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SecurityPkg Variable: Support the new introduced PcdMaxAuthVariableSize.
[mirror_edk2.git] / SecurityPkg / VariableAuthenticated / RuntimeDxe / AuthService.c
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0c18794e 1/** @file\r
2 Implement authentication services for the authenticated variable\r
3 service in UEFI2.2.\r
4\r
dc204d5a
JY		 5 Caution: This module requires additional review when modified.\r
6 This driver will have external input - variable data. It may be input in SMM mode.\r
7 This external input must be validated carefully to avoid security issue like\r
8 buffer overflow, integer overflow.\r
9 Variable attribute should also be checked to avoid authentication bypass.\r
36bdec3c
CZ		 10 The whole SMM authentication variable design relies on the integrity of flash part and SMM.\r
11 which is assumed to be protected by platform. All variable code and metadata in flash/SMM Memory\r
20333c6d 12 may not be modified without authorization. If platform fails to protect these resources,\r
36bdec3c 13 the authentication service provided in this driver will be broken, and the behavior is undefined.\r
dc204d5a
JY		 14\r
15 ProcessVarWithPk(), ProcessVarWithKek() and ProcessVariable() are the function to do\r
16 variable authentication.\r
17\r
18 VerifyTimeBasedPayload() and VerifyCounterBasedPayload() are sub function to do verification.\r
19 They will do basic validation for authentication data structure, then call crypto library\r
20 to verify the signature.\r
21\r
f6c50319 22Copyright (c) 2009 - 2015, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>\r
2d3fb919 23This program and the accompanying materials\r
24are licensed and made available under the terms and conditions of the BSD License\r
25which accompanies this distribution. The full text of the license may be found at\r
0c18794e 26http://opensource.org/licenses/bsd-license.php\r
27\r
2d3fb919 28THE PROGRAM IS DISTRIBUTED UNDER THE BSD LICENSE ON AN "AS IS" BASIS,\r
0c18794e 29WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR REPRESENTATIONS OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED.\r
30\r
31**/\r
32\r
33#include "Variable.h"\r
34#include "AuthService.h"\r
35\r
36///\r
37/// Global database array for scratch\r
2d3fb919 38///\r
4ccef561 39UINT8 *mPubKeyStore;\r
0c18794e 40UINT32 mPubKeyNumber;\r
4ccef561
DG		 41UINT32 mMaxKeyNumber;\r
42UINT32 mMaxKeyDbSize;\r
43UINT8 *mCertDbStore;\r
44UINT32 mMaxCertDbSize;\r
0c18794e 45UINT32 mPlatformMode;\r
a555940b
FS		 46UINT8 mVendorKeyState;\r
47\r
ae09f979 48EFI_GUID mSignatureSupport[] = {EFI_CERT_SHA1_GUID, EFI_CERT_SHA256_GUID, EFI_CERT_RSA2048_GUID, EFI_CERT_X509_GUID};\r
0c18794e 49//\r
50// Public Exponent of RSA Key.\r
51//\r
52CONST UINT8 mRsaE[] = { 0x01, 0x00, 0x01 };\r
53//\r
54// Hash context pointer\r
55//\r
56VOID *mHashCtx = NULL;\r
57\r
d912bad7 58//\r
59// Requirement for different signature type which have been defined in UEFI spec.\r
60// These data are used to peform SignatureList format check while setting PK/KEK variable.\r
61//\r
62EFI_SIGNATURE_ITEM mSupportSigItem[] = {\r
63//{SigType, SigHeaderSize, SigDataSize }\r
64 {EFI_CERT_SHA256_GUID, 0, 32 },\r
65 {EFI_CERT_RSA2048_GUID, 0, 256 },\r
66 {EFI_CERT_RSA2048_SHA256_GUID, 0, 256 },\r
67 {EFI_CERT_SHA1_GUID, 0, 20 },\r
68 {EFI_CERT_RSA2048_SHA1_GUID, 0, 256 },\r
69 {EFI_CERT_X509_GUID, 0, ((UINT32) ~0)},\r
70 {EFI_CERT_SHA224_GUID, 0, 28 },\r
