[mirror_edk2.git] / SecurityPkg / Library / DxeImageVerificationLib / DxeImageVerificationLib.c

/** @file\r
  Implement image verification services for secure boot service in UEFI2.3.1.\r
\r
Copyright (c) 2009 - 2012, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>\r
This program and the accompanying materials\r
are licensed and made available under the terms and conditions of the BSD License\r
which accompanies this distribution.  The full text of the license may be found at\r
http://opensource.org/licenses/bsd-license.php\r
\r
THE PROGRAM IS DISTRIBUTED UNDER THE BSD LICENSE ON AN "AS IS" BASIS,\r
WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR REPRESENTATIONS OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED.\r
\r
**/\r
\r
#include "DxeImageVerificationLib.h"\r
\r
EFI_IMAGE_OPTIONAL_HEADER_PTR_UNION mNtHeader;\r
UINTN                               mImageSize;\r
UINT32                              mPeCoffHeaderOffset;\r
UINT8                               mImageDigest[MAX_DIGEST_SIZE];\r
UINTN                               mImageDigestSize;\r
EFI_IMAGE_DATA_DIRECTORY            *mSecDataDir      = NULL;\r
UINT8                               *mImageBase       = NULL;\r
EFI_GUID                            mCertType;\r
\r
//\r
// Notify string for authorization UI.\r
//\r
CHAR16  mNotifyString1[MAX_NOTIFY_STRING_LEN] = L"Image verification pass but not found in authorized database!";\r
CHAR16  mNotifyString2[MAX_NOTIFY_STRING_LEN] = L"Launch this image anyway? (Yes/Defer/No)";\r
//\r
// Public Exponent of RSA Key.\r
//\r
CONST UINT8 mRsaE[] = { 0x01, 0x00, 0x01 };\r
\r
\r
//\r
// OID ASN.1 Value for Hash Algorithms\r
//\r
UINT8 mHashOidValue[] = {\r
  0x2A, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xF7, 0x0D, 0x02, 0x05,         // OBJ_md5\r
  0x2B, 0x0E, 0x03, 0x02, 0x1A,                           // OBJ_sha1\r
  0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x04,   // OBJ_sha224\r
  0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x01,   // OBJ_sha256\r
  0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x02,   // OBJ_sha384\r
  0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x03,   // OBJ_sha512\r
  };\r
\r
HASH_TABLE mHash[] = {\r
  { L"SHA1",   20, &mHashOidValue[8],  5, Sha1GetContextSize,  Sha1Init,   Sha1Update,    Sha1Final  },\r
  { L"SHA224", 28, &mHashOidValue[13], 9, NULL,                NULL,       NULL,          NULL       },\r
  { L"SHA256", 32, &mHashOidValue[22], 9, Sha256GetContextSize,Sha256Init, Sha256Update,  Sha256Final},\r
  { L"SHA384", 48, &mHashOidValue[31], 9, NULL,                NULL,       NULL,          NULL       },\r
  { L"SHA512", 64, &mHashOidValue[40], 9, NULL,                NULL,       NULL,          NULL       }\r
};\r
\r
\r
/**\r
  Get the image type.\r
\r
  @param[in]    File       This is a pointer to the device path of the file that is\r
                           being dispatched.\r
\r
  @return UINT32           Image Type\r
\r
**/\r
UINT32\r
GetImageType (\r
  IN  CONST EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL   *File\r
  )\r
{\r
  EFI_STATUS                        Status;\r
  EFI_HANDLE                        DeviceHandle;\r
  EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL          *TempDevicePath;\r
  EFI_BLOCK_IO_PROTOCOL             *BlockIo;\r
\r
  //\r
  // First check to see if File is from a Firmware Volume\r
  //\r
  DeviceHandle      = NULL;\r
  TempDevicePath = (EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *) File;\r
  Status = gBS->LocateDevicePath (\r
                  &gEfiFirmwareVolume2ProtocolGuid,\r
                  &TempDevicePath,\r
                  &DeviceHandle\r
                  );\r
  if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
    Status = gBS->OpenProtocol (\r
                    DeviceHandle,\r
                    &gEfiFirmwareVolume2ProtocolGuid,\r
                    NULL,\r
                    NULL,\r
                    NULL,\r
                    EFI_OPEN_PROTOCOL_TEST_PROTOCOL\r
                    );\r
    if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
      return IMAGE_FROM_FV;\r
    }\r
  }\r
\r
  //\r
  // Next check to see if File is from a Block I/O device\r
  //\r
  DeviceHandle   = NULL;\r
  TempDevicePath = (EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *) File;\r
  Status = gBS->LocateDevicePath (\r
                  &gEfiBlockIoProtocolGuid,\r
                  &TempDevicePath,\r
                  &DeviceHandle\r
                  );\r
  if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
    BlockIo = NULL;\r
    Status = gBS->OpenProtocol (\r
                    DeviceHandle,\r
                    &gEfiBlockIoProtocolGuid,\r
                    (VOID **) &BlockIo,\r
                    NULL,\r
                    NULL,\r
                    EFI_OPEN_PROTOCOL_GET_PROTOCOL\r
                    );\r
    if (!EFI_ERROR (Status) && BlockIo != NULL) {\r
      if (BlockIo->Media != NULL) {\r
        if (BlockIo->Media->RemovableMedia) {\r
          //\r
          // Block I/O is present and specifies the media is removable\r
          //\r
          return IMAGE_FROM_REMOVABLE_MEDIA;\r
        } else {\r
          //\r
          // Block I/O is present and specifies the media is not removable\r
          //\r
          return IMAGE_FROM_FIXED_MEDIA;\r
        }\r
      }\r
    }\r
  }\r
\r
  //\r
  // File is not in a Firmware Volume or on a Block I/O device, so check to see if\r
  // the device path supports the Simple File System Protocol.\r
  //\r
  DeviceHandle   = NULL;\r
  TempDevicePath = (EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *) File;\r
  Status = gBS->LocateDevicePath (\r
                  &gEfiSimpleFileSystemProtocolGuid,\r
                  &TempDevicePath,\r
                  &DeviceHandle\r
                  );\r
  if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
    //\r
    // Simple File System is present without Block I/O, so assume media is fixed.\r
    //\r
    return IMAGE_FROM_FIXED_MEDIA;\r
  }\r
\r
  //\r
  // File is not from an FV, Block I/O or Simple File System, so the only options\r
  // left are a PCI Option ROM and a Load File Protocol such as a PXE Boot from a NIC.\r
  //\r
  TempDevicePath = (EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *) File;\r
  while (!IsDevicePathEndType (TempDevicePath)) {\r
    switch (DevicePathType (TempDevicePath)) {\r
\r
    case MEDIA_DEVICE_PATH:\r
      if (DevicePathSubType (TempDevicePath) == MEDIA_RELATIVE_OFFSET_RANGE_DP) {\r
        return IMAGE_FROM_OPTION_ROM;\r
      }\r
      break;\r
\r
    case MESSAGING_DEVICE_PATH:\r
      if (DevicePathSubType(TempDevicePath) == MSG_MAC_ADDR_DP) {\r
        return IMAGE_FROM_REMOVABLE_MEDIA;\r
      }\r
