0c18794e |
1 | /** @file\r |
2 | Implement image verification services for secure boot service in UEFI2.3.1.\r |
3 | \r |
4 | Copyright (c) 2009 - 2011, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>\r |
5 | This program and the accompanying materials \r |
6 | are licensed and made available under the terms and conditions of the BSD License \r |
7 | which accompanies this distribution. The full text of the license may be found at \r |
8 | http://opensource.org/licenses/bsd-license.php\r |
9 | \r |
10 | THE PROGRAM IS DISTRIBUTED UNDER THE BSD LICENSE ON AN "AS IS" BASIS, \r |
11 | WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR REPRESENTATIONS OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED.\r |
12 | \r |
13 | **/\r |
14 | \r |
15 | #include "DxeImageVerificationLib.h"\r |
16 | \r |
17 | EFI_IMAGE_OPTIONAL_HEADER_PTR_UNION mNtHeader;\r |
18 | UINTN mImageSize;\r |
19 | UINT32 mPeCoffHeaderOffset; \r |
20 | UINT8 mImageDigest[MAX_DIGEST_SIZE];\r |
21 | UINTN mImageDigestSize;\r |
22 | EFI_IMAGE_DATA_DIRECTORY *mSecDataDir = NULL;\r |
23 | UINT8 *mImageBase = NULL;\r |
24 | EFI_GUID mCertType;\r |
25 | \r |
26 | //\r |
27 | // Notify string for authorization UI.\r |
28 | //\r |
29 | CHAR16 mNotifyString1[MAX_NOTIFY_STRING_LEN] = L"Image verification pass but not found in authorized database!";\r |
30 | CHAR16 mNotifyString2[MAX_NOTIFY_STRING_LEN] = L"Launch this image anyway? (Yes/Defer/No)";\r |
31 | //\r |
32 | // Public Exponent of RSA Key.\r |
33 | //\r |
34 | CONST UINT8 mRsaE[] = { 0x01, 0x00, 0x01 };\r |
35 | \r |
36 | \r |
37 | //\r |
38 | // OID ASN.1 Value for Hash Algorithms\r |
39 | //\r |
40 | UINT8 mHashOidValue[] = {\r |
41 | 0x2A, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xF7, 0x0D, 0x02, 0x05, // OBJ_md5\r |
42 | 0x2B, 0x0E, 0x03, 0x02, 0x1A, // OBJ_sha1\r |
43 | 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x04, // OBJ_sha224\r |
44 | 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x01, // OBJ_sha256\r |
45 | 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x02, // OBJ_sha384\r |
46 | 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x03, // OBJ_sha512\r |
47 | };\r |
48 | \r |
49 | HASH_TABLE mHash[] = {\r |
50 | { L"SHA1", 20, &mHashOidValue[8], 5, Sha1GetContextSize, Sha1Init, Sha1Update, Sha1Final },\r |
51 | { L"SHA224", 28, &mHashOidValue[13], 9, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL },\r |
52 | { L"SHA256", 32, &mHashOidValue[22], 9, Sha256GetContextSize,Sha256Init, Sha256Update, Sha256Final},\r |
53 | { L"SHA384", 48, &mHashOidValue[31], 9, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL },\r |
54 | { L"SHA512", 64, &mHashOidValue[40], 9, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL }\r |
55 | };\r |
56 | \r |
57 | \r |
58 | /**\r |
59 | Get the image type.\r |
60 | \r |
61 | @param[in] File This is a pointer to the device path of the file that is\r |
62 | being dispatched. \r |
63 | \r |
64 | @return UINT32 Image Type \r |
65 | \r |
66 | **/\r |
67 | UINT32\r |
68 | GetImageType (\r |
69 | IN CONST EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *File\r |
70 | )\r |
71 | {\r |
72 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r |
73 | EFI_HANDLE DeviceHandle; \r |
74 | EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *TempDevicePath;\r |
75 | EFI_BLOCK_IO_PROTOCOL *BlockIo;\r |
76 | \r |
77 | //\r |
78 | // First check to see if File is from a Firmware Volume\r |
79 | //\r |
80 | DeviceHandle = NULL;\r |
81 | TempDevicePath = (EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *)File;\r |
82 | Status = gBS->LocateDevicePath (\r |
83 | &gEfiFirmwareVolume2ProtocolGuid,\r |
84 | &TempDevicePath,\r |
85 | &DeviceHandle\r |
86 | );\r |
87 | if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r |
88 | Status = gBS->OpenProtocol (\r |
89 | DeviceHandle,\r |
90 | &gEfiFirmwareVolume2ProtocolGuid,\r |
91 | NULL,\r |
92 | NULL,\r |
93 | NULL,\r |
94 | EFI_OPEN_PROTOCOL_TEST_PROTOCOL\r |
95 | );\r |
96 | if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r |
97 | return IMAGE_FROM_FV;\r |
98 | }\r |
99 | }\r |
100 | \r |
101 | //\r |
102 | // Next check to see if File is from a Block I/O device\r |
103 | //\r |
104 | DeviceHandle = NULL;\r |
105 | TempDevicePath = (EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *)File;\r |
106 | Status = gBS->LocateDevicePath (\r |
107 | &gEfiBlockIoProtocolGuid,\r |
108 | &TempDevicePath,\r |
109 | &DeviceHandle\r |
110 | );\r |
111 | if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r |
112 | BlockIo = NULL;\r |
113 | Status = gBS->OpenProtocol (\r |
114 | DeviceHandle,\r |
115 | &gEfiBlockIoProtocolGuid,\r |
116 | (VOID **) &BlockIo,\r |
117 | NULL,\r |
118 | NULL,\r |
119 | EFI_OPEN_PROTOCOL_GET_PROTOCOL\r |
120 | );\r |
121 | if (!EFI_ERROR (Status) && BlockIo != NULL) {\r |
122 | if (BlockIo->Media != NULL) {\r |
123 | if (BlockIo->Media->RemovableMedia) {\r |
124 | //\r |
125 | // Block I/O is present and specifies the media is removable\r |
126 | //\r |
127 | return IMAGE_FROM_REMOVABLE_MEDIA;\r |
128 | } else {\r |
129 | //\r |
130 | // Block I/O is present and specifies the media is not removable\r |
131 | //\r |
132 | return IMAGE_FROM_FIXED_MEDIA;\r |
133 | }\r |
134 | }\r |
135 | }\r |
136 | }\r |
137 | \r |
138 | //\r |
139 | // File is not in a Firmware Volume or on a Block I/O device, so check to see if \r |
140 | // the device path supports the Simple File System Protocol.\r |
141 | //\r |
142 | DeviceHandle = NULL;\r |
143 | TempDevicePath = (EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *)File;\r |
144 | Status = gBS->LocateDevicePath (\r |
145 | &gEfiSimpleFileSystemProtocolGuid,\r |
146 | &TempDevicePath,\r |
147 | &DeviceHandle\r |
148 | );\r |
149 | if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r |
150 | //\r |
151 | // Simple File System is present without Block I/O, so assume media is fixed.\r |
152 | //\r |
153 | return IMAGE_FROM_FIXED_MEDIA;\r |
154 | }\r |
155 | \r |
156 | //\r |
157 | // File is not from an FV, Block I/O or Simple File System, so the only options\r |
158 | // left are a PCI Option ROM and a Load File Protocol such as a PXE Boot from a NIC. \r |
159 | //\r |
160 | TempDevicePath = (EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *)File;\r |
161 | while (!IsDevicePathEndType (TempDevicePath)) {\r |
162 | switch (DevicePathType (TempDevicePath)) {\r |
163 | \r |
164 | case MEDIA_DEVICE_PATH:\r |
165 | if (DevicePathSubType (TempDevicePath) == MEDIA_RELATIVE_OFFSET_RANGE_DP) {\r |
166 | return IMAGE_FROM_OPTION_ROM;\r |
167 | }\r |
168 | break;\r |
169 | \r |
170 | case MESSAGING_DEVICE_PATH:\r |
171 | if (DevicePathSubType(TempDevicePath) == MSG_MAC_ADDR_DP) {\r |
172 | return IMAGE_FROM_REMOVABLE_MEDIA;\r |
173 | } \r |
