Commit | Line | Data |
---|---|---|
0c18794e | 1 | /** @file\r |
3cd2484e | 2 | Implement image verification services for secure boot service\r |
0c18794e | 3 | \r |
dc204d5a JY |
4 | Caution: This file requires additional review when modified.\r |
5 | This library will have external input - PE/COFF image.\r | |
6 | This external input must be validated carefully to avoid security issue like\r | |
7 | buffer overflow, integer overflow.\r | |
8 | \r | |
9 | DxeImageVerificationLibImageRead() function will make sure the PE/COFF image content\r | |
10 | read is within the image buffer.\r | |
11 | \r | |
12 | DxeImageVerificationHandler(), HashPeImageByType(), HashPeImage() function will accept\r | |
13 | untrusted PE/COFF image and validate its data structure within this image buffer before use.\r | |
14 | \r | |
b3548d32 | 15 | Copyright (c) 2009 - 2018, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>\r |
531c89a1 | 16 | (C) Copyright 2016 Hewlett Packard Enterprise Development LP<BR>\r |
289b714b | 17 | SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent\r |
0c18794e | 18 | \r |
19 | **/\r | |
20 | \r | |
21 | #include "DxeImageVerificationLib.h"\r | |
22 | \r | |
dc204d5a JY |
23 | //\r |
24 | // Caution: This is used by a function which may receive untrusted input.\r | |
25 | // These global variables hold PE/COFF image data, and they should be validated before use.\r | |
26 | //\r | |
0c18794e | 27 | EFI_IMAGE_OPTIONAL_HEADER_PTR_UNION mNtHeader;\r |
45bf2c47 | 28 | UINT32 mPeCoffHeaderOffset;\r |
0c18794e | 29 | EFI_GUID mCertType;\r |
30 | \r | |
dc204d5a JY |
31 | //\r |
32 | // Information on current PE/COFF image\r | |
33 | //\r | |
34 | UINTN mImageSize;\r | |
35 | UINT8 *mImageBase = NULL;\r | |
36 | UINT8 mImageDigest[MAX_DIGEST_SIZE];\r | |
37 | UINTN mImageDigestSize;\r | |
38 | \r | |
0c18794e | 39 | //\r |
40 | // Notify string for authorization UI.\r | |
41 | //\r | |
42 | CHAR16 mNotifyString1[MAX_NOTIFY_STRING_LEN] = L"Image verification pass but not found in authorized database!";\r | |
43 | CHAR16 mNotifyString2[MAX_NOTIFY_STRING_LEN] = L"Launch this image anyway? (Yes/Defer/No)";\r | |
44 | //\r | |
45 | // Public Exponent of RSA Key.\r | |
46 | //\r | |
47 | CONST UINT8 mRsaE[] = { 0x01, 0x00, 0x01 };\r | |
48 | \r | |
49 | \r | |
50 | //\r | |
51 | // OID ASN.1 Value for Hash Algorithms\r | |
52 | //\r | |
53 | UINT8 mHashOidValue[] = {\r | |
0c18794e | 54 | 0x2B, 0x0E, 0x03, 0x02, 0x1A, // OBJ_sha1\r |
55 | 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x04, // OBJ_sha224\r | |
56 | 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x01, // OBJ_sha256\r | |
57 | 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x02, // OBJ_sha384\r | |
58 | 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x03, // OBJ_sha512\r | |
59 | };\r | |
60 | \r | |
61 | HASH_TABLE mHash[] = {\r | |
20333c6d QL |
62 | { L"SHA1", 20, &mHashOidValue[0], 5, Sha1GetContextSize, Sha1Init, Sha1Update, Sha1Final },\r |
63 | { L"SHA224", 28, &mHashOidValue[5], 9, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL },\r | |
64 | { L"SHA256", 32, &mHashOidValue[14], 9, Sha256GetContextSize, Sha256Init, Sha256Update, Sha256Final},\r | |
65 | { L"SHA384", 48, &mHashOidValue[23], 9, Sha384GetContextSize, Sha384Init, Sha384Update, Sha384Final},\r | |
66 | { L"SHA512", 64, &mHashOidValue[32], 9, Sha512GetContextSize, Sha512Init, Sha512Update, Sha512Final}\r | |
0c18794e | 67 | };\r |
68 | \r | |
531c89a1 CS |
69 | EFI_STRING mHashTypeStr;\r |
70 | \r | |
c1d93242 JY |
71 | /**\r |
72 | SecureBoot Hook for processing image verification.\r | |
73 | \r | |
74 | @param[in] VariableName Name of Variable to be found.\r | |
75 | @param[in] VendorGuid Variable vendor GUID.\r | |
76 | @param[in] DataSize Size of Data found. If size is less than the\r | |
77 | data, this value contains the required size.\r | |
78 | @param[in] Data Data pointer.\r | |
79 | \r | |
80 | **/\r | |
81 | VOID\r | |
82 | EFIAPI\r | |
83 | SecureBootHook (\r | |
84 | IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r | |
85 | IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r | |
86 | IN UINTN DataSize,\r | |
87 | IN VOID *Data\r | |
88 | );\r | |
89 | \r | |
28186d45 ED |
90 | /**\r |
91 | Reads contents of a PE/COFF image in memory buffer.\r | |
92 | \r | |
dc204d5a JY |
93 | Caution: This function may receive untrusted input.\r |
94 | PE/COFF image is external input, so this function will make sure the PE/COFF image content\r | |
95 | read is within the image buffer.\r | |
96 | \r | |
28186d45 ED |
97 | @param FileHandle Pointer to the file handle to read the PE/COFF image.\r |
98 | @param FileOffset Offset into the PE/COFF image to begin the read operation.\r | |
20333c6d | 99 | @param ReadSize On input, the size in bytes of the requested read operation.\r |
28186d45 ED |
100 | On output, the number of bytes actually read.\r |
101 | @param Buffer Output buffer that contains the data read from the PE/COFF image.\r | |
20333c6d QL |
102 | \r |
103 | @retval EFI_SUCCESS The specified portion of the PE/COFF image was read and the size\r | |
28186d45 ED |
104 | **/\r |
105 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
106 | EFIAPI\r | |
e0192326 | 107 | DxeImageVerificationLibImageRead (\r |
28186d45 ED |
108 | IN VOID *FileHandle,\r |
109 | IN UINTN FileOffset,\r | |
110 | IN OUT UINTN *ReadSize,\r | |
111 | OUT VOID *Buffer\r | |
112 | )\r | |
113 | {\r | |
114 | UINTN EndPosition;\r | |
115 | \r | |
116 | if (FileHandle == NULL || ReadSize == NULL || Buffer == NULL) {\r | |
20333c6d | 117 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r |
28186d45 ED |
118 | }\r |
119 | \r | |
120 | if (MAX_ADDRESS - FileOffset < *ReadSize) {\r | |
121 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r | |
122 | }\r | |
123 | \r | |
124 | EndPosition = FileOffset + *ReadSize;\r | |
125 | if (EndPosition > mImageSize) {\r | |
126 | *ReadSize = (UINT32)(mImageSize - FileOffset);\r | |
127 | }\r | |
128 | \r | |
129 | if (FileOffset >= mImageSize) {\r | |
130 | *ReadSize = 0;\r | |
131 | }\r | |
132 | \r | |
133 | CopyMem (Buffer, (UINT8 *)((UINTN) FileHandle + FileOffset), *ReadSize);\r | |
134 | \r | |
135 | return EFI_SUCCESS;\r | |
136 | }\r | |
137 | \r | |
0c18794e | 138 | \r |
139 | /**\r | |
140 | Get the image type.\r | |
141 | \r | |
142 | @param[in] File This is a pointer to the device path of the file that is\r | |
45bf2c47 | 143 | being dispatched.\r |
0c18794e | 144 | \r |
45bf2c47 | 145 | @return UINT32 Image Type\r |
0c18794e | 146 | \r |
147 | **/\r | |
148 | UINT32\r | |
149 | GetImageType (\r | |
150 | IN CONST EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *File\r | |
151 | )\r | |
152 | {\r | |
153 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r | |
45bf2c47 | 154 | EFI_HANDLE DeviceHandle;\r |
0c18794e | 155 | EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *TempDevicePath;\r |
156 | EFI_BLOCK_IO_PROTOCOL *BlockIo;\r | |
157 | \r | |
5db28a67 LG |
158 | if (File == NULL) {\r |
159 | return IMAGE_UNKNOWN;\r | |
160 | }\r | |
161 | \r | |
0c18794e | 162 | //\r |
163 | // First check to see if File is from a Firmware Volume\r | |
164 | //\r | |
165 | DeviceHandle = NULL;\r | |
45bf2c47 | 166 | TempDevicePath = (EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *) File;\r |
0c18794e | 167 | Status = gBS->LocateDevicePath (\r |
168 | &gEfiFirmwareVolume2ProtocolGuid,\r | |
169 | &TempDevicePath,\r | |
170 | &DeviceHandle\r | |
171 | );\r | |
172 | if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
173 | Status = gBS->OpenProtocol (\r | |
174 | DeviceHandle,\r | |
175 | &gEfiFirmwareVolume2ProtocolGuid,\r | |
176 | NULL,\r | |
177 | NULL,\r | |
178 | NULL,\r | |
179 | EFI_OPEN_PROTOCOL_TEST_PROTOCOL\r | |
180 | );\r | |
181 | if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
182 | return IMAGE_FROM_FV;\r | |
183 | }\r | |
184 | }\r | |
185 | \r | |
186 | //\r | |
187 | // Next check to see if File is from a Block I/O device\r | |
188 | //\r | |
189 | DeviceHandle = NULL;\r | |
45bf2c47 | 190 | TempDevicePath = (EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *) File;\r |
0c18794e | 191 | Status = gBS->LocateDevicePath (\r |
192 | &gEfiBlockIoProtocolGuid,\r | |
193 | &TempDevicePath,\r | |
194 | &DeviceHandle\r | |
195 | );\r | |
196 | if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
197 | BlockIo = NULL;\r | |
198 | Status = gBS->OpenProtocol (\r | |
199 | DeviceHandle,\r | |
200 | &gEfiBlockIoProtocolGuid,\r | |
201 | (VOID **) &BlockIo,\r | |
202 | NULL,\r | |
203 | NULL,\r | |
204 | EFI_OPEN_PROTOCOL_GET_PROTOCOL\r | |
205 | );\r | |
206 | if (!EFI_ERROR (Status) && BlockIo != NULL) {\r | |
207 | if (BlockIo->Media != NULL) {\r | |
208 | if (BlockIo->Media->RemovableMedia) {\r | |
209 | //\r | |
210 | // Block I/O is present and specifies the media is removable\r | |
211 | //\r | |
212 | return IMAGE_FROM_REMOVABLE_MEDIA;\r | |
213 | } else {\r | |
214 | //\r | |
215 | // Block I/O is present and specifies the media is not removable\r | |
216 | //\r | |
217 | return IMAGE_FROM_FIXED_MEDIA;\r | |
218 | }\r | |
219 | }\r | |
220 | }\r | |
221 | }\r | |
222 | \r | |
223 | //\r | |
45bf2c47 | 224 | // File is not in a Firmware Volume or on a Block I/O device, so check to see if\r |
0c18794e | 225 | // the device path supports the Simple File System Protocol.\r |
226 | //\r | |
227 | DeviceHandle = NULL;\r | |
45bf2c47 | 228 | TempDevicePath = (EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *) File;\r |
0c18794e | 229 | Status = gBS->LocateDevicePath (\r |
230 | &gEfiSimpleFileSystemProtocolGuid,\r | |
231 | &TempDevicePath,\r | |
232 | &DeviceHandle\r | |
233 | );\r | |
234 | if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
235 | //\r | |
236 | // Simple File System is present without Block I/O, so assume media is fixed.\r | |
237 | //\r | |
238 | return IMAGE_FROM_FIXED_MEDIA;\r | |
239 | }\r | |
240 | \r | |
241 | //\r | |
242 | // File is not from an FV, Block I/O or Simple File System, so the only options\r | |
45bf2c47 | 243 | // left are a PCI Option ROM and a Load File Protocol such as a PXE Boot from a NIC.\r |
0c18794e | 244 | //\r |
45bf2c47 | 245 | TempDevicePath = (EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *) File;\r |
0c18794e | 246 | while (!IsDevicePathEndType (TempDevicePath)) {\r |
247 | switch (DevicePathType (TempDevicePath)) {\r | |
45bf2c47 | 248 | \r |
0c18794e | 249 | case MEDIA_DEVICE_PATH:\r |
250 | if (DevicePathSubType (TempDevicePath) == MEDIA_RELATIVE_OFFSET_RANGE_DP) {\r | |
251 | return IMAGE_FROM_OPTION_ROM;\r | |
252 | }\r | |
253 | break;\r | |
254 | \r | |
255 | case MESSAGING_DEVICE_PATH:\r | |
256 | if (DevicePathSubType(TempDevicePath) == MSG_MAC_ADDR_DP) {\r | |
257 | return IMAGE_FROM_REMOVABLE_MEDIA;\r | |
45bf2c47 | 258 | }\r |
0c18794e | 259 | break;\r |
260 | \r | |
261 | default:\r | |
262 | break;\r | |
263 | }\r | |
264 | TempDevicePath = NextDevicePathNode (TempDevicePath);\r | |
265 | }\r | |
45bf2c47 | 266 | return IMAGE_UNKNOWN;\r |
0c18794e | 267 | }\r |