      break;\r
\r
    default:\r
      break;\r
    }\r
    TempDevicePath = NextDevicePathNode (TempDevicePath);\r
  }\r
  return IMAGE_UNKNOWN;\r
}\r
\r
/**\r
  Caculate hash of Pe/Coff image based on the authenticode image hashing in\r
  PE/COFF Specification 8.0 Appendix A\r
\r
  @param[in]    HashAlg   Hash algorithm type.\r
\r
  @retval TRUE            Successfully hash image.\r
  @retval FALSE           Fail in hash image.\r
\r
**/\r
BOOLEAN\r
HashPeImage (\r
  IN  UINT32              HashAlg\r
  )\r
{\r
  BOOLEAN                   Status;\r
  UINT16                    Magic;\r
  EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER  *Section;\r
  VOID                      *HashCtx;\r
  UINTN                     CtxSize;\r
  UINT8                     *HashBase;\r
  UINTN                     HashSize;\r
  UINTN                     SumOfBytesHashed;\r
  EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER  *SectionHeader;\r
  UINTN                     Index;\r
  UINTN                     Pos;\r
  UINTN                     SumOfSectionBytes;\r
  EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER  *SectionCache;\r
\r
  HashCtx       = NULL;\r
  SectionHeader = NULL;\r
  Status        = FALSE;\r
\r
  if ((HashAlg != HASHALG_SHA1) && (HashAlg != HASHALG_SHA256)) {\r
    return FALSE;\r
  }\r
\r
  //\r
  // Initialize context of hash.\r
  //\r
  ZeroMem (mImageDigest, MAX_DIGEST_SIZE);\r
\r
  if (HashAlg == HASHALG_SHA1) {\r
    mImageDigestSize  = SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE;\r
    mCertType         = gEfiCertSha1Guid;\r
  } else if (HashAlg == HASHALG_SHA256) {\r
    mImageDigestSize  = SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE;\r
    mCertType         = gEfiCertSha256Guid;\r
  } else {\r
    return FALSE;\r
  }\r
\r
  CtxSize   = mHash[HashAlg].GetContextSize();\r
\r
  HashCtx = AllocatePool (CtxSize);\r
  if (HashCtx == NULL) {\r
    return FALSE;\r
  }\r
\r
  // 1.  Load the image header into memory.\r
\r
  // 2.  Initialize a SHA hash context.\r
  Status = mHash[HashAlg].HashInit(HashCtx);\r
\r
  if (!Status) {\r
    goto Done;\r
  }\r
  //\r
  // Measuring PE/COFF Image Header;\r
  // But CheckSum field and SECURITY data directory (certificate) are excluded\r
  //\r
  Magic = mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.Magic;\r
  //\r
  // 3.  Calculate the distance from the base of the image header to the image checksum address.\r
  // 4.  Hash the image header from its base to beginning of the image checksum.\r
  //\r
  HashBase = mImageBase;\r
  if (Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {\r
    //\r
    // Use PE32 offset.\r
    //\r
    HashSize = (UINTN) ((UINT8 *) (&mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.CheckSum) - HashBase);\r
  } else if (Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR64_MAGIC) {\r
    //\r
    // Use PE32+ offset.\r
    //\r
    HashSize = (UINTN) ((UINT8 *) (&mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.CheckSum) - HashBase);\r
  } else {\r
    //\r
    // Invalid header magic number.\r
    //\r
    Status = FALSE;\r
    goto Done;\r
  }\r
\r
  Status  = mHash[HashAlg].HashUpdate(HashCtx, HashBase, HashSize);\r
  if (!Status) {\r
    goto Done;\r
  }\r
  //\r
  // 5.  Skip over the image checksum (it occupies a single ULONG).\r
  // 6.  Get the address of the beginning of the Cert Directory.\r
  // 7.  Hash everything from the end of the checksum to the start of the Cert Directory.\r
  //\r
  if (Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {\r
    //\r
    // Use PE32 offset.\r
    //\r
    HashBase = (UINT8 *) &mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.CheckSum + sizeof (UINT32);\r
    HashSize = (UINTN) ((UINT8 *) (&mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY]) - HashBase);\r
  } else {\r
    //\r
    // Use PE32+ offset.\r
    //\r
    HashBase = (UINT8 *) &mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.CheckSum + sizeof (UINT32);\r
    HashSize = (UINTN) ((UINT8 *) (&mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY]) - HashBase);\r
  }\r
\r
  Status  = mHash[HashAlg].HashUpdate(HashCtx, HashBase, HashSize);\r
  if (!Status) {\r
    goto Done;\r
  }\r
  //\r
  // 8.  Skip over the Cert Directory. (It is sizeof(IMAGE_DATA_DIRECTORY) bytes.)\r
  // 9.  Hash everything from the end of the Cert Directory to the end of image header.\r
  //\r
  if (Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {\r
    //\r
    // Use PE32 offset\r
    //\r
    HashBase = (UINT8 *) &mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY + 1];\r
    HashSize = mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.SizeOfHeaders - (UINTN) ((UINT8 *) (&mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY + 1]) - mImageBase);\r
  } else {\r
    //\r
    // Use PE32+ offset.\r
    //\r
    HashBase = (UINT8 *) &mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY + 1];\r
    HashSize = mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.SizeOfHeaders - (UINTN) ((UINT8 *) (&mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY + 1]) - mImageBase);\r
  }\r
\r
  Status  = mHash[HashAlg].HashUpdate(HashCtx, HashBase, HashSize);\r
  if (!Status) {\r
    goto Done;\r
  }\r
  //\r
  // 10. Set the SUM_OF_BYTES_HASHED to the size of the header.\r
  //\r
  if (Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {\r
    //\r
    // Use PE32 offset.\r
    //\r
    SumOfBytesHashed = mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.SizeOfHeaders;\r
  } else {\r
    //\r
    // Use PE32+ offset\r
    //\r
    SumOfBytesHashed = mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.SizeOfHeaders;\r
  }\r
\r
\r
  Section = (EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER *) (\r
               mImageBase +\r
               mPeCoffHeaderOffset +\r
               sizeof (UINT32) +\r
               sizeof (EFI_IMAGE_FILE_HEADER) +\r
               mNtHeader.Pe32->FileHeader.SizeOfOptionalHeader\r
               );\r
\r
  SectionCache = Section;\r
  for (Index = 0, SumOfSectionBytes = 0; Index < mNtHeader.Pe32->FileHeader.NumberOfSections; Index++, SectionCache++) {\r
    SumOfSectionBytes += SectionCache->SizeOfRawData;\r
  }\r
\r
  //\r
  // Sanity check for file corruption. Sections raw data size should be smaller\r
  // than Image Size.\r
  //\r
  if (SumOfSectionBytes >= mImageSize) {\r
    Status = FALSE;\r
    goto Done;\r
  }\r
\r
  //\r
  // 11. Build a temporary table of pointers to all the IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER\r
  //     structures in the image. The 'NumberOfSections' field of the image\r
  //     header indicates how big the table should be. Do not include any\r
  //     IMAGE_SECTION_HEADERs in the table whose 'SizeOfRawData' field is zero.\r