71 {EFI_CERT_SHA384_GUID, 0, 48 },\r
20333c6d
QL		 72 {EFI_CERT_SHA512_GUID, 0, 64 },\r
73 {EFI_CERT_X509_SHA256_GUID, 0, 48 },\r
74 {EFI_CERT_X509_SHA384_GUID, 0, 64 },\r
75 {EFI_CERT_X509_SHA512_GUID, 0, 80 }\r
d912bad7 76};\r
77\r
ecc722ad 78/**\r
79 Determine whether this operation needs a physical present user.\r
80\r
81 @param[in] VariableName Name of the Variable.\r
82 @param[in] VendorGuid GUID of the Variable.\r
83\r
84 @retval TRUE This variable is protected, only a physical present user could set this variable.\r
85 @retval FALSE This variable is not protected.\r
20333c6d 86\r
ecc722ad 87**/\r
88BOOLEAN\r
89NeedPhysicallyPresent(\r
90 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r
91 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid\r
92 )\r
93{\r
94 if ((CompareGuid (VendorGuid, &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid) && (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME) == 0))\r
95 || (CompareGuid (VendorGuid, &gEfiCustomModeEnableGuid) && (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_CUSTOM_MODE_NAME) == 0))) {\r
96 return TRUE;\r
97 }\r
20333c6d 98\r
ecc722ad 99 return FALSE;\r
100}\r
101\r
102/**\r
103 Determine whether the platform is operating in Custom Secure Boot mode.\r
104\r
105 @retval TRUE The platform is operating in Custom mode.\r
106 @retval FALSE The platform is operating in Standard mode.\r
107\r
108**/\r
109BOOLEAN\r
110InCustomMode (\r
111 VOID\r
112 )\r
113{\r
114 VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK Variable;\r
115\r
116 FindVariable (EFI_CUSTOM_MODE_NAME, &gEfiCustomModeEnableGuid, &Variable, &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal, FALSE);\r
117 if (Variable.CurrPtr != NULL && *(GetVariableDataPtr (Variable.CurrPtr)) == CUSTOM_SECURE_BOOT_MODE) {\r
118 return TRUE;\r
119 }\r
20333c6d 120\r
ecc722ad 121 return FALSE;\r
122}\r
123\r
0c18794e 124/**\r
125 Initializes for authenticated varibale service.\r
126\r
13af4ab0
SZ		 127 @param[in] MaxAuthVariableSize Reflect the overhead associated with the saving\r
128 of a single EFI authenticated variable with the exception\r
129 of the overhead associated with the length\r
130 of the string name of the EFI variable.\r
131\r
0c18794e 132 @retval EFI_SUCCESS Function successfully executed.\r
133 @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES Fail to allocate enough memory resources.\r
134\r
135**/\r
136EFI_STATUS\r
137AutenticatedVariableServiceInitialize (\r
13af4ab0 138 IN UINTN MaxAuthVariableSize\r
0c18794e 139 )\r
140{\r
141 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
142 VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK Variable;\r
7aaf2fd6 143 VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK PkVariable;\r
0c18794e 144 UINT8 VarValue;\r
145 UINT32 VarAttr;\r
146 UINT8 *Data;\r
147 UINTN DataSize;\r
148 UINTN CtxSize;\r
beda2356 149 UINT8 SecureBootMode;\r
150 UINT8 SecureBootEnable;\r
ecc722ad 151 UINT8 CustomMode;\r
ed47ae02 152 UINT32 ListSize;\r
2d3fb919 153\r
0c18794e 154 //\r
155 // Initialize hash context.\r
156 //\r
157 CtxSize = Sha256GetContextSize ();\r
158 mHashCtx = AllocateRuntimePool (CtxSize);\r
159 if (mHashCtx == NULL) {\r
160 return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
161 }\r
162\r
4ccef561
DG		 163 //\r
164 // Reserve runtime buffer for public key database. The size excludes variable header and name size.\r
165 //\r
13af4ab0 166 mMaxKeyDbSize = (UINT32) (MaxAuthVariableSize - sizeof (AUTHVAR_KEYDB_NAME));\r
