Add PI1.2.1 SAP2 support and UEFI231B mantis 896
[mirror_edk2.git] / SecurityPkg / Library / DxeImageVerificationLib / DxeImageVerificationLib.c
CommitLineData
0c18794e 1/** @file\r
2 Implement image verification services for secure boot service in UEFI2.3.1.\r
3\r
dc204d5a
JY
4 Caution: This file requires additional review when modified.\r
5 This library will have external input - PE/COFF image.\r
6 This external input must be validated carefully to avoid security issue like\r
7 buffer overflow, integer overflow.\r
8\r
9 DxeImageVerificationLibImageRead() function will make sure the PE/COFF image content\r
10 read is within the image buffer.\r
11\r
12 DxeImageVerificationHandler(), HashPeImageByType(), HashPeImage() function will accept\r
13 untrusted PE/COFF image and validate its data structure within this image buffer before use.\r
14\r
bd0de396 15Copyright (c) 2009 - 2012, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>\r
45bf2c47 16This program and the accompanying materials\r
17are licensed and made available under the terms and conditions of the BSD License\r
18which accompanies this distribution. The full text of the license may be found at\r
0c18794e 19http://opensource.org/licenses/bsd-license.php\r
20\r
45bf2c47 21THE PROGRAM IS DISTRIBUTED UNDER THE BSD LICENSE ON AN "AS IS" BASIS,\r
0c18794e 22WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR REPRESENTATIONS OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED.\r
23\r
24**/\r
25\r
26#include "DxeImageVerificationLib.h"\r
27\r
dc204d5a
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28//\r
29// Caution: This is used by a function which may receive untrusted input.\r
30// These global variables hold PE/COFF image data, and they should be validated before use.\r
31//\r
0c18794e 32EFI_IMAGE_OPTIONAL_HEADER_PTR_UNION mNtHeader;\r
45bf2c47 33UINT32 mPeCoffHeaderOffset;\r
0c18794e 34EFI_IMAGE_DATA_DIRECTORY *mSecDataDir = NULL;\r
0c18794e 35EFI_GUID mCertType;\r
36\r
dc204d5a
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37//\r
38// Information on current PE/COFF image\r
39//\r
40UINTN mImageSize;\r
41UINT8 *mImageBase = NULL;\r
42UINT8 mImageDigest[MAX_DIGEST_SIZE];\r
43UINTN mImageDigestSize;\r
44\r
0c18794e 45//\r
46// Notify string for authorization UI.\r
47//\r
48CHAR16 mNotifyString1[MAX_NOTIFY_STRING_LEN] = L"Image verification pass but not found in authorized database!";\r
49CHAR16 mNotifyString2[MAX_NOTIFY_STRING_LEN] = L"Launch this image anyway? (Yes/Defer/No)";\r
50//\r
51// Public Exponent of RSA Key.\r
52//\r
53CONST UINT8 mRsaE[] = { 0x01, 0x00, 0x01 };\r
54\r
55\r
56//\r
57// OID ASN.1 Value for Hash Algorithms\r
58//\r
59UINT8 mHashOidValue[] = {\r
60 0x2A, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xF7, 0x0D, 0x02, 0x05, // OBJ_md5\r
61 0x2B, 0x0E, 0x03, 0x02, 0x1A, // OBJ_sha1\r
62 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x04, // OBJ_sha224\r
63 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x01, // OBJ_sha256\r
64 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x02, // OBJ_sha384\r
65 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x03, // OBJ_sha512\r
66 };\r
67\r
68HASH_TABLE mHash[] = {\r
69 { L"SHA1", 20, &mHashOidValue[8], 5, Sha1GetContextSize, Sha1Init, Sha1Update, Sha1Final },\r
70 { L"SHA224", 28, &mHashOidValue[13], 9, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL },\r
71 { L"SHA256", 32, &mHashOidValue[22], 9, Sha256GetContextSize,Sha256Init, Sha256Update, Sha256Final},\r
72 { L"SHA384", 48, &mHashOidValue[31], 9, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL },\r
73 { L"SHA512", 64, &mHashOidValue[40], 9, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL }\r
74};\r
75\r
28186d45
ED
76/**\r
77 Reads contents of a PE/COFF image in memory buffer.\r
78\r
dc204d5a
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79 Caution: This function may receive untrusted input.\r
80 PE/COFF image is external input, so this function will make sure the PE/COFF image content\r
81 read is within the image buffer.\r
82\r
28186d45
ED
83 @param FileHandle Pointer to the file handle to read the PE/COFF image.\r
84 @param FileOffset Offset into the PE/COFF image to begin the read operation.\r
85 @param ReadSize On input, the size in bytes of the requested read operation. \r
86 On output, the number of bytes actually read.\r
87 @param Buffer Output buffer that contains the data read from the PE/COFF image.\r
88 \r
89 @retval EFI_SUCCESS The specified portion of the PE/COFF image was read and the size \r
90**/\r
91EFI_STATUS\r
92EFIAPI\r
e0192326 93DxeImageVerificationLibImageRead (\r
28186d45
ED
94 IN VOID *FileHandle,\r
95 IN UINTN FileOffset,\r
96 IN OUT UINTN *ReadSize,\r
97 OUT VOID *Buffer\r
98 )\r
99{\r
100 UINTN EndPosition;\r
101\r
102 if (FileHandle == NULL || ReadSize == NULL || Buffer == NULL) {\r
103 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; \r
104 }\r
105\r
106 if (MAX_ADDRESS - FileOffset < *ReadSize) {\r
107 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
108 }\r
109\r
110 EndPosition = FileOffset + *ReadSize;\r
111 if (EndPosition > mImageSize) {\r
112 *ReadSize = (UINT32)(mImageSize - FileOffset);\r
113 }\r
114\r
115 if (FileOffset >= mImageSize) {\r
116 *ReadSize = 0;\r
117 }\r
118\r
119 CopyMem (Buffer, (UINT8 *)((UINTN) FileHandle + FileOffset), *ReadSize);\r
120\r
121 return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
122}\r
123\r
0c18794e 124\r
125/**\r
126 Get the image type.\r
127\r
128 @param[in] File This is a pointer to the device path of the file that is\r
45bf2c47 129 being dispatched.\r
0c18794e 130\r
45bf2c47 131 @return UINT32 Image Type\r
0c18794e 132\r
133**/\r
134UINT32\r
135GetImageType (\r
136 IN CONST EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *File\r
137 )\r
138{\r
139 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
45bf2c47 140 EFI_HANDLE DeviceHandle;\r
0c18794e 141 EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *TempDevicePath;\r
142 EFI_BLOCK_IO_PROTOCOL *BlockIo;\r
143\r
144 //\r
145 // First check to see if File is from a Firmware Volume\r
146 //\r
147 DeviceHandle = NULL;\r
45bf2c47 148 TempDevicePath = (EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *) File;\r
0c18794e 149 Status = gBS->LocateDevicePath (\r
150 &gEfiFirmwareVolume2ProtocolGuid,\r
151 &TempDevicePath,\r
152 &DeviceHandle\r
153 );\r
154 if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
155 Status = gBS->OpenProtocol (\r
156 DeviceHandle,\r
157 &gEfiFirmwareVolume2ProtocolGuid,\r
158 NULL,\r
159 NULL,\r
160 NULL,\r
161 EFI_OPEN_PROTOCOL_TEST_PROTOCOL\r
162 );\r
163 if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
164 return IMAGE_FROM_FV;\r
165 }\r
166 }\r
167\r
168 //\r
169 // Next check to see if File is from a Block I/O device\r
