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Add TPM2 implementation.
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0c18794e 1## @file SecurityPkg.dec\r
2# This package includes the security drivers, defintions(including PPIs/PROTOCOLs/GUIDs \r
3# and library classes) and libraries instances.\r
4#\r
301c867b 5# Copyright (c) 2009 - 2013, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>\r
0c18794e 6# This program and the accompanying materials are licensed and made available under\r
7# the terms and conditions of the BSD License which accompanies this distribution.\r
8# The full text of the license may be found at\r
9# http://opensource.org/licenses/bsd-license.php\r
10#\r
11# THE PROGRAM IS DISTRIBUTED UNDER THE BSD LICENSE ON AN "AS IS" BASIS,\r
12# WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR REPRESENTATIONS OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED.\r
13#\r
14##\r
15\r
16[Defines]\r
17 DEC_SPECIFICATION = 0x00010005\r
18 PACKAGE_NAME = SecurityPkg\r
19 PACKAGE_GUID = 24369CAC-6AA6-4fb8-88DB-90BF061668AD\r
4cc5bbe9 20 PACKAGE_VERSION = 0.92\r
0c18794e 21\r
22[Includes]\r
23 Include\r
24\r
25[LibraryClasses]\r
26 ## @libraryclass Definitions for common TPM commands as library API for TPM\r
27 # module use.\r
28 TpmCommLib|Include/Library/TpmCommLib.h\r
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29 Tpm2CommandLib|Include/Library/Tpm2CommandLib.h\r
30 Tpm2DeviceLib|Include/Library/Tpm2DeviceLib.h\r
31 TrEEPhysicalPresenceLib|Include/Library/TrEEPhysicalPresenceLib.h\r
32 TpmMeasurementLib|Include/Library/TpmMeasurementLib.h\r
0c18794e 33\r
34[Guids]\r
35 ## Security package token space guid\r
36 # Include/Guid/SecurityPkgTokenSpace.h\r
ed47ae02 37 gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid = { 0xd3fb176, 0x9569, 0x4d51, { 0xa3, 0xef, 0x7d, 0x61, 0xc6, 0x4f, 0xea, 0xba }}\r
0c18794e 38 ## Guid acted as the authenticated variable store header's signature, and to specify the variable list entries put in the EFI system table.\r
39 # Include/Guid/AuthenticatedVariableFormat.h\r
ed47ae02 40 gEfiAuthenticatedVariableGuid = { 0xaaf32c78, 0x947b, 0x439a, { 0xa1, 0x80, 0x2e, 0x14, 0x4e, 0xc3, 0x77, 0x92 } }\r
0c18794e 41\r
beda2356 42 # Include/Guid/AuthenticatedVariableFormat.h\r
ed47ae02 43 gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid = { 0xf0a30bc7, 0xaf08, 0x4556, { 0x99, 0xc4, 0x0, 0x10, 0x9, 0xc9, 0x3a, 0x44 } }\r
ecc722ad 44\r
45 # Include/Guid/AuthenticatedVariableFormat.h\r
46 gEfiCustomModeEnableGuid = { 0xc076ec0c, 0x7028, 0x4399, { 0xa0, 0x72, 0x71, 0xee, 0x5c, 0x44, 0x8b, 0x9f } }\r
ed47ae02 47\r
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48 # Include/Guid/AuthenticatedVariableFormat.h\r
49 gEfiVendorKeysNvGuid = { 0x9073e4e0, 0x60ec, 0x4b6e, { 0x99, 0x3, 0x4c, 0x22, 0x3c, 0x26, 0xf, 0x3c } }\r
50\r
ed47ae02 51 # Include/Guid/AuthenticatedVariableFormat.h\r
52 gEfiCertDbGuid = { 0xd9bee56e, 0x75dc, 0x49d9, { 0xb4, 0xd7, 0xb5, 0x34, 0x21, 0xf, 0x63, 0x7a } }\r
beda2356 53 \r
0c18794e 54 ## Include/Guid/TcgEventHob.h\r
301c867b 55 gTcgEventEntryHobGuid = { 0x2b9ffb52, 0x1b13, 0x416f, { 0xa8, 0x7b, 0xbc, 0x93, 0xd, 0xef, 0x92, 0xa8 }}\r
0c18794e 56\r
0758c830 57 ## Include/Guid/MeasuredFvHob.h\r
58 gMeasuredFvHobGuid = { 0xb2360b42, 0x7173, 0x420a, { 0x86, 0x96, 0x46, 0xca, 0x6b, 0xab, 0x10, 0x60 }}\r
2aadc920 59\r
0c18794e 60 ## Include/Guid/PhysicalPresenceData.h\r
61 gEfiPhysicalPresenceGuid = { 0xf6499b1, 0xe9ad, 0x493d, { 0xb9, 0xc2, 0x2f, 0x90, 0x81, 0x5c, 0x6c, 0xbc }}\r
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62 \r
63 ## Include/Guid/PwdCredentialProviderHii.h\r
64 gPwdCredentialProviderGuid = { 0x78b9ec8b, 0xc000, 0x46c5, { 0xac, 0x93, 0x24, 0xa0, 0xc1, 0xbb, 0x0, 0xce }}\r