4ccef561
DG		 167 mMaxKeyNumber = mMaxKeyDbSize / EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE;\r
168 mPubKeyStore = AllocateRuntimePool (mMaxKeyDbSize);\r
169 if (mPubKeyStore == NULL) {\r
170 return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
171 }\r
172\r
173 //\r
174 // Reserve runtime buffer for certificate database. The size excludes variable header and name size.\r
175 //\r
13af4ab0 176 mMaxCertDbSize = (UINT32) (MaxAuthVariableSize - sizeof (EFI_CERT_DB_NAME));\r
4ccef561
DG		 177 mCertDbStore = AllocateRuntimePool (mMaxCertDbSize);\r
178 if (mCertDbStore == NULL) {\r
179 return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
180 }\r
181\r
2d3fb919 182 //\r
183 // Check "AuthVarKeyDatabase" variable's existence.\r
184 // If it doesn't exist, create a new one with initial value of 0 and EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS set.\r
0c18794e 185 //\r
186 Status = FindVariable (\r
2d3fb919 187 AUTHVAR_KEYDB_NAME,\r
188 &gEfiAuthenticatedVariableGuid,\r
189 &Variable,\r
ecc722ad 190 &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,\r
191 FALSE\r
0c18794e 192 );\r
193\r
194 if (Variable.CurrPtr == NULL) {\r
195 VarAttr = EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS;\r
196 VarValue = 0;\r
197 mPubKeyNumber = 0;\r
198 Status = UpdateVariable (\r
199 AUTHVAR_KEYDB_NAME,\r
200 &gEfiAuthenticatedVariableGuid,\r
201 &VarValue,\r
202 sizeof(UINT8),\r
203 VarAttr,\r
204 0,\r
205 0,\r
206 &Variable,\r
207 NULL\r
208 );\r
209 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
210 return Status;\r
211 }\r
212 } else {\r
213 //\r
214 // Load database in global variable for cache.\r
215 //\r
216 DataSize = DataSizeOfVariable (Variable.CurrPtr);\r
217 Data = GetVariableDataPtr (Variable.CurrPtr);\r
218 ASSERT ((DataSize != 0) && (Data != NULL));\r
36bdec3c 219 //\r
20333c6d 220 // "AuthVarKeyDatabase" is an internal variable. Its DataSize is always ensured not to exceed mPubKeyStore buffer size(See definition before)\r
36bdec3c
CZ		 221 // Therefore, there is no memory overflow in underlying CopyMem.\r
222 //\r
0c18794e 223 CopyMem (mPubKeyStore, (UINT8 *) Data, DataSize);\r
224 mPubKeyNumber = (UINT32) (DataSize / EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE);\r
225 }\r
7aaf2fd6 226\r
ecc722ad 227 FindVariable (EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, &PkVariable, &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal, FALSE);\r
7aaf2fd6 228 if (PkVariable.CurrPtr == NULL) {\r
229 DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Variable %s does not exist.\n", EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME));\r
230 } else {\r
231 DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Variable %s exists.\n", EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME));\r
232 }\r
20333c6d 233\r
0c18794e 234 //\r
a555940b 235 // Create "SetupMode" variable with BS+RT attribute set.\r
0c18794e 236 //\r
05a643f9 237 FindVariable (EFI_SETUP_MODE_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, &Variable, &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal, FALSE);\r
238 if (PkVariable.CurrPtr == NULL) {\r
239 mPlatformMode = SETUP_MODE;\r
240 } else {\r
241 mPlatformMode = USER_MODE;\r
242 }\r
243 Status = UpdateVariable (\r
2d3fb919 244 EFI_SETUP_MODE_NAME,\r
245 &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
05a643f9 246 &mPlatformMode,\r
247 sizeof(UINT8),\r