174 | break;\r |
175 | \r |
176 | default:\r |
177 | break;\r |
178 | }\r |
179 | TempDevicePath = NextDevicePathNode (TempDevicePath);\r |
180 | }\r |
181 | return IMAGE_UNKNOWN; \r |
182 | }\r |
183 | \r |
184 | /**\r |
185 | Caculate hash of Pe/Coff image based on the authenticode image hashing in\r |
186 | PE/COFF Specification 8.0 Appendix A\r |
187 | \r |
188 | @param[in] HashAlg Hash algorithm type.\r |
189 | \r |
190 | @retval TRUE Successfully hash image.\r |
191 | @retval FALSE Fail in hash image.\r |
192 | \r |
193 | **/\r |
194 | BOOLEAN \r |
195 | HashPeImage (\r |
196 | IN UINT32 HashAlg\r |
197 | )\r |
198 | {\r |
199 | BOOLEAN Status;\r |
200 | UINT16 Magic;\r |
201 | EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER *Section;\r |
202 | VOID *HashCtx;\r |
203 | UINTN CtxSize;\r |
204 | UINT8 *HashBase;\r |
205 | UINTN HashSize;\r |
206 | UINTN SumOfBytesHashed;\r |
207 | EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER *SectionHeader;\r |
208 | UINTN Index;\r |
209 | UINTN Pos;\r |
210 | \r |
211 | HashCtx = NULL;\r |
212 | SectionHeader = NULL;\r |
213 | Status = FALSE;\r |
214 | \r |
215 | if ((HashAlg != HASHALG_SHA1) && (HashAlg != HASHALG_SHA256)) {\r |
216 | return FALSE;\r |
217 | }\r |
218 | \r |
219 | //\r |
220 | // Initialize context of hash.\r |
221 | //\r |
222 | ZeroMem (mImageDigest, MAX_DIGEST_SIZE);\r |
223 | \r |
224 | if (HashAlg == HASHALG_SHA1) {\r |
225 | mImageDigestSize = SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE;\r |
226 | mCertType = gEfiCertSha1Guid;\r |
227 | } else if (HashAlg == HASHALG_SHA256) {\r |
228 | mImageDigestSize = SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE;\r |
229 | mCertType = gEfiCertSha256Guid;\r |
230 | } else {\r |
231 | return FALSE;\r |
232 | }\r |
233 | \r |
234 | CtxSize = mHash[HashAlg].GetContextSize();\r |
235 | \r |
236 | HashCtx = AllocatePool (CtxSize);\r |
237 | ASSERT (HashCtx != NULL);\r |
238 | \r |
239 | // 1. Load the image header into memory.\r |
240 | \r |
241 | // 2. Initialize a SHA hash context.\r |
242 | Status = mHash[HashAlg].HashInit(HashCtx);\r |
243 | \r |
244 | if (!Status) {\r |
245 | goto Done;\r |
246 | }\r |
247 | //\r |
248 | // Measuring PE/COFF Image Header;\r |
249 | // But CheckSum field and SECURITY data directory (certificate) are excluded\r |
250 | //\r |
251 | Magic = mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.Magic;\r |
252 | //\r |
253 | // 3. Calculate the distance from the base of the image header to the image checksum address.\r |
254 | // 4. Hash the image header from its base to beginning of the image checksum.\r |
255 | //\r |
256 | HashBase = mImageBase;\r |
257 | if (Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {\r |
258 | //\r |
259 | // Use PE32 offset.\r |
260 | //\r |
261 | HashSize = (UINTN) ((UINT8 *) (&mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.CheckSum) - HashBase);\r |
262 | } else {\r |
263 | //\r |
264 | // Use PE32+ offset.\r |
265 | //\r |
266 | HashSize = (UINTN) ((UINT8 *) (&mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.CheckSum) - HashBase);\r |
267 | }\r |
268 | \r |
269 | Status = mHash[HashAlg].HashUpdate(HashCtx, HashBase, HashSize);\r |
270 | if (!Status) {\r |
271 | goto Done;\r |
272 | }\r |
273 | //\r |
274 | // 5. Skip over the image checksum (it occupies a single ULONG).\r |
275 | // 6. Get the address of the beginning of the Cert Directory.\r |
276 | // 7. Hash everything from the end of the checksum to the start of the Cert Directory.\r |
277 | //\r |
278 | if (Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {\r |
279 | //\r |
280 | // Use PE32 offset.\r |
281 | //\r |
282 | HashBase = (UINT8 *) &mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.CheckSum + sizeof (UINT32);\r |
283 | HashSize = (UINTN) ((UINT8 *) (&mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY]) - HashBase);\r |
284 | } else {\r |
285 | //\r |
286 | // Use PE32+ offset.\r |
287 | // \r |
288 | HashBase = (UINT8 *) &mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.CheckSum + sizeof (UINT32);\r |
289 | HashSize = (UINTN) ((UINT8 *) (&mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY]) - HashBase);\r |
290 | }\r |
291 | \r |
292 | Status = mHash[HashAlg].HashUpdate(HashCtx, HashBase, HashSize);\r |
293 | if (!Status) {\r |
294 | goto Done;\r |
295 | }\r |
296 | //\r |
297 | // 8. Skip over the Cert Directory. (It is sizeof(IMAGE_DATA_DIRECTORY) bytes.)\r |
298 | // 9. Hash everything from the end of the Cert Directory to the end of image header.\r |
299 | //\r |
300 | if (Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {\r |
301 | //\r |
302 | // Use PE32 offset\r |
303 | //\r |
304 | HashBase = (UINT8 *) &mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY + 1];\r |
305 | HashSize = mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.SizeOfHeaders - (UINTN) ((UINT8 *) (&mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY + 1]) - mImageBase);\r |
306 | } else {\r |
307 | //\r |
308 | // Use PE32+ offset.\r |
309 | //\r |
310 | HashBase = (UINT8 *) &mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY + 1];\r |
311 | HashSize = mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.SizeOfHeaders - (UINTN) ((UINT8 *) (&mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY + 1]) - mImageBase);\r |
312 | }\r |
313 | \r |
314 | Status = mHash[HashAlg].HashUpdate(HashCtx, HashBase, HashSize);\r |
315 | if (!Status) {\r |
316 | goto Done;\r |
317 | }\r |
318 | //\r |
319 | // 10. Set the SUM_OF_BYTES_HASHED to the size of the header.\r |
320 | //\r |
321 | if (Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {\r |
322 | //\r |
323 | // Use PE32 offset.\r |
324 | //\r |
325 | SumOfBytesHashed = mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.SizeOfHeaders;\r |
326 | } else {\r |
327 | //\r |
328 | // Use PE32+ offset\r |
329 | //\r |
330 | SumOfBytesHashed = mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.SizeOfHeaders;\r |
331 | }\r |
332 | \r |
333 | //\r |
334 | // 11. Build a temporary table of pointers to all the IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER\r |
335 | // structures in the image. The 'NumberOfSections' field of the image\r |
336 | // header indicates how big the table should be. Do not include any\r |
337 | // IMAGE_SECTION_HEADERs in the table whose 'SizeOfRawData' field is zero.\r |
338 | //\r |
339 | SectionHeader = (EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER *) AllocateZeroPool (sizeof (EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER) * mNtHeader.Pe32->FileHeader.NumberOfSections);\r |
340 | ASSERT (SectionHeader != NULL);\r |
341 | //\r |
342 | // 12. Using the 'PointerToRawData' in the referenced section headers as\r |