268 | \r | |
269 | /**\r | |
69f8bb52 | 270 | Calculate hash of Pe/Coff image based on the authenticode image hashing in\r |
0c18794e | 271 | PE/COFF Specification 8.0 Appendix A\r |
b3548d32 | 272 | \r |
dc204d5a JY |
273 | Caution: This function may receive untrusted input.\r |
274 | PE/COFF image is external input, so this function will validate its data structure\r | |
275 | within this image buffer before use.\r | |
276 | \r | |
b3548d32 | 277 | Notes: PE/COFF image has been checked by BasePeCoffLib PeCoffLoaderGetImageInfo() in\r |
89fb5aef LG |
278 | its caller function DxeImageVerificationHandler().\r |
279 | \r | |
0c18794e | 280 | @param[in] HashAlg Hash algorithm type.\r |
45bf2c47 | 281 | \r |
0c18794e | 282 | @retval TRUE Successfully hash image.\r |
283 | @retval FALSE Fail in hash image.\r | |
284 | \r | |
285 | **/\r | |
45bf2c47 | 286 | BOOLEAN\r |
0c18794e | 287 | HashPeImage (\r |
288 | IN UINT32 HashAlg\r | |
289 | )\r | |
290 | {\r | |
291 | BOOLEAN Status;\r | |
0c18794e | 292 | EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER *Section;\r |
293 | VOID *HashCtx;\r | |
294 | UINTN CtxSize;\r | |
295 | UINT8 *HashBase;\r | |
296 | UINTN HashSize;\r | |
297 | UINTN SumOfBytesHashed;\r | |
298 | EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER *SectionHeader;\r | |
299 | UINTN Index;\r | |
300 | UINTN Pos;\r | |
551d8081 | 301 | UINT32 CertSize;\r |
302 | UINT32 NumberOfRvaAndSizes;\r | |
45bf2c47 | 303 | \r |
0c18794e | 304 | HashCtx = NULL;\r |
305 | SectionHeader = NULL;\r | |
306 | Status = FALSE;\r | |
307 | \r | |
20333c6d | 308 | if ((HashAlg >= HASHALG_MAX)) {\r |
0c18794e | 309 | return FALSE;\r |
310 | }\r | |
45bf2c47 | 311 | \r |
0c18794e | 312 | //\r |
313 | // Initialize context of hash.\r | |
314 | //\r | |
315 | ZeroMem (mImageDigest, MAX_DIGEST_SIZE);\r | |
316 | \r | |
20333c6d QL |
317 | switch (HashAlg) {\r |
318 | case HASHALG_SHA1:\r | |
319 | mImageDigestSize = SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE;\r | |
320 | mCertType = gEfiCertSha1Guid;\r | |
321 | break;\r | |
322 | \r | |
323 | case HASHALG_SHA256:\r | |
324 | mImageDigestSize = SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE;\r | |
325 | mCertType = gEfiCertSha256Guid;\r | |
326 | break;\r | |
327 | \r | |
328 | case HASHALG_SHA384:\r | |
329 | mImageDigestSize = SHA384_DIGEST_SIZE;\r | |
330 | mCertType = gEfiCertSha384Guid;\r | |
331 | break;\r | |
332 | \r | |
333 | case HASHALG_SHA512:\r | |
334 | mImageDigestSize = SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE;\r | |
335 | mCertType = gEfiCertSha512Guid;\r | |
336 | break;\r | |
337 | \r | |
338 | default:\r | |
0c18794e | 339 | return FALSE;\r |
340 | }\r | |
341 | \r | |
531c89a1 | 342 | mHashTypeStr = mHash[HashAlg].Name;\r |
0c18794e | 343 | CtxSize = mHash[HashAlg].GetContextSize();\r |
45bf2c47 | 344 | \r |
0c18794e | 345 | HashCtx = AllocatePool (CtxSize);\r |
570b3d1a | 346 | if (HashCtx == NULL) {\r |
347 | return FALSE;\r | |
348 | }\r | |
0c18794e | 349 | \r |
350 | // 1. Load the image header into memory.\r | |
351 | \r | |
352 | // 2. Initialize a SHA hash context.\r | |
353 | Status = mHash[HashAlg].HashInit(HashCtx);\r | |
45bf2c47 | 354 | \r |
0c18794e | 355 | if (!Status) {\r |
356 | goto Done;\r | |
357 | }\r | |
551d8081 | 358 | \r |
0c18794e | 359 | //\r |
360 | // Measuring PE/COFF Image Header;\r | |
361 | // But CheckSum field and SECURITY data directory (certificate) are excluded\r | |
362 | //\r | |
20333c6d | 363 | \r |
0c18794e | 364 | //\r |
365 | // 3. Calculate the distance from the base of the image header to the image checksum address.\r | |
366 | // 4. Hash the image header from its base to beginning of the image checksum.\r | |
367 | //\r | |
368 | HashBase = mImageBase;\r | |
f199664c | 369 | if (mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {\r |
0c18794e | 370 | //\r |
371 | // Use PE32 offset.\r | |
372 | //\r | |
4333b99d | 373 | HashSize = (UINTN) (&mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.CheckSum) - (UINTN) HashBase;\r |
551d8081 | 374 | NumberOfRvaAndSizes = mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.NumberOfRvaAndSizes;\r |
f199664c | 375 | } else if (mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR64_MAGIC) {\r |
0c18794e | 376 | //\r |
377 | // Use PE32+ offset.\r | |
378 | //\r | |
4333b99d | 379 | HashSize = (UINTN) (&mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.CheckSum) - (UINTN) HashBase;\r |
551d8081 | 380 | NumberOfRvaAndSizes = mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.NumberOfRvaAndSizes;\r |
570b3d1a | 381 | } else {\r |
382 | //\r | |
383 | // Invalid header magic number.\r | |
384 | //\r | |
385 | Status = FALSE;\r | |
386 | goto Done;\r | |
0c18794e | 387 | }\r |
388 | \r | |
389 | Status = mHash[HashAlg].HashUpdate(HashCtx, HashBase, HashSize);\r | |
390 | if (!Status) {\r | |
391 | goto Done;\r | |
392 | }\r | |
551d8081 | 393 | \r |
0c18794e | 394 | //\r |
395 | // 5. Skip over the image checksum (it occupies a single ULONG).\r | |
0c18794e | 396 | //\r |
551d8081 | 397 | if (NumberOfRvaAndSizes <= EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY) {\r |
0c18794e | 398 | //\r |
551d8081 | 399 | // 6. Since there is no Cert Directory in optional header, hash everything\r |
400 | // from the end of the checksum to the end of image header.\r | |
0c18794e | 401 | //\r |
f199664c | 402 | if (mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {\r |
551d8081 | 403 | //\r |
404 | // Use PE32 offset.\r | |
405 | //\r | |
406 | HashBase = (UINT8 *) &mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.CheckSum + sizeof (UINT32);\r | |
4333b99d | 407 | HashSize = mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.SizeOfHeaders - ((UINTN) HashBase - (UINTN) mImageBase);\r |
551d8081 | 408 | } else {\r |
409 | //\r | |
410 | // Use PE32+ offset.\r | |
411 | //\r | |
412 | HashBase = (UINT8 *) &mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.CheckSum + sizeof (UINT32);\r | |
4333b99d | 413 | HashSize = mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.SizeOfHeaders - ((UINTN) HashBase - (UINTN) mImageBase);\r |
551d8081 | 414 | }\r |
415 | \r | |
416 | if (HashSize != 0) {\r | |
417 | Status = mHash[HashAlg].HashUpdate(HashCtx, HashBase, HashSize);\r | |
418 | if (!Status) {\r | |
419 | goto Done;\r | |
420 | }\r | |
421 | }\r | |
0c18794e | 422 | } else {\r |
423 | //\r | |
551d8081 | 424 | // 7. Hash everything from the end of the checksum to the start of the Cert Directory.\r |
45bf2c47 | 425 | //\r |
f199664c | 426 | if (mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {\r |
551d8081 | 427 | //\r |
428 | // Use PE32 offset.\r | |
429 | //\r | |
430 | HashBase = (UINT8 *) &mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.CheckSum + sizeof (UINT32);\r | |
4333b99d | 431 | HashSize = (UINTN) (&mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY]) - (UINTN) HashBase;\r |
551d8081 | 432 | } else {\r |
433 | //\r | |
434 | // Use PE32+ offset.\r | |
435 | //\r | |
436 | HashBase = (UINT8 *) &mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.CheckSum + sizeof (UINT32);\r | |
4333b99d | 437 | HashSize = (UINTN) (&mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY]) - (UINTN) HashBase;\r |
551d8081 | 438 | }\r |
439 | \r | |
440 | if (HashSize != 0) {\r | |
441 | Status = mHash[HashAlg].HashUpdate(HashCtx, HashBase, HashSize);\r | |
442 | if (!Status) {\r | |
443 | goto Done;\r | |
444 | }\r | |
445 | }\r | |
0c18794e | 446 | \r |
0c18794e | 447 | //\r |
551d8081 | 448 | // 8. Skip over the Cert Directory. (It is sizeof(IMAGE_DATA_DIRECTORY) bytes.)\r |
449 | // 9. Hash everything from the end of the Cert Directory to the end of image header.\r | |
0c18794e | 450 | //\r |
f199664c | 451 | if (mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {\r |
551d8081 | 452 | //\r |
453 | // Use PE32 offset\r | |
454 | //\r | |
455 | HashBase = (UINT8 *) &mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY + 1];\r | |
4333b99d | 456 | HashSize = mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.SizeOfHeaders - ((UINTN) HashBase - (UINTN) mImageBase);\r |
551d8081 | 457 | } else {\r |
458 | //\r | |
459 | // Use PE32+ offset.\r | |
460 | //\r | |
461 | HashBase = (UINT8 *) &mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY + 1];\r | |
4333b99d | 462 | HashSize = mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.SizeOfHeaders - ((UINTN) HashBase - (UINTN) mImageBase);\r |
551d8081 | 463 | }\r |
0c18794e | 464 | \r |
551d8081 | 465 | if (HashSize != 0) {\r |
466 | Status = mHash[HashAlg].HashUpdate(HashCtx, HashBase, HashSize);\r | |
467 | if (!Status) {\r | |
468 | goto Done;\r | |
469 | }\r | |
20333c6d | 470 | }\r |
0c18794e | 471 | }\r |
551d8081 | 472 | \r |
0c18794e | 473 | //\r |
474 | // 10. Set the SUM_OF_BYTES_HASHED to the size of the header.\r | |
475 | //\r | |
f199664c | 476 | if (mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {\r |
0c18794e | 477 | //\r |
478 | // Use PE32 offset.\r | |
479 | //\r | |
480 | SumOfBytesHashed = mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.SizeOfHeaders;\r | |
481 | } else {\r | |
482 | //\r | |
483 | // Use PE32+ offset\r | |
484 | //\r | |
485 | SumOfBytesHashed = mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.SizeOfHeaders;\r | |
486 | }\r | |
487 | \r | |
570b3d1a | 488 | \r |
489 | Section = (EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER *) (\r | |
490 | mImageBase +\r | |
491 | mPeCoffHeaderOffset +\r | |
492 | sizeof (UINT32) +\r | |
493 | sizeof (EFI_IMAGE_FILE_HEADER) +\r | |
494 | mNtHeader.Pe32->FileHeader.SizeOfOptionalHeader\r | |
495 | );\r | |
496 | \r | |
0c18794e | 497 | //\r |
498 | // 11. Build a temporary table of pointers to all the IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER\r | |
499 | // structures in the image. The 'NumberOfSections' field of the image\r | |
500 | // header indicates how big the table should be. Do not include any\r | |
501 | // IMAGE_SECTION_HEADERs in the table whose 'SizeOfRawData' field is zero.\r | |
502 | //\r | |
503 | SectionHeader = (EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER *) AllocateZeroPool (sizeof (EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER) * mNtHeader.Pe32->FileHeader.NumberOfSections);\r | |
570b3d1a | 504 | if (SectionHeader == NULL) {\r |
505 | Status = FALSE;\r | |
506 | goto Done;\r | |
507 | }\r | |
0c18794e | 508 | //\r |
509 | // 12. Using the 'PointerToRawData' in the referenced section headers as\r | |
510 | // a key, arrange the elements in the table in ascending order. In other\r | |
511 | // words, sort the section headers according to the disk-file offset of\r | |
512 | // the section.\r | |
513 | //\r | |
0c18794e | 514 | for (Index = 0; Index < mNtHeader.Pe32->FileHeader.NumberOfSections; Index++) {\r |
515 | Pos = Index;\r | |
516 | while ((Pos > 0) && (Section->PointerToRawData < SectionHeader[Pos - 1].PointerToRawData)) {\r | |
517 | CopyMem (&SectionHeader[Pos], &SectionHeader[Pos - 1], sizeof (EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER));\r | |