248 EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS,\r
249 0,\r
250 0,\r
2d3fb919 251 &Variable,\r
05a643f9 252 NULL\r
0c18794e 253 );\r
05a643f9 254 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
255 return Status;\r
0c18794e 256 }\r
20333c6d 257\r
0c18794e 258 //\r
a555940b 259 // Create "SignatureSupport" variable with BS+RT attribute set.\r
0c18794e 260 //\r
05a643f9 261 FindVariable (EFI_SIGNATURE_SUPPORT_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, &Variable, &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal, FALSE);\r
262 Status = UpdateVariable (\r
263 EFI_SIGNATURE_SUPPORT_NAME,\r
264 &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
265 mSignatureSupport,\r
266 sizeof(mSignatureSupport),\r
267 EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS,\r
268 0,\r
269 0,\r
270 &Variable,\r
271 NULL\r
272 );\r
273 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
274 return Status;\r
0c18794e 275 }\r
beda2356 276\r
277 //\r
278 // If "SecureBootEnable" variable exists, then update "SecureBoot" variable.\r
2d3fb919 279 // If "SecureBootEnable" variable is SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE and in USER_MODE, Set "SecureBoot" variable to SECURE_BOOT_MODE_ENABLE.\r
beda2356 280 // If "SecureBootEnable" variable is SECURE_BOOT_DISABLE, Set "SecureBoot" variable to SECURE_BOOT_MODE_DISABLE.\r
281 //\r
8f8ca22e 282 SecureBootEnable = SECURE_BOOT_DISABLE;\r
ecc722ad 283 FindVariable (EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME, &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid, &Variable, &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal, FALSE);\r
beda2356 284 if (Variable.CurrPtr != NULL) {\r
98e9d30f
CZ		 285 if (mPlatformMode == SETUP_MODE){\r
286 //\r
287 // PK is cleared in runtime. "SecureBootMode" is not updated before reboot \r
288 // Delete "SecureBootMode" in SetupMode\r
289 //\r
290 Status = UpdateVariable (\r
291 EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME,\r
292 &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid,\r
293 &SecureBootEnable,\r
294 0,\r
295 EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS,\r
296 0,\r
297 0,\r
298 &Variable,\r
299 NULL\r
300 );\r
301 } else {\r
302 SecureBootEnable = *(GetVariableDataPtr (Variable.CurrPtr));\r
303 }\r
2d3fb919 304 } else if (mPlatformMode == USER_MODE) {\r
305 //\r
306 // "SecureBootEnable" not exist, initialize it in USER_MODE.\r
307 //\r
8f8ca22e 308 SecureBootEnable = SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE;\r
beda2356 309 Status = UpdateVariable (\r
2d3fb919 310 EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME,\r
311 &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid,\r
312 &SecureBootEnable,\r
313 sizeof (UINT8),\r
314 EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS,\r
315 0,\r
316 0,\r
beda2356 317 &Variable,\r
318 NULL\r
319 );\r
320 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
321 return Status;\r
322 }\r
323 }\r
324\r
05a643f9 325 //\r
a555940b 326 // Create "SecureBoot" variable with BS+RT attribute set.\r
05a643f9 327 //\r
2d3fb919 328 if (SecureBootEnable == SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE && mPlatformMode == USER_MODE) {\r
329 SecureBootMode = SECURE_BOOT_MODE_ENABLE;\r
330 } else {\r
331 SecureBootMode = SECURE_BOOT_MODE_DISABLE;\r
332 }\r
ecc722ad 333 FindVariable (EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, &Variable, &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal, FALSE);\r