  //\r
  SectionHeader = (EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER *) AllocateZeroPool (sizeof (EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER) * mNtHeader.Pe32->FileHeader.NumberOfSections);\r
  if (SectionHeader == NULL) {\r
    Status = FALSE;\r
    goto Done;\r
  }\r
  //\r
  // 12.  Using the 'PointerToRawData' in the referenced section headers as\r
  //      a key, arrange the elements in the table in ascending order. In other\r
  //      words, sort the section headers according to the disk-file offset of\r
  //      the section.\r
  //\r
  for (Index = 0; Index < mNtHeader.Pe32->FileHeader.NumberOfSections; Index++) {\r
    Pos = Index;\r
    while ((Pos > 0) && (Section->PointerToRawData < SectionHeader[Pos - 1].PointerToRawData)) {\r
      CopyMem (&SectionHeader[Pos], &SectionHeader[Pos - 1], sizeof (EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER));\r
      Pos--;\r
    }\r
    CopyMem (&SectionHeader[Pos], Section, sizeof (EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER));\r
    Section += 1;\r
  }\r
\r
  //\r
  // 13.  Walk through the sorted table, bring the corresponding section\r
  //      into memory, and hash the entire section (using the 'SizeOfRawData'\r
  //      field in the section header to determine the amount of data to hash).\r
  // 14.  Add the section's 'SizeOfRawData' to SUM_OF_BYTES_HASHED .\r
  // 15.  Repeat steps 13 and 14 for all the sections in the sorted table.\r
  //\r
  for (Index = 0; Index < mNtHeader.Pe32->FileHeader.NumberOfSections; Index++) {\r
    Section = &SectionHeader[Index];\r
    if (Section->SizeOfRawData == 0) {\r
      continue;\r
    }\r
    HashBase  = mImageBase + Section->PointerToRawData;\r
    HashSize  = (UINTN) Section->SizeOfRawData;\r
\r
    Status  = mHash[HashAlg].HashUpdate(HashCtx, HashBase, HashSize);\r
    if (!Status) {\r
      goto Done;\r
    }\r
\r
    SumOfBytesHashed += HashSize;\r
  }\r
\r
  //\r
  // 16.  If the file size is greater than SUM_OF_BYTES_HASHED, there is extra\r
  //      data in the file that needs to be added to the hash. This data begins\r
  //      at file offset SUM_OF_BYTES_HASHED and its length is:\r
  //             FileSize  -  (CertDirectory->Size)\r
  //\r
  if (mImageSize > SumOfBytesHashed) {\r
    HashBase = mImageBase + SumOfBytesHashed;\r
    if (Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {\r
      //\r
      // Use PE32 offset.\r
      //\r
      HashSize = (UINTN)(\r
                 mImageSize -\r
                 mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY].Size -\r
                 SumOfBytesHashed);\r
    } else {\r
      //\r
      // Use PE32+ offset.\r
      //\r
      HashSize = (UINTN)(\r
                 mImageSize -\r
                 mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY].Size -\r
                 SumOfBytesHashed);\r
    }\r
\r
    Status  = mHash[HashAlg].HashUpdate(HashCtx, HashBase, HashSize);\r
    if (!Status) {\r
      goto Done;\r
    }\r
  }\r
  Status  = mHash[HashAlg].HashFinal(HashCtx, mImageDigest);\r
\r
Done:\r
  if (HashCtx != NULL) {\r
    FreePool (HashCtx);\r
  }\r
  if (SectionHeader != NULL) {\r
    FreePool (SectionHeader);\r
  }\r
  return Status;\r
}\r
\r
/**\r
  Recognize the Hash algorithm in PE/COFF Authenticode and caculate hash of\r
  Pe/Coff image based on the authenticode image hashing in PE/COFF Specification\r
  8.0 Appendix A\r
\r
  @retval EFI_UNSUPPORTED             Hash algorithm is not supported.\r
  @retval EFI_SUCCESS                 Hash successfully.\r
\r
**/\r
EFI_STATUS\r
HashPeImageByType (\r
  VOID\r
  )\r
{\r
  UINT8                     Index;\r
  WIN_CERTIFICATE_EFI_PKCS  *PkcsCertData;\r
\r
  PkcsCertData = (WIN_CERTIFICATE_EFI_PKCS *) (mImageBase + mSecDataDir->VirtualAddress);\r
\r
  for (Index = 0; Index < HASHALG_MAX; Index++) {\r
    //\r
    // Check the Hash algorithm in PE/COFF Authenticode.\r
    //    According to PKCS#7 Definition:\r
    //        SignedData ::= SEQUENCE {\r
    //            version Version,\r
    //            digestAlgorithms DigestAlgorithmIdentifiers,\r
    //            contentInfo ContentInfo,\r
    //            .... }\r
    //    The DigestAlgorithmIdentifiers can be used to determine the hash algorithm in PE/COFF hashing\r
    //    This field has the fixed offset (+32) in final Authenticode ASN.1 data.\r
    //    Fixed offset (+32) is calculated based on two bytes of length encoding.\r
    //\r
    if ((*(PkcsCertData->CertData + 1) & TWO_BYTE_ENCODE) != TWO_BYTE_ENCODE) {\r
      //\r
      // Only support two bytes of Long Form of Length Encoding.\r
      //\r
      continue;\r
    }\r
\r
    if (CompareMem (PkcsCertData->CertData + 32, mHash[Index].OidValue, mHash[Index].OidLength) == 0) {\r
      break;\r
    }\r
  }\r
\r
  if (Index == HASHALG_MAX) {\r
    return EFI_UNSUPPORTED;\r
  }\r
\r
  //\r
  // HASH PE Image based on Hash algorithm in PE/COFF Authenticode.\r
  //\r
  if (!HashPeImage(Index)) {\r
    return EFI_UNSUPPORTED;\r
  }\r
\r
  return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
}\r
\r
\r
/**\r
  Returns the size of a given image execution info table in bytes.\r
\r
  This function returns the size, in bytes, of the image execution info table specified by\r
  ImageExeInfoTable. If ImageExeInfoTable is NULL, then 0 is returned.\r
\r
  @param  ImageExeInfoTable          A pointer to a image execution info table structure.\r
\r
  @retval 0       If ImageExeInfoTable is NULL.\r
  @retval Others  The size of a image execution info table in bytes.\r
\r
**/\r
UINTN\r
GetImageExeInfoTableSize (\r
  EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO_TABLE        *ImageExeInfoTable\r
  )\r
{\r
  UINTN                     Index;\r
  EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO  *ImageExeInfoItem;\r
  UINTN                     TotalSize;\r
\r
  if (ImageExeInfoTable == NULL) {\r
    return 0;\r
  }\r
\r
  ImageExeInfoItem  = (EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO *) ((UINT8 *) ImageExeInfoTable + sizeof (EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO_TABLE));\r
  TotalSize         = sizeof (EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO_TABLE);\r
  for (Index = 0; Index < ImageExeInfoTable->NumberOfImages; Index++) {\r
    TotalSize += ReadUnaligned32 ((UINT32 *) &ImageExeInfoItem->InfoSize);\r
    ImageExeInfoItem = (EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO *) ((UINT8 *) ImageExeInfoItem + ReadUnaligned32 ((UINT32 *) &ImageExeInfoItem->InfoSize));\r
  }\r
\r
  return TotalSize;\r
}\r
\r
/**\r
  Create an Image Execution Information Table entry and add it to system configuration table.\r
\r
  @param[in]  Action          Describes the action taken by the firmware regarding this image.\r
