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0c18794e | 1 | /** @file\r |
2 | The library instance provides security service of TPM measure boot. \r | |
3 | \r | |
dc204d5a JY |
4 | Caution: This file requires additional review when modified.\r |
5 | This library will have external input - PE/COFF image and GPT partition.\r | |
6 | This external input must be validated carefully to avoid security issue like\r | |
7 | buffer overflow, integer overflow.\r | |
8 | \r | |
9 | DxeTpmMeasureBootLibImageRead() function will make sure the PE/COFF image content\r | |
10 | read is within the image buffer.\r | |
11 | \r | |
12 | TcgMeasurePeImage() function will accept untrusted PE/COFF image and validate its\r | |
13 | data structure within this image buffer before use.\r | |
14 | \r | |
15 | TcgMeasureGptTable() function will receive untrusted GPT partition table, and parse\r | |
16 | partition data carefully.\r | |
17 | \r | |
772b6011 | 18 | Copyright (c) 2009 - 2013, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>\r |
0c18794e | 19 | This program and the accompanying materials \r |
20 | are licensed and made available under the terms and conditions of the BSD License \r | |
21 | which accompanies this distribution. The full text of the license may be found at \r | |
22 | http://opensource.org/licenses/bsd-license.php\r | |
23 | \r | |
24 | THE PROGRAM IS DISTRIBUTED UNDER THE BSD LICENSE ON AN "AS IS" BASIS, \r | |
25 | WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR REPRESENTATIONS OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED.\r | |
26 | \r | |
27 | **/\r | |
28 | \r | |
29 | #include <PiDxe.h>\r | |
30 | \r | |
31 | #include <Protocol/TcgService.h>\r | |
0c18794e | 32 | #include <Protocol/BlockIo.h>\r |
33 | #include <Protocol/DiskIo.h>\r | |
2aadc920 | 34 | #include <Protocol/FirmwareVolumeBlock.h>\r |
35 | \r | |
0758c830 | 36 | #include <Guid/MeasuredFvHob.h>\r |
0c18794e | 37 | \r |
38 | #include <Library/BaseLib.h>\r | |
39 | #include <Library/DebugLib.h>\r | |
40 | #include <Library/BaseMemoryLib.h>\r | |
41 | #include <Library/MemoryAllocationLib.h>\r | |
42 | #include <Library/DevicePathLib.h>\r | |
43 | #include <Library/UefiBootServicesTableLib.h>\r | |
44 | #include <Library/BaseCryptLib.h>\r | |
45 | #include <Library/PeCoffLib.h>\r | |
46 | #include <Library/SecurityManagementLib.h>\r | |
2aadc920 | 47 | #include <Library/HobLib.h>\r |
0c18794e | 48 | \r |
49 | //\r | |
50 | // Flag to check GPT partition. It only need be measured once.\r | |
51 | //\r | |
52 | BOOLEAN mMeasureGptTableFlag = FALSE;\r | |
53 | EFI_GUID mZeroGuid = {0, 0, 0, {0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}};\r | |
54 | UINTN mMeasureGptCount = 0;\r | |
28186d45 ED |
55 | VOID *mFileBuffer;\r |
56 | UINTN mImageSize;\r | |
2aadc920 | 57 | //\r |
58 | // Measured FV handle cache\r | |
59 | //\r | |
60 | EFI_HANDLE mCacheMeasuredHandle = NULL;\r | |
0758c830 | 61 | MEASURED_HOB_DATA *mMeasuredHobData = NULL;\r |
0c18794e | 62 | \r |
63 | /**\r | |
64 | Reads contents of a PE/COFF image in memory buffer.\r | |
65 | \r | |
dc204d5a JY |
66 | Caution: This function may receive untrusted input.\r |
67 | PE/COFF image is external input, so this function will make sure the PE/COFF image content\r | |
68 | read is within the image buffer.\r | |
69 | \r | |
0c18794e | 70 | @param FileHandle Pointer to the file handle to read the PE/COFF image.\r |
71 | @param FileOffset Offset into the PE/COFF image to begin the read operation.\r | |
72 | @param ReadSize On input, the size in bytes of the requested read operation. \r | |
73 | On output, the number of bytes actually read.\r | |
74 | @param Buffer Output buffer that contains the data read from the PE/COFF image.\r | |
75 | \r | |
76 | @retval EFI_SUCCESS The specified portion of the PE/COFF image was read and the size \r | |
77 | **/\r | |
78 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
79 | EFIAPI\r | |
e0192326 | 80 | DxeTpmMeasureBootLibImageRead (\r |
0c18794e | 81 | IN VOID *FileHandle,\r |
82 | IN UINTN FileOffset,\r | |
83 | IN OUT UINTN *ReadSize,\r | |
84 | OUT VOID *Buffer\r | |
85 | )\r | |
86 | {\r | |
28186d45 ED |
87 | UINTN EndPosition;\r |
88 | \r | |
89 | if (FileHandle == NULL || ReadSize == NULL || Buffer == NULL) {\r | |
90 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r | |
91 | }\r | |
92 | \r | |
93 | if (MAX_ADDRESS - FileOffset < *ReadSize) {\r | |
94 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r | |
95 | }\r | |
96 | \r | |
97 | EndPosition = FileOffset + *ReadSize;\r | |
98 | if (EndPosition > mImageSize) {\r | |
99 | *ReadSize = (UINT32)(mImageSize - FileOffset);\r | |
100 | }\r | |
101 | \r | |
102 | if (FileOffset >= mImageSize) {\r | |
103 | *ReadSize = 0;\r | |
104 | }\r | |
105 | \r | |
0c18794e | 106 | CopyMem (Buffer, (UINT8 *)((UINTN) FileHandle + FileOffset), *ReadSize);\r |
28186d45 | 107 | \r |
0c18794e | 108 | return EFI_SUCCESS;\r |
109 | }\r | |
110 | \r | |
111 | /**\r | |
112 | Measure GPT table data into TPM log.\r | |
113 | \r | |
dc204d5a JY |
114 | Caution: This function may receive untrusted input.\r |
115 | The GPT partition table is external input, so this function should parse partition data carefully.\r | |
116 | \r | |
0c18794e | 117 | @param TcgProtocol Pointer to the located TCG protocol instance.\r |
118 | @param GptHandle Handle that GPT partition was installed.\r | |
119 | \r | |
120 | @retval EFI_SUCCESS Successfully measure GPT table.\r | |