343 | // a key, arrange the elements in the table in ascending order. In other\r |
344 | // words, sort the section headers according to the disk-file offset of\r |
345 | // the section.\r |
346 | //\r |
347 | Section = (EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER *) (\r |
348 | mImageBase +\r |
349 | mPeCoffHeaderOffset +\r |
350 | sizeof (UINT32) +\r |
351 | sizeof (EFI_IMAGE_FILE_HEADER) +\r |
352 | mNtHeader.Pe32->FileHeader.SizeOfOptionalHeader\r |
353 | );\r |
354 | for (Index = 0; Index < mNtHeader.Pe32->FileHeader.NumberOfSections; Index++) {\r |
355 | Pos = Index;\r |
356 | while ((Pos > 0) && (Section->PointerToRawData < SectionHeader[Pos - 1].PointerToRawData)) {\r |
357 | CopyMem (&SectionHeader[Pos], &SectionHeader[Pos - 1], sizeof (EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER));\r |
358 | Pos--;\r |
359 | }\r |
360 | CopyMem (&SectionHeader[Pos], Section, sizeof (EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER));\r |
361 | Section += 1;\r |
362 | }\r |
363 | \r |
364 | //\r |
365 | // 13. Walk through the sorted table, bring the corresponding section\r |
366 | // into memory, and hash the entire section (using the 'SizeOfRawData'\r |
367 | // field in the section header to determine the amount of data to hash).\r |
368 | // 14. Add the section's 'SizeOfRawData' to SUM_OF_BYTES_HASHED .\r |
369 | // 15. Repeat steps 13 and 14 for all the sections in the sorted table.\r |
370 | //\r |
371 | for (Index = 0; Index < mNtHeader.Pe32->FileHeader.NumberOfSections; Index++) {\r |
372 | Section = &SectionHeader[Index];\r |
373 | if (Section->SizeOfRawData == 0) {\r |
374 | continue;\r |
375 | }\r |
376 | HashBase = mImageBase + Section->PointerToRawData;\r |
377 | HashSize = (UINTN) Section->SizeOfRawData;\r |
378 | \r |
379 | Status = mHash[HashAlg].HashUpdate(HashCtx, HashBase, HashSize);\r |
380 | if (!Status) {\r |
381 | goto Done;\r |
382 | }\r |
383 | \r |
384 | SumOfBytesHashed += HashSize;\r |
385 | }\r |
386 | \r |
387 | //\r |
388 | // 16. If the file size is greater than SUM_OF_BYTES_HASHED, there is extra\r |
389 | // data in the file that needs to be added to the hash. This data begins\r |
390 | // at file offset SUM_OF_BYTES_HASHED and its length is:\r |
391 | // FileSize - (CertDirectory->Size)\r |
392 | //\r |
393 | if (mImageSize > SumOfBytesHashed) {\r |
394 | HashBase = mImageBase + SumOfBytesHashed;\r |
395 | if (Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {\r |
396 | //\r |
397 | // Use PE32 offset.\r |
398 | //\r |
399 | HashSize = (UINTN)(\r |
400 | mImageSize -\r |
401 | mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY].Size -\r |
402 | SumOfBytesHashed);\r |
403 | } else {\r |
404 | //\r |
405 | // Use PE32+ offset.\r |
406 | //\r |
407 | HashSize = (UINTN)(\r |
408 | mImageSize -\r |
409 | mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY].Size -\r |
410 | SumOfBytesHashed); \r |
411 | }\r |
412 | \r |
413 | Status = mHash[HashAlg].HashUpdate(HashCtx, HashBase, HashSize);\r |
414 | if (!Status) {\r |
415 | goto Done;\r |
416 | }\r |
417 | }\r |
418 | Status = mHash[HashAlg].HashFinal(HashCtx, mImageDigest);\r |
419 | \r |
420 | Done:\r |
421 | if (HashCtx != NULL) {\r |
422 | FreePool (HashCtx);\r |
423 | }\r |
424 | if (SectionHeader != NULL) {\r |
425 | FreePool (SectionHeader);\r |
426 | }\r |
427 | return Status;\r |
428 | }\r |
429 | \r |
430 | /**\r |
431 | Recognize the Hash algorithm in PE/COFF Authenticode and caculate hash of \r |
432 | Pe/Coff image based on the authenticode image hashing in PE/COFF Specification \r |
433 | 8.0 Appendix A\r |
434 | \r |
435 | @retval EFI_UNSUPPORTED Hash algorithm is not supported.\r |
436 | @retval EFI_SUCCESS Hash successfully.\r |
437 | \r |
438 | **/\r |
439 | EFI_STATUS \r |
440 | HashPeImageByType (\r |
441 | VOID\r |
442 | )\r |
443 | {\r |
444 | UINT8 Index;\r |
445 | WIN_CERTIFICATE_EFI_PKCS *PkcsCertData;\r |
446 | \r |
447 | PkcsCertData = (WIN_CERTIFICATE_EFI_PKCS *) (mImageBase + mSecDataDir->VirtualAddress);\r |
448 | \r |
449 | for (Index = 0; Index < HASHALG_MAX; Index++) { \r |
450 | //\r |
451 | // Check the Hash algorithm in PE/COFF Authenticode.\r |
452 | // According to PKCS#7 Definition: \r |
453 | // SignedData ::= SEQUENCE {\r |
454 | // version Version,\r |
455 | // digestAlgorithms DigestAlgorithmIdentifiers,\r |
456 | // contentInfo ContentInfo,\r |
457 | // .... }\r |
458 | // The DigestAlgorithmIdentifiers can be used to determine the hash algorithm in PE/COFF hashing\r |
459 | // This field has the fixed offset (+32) in final Authenticode ASN.1 data.\r |
460 | // \r |
461 | if (CompareMem (PkcsCertData->CertData + 32, mHash[Index].OidValue, mHash[Index].OidLength) == 0) {\r |
462 | break;\r |
463 | }\r |
464 | }\r |
465 | \r |
466 | if (Index == HASHALG_MAX) {\r |
467 | return EFI_UNSUPPORTED;\r |
468 | }\r |
469 | \r |
470 | //\r |
471 | // HASH PE Image based on Hash algorithm in PE/COFF Authenticode.\r |
472 | //\r |
473 | if (!HashPeImage(Index)) {\r |
474 | return EFI_UNSUPPORTED;\r |
475 | }\r |
476 | \r |
477 | return EFI_SUCCESS;\r |
478 | }\r |
479 | \r |
480 | \r |
481 | /**\r |
482 | Returns the size of a given image execution info table in bytes.\r |
483 | \r |
484 | This function returns the size, in bytes, of the image execution info table specified by\r |
485 | ImageExeInfoTable. If ImageExeInfoTable is NULL, then 0 is returned.\r |
486 | \r |
487 | @param ImageExeInfoTable A pointer to a image execution info table structure.\r |
488 | \r |
489 | @retval 0 If ImageExeInfoTable is NULL.\r |
490 | @retval Others The size of a image execution info table in bytes.\r |
491 | \r |
492 | **/\r |
493 | UINTN\r |
494 | GetImageExeInfoTableSize (\r |
495 | EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO_TABLE *ImageExeInfoTable\r |
496 | )\r |
497 | {\r |
498 | UINTN Index;\r |
499 | EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO *ImageExeInfoItem;\r |
500 | UINTN TotalSize;\r |
501 | \r |
502 | if (ImageExeInfoTable == NULL) {\r |
503 | return 0;\r |
504 | }\r |
505 | \r |
506 | ImageExeInfoItem = (EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO *) ((UINT8 *) ImageExeInfoTable + sizeof (EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO_TABLE));\r |
507 | TotalSize = sizeof (EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO_TABLE);\r |
508 | for (Index = 0; Index < ImageExeInfoTable->NumberOfImages; Index++) {\r |
509 | TotalSize += ReadUnaligned32 ((UINT32 *) &ImageExeInfoItem->InfoSize);\r |
510 | ImageExeInfoItem = (EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO *) ((UINT8 *) ImageExeInfoItem + ReadUnaligned32 ((UINT32 *) &ImageExeInfoItem->InfoSize));\r |
511 | }\r |
512 | \r |
513 | return TotalSize;\r |
514 | }\r |
515 | \r |
516 | /**\r |