518 | Pos--;\r | |
519 | }\r | |
520 | CopyMem (&SectionHeader[Pos], Section, sizeof (EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER));\r | |
521 | Section += 1;\r | |
522 | }\r | |
523 | \r | |
524 | //\r | |
525 | // 13. Walk through the sorted table, bring the corresponding section\r | |
526 | // into memory, and hash the entire section (using the 'SizeOfRawData'\r | |
527 | // field in the section header to determine the amount of data to hash).\r | |
528 | // 14. Add the section's 'SizeOfRawData' to SUM_OF_BYTES_HASHED .\r | |
529 | // 15. Repeat steps 13 and 14 for all the sections in the sorted table.\r | |
530 | //\r | |
531 | for (Index = 0; Index < mNtHeader.Pe32->FileHeader.NumberOfSections; Index++) {\r | |
532 | Section = &SectionHeader[Index];\r | |
533 | if (Section->SizeOfRawData == 0) {\r | |
534 | continue;\r | |
535 | }\r | |
536 | HashBase = mImageBase + Section->PointerToRawData;\r | |
537 | HashSize = (UINTN) Section->SizeOfRawData;\r | |
538 | \r | |
539 | Status = mHash[HashAlg].HashUpdate(HashCtx, HashBase, HashSize);\r | |
540 | if (!Status) {\r | |
541 | goto Done;\r | |
542 | }\r | |
543 | \r | |
544 | SumOfBytesHashed += HashSize;\r | |
545 | }\r | |
546 | \r | |
547 | //\r | |
548 | // 16. If the file size is greater than SUM_OF_BYTES_HASHED, there is extra\r | |
549 | // data in the file that needs to be added to the hash. This data begins\r | |
550 | // at file offset SUM_OF_BYTES_HASHED and its length is:\r | |
551 | // FileSize - (CertDirectory->Size)\r | |
552 | //\r | |
553 | if (mImageSize > SumOfBytesHashed) {\r | |
554 | HashBase = mImageBase + SumOfBytesHashed;\r | |
551d8081 | 555 | \r |
556 | if (NumberOfRvaAndSizes <= EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY) {\r | |
557 | CertSize = 0;\r | |
0c18794e | 558 | } else {\r |
f199664c | 559 | if (mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {\r |
551d8081 | 560 | //\r |
561 | // Use PE32 offset.\r | |
562 | //\r | |
563 | CertSize = mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY].Size;\r | |
564 | } else {\r | |
565 | //\r | |
566 | // Use PE32+ offset.\r | |
567 | //\r | |
568 | CertSize = mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY].Size;\r | |
28186d45 | 569 | }\r |
0c18794e | 570 | }\r |
571 | \r | |
551d8081 | 572 | if (mImageSize > CertSize + SumOfBytesHashed) {\r |
573 | HashSize = (UINTN) (mImageSize - CertSize - SumOfBytesHashed);\r | |
574 | \r | |
575 | Status = mHash[HashAlg].HashUpdate(HashCtx, HashBase, HashSize);\r | |
576 | if (!Status) {\r | |
577 | goto Done;\r | |
578 | }\r | |
579 | } else if (mImageSize < CertSize + SumOfBytesHashed) {\r | |
580 | Status = FALSE;\r | |
0c18794e | 581 | goto Done;\r |
582 | }\r | |
583 | }\r | |
551d8081 | 584 | \r |
0c18794e | 585 | Status = mHash[HashAlg].HashFinal(HashCtx, mImageDigest);\r |
586 | \r | |
587 | Done:\r | |
588 | if (HashCtx != NULL) {\r | |
589 | FreePool (HashCtx);\r | |
590 | }\r | |
591 | if (SectionHeader != NULL) {\r | |
592 | FreePool (SectionHeader);\r | |
593 | }\r | |
594 | return Status;\r | |
595 | }\r | |
596 | \r | |
597 | /**\r | |
69f8bb52 | 598 | Recognize the Hash algorithm in PE/COFF Authenticode and calculate hash of\r |
45bf2c47 | 599 | Pe/Coff image based on the authenticode image hashing in PE/COFF Specification\r |
0c18794e | 600 | 8.0 Appendix A\r |
601 | \r | |
dc204d5a JY |
602 | Caution: This function may receive untrusted input.\r |
603 | PE/COFF image is external input, so this function will validate its data structure\r | |
604 | within this image buffer before use.\r | |
605 | \r | |
f6f9031f | 606 | @param[in] AuthData Pointer to the Authenticode Signature retrieved from signed image.\r |
607 | @param[in] AuthDataSize Size of the Authenticode Signature in bytes.\r | |
20333c6d | 608 | \r |
0c18794e | 609 | @retval EFI_UNSUPPORTED Hash algorithm is not supported.\r |
610 | @retval EFI_SUCCESS Hash successfully.\r | |
611 | \r | |
612 | **/\r | |
45bf2c47 | 613 | EFI_STATUS\r |
0c18794e | 614 | HashPeImageByType (\r |
f6f9031f | 615 | IN UINT8 *AuthData,\r |
616 | IN UINTN AuthDataSize\r | |
0c18794e | 617 | )\r |
618 | {\r | |
619 | UINT8 Index;\r | |
badd40f9 | 620 | \r |
45bf2c47 | 621 | for (Index = 0; Index < HASHALG_MAX; Index++) {\r |
0c18794e | 622 | //\r |
623 | // Check the Hash algorithm in PE/COFF Authenticode.\r | |
45bf2c47 | 624 | // According to PKCS#7 Definition:\r |
0c18794e | 625 | // SignedData ::= SEQUENCE {\r |
626 | // version Version,\r | |
627 | // digestAlgorithms DigestAlgorithmIdentifiers,\r | |
628 | // contentInfo ContentInfo,\r | |
629 | // .... }\r | |
630 | // The DigestAlgorithmIdentifiers can be used to determine the hash algorithm in PE/COFF hashing\r | |
631 | // This field has the fixed offset (+32) in final Authenticode ASN.1 data.\r | |
bd0de396 | 632 | // Fixed offset (+32) is calculated based on two bytes of length encoding.\r |
45bf2c47 | 633 | //\r |
f6f9031f | 634 | if ((*(AuthData + 1) & TWO_BYTE_ENCODE) != TWO_BYTE_ENCODE) {\r |
bd0de396 | 635 | //\r |
636 | // Only support two bytes of Long Form of Length Encoding.\r | |
637 | //\r | |
638 | continue;\r | |
639 | }\r | |
640 | \r | |
f6f9031f | 641 | if (AuthDataSize < 32 + mHash[Index].OidLength) {\r |
badd40f9 | 642 | return EFI_UNSUPPORTED;\r |
643 | }\r | |
644 | \r | |
f6f9031f | 645 | if (CompareMem (AuthData + 32, mHash[Index].OidValue, mHash[Index].OidLength) == 0) {\r |
0c18794e | 646 | break;\r |
647 | }\r | |
648 | }\r | |
649 | \r | |
650 | if (Index == HASHALG_MAX) {\r | |
651 | return EFI_UNSUPPORTED;\r | |
652 | }\r | |
653 | \r | |
654 | //\r | |
655 | // HASH PE Image based on Hash algorithm in PE/COFF Authenticode.\r | |
656 | //\r | |
657 | if (!HashPeImage(Index)) {\r | |
658 | return EFI_UNSUPPORTED;\r | |
659 | }\r | |
660 | \r | |
661 | return EFI_SUCCESS;\r | |
662 | }\r | |
663 | \r | |
664 | \r | |
665 | /**\r | |
666 | Returns the size of a given image execution info table in bytes.\r | |
667 | \r | |
668 | This function returns the size, in bytes, of the image execution info table specified by\r | |
669 | ImageExeInfoTable. If ImageExeInfoTable is NULL, then 0 is returned.\r | |
670 | \r | |
671 | @param ImageExeInfoTable A pointer to a image execution info table structure.\r | |
45bf2c47 | 672 | \r |
0c18794e | 673 | @retval 0 If ImageExeInfoTable is NULL.\r |
674 | @retval Others The size of a image execution info table in bytes.\r | |
675 | \r | |
676 | **/\r | |
677 | UINTN\r | |
678 | GetImageExeInfoTableSize (\r | |
679 | EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO_TABLE *ImageExeInfoTable\r | |
680 | )\r | |
681 | {\r | |
682 | UINTN Index;\r | |
683 | EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO *ImageExeInfoItem;\r | |
684 | UINTN TotalSize;\r | |
685 | \r | |
686 | if (ImageExeInfoTable == NULL) {\r | |
687 | return 0;\r | |
688 | }\r | |
689 | \r | |
690 | ImageExeInfoItem = (EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO *) ((UINT8 *) ImageExeInfoTable + sizeof (EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO_TABLE));\r | |
691 | TotalSize = sizeof (EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO_TABLE);\r | |
692 | for (Index = 0; Index < ImageExeInfoTable->NumberOfImages; Index++) {\r | |
693 | TotalSize += ReadUnaligned32 ((UINT32 *) &ImageExeInfoItem->InfoSize);\r | |
694 | ImageExeInfoItem = (EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO *) ((UINT8 *) ImageExeInfoItem + ReadUnaligned32 ((UINT32 *) &ImageExeInfoItem->InfoSize));\r | |
695 | }\r | |
696 | \r | |
697 | return TotalSize;\r | |
698 | }\r | |
699 | \r | |
700 | /**\r | |
701 | Create an Image Execution Information Table entry and add it to system configuration table.\r | |
702 | \r | |
703 | @param[in] Action Describes the action taken by the firmware regarding this image.\r | |
704 | @param[in] Name Input a null-terminated, user-friendly name.\r | |
705 | @param[in] DevicePath Input device path pointer.\r | |
706 | @param[in] Signature Input signature info in EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST data structure.\r | |
707 | @param[in] SignatureSize Size of signature.\r | |
45bf2c47 | 708 | \r |
0c18794e | 709 | **/\r |
710 | VOID\r | |
711 | AddImageExeInfo (\r | |
45bf2c47 | 712 | IN EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_ACTION Action,\r |
713 | IN CHAR16 *Name OPTIONAL,\r | |
0c18794e | 714 | IN CONST EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *DevicePath,\r |
715 | IN EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *Signature OPTIONAL,\r | |
716 | IN UINTN SignatureSize\r | |
717 | )\r | |
718 | {\r | |
0c18794e | 719 | EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO_TABLE *ImageExeInfoTable;\r |
720 | EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO_TABLE *NewImageExeInfoTable;\r | |
721 | EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO *ImageExeInfoEntry;\r | |
722 | UINTN ImageExeInfoTableSize;\r | |
723 | UINTN NewImageExeInfoEntrySize;\r | |
724 | UINTN NameStringLen;\r | |
725 | UINTN DevicePathSize;\r | |
4fc08e8d | 726 | CHAR16 *NameStr;\r |
0c18794e | 727 | \r |
0c18794e | 728 | ImageExeInfoTable = NULL;\r |
729 | NewImageExeInfoTable = NULL;\r | |
730 | ImageExeInfoEntry = NULL;\r | |
731 | NameStringLen = 0;\r | |
4fc08e8d | 732 | NameStr = NULL;\r |
0c18794e | 733 | \r |
570b3d1a | 734 | if (DevicePath == NULL) {\r |
735 | return ;\r | |
736 | }\r | |
45bf2c47 | 737 | \r |
0c18794e | 738 | if (Name != NULL) {\r |
739 | NameStringLen = StrSize (Name);\r | |
b3d42170 | 740 | } else {\r |
741 | NameStringLen = sizeof (CHAR16);\r | |
0c18794e | 742 | }\r |
743 | \r | |
45bf2c47 | 744 | EfiGetSystemConfigurationTable (&gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, (VOID **) &ImageExeInfoTable);\r |
0c18794e | 745 | if (ImageExeInfoTable != NULL) {\r |
746 | //\r | |
747 | // The table has been found!\r | |
d6b926e7 | 748 | // We must enlarge the table to accommodate the new exe info entry.\r |
0c18794e | 749 | //\r |
750 | ImageExeInfoTableSize = GetImageExeInfoTableSize (ImageExeInfoTable);\r | |
751 | } else {\r | |
752 | //\r | |
753 | // Not Found!\r | |
754 | // We should create a new table to append to the configuration table.\r | |
755 | //\r | |
756 | ImageExeInfoTableSize = sizeof (EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO_TABLE);\r | |
757 | }\r | |
758 | \r | |
759 | DevicePathSize = GetDevicePathSize (DevicePath);\r | |
4fc08e8d CZ |
760 | \r |
761 | //\r | |
762 | // Signature size can be odd. Pad after signature to ensure next EXECUTION_INFO entry align\r | |
763 | //\r | |
764 | NewImageExeInfoEntrySize = sizeof (EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO) + NameStringLen + DevicePathSize + SignatureSize;\r | |
765 | \r | |
0c18794e | 766 | NewImageExeInfoTable = (EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO_TABLE *) AllocateRuntimePool (ImageExeInfoTableSize + NewImageExeInfoEntrySize);\r |
570b3d1a | 767 | if (NewImageExeInfoTable == NULL) {\r |