170 //\r
171 DeviceHandle = NULL;\r
45bf2c47 172 TempDevicePath = (EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *) File;\r
0c18794e 173 Status = gBS->LocateDevicePath (\r
174 &gEfiBlockIoProtocolGuid,\r
175 &TempDevicePath,\r
176 &DeviceHandle\r
177 );\r
178 if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
179 BlockIo = NULL;\r
180 Status = gBS->OpenProtocol (\r
181 DeviceHandle,\r
182 &gEfiBlockIoProtocolGuid,\r
183 (VOID **) &BlockIo,\r
184 NULL,\r
185 NULL,\r
186 EFI_OPEN_PROTOCOL_GET_PROTOCOL\r
187 );\r
188 if (!EFI_ERROR (Status) && BlockIo != NULL) {\r
189 if (BlockIo->Media != NULL) {\r
190 if (BlockIo->Media->RemovableMedia) {\r
191 //\r
192 // Block I/O is present and specifies the media is removable\r
193 //\r
194 return IMAGE_FROM_REMOVABLE_MEDIA;\r
195 } else {\r
196 //\r
197 // Block I/O is present and specifies the media is not removable\r
198 //\r
199 return IMAGE_FROM_FIXED_MEDIA;\r
200 }\r
201 }\r
202 }\r
203 }\r
204\r
205 //\r
45bf2c47 206 // File is not in a Firmware Volume or on a Block I/O device, so check to see if\r
0c18794e 207 // the device path supports the Simple File System Protocol.\r
208 //\r
209 DeviceHandle = NULL;\r
45bf2c47 210 TempDevicePath = (EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *) File;\r
0c18794e 211 Status = gBS->LocateDevicePath (\r
212 &gEfiSimpleFileSystemProtocolGuid,\r
213 &TempDevicePath,\r
214 &DeviceHandle\r
215 );\r
216 if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
217 //\r
218 // Simple File System is present without Block I/O, so assume media is fixed.\r
219 //\r
220 return IMAGE_FROM_FIXED_MEDIA;\r
221 }\r
222\r
223 //\r
224 // File is not from an FV, Block I/O or Simple File System, so the only options\r
45bf2c47 225 // left are a PCI Option ROM and a Load File Protocol such as a PXE Boot from a NIC.\r
0c18794e 226 //\r
45bf2c47 227 TempDevicePath = (EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *) File;\r
0c18794e 228 while (!IsDevicePathEndType (TempDevicePath)) {\r
229 switch (DevicePathType (TempDevicePath)) {\r
45bf2c47 230\r
0c18794e 231 case MEDIA_DEVICE_PATH:\r
232 if (DevicePathSubType (TempDevicePath) == MEDIA_RELATIVE_OFFSET_RANGE_DP) {\r
233 return IMAGE_FROM_OPTION_ROM;\r
234 }\r
235 break;\r
236\r
237 case MESSAGING_DEVICE_PATH:\r
238 if (DevicePathSubType(TempDevicePath) == MSG_MAC_ADDR_DP) {\r
239 return IMAGE_FROM_REMOVABLE_MEDIA;\r
45bf2c47 240 }\r
0c18794e 241 break;\r
242\r
243 default:\r
244 break;\r
245 }\r
246 TempDevicePath = NextDevicePathNode (TempDevicePath);\r
247 }\r
45bf2c47 248 return IMAGE_UNKNOWN;\r
0c18794e 249}\r
250\r
251/**\r
252 Caculate hash of Pe/Coff image based on the authenticode image hashing in\r
253 PE/COFF Specification 8.0 Appendix A\r
254\r
dc204d5a
JY
255 Caution: This function may receive untrusted input.\r
256 PE/COFF image is external input, so this function will validate its data structure\r
257 within this image buffer before use.\r
258\r
0c18794e 259 @param[in] HashAlg Hash algorithm type.\r
45bf2c47 260\r
0c18794e 261 @retval TRUE Successfully hash image.\r
262 @retval FALSE Fail in hash image.\r
263\r
264**/\r
45bf2c47 265BOOLEAN\r
0c18794e 266HashPeImage (\r
267 IN UINT32 HashAlg\r
268 )\r
269{\r
270 BOOLEAN Status;\r
271 UINT16 Magic;\r
272 EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER *Section;\r
273 VOID *HashCtx;\r
274 UINTN CtxSize;\r
275 UINT8 *HashBase;\r
276 UINTN HashSize;\r
277 UINTN SumOfBytesHashed;\r
278 EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER *SectionHeader;\r
279 UINTN Index;\r
280 UINTN Pos;\r
551d8081 281 UINT32 CertSize;\r
282 UINT32 NumberOfRvaAndSizes;\r
45bf2c47 283\r
0c18794e 284 HashCtx = NULL;\r
285 SectionHeader = NULL;\r
286 Status = FALSE;\r
287\r
288 if ((HashAlg != HASHALG_SHA1) && (HashAlg != HASHALG_SHA256)) {\r
289 return FALSE;\r
290 }\r
45bf2c47 291\r
0c18794e 292 //\r
293 // Initialize context of hash.\r
294 //\r
295 ZeroMem (mImageDigest, MAX_DIGEST_SIZE);\r
296\r
297 if (HashAlg == HASHALG_SHA1) {\r
298 mImageDigestSize = SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE;\r
299 mCertType = gEfiCertSha1Guid;\r
300 } else if (HashAlg == HASHALG_SHA256) {\r
301 mImageDigestSize = SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE;\r
302 mCertType = gEfiCertSha256Guid;\r
303 } else {\r
304 return FALSE;\r
305 }\r
306\r
307 CtxSize = mHash[HashAlg].GetContextSize();\r
45bf2c47 308\r
0c18794e 309 HashCtx = AllocatePool (CtxSize);\r
570b3d1a 310 if (HashCtx == NULL) {\r
311 return FALSE;\r
312 }\r
0c18794e 313\r
314 // 1. Load the image header into memory.\r
315\r
316 // 2. Initialize a SHA hash context.\r
317 Status = mHash[HashAlg].HashInit(HashCtx);\r
45bf2c47 318\r
0c18794e 319 if (!Status) {\r
320 goto Done;\r
321 }\r
551d8081 322\r
0c18794e 323 //\r
324 // Measuring PE/COFF Image Header;\r
325 // But CheckSum field and SECURITY data directory (certificate) are excluded\r
326 //\r
de2447dd 327 if (mNtHeader.Pe32->FileHeader.Machine == IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_IA64 && mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {\r
328 //\r
329 // NOTE: Some versions of Linux ELILO for Itanium have an incorrect magic value \r
330 // in the PE/COFF Header. If the MachineType is Itanium(IA64) and the \r
331 // Magic value in the OptionalHeader is EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC\r
332 // then override the magic value to EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR64_MAGIC\r
333 //\r
334 Magic = EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR64_MAGIC;\r
335 } else {\r
336 //\r
337 // Get the magic value from the PE/COFF Optional Header\r
338 //\r
339 Magic = mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.Magic;\r
340 }\r
341 \r
0c18794e 342 //\r
343 // 3. Calculate the distance from the base of the image header to the image checksum address.\r
344 // 4. Hash the image header from its base to beginning of the image checksum.\r
345 //\r
346 HashBase = mImageBase;\r
347 if (Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {\r
348 //\r
349 // Use PE32 offset.\r
350 //\r
351 HashSize = (UINTN) ((UINT8 *) (&mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.CheckSum) - HashBase);\r
551d8081 352 NumberOfRvaAndSizes = mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.NumberOfRvaAndSizes;\r
570b3d1a 353 } else if (Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR64_MAGIC) {\r
0c18794e 354 //\r
355 // Use PE32+ offset.\r
356 //\r
357 HashSize = (UINTN) ((UINT8 *) (&mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.CheckSum) - HashBase);\r
551d8081 358 NumberOfRvaAndSizes = mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.NumberOfRvaAndSizes;\r
570b3d1a 359 } else {\r
360 //\r
361 // Invalid header magic number.\r