2d3fb919 334 Status = UpdateVariable (\r
335 EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME,\r
336 &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
337 &SecureBootMode,\r
338 sizeof (UINT8),\r
05a643f9 339 EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS,\r
2d3fb919 340 0,\r
341 0,\r
342 &Variable,\r
343 NULL\r
344 );\r
345 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
346 return Status;\r
347 }\r
348\r
7aaf2fd6 349 DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Variable %s is %x\n", EFI_SETUP_MODE_NAME, mPlatformMode));\r
350 DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Variable %s is %x\n", EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME, SecureBootMode));\r
351 DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Variable %s is %x\n", EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME, SecureBootEnable));\r
352\r
0c18794e 353 //\r
f71ed839 354 // Initialize "CustomMode" in STANDARD_SECURE_BOOT_MODE state.\r
0c18794e 355 //\r
ecc722ad 356 FindVariable (EFI_CUSTOM_MODE_NAME, &gEfiCustomModeEnableGuid, &Variable, &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal, FALSE);\r
f71ed839 357 CustomMode = STANDARD_SECURE_BOOT_MODE;\r
358 Status = UpdateVariable (\r
359 EFI_CUSTOM_MODE_NAME,\r
360 &gEfiCustomModeEnableGuid,\r
361 &CustomMode,\r
362 sizeof (UINT8),\r
363 EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS,\r
364 0,\r
365 0,\r
366 &Variable,\r
367 NULL\r
368 );\r
369 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
370 return Status;\r
0c18794e 371 }\r
20333c6d 372\r
ecc722ad 373 DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Variable %s is %x\n", EFI_CUSTOM_MODE_NAME, CustomMode));\r
2d3fb919 374\r
ed47ae02 375 //\r
376 // Check "certdb" variable's existence.\r
20333c6d 377 // If it doesn't exist, then create a new one with\r
ed47ae02 378 // EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS set.\r
379 //\r
380 Status = FindVariable (\r
381 EFI_CERT_DB_NAME,\r
382 &gEfiCertDbGuid,\r
383 &Variable,\r
384 &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,\r
385 FALSE\r
386 );\r
387\r
388 if (Variable.CurrPtr == NULL) {\r
389 VarAttr = EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS;\r
f6e23353 390 ListSize = sizeof (UINT32);\r
ed47ae02 391 Status = UpdateVariable (\r
392 EFI_CERT_DB_NAME,\r
393 &gEfiCertDbGuid,\r
394 &ListSize,\r
395 sizeof (UINT32),\r
396 VarAttr,\r
397 0,\r
398 0,\r
399 &Variable,\r
400 NULL\r
401 );\r
f6e23353 402 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
403 return Status;\r
404 }\r
20333c6d 405 }\r
ed47ae02 406\r
a555940b
FS		 407 //\r
408 // Check "VendorKeysNv" variable's existence and create "VendorKeys" variable accordingly.\r
409 //\r
410 FindVariable (EFI_VENDOR_KEYS_NV_VARIABLE_NAME, &gEfiVendorKeysNvGuid, &Variable, &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal, FALSE);\r
411 if (Variable.CurrPtr != NULL) {\r
412 mVendorKeyState = *(GetVariableDataPtr (Variable.CurrPtr));\r
413 } else {\r
414 //\r
415 // "VendorKeysNv" not exist, initialize it in VENDOR_KEYS_VALID state.\r
416 //\r
417 mVendorKeyState = VENDOR_KEYS_VALID;\r
418 Status = UpdateVariable (\r
419 EFI_VENDOR_KEYS_NV_VARIABLE_NAME,\r
420 &gEfiVendorKeysNvGuid,\r
421 &mVendorKeyState,\r
422 sizeof (UINT8),\r
423 EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS,\r
424 0,\r
425 0,\r
426 &Variable,\r
427 NULL\r
428 );\r