768 | return ;\r | |
769 | }\r | |
0c18794e | 770 | \r |
771 | if (ImageExeInfoTable != NULL) {\r | |
772 | CopyMem (NewImageExeInfoTable, ImageExeInfoTable, ImageExeInfoTableSize);\r | |
773 | } else {\r | |
774 | NewImageExeInfoTable->NumberOfImages = 0;\r | |
775 | }\r | |
776 | NewImageExeInfoTable->NumberOfImages++;\r | |
777 | ImageExeInfoEntry = (EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO *) ((UINT8 *) NewImageExeInfoTable + ImageExeInfoTableSize);\r | |
778 | //\r | |
ffccb935 | 779 | // Update new item's information.\r |
0c18794e | 780 | //\r |
1fee5304 ED |
781 | WriteUnaligned32 ((UINT32 *) ImageExeInfoEntry, Action);\r |
782 | WriteUnaligned32 ((UINT32 *) ((UINT8 *) ImageExeInfoEntry + sizeof (EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_ACTION)), (UINT32) NewImageExeInfoEntrySize);\r | |
0c18794e | 783 | \r |
4fc08e8d | 784 | NameStr = (CHAR16 *)(ImageExeInfoEntry + 1);\r |
0c18794e | 785 | if (Name != NULL) {\r |
4fc08e8d | 786 | CopyMem ((UINT8 *) NameStr, Name, NameStringLen);\r |
b3d42170 | 787 | } else {\r |
4fc08e8d | 788 | ZeroMem ((UINT8 *) NameStr, sizeof (CHAR16));\r |
0c18794e | 789 | }\r |
4fc08e8d | 790 | \r |
0c18794e | 791 | CopyMem (\r |
4fc08e8d | 792 | (UINT8 *) NameStr + NameStringLen,\r |
0c18794e | 793 | DevicePath,\r |
794 | DevicePathSize\r | |
795 | );\r | |
796 | if (Signature != NULL) {\r | |
797 | CopyMem (\r | |
4fc08e8d | 798 | (UINT8 *) NameStr + NameStringLen + DevicePathSize,\r |
0c18794e | 799 | Signature,\r |
800 | SignatureSize\r | |
801 | );\r | |
802 | }\r | |
803 | //\r | |
804 | // Update/replace the image execution table.\r | |
805 | //\r | |
570b3d1a | 806 | gBS->InstallConfigurationTable (&gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, (VOID *) NewImageExeInfoTable);\r |
45bf2c47 | 807 | \r |
0c18794e | 808 | //\r |
809 | // Free Old table data!\r | |
810 | //\r | |
811 | if (ImageExeInfoTable != NULL) {\r | |
812 | FreePool (ImageExeInfoTable);\r | |
813 | }\r | |
814 | }\r | |
815 | \r | |
20333c6d QL |
816 | /**\r |
817 | Check whether the hash of an given X.509 certificate is in forbidden database (DBX).\r | |
818 | \r | |
819 | @param[in] Certificate Pointer to X.509 Certificate that is searched for.\r | |
820 | @param[in] CertSize Size of X.509 Certificate.\r | |
821 | @param[in] SignatureList Pointer to the Signature List in forbidden database.\r | |
822 | @param[in] SignatureListSize Size of Signature List.\r | |
823 | @param[out] RevocationTime Return the time that the certificate was revoked.\r | |
824 | \r | |
825 | @return TRUE The certificate hash is found in the forbidden database.\r | |
826 | @return FALSE The certificate hash is not found in the forbidden database.\r | |
827 | \r | |
828 | **/\r | |
829 | BOOLEAN\r | |
830 | IsCertHashFoundInDatabase (\r | |
831 | IN UINT8 *Certificate,\r | |
832 | IN UINTN CertSize,\r | |
833 | IN EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *SignatureList,\r | |
834 | IN UINTN SignatureListSize,\r | |
835 | OUT EFI_TIME *RevocationTime\r | |
836 | )\r | |
837 | {\r | |
838 | BOOLEAN IsFound;\r | |
5789fe35 | 839 | BOOLEAN Status;\r |
20333c6d QL |
840 | EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *DbxList;\r |
841 | UINTN DbxSize;\r | |
842 | EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *CertHash;\r | |
843 | UINTN CertHashCount;\r | |
844 | UINTN Index;\r | |
845 | UINT32 HashAlg;\r | |
846 | VOID *HashCtx;\r | |
847 | UINT8 CertDigest[MAX_DIGEST_SIZE];\r | |
848 | UINT8 *DbxCertHash;\r | |
849 | UINTN SiglistHeaderSize;\r | |
12d95665 LQ |
850 | UINT8 *TBSCert;\r |
851 | UINTN TBSCertSize;\r | |
20333c6d QL |
852 | \r |
853 | IsFound = FALSE;\r | |
854 | DbxList = SignatureList;\r | |
855 | DbxSize = SignatureListSize;\r | |
856 | HashCtx = NULL;\r | |
857 | HashAlg = HASHALG_MAX;\r | |
858 | \r | |
12d95665 LQ |
859 | if ((RevocationTime == NULL) || (DbxList == NULL)) {\r |
860 | return FALSE;\r | |
861 | }\r | |
862 | \r | |
863 | //\r | |
864 | // Retrieve the TBSCertificate from the X.509 Certificate.\r | |
865 | //\r | |
866 | if (!X509GetTBSCert (Certificate, CertSize, &TBSCert, &TBSCertSize)) {\r | |
867 | return FALSE;\r | |
868 | }\r | |
20333c6d QL |
869 | \r |
870 | while ((DbxSize > 0) && (SignatureListSize >= DbxList->SignatureListSize)) {\r | |
871 | //\r | |
872 | // Determine Hash Algorithm of Certificate in the forbidden database.\r | |
873 | //\r | |
874 | if (CompareGuid (&DbxList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Sha256Guid)) {\r | |
875 | HashAlg = HASHALG_SHA256;\r | |
876 | } else if (CompareGuid (&DbxList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Sha384Guid)) {\r | |
877 | HashAlg = HASHALG_SHA384;\r | |
878 | } else if (CompareGuid (&DbxList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Sha512Guid)) {\r | |
879 | HashAlg = HASHALG_SHA512;\r | |
880 | } else {\r | |
881 | DbxSize -= DbxList->SignatureListSize;\r | |
882 | DbxList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) DbxList + DbxList->SignatureListSize);\r | |
883 | continue;\r | |
884 | }\r | |
885 | \r | |
886 | //\r | |
12d95665 | 887 | // Calculate the hash value of current TBSCertificate for comparision.\r |
20333c6d QL |
888 | //\r |
889 | if (mHash[HashAlg].GetContextSize == NULL) {\r | |
890 | goto Done;\r | |
891 | }\r | |
892 | ZeroMem (CertDigest, MAX_DIGEST_SIZE);\r | |
893 | HashCtx = AllocatePool (mHash[HashAlg].GetContextSize ());\r | |
894 | if (HashCtx == NULL) {\r | |
895 | goto Done;\r | |
896 | }\r | |
897 | Status = mHash[HashAlg].HashInit (HashCtx);\r | |
898 | if (!Status) {\r | |
899 | goto Done;\r | |
900 | }\r | |
12d95665 | 901 | Status = mHash[HashAlg].HashUpdate (HashCtx, TBSCert, TBSCertSize);\r |
20333c6d QL |
902 | if (!Status) {\r |
903 | goto Done;\r | |
904 | }\r | |
905 | Status = mHash[HashAlg].HashFinal (HashCtx, CertDigest);\r | |
906 | if (!Status) {\r | |
907 | goto Done;\r | |
908 | }\r | |
909 | \r | |
910 | SiglistHeaderSize = sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + DbxList->SignatureHeaderSize;\r | |
911 | CertHash = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) DbxList + SiglistHeaderSize);\r | |
912 | CertHashCount = (DbxList->SignatureListSize - SiglistHeaderSize) / DbxList->SignatureSize;\r | |
913 | for (Index = 0; Index < CertHashCount; Index++) {\r | |
914 | //\r | |
915 | // Iterate each Signature Data Node within this CertList for verify.\r | |
916 | //\r | |
917 | DbxCertHash = CertHash->SignatureData;\r | |
918 | if (CompareMem (DbxCertHash, CertDigest, mHash[HashAlg].DigestLength) == 0) {\r | |
919 | //\r | |
920 | // Hash of Certificate is found in forbidden database.\r | |
921 | //\r | |
922 | IsFound = TRUE;\r | |
923 | \r | |
924 | //\r | |
925 | // Return the revocation time.\r | |
926 | //\r | |
927 | CopyMem (RevocationTime, (EFI_TIME *)(DbxCertHash + mHash[HashAlg].DigestLength), sizeof (EFI_TIME));\r | |
928 | goto Done;\r | |
929 | }\r | |
930 | CertHash = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertHash + DbxList->SignatureSize);\r | |
931 | }\r | |
932 | \r | |
933 | DbxSize -= DbxList->SignatureListSize;\r | |
934 | DbxList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) DbxList + DbxList->SignatureListSize);\r | |
935 | }\r | |
936 | \r | |
937 | Done:\r | |
938 | if (HashCtx != NULL) {\r | |
939 | FreePool (HashCtx);\r | |
940 | }\r | |
941 | \r | |
942 | return IsFound;\r | |
943 | }\r | |
944 | \r | |
0c18794e | 945 | /**\r |
946 | Check whether signature is in specified database.\r | |
947 | \r | |
948 | @param[in] VariableName Name of database variable that is searched in.\r | |
949 | @param[in] Signature Pointer to signature that is searched for.\r | |
d6b926e7 | 950 | @param[in] CertType Pointer to hash algorithm.\r |
0c18794e | 951 | @param[in] SignatureSize Size of Signature.\r |
952 | \r | |
953 | @return TRUE Found the signature in the variable database.\r | |
954 | @return FALSE Not found the signature in the variable database.\r | |
955 | \r | |
956 | **/\r | |
957 | BOOLEAN\r | |
958 | IsSignatureFoundInDatabase (\r | |
959 | IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r | |
45bf2c47 | 960 | IN UINT8 *Signature,\r |
0c18794e | 961 | IN EFI_GUID *CertType,\r |
962 | IN UINTN SignatureSize\r | |
963 | )\r | |
964 | {\r | |
965 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r | |
966 | EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *CertList;\r | |
967 | EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *Cert;\r | |
968 | UINTN DataSize;\r | |
969 | UINT8 *Data;\r | |
970 | UINTN Index;\r | |
971 | UINTN CertCount;\r | |
972 | BOOLEAN IsFound;\r | |
20333c6d | 973 | \r |
0c18794e | 974 | //\r |
975 | // Read signature database variable.\r | |
976 | //\r | |
977 | IsFound = FALSE;\r | |
978 | Data = NULL;\r | |
979 | DataSize = 0;\r | |
980 | Status = gRT->GetVariable (VariableName, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, NULL, &DataSize, NULL);\r | |
981 | if (Status != EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {\r | |
982 | return FALSE;\r | |
983 | }\r | |
984 | \r | |
985 | Data = (UINT8 *) AllocateZeroPool (DataSize);\r | |
570b3d1a | 986 | if (Data == NULL) {\r |
987 | return FALSE;\r | |
988 | }\r | |
0c18794e | 989 | \r |
990 | Status = gRT->GetVariable (VariableName, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, NULL, &DataSize, Data);\r | |
991 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
992 | goto Done;\r | |
993 | }\r | |
994 | //\r | |
d6b926e7 | 995 | // Enumerate all signature data in SigDB to check if signature exists for executable.\r |
0c18794e | 996 | //\r |
997 | CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) Data;\r | |
998 | while ((DataSize > 0) && (DataSize >= CertList->SignatureListSize)) {\r | |
7403ff5b | 999 | CertCount = (CertList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - CertList->SignatureHeaderSize) / CertList->SignatureSize;\r |
0c18794e | 1000 | Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r |
1001 | if ((CertList->SignatureSize == sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1 + SignatureSize) && (CompareGuid(&CertList->SignatureType, CertType))) {\r | |
1002 | for (Index = 0; Index < CertCount; Index++) {\r | |
1003 | if (CompareMem (Cert->SignatureData, Signature, SignatureSize) == 0) {\r | |
1004 | //\r | |
1005 | // Find the signature in database.\r | |
1006 | //\r | |
1007 | IsFound = TRUE;\r | |
5b196b06 ZC |
1008 | //\r |
1009 | // Entries in UEFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE that are used to validate image should be measured\r | |
1010 | //\r | |
1011 | if (StrCmp(VariableName, EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE) == 0) {\r | |
1012 | SecureBootHook (VariableName, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, CertList->SignatureSize, Cert);\r | |
1013 | }\r | |
0c18794e | 1014 | break;\r |
1015 | }\r | |
1016 | \r | |
1017 | Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) Cert + CertList->SignatureSize);\r | |
1018 | }\r | |
1019 | \r | |
1020 | if (IsFound) {\r | |