362 //\r
363 Status = FALSE;\r
364 goto Done;\r
0c18794e 365 }\r
366\r
367 Status = mHash[HashAlg].HashUpdate(HashCtx, HashBase, HashSize);\r
368 if (!Status) {\r
369 goto Done;\r
370 }\r
551d8081 371\r
0c18794e 372 //\r
373 // 5. Skip over the image checksum (it occupies a single ULONG).\r
0c18794e 374 //\r
551d8081 375 if (NumberOfRvaAndSizes <= EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY) {\r
0c18794e 376 //\r
551d8081 377 // 6. Since there is no Cert Directory in optional header, hash everything\r
378 // from the end of the checksum to the end of image header.\r
0c18794e 379 //\r
551d8081 380 if (Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {\r
381 //\r
382 // Use PE32 offset.\r
383 //\r
384 HashBase = (UINT8 *) &mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.CheckSum + sizeof (UINT32);\r
385 HashSize = mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.SizeOfHeaders - (UINTN) (HashBase - mImageBase);\r
386 } else {\r
387 //\r
388 // Use PE32+ offset.\r
389 //\r
390 HashBase = (UINT8 *) &mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.CheckSum + sizeof (UINT32);\r
391 HashSize = mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.SizeOfHeaders - (UINTN) (HashBase - mImageBase);\r
392 }\r
393\r
394 if (HashSize != 0) {\r
395 Status = mHash[HashAlg].HashUpdate(HashCtx, HashBase, HashSize);\r
396 if (!Status) {\r
397 goto Done;\r
398 }\r
399 }\r
0c18794e 400 } else {\r
401 //\r
551d8081 402 // 7. Hash everything from the end of the checksum to the start of the Cert Directory.\r
45bf2c47 403 //\r
551d8081 404 if (Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {\r
405 //\r
406 // Use PE32 offset.\r
407 //\r
408 HashBase = (UINT8 *) &mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.CheckSum + sizeof (UINT32);\r
409 HashSize = (UINTN) ((UINT8 *) (&mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY]) - HashBase);\r
410 } else {\r
411 //\r
412 // Use PE32+ offset.\r
413 //\r
414 HashBase = (UINT8 *) &mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.CheckSum + sizeof (UINT32);\r
415 HashSize = (UINTN) ((UINT8 *) (&mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY]) - HashBase);\r
416 }\r
417\r
418 if (HashSize != 0) {\r
419 Status = mHash[HashAlg].HashUpdate(HashCtx, HashBase, HashSize);\r
420 if (!Status) {\r
421 goto Done;\r
422 }\r
423 }\r
0c18794e 424\r
0c18794e 425 //\r
551d8081 426 // 8. Skip over the Cert Directory. (It is sizeof(IMAGE_DATA_DIRECTORY) bytes.)\r
427 // 9. Hash everything from the end of the Cert Directory to the end of image header.\r
0c18794e 428 //\r
551d8081 429 if (Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {\r
430 //\r
431 // Use PE32 offset\r
432 //\r
433 HashBase = (UINT8 *) &mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY + 1];\r
434 HashSize = mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.SizeOfHeaders - (UINTN) (HashBase - mImageBase);\r
435 } else {\r
436 //\r
437 // Use PE32+ offset.\r
438 //\r
439 HashBase = (UINT8 *) &mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY + 1];\r
440 HashSize = mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.SizeOfHeaders - (UINTN) (HashBase - mImageBase);\r
441 }\r
0c18794e 442\r
551d8081 443 if (HashSize != 0) {\r
444 Status = mHash[HashAlg].HashUpdate(HashCtx, HashBase, HashSize);\r
445 if (!Status) {\r
446 goto Done;\r
447 }\r
448 } \r
0c18794e 449 }\r
551d8081 450\r
0c18794e 451 //\r
452 // 10. Set the SUM_OF_BYTES_HASHED to the size of the header.\r
453 //\r
454 if (Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {\r
455 //\r
456 // Use PE32 offset.\r
457 //\r
458 SumOfBytesHashed = mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.SizeOfHeaders;\r
459 } else {\r
460 //\r
461 // Use PE32+ offset\r
462 //\r
463 SumOfBytesHashed = mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.SizeOfHeaders;\r
464 }\r
465\r
570b3d1a 466\r
467 Section = (EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER *) (\r
468 mImageBase +\r
469 mPeCoffHeaderOffset +\r
470 sizeof (UINT32) +\r
471 sizeof (EFI_IMAGE_FILE_HEADER) +\r
472 mNtHeader.Pe32->FileHeader.SizeOfOptionalHeader\r
473 );\r
474\r
0c18794e 475 //\r
476 // 11. Build a temporary table of pointers to all the IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER\r
477 // structures in the image. The 'NumberOfSections' field of the image\r
478 // header indicates how big the table should be. Do not include any\r
479 // IMAGE_SECTION_HEADERs in the table whose 'SizeOfRawData' field is zero.\r
480 //\r
481 SectionHeader = (EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER *) AllocateZeroPool (sizeof (EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER) * mNtHeader.Pe32->FileHeader.NumberOfSections);\r
570b3d1a 482 if (SectionHeader == NULL) {\r
483 Status = FALSE;\r
484 goto Done;\r
485 }\r
0c18794e 486 //\r
487 // 12. Using the 'PointerToRawData' in the referenced section headers as\r
488 // a key, arrange the elements in the table in ascending order. In other\r
489 // words, sort the section headers according to the disk-file offset of\r
490 // the section.\r
491 //\r
0c18794e 492 for (Index = 0; Index < mNtHeader.Pe32->FileHeader.NumberOfSections; Index++) {\r
493 Pos = Index;\r
494 while ((Pos > 0) && (Section->PointerToRawData < SectionHeader[Pos - 1].PointerToRawData)) {\r
495 CopyMem (&SectionHeader[Pos], &SectionHeader[Pos - 1], sizeof (EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER));\r
496 Pos--;\r
497 }\r
498 CopyMem (&SectionHeader[Pos], Section, sizeof (EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER));\r
499 Section += 1;\r
500 }\r
501\r
502 //\r
503 // 13. Walk through the sorted table, bring the corresponding section\r
504 // into memory, and hash the entire section (using the 'SizeOfRawData'\r
505 // field in the section header to determine the amount of data to hash).\r
506 // 14. Add the section's 'SizeOfRawData' to SUM_OF_BYTES_HASHED .\r
507 // 15. Repeat steps 13 and 14 for all the sections in the sorted table.\r
508 //\r
509 for (Index = 0; Index < mNtHeader.Pe32->FileHeader.NumberOfSections; Index++) {\r
510 Section = &SectionHeader[Index];\r
511 if (Section->SizeOfRawData == 0) {\r
512 continue;\r
513 }\r
514 HashBase = mImageBase + Section->PointerToRawData;\r
515 HashSize = (UINTN) Section->SizeOfRawData;\r
516\r
517 Status = mHash[HashAlg].HashUpdate(HashCtx, HashBase, HashSize);\r
518 if (!Status) {\r
519 goto Done;\r
520 }\r
521\r
522 SumOfBytesHashed += HashSize;\r
523 }\r
524\r
525 //\r
526 // 16. If the file size is greater than SUM_OF_BYTES_HASHED, there is extra\r
527 // data in the file that needs to be added to the hash. This data begins\r
528 // at file offset SUM_OF_BYTES_HASHED and its length is:\r
529 // FileSize - (CertDirectory->Size)\r
530 //\r