121 | @retval EFI_UNSUPPORTED Not support GPT table on the given handle.\r | |
122 | @retval EFI_DEVICE_ERROR Can't get GPT table because device error.\r | |
123 | @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES No enough resource to measure GPT table.\r | |
124 | @retval other error value\r | |
125 | **/\r | |
126 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
127 | EFIAPI\r | |
128 | TcgMeasureGptTable (\r | |
129 | IN EFI_TCG_PROTOCOL *TcgProtocol,\r | |
130 | IN EFI_HANDLE GptHandle\r | |
131 | )\r | |
132 | {\r | |
133 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r | |
134 | EFI_BLOCK_IO_PROTOCOL *BlockIo;\r | |
135 | EFI_DISK_IO_PROTOCOL *DiskIo;\r | |
136 | EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER *PrimaryHeader;\r | |
137 | EFI_PARTITION_ENTRY *PartitionEntry;\r | |
138 | UINT8 *EntryPtr;\r | |
139 | UINTN NumberOfPartition;\r | |
140 | UINT32 Index;\r | |
141 | TCG_PCR_EVENT *TcgEvent;\r | |
142 | EFI_GPT_DATA *GptData;\r | |
143 | UINT32 EventSize;\r | |
144 | UINT32 EventNumber;\r | |
145 | EFI_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS EventLogLastEntry;\r | |
146 | \r | |
147 | if (mMeasureGptCount > 0) {\r | |
148 | return EFI_SUCCESS;\r | |
149 | }\r | |
150 | \r | |
151 | Status = gBS->HandleProtocol (GptHandle, &gEfiBlockIoProtocolGuid, (VOID**)&BlockIo);\r | |
152 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
153 | return EFI_UNSUPPORTED;\r | |
154 | }\r | |
155 | Status = gBS->HandleProtocol (GptHandle, &gEfiDiskIoProtocolGuid, (VOID**)&DiskIo);\r | |
156 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
157 | return EFI_UNSUPPORTED;\r | |
158 | }\r | |
159 | //\r | |
160 | // Read the EFI Partition Table Header\r | |
161 | // \r | |
162 | PrimaryHeader = (EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER *) AllocatePool (BlockIo->Media->BlockSize);\r | |
163 | if (PrimaryHeader == NULL) {\r | |
164 | return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r | |
165 | } \r | |
166 | Status = DiskIo->ReadDisk (\r | |
167 | DiskIo,\r | |
168 | BlockIo->Media->MediaId,\r | |
169 | 1 * BlockIo->Media->BlockSize,\r | |
170 | BlockIo->Media->BlockSize,\r | |
171 | (UINT8 *)PrimaryHeader\r | |
172 | );\r | |
173 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
174 | DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Failed to Read Partition Table Header!\n"));\r | |
175 | FreePool (PrimaryHeader);\r | |
176 | return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR;\r | |
177 | } \r | |
178 | //\r | |
179 | // Read the partition entry.\r | |
180 | //\r | |
181 | EntryPtr = (UINT8 *)AllocatePool (PrimaryHeader->NumberOfPartitionEntries * PrimaryHeader->SizeOfPartitionEntry);\r | |
182 | if (EntryPtr == NULL) {\r | |
183 | FreePool (PrimaryHeader);\r | |
184 | return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r | |
185 | }\r | |
186 | Status = DiskIo->ReadDisk (\r | |
187 | DiskIo,\r | |
188 | BlockIo->Media->MediaId,\r | |
189 | MultU64x32(PrimaryHeader->PartitionEntryLBA, BlockIo->Media->BlockSize),\r | |
190 | PrimaryHeader->NumberOfPartitionEntries * PrimaryHeader->SizeOfPartitionEntry,\r | |
191 | EntryPtr\r | |
192 | );\r | |
193 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
194 | FreePool (PrimaryHeader);\r | |
195 | FreePool (EntryPtr);\r | |
196 | return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR;\r | |
197 | }\r | |
198 | \r | |
199 | //\r | |
200 | // Count the valid partition\r | |
201 | //\r | |
202 | PartitionEntry = (EFI_PARTITION_ENTRY *)EntryPtr;\r | |
203 | NumberOfPartition = 0;\r | |
204 | for (Index = 0; Index < PrimaryHeader->NumberOfPartitionEntries; Index++) {\r | |
205 | if (!CompareGuid (&PartitionEntry->PartitionTypeGUID, &mZeroGuid)) {\r | |
206 | NumberOfPartition++; \r | |
207 | }\r | |
2ea3b920 | 208 | PartitionEntry = (EFI_PARTITION_ENTRY *)((UINT8 *)PartitionEntry + PrimaryHeader->SizeOfPartitionEntry);\r |
0c18794e | 209 | }\r |
210 | \r | |
211 | //\r | |
2ea3b920 | 212 | // Prepare Data for Measurement\r |
0c18794e | 213 | // \r |
214 | EventSize = (UINT32)(sizeof (EFI_GPT_DATA) - sizeof (GptData->Partitions) \r | |
215 | + NumberOfPartition * PrimaryHeader->SizeOfPartitionEntry);\r | |
2ea3b920 | 216 | TcgEvent = (TCG_PCR_EVENT *) AllocateZeroPool (EventSize + sizeof (TCG_PCR_EVENT_HDR));\r |
0c18794e | 217 | if (TcgEvent == NULL) {\r |
218 | FreePool (PrimaryHeader);\r | |
219 | FreePool (EntryPtr);\r | |
220 | return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r | |
221 | }\r | |
222 | \r | |
223 | TcgEvent->PCRIndex = 5;\r | |
224 | TcgEvent->EventType = EV_EFI_GPT_EVENT;\r | |
225 | TcgEvent->EventSize = EventSize;\r | |
226 | GptData = (EFI_GPT_DATA *) TcgEvent->Event; \r | |
227 | \r | |
228 | //\r | |
229 | // Copy the EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER and NumberOfPartition\r | |
230 | // \r | |
231 | CopyMem ((UINT8 *)GptData, (UINT8*)PrimaryHeader, sizeof (EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER));\r | |
232 | GptData->NumberOfPartitions = NumberOfPartition;\r | |
233 | //\r | |
234 | // Copy the valid partition entry\r | |
235 | //\r | |
236 | PartitionEntry = (EFI_PARTITION_ENTRY*)EntryPtr;\r | |
237 | NumberOfPartition = 0;\r | |
238 | for (Index = 0; Index < PrimaryHeader->NumberOfPartitionEntries; Index++) {\r | |
239 | if (!CompareGuid (&PartitionEntry->PartitionTypeGUID, &mZeroGuid)) {\r | |
240 | CopyMem (\r | |