517 | Create an Image Execution Information Table entry and add it to system configuration table.\r |
518 | \r |
519 | @param[in] Action Describes the action taken by the firmware regarding this image.\r |
520 | @param[in] Name Input a null-terminated, user-friendly name.\r |
521 | @param[in] DevicePath Input device path pointer.\r |
522 | @param[in] Signature Input signature info in EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST data structure.\r |
523 | @param[in] SignatureSize Size of signature.\r |
524 | \r |
525 | **/\r |
526 | VOID\r |
527 | AddImageExeInfo (\r |
528 | IN EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_ACTION Action, \r |
529 | IN CHAR16 *Name OPTIONAL, \r |
530 | IN CONST EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *DevicePath,\r |
531 | IN EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *Signature OPTIONAL,\r |
532 | IN UINTN SignatureSize\r |
533 | )\r |
534 | {\r |
535 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r |
536 | EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO_TABLE *ImageExeInfoTable;\r |
537 | EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO_TABLE *NewImageExeInfoTable;\r |
538 | EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO *ImageExeInfoEntry;\r |
539 | UINTN ImageExeInfoTableSize;\r |
540 | UINTN NewImageExeInfoEntrySize;\r |
541 | UINTN NameStringLen;\r |
542 | UINTN DevicePathSize;\r |
543 | \r |
544 | ASSERT (DevicePath != NULL);\r |
545 | ImageExeInfoTable = NULL;\r |
546 | NewImageExeInfoTable = NULL;\r |
547 | ImageExeInfoEntry = NULL;\r |
548 | NameStringLen = 0;\r |
549 | \r |
550 | if (Name != NULL) {\r |
551 | NameStringLen = StrSize (Name);\r |
552 | }\r |
553 | \r |
554 | ImageExeInfoTable = NULL;\r |
555 | EfiGetSystemConfigurationTable (&gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, (VOID**)&ImageExeInfoTable);\r |
556 | if (ImageExeInfoTable != NULL) {\r |
557 | //\r |
558 | // The table has been found!\r |
559 | // We must enlarge the table to accmodate the new exe info entry.\r |
560 | //\r |
561 | ImageExeInfoTableSize = GetImageExeInfoTableSize (ImageExeInfoTable);\r |
562 | } else {\r |
563 | //\r |
564 | // Not Found!\r |
565 | // We should create a new table to append to the configuration table.\r |
566 | //\r |
567 | ImageExeInfoTableSize = sizeof (EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO_TABLE);\r |
568 | }\r |
569 | \r |
570 | DevicePathSize = GetDevicePathSize (DevicePath);\r |
571 | NewImageExeInfoEntrySize = sizeof (EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO) + NameStringLen + DevicePathSize + SignatureSize;\r |
572 | NewImageExeInfoTable = (EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO_TABLE *) AllocateRuntimePool (ImageExeInfoTableSize + NewImageExeInfoEntrySize);\r |
573 | ASSERT (NewImageExeInfoTable != NULL);\r |
574 | \r |
575 | if (ImageExeInfoTable != NULL) {\r |
576 | CopyMem (NewImageExeInfoTable, ImageExeInfoTable, ImageExeInfoTableSize);\r |
577 | } else {\r |
578 | NewImageExeInfoTable->NumberOfImages = 0;\r |
579 | }\r |
580 | NewImageExeInfoTable->NumberOfImages++;\r |
581 | ImageExeInfoEntry = (EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO *) ((UINT8 *) NewImageExeInfoTable + ImageExeInfoTableSize);\r |
582 | //\r |
583 | // Update new item's infomation.\r |
584 | //\r |
585 | WriteUnaligned32 ((UINT32 *) &ImageExeInfoEntry->Action, Action);\r |
586 | WriteUnaligned32 ((UINT32 *) &ImageExeInfoEntry->InfoSize, (UINT32) NewImageExeInfoEntrySize);\r |
587 | \r |
588 | if (Name != NULL) {\r |
589 | CopyMem ((UINT8 *) &ImageExeInfoEntry->InfoSize + sizeof (UINT32), Name, NameStringLen);\r |
590 | }\r |
591 | CopyMem (\r |
592 | (UINT8 *) &ImageExeInfoEntry->InfoSize + sizeof (UINT32) + NameStringLen,\r |
593 | DevicePath,\r |
594 | DevicePathSize\r |
595 | );\r |
596 | if (Signature != NULL) {\r |
597 | CopyMem (\r |
598 | (UINT8 *) &ImageExeInfoEntry->InfoSize + sizeof (UINT32) + NameStringLen + DevicePathSize,\r |
599 | Signature,\r |
600 | SignatureSize\r |
601 | );\r |
602 | }\r |
603 | //\r |
604 | // Update/replace the image execution table.\r |
605 | //\r |
606 | Status = gBS->InstallConfigurationTable (&gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, (VOID *) NewImageExeInfoTable);\r |
607 | ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status);\r |
608 | //\r |
609 | // Free Old table data!\r |
610 | //\r |
611 | if (ImageExeInfoTable != NULL) {\r |
612 | FreePool (ImageExeInfoTable);\r |
613 | }\r |
614 | }\r |
615 | \r |
616 | /**\r |
617 | Discover if the UEFI image is authorized by user's policy setting.\r |
618 | \r |
619 | @param[in] Policy Specify platform's policy setting. \r |
620 | \r |
621 | @retval EFI_ACCESS_DENIED Image is not allowed to run.\r |
622 | @retval EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION Image is deferred.\r |
623 | @retval EFI_SUCCESS Image is authorized to run.\r |
624 | \r |
625 | **/\r |
626 | EFI_STATUS\r |
627 | ImageAuthorization (\r |
628 | IN UINT32 Policy\r |
629 | )\r |
630 | {\r |
631 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r |
632 | EFI_INPUT_KEY Key;\r |
633 | \r |
634 | Status = EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;\r |
635 | \r |
636 | switch (Policy) {\r |
637 | \r |
638 | case QUERY_USER_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION:\r |
639 | do {\r |
640 | CreatePopUp (EFI_LIGHTGRAY | EFI_BACKGROUND_BLUE, &Key, mNotifyString1, mNotifyString2, NULL);\r |
641 | if (Key.UnicodeChar == L'Y' || Key.UnicodeChar == L'y') {\r |
642 | Status = EFI_SUCCESS;\r |
643 | break;\r |
644 | } else if (Key.UnicodeChar == L'N' || Key.UnicodeChar == L'n') {\r |
645 | Status = EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;\r |
646 | break;\r |
647 | } else if (Key.UnicodeChar == L'D' || Key.UnicodeChar == L'd') {\r |
648 | Status = EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r |
649 | break;\r |
650 | }\r |
651 | } while (TRUE);\r |
652 | break;\r |
653 | \r |
654 | case ALLOW_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION:\r |
655 | Status = EFI_SUCCESS;\r |
656 | break;\r |
657 | \r |
658 | case DEFER_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION:\r |
659 | Status = EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r |
660 | break;\r |
661 | \r |
662 | case DENY_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION:\r |
663 | Status = EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;\r |
664 | break;\r |
665 | }\r |
666 | \r |
667 | return Status;\r |
668 | }\r |
669 | \r |
670 | /**\r |
671 | Check whether signature is in specified database.\r |
672 | \r |
673 | @param[in] VariableName Name of database variable that is searched in.\r |
674 | @param[in] Signature Pointer to signature that is searched for.\r |