531 if (mImageSize > SumOfBytesHashed) {\r
532 HashBase = mImageBase + SumOfBytesHashed;\r
551d8081 533\r
534 if (NumberOfRvaAndSizes <= EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY) {\r
535 CertSize = 0;\r
0c18794e 536 } else {\r
551d8081 537 if (Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {\r
538 //\r
539 // Use PE32 offset.\r
540 //\r
541 CertSize = mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY].Size;\r
542 } else {\r
543 //\r
544 // Use PE32+ offset.\r
545 //\r
546 CertSize = mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY].Size;\r
28186d45 547 }\r
0c18794e 548 }\r
549\r
551d8081 550 if (mImageSize > CertSize + SumOfBytesHashed) {\r
551 HashSize = (UINTN) (mImageSize - CertSize - SumOfBytesHashed);\r
552\r
553 Status = mHash[HashAlg].HashUpdate(HashCtx, HashBase, HashSize);\r
554 if (!Status) {\r
555 goto Done;\r
556 }\r
557 } else if (mImageSize < CertSize + SumOfBytesHashed) {\r
558 Status = FALSE;\r
0c18794e 559 goto Done;\r
560 }\r
561 }\r
551d8081 562\r
0c18794e 563 Status = mHash[HashAlg].HashFinal(HashCtx, mImageDigest);\r
564\r
565Done:\r
566 if (HashCtx != NULL) {\r
567 FreePool (HashCtx);\r
568 }\r
569 if (SectionHeader != NULL) {\r
570 FreePool (SectionHeader);\r
571 }\r
572 return Status;\r
573}\r
574\r
575/**\r
45bf2c47 576 Recognize the Hash algorithm in PE/COFF Authenticode and caculate hash of\r
577 Pe/Coff image based on the authenticode image hashing in PE/COFF Specification\r
0c18794e 578 8.0 Appendix A\r
579\r
dc204d5a
JY
580 Caution: This function may receive untrusted input.\r
581 PE/COFF image is external input, so this function will validate its data structure\r
582 within this image buffer before use.\r
583\r
0c18794e 584 @retval EFI_UNSUPPORTED Hash algorithm is not supported.\r
585 @retval EFI_SUCCESS Hash successfully.\r
586\r
587**/\r
45bf2c47 588EFI_STATUS\r
0c18794e 589HashPeImageByType (\r
590 VOID\r
591 )\r
592{\r
593 UINT8 Index;\r
594 WIN_CERTIFICATE_EFI_PKCS *PkcsCertData;\r
595\r
596 PkcsCertData = (WIN_CERTIFICATE_EFI_PKCS *) (mImageBase + mSecDataDir->VirtualAddress);\r
597\r
badd40f9 598 if (PkcsCertData->Hdr.dwLength < sizeof (WIN_CERTIFICATE_EFI_PKCS) + 32) {\r
599 return EFI_UNSUPPORTED;\r
600 }\r
601\r
45bf2c47 602 for (Index = 0; Index < HASHALG_MAX; Index++) {\r
0c18794e 603 //\r
604 // Check the Hash algorithm in PE/COFF Authenticode.\r
45bf2c47 605 // According to PKCS#7 Definition:\r
0c18794e 606 // SignedData ::= SEQUENCE {\r
607 // version Version,\r
608 // digestAlgorithms DigestAlgorithmIdentifiers,\r
609 // contentInfo ContentInfo,\r
610 // .... }\r
611 // The DigestAlgorithmIdentifiers can be used to determine the hash algorithm in PE/COFF hashing\r
612 // This field has the fixed offset (+32) in final Authenticode ASN.1 data.\r
bd0de396 613 // Fixed offset (+32) is calculated based on two bytes of length encoding.\r
45bf2c47 614 //\r
bd0de396 615 if ((*(PkcsCertData->CertData + 1) & TWO_BYTE_ENCODE) != TWO_BYTE_ENCODE) {\r
616 //\r
617 // Only support two bytes of Long Form of Length Encoding.\r
618 //\r
619 continue;\r
620 }\r
621\r
badd40f9 622 if (PkcsCertData->Hdr.dwLength < sizeof (WIN_CERTIFICATE_EFI_PKCS) + 32 + mHash[Index].OidLength) {\r
623 return EFI_UNSUPPORTED;\r
624 }\r
625\r
0c18794e 626 if (CompareMem (PkcsCertData->CertData + 32, mHash[Index].OidValue, mHash[Index].OidLength) == 0) {\r
627 break;\r
628 }\r
629 }\r
630\r
631 if (Index == HASHALG_MAX) {\r
632 return EFI_UNSUPPORTED;\r
633 }\r
634\r
635 //\r
636 // HASH PE Image based on Hash algorithm in PE/COFF Authenticode.\r
637 //\r
638 if (!HashPeImage(Index)) {\r
639 return EFI_UNSUPPORTED;\r
640 }\r
641\r
642 return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
643}\r
644\r
645\r
646/**\r
647 Returns the size of a given image execution info table in bytes.\r
648\r
649 This function returns the size, in bytes, of the image execution info table specified by\r
650 ImageExeInfoTable. If ImageExeInfoTable is NULL, then 0 is returned.\r
651\r
652 @param ImageExeInfoTable A pointer to a image execution info table structure.\r
45bf2c47 653\r
0c18794e 654 @retval 0 If ImageExeInfoTable is NULL.\r
655 @retval Others The size of a image execution info table in bytes.\r
656\r
657**/\r
658UINTN\r
659GetImageExeInfoTableSize (\r
660 EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO_TABLE *ImageExeInfoTable\r
661 )\r
662{\r
663 UINTN Index;\r
664 EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO *ImageExeInfoItem;\r
665 UINTN TotalSize;\r
666\r
667 if (ImageExeInfoTable == NULL) {\r
668 return 0;\r
669 }\r
670\r
671 ImageExeInfoItem = (EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO *) ((UINT8 *) ImageExeInfoTable + sizeof (EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO_TABLE));\r
672 TotalSize = sizeof (EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO_TABLE);\r
673 for (Index = 0; Index < ImageExeInfoTable->NumberOfImages; Index++) {\r
674 TotalSize += ReadUnaligned32 ((UINT32 *) &ImageExeInfoItem->InfoSize);\r
675 ImageExeInfoItem = (EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO *) ((UINT8 *) ImageExeInfoItem + ReadUnaligned32 ((UINT32 *) &ImageExeInfoItem->InfoSize));\r
676 }\r
677\r
678 return TotalSize;\r
679}\r
680\r
681/**\r
682 Create an Image Execution Information Table entry and add it to system configuration table.\r
683\r
684 @param[in] Action Describes the action taken by the firmware regarding this image.\r
685 @param[in] Name Input a null-terminated, user-friendly name.\r
686 @param[in] DevicePath Input device path pointer.\r
687 @param[in] Signature Input signature info in EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST data structure.\r
688 @param[in] SignatureSize Size of signature.\r
45bf2c47 689\r
0c18794e 690**/\r
691VOID\r
692AddImageExeInfo (\r
45bf2c47 693 IN EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_ACTION Action,\r
694 IN CHAR16 *Name OPTIONAL,\r
0c18794e 695 IN CONST EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *DevicePath,\r
696 IN EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *Signature OPTIONAL,\r
697 IN UINTN SignatureSize\r
698 )\r
699{\r
0c18794e 700 EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO_TABLE *ImageExeInfoTable;\r
701 EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO_TABLE *NewImageExeInfoTable;\r
702 EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO *ImageExeInfoEntry;\r
703 UINTN ImageExeInfoTableSize;\r
704 UINTN NewImageExeInfoEntrySize;\r
705 UINTN NameStringLen;\r
706 UINTN DevicePathSize;\r
707\r
0c18794e 708 ImageExeInfoTable = NULL;\r
709 NewImageExeInfoTable = NULL;\r
710 ImageExeInfoEntry = NULL;\r
711 NameStringLen = 0;\r
712\r
570b3d1a 713 if (DevicePath == NULL) {\r
714 return ;\r
715 }\r
45bf2c47 716\r
0c18794e 717 if (Name != NULL) {\r