  @param[in]  Name            Input a null-terminated, user-friendly name.\r
  @param[in]  DevicePath      Input device path pointer.\r
  @param[in]  Signature       Input signature info in EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST data structure.\r
  @param[in]  SignatureSize   Size of signature.\r
\r
**/\r
VOID\r
AddImageExeInfo (\r
  IN       EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_ACTION       Action,\r
  IN       CHAR16                           *Name OPTIONAL,\r
  IN CONST EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL         *DevicePath,\r
  IN       EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST               *Signature OPTIONAL,\r
  IN       UINTN                            SignatureSize\r
  )\r
{\r
  EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO_TABLE  *ImageExeInfoTable;\r
  EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO_TABLE  *NewImageExeInfoTable;\r
  EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO        *ImageExeInfoEntry;\r
  UINTN                           ImageExeInfoTableSize;\r
  UINTN                           NewImageExeInfoEntrySize;\r
  UINTN                           NameStringLen;\r
  UINTN                           DevicePathSize;\r
\r
  ImageExeInfoTable     = NULL;\r
  NewImageExeInfoTable  = NULL;\r
  ImageExeInfoEntry     = NULL;\r
  NameStringLen         = 0;\r
\r
  if (DevicePath == NULL) {\r
    return ;\r
  }\r
\r
  if (Name != NULL) {\r
    NameStringLen = StrSize (Name);\r
  }\r
\r
  ImageExeInfoTable = NULL;\r
  EfiGetSystemConfigurationTable (&gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, (VOID **) &ImageExeInfoTable);\r
  if (ImageExeInfoTable != NULL) {\r
    //\r
    // The table has been found!\r
    // We must enlarge the table to accmodate the new exe info entry.\r
    //\r
    ImageExeInfoTableSize = GetImageExeInfoTableSize (ImageExeInfoTable);\r
  } else {\r
    //\r
    // Not Found!\r
    // We should create a new table to append to the configuration table.\r
    //\r
    ImageExeInfoTableSize = sizeof (EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO_TABLE);\r
  }\r
\r
  DevicePathSize            = GetDevicePathSize (DevicePath);\r
  NewImageExeInfoEntrySize  = sizeof (EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO) + NameStringLen + DevicePathSize + SignatureSize;\r
  NewImageExeInfoTable      = (EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO_TABLE *) AllocateRuntimePool (ImageExeInfoTableSize + NewImageExeInfoEntrySize);\r
  if (NewImageExeInfoTable == NULL) {\r
    return ;\r
  }\r
\r
  if (ImageExeInfoTable != NULL) {\r
    CopyMem (NewImageExeInfoTable, ImageExeInfoTable, ImageExeInfoTableSize);\r
  } else {\r
    NewImageExeInfoTable->NumberOfImages = 0;\r
  }\r
  NewImageExeInfoTable->NumberOfImages++;\r
  ImageExeInfoEntry = (EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO *) ((UINT8 *) NewImageExeInfoTable + ImageExeInfoTableSize);\r
  //\r
  // Update new item's infomation.\r
  //\r
  WriteUnaligned32 ((UINT32 *) &ImageExeInfoEntry->Action, Action);\r
  WriteUnaligned32 ((UINT32 *) &ImageExeInfoEntry->InfoSize, (UINT32) NewImageExeInfoEntrySize);\r
\r
  if (Name != NULL) {\r
    CopyMem ((UINT8 *) &ImageExeInfoEntry->InfoSize + sizeof (UINT32), Name, NameStringLen);\r
  }\r
  CopyMem (\r
    (UINT8 *) &ImageExeInfoEntry->InfoSize + sizeof (UINT32) + NameStringLen,\r
    DevicePath,\r
    DevicePathSize\r
    );\r
  if (Signature != NULL) {\r
    CopyMem (\r
      (UINT8 *) &ImageExeInfoEntry->InfoSize + sizeof (UINT32) + NameStringLen + DevicePathSize,\r
      Signature,\r
      SignatureSize\r
      );\r
  }\r
  //\r
  // Update/replace the image execution table.\r
  //\r
  gBS->InstallConfigurationTable (&gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, (VOID *) NewImageExeInfoTable);\r
\r
  //\r
  // Free Old table data!\r
  //\r
  if (ImageExeInfoTable != NULL) {\r
    FreePool (ImageExeInfoTable);\r
  }\r
}\r
\r
/**\r
  Discover if the UEFI image is authorized by user's policy setting.\r
\r
  @param[in]    Policy            Specify platform's policy setting.\r
\r
  @retval EFI_ACCESS_DENIED       Image is not allowed to run.\r
  @retval EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION  Image is deferred.\r
  @retval EFI_SUCCESS             Image is authorized to run.\r
\r
**/\r
EFI_STATUS\r
ImageAuthorization (\r
  IN UINT32     Policy\r
  )\r
{\r
  EFI_STATUS    Status;\r
  EFI_INPUT_KEY Key;\r
\r
  Status = EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;\r
\r
  switch (Policy) {\r
\r
  case QUERY_USER_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION:\r
    do {\r
      CreatePopUp (EFI_LIGHTGRAY | EFI_BACKGROUND_BLUE, &Key, mNotifyString1, mNotifyString2, NULL);\r
      if (Key.UnicodeChar == L'Y' || Key.UnicodeChar == L'y') {\r
        Status = EFI_SUCCESS;\r
        break;\r
      } else if (Key.UnicodeChar == L'N' || Key.UnicodeChar == L'n') {\r
        Status = EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;\r
        break;\r
      } else if (Key.UnicodeChar == L'D' || Key.UnicodeChar == L'd') {\r
        Status = EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r
        break;\r
      }\r
    } while (TRUE);\r
    break;\r
\r
  case ALLOW_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION:\r
    Status = EFI_SUCCESS;\r
    break;\r
\r
  case DEFER_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION:\r
    Status = EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r
    break;\r
\r
  case DENY_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION:\r
    Status = EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;\r
    break;\r
  }\r
\r
  return Status;\r
}\r
\r
/**\r
  Check whether signature is in specified database.\r
\r
  @param[in]  VariableName        Name of database variable that is searched in.\r
  @param[in]  Signature           Pointer to signature that is searched for.\r
  @param[in]  CertType            Pointer to hash algrithom.\r
  @param[in]  SignatureSize       Size of Signature.\r
\r
  @return TRUE                    Found the signature in the variable database.\r
  @return FALSE                   Not found the signature in the variable database.\r
\r
**/\r
BOOLEAN\r
IsSignatureFoundInDatabase (\r
  IN CHAR16             *VariableName,\r
  IN UINT8              *Signature,\r
  IN EFI_GUID           *CertType,\r
  IN UINTN              SignatureSize\r
  )\r
{\r
  EFI_STATUS          Status;\r
  EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST  *CertList;\r
  EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA  *Cert;\r
  UINTN               DataSize;\r
  UINT8               *Data;\r
  UINTN               Index;\r
  UINTN               CertCount;\r