65\r
66 ## Include/Guid/UsbCredentialProviderHii.h\r
67 gUsbCredentialProviderGuid = { 0xd0849ed1, 0xa88c, 0x4ba6, { 0xb1, 0xd6, 0xab, 0x50, 0xe2, 0x80, 0xb7, 0xa9 }}\r
68\r
69 ## Include/Guid/UserIdentifyManagerHii.h\r
70 gUserIdentifyManagerGuid = { 0x3ccd3dd8, 0x8d45, 0x4fed, { 0x96, 0x2d, 0x2b, 0x38, 0xcd, 0x82, 0xb3, 0xc4 }}\r
71\r
72 ## Include/Guid/UserProfileManagerHii.h\r
73 gUserProfileManagerGuid = { 0xc35f272c, 0x97c2, 0x465a, { 0xa2, 0x16, 0x69, 0x6b, 0x66, 0x8a, 0x8c, 0xfe }}\r
74\r
75 ## Include/Guid/TcgConfigHii.h\r
76 gTcgConfigFormSetGuid = { 0xb0f901e4, 0xc424, 0x45de, { 0x90, 0x81, 0x95, 0xe2, 0xb, 0xde, 0x6f, 0xb5 }}\r
beda2356 77 \r
78 ## Include/Guid/SecureBootConfigHii.h\r
79 gSecureBootConfigFormSetGuid = { 0x5daf50a5, 0xea81, 0x4de2, {0x8f, 0x9b, 0xca, 0xbd, 0xa9, 0xcf, 0x5c, 0x14}}\r
80 \r
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81 ## Include/Guid/TrEEPhysicalPresenceData.h\r
82 gEfiTrEEPhysicalPresenceGuid = { 0xf24643c2, 0xc622, 0x494e, { 0x8a, 0xd, 0x46, 0x32, 0x57, 0x9c, 0x2d, 0x5b }}\r
83\r
84 ## Include/Guid/TpmInstance.h\r
85 gEfiTpmDeviceInstanceNoneGuid = { 0x00000000, 0x0000, 0x0000, { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 } }\r
86 gEfiTpmDeviceInstanceTpm12Guid = { 0x8b01e5b6, 0x4f19, 0x46e8, { 0xab, 0x93, 0x1c, 0x53, 0x67, 0x1b, 0x90, 0xcc } }\r
87 gEfiTpmDeviceInstanceTpm20DtpmGuid = { 0x286bf25a, 0xc2c3, 0x408c, { 0xb3, 0xb4, 0x25, 0xe6, 0x75, 0x8b, 0x73, 0x17 } }\r
88 gEfiTpmDeviceSelectedGuid = { 0x7f4158d3, 0x74d, 0x456d, { 0x8c, 0xb2, 0x1, 0xf9, 0xc8, 0xf7, 0x9d, 0xaa } }\r
89\r
90 ## Include/Guid/TrEEConfigHii.h\r
91 gTrEEConfigFormSetGuid = {0xc54b425f, 0xaa79, 0x48b4, { 0x98, 0x1f, 0x99, 0x8b, 0x3c, 0x4b, 0x64, 0x1c }}\r
92\r
0c18794e 93[Ppis]\r
94 ## Include/Ppi/LockPhysicalPresence.h\r
95 gPeiLockPhysicalPresencePpiGuid = { 0xef9aefe5, 0x2bd3, 0x4031, { 0xaf, 0x7d, 0x5e, 0xfe, 0x5a, 0xbb, 0x9a, 0xd } }\r
96\r
97 ## Include/Ppi/TpmInitialized.h\r
98 gPeiTpmInitializedPpiGuid = { 0xe9db0d58, 0xd48d, 0x47f6, { 0x9c, 0x6e, 0x6f, 0x40, 0xe8, 0x6c, 0x7b, 0x41 }}\r
99\r
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100 ## Include/Ppi/FirmwareVolumeInfoMeasurementExcluded.h\r
101 gEfiPeiFirmwareVolumeInfoMeasurementExcludedPpiGuid = { 0x6e056ff9, 0xc695, 0x4364, { 0x9e, 0x2c, 0x61, 0x26, 0xf5, 0xce, 0xea, 0xae } }\r
102\r
0c18794e 103[PcdsFixedAtBuild]\r
104 ## Pcd for OptionRom.\r
105 # Image verification policy settings:\r
106 # ALWAYS_EXECUTE 0x00000000\r
107 # NEVER_EXECUTE 0x00000001\r
108 # ALLOW_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION 0x00000002\r
109 # DEFER_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION 0x00000003\r
110 # DENY_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION 0x00000004\r
111 # QUERY_USER_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION 0x00000005 \r
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112 # NOTE: Do NOT use QUERY_USER_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION since it violates the UEFI specification and has been removed.\r
113 gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOptionRomImageVerificationPolicy|0x04|UINT32|0x00000001\r
0c18794e 114 \r
115 ## Pcd for removable media.\r
116 # Removable media include CD-ROM, Floppy, USB and network.\r
117 # Image verification policy settings:\r
118 # ALWAYS_EXECUTE 0x00000000\r
119 # NEVER_EXECUTE 0x00000001\r
120 # ALLOW_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION 0x00000002\r
121 # DEFER_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION 0x00000003\r
122 # DENY_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION 0x00000004\r
123 # QUERY_USER_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION 0x00000005\r