718 NameStringLen = StrSize (Name);\r
719 }\r
720\r
721 ImageExeInfoTable = NULL;\r
45bf2c47 722 EfiGetSystemConfigurationTable (&gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, (VOID **) &ImageExeInfoTable);\r
0c18794e 723 if (ImageExeInfoTable != NULL) {\r
724 //\r
725 // The table has been found!\r
726 // We must enlarge the table to accmodate the new exe info entry.\r
727 //\r
728 ImageExeInfoTableSize = GetImageExeInfoTableSize (ImageExeInfoTable);\r
729 } else {\r
730 //\r
731 // Not Found!\r
732 // We should create a new table to append to the configuration table.\r
733 //\r
734 ImageExeInfoTableSize = sizeof (EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO_TABLE);\r
735 }\r
736\r
737 DevicePathSize = GetDevicePathSize (DevicePath);\r
738 NewImageExeInfoEntrySize = sizeof (EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO) + NameStringLen + DevicePathSize + SignatureSize;\r
739 NewImageExeInfoTable = (EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO_TABLE *) AllocateRuntimePool (ImageExeInfoTableSize + NewImageExeInfoEntrySize);\r
570b3d1a 740 if (NewImageExeInfoTable == NULL) {\r
741 return ;\r
742 }\r
0c18794e 743\r
744 if (ImageExeInfoTable != NULL) {\r
745 CopyMem (NewImageExeInfoTable, ImageExeInfoTable, ImageExeInfoTableSize);\r
746 } else {\r
747 NewImageExeInfoTable->NumberOfImages = 0;\r
748 }\r
749 NewImageExeInfoTable->NumberOfImages++;\r
750 ImageExeInfoEntry = (EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO *) ((UINT8 *) NewImageExeInfoTable + ImageExeInfoTableSize);\r
751 //\r
752 // Update new item's infomation.\r
753 //\r
754 WriteUnaligned32 ((UINT32 *) &ImageExeInfoEntry->Action, Action);\r
755 WriteUnaligned32 ((UINT32 *) &ImageExeInfoEntry->InfoSize, (UINT32) NewImageExeInfoEntrySize);\r
756\r
757 if (Name != NULL) {\r
758 CopyMem ((UINT8 *) &ImageExeInfoEntry->InfoSize + sizeof (UINT32), Name, NameStringLen);\r
759 }\r
760 CopyMem (\r
761 (UINT8 *) &ImageExeInfoEntry->InfoSize + sizeof (UINT32) + NameStringLen,\r
762 DevicePath,\r
763 DevicePathSize\r
764 );\r
765 if (Signature != NULL) {\r
766 CopyMem (\r
767 (UINT8 *) &ImageExeInfoEntry->InfoSize + sizeof (UINT32) + NameStringLen + DevicePathSize,\r
768 Signature,\r
769 SignatureSize\r
770 );\r
771 }\r
772 //\r
773 // Update/replace the image execution table.\r
774 //\r
570b3d1a 775 gBS->InstallConfigurationTable (&gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, (VOID *) NewImageExeInfoTable);\r
45bf2c47 776\r
0c18794e 777 //\r
778 // Free Old table data!\r
779 //\r
780 if (ImageExeInfoTable != NULL) {\r
781 FreePool (ImageExeInfoTable);\r
782 }\r
783}\r
784\r
0c18794e 785/**\r
786 Check whether signature is in specified database.\r
787\r
788 @param[in] VariableName Name of database variable that is searched in.\r
789 @param[in] Signature Pointer to signature that is searched for.\r
790 @param[in] CertType Pointer to hash algrithom.\r
791 @param[in] SignatureSize Size of Signature.\r
792\r
793 @return TRUE Found the signature in the variable database.\r
794 @return FALSE Not found the signature in the variable database.\r
795\r
796**/\r
797BOOLEAN\r
798IsSignatureFoundInDatabase (\r
799 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r
45bf2c47 800 IN UINT8 *Signature,\r
0c18794e 801 IN EFI_GUID *CertType,\r
802 IN UINTN SignatureSize\r
803 )\r
804{\r
805 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
806 EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *CertList;\r
807 EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *Cert;\r
808 UINTN DataSize;\r
809 UINT8 *Data;\r
810 UINTN Index;\r
811 UINTN CertCount;\r
812 BOOLEAN IsFound;\r
813 //\r
814 // Read signature database variable.\r
815 //\r
816 IsFound = FALSE;\r
817 Data = NULL;\r
818 DataSize = 0;\r
819 Status = gRT->GetVariable (VariableName, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, NULL, &DataSize, NULL);\r
820 if (Status != EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {\r
821 return FALSE;\r
822 }\r
823\r
824 Data = (UINT8 *) AllocateZeroPool (DataSize);\r
570b3d1a 825 if (Data == NULL) {\r
826 return FALSE;\r
827 }\r
0c18794e 828\r
829 Status = gRT->GetVariable (VariableName, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, NULL, &DataSize, Data);\r
830 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
831 goto Done;\r
832 }\r
833 //\r
834 // Enumerate all signature data in SigDB to check if executable's signature exists.\r
835 //\r
836 CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) Data;\r
837 while ((DataSize > 0) && (DataSize >= CertList->SignatureListSize)) {\r
838 CertCount = (CertList->SignatureListSize - CertList->SignatureHeaderSize) / CertList->SignatureSize;\r
839 Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r
840 if ((CertList->SignatureSize == sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1 + SignatureSize) && (CompareGuid(&CertList->SignatureType, CertType))) {\r
841 for (Index = 0; Index < CertCount; Index++) {\r
842 if (CompareMem (Cert->SignatureData, Signature, SignatureSize) == 0) {\r
843 //\r
844 // Find the signature in database.\r
845 //\r
846 IsFound = TRUE;\r
847 break;\r
848 }\r
849\r
850 Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) Cert + CertList->SignatureSize);\r
851 }\r
852\r
853 if (IsFound) {\r
854 break;\r
855 }\r
856 }\r
857\r
858 DataSize -= CertList->SignatureListSize;\r
859 CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + CertList->SignatureListSize);\r
860 }\r
861\r
862Done:\r
863 if (Data != NULL) {\r
864 FreePool (Data);\r
865 }\r
866\r
867 return IsFound;\r
868}\r
869\r
870/**\r
45bf2c47 871 Verify PKCS#7 SignedData using certificate found in Variable which formatted\r
872 as EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST. The Variable may be PK, KEK, DB or DBX.\r
0c18794e 873\r
45bf2c47 874 @param VariableName Name of Variable to search for Certificate.\r
875 @param VendorGuid Variable vendor GUID.\r
876\r
877 @retval TRUE Image pass verification.\r
878 @retval FALSE Image fail verification.\r
0c18794e 879\r
880**/\r
45bf2c47 881BOOLEAN\r
882IsPkcsSignedDataVerifiedBySignatureList (\r
883 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r
884 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid\r
0c18794e 885 )\r
886{\r
887 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
888 BOOLEAN VerifyStatus;\r
889 WIN_CERTIFICATE_EFI_PKCS *PkcsCertData;\r
890 EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *CertList;\r
891 EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *Cert;\r
892 UINTN DataSize;\r
45bf2c47 893 UINT8 *Data;\r
0c18794e 894 UINT8 *RootCert;\r
895 UINTN RootCertSize;\r
896 UINTN Index;\r
897 UINTN CertCount;\r
898\r
45bf2c47 899 Data = NULL;\r
900 CertList = NULL;\r
901 Cert = NULL;\r