  BOOLEAN             IsFound;\r
  //\r
  // Read signature database variable.\r
  //\r
  IsFound   = FALSE;\r
  Data      = NULL;\r
  DataSize  = 0;\r
  Status    = gRT->GetVariable (VariableName, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, NULL, &DataSize, NULL);\r
  if (Status != EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {\r
    return FALSE;\r
  }\r
\r
  Data = (UINT8 *) AllocateZeroPool (DataSize);\r
  if (Data == NULL) {\r
    return FALSE;\r
  }\r
\r
  Status = gRT->GetVariable (VariableName, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, NULL, &DataSize, Data);\r
  if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
    goto Done;\r
  }\r
  //\r
  // Enumerate all signature data in SigDB to check if executable's signature exists.\r
  //\r
  CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) Data;\r
  while ((DataSize > 0) && (DataSize >= CertList->SignatureListSize)) {\r
    CertCount = (CertList->SignatureListSize - CertList->SignatureHeaderSize) / CertList->SignatureSize;\r
    Cert      = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r
    if ((CertList->SignatureSize == sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1 + SignatureSize) && (CompareGuid(&CertList->SignatureType, CertType))) {\r
      for (Index = 0; Index < CertCount; Index++) {\r
        if (CompareMem (Cert->SignatureData, Signature, SignatureSize) == 0) {\r
          //\r
          // Find the signature in database.\r
          //\r
          IsFound = TRUE;\r
          break;\r
        }\r
\r
        Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) Cert + CertList->SignatureSize);\r
      }\r
\r
      if (IsFound) {\r
        break;\r
      }\r
    }\r
\r
    DataSize -= CertList->SignatureListSize;\r
    CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + CertList->SignatureListSize);\r
  }\r
\r
Done:\r
  if (Data != NULL) {\r
    FreePool (Data);\r
  }\r
\r
  return IsFound;\r
}\r
\r
/**\r
  Verify PKCS#7 SignedData using certificate found in Variable which formatted\r
  as EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST. The Variable may be PK, KEK, DB or DBX.\r
\r
  @param VariableName  Name of Variable to search for Certificate.\r
  @param VendorGuid    Variable vendor GUID.\r
\r
  @retval TRUE         Image pass verification.\r
  @retval FALSE        Image fail verification.\r
\r
**/\r
BOOLEAN\r
IsPkcsSignedDataVerifiedBySignatureList (\r
  IN CHAR16             *VariableName,\r
  IN EFI_GUID           *VendorGuid\r
  )\r
{\r
  EFI_STATUS                Status;\r
  BOOLEAN                   VerifyStatus;\r
  WIN_CERTIFICATE_EFI_PKCS  *PkcsCertData;\r
  EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST        *CertList;\r
  EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA        *Cert;\r
  UINTN                     DataSize;\r
  UINT8                     *Data;\r
  UINT8                     *RootCert;\r
  UINTN                     RootCertSize;\r
  UINTN                     Index;\r
  UINTN                     CertCount;\r
\r
  Data         = NULL;\r
  CertList     = NULL;\r
  Cert         = NULL;\r
  RootCert     = NULL;\r
  RootCertSize = 0;\r
  VerifyStatus = FALSE;\r
  PkcsCertData = (WIN_CERTIFICATE_EFI_PKCS *) (mImageBase + mSecDataDir->VirtualAddress);\r
\r
  DataSize = 0;\r
  Status   = gRT->GetVariable (VariableName, VendorGuid, NULL, &DataSize, NULL);\r
  if (Status == EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {\r
    Data = (UINT8 *) AllocateZeroPool (DataSize);\r
    if (Data == NULL) {\r
      return VerifyStatus;\r
    }\r
\r
    Status = gRT->GetVariable (VariableName, VendorGuid, NULL, &DataSize, (VOID *) Data);\r
    if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
      goto Done;\r
    }\r
\r
    //\r
    // Find X509 certificate in Signature List to verify the signature in pkcs7 signed data.\r
    //\r
    CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) Data;\r
    while ((DataSize > 0) && (DataSize >= CertList->SignatureListSize)) {\r
      if (CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Guid)) {\r
        Cert          = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r
        CertCount     = (CertList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - CertList->SignatureHeaderSize) / CertList->SignatureSize;\r
        for (Index = 0; Index < CertCount; Index++) {\r
          //\r
          // Iterate each Signature Data Node within this CertList for verify.\r
          //\r
          RootCert      = Cert->SignatureData;\r
          RootCertSize  = CertList->SignatureSize;\r
\r
          //\r
          // Call AuthenticodeVerify library to Verify Authenticode struct.\r
          //\r
          VerifyStatus = AuthenticodeVerify (\r
                           PkcsCertData->CertData,\r
                           mSecDataDir->Size - sizeof(PkcsCertData->Hdr),\r
                           RootCert,\r
                           RootCertSize,\r
                           mImageDigest,\r
                           mImageDigestSize\r
                           );\r
          if (VerifyStatus) {\r
            goto Done;\r
          }\r
          Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) Cert + CertList->SignatureSize);\r
        }\r
      }\r
      DataSize -= CertList->SignatureListSize;\r
      CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + CertList->SignatureListSize);\r
    }\r
  }\r
\r
Done:\r
  if (Data != NULL) {\r
    FreePool (Data);\r
  }\r
\r
  return VerifyStatus;\r
}\r
\r
/**\r
  Verify certificate in WIN_CERT_TYPE_PKCS_SIGNED_DATA format.\r
\r
  @retval EFI_SUCCESS                 Image pass verification.\r
  @retval EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION      Image fail verification.\r
\r
**/\r
EFI_STATUS\r
VerifyCertPkcsSignedData (\r
  VOID\r
  )\r
{\r
  //\r
  // 1: Find certificate from DBX forbidden database for revoked certificate.\r
  //\r
  if (IsPkcsSignedDataVerifiedBySignatureList (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid)) {\r
    //\r
    // DBX is forbidden database, if Authenticode verification pass with\r
    // one of the certificate in DBX, this image should be rejected.\r
    //\r
    return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r
  }\r
\r
  //\r
  // 2: Find certificate from KEK database and try to verify authenticode struct.\r
  //\r
  if (IsPkcsSignedDataVerifiedBySignatureList (EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid)) {\r
    return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
  }\r
\r
  //\r
  // 3: Find certificate from DB database and try to verify authenticode struct.\r
  //\r
  if (IsPkcsSignedDataVerifiedBySignatureList (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid)) {\r