2ea3b920 | 241 | (UINT8 *)&GptData->Partitions + NumberOfPartition * PrimaryHeader->SizeOfPartitionEntry,\r |
0c18794e | 242 | (UINT8 *)PartitionEntry,\r |
2ea3b920 | 243 | PrimaryHeader->SizeOfPartitionEntry\r |
0c18794e | 244 | );\r |
245 | NumberOfPartition++;\r | |
246 | }\r | |
2ea3b920 | 247 | PartitionEntry =(EFI_PARTITION_ENTRY *)((UINT8 *)PartitionEntry + PrimaryHeader->SizeOfPartitionEntry);\r |
0c18794e | 248 | }\r |
249 | \r | |
250 | //\r | |
251 | // Measure the GPT data\r | |
252 | //\r | |
253 | EventNumber = 1;\r | |
254 | Status = TcgProtocol->HashLogExtendEvent (\r | |
255 | TcgProtocol,\r | |
256 | (EFI_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS) (UINTN) (VOID *) GptData,\r | |
257 | (UINT64) TcgEvent->EventSize,\r | |
258 | TPM_ALG_SHA,\r | |
259 | TcgEvent,\r | |
260 | &EventNumber,\r | |
261 | &EventLogLastEntry\r | |
262 | );\r | |
263 | if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
264 | mMeasureGptCount++;\r | |
265 | }\r | |
266 | \r | |
267 | FreePool (PrimaryHeader);\r | |
268 | FreePool (EntryPtr);\r | |
269 | FreePool (TcgEvent);\r | |
270 | \r | |
271 | return Status;\r | |
272 | }\r | |
273 | \r | |
274 | /**\r | |
275 | Measure PE image into TPM log based on the authenticode image hashing in\r | |
276 | PE/COFF Specification 8.0 Appendix A.\r | |
277 | \r | |
dc204d5a JY |
278 | Caution: This function may receive untrusted input.\r |
279 | PE/COFF image is external input, so this function will validate its data structure\r | |
280 | within this image buffer before use.\r | |
281 | \r | |
0c18794e | 282 | @param[in] TcgProtocol Pointer to the located TCG protocol instance.\r |
283 | @param[in] ImageAddress Start address of image buffer.\r | |
284 | @param[in] ImageSize Image size\r | |
285 | @param[in] LinkTimeBase Address that the image is loaded into memory.\r | |
286 | @param[in] ImageType Image subsystem type.\r | |
287 | @param[in] FilePath File path is corresponding to the input image.\r | |
288 | \r | |
289 | @retval EFI_SUCCESS Successfully measure image.\r | |
290 | @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES No enough resource to measure image.\r | |
551d8081 | 291 | @retval EFI_UNSUPPORTED ImageType is unsupported or PE image is mal-format. \r |
0c18794e | 292 | @retval other error value\r |
551d8081 | 293 | \r |
0c18794e | 294 | **/\r |
295 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
296 | EFIAPI\r | |
297 | TcgMeasurePeImage (\r | |
298 | IN EFI_TCG_PROTOCOL *TcgProtocol,\r | |
299 | IN EFI_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS ImageAddress,\r | |
300 | IN UINTN ImageSize,\r | |
301 | IN UINTN LinkTimeBase,\r | |
302 | IN UINT16 ImageType,\r | |
303 | IN EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *FilePath\r | |
304 | )\r | |
305 | {\r | |
551d8081 | 306 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r |
307 | TCG_PCR_EVENT *TcgEvent;\r | |
308 | EFI_IMAGE_LOAD_EVENT *ImageLoad;\r | |
309 | UINT32 FilePathSize;\r | |
310 | VOID *Sha1Ctx;\r | |
311 | UINTN CtxSize;\r | |
312 | EFI_IMAGE_DOS_HEADER *DosHdr;\r | |
313 | UINT32 PeCoffHeaderOffset;\r | |
314 | EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER *Section;\r | |
315 | UINT8 *HashBase;\r | |
316 | UINTN HashSize;\r | |
317 | UINTN SumOfBytesHashed;\r | |
318 | EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER *SectionHeader;\r | |
319 | UINTN Index;\r | |
320 | UINTN Pos;\r | |
321 | UINT16 Magic;\r | |
322 | UINT32 EventSize;\r | |
323 | UINT32 EventNumber;\r | |
324 | EFI_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS EventLogLastEntry;\r | |
0c18794e | 325 | EFI_IMAGE_OPTIONAL_HEADER_PTR_UNION Hdr;\r |
551d8081 | 326 | UINT32 NumberOfRvaAndSizes;\r |
327 | BOOLEAN HashStatus;\r | |
328 | UINT32 CertSize;\r | |
0c18794e | 329 | \r |
551d8081 | 330 | Status = EFI_UNSUPPORTED;\r |
0c18794e | 331 | ImageLoad = NULL;\r |
332 | SectionHeader = NULL;\r | |
333 | Sha1Ctx = NULL;\r | |
334 | FilePathSize = (UINT32) GetDevicePathSize (FilePath);\r | |
335 | \r | |
336 | //\r | |
337 | // Determine destination PCR by BootPolicy\r | |
338 | //\r | |
339 | EventSize = sizeof (*ImageLoad) - sizeof (ImageLoad->DevicePath) + FilePathSize;\r | |
340 | TcgEvent = AllocateZeroPool (EventSize + sizeof (TCG_PCR_EVENT));\r | |
341 | if (TcgEvent == NULL) {\r | |
342 | return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r | |
343 | }\r | |
344 | \r | |
345 | TcgEvent->EventSize = EventSize;\r | |
346 | ImageLoad = (EFI_IMAGE_LOAD_EVENT *) TcgEvent->Event;\r | |
347 | \r | |
348 | switch (ImageType) {\r | |
349 | case EFI_IMAGE_SUBSYSTEM_EFI_APPLICATION:\r | |
350 | TcgEvent->EventType = EV_EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_APPLICATION;\r | |
351 | TcgEvent->PCRIndex = 4;\r | |
352 | break;\r | |
353 | case EFI_IMAGE_SUBSYSTEM_EFI_BOOT_SERVICE_DRIVER:\r | |
354 | TcgEvent->EventType = EV_EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_DRIVER;\r | |
355 | TcgEvent->PCRIndex = 2;\r | |
356 | break;\r | |
357 | case EFI_IMAGE_SUBSYSTEM_EFI_RUNTIME_DRIVER:\r | |
358 | TcgEvent->EventType = EV_EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_DRIVER;\r | |
359 | TcgEvent->PCRIndex = 2;\r | |
360 | break;\r | |
361 | default:\r | |
362 | DEBUG ((\r | |
363 | EFI_D_ERROR,\r | |
364 | "TcgMeasurePeImage: Unknown subsystem type %d",\r | |
365 | ImageType\r | |
366 | ));\r | |
0c18794e | 367 | goto Finish;\r |
368 | }\r | |
369 | \r | |
370 | ImageLoad->ImageLocationInMemory = ImageAddress;\r | |