902 RootCert = NULL;\r
903 RootCertSize = 0;\r
904 VerifyStatus = FALSE;\r
905 PkcsCertData = (WIN_CERTIFICATE_EFI_PKCS *) (mImageBase + mSecDataDir->VirtualAddress);\r
0c18794e 906\r
0c18794e 907 DataSize = 0;\r
45bf2c47 908 Status = gRT->GetVariable (VariableName, VendorGuid, NULL, &DataSize, NULL);\r
0c18794e 909 if (Status == EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {\r
45bf2c47 910 Data = (UINT8 *) AllocateZeroPool (DataSize);\r
911 if (Data == NULL) {\r
912 return VerifyStatus;\r
570b3d1a 913 }\r
0c18794e 914\r
45bf2c47 915 Status = gRT->GetVariable (VariableName, VendorGuid, NULL, &DataSize, (VOID *) Data);\r
0c18794e 916 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
917 goto Done;\r
918 }\r
45bf2c47 919\r
920 //\r
921 // Find X509 certificate in Signature List to verify the signature in pkcs7 signed data.\r
0c18794e 922 //\r
45bf2c47 923 CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) Data;\r
0c18794e 924 while ((DataSize > 0) && (DataSize >= CertList->SignatureListSize)) {\r
925 if (CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Guid)) {\r
926 Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r
927 CertCount = (CertList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - CertList->SignatureHeaderSize) / CertList->SignatureSize;\r
928 for (Index = 0; Index < CertCount; Index++) {\r
929 //\r
45bf2c47 930 // Iterate each Signature Data Node within this CertList for verify.\r
931 //\r
0c18794e 932 RootCert = Cert->SignatureData;\r
3277a4e5 933 RootCertSize = CertList->SignatureSize - sizeof (EFI_GUID);\r
45bf2c47 934\r
0c18794e 935 //\r
45bf2c47 936 // Call AuthenticodeVerify library to Verify Authenticode struct.\r
0c18794e 937 //\r
938 VerifyStatus = AuthenticodeVerify (\r
939 PkcsCertData->CertData,\r
4ef15e6e 940 PkcsCertData->Hdr.dwLength - sizeof(PkcsCertData->Hdr),\r
0c18794e 941 RootCert,\r
942 RootCertSize,\r
943 mImageDigest,\r
944 mImageDigestSize\r
945 );\r
0c18794e 946 if (VerifyStatus) {\r
947 goto Done;\r
948 }\r
949 Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) Cert + CertList->SignatureSize);\r
45bf2c47 950 }\r
0c18794e 951 }\r
952 DataSize -= CertList->SignatureListSize;\r
953 CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + CertList->SignatureListSize);\r
954 }\r
955 }\r
956\r
45bf2c47 957Done:\r
958 if (Data != NULL) {\r
959 FreePool (Data);\r
960 }\r
0c18794e 961\r
45bf2c47 962 return VerifyStatus;\r
963}\r
0c18794e 964\r
45bf2c47 965/**\r
966 Verify certificate in WIN_CERT_TYPE_PKCS_SIGNED_DATA format.\r
0c18794e 967\r
45bf2c47 968 @retval EFI_SUCCESS Image pass verification.\r
969 @retval EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION Image fail verification.\r
0c18794e 970\r
45bf2c47 971**/\r
972EFI_STATUS\r
973VerifyCertPkcsSignedData (\r
974 VOID\r
975 )\r
976{\r
977 //\r
978 // 1: Find certificate from DBX forbidden database for revoked certificate.\r
979 //\r
980 if (IsPkcsSignedDataVerifiedBySignatureList (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid)) {\r
981 //\r
982 // DBX is forbidden database, if Authenticode verification pass with\r
983 // one of the certificate in DBX, this image should be rejected.\r
984 //\r
985 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r
570b3d1a 986 }\r
987\r
45bf2c47 988 //\r
50fe73a1 989 // 2: Find certificate from DB database and try to verify authenticode struct.\r
45bf2c47 990 //\r
991 if (IsPkcsSignedDataVerifiedBySignatureList (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid)) {\r
0c18794e 992 return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
993 } else {\r
994 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r
995 }\r
996}\r
997\r
0c18794e 998/**\r
999 Provide verification service for signed images, which include both signature validation\r
45bf2c47 1000 and platform policy control. For signature types, both UEFI WIN_CERTIFICATE_UEFI_GUID and\r
0c18794e 1001 MSFT Authenticode type signatures are supported.\r
0c18794e 1002\r
45bf2c47 1003 In this implementation, only verify external executables when in USER MODE.\r
1004 Executables from FV is bypass, so pass in AuthenticationStatus is ignored.\r
1005\r
1006 The image verification process is:\r
50fe73a1 1007 If the image is signed,\r
1008 If the image's certificate verifies against a certificate (root or intermediate) in the allowed \r
1009 database (DB) and not in the forbidden database (DBX), the certificate verification is passed.\r
1010 If the image's hash digest is in DBX,\r
1011 deny execution.\r
1012 If not,\r
1013 run it.\r
1014 If the Image's certificate verification failed.\r
1015 If the Image's Hash is in DB and not in DBX,\r
1016 run it.\r
1017 Otherwise,\r
1018 deny execution.\r
1019 Otherwise, the image is not signed,\r
1020 Is the Image's Hash in DBX?\r
1021 If yes, deny execution.\r
1022 If not, is the Image's Hash in DB?\r
1023 If yes, run it.\r
1024 If not, deny execution.\r
45bf2c47 1025\r
dc204d5a
JY
1026 Caution: This function may receive untrusted input.\r
1027 PE/COFF image is external input, so this function will validate its data structure\r
1028 within this image buffer before use.\r
1029\r
45bf2c47 1030 @param[in] AuthenticationStatus\r
0c18794e 1031 This is the authentication status returned from the security\r
1032 measurement services for the input file.\r
1033 @param[in] File This is a pointer to the device path of the file that is\r
1034 being dispatched. This will optionally be used for logging.\r
1035 @param[in] FileBuffer File buffer matches the input file device path.\r
1036 @param[in] FileSize Size of File buffer matches the input file device path.\r
1037\r
1038 @retval EFI_SUCCESS The file specified by File did authenticate, and the\r
1039 platform policy dictates that the DXE Core may use File.\r
570b3d1a 1040 @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Input argument is incorrect.\r
1041 @retval EFI_OUT_RESOURCE Fail to allocate memory.\r
0c18794e 1042 @retval EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION The file specified by File did not authenticate, and\r
1043 the platform policy dictates that File should be placed\r
1044 in the untrusted state. A file may be promoted from\r
1045 the untrusted to the trusted state at a future time\r
1046 with a call to the Trust() DXE Service.\r
1047 @retval EFI_ACCESS_DENIED The file specified by File did not authenticate, and\r
1048 the platform policy dictates that File should not be\r
1049 used for any purpose.\r
1050\r
1051**/\r
1052EFI_STATUS\r
1053EFIAPI\r
1054DxeImageVerificationHandler (\r
1055 IN UINT32 AuthenticationStatus,\r
1056 IN CONST EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *File,\r
1057 IN VOID *FileBuffer,\r
1058 IN UINTN FileSize\r
1059 )\r
0c18794e 1060{\r
551d8081 1061 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