1021 | break;\r | |
1022 | }\r | |
1023 | }\r | |
1024 | \r | |
1025 | DataSize -= CertList->SignatureListSize;\r | |
1026 | CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + CertList->SignatureListSize);\r | |
1027 | }\r | |
1028 | \r | |
1029 | Done:\r | |
1030 | if (Data != NULL) {\r | |
1031 | FreePool (Data);\r | |
1032 | }\r | |
1033 | \r | |
1034 | return IsFound;\r | |
1035 | }\r | |
1036 | \r | |
1037 | /**\r | |
20333c6d | 1038 | Check whether the timestamp is valid by comparing the signing time and the revocation time.\r |
0c18794e | 1039 | \r |
20333c6d QL |
1040 | @param SigningTime A pointer to the signing time.\r |
1041 | @param RevocationTime A pointer to the revocation time.\r | |
45bf2c47 | 1042 | \r |
20333c6d QL |
1043 | @retval TRUE The SigningTime is not later than the RevocationTime.\r |
1044 | @retval FALSE The SigningTime is later than the RevocationTime.\r | |
0c18794e | 1045 | \r |
1046 | **/\r | |
45bf2c47 | 1047 | BOOLEAN\r |
20333c6d QL |
1048 | IsValidSignatureByTimestamp (\r |
1049 | IN EFI_TIME *SigningTime,\r | |
1050 | IN EFI_TIME *RevocationTime\r | |
1051 | )\r | |
1052 | {\r | |
1053 | if (SigningTime->Year != RevocationTime->Year) {\r | |
1054 | return (BOOLEAN) (SigningTime->Year < RevocationTime->Year);\r | |
1055 | } else if (SigningTime->Month != RevocationTime->Month) {\r | |
1056 | return (BOOLEAN) (SigningTime->Month < RevocationTime->Month);\r | |
1057 | } else if (SigningTime->Day != RevocationTime->Day) {\r | |
1058 | return (BOOLEAN) (SigningTime->Day < RevocationTime->Day);\r | |
1059 | } else if (SigningTime->Hour != RevocationTime->Hour) {\r | |
1060 | return (BOOLEAN) (SigningTime->Hour < RevocationTime->Hour);\r | |
1061 | } else if (SigningTime->Minute != RevocationTime->Minute) {\r | |
1062 | return (BOOLEAN) (SigningTime->Minute < RevocationTime->Minute);\r | |
1063 | }\r | |
1064 | \r | |
1065 | return (BOOLEAN) (SigningTime->Second <= RevocationTime->Second);\r | |
1066 | }\r | |
1067 | \r | |
1068 | /**\r | |
1069 | Check if the given time value is zero.\r | |
1070 | \r | |
1071 | @param[in] Time Pointer of a time value.\r | |
1072 | \r | |
1073 | @retval TRUE The Time is Zero.\r | |
1074 | @retval FALSE The Time is not Zero.\r | |
1075 | \r | |
1076 | **/\r | |
1077 | BOOLEAN\r | |
1078 | IsTimeZero (\r | |
1079 | IN EFI_TIME *Time\r | |
1080 | )\r | |
1081 | {\r | |
1082 | if ((Time->Year == 0) && (Time->Month == 0) && (Time->Day == 0) &&\r | |
1083 | (Time->Hour == 0) && (Time->Minute == 0) && (Time->Second == 0)) {\r | |
1084 | return TRUE;\r | |
1085 | }\r | |
1086 | \r | |
1087 | return FALSE;\r | |
1088 | }\r | |
1089 | \r | |
1090 | /**\r | |
b3548d32 | 1091 | Check whether the timestamp signature is valid and the signing time is also earlier than\r |
20333c6d QL |
1092 | the revocation time.\r |
1093 | \r | |
1094 | @param[in] AuthData Pointer to the Authenticode signature retrieved from signed image.\r | |
1095 | @param[in] AuthDataSize Size of the Authenticode signature in bytes.\r | |
1096 | @param[in] RevocationTime The time that the certificate was revoked.\r | |
1097 | \r | |
b3548d32 | 1098 | @retval TRUE Timestamp signature is valid and signing time is no later than the\r |
20333c6d QL |
1099 | revocation time.\r |
1100 | @retval FALSE Timestamp signature is not valid or the signing time is later than the\r | |
1101 | revocation time.\r | |
1102 | \r | |
1103 | **/\r | |
1104 | BOOLEAN\r | |
1105 | PassTimestampCheck (\r | |
1106 | IN UINT8 *AuthData,\r | |
1107 | IN UINTN AuthDataSize,\r | |
1108 | IN EFI_TIME *RevocationTime\r | |
1109 | )\r | |
1110 | {\r | |
1111 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r | |
1112 | BOOLEAN VerifyStatus;\r | |
1113 | EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *CertList;\r | |
1114 | EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *Cert;\r | |
1115 | UINT8 *DbtData;\r | |
1116 | UINTN DbtDataSize;\r | |
1117 | UINT8 *RootCert;\r | |
1118 | UINTN RootCertSize;\r | |
1119 | UINTN Index;\r | |
1120 | UINTN CertCount;\r | |
1121 | EFI_TIME SigningTime;\r | |
1122 | \r | |
1123 | //\r | |
1124 | // Variable Initialization\r | |
1125 | //\r | |
1126 | VerifyStatus = FALSE;\r | |
1127 | DbtData = NULL;\r | |
1128 | CertList = NULL;\r | |
1129 | Cert = NULL;\r | |
1130 | RootCert = NULL;\r | |
1131 | RootCertSize = 0;\r | |
1132 | \r | |
1133 | //\r | |
1134 | // If RevocationTime is zero, the certificate shall be considered to always be revoked.\r | |
1135 | //\r | |
1136 | if (IsTimeZero (RevocationTime)) {\r | |
1137 | return FALSE;\r | |
1138 | }\r | |
1139 | \r | |
1140 | //\r | |
1141 | // RevocationTime is non-zero, the certificate should be considered to be revoked from that time and onwards.\r | |
1142 | // Using the dbt to get the trusted TSA certificates.\r | |
1143 | //\r | |
1144 | DbtDataSize = 0;\r | |
1145 | Status = gRT->GetVariable (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE2, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, NULL, &DbtDataSize, NULL);\r | |
7e0699c0 QL |
1146 | if (Status != EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {\r |
1147 | goto Done;\r | |
1148 | }\r | |
1149 | DbtData = (UINT8 *) AllocateZeroPool (DbtDataSize);\r | |
1150 | if (DbtData == NULL) {\r | |
1151 | goto Done;\r | |
1152 | }\r | |
1153 | Status = gRT->GetVariable (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE2, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, NULL, &DbtDataSize, (VOID *) DbtData);\r | |
1154 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
1155 | goto Done;\r | |
20333c6d QL |
1156 | }\r |
1157 | \r | |
1158 | CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) DbtData;\r | |
1159 | while ((DbtDataSize > 0) && (DbtDataSize >= CertList->SignatureListSize)) {\r | |
1160 | if (CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Guid)) {\r | |
1161 | Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r | |
1162 | CertCount = (CertList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - CertList->SignatureHeaderSize) / CertList->SignatureSize;\r | |
1163 | for (Index = 0; Index < CertCount; Index++) {\r | |
1164 | //\r | |
1165 | // Iterate each Signature Data Node within this CertList for verify.\r | |
1166 | //\r | |
1167 | RootCert = Cert->SignatureData;\r | |
1168 | RootCertSize = CertList->SignatureSize - sizeof (EFI_GUID);\r | |
1169 | //\r | |
1170 | // Get the signing time if the timestamp signature is valid.\r | |
1171 | //\r | |
1172 | if (ImageTimestampVerify (AuthData, AuthDataSize, RootCert, RootCertSize, &SigningTime)) {\r | |
1173 | //\r | |
1174 | // The signer signature is valid only when the signing time is earlier than revocation time.\r | |
1175 | //\r | |
1176 | if (IsValidSignatureByTimestamp (&SigningTime, RevocationTime)) {\r | |
1177 | VerifyStatus = TRUE;\r | |
1178 | goto Done;\r | |
1179 | }\r | |
1180 | }\r | |
1181 | Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) Cert + CertList->SignatureSize);\r | |
1182 | }\r | |
1183 | }\r | |
1184 | DbtDataSize -= CertList->SignatureListSize;\r | |
1185 | CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + CertList->SignatureListSize);\r | |
1186 | }\r | |
1187 | \r | |
1188 | Done:\r | |
1189 | if (DbtData != NULL) {\r | |
1190 | FreePool (DbtData);\r | |
1191 | }\r | |
1192 | \r | |
1193 | return VerifyStatus;\r | |
1194 | }\r | |
1195 | \r | |
1196 | /**\r | |
1197 | Check whether the image signature is forbidden by the forbidden database (dbx).\r | |
1198 | The image is forbidden to load if any certificates for signing are revoked before signing time.\r | |
1199 | \r | |
560ac77e ZC |
1200 | @param[in] AuthData Pointer to the Authenticode signature retrieved from the signed image.\r |
1201 | @param[in] AuthDataSize Size of the Authenticode signature in bytes.\r | |
20333c6d QL |
1202 | \r |
1203 | @retval TRUE Image is forbidden by dbx.\r | |
1204 | @retval FALSE Image is not forbidden by dbx.\r | |
1205 | \r | |
1206 | **/\r | |
1207 | BOOLEAN\r | |
b3548d32 | 1208 | IsForbiddenByDbx (\r |
560ac77e | 1209 | IN UINT8 *AuthData,\r |
b3548d32 | 1210 | IN UINTN AuthDataSize\r |
20333c6d QL |
1211 | )\r |
1212 | {\r | |
1213 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r | |
1214 | BOOLEAN IsForbidden;\r | |
1215 | UINT8 *Data;\r | |
1216 | UINTN DataSize;\r | |
27c93c06 LQ |
1217 | EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *CertList;\r |
1218 | UINTN CertListSize;\r | |
1219 | EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *CertData;\r | |
1220 | UINT8 *RootCert;\r | |
1221 | UINTN RootCertSize;\r | |
1222 | UINTN CertCount;\r | |
20333c6d QL |
1223 | UINTN Index;\r |
1224 | UINT8 *CertBuffer;\r | |
1225 | UINTN BufferLength;\r | |
1226 | UINT8 *TrustedCert;\r | |
1227 | UINTN TrustedCertLength;\r | |
1228 | UINT8 CertNumber;\r | |
1229 | UINT8 *CertPtr;\r | |
1230 | UINT8 *Cert;\r | |
1231 | UINTN CertSize;\r | |
1232 | EFI_TIME RevocationTime;\r | |
20333c6d QL |
1233 | //\r |
1234 | // Variable Initialization\r | |
1235 | //\r | |
1236 | IsForbidden = FALSE;\r | |
1237 | Data = NULL;\r | |
27c93c06 LQ |
1238 | CertList = NULL;\r |
1239 | CertData = NULL;\r | |
1240 | RootCert = NULL;\r | |
1241 | RootCertSize = 0;\r | |
20333c6d QL |
1242 | Cert = NULL;\r |
1243 | CertBuffer = NULL;\r | |
1244 | BufferLength = 0;\r | |
1245 | TrustedCert = NULL;\r | |
1246 | TrustedCertLength = 0;\r | |
1247 | \r | |
1248 | //\r | |
1249 | // The image will not be forbidden if dbx can't be got.\r | |
1250 | //\r | |
1251 | DataSize = 0;\r | |
1252 | Status = gRT->GetVariable (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, NULL, &DataSize, NULL);\r | |
7e0699c0 QL |
1253 | if (Status != EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {\r |
1254 | return IsForbidden;\r | |
20333c6d | 1255 | }\r |
7e0699c0 QL |
1256 | Data = (UINT8 *) AllocateZeroPool (DataSize);\r |
1257 | if (Data == NULL) {\r | |
1258 | return IsForbidden;\r | |
1259 | }\r | |
1260 | \r | |
1261 | Status = gRT->GetVariable (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, NULL, &DataSize, (VOID *) Data);\r | |
20333c6d QL |
1262 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r |
1263 | return IsForbidden;\r | |
1264 | }\r | |
1265 | \r | |
27c93c06 LQ |
1266 | //\r |
1267 | // Verify image signature with RAW X509 certificates in DBX database.\r | |
1268 | // If passed, the image will be forbidden.\r | |
1269 | //\r | |
1270 | CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) Data;\r | |
1271 | CertListSize = DataSize;\r | |
1272 | while ((CertListSize > 0) && (CertListSize >= CertList->SignatureListSize)) {\r | |
1273 | if (CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Guid)) {\r | |
1274 | CertData = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r | |
1275 | CertCount = (CertList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - CertList->SignatureHeaderSize) / CertList->SignatureSize;\r | |
1276 | \r | |
1277 | for (Index = 0; Index < CertCount; Index++) {\r | |
1278 | //\r | |
1279 | // Iterate each Signature Data Node within this CertList for verify.\r | |