429 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
430 return Status;\r
431 }\r
432 }\r
433\r
434 //\r
435 // Create "VendorKeys" variable with BS+RT attribute set.\r
436 //\r
437 FindVariable (EFI_VENDOR_KEYS_VARIABLE_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, &Variable, &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal, FALSE);\r
438 Status = UpdateVariable (\r
439 EFI_VENDOR_KEYS_VARIABLE_NAME,\r
440 &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
441 &mVendorKeyState,\r
442 sizeof (UINT8),\r
443 EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS,\r
444 0,\r
445 0,\r
446 &Variable,\r
447 NULL\r
448 );\r
449 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
450 return Status;\r
451 }\r
452\r
453 DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Variable %s is %x\n", EFI_VENDOR_KEYS_VARIABLE_NAME, mVendorKeyState));\r
454\r
0c18794e 455 return Status;\r
456}\r
457\r
458/**\r
459 Add public key in store and return its index.\r
460\r
461 @param[in] PubKey Input pointer to Public Key data\r
20333c6d 462 @param[in] VariableDataEntry The variable data entry\r
0c18794e 463\r
464 @return Index of new added item\r
465\r
466**/\r
467UINT32\r
468AddPubKeyInStore (\r
9a12e582
DG		 469 IN UINT8 *PubKey,\r
470 IN VARIABLE_ENTRY_CONSISTENCY *VariableDataEntry\r
0c18794e 471 )\r
472{\r
9a12e582
DG		 473 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
474 BOOLEAN IsFound;\r
475 UINT32 Index;\r
476 VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK Variable;\r
477 UINT8 *Ptr;\r
478 UINT8 *Data;\r
479 UINTN DataSize;\r
480 VARIABLE_ENTRY_CONSISTENCY PublicKeyEntry;\r
481 UINT32 Attributes;\r
0c18794e 482\r
483 if (PubKey == NULL) {\r
484 return 0;\r
485 }\r
486\r
487 Status = FindVariable (\r
488 AUTHVAR_KEYDB_NAME,\r
489 &gEfiAuthenticatedVariableGuid,\r
490 &Variable,\r
ecc722ad 491 &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,\r
492 FALSE\r
0c18794e 493 );\r
ca5a7d87 494 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
25da08c8 495 DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Get public key database variable failure, Status = %r\n", Status));\r
ca5a7d87 496 return 0;\r
497 }\r
498\r
0c18794e 499 //\r
500 // Check whether the public key entry does exist.\r
501 //\r
502 IsFound = FALSE;\r
503 for (Ptr = mPubKeyStore, Index = 1; Index <= mPubKeyNumber; Index++) {\r
504 if (CompareMem (Ptr, PubKey, EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE) == 0) {\r
505 IsFound = TRUE;\r
506 break;\r
507 }\r
508 Ptr += EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE;\r
509 }\r
510\r
511 if (!IsFound) {\r
512 //\r
513 // Add public key in database.\r
514 //\r
4ccef561 515 if (mPubKeyNumber == mMaxKeyNumber) {\r
0c18794e 516 //\r
83758cdc 517 // Public key dadatase is full, try to reclaim invalid key.\r
0c18794e 518 //\r
83758cdc 519 if (AtRuntime ()) {\r
520 //\r
521 // NV storage can't reclaim at runtime.\r
522 //\r
523 return 0;\r
524 }\r
20333c6d 525\r
83758cdc 526 Status = Reclaim (\r
527 mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal.NonVolatileVariableBase,\r
528 &mVariableModuleGlobal->NonVolatileLastVariableOffset,\r
529 FALSE,\r
530 NULL,\r
7baf3c69
SZ		 531 NULL,\r
532 0,\r
83758cdc 533 TRUE\r
534 );\r
535 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
536 return 0;\r
537 }\r
538\r
539 Status = FindVariable (\r
540 AUTHVAR_KEYDB_NAME,\r
541 &gEfiAuthenticatedVariableGuid,\r
542 &Variable,\r
543 &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,\r