1062 UINT16 Magic;\r
1063 EFI_IMAGE_DOS_HEADER *DosHdr;\r
1064 EFI_STATUS VerifyStatus;\r
551d8081 1065 EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *SignatureList;\r
1066 UINTN SignatureListSize;\r
1067 EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *Signature;\r
1068 EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_ACTION Action;\r
1069 WIN_CERTIFICATE *WinCertificate;\r
1070 UINT32 Policy;\r
8f8ca22e 1071 UINT8 *SecureBoot;\r
551d8081 1072 PE_COFF_LOADER_IMAGE_CONTEXT ImageContext;\r
1073 UINT32 NumberOfRvaAndSizes;\r
badd40f9 1074 UINT32 CertSize;\r
0c18794e 1075\r
1076 if (File == NULL) {\r
1077 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
1078 }\r
1079\r
1080 SignatureList = NULL;\r
1081 SignatureListSize = 0;\r
1082 WinCertificate = NULL;\r
1083 Action = EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_AUTH_UNTESTED;\r
1084 Status = EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;\r
1085 //\r
1086 // Check the image type and get policy setting.\r
1087 //\r
1088 switch (GetImageType (File)) {\r
45bf2c47 1089\r
0c18794e 1090 case IMAGE_FROM_FV:\r
1091 Policy = ALWAYS_EXECUTE;\r
1092 break;\r
1093\r
1094 case IMAGE_FROM_OPTION_ROM:\r
1095 Policy = PcdGet32 (PcdOptionRomImageVerificationPolicy);\r
1096 break;\r
1097\r
1098 case IMAGE_FROM_REMOVABLE_MEDIA:\r
1099 Policy = PcdGet32 (PcdRemovableMediaImageVerificationPolicy);\r
1100 break;\r
1101\r
1102 case IMAGE_FROM_FIXED_MEDIA:\r
1103 Policy = PcdGet32 (PcdFixedMediaImageVerificationPolicy);\r
1104 break;\r
1105\r
1106 default:\r
45bf2c47 1107 Policy = DENY_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r
0c18794e 1108 break;\r
1109 }\r
1110 //\r
1111 // If policy is always/never execute, return directly.\r
1112 //\r
1113 if (Policy == ALWAYS_EXECUTE) {\r
1114 return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
1115 } else if (Policy == NEVER_EXECUTE) {\r
1116 return EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;\r
1117 }\r
beda2356 1118\r
8f8ca22e 1119 GetEfiGlobalVariable2 (EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME, (VOID**)&SecureBoot, NULL);\r
beda2356 1120 //\r
8f8ca22e 1121 // Skip verification if SecureBoot variable doesn't exist.\r
beda2356 1122 //\r
8f8ca22e 1123 if (SecureBoot == NULL) {\r
beda2356 1124 return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
1125 }\r
1126\r
1127 //\r
8f8ca22e 1128 // Skip verification if SecureBoot is disabled.\r
beda2356 1129 //\r
8f8ca22e 1130 if (*SecureBoot == SECURE_BOOT_MODE_DISABLE) {\r
1131 FreePool (SecureBoot);\r
beda2356 1132 return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
45bf2c47 1133 }\r
8f8ca22e 1134 FreePool (SecureBoot);\r
551d8081 1135\r
0c18794e 1136 //\r
1137 // Read the Dos header.\r
1138 //\r
570b3d1a 1139 if (FileBuffer == NULL) {\r
570b3d1a 1140 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
1141 }\r
551d8081 1142\r
0c18794e 1143 mImageBase = (UINT8 *) FileBuffer;\r
1144 mImageSize = FileSize;\r
28186d45
ED
1145\r
1146 ZeroMem (&ImageContext, sizeof (ImageContext));\r
1147 ImageContext.Handle = (VOID *) FileBuffer;\r
e0192326 1148 ImageContext.ImageRead = (PE_COFF_LOADER_READ_FILE) DxeImageVerificationLibImageRead;\r
28186d45
ED
1149\r
1150 //\r
1151 // Get information about the image being loaded\r
1152 //\r
1153 Status = PeCoffLoaderGetImageInfo (&ImageContext);\r
1154 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
1155 //\r
1156 // The information can't be got from the invalid PeImage\r
1157 //\r
1158 goto Done;\r
1159 }\r
1160\r
badd40f9 1161 Status = EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;\r
1162\r
1163 DosHdr = (EFI_IMAGE_DOS_HEADER *) mImageBase;\r
0c18794e 1164 if (DosHdr->e_magic == EFI_IMAGE_DOS_SIGNATURE) {\r
1165 //\r
45bf2c47 1166 // DOS image header is present,\r
0c18794e 1167 // so read the PE header after the DOS image header.\r
1168 //\r
1169 mPeCoffHeaderOffset = DosHdr->e_lfanew;\r
1170 } else {\r
1171 mPeCoffHeaderOffset = 0;\r
1172 }\r
1173 //\r
1174 // Check PE/COFF image.\r
1175 //\r
1176 mNtHeader.Pe32 = (EFI_IMAGE_NT_HEADERS32 *) (mImageBase + mPeCoffHeaderOffset);\r
1177 if (mNtHeader.Pe32->Signature != EFI_IMAGE_NT_SIGNATURE) {\r
1178 //\r
1179 // It is not a valid Pe/Coff file.\r
1180 //\r
551d8081 1181 goto Done;\r
0c18794e 1182 }\r
1183\r
de2447dd 1184 if (mNtHeader.Pe32->FileHeader.Machine == IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_IA64 && mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {\r
1185 //\r
1186 // NOTE: Some versions of Linux ELILO for Itanium have an incorrect magic value \r
1187 // in the PE/COFF Header. If the MachineType is Itanium(IA64) and the \r
1188 // Magic value in the OptionalHeader is EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC\r
1189 // then override the magic value to EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR64_MAGIC\r
1190 //\r
1191 Magic = EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR64_MAGIC;\r
1192 } else {\r
1193 //\r
1194 // Get the magic value from the PE/COFF Optional Header\r
1195 //\r
1196 Magic = mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.Magic;\r
1197 }\r
1198 \r
0c18794e 1199 if (Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {\r
1200 //\r
1201 // Use PE32 offset.\r
1202 //\r
551d8081 1203 NumberOfRvaAndSizes = mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.NumberOfRvaAndSizes;\r
1204 if (NumberOfRvaAndSizes > EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY) {\r
1205 mSecDataDir = (EFI_IMAGE_DATA_DIRECTORY *) &mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY];\r
1206 } \r
570b3d1a 1207 } else {\r
1208 //\r
551d8081 1209 // Use PE32+ offset.\r
570b3d1a 1210 //\r
551d8081 1211 NumberOfRvaAndSizes = mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.NumberOfRvaAndSizes;\r
1212 if (NumberOfRvaAndSizes > EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY) {\r
1213 mSecDataDir = (EFI_IMAGE_DATA_DIRECTORY *) &mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY];\r
1214 }\r
0c18794e 1215 }\r
1216\r
551d8081 1217 if ((mSecDataDir == NULL) || ((mSecDataDir != NULL) && (mSecDataDir->Size == 0))) {\r
0c18794e 1218 //\r
1219 // This image is not signed.\r
1220 //\r
45bf2c47 1221 if (!HashPeImage (HASHALG_SHA256)) {\r
1222 goto Done;\r
1223 }\r
1224\r
1225 if (IsSignatureFoundInDatabase (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1, mImageDigest, &mCertType, mImageDigestSize)) {\r
1226 //\r
1227 // Image Hash is in forbidden database (DBX).\r
1228 //\r
45bf2c47 1229 goto Done;\r
1230 }\r
1231\r
1232 if (IsSignatureFoundInDatabase (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE, mImageDigest, &mCertType, mImageDigestSize)) {\r
1233 //\r
1234 // Image Hash is in allowed database (DB).\r
1235 //\r