675 | @param[in] CertType Pointer to hash algrithom.\r |
676 | @param[in] SignatureSize Size of Signature.\r |
677 | \r |
678 | @return TRUE Found the signature in the variable database.\r |
679 | @return FALSE Not found the signature in the variable database.\r |
680 | \r |
681 | **/\r |
682 | BOOLEAN\r |
683 | IsSignatureFoundInDatabase (\r |
684 | IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r |
685 | IN UINT8 *Signature, \r |
686 | IN EFI_GUID *CertType,\r |
687 | IN UINTN SignatureSize\r |
688 | )\r |
689 | {\r |
690 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r |
691 | EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *CertList;\r |
692 | EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *Cert;\r |
693 | UINTN DataSize;\r |
694 | UINT8 *Data;\r |
695 | UINTN Index;\r |
696 | UINTN CertCount;\r |
697 | BOOLEAN IsFound;\r |
698 | //\r |
699 | // Read signature database variable.\r |
700 | //\r |
701 | IsFound = FALSE;\r |
702 | Data = NULL;\r |
703 | DataSize = 0;\r |
704 | Status = gRT->GetVariable (VariableName, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, NULL, &DataSize, NULL);\r |
705 | if (Status != EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {\r |
706 | return FALSE;\r |
707 | }\r |
708 | \r |
709 | Data = (UINT8 *) AllocateZeroPool (DataSize);\r |
710 | ASSERT (Data != NULL);\r |
711 | \r |
712 | Status = gRT->GetVariable (VariableName, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, NULL, &DataSize, Data);\r |
713 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r |
714 | goto Done;\r |
715 | }\r |
716 | //\r |
717 | // Enumerate all signature data in SigDB to check if executable's signature exists.\r |
718 | //\r |
719 | CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) Data;\r |
720 | while ((DataSize > 0) && (DataSize >= CertList->SignatureListSize)) {\r |
721 | CertCount = (CertList->SignatureListSize - CertList->SignatureHeaderSize) / CertList->SignatureSize;\r |
722 | Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r |
723 | if ((CertList->SignatureSize == sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1 + SignatureSize) && (CompareGuid(&CertList->SignatureType, CertType))) {\r |
724 | for (Index = 0; Index < CertCount; Index++) {\r |
725 | if (CompareMem (Cert->SignatureData, Signature, SignatureSize) == 0) {\r |
726 | //\r |
727 | // Find the signature in database.\r |
728 | //\r |
729 | IsFound = TRUE;\r |
730 | break;\r |
731 | }\r |
732 | \r |
733 | Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) Cert + CertList->SignatureSize);\r |
734 | }\r |
735 | \r |
736 | if (IsFound) {\r |
737 | break;\r |
738 | }\r |
739 | }\r |
740 | \r |
741 | DataSize -= CertList->SignatureListSize;\r |
742 | CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + CertList->SignatureListSize);\r |
743 | }\r |
744 | \r |
745 | Done:\r |
746 | if (Data != NULL) {\r |
747 | FreePool (Data);\r |
748 | }\r |
749 | \r |
750 | return IsFound;\r |
751 | }\r |
752 | \r |
753 | /**\r |
754 | Verify certificate in WIN_CERT_TYPE_PKCS_SIGNED_DATA format .\r |
755 | \r |
756 | @retval EFI_SUCCESS Image pass verification.\r |
757 | @retval EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION Image fail verification.\r |
758 | @retval other error value\r |
759 | \r |
760 | **/\r |
761 | EFI_STATUS \r |
762 | VerifyCertPkcsSignedData (\r |
763 | VOID\r |
764 | )\r |
765 | {\r |
766 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r |
767 | BOOLEAN VerifyStatus;\r |
768 | WIN_CERTIFICATE_EFI_PKCS *PkcsCertData;\r |
769 | EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *CertList;\r |
770 | EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *Cert;\r |
771 | UINTN DataSize;\r |
772 | UINT8 *Data;\r |
773 | UINT8 *RootCert;\r |
774 | UINTN RootCertSize;\r |
775 | UINTN Index;\r |
776 | UINTN CertCount;\r |
777 | \r |
778 | Data = NULL;\r |
779 | CertList = NULL;\r |
780 | Cert = NULL;\r |
781 | RootCert = NULL;\r |
782 | RootCertSize = 0;\r |
783 | VerifyStatus = FALSE;\r |
784 | PkcsCertData = (WIN_CERTIFICATE_EFI_PKCS *) (mImageBase + mSecDataDir->VirtualAddress);\r |
785 | \r |
786 | //\r |
787 | // 1: Find certificate from KEK database and try to verify authenticode struct.\r |
788 | //\r |
789 | DataSize = 0;\r |
790 | Status = gRT->GetVariable (EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, NULL, &DataSize, NULL);\r |
791 | if (Status == EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {\r |
792 | Data = (UINT8 *)AllocateZeroPool (DataSize);\r |
793 | ASSERT (Data != NULL);\r |
794 | \r |
795 | Status = gRT->GetVariable (EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, NULL, &DataSize, (VOID *)Data);\r |
796 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r |
797 | goto Done;\r |
798 | }\r |
799 | \r |
800 | //\r |
801 | // Find Cert Enrolled in KEK database to verify the signature in pkcs7 signed data.\r |
802 | // \r |
803 | CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) Data;\r |
804 | while ((DataSize > 0) && (DataSize >= CertList->SignatureListSize)) {\r |
805 | if (CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Guid)) {\r |
806 | Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r |
807 | CertCount = (CertList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - CertList->SignatureHeaderSize) / CertList->SignatureSize;\r |
808 | for (Index = 0; Index < CertCount; Index++) {\r |
809 | //\r |
810 | // Iterate each Signature Data Node within this CertList for a verify\r |
811 | // \r |
812 | RootCert = Cert->SignatureData;\r |
813 | RootCertSize = CertList->SignatureSize;\r |
814 | \r |
815 | //\r |
816 | // Call AuthenticodeVerify library to Verify Authenticode struct. \r |
817 | //\r |
818 | VerifyStatus = AuthenticodeVerify (\r |
819 | PkcsCertData->CertData,\r |
820 | mSecDataDir->Size - sizeof(PkcsCertData->Hdr),\r |
821 | RootCert,\r |
822 | RootCertSize,\r |
823 | mImageDigest,\r |
824 | mImageDigestSize\r |
825 | );\r |
826 | \r |
827 | if (VerifyStatus) {\r |
828 | goto Done;\r |
829 | }\r |
830 | Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) Cert + CertList->SignatureSize);\r |
831 | } \r |
832 | }\r |
833 | DataSize -= CertList->SignatureListSize;\r |
834 | CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + CertList->SignatureListSize);\r |
835 | }\r |
836 | }\r |
837 | \r |
838 | \r |
839 | \r |
840 | //\r |
841 | // 2: Find certificate from DB database and try to verify authenticode struct.\r |
842 | //\r |
843 | DataSize = 0;\r |
844 | Status = gRT->GetVariable (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, NULL, &DataSize, NULL);\r |
845 | if (Status == EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {\r |
846 | Data = (UINT8 *)AllocateZeroPool (DataSize);\r |
847 | ASSERT (Data != NULL);\r |