371 | ImageLoad->ImageLengthInMemory = ImageSize;\r | |
372 | ImageLoad->ImageLinkTimeAddress = LinkTimeBase;\r | |
373 | ImageLoad->LengthOfDevicePath = FilePathSize;\r | |
374 | CopyMem (ImageLoad->DevicePath, FilePath, FilePathSize);\r | |
375 | \r | |
376 | //\r | |
377 | // Check PE/COFF image\r | |
378 | //\r | |
379 | DosHdr = (EFI_IMAGE_DOS_HEADER *) (UINTN) ImageAddress;\r | |
380 | PeCoffHeaderOffset = 0;\r | |
381 | if (DosHdr->e_magic == EFI_IMAGE_DOS_SIGNATURE) {\r | |
382 | PeCoffHeaderOffset = DosHdr->e_lfanew;\r | |
383 | }\r | |
551d8081 | 384 | \r |
385 | Hdr.Pe32 = (EFI_IMAGE_NT_HEADERS32 *)((UINT8 *) (UINTN) ImageAddress + PeCoffHeaderOffset);\r | |
386 | if (Hdr.Pe32->Signature != EFI_IMAGE_NT_SIGNATURE) {\r | |
0c18794e | 387 | goto Finish;\r |
388 | }\r | |
389 | \r | |
390 | //\r | |
391 | // PE/COFF Image Measurement\r | |
392 | //\r | |
393 | // NOTE: The following codes/steps are based upon the authenticode image hashing in\r | |
394 | // PE/COFF Specification 8.0 Appendix A.\r | |
395 | //\r | |
396 | //\r | |
397 | \r | |
398 | // 1. Load the image header into memory.\r | |
399 | \r | |
400 | // 2. Initialize a SHA hash context.\r | |
401 | CtxSize = Sha1GetContextSize ();\r | |
402 | Sha1Ctx = AllocatePool (CtxSize);\r | |
403 | if (Sha1Ctx == NULL) {\r | |
404 | Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r | |
405 | goto Finish;\r | |
406 | }\r | |
407 | \r | |
551d8081 | 408 | HashStatus = Sha1Init (Sha1Ctx);\r |
409 | if (!HashStatus) {\r | |
410 | goto Finish;\r | |
411 | }\r | |
0c18794e | 412 | \r |
413 | //\r | |
414 | // Measuring PE/COFF Image Header;\r | |
415 | // But CheckSum field and SECURITY data directory (certificate) are excluded\r | |
416 | //\r | |
de2447dd | 417 | if (Hdr.Pe32->FileHeader.Machine == IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_IA64 && Hdr.Pe32->OptionalHeader.Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {\r |
418 | //\r | |
419 | // NOTE: Some versions of Linux ELILO for Itanium have an incorrect magic value \r | |
420 | // in the PE/COFF Header. If the MachineType is Itanium(IA64) and the \r | |
421 | // Magic value in the OptionalHeader is EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC\r | |
422 | // then override the magic value to EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR64_MAGIC\r | |
423 | //\r | |
424 | Magic = EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR64_MAGIC;\r | |
425 | } else {\r | |
426 | //\r | |
427 | // Get the magic value from the PE/COFF Optional Header\r | |
428 | //\r | |
429 | Magic = Hdr.Pe32->OptionalHeader.Magic;\r | |
430 | }\r | |
0c18794e | 431 | \r |
432 | //\r | |
433 | // 3. Calculate the distance from the base of the image header to the image checksum address.\r | |
434 | // 4. Hash the image header from its base to beginning of the image checksum.\r | |
435 | //\r | |
436 | HashBase = (UINT8 *) (UINTN) ImageAddress;\r | |
437 | if (Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {\r | |
438 | //\r | |
439 | // Use PE32 offset\r | |
440 | //\r | |
551d8081 | 441 | NumberOfRvaAndSizes = Hdr.Pe32->OptionalHeader.NumberOfRvaAndSizes;\r |
0c18794e | 442 | HashSize = (UINTN) ((UINT8 *)(&Hdr.Pe32->OptionalHeader.CheckSum) - HashBase);\r |
443 | } else {\r | |
444 | //\r | |
445 | // Use PE32+ offset\r | |
446 | //\r | |
551d8081 | 447 | NumberOfRvaAndSizes = Hdr.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.NumberOfRvaAndSizes;\r |
0c18794e | 448 | HashSize = (UINTN) ((UINT8 *)(&Hdr.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.CheckSum) - HashBase);\r |
449 | }\r | |
450 | \r | |
551d8081 | 451 | HashStatus = Sha1Update (Sha1Ctx, HashBase, HashSize);\r |
452 | if (!HashStatus) {\r | |
453 | goto Finish;\r | |
454 | } \r | |
0c18794e | 455 | \r |
456 | //\r | |
457 | // 5. Skip over the image checksum (it occupies a single ULONG).\r | |
0c18794e | 458 | //\r |
551d8081 | 459 | if (NumberOfRvaAndSizes <= EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY) {\r |
0c18794e | 460 | //\r |
551d8081 | 461 | // 6. Since there is no Cert Directory in optional header, hash everything\r |
462 | // from the end of the checksum to the end of image header.\r | |
0c18794e | 463 | //\r |
551d8081 | 464 | if (Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {\r |
465 | //\r | |
466 | // Use PE32 offset.\r | |
467 | //\r | |
468 | HashBase = (UINT8 *) &Hdr.Pe32->OptionalHeader.CheckSum + sizeof (UINT32);\r | |
469 | HashSize = Hdr.Pe32->OptionalHeader.SizeOfHeaders - (UINTN) (HashBase - ImageAddress);\r | |
470 | } else {\r | |
471 | //\r | |
472 | // Use PE32+ offset.\r | |
473 | //\r | |
474 | HashBase = (UINT8 *) &Hdr.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.CheckSum + sizeof (UINT32);\r | |
475 | HashSize = Hdr.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.SizeOfHeaders - (UINTN) (HashBase - ImageAddress);\r | |
476 | }\r | |
477 | \r | |
478 | if (HashSize != 0) {\r | |
479 | HashStatus = Sha1Update (Sha1Ctx, HashBase, HashSize);\r | |
480 | if (!HashStatus) {\r | |
481 | goto Finish;\r | |
482 | }\r | |
483 | } \r | |
0c18794e | 484 | } else {\r |
485 | //\r | |
551d8081 | 486 | // 7. Hash everything from the end of the checksum to the start of the Cert Directory.\r |
487 | //\r | |
488 | if (Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {\r | |
489 | //\r | |
490 | // Use PE32 offset\r | |
491 | //\r | |
492 | HashBase = (UINT8 *) &Hdr.Pe32->OptionalHeader.CheckSum + sizeof (UINT32);\r | |