    return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
  } else {\r
    return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r
  }\r
}\r
\r
/**\r
  Verify certificate in WIN_CERTIFICATE_UEFI_GUID format.\r
\r
  @retval EFI_SUCCESS                 Image pass verification.\r
  @retval EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION      Image fail verification.\r
  @retval other error value\r
\r
**/\r
EFI_STATUS\r
VerifyCertUefiGuid (\r
  VOID\r
  )\r
{\r
  BOOLEAN                         Status;\r
  WIN_CERTIFICATE_UEFI_GUID       *EfiCert;\r
  EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST              *KekList;\r
  EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA              *KekItem;\r
  EFI_CERT_BLOCK_RSA_2048_SHA256  *CertBlock;\r
  VOID                            *Rsa;\r
  UINTN                           KekCount;\r
  UINTN                           Index;\r
  UINTN                           KekDataSize;\r
  BOOLEAN                         IsFound;\r
  EFI_STATUS                      Result;\r
\r
  EfiCert   = NULL;\r
  KekList   = NULL;\r
  KekItem   = NULL;\r
  CertBlock = NULL;\r
  Rsa       = NULL;\r
  Status    = FALSE;\r
  IsFound   = FALSE;\r
  KekDataSize = 0;\r
\r
  EfiCert   = (WIN_CERTIFICATE_UEFI_GUID *) (mImageBase + mSecDataDir->VirtualAddress);\r
  CertBlock = (EFI_CERT_BLOCK_RSA_2048_SHA256 *) EfiCert->CertData;\r
  if (!CompareGuid (&EfiCert->CertType, &gEfiCertTypeRsa2048Sha256Guid)) {\r
    //\r
    // Invalid Certificate Data Type.\r
    //\r
    return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r
  }\r
\r
  //\r
  // Get KEK database variable data size\r
  //\r
  Result = gRT->GetVariable (EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, NULL, &KekDataSize, NULL);\r
  if (Result != EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {\r
    return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r
  }\r
\r
  //\r
  // Get KEK database variable.\r
  //\r
  KekList = GetEfiGlobalVariable (EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME);\r
  if (KekList == NULL) {\r
    return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r
  }\r
\r
  //\r
  // Enumerate all Kek items in this list to verify the variable certificate data.\r
  // If anyone is authenticated successfully, it means the variable is correct!\r
  //\r
  while ((KekDataSize > 0) && (KekDataSize >= KekList->SignatureListSize)) {\r
    if (CompareGuid (&KekList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertRsa2048Guid)) {\r
      KekItem   = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) KekList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + KekList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r
      KekCount  = (KekList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - KekList->SignatureHeaderSize) / KekList->SignatureSize;\r
      for (Index = 0; Index < KekCount; Index++) {\r
        if (CompareMem (KekItem->SignatureData, CertBlock->PublicKey, EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE) == 0) {\r
          IsFound = TRUE;\r
          break;\r
        }\r
        KekItem = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) KekItem + KekList->SignatureSize);\r
      }\r
    }\r
    KekDataSize -= KekList->SignatureListSize;\r
    KekList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) KekList + KekList->SignatureListSize);\r
  }\r
\r
  if (!IsFound) {\r
    //\r
    // Signed key is not a trust one.\r
    //\r
    goto Done;\r
  }\r
\r
  //\r
  // Now, we found the corresponding security policy.\r
  // Verify the data payload.\r
  //\r
  Rsa = RsaNew ();\r
  if (Rsa == NULL) {\r
    Status = FALSE;\r
    goto Done;\r
  }\r
\r
  //\r
  // Set RSA Key Components.\r
  // NOTE: Only N and E are needed to be set as RSA public key for signature verification.\r
  //\r
  Status = RsaSetKey (Rsa, RsaKeyN, CertBlock->PublicKey, EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE);\r
  if (!Status) {\r
    goto Done;\r
  }\r
  Status = RsaSetKey (Rsa, RsaKeyE, mRsaE, sizeof (mRsaE));\r
  if (!Status) {\r
    goto Done;\r
  }\r
  //\r
  // Verify the signature.\r
  //\r
  Status = RsaPkcs1Verify (\r
             Rsa,\r
             mImageDigest,\r
             mImageDigestSize,\r
             CertBlock->Signature,\r
             EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SHA256_SIZE\r
             );\r
\r
Done:\r
  if (KekList != NULL) {\r
    FreePool (KekList);\r
  }\r
  if (Rsa != NULL ) {\r
    RsaFree (Rsa);\r
  }\r
  if (Status) {\r
    return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
  } else {\r
    return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r
  }\r
}\r
\r
/**\r
  Provide verification service for signed images, which include both signature validation\r
  and platform policy control. For signature types, both UEFI WIN_CERTIFICATE_UEFI_GUID and\r
  MSFT Authenticode type signatures are supported.\r
\r
  In this implementation, only verify external executables when in USER MODE.\r
  Executables from FV is bypass, so pass in AuthenticationStatus is ignored.\r
\r
  The image verification process is:\r
    Is the Image signed?\r
      If yes,\r
        Does the image verify against a certificate (root or intermediate) in the allowed db?\r
          Run it\r
        Image verification fail\r
          Is the Image's Hash not in forbidden database and the Image's Hash in allowed db?\r
            Run it\r
      If no,\r
        Is the Image's Hash in the forbidden database (DBX)?\r
          if yes,\r
            Error out\r
        Is the Image's Hash in the allowed database (DB)?\r
          If yes,\r
            Run it\r
          If no,\r
            Error out\r
\r
  @param[in]    AuthenticationStatus\r
                           This is the authentication status returned from the security\r
                           measurement services for the input file.\r
  @param[in]    File       This is a pointer to the device path of the file that is\r
                           being dispatched. This will optionally be used for logging.\r
  @param[in]    FileBuffer File buffer matches the input file device path.\r
  @param[in]    FileSize   Size of File buffer matches the input file device path.\r
\r
  @retval EFI_SUCCESS            The file specified by File did authenticate, and the\r
                                 platform policy dictates that the DXE Core may use File.\r
  @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER  Input argument is incorrect.\r
  @retval EFI_OUT_RESOURCE       Fail to allocate memory.\r
  @retval EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION The file specified by File did not authenticate, and\r
                                 the platform policy dictates that File should be placed\r
