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Clean up the private GUID definition in module Level.
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0c18794e 1## @file SecurityPkg.dec\r
2# This package includes the security drivers, defintions(including PPIs/PROTOCOLs/GUIDs \r
3# and library classes) and libraries instances.\r
4#\r
5# Copyright (c) 2009 - 2011, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>\r
6# This program and the accompanying materials are licensed and made available under\r
7# the terms and conditions of the BSD License which accompanies this distribution.\r
8# The full text of the license may be found at\r
9# http://opensource.org/licenses/bsd-license.php\r
10#\r
11# THE PROGRAM IS DISTRIBUTED UNDER THE BSD LICENSE ON AN "AS IS" BASIS,\r
12# WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR REPRESENTATIONS OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED.\r
13#\r
14##\r
15\r
16[Defines]\r
17 DEC_SPECIFICATION = 0x00010005\r
18 PACKAGE_NAME = SecurityPkg\r
19 PACKAGE_GUID = 24369CAC-6AA6-4fb8-88DB-90BF061668AD\r
20 PACKAGE_VERSION = 0.91\r
21\r
22[Includes]\r
23 Include\r
24\r
25[LibraryClasses]\r
26 ## @libraryclass Definitions for common TPM commands as library API for TPM\r
27 # module use.\r
28 TpmCommLib|Include/Library/TpmCommLib.h\r
29\r
30[Guids]\r
31 ## Security package token space guid\r
32 # Include/Guid/SecurityPkgTokenSpace.h\r
33 gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid = { 0xd3fb176, 0x9569, 0x4d51, { 0xa3, 0xef, 0x7d, 0x61, 0xc6, 0x4f, 0xea, 0xba }}\r
34 ## Guid acted as the authenticated variable store header's signature, and to specify the variable list entries put in the EFI system table.\r
35 # Include/Guid/AuthenticatedVariableFormat.h\r
36 gEfiAuthenticatedVariableGuid = { 0xaaf32c78, 0x947b, 0x439a, { 0xa1, 0x80, 0x2e, 0x14, 0x4e, 0xc3, 0x77, 0x92 } }\r
37\r
38 ## Include/Guid/TcgEventHob.h\r
39 gTcgEventEntryHobGuid = { 0x2e3044ac, 0x879f, 0x490f, {0x97, 0x60, 0xbb, 0xdf, 0xaf, 0x69, 0x5f, 0x50 }}\r
40\r
41 ## Include/Guid/PhysicalPresenceData.h\r
42 gEfiPhysicalPresenceGuid = { 0xf6499b1, 0xe9ad, 0x493d, { 0xb9, 0xc2, 0x2f, 0x90, 0x81, 0x5c, 0x6c, 0xbc }}\r
43\r
44[Ppis]\r
45 ## Include/Ppi/LockPhysicalPresence.h\r
46 gPeiLockPhysicalPresencePpiGuid = { 0xef9aefe5, 0x2bd3, 0x4031, { 0xaf, 0x7d, 0x5e, 0xfe, 0x5a, 0xbb, 0x9a, 0xd } }\r
47\r
48 ## Include/Ppi/TpmInitialized.h\r
49 gPeiTpmInitializedPpiGuid = { 0xe9db0d58, 0xd48d, 0x47f6, { 0x9c, 0x6e, 0x6f, 0x40, 0xe8, 0x6c, 0x7b, 0x41 }}\r
50\r
51[PcdsFixedAtBuild]\r
52 ## Pcd for OptionRom.\r
53 # Image verification policy settings:\r
54 # ALWAYS_EXECUTE 0x00000000\r
55 # NEVER_EXECUTE 0x00000001\r
56 # ALLOW_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION 0x00000002\r
57 # DEFER_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION 0x00000003\r
58 # DENY_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION 0x00000004\r
59 # QUERY_USER_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION 0x00000005 \r
60 gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOptionRomImageVerificationPolicy|0x00|UINT32|0x00000001\r
61 \r
62 ## Pcd for removable media.\r
63 # Removable media include CD-ROM, Floppy, USB and network.\r
64 # Image verification policy settings:\r
65 # ALWAYS_EXECUTE 0x00000000\r
66 # NEVER_EXECUTE 0x00000001\r
67 # ALLOW_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION 0x00000002\r
68 # DEFER_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION 0x00000003\r
69 # DENY_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION 0x00000004\r
70 # QUERY_USER_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION 0x00000005\r
71 gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdRemovableMediaImageVerificationPolicy|0x05|UINT32|0x00000002\r
72 \r
73 ## Pcd for fixed media.\r
74 # Fixed media include hard disk.\r
75 # Image verification policy settings:\r
76 # ALWAYS_EXECUTE 0x00000000\r
77 # NEVER_EXECUTE 0x00000001\r
78 # ALLOW_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION 0x00000002\r
79 # DEFER_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION 0x00000003\r
80 # DENY_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION 0x00000004\r
81 # QUERY_USER_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION 0x00000005 \r
82 gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdFixedMediaImageVerificationPolicy|0x05|UINT32|0x00000003\r
83 \r
84 ## Defer Image Load policy settings.\r
85 # The policy is bitwise. \r
86 # If bit is set, the image from corresponding device will be trust when loading.\r
87 #\r
88 # IMAGE_UNKNOWN 0x00000001\r
89 # IMAGE_FROM_FV 0x00000002\r
90 # IMAGE_FROM_OPTION_ROM 0x00000004\r
91 # IMAGE_FROM_REMOVABLE_MEDIA 0x00000008\r
92 # IMAGE_FROM_FIXED_MEDIA 0x00000010\r
93 gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdDeferImageLoadPolicy|0x0000001F|UINT32|0x0000004\r
94 \r
95 ## The token file name used to save credential in USB credential provider driver.\r
96 # The specified file should be saved at the root directory of USB storage disk.\r
97 gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdFixedUsbCredentialProviderTokenFileName|L"Token.bin"|VOID*|0x00000005\r
98\r
99 ## The size of Append variable buffer. This buffer is reserved for runtime use, OS can append data into one existing variable.\r
100 gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdMaxAppendVariableSize|0x2000|UINT32|0x30000005 \r
101\r
102 ## This PCD specifies the type of TCG platform that contains TPM chip. \r
103 # This PCD is only avaiable when PcdTpmPhysicalPresence is TRUE.\r
104 # If 0, TCG platform type is PC client.\r
105 # If 1, TCG platform type is server.\r
106 gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTpmPlatformClass|0|UINT8|0x00000006\r
107\r
108 ## The PCD is used to control whether to support hiding the TPM.\r
109 # If TRUE, PcdHideTpm controls whether to hide the TPM.\r
110 gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdHideTpmSupport|FALSE|BOOLEAN|0x00000007\r
111 \r
112[PcdsDynamic, PcdsDynamicEx]\r
113 ## The PCD is used to control whether to hide the TPM.\r
114 gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdHideTpm|FALSE|BOOLEAN|0x00010002\r
115\r
116 ## The PCD is used to specify whether or not MOR (MemoryOverwriteControl) feature is enabled.\r
117 gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdMorEnable|FALSE|BOOLEAN|0x00010000\r
118\r
119[PcdsFixedAtBuild, PcdsPatchableInModule, PcdsDynamic, PcdsDynamicEx]\r
120 ## This PCD indicates the presence or absence of the platform operator.\r
121 gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTpmPhysicalPresence|TRUE|BOOLEAN|0x00010001\r
122\r