544 FALSE\r
545 );\r
ca5a7d87 546 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
25da08c8 547 DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Get public key database variable failure, Status = %r\n", Status));\r
ca5a7d87 548 return 0;\r
549 }\r
83758cdc 550\r
551 DataSize = DataSizeOfVariable (Variable.CurrPtr);\r
552 Data = GetVariableDataPtr (Variable.CurrPtr);\r
553 ASSERT ((DataSize != 0) && (Data != NULL));\r
36bdec3c 554 //\r
20333c6d 555 // "AuthVarKeyDatabase" is an internal used variable. Its DataSize is always ensured not to exceed mPubKeyStore buffer size(See definition before)\r
36bdec3c
CZ		 556 // Therefore, there is no memory overflow in underlying CopyMem.\r
557 //\r
83758cdc 558 CopyMem (mPubKeyStore, (UINT8 *) Data, DataSize);\r
559 mPubKeyNumber = (UINT32) (DataSize / EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE);\r
560\r
4ccef561 561 if (mPubKeyNumber == mMaxKeyNumber) {\r
83758cdc 562 return 0;\r
20333c6d 563 }\r
0c18794e 564 }\r
565\r
9a12e582
DG		 566 //\r
567 // Check the variable space for both public key and variable data.\r
568 //\r
569 PublicKeyEntry.VariableSize = (mPubKeyNumber + 1) * EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE;\r
570 PublicKeyEntry.Guid = &gEfiAuthenticatedVariableGuid;\r
571 PublicKeyEntry.Name = AUTHVAR_KEYDB_NAME;\r
572 Attributes = VARIABLE_ATTRIBUTE_NV_BS_RT | EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS;\r
573\r
574 if (!CheckRemainingSpaceForConsistency (Attributes, &PublicKeyEntry, VariableDataEntry, NULL)) {\r
575 //\r
576 // No enough variable space.\r
577 //\r
578 return 0;\r
579 }\r
580\r
0c18794e 581 CopyMem (mPubKeyStore + mPubKeyNumber * EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE, PubKey, EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE);\r
582 Index = ++mPubKeyNumber;\r
583 //\r
584 // Update public key database variable.\r
585 //\r
586 Status = UpdateVariable (\r
587 AUTHVAR_KEYDB_NAME,\r
588 &gEfiAuthenticatedVariableGuid,\r
589 mPubKeyStore,\r
590 mPubKeyNumber * EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE,\r
9a12e582 591 Attributes,\r
0c18794e 592 0,\r
593 0,\r
594 &Variable,\r
595 NULL\r
596 );\r
25da08c8
DG		 597 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
598 DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Update public key database variable failure, Status = %r\n", Status));\r
599 return 0;\r
600 }\r
0c18794e 601 }\r
602\r
603 return Index;\r
604}\r
605\r
606/**\r
85560919 607 Verify data payload with AuthInfo in EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SHA256_GUID type.\r
0c18794e 608 Follow the steps in UEFI2.2.\r
609\r
dc204d5a
JY		 610 Caution: This function may receive untrusted input.\r
611 This function may be invoked in SMM mode, and datasize and data are external input.\r
612 This function will do basic validation, before parse the data.\r
613 This function will parse the authentication carefully to avoid security issues, like\r
614 buffer overflow, integer overflow.\r
615\r
0c18794e 616 @param[in] Data Pointer to data with AuthInfo.\r
617 @param[in] DataSize Size of Data.\r
618 @param[in] PubKey Public key used for verification.\r
619\r
2d3fb919 620 @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.\r
0c18794e 621 @retval EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION If authentication failed.\r
2d3fb919 622 @retval EFI_SUCCESS Authentication successful.\r
0c18794e 623\r
624**/\r