493 | HashSize = (UINTN) ((UINT8 *)(&Hdr.Pe32->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY]) - HashBase);\r | |
494 | } else {\r | |
495 | //\r | |
496 | // Use PE32+ offset\r | |
497 | // \r | |
498 | HashBase = (UINT8 *) &Hdr.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.CheckSum + sizeof (UINT32);\r | |
499 | HashSize = (UINTN) ((UINT8 *)(&Hdr.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY]) - HashBase);\r | |
500 | }\r | |
0c18794e | 501 | \r |
551d8081 | 502 | if (HashSize != 0) {\r |
503 | HashStatus = Sha1Update (Sha1Ctx, HashBase, HashSize);\r | |
504 | if (!HashStatus) {\r | |
505 | goto Finish;\r | |
506 | }\r | |
507 | }\r | |
0c18794e | 508 | \r |
0c18794e | 509 | //\r |
551d8081 | 510 | // 8. Skip over the Cert Directory. (It is sizeof(IMAGE_DATA_DIRECTORY) bytes.)\r |
511 | // 9. Hash everything from the end of the Cert Directory to the end of image header.\r | |
0c18794e | 512 | //\r |
551d8081 | 513 | if (Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {\r |
514 | //\r | |
515 | // Use PE32 offset\r | |
516 | //\r | |
517 | HashBase = (UINT8 *) &Hdr.Pe32->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY + 1];\r | |
518 | HashSize = Hdr.Pe32->OptionalHeader.SizeOfHeaders - (UINTN) (HashBase - ImageAddress);\r | |
519 | } else {\r | |
520 | //\r | |
521 | // Use PE32+ offset\r | |
522 | //\r | |
523 | HashBase = (UINT8 *) &Hdr.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY + 1];\r | |
524 | HashSize = Hdr.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.SizeOfHeaders - (UINTN) (HashBase - ImageAddress);\r | |
525 | }\r | |
526 | \r | |
527 | if (HashSize != 0) {\r | |
528 | HashStatus = Sha1Update (Sha1Ctx, HashBase, HashSize);\r | |
529 | if (!HashStatus) {\r | |
530 | goto Finish;\r | |
531 | }\r | |
532 | }\r | |
0c18794e | 533 | }\r |
0c18794e | 534 | \r |
535 | //\r | |
536 | // 10. Set the SUM_OF_BYTES_HASHED to the size of the header\r | |
537 | //\r | |
538 | if (Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {\r | |
539 | //\r | |
540 | // Use PE32 offset\r | |
541 | //\r | |
542 | SumOfBytesHashed = Hdr.Pe32->OptionalHeader.SizeOfHeaders;\r | |
543 | } else {\r | |
544 | //\r | |
545 | // Use PE32+ offset\r | |
546 | //\r | |
547 | SumOfBytesHashed = Hdr.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.SizeOfHeaders;\r | |
548 | }\r | |
549 | \r | |
550 | //\r | |
551 | // 11. Build a temporary table of pointers to all the IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER\r | |
552 | // structures in the image. The 'NumberOfSections' field of the image\r | |
553 | // header indicates how big the table should be. Do not include any\r | |
554 | // IMAGE_SECTION_HEADERs in the table whose 'SizeOfRawData' field is zero.\r | |
555 | //\r | |
551d8081 | 556 | SectionHeader = (EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER *) AllocateZeroPool (sizeof (EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER) * Hdr.Pe32->FileHeader.NumberOfSections);\r |
0c18794e | 557 | if (SectionHeader == NULL) {\r |
558 | Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r | |
559 | goto Finish;\r | |
560 | }\r | |
561 | \r | |
562 | //\r | |
563 | // 12. Using the 'PointerToRawData' in the referenced section headers as\r | |
564 | // a key, arrange the elements in the table in ascending order. In other\r | |
565 | // words, sort the section headers according to the disk-file offset of\r | |
566 | // the section.\r | |
567 | //\r | |
568 | Section = (EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER *) (\r | |
569 | (UINT8 *) (UINTN) ImageAddress +\r | |
570 | PeCoffHeaderOffset +\r | |
571 | sizeof(UINT32) +\r | |
572 | sizeof(EFI_IMAGE_FILE_HEADER) +\r | |
573 | Hdr.Pe32->FileHeader.SizeOfOptionalHeader\r | |
574 | );\r | |
575 | for (Index = 0; Index < Hdr.Pe32->FileHeader.NumberOfSections; Index++) {\r | |
576 | Pos = Index;\r | |
577 | while ((Pos > 0) && (Section->PointerToRawData < SectionHeader[Pos - 1].PointerToRawData)) {\r | |
578 | CopyMem (&SectionHeader[Pos], &SectionHeader[Pos - 1], sizeof(EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER));\r | |
579 | Pos--;\r | |
580 | }\r | |
581 | CopyMem (&SectionHeader[Pos], Section, sizeof(EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER));\r | |
582 | Section += 1;\r | |
583 | }\r | |
584 | \r | |
585 | //\r | |
586 | // 13. Walk through the sorted table, bring the corresponding section\r | |
587 | // into memory, and hash the entire section (using the 'SizeOfRawData'\r | |
588 | // field in the section header to determine the amount of data to hash).\r | |
589 | // 14. Add the section's 'SizeOfRawData' to SUM_OF_BYTES_HASHED .\r | |
590 | // 15. Repeat steps 13 and 14 for all the sections in the sorted table.\r | |
591 | //\r | |
592 | for (Index = 0; Index < Hdr.Pe32->FileHeader.NumberOfSections; Index++) {\r | |
593 | Section = (EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER *) &SectionHeader[Index];\r | |
594 | if (Section->SizeOfRawData == 0) {\r | |
595 | continue;\r | |
596 | }\r | |
597 | HashBase = (UINT8 *) (UINTN) ImageAddress + Section->PointerToRawData;\r | |
598 | HashSize = (UINTN) Section->SizeOfRawData;\r | |
599 | \r | |
551d8081 | 600 | HashStatus = Sha1Update (Sha1Ctx, HashBase, HashSize);\r |
601 | if (!HashStatus) {\r | |
602 | goto Finish;\r | |
603 | }\r | |
0c18794e | 604 | \r |
605 | SumOfBytesHashed += HashSize;\r | |
606 | }\r | |