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124 # NOTE: Do NOT use QUERY_USER_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION since it violates the UEFI specification and has been removed.\r
125 gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdRemovableMediaImageVerificationPolicy|0x04|UINT32|0x00000002\r
0c18794e 126 \r
127 ## Pcd for fixed media.\r
128 # Fixed media include hard disk.\r
129 # Image verification policy settings:\r
130 # ALWAYS_EXECUTE 0x00000000\r
131 # NEVER_EXECUTE 0x00000001\r
132 # ALLOW_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION 0x00000002\r
133 # DEFER_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION 0x00000003\r
134 # DENY_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION 0x00000004\r
135 # QUERY_USER_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION 0x00000005 \r
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136 # NOTE: Do NOT use QUERY_USER_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION since it violates the UEFI specification and has been removed.\r
137 gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdFixedMediaImageVerificationPolicy|0x04|UINT32|0x00000003\r
0c18794e 138 \r
139 ## Defer Image Load policy settings.\r
140 # The policy is bitwise. \r
141 # If bit is set, the image from corresponding device will be trust when loading.\r
142 #\r
143 # IMAGE_UNKNOWN 0x00000001\r
144 # IMAGE_FROM_FV 0x00000002\r
145 # IMAGE_FROM_OPTION_ROM 0x00000004\r
146 # IMAGE_FROM_REMOVABLE_MEDIA 0x00000008\r
147 # IMAGE_FROM_FIXED_MEDIA 0x00000010\r
148 gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdDeferImageLoadPolicy|0x0000001F|UINT32|0x0000004\r
149 \r
150 ## The token file name used to save credential in USB credential provider driver.\r
151 # The specified file should be saved at the root directory of USB storage disk.\r
152 gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdFixedUsbCredentialProviderTokenFileName|L"Token.bin"|VOID*|0x00000005\r
153\r
154 ## The size of Append variable buffer. This buffer is reserved for runtime use, OS can append data into one existing variable.\r
155 gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdMaxAppendVariableSize|0x2000|UINT32|0x30000005 \r
156\r
157 ## This PCD specifies the type of TCG platform that contains TPM chip. \r
158 # This PCD is only avaiable when PcdTpmPhysicalPresence is TRUE.\r
159 # If 0, TCG platform type is PC client.\r
160 # If 1, TCG platform type is server.\r
161 gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTpmPlatformClass|0|UINT8|0x00000006\r
162\r
163 ## The PCD is used to control whether to support hiding the TPM.\r
164 # If TRUE, PcdHideTpm controls whether to hide the TPM.\r
165 gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdHideTpmSupport|FALSE|BOOLEAN|0x00000007\r
166 \r
167[PcdsDynamic, PcdsDynamicEx]\r
168 ## The PCD is used to control whether to hide the TPM.\r
169 gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdHideTpm|FALSE|BOOLEAN|0x00010002\r
170\r
0c18794e 171[PcdsFixedAtBuild, PcdsPatchableInModule, PcdsDynamic, PcdsDynamicEx]\r
172 ## This PCD indicates the presence or absence of the platform operator.\r
173 gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTpmPhysicalPresence|TRUE|BOOLEAN|0x00010001\r
174\r
5a500332 175[PcdsFixedAtBuild, PcdsPatchableInModule, PcdsDynamic, PcdsDynamicEx]\r
176 ## This PCD indicates whether to set TPM physicalPresenceLifetimeLock bit.\r
177 ## Once this bit is set, it can not be cleared (It is locked for TPM life time).\r
178 gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdPhysicalPresenceLifetimeLock|FALSE|BOOLEAN|0x00010003\r
179 \r
180[PcdsFixedAtBuild, PcdsPatchableInModule, PcdsDynamic, PcdsDynamicEx]\r