1236 return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
1237 }\r
1238\r
1239 //\r
1240 // Image Hash is not found in both forbidden and allowed database.\r
1241 //\r
45bf2c47 1242 goto Done;\r
0c18794e 1243 }\r
45bf2c47 1244\r
0c18794e 1245 //\r
1246 // Verify signature of executables.\r
1247 //\r
1248 WinCertificate = (WIN_CERTIFICATE *) (mImageBase + mSecDataDir->VirtualAddress);\r
1249\r
badd40f9 1250 CertSize = sizeof (WIN_CERTIFICATE);\r
1251\r
1252 if ((mSecDataDir->Size <= CertSize) || (mSecDataDir->Size < WinCertificate->dwLength)) {\r
1253 goto Done;\r
1254 }\r
1255\r
50fe73a1 1256 if (WinCertificate->wCertificateType == WIN_CERT_TYPE_PKCS_SIGNED_DATA) {\r
0c18794e 1257 //\r
1258 // Verify Pkcs signed data type.\r
1259 //\r
badd40f9 1260 Status = HashPeImageByType();\r
45bf2c47 1261 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
0c18794e 1262 goto Done;\r
1263 }\r
50fe73a1 1264 \r
0c18794e 1265 VerifyStatus = VerifyCertPkcsSignedData ();\r
50fe73a1 1266 } else {\r
1267 goto Done;\r
1268 }\r
0c18794e 1269\r
50fe73a1 1270 if (!EFI_ERROR (VerifyStatus)) {\r
0c18794e 1271 //\r
50fe73a1 1272 // Verification is passed.\r
1273 // Continue to check the image digest in signature database.\r
0c18794e 1274 //\r
50fe73a1 1275 if (IsSignatureFoundInDatabase (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1, mImageDigest, &mCertType, mImageDigestSize)) {\r
1276 //\r
1277 // Executable signature verification passes, but is found in forbidden signature database.\r
1278 //\r
1279 Action = EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_AUTH_SIG_FOUND;\r
1280 Status = EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;\r
1281 } else {\r
1282 //\r
1283 // For image verification against enrolled X.509 certificate(root or intermediate),\r
1284 // no need to check image's hash in the allowed database.\r
1285 //\r
1286 return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
0c18794e 1287 }\r
50fe73a1 1288 } else {\r
0c18794e 1289 //\r
1290 // Verification failure.\r
1291 //\r
45bf2c47 1292 if (!IsSignatureFoundInDatabase (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1, mImageDigest, &mCertType, mImageDigestSize) &&\r
1293 IsSignatureFoundInDatabase (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE, mImageDigest, &mCertType, mImageDigestSize)) {\r
1294 //\r
1295 // Verification fail, Image Hash is not in forbidden database (DBX),\r
1296 // and Image Hash is in allowed database (DB).\r
1297 //\r
1298 Status = EFI_SUCCESS;\r
1299 } else {\r
1300 Action = EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_AUTH_SIG_FAILED;\r
1301 Status = EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;\r
1302 }\r
50fe73a1 1303 }\r
1304\r
1305 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
0c18794e 1306 //\r
50fe73a1 1307 // Get image hash value as executable's signature.\r
0c18794e 1308 //\r
50fe73a1 1309 SignatureListSize = sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1 + mImageDigestSize;\r
1310 SignatureList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) AllocateZeroPool (SignatureListSize);\r
1311 if (SignatureList == NULL) {\r
1312 Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
1313 goto Done;\r
1314 }\r
1315 SignatureList->SignatureHeaderSize = 0;\r
1316 SignatureList->SignatureListSize = (UINT32) SignatureListSize;\r
1317 SignatureList->SignatureSize = (UINT32) mImageDigestSize;\r
1318 CopyMem (&SignatureList->SignatureType, &mCertType, sizeof (EFI_GUID));\r
1319 Signature = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) SignatureList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST));\r
1320 CopyMem (Signature->SignatureData, mImageDigest, mImageDigestSize);\r
0c18794e 1321 }\r
1322\r
1323Done:\r
1324 if (Status != EFI_SUCCESS) {\r
1325 //\r
1326 // Policy decides to defer or reject the image; add its information in image executable information table.\r
1327 //\r
1328 AddImageExeInfo (Action, NULL, File, SignatureList, SignatureListSize);\r
1329 }\r
1330\r
1331 if (SignatureList != NULL) {\r
1332 FreePool (SignatureList);\r
1333 }\r
1334\r
0c18794e 1335 return Status;\r
1336}\r
1337\r
1338/**\r
1339 When VariableWriteArchProtocol install, create "SecureBoot" variable.\r
45bf2c47 1340\r
0c18794e 1341 @param[in] Event Event whose notification function is being invoked.\r
1342 @param[in] Context Pointer to the notification function's context.\r
45bf2c47 1343\r
0c18794e 1344**/\r
1345VOID\r
1346EFIAPI\r
1347VariableWriteCallBack (\r
1348 IN EFI_EVENT Event,\r
1349 IN VOID *Context\r
1350 )\r
1351{\r
1352 UINT8 SecureBootMode;\r
1353 UINT8 *SecureBootModePtr;\r
1354 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
1355 VOID *ProtocolPointer;\r
1356\r
1357 Status = gBS->LocateProtocol (&gEfiVariableWriteArchProtocolGuid, NULL, &ProtocolPointer);\r
1358 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
1359 return;\r
1360 }\r
45bf2c47 1361\r
0c18794e 1362 //\r
1363 // Check whether "SecureBoot" variable exists.\r
1364 // If this library is built-in, it means firmware has capability to perform\r
1365 // driver signing verification.\r
1366 //\r
f01b91ae 1367 GetEfiGlobalVariable2 (EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME, (VOID**)&SecureBootModePtr, NULL);\r
0c18794e 1368 if (SecureBootModePtr == NULL) {\r
1369 SecureBootMode = SECURE_BOOT_MODE_DISABLE;\r
1370 //\r
1371 // Authenticated variable driver will update "SecureBoot" depending on SetupMode variable.\r
1372 //\r
1373 gRT->SetVariable (\r
1374 EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME,\r
1375 &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
1376 EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE,\r
1377 sizeof (UINT8),\r
1378 &SecureBootMode\r
1379 );\r
1380 } else {\r
1381 FreePool (SecureBootModePtr);\r
1382 }\r
45bf2c47 1383}\r
0c18794e 1384\r
1385/**\r
1386 Register security measurement handler.\r
1387\r
1388 @param ImageHandle ImageHandle of the loaded driver.\r
1389 @param SystemTable Pointer to the EFI System Table.\r
1390\r
1391 @retval EFI_SUCCESS The handlers were registered successfully.\r
1392**/\r
1393EFI_STATUS\r
1394EFIAPI\r
1395DxeImageVerificationLibConstructor (\r
1396 IN EFI_HANDLE ImageHandle,\r
1397 IN EFI_SYSTEM_TABLE *SystemTable\r
1398 )\r
1399{\r
1400 VOID *Registration;\r
1401\r
1402 //\r
1403 // Register callback function upon VariableWriteArchProtocol.\r
45bf2c47 1404 //\r
0c18794e 1405 EfiCreateProtocolNotifyEvent (\r
1406 &gEfiVariableWriteArchProtocolGuid,\r
1407 TPL_CALLBACK,\r
1408 VariableWriteCallBack,\r
1409 NULL,\r
1410 &Registration\r
1411 );\r
1412\r
1413 return RegisterSecurityHandler (\r
1414 DxeImageVerificationHandler,\r
1415 EFI_AUTH_OPERATION_VERIFY_IMAGE | EFI_AUTH_OPERATION_IMAGE_REQUIRED\r
45bf2c47 1416 );\r
0c18794e 1417}\r