607 | \r | |
608 | //\r | |
609 | // 16. If the file size is greater than SUM_OF_BYTES_HASHED, there is extra\r | |
610 | // data in the file that needs to be added to the hash. This data begins\r | |
611 | // at file offset SUM_OF_BYTES_HASHED and its length is:\r | |
612 | // FileSize - (CertDirectory->Size)\r | |
613 | //\r | |
614 | if (ImageSize > SumOfBytesHashed) {\r | |
615 | HashBase = (UINT8 *) (UINTN) ImageAddress + SumOfBytesHashed;\r | |
551d8081 | 616 | \r |
617 | if (NumberOfRvaAndSizes <= EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY) {\r | |
618 | CertSize = 0;\r | |
0c18794e | 619 | } else {\r |
551d8081 | 620 | if (Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {\r |
621 | //\r | |
622 | // Use PE32 offset.\r | |
623 | //\r | |
624 | CertSize = Hdr.Pe32->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY].Size;\r | |
625 | } else {\r | |
626 | //\r | |
627 | // Use PE32+ offset.\r | |
628 | //\r | |
629 | CertSize = Hdr.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY].Size;\r | |
28186d45 | 630 | }\r |
0c18794e | 631 | }\r |
632 | \r | |
551d8081 | 633 | if (ImageSize > CertSize + SumOfBytesHashed) {\r |
634 | HashSize = (UINTN) (ImageSize - CertSize - SumOfBytesHashed);\r | |
635 | \r | |
636 | HashStatus = Sha1Update (Sha1Ctx, HashBase, HashSize);\r | |
637 | if (!HashStatus) {\r | |
638 | goto Finish;\r | |
639 | }\r | |
640 | } else if (ImageSize < CertSize + SumOfBytesHashed) {\r | |
641 | goto Finish;\r | |
642 | }\r | |
0c18794e | 643 | }\r |
644 | \r | |
645 | //\r | |
646 | // 17. Finalize the SHA hash.\r | |
647 | //\r | |
551d8081 | 648 | HashStatus = Sha1Final (Sha1Ctx, (UINT8 *) &TcgEvent->Digest);\r |
649 | if (!HashStatus) {\r | |
650 | goto Finish;\r | |
651 | }\r | |
0c18794e | 652 | \r |
653 | //\r | |
654 | // Log the PE data\r | |
655 | //\r | |
656 | EventNumber = 1;\r | |
657 | Status = TcgProtocol->HashLogExtendEvent (\r | |
658 | TcgProtocol,\r | |
659 | (EFI_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS) (UINTN) (VOID *) NULL,\r | |
660 | 0,\r | |
661 | TPM_ALG_SHA,\r | |
662 | TcgEvent,\r | |
663 | &EventNumber,\r | |
664 | &EventLogLastEntry\r | |
665 | );\r | |
772b6011 | 666 | if (Status == EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES) {\r |
667 | //\r | |
668 | // Out of resource here means the image is hashed and its result is extended to PCR.\r | |
669 | // But the event log cann't be saved since log area is full.\r | |
670 | // Just return EFI_SUCCESS in order not to block the image load.\r | |
671 | //\r | |
672 | Status = EFI_SUCCESS;\r | |
673 | }\r | |
0c18794e | 674 | \r |
675 | Finish:\r | |
676 | FreePool (TcgEvent);\r | |
677 | \r | |
678 | if (SectionHeader != NULL) {\r | |
679 | FreePool (SectionHeader);\r | |
680 | }\r | |
681 | \r | |
682 | if (Sha1Ctx != NULL ) {\r | |
683 | FreePool (Sha1Ctx);\r | |
684 | }\r | |
685 | return Status;\r | |
686 | }\r | |
687 | \r | |
688 | /**\r | |
689 | The security handler is used to abstract platform-specific policy \r | |
690 | from the DXE core response to an attempt to use a file that returns a \r | |
691 | given status for the authentication check from the section extraction protocol. \r | |
692 | \r | |
693 | The possible responses in a given SAP implementation may include locking \r | |
694 | flash upon failure to authenticate, attestation logging for all signed drivers, \r | |
695 | and other exception operations. The File parameter allows for possible logging \r | |
696 | within the SAP of the driver.\r | |
697 | \r | |
698 | If File is NULL, then EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER is returned.\r | |
699 | \r | |
700 | If the file specified by File with an authentication status specified by \r | |
701 | AuthenticationStatus is safe for the DXE Core to use, then EFI_SUCCESS is returned.\r | |
702 | \r | |
703 | If the file specified by File with an authentication status specified by \r | |
704 | AuthenticationStatus is not safe for the DXE Core to use under any circumstances, \r | |
705 | then EFI_ACCESS_DENIED is returned.\r | |
706 | \r | |
707 | If the file specified by File with an authentication status specified by \r | |
708 | AuthenticationStatus is not safe for the DXE Core to use right now, but it \r | |
709 | might be possible to use it at a future time, then EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION is \r | |
710 | returned.\r | |
711 | \r | |
5db28a67 | 712 | @param[in] AuthenticationStatus This is the authentication status returned\r |
0c18794e | 713 | from the securitymeasurement services for the\r |
714 | input file.\r | |
715 | @param[in] File This is a pointer to the device path of the file that is\r | |
716 | being dispatched. This will optionally be used for logging.\r | |
717 | @param[in] FileBuffer File buffer matches the input file device path.\r | |
718 | @param[in] FileSize Size of File buffer matches the input file device path.\r | |
5db28a67 | 719 | @param[in] BootPolicy A boot policy that was used to call LoadImage() UEFI service.\r |
0c18794e | 720 | \r |
5db28a67 LG |
721 | @retval EFI_SUCCESS The file specified by DevicePath and non-NULL\r |
722 | FileBuffer did authenticate, and the platform policy dictates\r | |
723 | that the DXE Foundation may use the file.\r | |
724 | @retval other error value\r | |
0c18794e | 725 | **/\r |
726 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
727 | EFIAPI\r | |
728 | DxeTpmMeasureBootHandler (\r | |