1280 | //\r | |
1281 | RootCert = CertData->SignatureData;\r | |
1282 | RootCertSize = CertList->SignatureSize - sizeof (EFI_GUID);\r | |
1283 | \r | |
1284 | //\r | |
1285 | // Call AuthenticodeVerify library to Verify Authenticode struct.\r | |
1286 | //\r | |
1287 | IsForbidden = AuthenticodeVerify (\r | |
1288 | AuthData,\r | |
1289 | AuthDataSize,\r | |
1290 | RootCert,\r | |
1291 | RootCertSize,\r | |
1292 | mImageDigest,\r | |
1293 | mImageDigestSize\r | |
1294 | );\r | |
1295 | if (IsForbidden) {\r | |
531c89a1 | 1296 | DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "DxeImageVerificationLib: Image is signed but signature is forbidden by DBX.\n"));\r |
27c93c06 LQ |
1297 | goto Done;\r |
1298 | }\r | |
1299 | \r | |
1300 | CertData = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertData + CertList->SignatureSize);\r | |
1301 | }\r | |
1302 | }\r | |
1303 | \r | |
1304 | CertListSize -= CertList->SignatureListSize;\r | |
1305 | CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + CertList->SignatureListSize);\r | |
1306 | }\r | |
1307 | \r | |
1308 | //\r | |
1309 | // Check X.509 Certificate Hash & Possible Timestamp.\r | |
1310 | //\r | |
1311 | \r | |
20333c6d QL |
1312 | //\r |
1313 | // Retrieve the certificate stack from AuthData\r | |
1314 | // The output CertStack format will be:\r | |
1315 | // UINT8 CertNumber;\r | |
1316 | // UINT32 Cert1Length;\r | |
1317 | // UINT8 Cert1[];\r | |
1318 | // UINT32 Cert2Length;\r | |
1319 | // UINT8 Cert2[];\r | |
1320 | // ...\r | |
1321 | // UINT32 CertnLength;\r | |
1322 | // UINT8 Certn[];\r | |
1323 | //\r | |
1324 | Pkcs7GetSigners (AuthData, AuthDataSize, &CertBuffer, &BufferLength, &TrustedCert, &TrustedCertLength);\r | |
7e0699c0 | 1325 | if ((BufferLength == 0) || (CertBuffer == NULL)) {\r |
20333c6d QL |
1326 | IsForbidden = TRUE;\r |
1327 | goto Done;\r | |
1328 | }\r | |
1329 | \r | |
1330 | //\r | |
27c93c06 | 1331 | // Check if any hash of certificates embedded in AuthData is in the forbidden database.\r |
20333c6d QL |
1332 | //\r |
1333 | CertNumber = (UINT8) (*CertBuffer);\r | |
1334 | CertPtr = CertBuffer + 1;\r | |
1335 | for (Index = 0; Index < CertNumber; Index++) {\r | |
1336 | CertSize = (UINTN) ReadUnaligned32 ((UINT32 *)CertPtr);\r | |
1337 | Cert = (UINT8 *)CertPtr + sizeof (UINT32);\r | |
91422384 ZC |
1338 | //\r |
1339 | // Advance CertPtr to the next cert in image signer's cert list\r | |
1340 | //\r | |
1341 | CertPtr = CertPtr + sizeof (UINT32) + CertSize;\r | |
20333c6d QL |
1342 | \r |
1343 | if (IsCertHashFoundInDatabase (Cert, CertSize, (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *)Data, DataSize, &RevocationTime)) {\r | |
1344 | //\r | |
1345 | // Check the timestamp signature and signing time to determine if the image can be trusted.\r | |
1346 | //\r | |
1347 | IsForbidden = TRUE;\r | |
1348 | if (PassTimestampCheck (AuthData, AuthDataSize, &RevocationTime)) {\r | |
1349 | IsForbidden = FALSE;\r | |
91422384 ZC |
1350 | //\r |
1351 | // Pass DBT check. Continue to check other certs in image signer's cert list against DBX, DBT\r | |
1352 | //\r | |
1353 | continue;\r | |
20333c6d | 1354 | }\r |
531c89a1 | 1355 | DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "DxeImageVerificationLib: Image is signed but signature failed the timestamp check.\n"));\r |
20333c6d QL |
1356 | goto Done;\r |
1357 | }\r | |
1358 | \r | |
20333c6d QL |
1359 | }\r |
1360 | \r | |
1361 | Done:\r | |
1362 | if (Data != NULL) {\r | |
1363 | FreePool (Data);\r | |
1364 | }\r | |
1365 | \r | |
1366 | Pkcs7FreeSigners (CertBuffer);\r | |
1367 | Pkcs7FreeSigners (TrustedCert);\r | |
1368 | \r | |
1369 | return IsForbidden;\r | |
1370 | }\r | |
1371 | \r | |
4fc08e8d | 1372 | \r |
20333c6d QL |
1373 | /**\r |
1374 | Check whether the image signature can be verified by the trusted certificates in DB database.\r | |
1375 | \r | |
560ac77e ZC |
1376 | @param[in] AuthData Pointer to the Authenticode signature retrieved from signed image.\r |
1377 | @param[in] AuthDataSize Size of the Authenticode signature in bytes.\r | |
20333c6d QL |
1378 | \r |
1379 | @retval TRUE Image passed verification using certificate in db.\r | |
1380 | @retval FALSE Image didn't pass verification using certificate in db.\r | |
1381 | \r | |
1382 | **/\r | |
1383 | BOOLEAN\r | |
1384 | IsAllowedByDb (\r | |
560ac77e ZC |
1385 | IN UINT8 *AuthData,\r |
1386 | IN UINTN AuthDataSize\r | |
0c18794e | 1387 | )\r |
1388 | {\r | |
1389 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r | |
1390 | BOOLEAN VerifyStatus;\r | |
0c18794e | 1391 | EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *CertList;\r |
4fc08e8d | 1392 | EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *CertData;\r |
0c18794e | 1393 | UINTN DataSize;\r |
45bf2c47 | 1394 | UINT8 *Data;\r |
0c18794e | 1395 | UINT8 *RootCert;\r |
1396 | UINTN RootCertSize;\r | |
1397 | UINTN Index;\r | |
1398 | UINTN CertCount;\r | |
27c93c06 LQ |
1399 | UINTN DbxDataSize;\r |
1400 | UINT8 *DbxData;\r | |
1401 | EFI_TIME RevocationTime;\r | |
0c18794e | 1402 | \r |
4fc08e8d CZ |
1403 | Data = NULL;\r |
1404 | CertList = NULL;\r | |
1405 | CertData = NULL;\r | |
1406 | RootCert = NULL;\r | |
1407 | DbxData = NULL;\r | |
1408 | RootCertSize = 0;\r | |
1409 | VerifyStatus = FALSE;\r | |
0c18794e | 1410 | \r |
0c18794e | 1411 | DataSize = 0;\r |
20333c6d | 1412 | Status = gRT->GetVariable (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, NULL, &DataSize, NULL);\r |
0c18794e | 1413 | if (Status == EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {\r |
45bf2c47 | 1414 | Data = (UINT8 *) AllocateZeroPool (DataSize);\r |
1415 | if (Data == NULL) {\r | |
1416 | return VerifyStatus;\r | |
570b3d1a | 1417 | }\r |
0c18794e | 1418 | \r |
20333c6d | 1419 | Status = gRT->GetVariable (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, NULL, &DataSize, (VOID *) Data);\r |
0c18794e | 1420 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r |
1421 | goto Done;\r | |
1422 | }\r | |
45bf2c47 | 1423 | \r |
1424 | //\r | |
1425 | // Find X509 certificate in Signature List to verify the signature in pkcs7 signed data.\r | |
0c18794e | 1426 | //\r |
45bf2c47 | 1427 | CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) Data;\r |
0c18794e | 1428 | while ((DataSize > 0) && (DataSize >= CertList->SignatureListSize)) {\r |
1429 | if (CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Guid)) {\r | |
4fc08e8d CZ |
1430 | CertData = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r |
1431 | CertCount = (CertList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - CertList->SignatureHeaderSize) / CertList->SignatureSize;\r | |
20333c6d | 1432 | \r |
0c18794e | 1433 | for (Index = 0; Index < CertCount; Index++) {\r |
1434 | //\r | |
45bf2c47 | 1435 | // Iterate each Signature Data Node within this CertList for verify.\r |
1436 | //\r | |
4fc08e8d | 1437 | RootCert = CertData->SignatureData;\r |
20333c6d | 1438 | RootCertSize = CertList->SignatureSize - sizeof (EFI_GUID);\r |
45bf2c47 | 1439 | \r |
0c18794e | 1440 | //\r |
45bf2c47 | 1441 | // Call AuthenticodeVerify library to Verify Authenticode struct.\r |
0c18794e | 1442 | //\r |
1443 | VerifyStatus = AuthenticodeVerify (\r | |
f6f9031f | 1444 | AuthData,\r |
1445 | AuthDataSize,\r | |
0c18794e | 1446 | RootCert,\r |
1447 | RootCertSize,\r | |
1448 | mImageDigest,\r | |
1449 | mImageDigestSize\r | |
1450 | );\r | |
0c18794e | 1451 | if (VerifyStatus) {\r |
27c93c06 LQ |
1452 | //\r |
1453 | // Here We still need to check if this RootCert's Hash is revoked\r | |
1454 | //\r | |
1455 | Status = gRT->GetVariable (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, NULL, &DbxDataSize, NULL);\r | |
1456 | if (Status == EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {\r | |
1457 | goto Done;\r | |
1458 | }\r | |
1ca3a099 | 1459 | DbxData = (UINT8 *) AllocateZeroPool (DbxDataSize);\r |
27c93c06 LQ |
1460 | if (DbxData == NULL) {\r |
1461 | goto Done;\r | |
1462 | }\r | |
1463 | \r | |
1464 | Status = gRT->GetVariable (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, NULL, &DbxDataSize, (VOID *) DbxData);\r | |
1465 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
1466 | goto Done;\r | |
1467 | }\r | |
1468 | \r | |
1469 | if (IsCertHashFoundInDatabase (RootCert, RootCertSize, (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *)DbxData, DbxDataSize, &RevocationTime)) {\r | |
1470 | //\r | |
531c89a1 | 1471 | // Check the timestamp signature and signing time to determine if the RootCert can be trusted.\r |
27c93c06 LQ |
1472 | //\r |
1473 | VerifyStatus = PassTimestampCheck (AuthData, AuthDataSize, &RevocationTime);\r | |
531c89a1 CS |
1474 | if (!VerifyStatus) {\r |
1475 | DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "DxeImageVerificationLib: Image is signed and signature is accepted by DB, but its root cert failed the timestamp check.\n"));\r | |
1476 | }\r | |
27c93c06 LQ |
1477 | }\r |
1478 | \r | |
0c18794e | 1479 | goto Done;\r |
1480 | }\r | |
20333c6d | 1481 | \r |
4fc08e8d | 1482 | CertData = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertData + CertList->SignatureSize);\r |
45bf2c47 | 1483 | }\r |
0c18794e | 1484 | }\r |
20333c6d | 1485 | \r |
0c18794e | 1486 | DataSize -= CertList->SignatureListSize;\r |
1487 | CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + CertList->SignatureListSize);\r | |
1488 | }\r | |
1489 | }\r | |
1490 | \r | |
45bf2c47 | 1491 | Done:\r |
4fc08e8d | 1492 | \r |
27c93c06 | 1493 | if (VerifyStatus) {\r |
4fc08e8d | 1494 | SecureBootHook (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, CertList->SignatureSize, CertData);\r |
27c93c06 LQ |
1495 | }\r |
1496 | \r | |
45bf2c47 | 1497 | if (Data != NULL) {\r |
1498 | FreePool (Data);\r | |
1499 | }\r | |
27c93c06 LQ |
1500 | if (DbxData != NULL) {\r |
1501 | FreePool (DbxData);\r | |
1502 | }\r | |
0c18794e | 1503 | \r |
45bf2c47 | 1504 | return VerifyStatus;\r |
1505 | }\r | |
0c18794e | 1506 | \r |
0c18794e | 1507 | /**\r |
1508 | Provide verification service for signed images, which include both signature validation\r | |
45bf2c47 | 1509 | and platform policy control. For signature types, both UEFI WIN_CERTIFICATE_UEFI_GUID and\r |
0c18794e | 1510 | MSFT Authenticode type signatures are supported.\r |
0c18794e | 1511 | \r |
45bf2c47 | 1512 | In this implementation, only verify external executables when in USER MODE.\r |
1513 | Executables from FV is bypass, so pass in AuthenticationStatus is ignored.\r | |
1514 | \r | |
6de4c35f | 1515 | The image verification policy is:\r |
50fe73a1 | 1516 | If the image is signed,\r |
6de4c35f | 1517 | At least one valid signature or at least one hash value of the image must match a record\r |
1518 | in the security database "db", and no valid signature nor any hash value of the image may\r | |
1519 | be reflected in the security database "dbx".\r | |
50fe73a1 | 1520 | Otherwise, the image is not signed,\r |
6de4c35f | 1521 | The SHA256 hash value of the image must match a record in the security database "db", and\r |