848 | \r |
849 | Status = gRT->GetVariable (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, NULL, &DataSize, (VOID *)Data);\r |
850 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r |
851 | goto Done;\r |
852 | }\r |
853 | \r |
854 | //\r |
855 | // Find Cert Enrolled in DB database to verify the signature in pkcs7 signed data.\r |
856 | // \r |
857 | CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) Data;\r |
858 | while ((DataSize > 0) && (DataSize >= CertList->SignatureListSize)) {\r |
859 | if (CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Guid)) {\r |
860 | Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r |
861 | CertCount = (CertList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - CertList->SignatureHeaderSize) / CertList->SignatureSize;\r |
862 | for (Index = 0; Index < CertCount; Index++) {\r |
863 | //\r |
864 | // Iterate each Signature Data Node within this CertList for a verify\r |
865 | // \r |
866 | RootCert = Cert->SignatureData;\r |
867 | RootCertSize = CertList->SignatureSize;\r |
868 | \r |
869 | //\r |
870 | // Call AuthenticodeVerify library to Verify Authenticode struct. \r |
871 | //\r |
872 | VerifyStatus = AuthenticodeVerify (\r |
873 | PkcsCertData->CertData,\r |
874 | mSecDataDir->Size - sizeof(PkcsCertData->Hdr),\r |
875 | RootCert,\r |
876 | RootCertSize,\r |
877 | mImageDigest,\r |
878 | mImageDigestSize\r |
879 | );\r |
880 | \r |
881 | if (VerifyStatus) {\r |
882 | goto Done;\r |
883 | }\r |
884 | Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) Cert + CertList->SignatureSize);\r |
885 | } \r |
886 | }\r |
887 | DataSize -= CertList->SignatureListSize;\r |
888 | CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + CertList->SignatureListSize);\r |
889 | }\r |
890 | }\r |
891 | \r |
892 | Done:\r |
893 | if (Data != NULL) {\r |
894 | FreePool (Data);\r |
895 | }\r |
896 | \r |
897 | if (VerifyStatus) {\r |
898 | return EFI_SUCCESS;\r |
899 | } else {\r |
900 | return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r |
901 | }\r |
902 | }\r |
903 | \r |
904 | /**\r |
905 | Verify certificate in WIN_CERTIFICATE_UEFI_GUID format. \r |
906 | \r |
907 | @retval EFI_SUCCESS Image pass verification.\r |
908 | @retval EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION Image fail verification.\r |
909 | @retval other error value\r |
910 | \r |
911 | **/\r |
912 | EFI_STATUS \r |
913 | VerifyCertUefiGuid (\r |
914 | VOID\r |
915 | )\r |
916 | {\r |
917 | BOOLEAN Status;\r |
918 | WIN_CERTIFICATE_UEFI_GUID *EfiCert;\r |
919 | EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *KekList;\r |
920 | EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *KekItem;\r |
921 | EFI_CERT_BLOCK_RSA_2048_SHA256 *CertBlock;\r |
922 | VOID *Rsa;\r |
923 | UINTN KekCount;\r |
924 | UINTN Index;\r |
925 | UINTN KekDataSize;\r |
926 | BOOLEAN IsFound;\r |
927 | EFI_STATUS Result;\r |
928 | \r |
929 | EfiCert = NULL;\r |
930 | KekList = NULL;\r |
931 | KekItem = NULL;\r |
932 | CertBlock = NULL;\r |
933 | Rsa = NULL;\r |
934 | Status = FALSE;\r |
935 | IsFound = FALSE;\r |
936 | KekDataSize = 0;\r |
937 | \r |
938 | EfiCert = (WIN_CERTIFICATE_UEFI_GUID *) (mImageBase + mSecDataDir->VirtualAddress);\r |
939 | CertBlock = (EFI_CERT_BLOCK_RSA_2048_SHA256 *) EfiCert->CertData;\r |
940 | if (!CompareGuid (&EfiCert->CertType, &gEfiCertTypeRsa2048Sha256Guid)) {\r |
941 | //\r |
942 | // Invalid Certificate Data Type.\r |
943 | //\r |
944 | return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r |
945 | }\r |
946 | \r |
947 | //\r |
948 | // Get KEK database variable data size\r |
949 | //\r |
950 | Result = gRT->GetVariable (EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, NULL, &KekDataSize, NULL);\r |
951 | if (Result != EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {\r |
952 | return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r |
953 | }\r |
954 | \r |
955 | //\r |
956 | // Get KEK database variable.\r |
957 | //\r |
958 | KekList = GetEfiGlobalVariable (EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME);\r |
959 | if (KekList == NULL) {\r |
960 | return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r |
961 | }\r |
962 | \r |
963 | //\r |
964 | // Enumerate all Kek items in this list to verify the variable certificate data.\r |
965 | // If anyone is authenticated successfully, it means the variable is correct!\r |
966 | //\r |
967 | while ((KekDataSize > 0) && (KekDataSize >= KekList->SignatureListSize)) {\r |
968 | if (CompareGuid (&KekList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertRsa2048Guid)) {\r |
969 | KekItem = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) KekList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + KekList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r |
970 | KekCount = (KekList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - KekList->SignatureHeaderSize) / KekList->SignatureSize;\r |
971 | for (Index = 0; Index < KekCount; Index++) {\r |
972 | if (CompareMem (KekItem->SignatureData, CertBlock->PublicKey, EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE) == 0) {\r |
973 | IsFound = TRUE;\r |
974 | break;\r |
975 | }\r |
976 | KekItem = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) KekItem + KekList->SignatureSize);\r |
977 | }\r |
978 | }\r |
979 | KekDataSize -= KekList->SignatureListSize;\r |
980 | KekList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) KekList + KekList->SignatureListSize);\r |
981 | }\r |
982 | \r |
983 | if (!IsFound) {\r |
984 | //\r |
985 | // Signed key is not a trust one.\r |
986 | //\r |
987 | goto Done;\r |
988 | }\r |
989 | \r |
990 | //\r |
991 | // Now, we found the corresponding security policy.\r |
992 | // Verify the data payload.\r |
993 | //\r |
994 | Rsa = RsaNew ();\r |
995 | ASSERT (Rsa != NULL);\r |
996 | // \r |
997 | // Set RSA Key Components.\r |
998 | // NOTE: Only N and E are needed to be set as RSA public key for signature verification.\r |
999 | //\r |
1000 | Status = RsaSetKey (Rsa, RsaKeyN, CertBlock->PublicKey, EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE);\r |
1001 | if (!Status) {\r |
1002 | goto Done;\r |
1003 | }\r |
1004 | Status = RsaSetKey (Rsa, RsaKeyE, mRsaE, sizeof (mRsaE));\r |
1005 | if (!Status) {\r |
1006 | goto Done;\r |
1007 | }\r |
1008 | //\r |
1009 | // Verify the signature.\r |
1010 | //\r |
1011 | Status = RsaPkcs1Verify (\r |
1012 | Rsa, \r |
1013 | mImageDigest, \r |
1014 | mImageDigestSize, \r |
1015 | CertBlock->Signature, \r |
1016 | EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SHA256_SIZE\r |
1017 | );\r |
1018 | \r |
1019 | Done:\r |
1020 | if (KekList != NULL) {\r |
1021 | FreePool (KekList);\r |
1022 | }\r |
1023 | if (Rsa != NULL ) {\r |
1024 | RsaFree (Rsa);\r |
1025 | }\r |