                                 in the untrusted state. A file may be promoted from\r
                                 the untrusted to the trusted state at a future time\r
                                 with a call to the Trust() DXE Service.\r
  @retval EFI_ACCESS_DENIED      The file specified by File did not authenticate, and\r
                                 the platform policy dictates that File should not be\r
                                 used for any purpose.\r
\r
**/\r
EFI_STATUS\r
EFIAPI\r
DxeImageVerificationHandler (\r
  IN  UINT32                           AuthenticationStatus,\r
  IN  CONST EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL   *File,\r
  IN  VOID                             *FileBuffer,\r
  IN  UINTN                            FileSize\r
  )\r
{\r
  EFI_STATUS                  Status;\r
  UINT16                      Magic;\r
  EFI_IMAGE_DOS_HEADER        *DosHdr;\r
  EFI_STATUS                  VerifyStatus;\r
  UINT8                       *SetupMode;\r
  EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST          *SignatureList;\r
  UINTN                       SignatureListSize;\r
  EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA          *Signature;\r
  EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_ACTION  Action;\r
  WIN_CERTIFICATE             *WinCertificate;\r
  UINT32                      Policy;\r
  UINT8                       *SecureBootEnable;\r
\r
  if (File == NULL) {\r
    return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
  }\r
\r
  SignatureList     = NULL;\r
  SignatureListSize = 0;\r
  WinCertificate    = NULL;\r
  Action            = EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_AUTH_UNTESTED;\r
  Status            = EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;\r
  //\r
  // Check the image type and get policy setting.\r
  //\r
  switch (GetImageType (File)) {\r
\r
  case IMAGE_FROM_FV:\r
    Policy = ALWAYS_EXECUTE;\r
    break;\r
\r
  case IMAGE_FROM_OPTION_ROM:\r
    Policy = PcdGet32 (PcdOptionRomImageVerificationPolicy);\r
    break;\r
\r
  case IMAGE_FROM_REMOVABLE_MEDIA:\r
    Policy = PcdGet32 (PcdRemovableMediaImageVerificationPolicy);\r
    break;\r
\r
  case IMAGE_FROM_FIXED_MEDIA:\r
    Policy = PcdGet32 (PcdFixedMediaImageVerificationPolicy);\r
    break;\r
\r
  default:\r
    Policy = DENY_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r
    break;\r
  }\r
  //\r
  // If policy is always/never execute, return directly.\r
  //\r
  if (Policy == ALWAYS_EXECUTE) {\r
    return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
  } else if (Policy == NEVER_EXECUTE) {\r
    return EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;\r
  }\r
\r
  SecureBootEnable = GetVariable (EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME, &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid);\r
  //\r
  // Skip verification if SecureBootEnable variable doesn't exist.\r
  //\r
  if (SecureBootEnable == NULL) {\r
    return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
  }\r
\r
  //\r
  // Skip verification if SecureBootEnable is disabled.\r
  //\r
  if (*SecureBootEnable == SECURE_BOOT_DISABLE) {\r
    FreePool (SecureBootEnable);\r
    return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
  }\r
\r
  SetupMode = GetEfiGlobalVariable (EFI_SETUP_MODE_NAME);\r
\r
  //\r
  // SetupMode doesn't exist means no AuthVar driver is dispatched,\r
  // skip verification.\r
  //\r
  if (SetupMode == NULL) {\r
    return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
  }\r
\r
  //\r
  // If platform is in SETUP MODE, skip verification.\r
  //\r
  if (*SetupMode == SETUP_MODE) {\r
    FreePool (SetupMode);\r
    return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
  }\r
  //\r
  // Read the Dos header.\r
  //\r
  if (FileBuffer == NULL) {\r
    FreePool (SetupMode);\r
    return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
  }\r
  mImageBase  = (UINT8 *) FileBuffer;\r
  mImageSize  = FileSize;\r
  DosHdr      = (EFI_IMAGE_DOS_HEADER *) mImageBase;\r
  if (DosHdr->e_magic == EFI_IMAGE_DOS_SIGNATURE) {\r
    //\r
    // DOS image header is present,\r
    // so read the PE header after the DOS image header.\r
    //\r
    mPeCoffHeaderOffset = DosHdr->e_lfanew;\r
  } else {\r
    mPeCoffHeaderOffset = 0;\r
  }\r
  //\r
  // Check PE/COFF image.\r
  //\r
  mNtHeader.Pe32 = (EFI_IMAGE_NT_HEADERS32 *) (mImageBase + mPeCoffHeaderOffset);\r
  if (mNtHeader.Pe32->Signature != EFI_IMAGE_NT_SIGNATURE) {\r
    //\r
    // It is not a valid Pe/Coff file.\r
    //\r
    return EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;\r
  }\r
\r
  Magic = mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.Magic;\r
  if (Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {\r
    //\r
    // Use PE32 offset.\r
    //\r
    mSecDataDir = (EFI_IMAGE_DATA_DIRECTORY *) &mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY];\r
  } else if (Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR64_MAGIC) {\r
    //\r
    // Use PE32+ offset.\r
    //\r
    mSecDataDir = (EFI_IMAGE_DATA_DIRECTORY *) &mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY];\r
  } else {\r
    //\r
    // Invalid header magic number.\r
    //\r
    Status       = EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
    goto Done;\r
  }\r
\r
  if (mSecDataDir->VirtualAddress >= mImageSize) {\r
    //\r
    // Sanity check to see if this file is corrupted.\r
    //\r
    Status       = EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
    goto Done;\r
  }\r
\r
  if (mSecDataDir->Size == 0) {\r
    //\r
    // This image is not signed.\r
    //\r
    if (!HashPeImage (HASHALG_SHA256)) {\r
      goto Done;\r
    }\r
\r
    if (IsSignatureFoundInDatabase (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1, mImageDigest, &mCertType, mImageDigestSize)) {\r
      //\r
      // Image Hash is in forbidden database (DBX).\r
      //\r
      Action = EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_AUTH_UNTESTED;\r
      Status = EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;\r
      goto Done;\r
    }\r
\r
    if (IsSignatureFoundInDatabase (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE, mImageDigest, &mCertType, mImageDigestSize)) {\r
      //\r
      // Image Hash is in allowed database (DB).\r
      //\r
      return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
    }\r
\r
    //\r
    // Image Hash is not found in both forbidden and allowed database.\r
    //\r
    Action = EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_AUTH_UNTESTED;\r
    Status = EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;\r
    goto Done;\r
  }\r
\r
  //\r
  // Verify signature of executables.\r
  //\r