1522 | not be reflected in the security data base "dbx".\r | |
45bf2c47 | 1523 | \r |
dc204d5a JY |
1524 | Caution: This function may receive untrusted input.\r |
1525 | PE/COFF image is external input, so this function will validate its data structure\r | |
1526 | within this image buffer before use.\r | |
1527 | \r | |
45bf2c47 | 1528 | @param[in] AuthenticationStatus\r |
0c18794e | 1529 | This is the authentication status returned from the security\r |
1530 | measurement services for the input file.\r | |
1531 | @param[in] File This is a pointer to the device path of the file that is\r | |
1532 | being dispatched. This will optionally be used for logging.\r | |
1533 | @param[in] FileBuffer File buffer matches the input file device path.\r | |
1534 | @param[in] FileSize Size of File buffer matches the input file device path.\r | |
5db28a67 LG |
1535 | @param[in] BootPolicy A boot policy that was used to call LoadImage() UEFI service.\r |
1536 | \r | |
1537 | @retval EFI_SUCCESS The file specified by DevicePath and non-NULL\r | |
1538 | FileBuffer did authenticate, and the platform policy dictates\r | |
1539 | that the DXE Foundation may use the file.\r | |
1540 | @retval EFI_SUCCESS The device path specified by NULL device path DevicePath\r | |
1541 | and non-NULL FileBuffer did authenticate, and the platform\r | |
1542 | policy dictates that the DXE Foundation may execute the image in\r | |
1543 | FileBuffer.\r | |
570b3d1a | 1544 | @retval EFI_OUT_RESOURCE Fail to allocate memory.\r |
0c18794e | 1545 | @retval EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION The file specified by File did not authenticate, and\r |
1546 | the platform policy dictates that File should be placed\r | |
5db28a67 LG |
1547 | in the untrusted state. The image has been added to the file\r |
1548 | execution table.\r | |
1549 | @retval EFI_ACCESS_DENIED The file specified by File and FileBuffer did not\r | |
1550 | authenticate, and the platform policy dictates that the DXE\r | |
1551 | Foundation many not use File.\r | |
0c18794e | 1552 | \r |
1553 | **/\r | |
1554 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
1555 | EFIAPI\r | |
1556 | DxeImageVerificationHandler (\r | |
1557 | IN UINT32 AuthenticationStatus,\r | |
1558 | IN CONST EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *File,\r | |
1559 | IN VOID *FileBuffer,\r | |
5db28a67 LG |
1560 | IN UINTN FileSize,\r |
1561 | IN BOOLEAN BootPolicy\r | |
0c18794e | 1562 | )\r |
0c18794e | 1563 | {\r |
551d8081 | 1564 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r |
551d8081 | 1565 | EFI_IMAGE_DOS_HEADER *DosHdr;\r |
1566 | EFI_STATUS VerifyStatus;\r | |
551d8081 | 1567 | EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *SignatureList;\r |
1568 | UINTN SignatureListSize;\r | |
1569 | EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *Signature;\r | |
1570 | EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_ACTION Action;\r | |
1571 | WIN_CERTIFICATE *WinCertificate;\r | |
1572 | UINT32 Policy;\r | |
560ac77e | 1573 | UINT8 *SecureBoot;\r |
551d8081 | 1574 | PE_COFF_LOADER_IMAGE_CONTEXT ImageContext;\r |
1575 | UINT32 NumberOfRvaAndSizes;\r | |
f6f9031f | 1576 | WIN_CERTIFICATE_EFI_PKCS *PkcsCertData;\r |
1577 | WIN_CERTIFICATE_UEFI_GUID *WinCertUefiGuid;\r | |
1578 | UINT8 *AuthData;\r | |
1579 | UINTN AuthDataSize;\r | |
1580 | EFI_IMAGE_DATA_DIRECTORY *SecDataDir;\r | |
6de4c35f | 1581 | UINT32 OffSet;\r |
213cc100 | 1582 | CHAR16 *NameStr;\r |
0c18794e | 1583 | \r |
0c18794e | 1584 | SignatureList = NULL;\r |
1585 | SignatureListSize = 0;\r | |
1586 | WinCertificate = NULL;\r | |
f6f9031f | 1587 | SecDataDir = NULL;\r |
1588 | PkcsCertData = NULL;\r | |
0c18794e | 1589 | Action = EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_AUTH_UNTESTED;\r |
1590 | Status = EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;\r | |
6de4c35f | 1591 | VerifyStatus = EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;\r |
1592 | \r | |
4fc08e8d | 1593 | \r |
0c18794e | 1594 | //\r |
1595 | // Check the image type and get policy setting.\r | |
1596 | //\r | |
1597 | switch (GetImageType (File)) {\r | |
45bf2c47 | 1598 | \r |
0c18794e | 1599 | case IMAGE_FROM_FV:\r |
1600 | Policy = ALWAYS_EXECUTE;\r | |
1601 | break;\r | |
1602 | \r | |
1603 | case IMAGE_FROM_OPTION_ROM:\r | |
1604 | Policy = PcdGet32 (PcdOptionRomImageVerificationPolicy);\r | |
1605 | break;\r | |
1606 | \r | |
1607 | case IMAGE_FROM_REMOVABLE_MEDIA:\r | |
1608 | Policy = PcdGet32 (PcdRemovableMediaImageVerificationPolicy);\r | |
1609 | break;\r | |
1610 | \r | |
1611 | case IMAGE_FROM_FIXED_MEDIA:\r | |
1612 | Policy = PcdGet32 (PcdFixedMediaImageVerificationPolicy);\r | |
1613 | break;\r | |
1614 | \r | |
1615 | default:\r | |
45bf2c47 | 1616 | Policy = DENY_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r |
0c18794e | 1617 | break;\r |
1618 | }\r | |
1619 | //\r | |
1620 | // If policy is always/never execute, return directly.\r | |
1621 | //\r | |
1622 | if (Policy == ALWAYS_EXECUTE) {\r | |
1623 | return EFI_SUCCESS;\r | |
1624 | } else if (Policy == NEVER_EXECUTE) {\r | |
1625 | return EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;\r | |
1626 | }\r | |
beda2356 | 1627 | \r |
db44ea6c | 1628 | //\r |
20333c6d | 1629 | // The policy QUERY_USER_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION and ALLOW_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION\r |
68fc0c73 | 1630 | // violates the UEFI spec and has been removed.\r |
db44ea6c | 1631 | //\r |
68fc0c73 FS |
1632 | ASSERT (Policy != QUERY_USER_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION && Policy != ALLOW_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION);\r |
1633 | if (Policy == QUERY_USER_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION || Policy == ALLOW_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION) {\r | |
db44ea6c FS |
1634 | CpuDeadLoop ();\r |
1635 | }\r | |
1636 | \r | |
560ac77e | 1637 | GetEfiGlobalVariable2 (EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME, (VOID**)&SecureBoot, NULL);\r |
beda2356 | 1638 | //\r |
8f8ca22e | 1639 | // Skip verification if SecureBoot variable doesn't exist.\r |
beda2356 | 1640 | //\r |
560ac77e | 1641 | if (SecureBoot == NULL) {\r |
beda2356 | 1642 | return EFI_SUCCESS;\r |
1643 | }\r | |
1644 | \r | |
1645 | //\r | |
4fc08e8d | 1646 | // Skip verification if SecureBoot is disabled but not AuditMode\r |
beda2356 | 1647 | //\r |
560ac77e ZC |
1648 | if (*SecureBoot == SECURE_BOOT_MODE_DISABLE) {\r |
1649 | FreePool (SecureBoot);\r | |
beda2356 | 1650 | return EFI_SUCCESS;\r |
45bf2c47 | 1651 | }\r |
560ac77e | 1652 | FreePool (SecureBoot);\r |
551d8081 | 1653 | \r |
0c18794e | 1654 | //\r |
1655 | // Read the Dos header.\r | |
1656 | //\r | |
570b3d1a | 1657 | if (FileBuffer == NULL) {\r |
570b3d1a | 1658 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r |
1659 | }\r | |
551d8081 | 1660 | \r |
0c18794e | 1661 | mImageBase = (UINT8 *) FileBuffer;\r |
1662 | mImageSize = FileSize;\r | |
28186d45 ED |
1663 | \r |
1664 | ZeroMem (&ImageContext, sizeof (ImageContext));\r | |
1665 | ImageContext.Handle = (VOID *) FileBuffer;\r | |
e0192326 | 1666 | ImageContext.ImageRead = (PE_COFF_LOADER_READ_FILE) DxeImageVerificationLibImageRead;\r |
28186d45 ED |
1667 | \r |
1668 | //\r | |
1669 | // Get information about the image being loaded\r | |
1670 | //\r | |
1671 | Status = PeCoffLoaderGetImageInfo (&ImageContext);\r | |
1672 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
1673 | //\r | |
1674 | // The information can't be got from the invalid PeImage\r | |
1675 | //\r | |
531c89a1 | 1676 | DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "DxeImageVerificationLib: PeImage invalid. Cannot retrieve image information.\n"));\r |
28186d45 ED |
1677 | goto Done;\r |
1678 | }\r | |
1679 | \r | |
badd40f9 | 1680 | Status = EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;\r |
1681 | \r | |
1682 | DosHdr = (EFI_IMAGE_DOS_HEADER *) mImageBase;\r | |
0c18794e | 1683 | if (DosHdr->e_magic == EFI_IMAGE_DOS_SIGNATURE) {\r |
1684 | //\r | |
45bf2c47 | 1685 | // DOS image header is present,\r |
0c18794e | 1686 | // so read the PE header after the DOS image header.\r |
1687 | //\r | |
1688 | mPeCoffHeaderOffset = DosHdr->e_lfanew;\r | |
1689 | } else {\r | |
1690 | mPeCoffHeaderOffset = 0;\r | |
1691 | }\r | |
1692 | //\r | |
1693 | // Check PE/COFF image.\r | |
1694 | //\r | |
1695 | mNtHeader.Pe32 = (EFI_IMAGE_NT_HEADERS32 *) (mImageBase + mPeCoffHeaderOffset);\r | |
1696 | if (mNtHeader.Pe32->Signature != EFI_IMAGE_NT_SIGNATURE) {\r | |
1697 | //\r | |
1698 | // It is not a valid Pe/Coff file.\r | |
1699 | //\r | |
531c89a1 | 1700 | DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "DxeImageVerificationLib: Not a valid PE/COFF image.\n"));\r |
551d8081 | 1701 | goto Done;\r |
0c18794e | 1702 | }\r |
1703 | \r | |
f199664c | 1704 | if (mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {\r |
0c18794e | 1705 | //\r |
1706 | // Use PE32 offset.\r | |
1707 | //\r | |
551d8081 | 1708 | NumberOfRvaAndSizes = mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.NumberOfRvaAndSizes;\r |
1709 | if (NumberOfRvaAndSizes > EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY) {\r | |
f6f9031f | 1710 | SecDataDir = (EFI_IMAGE_DATA_DIRECTORY *) &mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY];\r |
20333c6d | 1711 | }\r |
570b3d1a | 1712 | } else {\r |
1713 | //\r | |
551d8081 | 1714 | // Use PE32+ offset.\r |
570b3d1a | 1715 | //\r |
551d8081 | 1716 | NumberOfRvaAndSizes = mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.NumberOfRvaAndSizes;\r |
1717 | if (NumberOfRvaAndSizes > EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY) {\r | |
f6f9031f | 1718 | SecDataDir = (EFI_IMAGE_DATA_DIRECTORY *) &mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY];\r |
551d8081 | 1719 | }\r |
0c18794e | 1720 | }\r |
1721 | \r | |
6de4c35f | 1722 | //\r |
1723 | // Start Image Validation.\r | |
1724 | //\r | |
1725 | if (SecDataDir == NULL || SecDataDir->Size == 0) {\r | |
0c18794e | 1726 | //\r |
20333c6d | 1727 | // This image is not signed. The SHA256 hash value of the image must match a record in the security database "db",\r |
6de4c35f | 1728 | // and not be reflected in the security data base "dbx".\r |
0c18794e | 1729 | //\r |
45bf2c47 | 1730 | if (!HashPeImage (HASHALG_SHA256)) {\r |
531c89a1 | 1731 | DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "DxeImageVerificationLib: Failed to hash this image using %s.\n", mHashTypeStr));\r |
45bf2c47 | 1732 | goto Done;\r |
1733 | }\r | |
1734 | \r | |
1735 | if (IsSignatureFoundInDatabase (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1, mImageDigest, &mCertType, mImageDigestSize)) {\r | |
1736 | //\r | |
1737 | // Image Hash is in forbidden database (DBX).\r | |
1738 | //\r | |
531c89a1 | 1739 | DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "DxeImageVerificationLib: Image is not signed and %s hash of image is forbidden by DBX.\n", mHashTypeStr));\r |
45bf2c47 | 1740 | goto Done;\r |
1741 | }\r | |