5db28a67 | 729 | IN UINT32 AuthenticationStatus,\r |
0c18794e | 730 | IN CONST EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *File,\r |
5db28a67 LG |
731 | IN VOID *FileBuffer,\r |
732 | IN UINTN FileSize,\r | |
733 | IN BOOLEAN BootPolicy\r | |
0c18794e | 734 | )\r |
735 | {\r | |
2aadc920 | 736 | EFI_TCG_PROTOCOL *TcgProtocol;\r |
737 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r | |
738 | TCG_EFI_BOOT_SERVICE_CAPABILITY ProtocolCapability;\r | |
739 | UINT32 TCGFeatureFlags;\r | |
740 | EFI_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS EventLogLocation;\r | |
741 | EFI_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS EventLogLastEntry;\r | |
742 | EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *DevicePathNode;\r | |
743 | EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *OrigDevicePathNode;\r | |
744 | EFI_HANDLE Handle;\r | |
745 | EFI_HANDLE TempHandle;\r | |
746 | BOOLEAN ApplicationRequired;\r | |
747 | PE_COFF_LOADER_IMAGE_CONTEXT ImageContext;\r | |
748 | EFI_FIRMWARE_VOLUME_BLOCK_PROTOCOL *FvbProtocol;\r | |
749 | EFI_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS FvAddress;\r | |
2aadc920 | 750 | UINT32 Index;\r |
0c18794e | 751 | \r |
0c18794e | 752 | Status = gBS->LocateProtocol (&gEfiTcgProtocolGuid, NULL, (VOID **) &TcgProtocol);\r |
753 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
754 | //\r | |
755 | // TCG protocol is not installed. So, TPM is not present.\r | |
756 | // Don't do any measurement, and directly return EFI_SUCCESS.\r | |
757 | //\r | |
758 | return EFI_SUCCESS;\r | |
759 | }\r | |
760 | \r | |
761 | ProtocolCapability.Size = (UINT8) sizeof (ProtocolCapability);\r | |
762 | Status = TcgProtocol->StatusCheck (\r | |
763 | TcgProtocol, \r | |
764 | &ProtocolCapability,\r | |
765 | &TCGFeatureFlags,\r | |
766 | &EventLogLocation,\r | |
767 | &EventLogLastEntry\r | |
768 | );\r | |
769 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status) || ProtocolCapability.TPMDeactivatedFlag) {\r | |
770 | //\r | |
771 | // TPM device doesn't work or activate.\r | |
772 | //\r | |
773 | return EFI_SUCCESS;\r | |
774 | }\r | |
775 | \r | |
776 | //\r | |
777 | // Copy File Device Path\r | |
778 | //\r | |
779 | OrigDevicePathNode = DuplicateDevicePath (File);\r | |
0c18794e | 780 | \r |
781 | //\r | |
782 | // 1. Check whether this device path support BlockIo protocol.\r | |
783 | // Is so, this device path may be a GPT device path.\r | |
784 | //\r | |
785 | DevicePathNode = OrigDevicePathNode;\r | |
786 | Status = gBS->LocateDevicePath (&gEfiBlockIoProtocolGuid, &DevicePathNode, &Handle);\r | |
787 | if (!EFI_ERROR (Status) && !mMeasureGptTableFlag) {\r | |
788 | //\r | |
789 | // Find the gpt partion on the given devicepath\r | |
790 | //\r | |
791 | DevicePathNode = OrigDevicePathNode;\r | |
4dbb98ab | 792 | ASSERT (DevicePathNode != NULL);\r |
0c18794e | 793 | while (!IsDevicePathEnd (DevicePathNode)) {\r |
794 | //\r | |
795 | // Find the Gpt partition\r | |
796 | //\r | |
797 | if (DevicePathType (DevicePathNode) == MEDIA_DEVICE_PATH &&\r | |
798 | DevicePathSubType (DevicePathNode) == MEDIA_HARDDRIVE_DP) {\r | |
799 | //\r | |
800 | // Check whether it is a gpt partition or not\r | |
801 | // \r | |
802 | if (((HARDDRIVE_DEVICE_PATH *) DevicePathNode)->MBRType == MBR_TYPE_EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER && \r | |
803 | ((HARDDRIVE_DEVICE_PATH *) DevicePathNode)->SignatureType == SIGNATURE_TYPE_GUID) {\r | |
804 | \r | |
805 | //\r | |
806 | // Change the partition device path to its parent device path (disk) and get the handle.\r | |
807 | //\r | |
808 | DevicePathNode->Type = END_DEVICE_PATH_TYPE;\r | |
809 | DevicePathNode->SubType = END_ENTIRE_DEVICE_PATH_SUBTYPE;\r | |
810 | DevicePathNode = OrigDevicePathNode;\r | |
811 | Status = gBS->LocateDevicePath (\r | |
812 | &gEfiDiskIoProtocolGuid,\r | |
813 | &DevicePathNode,\r | |
814 | &Handle\r | |
815 | );\r | |
816 | if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
817 | //\r | |
818 | // Measure GPT disk.\r | |
819 | //\r | |
820 | Status = TcgMeasureGptTable (TcgProtocol, Handle);\r | |
821 | if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
822 | //\r | |
823 | // GPT disk check done.\r | |
824 | //\r | |
825 | mMeasureGptTableFlag = TRUE;\r | |
826 | }\r | |
827 | }\r | |
828 | FreePool (OrigDevicePathNode);\r | |
829 | OrigDevicePathNode = DuplicateDevicePath (File);\r | |
830 | ASSERT (OrigDevicePathNode != NULL);\r | |
831 | break;\r | |
832 | }\r | |
833 | }\r | |
834 | DevicePathNode = NextDevicePathNode (DevicePathNode);\r | |
835 | }\r | |
836 | }\r | |
837 | \r | |
838 | //\r | |
839 | // 2. Measure PE image.\r | |
840 | //\r | |
841 | ApplicationRequired = FALSE;\r | |
842 | \r | |
843 | //\r | |
2aadc920 | 844 | // Check whether this device path support FVB protocol.\r |
0c18794e | 845 | //\r |
846 | DevicePathNode = OrigDevicePathNode;\r | |
2aadc920 | 847 | Status = gBS->LocateDevicePath (&gEfiFirmwareVolumeBlockProtocolGuid, &DevicePathNode, &Handle);\r |
0c18794e | 848 | if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r |
849 | //\r | |
850 | // Don't check FV image, and directly return EFI_SUCCESS.\r | |
851 | // It can be extended to the specific FV authentication according to the different requirement.\r | |
852 | //\r | |
853 | if (IsDevicePathEnd (DevicePathNode)) {\r | |
854 | return EFI_SUCCESS;\r | |
855 | }\r | |
856 | //\r | |