1026 | if (Status) {\r |
1027 | return EFI_SUCCESS;\r |
1028 | } else {\r |
1029 | return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r |
1030 | }\r |
1031 | }\r |
1032 | \r |
1033 | /**\r |
1034 | Provide verification service for signed images, which include both signature validation\r |
1035 | and platform policy control. For signature types, both UEFI WIN_CERTIFICATE_UEFI_GUID and \r |
1036 | MSFT Authenticode type signatures are supported.\r |
1037 | \r |
1038 | In this implementation, only verify external executables when in USER MODE.\r |
1039 | Executables from FV is bypass, so pass in AuthenticationStatus is ignored. \r |
1040 | \r |
1041 | @param[in] AuthenticationStatus \r |
1042 | This is the authentication status returned from the security\r |
1043 | measurement services for the input file.\r |
1044 | @param[in] File This is a pointer to the device path of the file that is\r |
1045 | being dispatched. This will optionally be used for logging.\r |
1046 | @param[in] FileBuffer File buffer matches the input file device path.\r |
1047 | @param[in] FileSize Size of File buffer matches the input file device path.\r |
1048 | \r |
1049 | @retval EFI_SUCCESS The file specified by File did authenticate, and the\r |
1050 | platform policy dictates that the DXE Core may use File.\r |
1051 | @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER File is NULL.\r |
1052 | @retval EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION The file specified by File did not authenticate, and\r |
1053 | the platform policy dictates that File should be placed\r |
1054 | in the untrusted state. A file may be promoted from\r |
1055 | the untrusted to the trusted state at a future time\r |
1056 | with a call to the Trust() DXE Service.\r |
1057 | @retval EFI_ACCESS_DENIED The file specified by File did not authenticate, and\r |
1058 | the platform policy dictates that File should not be\r |
1059 | used for any purpose.\r |
1060 | \r |
1061 | **/\r |
1062 | EFI_STATUS\r |
1063 | EFIAPI\r |
1064 | DxeImageVerificationHandler (\r |
1065 | IN UINT32 AuthenticationStatus,\r |
1066 | IN CONST EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *File,\r |
1067 | IN VOID *FileBuffer,\r |
1068 | IN UINTN FileSize\r |
1069 | )\r |
1070 | \r |
1071 | {\r |
1072 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r |
1073 | UINT16 Magic;\r |
1074 | EFI_IMAGE_DOS_HEADER *DosHdr;\r |
1075 | EFI_STATUS VerifyStatus;\r |
1076 | UINT8 *SetupMode;\r |
1077 | EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *SignatureList;\r |
1078 | UINTN SignatureListSize;\r |
1079 | EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *Signature;\r |
1080 | EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_ACTION Action;\r |
1081 | WIN_CERTIFICATE *WinCertificate;\r |
1082 | UINT32 Policy;\r |
1083 | \r |
1084 | if (File == NULL) {\r |
1085 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r |
1086 | }\r |
1087 | \r |
1088 | SignatureList = NULL;\r |
1089 | SignatureListSize = 0;\r |
1090 | WinCertificate = NULL;\r |
1091 | Action = EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_AUTH_UNTESTED;\r |
1092 | Status = EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;\r |
1093 | //\r |
1094 | // Check the image type and get policy setting.\r |
1095 | //\r |
1096 | switch (GetImageType (File)) {\r |
1097 | \r |
1098 | case IMAGE_FROM_FV:\r |
1099 | Policy = ALWAYS_EXECUTE;\r |
1100 | break;\r |
1101 | \r |
1102 | case IMAGE_FROM_OPTION_ROM:\r |
1103 | Policy = PcdGet32 (PcdOptionRomImageVerificationPolicy);\r |
1104 | break;\r |
1105 | \r |
1106 | case IMAGE_FROM_REMOVABLE_MEDIA:\r |
1107 | Policy = PcdGet32 (PcdRemovableMediaImageVerificationPolicy);\r |
1108 | break;\r |
1109 | \r |
1110 | case IMAGE_FROM_FIXED_MEDIA:\r |
1111 | Policy = PcdGet32 (PcdFixedMediaImageVerificationPolicy);\r |
1112 | break;\r |
1113 | \r |
1114 | default:\r |
1115 | Policy = DENY_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION; \r |
1116 | break;\r |
1117 | }\r |
1118 | //\r |
1119 | // If policy is always/never execute, return directly.\r |
1120 | //\r |
1121 | if (Policy == ALWAYS_EXECUTE) {\r |
1122 | return EFI_SUCCESS;\r |
1123 | } else if (Policy == NEVER_EXECUTE) {\r |
1124 | return EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;\r |
1125 | }\r |
1126 | SetupMode = GetEfiGlobalVariable (EFI_SETUP_MODE_NAME);\r |
1127 | \r |
1128 | //\r |
1129 | // SetupMode doesn't exist means no AuthVar driver is dispatched,\r |
1130 | // skip verification.\r |
1131 | //\r |
1132 | if (SetupMode == NULL) {\r |
1133 | return EFI_SUCCESS;\r |
1134 | }\r |
1135 | \r |
1136 | //\r |
1137 | // If platform is in SETUP MODE, skip verification.\r |
1138 | //\r |
1139 | if (*SetupMode == SETUP_MODE) {\r |
1140 | FreePool (SetupMode);\r |
1141 | return EFI_SUCCESS;\r |
1142 | }\r |
1143 | //\r |
1144 | // Read the Dos header.\r |
1145 | //\r |
1146 | ASSERT (FileBuffer != NULL);\r |
1147 | mImageBase = (UINT8 *) FileBuffer;\r |
1148 | mImageSize = FileSize;\r |
1149 | DosHdr = (EFI_IMAGE_DOS_HEADER *) (mImageBase);\r |
1150 | if (DosHdr->e_magic == EFI_IMAGE_DOS_SIGNATURE) {\r |
1151 | //\r |
1152 | // DOS image header is present, \r |
1153 | // so read the PE header after the DOS image header.\r |
1154 | //\r |
1155 | mPeCoffHeaderOffset = DosHdr->e_lfanew;\r |
1156 | } else {\r |
1157 | mPeCoffHeaderOffset = 0;\r |
1158 | }\r |
1159 | //\r |
1160 | // Check PE/COFF image.\r |
1161 | //\r |
1162 | mNtHeader.Pe32 = (EFI_IMAGE_NT_HEADERS32 *) (mImageBase + mPeCoffHeaderOffset);\r |
1163 | if (mNtHeader.Pe32->Signature != EFI_IMAGE_NT_SIGNATURE) {\r |
1164 | //\r |
1165 | // It is not a valid Pe/Coff file.\r |
1166 | //\r |
1167 | return EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;\r |
1168 | }\r |
1169 | \r |
1170 | Magic = mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.Magic;\r |
1171 | if (Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {\r |
1172 | //\r |
1173 | // Use PE32 offset.\r |
1174 | //\r |
1175 | mSecDataDir = (EFI_IMAGE_DATA_DIRECTORY *)&mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY];\r |
1176 | } else {\r |
1177 | //\r |
1178 | // Use PE32+ offset.\r |
1179 | //\r |
1180 | mSecDataDir = (EFI_IMAGE_DATA_DIRECTORY *)&mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY];\r |
1181 | }\r |
1182 | \r |
1183 | if (mSecDataDir->Size == 0) {\r |
1184 | //\r |
1185 | // This image is not signed.\r |
1186 | //\r |
1187 | Action = EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_AUTH_UNTESTED;\r |
1188 | Status = EFI_ACCESS_DENIED; \r |
1189 | goto Done; \r |
1190 | }\r |
1191 | //\r |
1192 | // Verify signature of executables.\r |
1193 | //\r |
1194 | WinCertificate = (WIN_CERTIFICATE *) (mImageBase + mSecDataDir->VirtualAddress);\r |