1742 | \r | |
1743 | if (IsSignatureFoundInDatabase (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE, mImageDigest, &mCertType, mImageDigestSize)) {\r | |
1744 | //\r | |
1745 | // Image Hash is in allowed database (DB).\r | |
1746 | //\r | |
1747 | return EFI_SUCCESS;\r | |
1748 | }\r | |
1749 | \r | |
1750 | //\r | |
1751 | // Image Hash is not found in both forbidden and allowed database.\r | |
1752 | //\r | |
531c89a1 | 1753 | DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "DxeImageVerificationLib: Image is not signed and %s hash of image is not found in DB/DBX.\n", mHashTypeStr));\r |
45bf2c47 | 1754 | goto Done;\r |
0c18794e | 1755 | }\r |
45bf2c47 | 1756 | \r |
0c18794e | 1757 | //\r |
20333c6d | 1758 | // Verify the signature of the image, multiple signatures are allowed as per PE/COFF Section 4.7\r |
6de4c35f | 1759 | // "Attribute Certificate Table".\r |
1760 | // The first certificate starts at offset (SecDataDir->VirtualAddress) from the start of the file.\r | |
0c18794e | 1761 | //\r |
6de4c35f | 1762 | for (OffSet = SecDataDir->VirtualAddress;\r |
1763 | OffSet < (SecDataDir->VirtualAddress + SecDataDir->Size);\r | |
2bf41ed7 | 1764 | OffSet += (WinCertificate->dwLength + ALIGN_SIZE (WinCertificate->dwLength))) {\r |
6de4c35f | 1765 | WinCertificate = (WIN_CERTIFICATE *) (mImageBase + OffSet);\r |
1766 | if ((SecDataDir->VirtualAddress + SecDataDir->Size - OffSet) <= sizeof (WIN_CERTIFICATE) ||\r | |
1767 | (SecDataDir->VirtualAddress + SecDataDir->Size - OffSet) < WinCertificate->dwLength) {\r | |
1768 | break;\r | |
1769 | }\r | |
20333c6d | 1770 | \r |
0c18794e | 1771 | //\r |
6de4c35f | 1772 | // Verify the image's Authenticode signature, only DER-encoded PKCS#7 signed data is supported.\r |
0c18794e | 1773 | //\r |
6de4c35f | 1774 | if (WinCertificate->wCertificateType == WIN_CERT_TYPE_PKCS_SIGNED_DATA) {\r |
1775 | //\r | |
20333c6d | 1776 | // The certificate is formatted as WIN_CERTIFICATE_EFI_PKCS which is described in the\r |
6de4c35f | 1777 | // Authenticode specification.\r |
1778 | //\r | |
1779 | PkcsCertData = (WIN_CERTIFICATE_EFI_PKCS *) WinCertificate;\r | |
1780 | if (PkcsCertData->Hdr.dwLength <= sizeof (PkcsCertData->Hdr)) {\r | |
1781 | break;\r | |
1782 | }\r | |
1783 | AuthData = PkcsCertData->CertData;\r | |
1784 | AuthDataSize = PkcsCertData->Hdr.dwLength - sizeof(PkcsCertData->Hdr);\r | |
1785 | } else if (WinCertificate->wCertificateType == WIN_CERT_TYPE_EFI_GUID) {\r | |
1786 | //\r | |
1787 | // The certificate is formatted as WIN_CERTIFICATE_UEFI_GUID which is described in UEFI Spec.\r | |
1788 | //\r | |
1789 | WinCertUefiGuid = (WIN_CERTIFICATE_UEFI_GUID *) WinCertificate;\r | |
1790 | if (WinCertUefiGuid->Hdr.dwLength <= OFFSET_OF(WIN_CERTIFICATE_UEFI_GUID, CertData)) {\r | |
1791 | break;\r | |
1792 | }\r | |
1793 | if (!CompareGuid (&WinCertUefiGuid->CertType, &gEfiCertPkcs7Guid)) {\r | |
1794 | continue;\r | |
1795 | }\r | |
1796 | AuthData = WinCertUefiGuid->CertData;\r | |
1797 | AuthDataSize = WinCertUefiGuid->Hdr.dwLength - OFFSET_OF(WIN_CERTIFICATE_UEFI_GUID, CertData);\r | |
1798 | } else {\r | |
1799 | if (WinCertificate->dwLength < sizeof (WIN_CERTIFICATE)) {\r | |
1800 | break;\r | |
1801 | }\r | |
1802 | continue;\r | |
84bce75b | 1803 | }\r |
6de4c35f | 1804 | \r |
f6f9031f | 1805 | Status = HashPeImageByType (AuthData, AuthDataSize);\r |
45bf2c47 | 1806 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r |
6de4c35f | 1807 | continue;\r |
0c18794e | 1808 | }\r |
20333c6d | 1809 | \r |
f6f9031f | 1810 | //\r |
6de4c35f | 1811 | // Check the digital signature against the revoked certificate in forbidden database (dbx).\r |
f6f9031f | 1812 | //\r |
560ac77e | 1813 | if (IsForbiddenByDbx (AuthData, AuthDataSize)) {\r |
6de4c35f | 1814 | Action = EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_AUTH_SIG_FAILED;\r |
1815 | VerifyStatus = EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;\r | |
1816 | break;\r | |
f6f9031f | 1817 | }\r |
0c18794e | 1818 | \r |
1819 | //\r | |
6de4c35f | 1820 | // Check the digital signature against the valid certificate in allowed database (db).\r |
0c18794e | 1821 | //\r |
6de4c35f | 1822 | if (EFI_ERROR (VerifyStatus)) {\r |
560ac77e | 1823 | if (IsAllowedByDb (AuthData, AuthDataSize)) {\r |
6de4c35f | 1824 | VerifyStatus = EFI_SUCCESS;\r |
1825 | }\r | |
0c18794e | 1826 | }\r |
6de4c35f | 1827 | \r |
0c18794e | 1828 | //\r |
6de4c35f | 1829 | // Check the image's hash value.\r |
0c18794e | 1830 | //\r |
6de4c35f | 1831 | if (IsSignatureFoundInDatabase (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1, mImageDigest, &mCertType, mImageDigestSize)) {\r |
1832 | Action = EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_AUTH_SIG_FOUND;\r | |
531c89a1 | 1833 | DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "DxeImageVerificationLib: Image is signed but %s hash of image is found in DBX.\n", mHashTypeStr));\r |
6de4c35f | 1834 | VerifyStatus = EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;\r |
1835 | break;\r | |
1836 | } else if (EFI_ERROR (VerifyStatus)) {\r | |
1837 | if (IsSignatureFoundInDatabase (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE, mImageDigest, &mCertType, mImageDigestSize)) {\r | |
1838 | VerifyStatus = EFI_SUCCESS;\r | |
531c89a1 CS |
1839 | } else {\r |
1840 | DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "DxeImageVerificationLib: Image is signed but signature is not allowed by DB and %s hash of image is not found in DB/DBX.\n", mHashTypeStr));\r | |
6de4c35f | 1841 | }\r |
45bf2c47 | 1842 | }\r |
50fe73a1 | 1843 | }\r |
1844 | \r | |
6de4c35f | 1845 | if (OffSet != (SecDataDir->VirtualAddress + SecDataDir->Size)) {\r |
0c18794e | 1846 | //\r |
d6b926e7 | 1847 | // The Size in Certificate Table or the attribute certificate table is corrupted.\r |
0c18794e | 1848 | //\r |
6de4c35f | 1849 | VerifyStatus = EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;\r |
1850 | }\r | |
20333c6d | 1851 | \r |
6de4c35f | 1852 | if (!EFI_ERROR (VerifyStatus)) {\r |
1853 | return EFI_SUCCESS;\r | |
1854 | } else {\r | |
1855 | Status = EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;\r | |
1856 | if (Action == EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_AUTH_SIG_FAILED || Action == EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_AUTH_SIG_FOUND) {\r | |
1857 | //\r | |
d6b926e7 | 1858 | // Get image hash value as signature of executable.\r |
6de4c35f | 1859 | //\r |
1860 | SignatureListSize = sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1 + mImageDigestSize;\r | |
1861 | SignatureList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) AllocateZeroPool (SignatureListSize);\r | |
1862 | if (SignatureList == NULL) {\r | |
1863 | Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r | |
1864 | goto Done;\r | |
1865 | }\r | |
1866 | SignatureList->SignatureHeaderSize = 0;\r | |
1867 | SignatureList->SignatureListSize = (UINT32) SignatureListSize;\r | |
13a220a9 | 1868 | SignatureList->SignatureSize = (UINT32) (sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1 + mImageDigestSize);\r |
6de4c35f | 1869 | CopyMem (&SignatureList->SignatureType, &mCertType, sizeof (EFI_GUID));\r |
1870 | Signature = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) SignatureList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST));\r | |
1871 | CopyMem (Signature->SignatureData, mImageDigest, mImageDigestSize);\r | |
50fe73a1 | 1872 | }\r |
0c18794e | 1873 | }\r |
1874 | \r | |
1875 | Done:\r | |
1876 | if (Status != EFI_SUCCESS) {\r | |
1877 | //\r | |
1878 | // Policy decides to defer or reject the image; add its information in image executable information table.\r | |
1879 | //\r | |
213cc100 DG |
1880 | NameStr = ConvertDevicePathToText (File, FALSE, TRUE);\r |
1881 | AddImageExeInfo (Action, NameStr, File, SignatureList, SignatureListSize);\r | |
1882 | if (NameStr != NULL) {\r | |
1883 | DEBUG((EFI_D_INFO, "The image doesn't pass verification: %s\n", NameStr));\r | |
1884 | FreePool(NameStr);\r | |
1885 | }\r | |
5db28a67 | 1886 | Status = EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r |
0c18794e | 1887 | }\r |
1888 | \r | |
1889 | if (SignatureList != NULL) {\r | |
1890 | FreePool (SignatureList);\r | |
1891 | }\r | |
1892 | \r | |
0c18794e | 1893 | return Status;\r |
1894 | }\r | |
1895 | \r | |
ffccb935 DG |
1896 | /**\r |
1897 | On Ready To Boot Services Event notification handler.\r | |
1898 | \r | |
1899 | Add the image execution information table if it is not in system configuration table.\r | |
1900 | \r | |
1901 | @param[in] Event Event whose notification function is being invoked\r | |
1902 | @param[in] Context Pointer to the notification function's context\r | |
1903 | \r | |
1904 | **/\r | |
1905 | VOID\r | |
1906 | EFIAPI\r | |
1907 | OnReadyToBoot (\r | |
1908 | IN EFI_EVENT Event,\r | |
1909 | IN VOID *Context\r | |
1910 | )\r | |
1911 | {\r | |
1912 | EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO_TABLE *ImageExeInfoTable;\r | |
1913 | UINTN ImageExeInfoTableSize;\r | |
1914 | \r | |
1915 | EfiGetSystemConfigurationTable (&gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, (VOID **) &ImageExeInfoTable);\r | |
1916 | if (ImageExeInfoTable != NULL) {\r | |
1917 | return;\r | |
1918 | }\r | |
1919 | \r | |
1920 | ImageExeInfoTableSize = sizeof (EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO_TABLE);\r | |
1921 | ImageExeInfoTable = (EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO_TABLE *) AllocateRuntimePool (ImageExeInfoTableSize);\r | |
1922 | if (ImageExeInfoTable == NULL) {\r | |
1923 | return ;\r | |
1924 | }\r | |
1925 | \r | |
20333c6d | 1926 | ImageExeInfoTable->NumberOfImages = 0;\r |
ffccb935 DG |
1927 | gBS->InstallConfigurationTable (&gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, (VOID *) ImageExeInfoTable);\r |
1928 | \r | |
1929 | }\r | |
1930 | \r | |
0c18794e | 1931 | /**\r |
1932 | Register security measurement handler.\r | |
1933 | \r | |
1934 | @param ImageHandle ImageHandle of the loaded driver.\r | |
1935 | @param SystemTable Pointer to the EFI System Table.\r | |
1936 | \r | |
1937 | @retval EFI_SUCCESS The handlers were registered successfully.\r | |
1938 | **/\r | |
1939 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
1940 | EFIAPI\r | |
1941 | DxeImageVerificationLibConstructor (\r | |
1942 | IN EFI_HANDLE ImageHandle,\r | |
1943 | IN EFI_SYSTEM_TABLE *SystemTable\r | |
1944 | )\r | |
1945 | {\r | |
ffccb935 DG |
1946 | EFI_EVENT Event;\r |
1947 | \r | |
1948 | //\r | |
1949 | // Register the event to publish the image execution table.\r | |
1950 | //\r | |
1951 | EfiCreateEventReadyToBootEx (\r | |
1952 | TPL_CALLBACK,\r | |
20333c6d QL |
1953 | OnReadyToBoot,\r |
1954 | NULL,\r | |
ffccb935 | 1955 | &Event\r |
20333c6d | 1956 | );\r |
ffccb935 | 1957 | \r |
5db28a67 | 1958 | return RegisterSecurity2Handler (\r |
0c18794e | 1959 | DxeImageVerificationHandler,\r |
1960 | EFI_AUTH_OPERATION_VERIFY_IMAGE | EFI_AUTH_OPERATION_IMAGE_REQUIRED\r | |
45bf2c47 | 1961 | );\r |
0c18794e | 1962 | }\r |