181 ## This PCD is used to specify the default value for physicalPresenceCMDEnable bit when setting physicalPresenceLifetimeLock bit.\r
182 ## If PcdPhysicalPresenceCmdEnable is set to TRUE, physicalPresenceCMDEnable bit will be set, else this bit will be cleared.\r
183 gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdPhysicalPresenceCmdEnable|TRUE|BOOLEAN|0x00010004\r
184 \r
185[PcdsFixedAtBuild, PcdsPatchableInModule, PcdsDynamic, PcdsDynamicEx]\r
186 ## This PCD is used to specify the default value for physicalPresenceHWEnable bit when setting physicalPresenceLifetimeLock bit.\r
187 ## If PcdPhysicalPresenceHwEnable is set to TRUE, physicalPresenceHWEnable bit will be set, else this bit will be cleared.\r
188 gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdPhysicalPresenceHwEnable|TRUE|BOOLEAN|0x00010005\r
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189\r
190[PcdsFixedAtBuild, PcdsPatchableInModule, PcdsDynamic, PcdsDynamicEx]\r
191 ## This PCD indicates if debugger exists.\r
192 gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdFirmwareDebuggerInitialized|FALSE|BOOLEAN|0x00010009\r
193\r
194 ## This PCD indicates the TPM2 initializatin policy.\r
195 ## 0: No initialization needed - most likely used for chipset SRTM sloution, in which TPM is already initialized.\r
196 ## 1: Initialization needed.\r
197 gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTpm2InitializationPolicy|1|UINT8|0x0001000A\r
198\r
199 ## This PCD indicates the TPM initializatin policy.\r
200 ## 0: No initialization needed - most likely used for chipset SRTM sloution, in which TPM is already initialized.\r
201 ## 1: Initialization needed.\r
202 gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTpmInitializationPolicy|1|UINT8|0x0001000B\r
203\r
204 ## This PCD indicates the TPM2 SelfTest policy.\r
205 ## 0: No SelfTest needed - most likely used for fTPM, because it might already be tested.\r
206 ## 1: SelfTest needed.\r
207 gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTpm2SelfTestPolicy|1|UINT8|0x0001000C\r
208\r
209 ## This PCD indicates the TPM2 SCRTM policy.\r
210 ## 0: No SCRTM needed - In this case, it is already done.\r
211 ## 1: SCRTM done by BIOS.\r
212 gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTpm2ScrtmPolicy|1|UINT8|0x0001000D\r
213\r
214 ## This PCD indicates the TPM SCRTM policy.\r
215 ## 0: No SCRTM needed - In this case, it is already done.\r
216 ## 1: SCRTM done by BIOS.\r
217 gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTpmScrtmPolicy|1|UINT8|0x0001000E\r
218\r
219 ## Guid name to identify TPM instance\r
220 ## TPM_DEVICE_INTERFACE_NONE means disable\r
221 ## TPM_DEVICE_INTERFACE_TPM12 means TPM1.2 DTPM\r
222 ## TPM_DEVICE_INTERFACE_DTPM2 means TPM2 DTPM\r
223 gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTpmInstanceGuid |{ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 }|VOID*|0x0001000F\r
224\r
225 ## This PCD indicates the TPM2 Hash mask.\r
226 ## BIT0: SHA1\r
227 ## BIT1: SHA256\r
228 ## BIT2: SHA384\r
229 ## BIT3: SHA512\r
230 ## If this bit is set, that means this algorithm is needed to extend to PCR.\r
231 ## If this bit is clear, that means this algorithm is NOT needed to extend to PCR.\r
232 ## 0xFFFFFFFF means extend all.\r
233 gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTpm2HashMask|0xFFFFFFFF|UINT32|0x00010010\r
234\r
235 ## This PCD indicates if BIOS auto detect TPM1.2 or dTPM2.0.\r
236 ## 0: No auto detection.\r
237 ## 1: Auto detection.\r
238 gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTpmAutoDetection|TRUE|BOOLEAN|0x00010011\r
239\r
240 ## This PCD indicates TPM base address.\r
241 gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTpmBaseAddress|0xFED40000|UINT64|0x00010012\r