  WinCertificate = (WIN_CERTIFICATE *) (mImageBase + mSecDataDir->VirtualAddress);\r
\r
  switch (WinCertificate->wCertificateType) {\r
\r
  case WIN_CERT_TYPE_EFI_GUID:\r
    //\r
    // Verify UEFI GUID type.\r
    //\r
    if (!HashPeImage (HASHALG_SHA256)) {\r
      goto Done;\r
    }\r
\r
    VerifyStatus = VerifyCertUefiGuid ();\r
    break;\r
\r
  case WIN_CERT_TYPE_PKCS_SIGNED_DATA:\r
    //\r
    // Verify Pkcs signed data type.\r
    //\r
    Status    = HashPeImageByType();\r
    if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
      goto Done;\r
    }\r
\r
    VerifyStatus = VerifyCertPkcsSignedData ();\r
\r
    //\r
    // For image verification against enrolled certificate(root or intermediate),\r
    // no need to check image's hash in the allowed database.\r
    //\r
    if (!EFI_ERROR (VerifyStatus)) {\r
      if (!IsSignatureFoundInDatabase (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1, mImageDigest, &mCertType, mImageDigestSize)) {\r
        return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
      }\r
    }\r
    break;\r
\r
  default:\r
    Status = EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;\r
    goto Done;\r
  }\r
  //\r
  // Get image hash value as executable's signature.\r
  //\r
  SignatureListSize = sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1 + mImageDigestSize;\r
  SignatureList     = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) AllocateZeroPool (SignatureListSize);\r
  if (SignatureList == NULL) {\r
    Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
    goto Done;\r
  }\r
  SignatureList->SignatureHeaderSize  = 0;\r
  SignatureList->SignatureListSize    = (UINT32) SignatureListSize;\r
  SignatureList->SignatureSize        = (UINT32) mImageDigestSize;\r
  CopyMem (&SignatureList->SignatureType, &mCertType, sizeof (EFI_GUID));\r
  Signature = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) SignatureList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST));\r
  CopyMem (Signature->SignatureData, mImageDigest, mImageDigestSize);\r
  //\r
  // Signature database check after verification.\r
  //\r
  if (EFI_ERROR (VerifyStatus)) {\r
    //\r
    // Verification failure.\r
    //\r
    if (!IsSignatureFoundInDatabase (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1, mImageDigest, &mCertType, mImageDigestSize) &&\r
        IsSignatureFoundInDatabase (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE, mImageDigest, &mCertType, mImageDigestSize)) {\r
      //\r
      // Verification fail, Image Hash is not in forbidden database (DBX),\r
      // and Image Hash is in allowed database (DB).\r
      //\r
      Status = EFI_SUCCESS;\r
    } else {\r
      Action = EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_AUTH_SIG_FAILED;\r
      Status = EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;\r
    }\r
  } else if (IsSignatureFoundInDatabase (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1, Signature->SignatureData, &mCertType, mImageDigestSize)) {\r
    //\r
    // Executable signature verification passes, but is found in forbidden signature database.\r
    //\r
    Action = EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_AUTH_SIG_FOUND;\r
    Status = EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;\r
  } else if (IsSignatureFoundInDatabase (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE, Signature->SignatureData, &mCertType, mImageDigestSize)) {\r
    //\r
    // Executable signature is found in authorized signature database.\r
    //\r
    Status = EFI_SUCCESS;\r
  } else {\r
    //\r
    // Executable signature verification passes, but cannot be found in authorized signature database.\r
    // Get platform policy to determine the action.\r
    //\r
    Action = EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_AUTH_SIG_PASSED;\r
    Status = ImageAuthorization (Policy);\r
  }\r
\r
Done:\r
  if (Status != EFI_SUCCESS) {\r
    //\r
    // Policy decides to defer or reject the image; add its information in image executable information table.\r
    //\r
    AddImageExeInfo (Action, NULL, File, SignatureList, SignatureListSize);\r
  }\r
\r
  if (SignatureList != NULL) {\r
    FreePool (SignatureList);\r
  }\r
\r
  FreePool (SetupMode);\r
\r
  return Status;\r
}\r
\r
/**\r
  When VariableWriteArchProtocol install, create "SecureBoot" variable.\r
\r
  @param[in] Event    Event whose notification function is being invoked.\r
  @param[in] Context  Pointer to the notification function's context.\r
\r
**/\r
VOID\r
EFIAPI\r
VariableWriteCallBack (\r
  IN  EFI_EVENT                           Event,\r
  IN  VOID                                *Context\r
  )\r
{\r
  UINT8                       SecureBootMode;\r
  UINT8                       *SecureBootModePtr;\r
  EFI_STATUS                  Status;\r
  VOID                        *ProtocolPointer;\r
\r
  Status = gBS->LocateProtocol (&gEfiVariableWriteArchProtocolGuid, NULL, &ProtocolPointer);\r
  if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
    return;\r
  }\r
\r
  //\r
  // Check whether "SecureBoot" variable exists.\r
  // If this library is built-in, it means firmware has capability to perform\r
  // driver signing verification.\r
  //\r
  SecureBootModePtr = GetEfiGlobalVariable (EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME);\r
  if (SecureBootModePtr == NULL) {\r
    SecureBootMode   = SECURE_BOOT_MODE_DISABLE;\r
    //\r
    // Authenticated variable driver will update "SecureBoot" depending on SetupMode variable.\r
    //\r
    gRT->SetVariable (\r
           EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME,\r
           &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
           EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE,\r
           sizeof (UINT8),\r
           &SecureBootMode\r
           );\r
  } else {\r
    FreePool (SecureBootModePtr);\r
  }\r
}\r
\r
/**\r
  Register security measurement handler.\r
\r
  @param  ImageHandle   ImageHandle of the loaded driver.\r
  @param  SystemTable   Pointer to the EFI System Table.\r
\r
  @retval EFI_SUCCESS   The handlers were registered successfully.\r
**/\r
EFI_STATUS\r
EFIAPI\r
DxeImageVerificationLibConstructor (\r
  IN EFI_HANDLE        ImageHandle,\r
  IN EFI_SYSTEM_TABLE  *SystemTable\r
  )\r
{\r
  VOID                *Registration;\r
\r
  //\r
  // Register callback function upon VariableWriteArchProtocol.\r
  //\r
  EfiCreateProtocolNotifyEvent (\r
    &gEfiVariableWriteArchProtocolGuid,\r
    TPL_CALLBACK,\r
    VariableWriteCallBack,\r
    NULL,\r
    &Registration\r
    );\r
\r
  return RegisterSecurityHandler (\r
          DxeImageVerificationHandler,\r
          EFI_AUTH_OPERATION_VERIFY_IMAGE | EFI_AUTH_OPERATION_IMAGE_REQUIRED\r
          );\r
}\r