1195 | \r |
1196 | switch (WinCertificate->wCertificateType) {\r |
1197 | \r |
1198 | case WIN_CERT_TYPE_EFI_GUID:\r |
1199 | //\r |
1200 | // Verify UEFI GUID type.\r |
1201 | // \r |
1202 | if (!HashPeImage (HASHALG_SHA256)) {\r |
1203 | goto Done;\r |
1204 | }\r |
1205 | \r |
1206 | VerifyStatus = VerifyCertUefiGuid ();\r |
1207 | break;\r |
1208 | \r |
1209 | case WIN_CERT_TYPE_PKCS_SIGNED_DATA:\r |
1210 | //\r |
1211 | // Verify Pkcs signed data type.\r |
1212 | //\r |
1213 | Status = HashPeImageByType();\r |
1214 | if (EFI_ERROR(Status)) {\r |
1215 | goto Done;\r |
1216 | }\r |
1217 | \r |
1218 | VerifyStatus = VerifyCertPkcsSignedData ();\r |
1219 | \r |
1220 | //\r |
1221 | // For image verification against enrolled certificate(root or intermediate),\r |
1222 | // no need to check image's hash in the allowed database.\r |
1223 | //\r |
1224 | if (!EFI_ERROR (VerifyStatus)) {\r |
1225 | return EFI_SUCCESS;\r |
1226 | }\r |
1227 | \r |
1228 | default:\r |
1229 | return EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;\r |
1230 | }\r |
1231 | //\r |
1232 | // Get image hash value as executable's signature.\r |
1233 | //\r |
1234 | SignatureListSize = sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1 + mImageDigestSize;\r |
1235 | SignatureList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) AllocateZeroPool (SignatureListSize);\r |
1236 | ASSERT (SignatureList != NULL);\r |
1237 | SignatureList->SignatureHeaderSize = 0;\r |
1238 | SignatureList->SignatureListSize = (UINT32) SignatureListSize;\r |
1239 | SignatureList->SignatureSize = (UINT32) mImageDigestSize;\r |
1240 | CopyMem (&SignatureList->SignatureType, &mCertType, sizeof (EFI_GUID));\r |
1241 | Signature = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) SignatureList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST));\r |
1242 | CopyMem (Signature->SignatureData, mImageDigest, mImageDigestSize);\r |
1243 | //\r |
1244 | // Signature database check after verification.\r |
1245 | //\r |
1246 | if (EFI_ERROR (VerifyStatus)) {\r |
1247 | //\r |
1248 | // Verification failure.\r |
1249 | //\r |
1250 | Action = EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_AUTH_SIG_FAILED;\r |
1251 | Status = EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;\r |
1252 | } else if (IsSignatureFoundInDatabase (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1, Signature->SignatureData, &mCertType, mImageDigestSize)) {\r |
1253 | //\r |
1254 | // Executable signature verification passes, but is found in forbidden signature database.\r |
1255 | //\r |
1256 | Action = EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_AUTH_SIG_FOUND;\r |
1257 | Status = EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;\r |
1258 | } else if (IsSignatureFoundInDatabase (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE, Signature->SignatureData, &mCertType, mImageDigestSize)) {\r |
1259 | //\r |
1260 | // Executable signature is found in authorized signature database.\r |
1261 | //\r |
1262 | Status = EFI_SUCCESS;\r |
1263 | } else {\r |
1264 | //\r |
1265 | // Executable signature verification passes, but cannot be found in authorized signature database.\r |
1266 | // Get platform policy to determine the action.\r |
1267 | //\r |
1268 | Action = EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_AUTH_SIG_PASSED;\r |
1269 | Status = ImageAuthorization (Policy);\r |
1270 | }\r |
1271 | \r |
1272 | Done:\r |
1273 | if (Status != EFI_SUCCESS) {\r |
1274 | //\r |
1275 | // Policy decides to defer or reject the image; add its information in image executable information table.\r |
1276 | //\r |
1277 | AddImageExeInfo (Action, NULL, File, SignatureList, SignatureListSize);\r |
1278 | }\r |
1279 | \r |
1280 | if (SignatureList != NULL) {\r |
1281 | FreePool (SignatureList);\r |
1282 | }\r |
1283 | \r |
1284 | FreePool (SetupMode);\r |
1285 | \r |
1286 | return Status;\r |
1287 | }\r |
1288 | \r |
1289 | /**\r |
1290 | When VariableWriteArchProtocol install, create "SecureBoot" variable.\r |
1291 | \r |
1292 | @param[in] Event Event whose notification function is being invoked.\r |
1293 | @param[in] Context Pointer to the notification function's context.\r |
1294 | \r |
1295 | **/\r |
1296 | VOID\r |
1297 | EFIAPI\r |
1298 | VariableWriteCallBack (\r |
1299 | IN EFI_EVENT Event,\r |
1300 | IN VOID *Context\r |
1301 | )\r |
1302 | {\r |
1303 | UINT8 SecureBootMode;\r |
1304 | UINT8 *SecureBootModePtr;\r |
1305 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r |
1306 | VOID *ProtocolPointer;\r |
1307 | \r |
1308 | Status = gBS->LocateProtocol (&gEfiVariableWriteArchProtocolGuid, NULL, &ProtocolPointer);\r |
1309 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r |
1310 | return;\r |
1311 | }\r |
1312 | \r |
1313 | //\r |
1314 | // Check whether "SecureBoot" variable exists.\r |
1315 | // If this library is built-in, it means firmware has capability to perform\r |
1316 | // driver signing verification.\r |
1317 | //\r |
1318 | SecureBootModePtr = GetEfiGlobalVariable (EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME);\r |
1319 | if (SecureBootModePtr == NULL) {\r |
1320 | SecureBootMode = SECURE_BOOT_MODE_DISABLE;\r |
1321 | //\r |
1322 | // Authenticated variable driver will update "SecureBoot" depending on SetupMode variable.\r |
1323 | //\r |
1324 | gRT->SetVariable (\r |
1325 | EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME,\r |
1326 | &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r |
1327 | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE,\r |
1328 | sizeof (UINT8),\r |
1329 | &SecureBootMode\r |
1330 | );\r |
1331 | } else {\r |
1332 | FreePool (SecureBootModePtr);\r |
1333 | }\r |
1334 | } \r |
1335 | \r |
1336 | /**\r |
1337 | Register security measurement handler.\r |
1338 | \r |
1339 | @param ImageHandle ImageHandle of the loaded driver.\r |
1340 | @param SystemTable Pointer to the EFI System Table.\r |
1341 | \r |
1342 | @retval EFI_SUCCESS The handlers were registered successfully.\r |
1343 | **/\r |
1344 | EFI_STATUS\r |
1345 | EFIAPI\r |
1346 | DxeImageVerificationLibConstructor (\r |
1347 | IN EFI_HANDLE ImageHandle,\r |
1348 | IN EFI_SYSTEM_TABLE *SystemTable\r |
1349 | )\r |
1350 | {\r |
1351 | VOID *Registration;\r |
1352 | \r |
1353 | //\r |
1354 | // Register callback function upon VariableWriteArchProtocol.\r |
1355 | // \r |
1356 | EfiCreateProtocolNotifyEvent (\r |
1357 | &gEfiVariableWriteArchProtocolGuid,\r |
1358 | TPL_CALLBACK,\r |
1359 | VariableWriteCallBack,\r |
1360 | NULL,\r |
1361 | &Registration\r |
1362 | );\r |
1363 | \r |
1364 | return RegisterSecurityHandler (\r |
1365 | DxeImageVerificationHandler,\r |
1366 | EFI_AUTH_OPERATION_VERIFY_IMAGE | EFI_AUTH_OPERATION_IMAGE_REQUIRED\r |
1367 | ); \r |
1368 | }\r |