0758c830 | 857 | // The PE image from unmeasured Firmware volume need be measured\r |
858 | // The PE image from measured Firmware volume will be mearsured according to policy below.\r | |
859 | // If it is driver, do not measure\r | |
2aadc920 | 860 | // If it is application, still measure.\r |
0c18794e | 861 | //\r |
862 | ApplicationRequired = TRUE;\r | |
2aadc920 | 863 | \r |
0758c830 | 864 | if (mCacheMeasuredHandle != Handle && mMeasuredHobData != NULL) {\r |
2aadc920 | 865 | //\r |
866 | // Search for Root FV of this PE image\r | |
867 | //\r | |
868 | TempHandle = Handle;\r | |
869 | do {\r | |
870 | Status = gBS->HandleProtocol(\r | |
871 | TempHandle, \r | |
872 | &gEfiFirmwareVolumeBlockProtocolGuid,\r | |
6dbdb191 | 873 | (VOID**)&FvbProtocol\r |
2aadc920 | 874 | );\r |
875 | TempHandle = FvbProtocol->ParentHandle;\r | |
876 | } while (!EFI_ERROR(Status) && FvbProtocol->ParentHandle != NULL);\r | |
877 | \r | |
878 | //\r | |
879 | // Search in measured FV Hob\r | |
880 | //\r | |
881 | Status = FvbProtocol->GetPhysicalAddress(FvbProtocol, &FvAddress);\r | |
882 | if (EFI_ERROR(Status)){\r | |
883 | return Status;\r | |
884 | }\r | |
885 | \r | |
2aadc920 | 886 | ApplicationRequired = FALSE;\r |
887 | \r | |
0758c830 | 888 | for (Index = 0; Index < mMeasuredHobData->Num; Index++) {\r |
889 | if(mMeasuredHobData->MeasuredFvBuf[Index].BlobBase == FvAddress) {\r | |
2aadc920 | 890 | //\r |
891 | // Cache measured FV for next measurement\r | |
892 | //\r | |
893 | mCacheMeasuredHandle = Handle;\r | |
894 | ApplicationRequired = TRUE;\r | |
895 | break;\r | |
896 | }\r | |
897 | }\r | |
898 | }\r | |
0c18794e | 899 | }\r |
2aadc920 | 900 | \r |
0c18794e | 901 | //\r |
902 | // File is not found.\r | |
903 | //\r | |
904 | if (FileBuffer == NULL) {\r | |
905 | Status = EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r | |
906 | goto Finish;\r | |
907 | }\r | |
908 | \r | |
28186d45 ED |
909 | mImageSize = FileSize;\r |
910 | mFileBuffer = FileBuffer;\r | |
911 | \r | |
0c18794e | 912 | //\r |
913 | // Measure PE Image\r | |
914 | //\r | |
915 | DevicePathNode = OrigDevicePathNode;\r | |
916 | ZeroMem (&ImageContext, sizeof (ImageContext));\r | |
917 | ImageContext.Handle = (VOID *) FileBuffer;\r | |
e0192326 | 918 | ImageContext.ImageRead = (PE_COFF_LOADER_READ_FILE) DxeTpmMeasureBootLibImageRead;\r |
0c18794e | 919 | \r |
920 | //\r | |
921 | // Get information about the image being loaded\r | |
922 | //\r | |
923 | Status = PeCoffLoaderGetImageInfo (&ImageContext);\r | |
924 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
925 | //\r | |
926 | // The information can't be got from the invalid PeImage\r | |
927 | //\r | |
928 | goto Finish;\r | |
929 | }\r | |
930 | \r | |
931 | //\r | |
932 | // Measure only application if Application flag is set\r | |
933 | // Measure drivers and applications if Application flag is not set\r | |
934 | //\r | |
935 | if ((!ApplicationRequired) || \r | |
936 | (ApplicationRequired && ImageContext.ImageType == EFI_IMAGE_SUBSYSTEM_EFI_APPLICATION)) { \r | |
937 | //\r | |
938 | // Print the image path to be measured.\r | |
939 | // \r | |
940 | DEBUG_CODE_BEGIN ();\r | |
941 | CHAR16 *ToText;\r | |
863986b3 RN |
942 | ToText = ConvertDevicePathToText (\r |
943 | DevicePathNode,\r | |
944 | FALSE,\r | |
945 | TRUE\r | |
946 | );\r | |
947 | if (ToText != NULL) {\r | |
948 | DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "The measured image path is %s.\n", ToText));\r | |
949 | FreePool (ToText);\r | |
0c18794e | 950 | }\r |
951 | DEBUG_CODE_END ();\r | |
952 | \r | |
953 | //\r | |
954 | // Measure PE image into TPM log.\r | |
955 | //\r | |
956 | Status = TcgMeasurePeImage (\r | |
957 | TcgProtocol,\r | |
958 | (EFI_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS) (UINTN) FileBuffer, \r | |
959 | FileSize, \r | |
960 | (UINTN) ImageContext.ImageAddress, \r | |
961 | ImageContext.ImageType, \r | |
962 | DevicePathNode\r | |
963 | );\r | |
964 | }\r | |
965 | \r | |
966 | //\r | |
967 | // Done, free the allocated resource.\r | |
968 | //\r | |
969 | Finish:\r | |
5db28a67 LG |
970 | if (OrigDevicePathNode != NULL) {\r |
971 | FreePool (OrigDevicePathNode);\r | |
972 | }\r | |
0c18794e | 973 | \r |
974 | return Status;\r | |
975 | }\r | |
976 | \r | |
977 | /**\r | |
978 | Register the security handler to provide TPM measure boot service.\r | |
979 | \r | |
980 | @param ImageHandle ImageHandle of the loaded driver.\r | |
981 | @param SystemTable Pointer to the EFI System Table.\r | |
982 | \r | |
983 | @retval EFI_SUCCESS Register successfully.\r | |
984 | @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES No enough memory to register this handler.\r | |
985 | **/\r | |
986 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
987 | EFIAPI\r | |
988 | DxeTpmMeasureBootLibConstructor (\r | |
989 | IN EFI_HANDLE ImageHandle,\r | |
990 | IN EFI_SYSTEM_TABLE *SystemTable\r | |
991 | )\r | |
992 | {\r | |
2aadc920 | 993 | EFI_HOB_GUID_TYPE *GuidHob;\r |
994 | \r | |
995 | GuidHob = NULL;\r | |
996 | \r | |
0758c830 | 997 | GuidHob = GetFirstGuidHob (&gMeasuredFvHobGuid);\r |
2aadc920 | 998 | \r |
999 | if (GuidHob != NULL) {\r | |
0758c830 | 1000 | mMeasuredHobData = GET_GUID_HOB_DATA (GuidHob);\r |
2aadc920 | 1001 | }\r |
1002 | \r | |
5db28a67 | 1003 | return RegisterSecurity2Handler (\r |
0c18794e | 1004 | DxeTpmMeasureBootHandler,\r |
1005 | EFI_AUTH_OPERATION_MEASURE_IMAGE | EFI_AUTH_OPERATION_IMAGE_REQUIRED\r | |
1006 | );\r | |
1007 | }\r |