 | VOID *Registration;\r |
1422 | \r |
1423 | //\r |
1424 | // Register callback function upon VariableWriteArchProtocol.\r |
1425 | // \r |
1426 | EfiCreateProtocolNotifyEvent (\r |
1427 | &gEfiVariableWriteArchProtocolGuid,\r |
1428 | TPL_CALLBACK,\r |
1429 | VariableWriteCallBack,\r |
1430 | NULL,\r |
1431 | &Registration\r |
1432 | );\r |
1433 | \r |
1434 | return RegisterSecurityHandler (\r |
1435 | DxeImageVerificationHandler,\r |
1436 | EFI_AUTH_OPERATION_VERIFY_IMAGE | EFI_AUTH_OPERATION_IMAGE_REQUIRED\r |
1437 | ); \r |
1438 | }\r |