625EFI_STATUS\r
626VerifyCounterBasedPayload (\r
627 IN UINT8 *Data,\r
628 IN UINTN DataSize,\r
629 IN UINT8 *PubKey\r
630 )\r
631{\r
632 BOOLEAN Status;\r
633 EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION *CertData;\r
634 EFI_CERT_BLOCK_RSA_2048_SHA256 *CertBlock;\r
635 UINT8 Digest[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE];\r
636 VOID *Rsa;\r
275beb2b 637 UINTN PayloadSize;\r
20333c6d 638\r
275beb2b 639 PayloadSize = DataSize - AUTHINFO_SIZE;\r
0c18794e 640 Rsa = NULL;\r
641 CertData = NULL;\r
642 CertBlock = NULL;\r
643\r
644 if (Data == NULL || PubKey == NULL) {\r
645 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
646 }\r
647\r
648 CertData = (EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION *) Data;\r
649 CertBlock = (EFI_CERT_BLOCK_RSA_2048_SHA256 *) (CertData->AuthInfo.CertData);\r
650\r
651 //\r
652 // wCertificateType should be WIN_CERT_TYPE_EFI_GUID.\r
85560919 653 // Cert type should be EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SHA256_GUID.\r
0c18794e 654 //\r
655 if ((CertData->AuthInfo.Hdr.wCertificateType != WIN_CERT_TYPE_EFI_GUID) ||\r
85560919 656 !CompareGuid (&CertData->AuthInfo.CertType, &gEfiCertTypeRsa2048Sha256Guid)\r
0c18794e 657 ) {\r
658 //\r
659 // Invalid AuthInfo type, return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION.\r
660 //\r
661 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r
662 }\r
663 //\r
664 // Hash data payload with SHA256.\r
665 //\r
666 ZeroMem (Digest, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE);\r
667 Status = Sha256Init (mHashCtx);\r
668 if (!Status) {\r
669 goto Done;\r
670 }\r
275beb2b 671 Status = Sha256Update (mHashCtx, Data + AUTHINFO_SIZE, PayloadSize);\r
672 if (!Status) {\r
673 goto Done;\r
674 }\r
675 //\r
676 // Hash Size.\r
677 //\r
678 Status = Sha256Update (mHashCtx, &PayloadSize, sizeof (UINTN));\r
0c18794e 679 if (!Status) {\r
680 goto Done;\r
681 }\r
682 //\r
683 // Hash Monotonic Count.\r
684 //\r
685 Status = Sha256Update (mHashCtx, &CertData->MonotonicCount, sizeof (UINT64));\r
686 if (!Status) {\r
687 goto Done;\r
688 }\r
689 Status = Sha256Final (mHashCtx, Digest);\r
690 if (!Status) {\r
691 goto Done;\r
692 }\r
693 //\r
694 // Generate & Initialize RSA Context.\r
695 //\r
696 Rsa = RsaNew ();\r
697 ASSERT (Rsa != NULL);\r
2d3fb919 698 //\r
0c18794e 699 // Set RSA Key Components.\r
700 // NOTE: Only N and E are needed to be set as RSA public key for signature verification.\r
701 //\r
702 Status = RsaSetKey (Rsa, RsaKeyN, PubKey, EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE);\r
703 if (!Status) {\r
704 goto Done;\r
705 }\r
706 Status = RsaSetKey (Rsa, RsaKeyE, mRsaE, sizeof (mRsaE));\r
707 if (!Status) {\r
708 goto Done;\r
709 }\r
710 //\r
711 // Verify the signature.\r
712 //\r
713 Status = RsaPkcs1Verify (\r
2d3fb919 714 Rsa,\r
715 Digest,\r
716 SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE,\r
717 CertBlock->Signature,\r
0c18794e 718 EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SHA256_SIZE\r
719 );\r
720\r
721Done:\r
722 if (Rsa != NULL) {\r
723 RsaFree (Rsa);\r
724 }\r
725 if (Status) {\r
726 return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
727 } else {\r
728 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r
729 }\r
730}\r
731\r
0c18794e 732/**\r
733 Update platform mode.\r
734\r
735 @param[in] Mode SETUP_MODE or USER_MODE.\r
736\r
737 @return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.\r
738 @return EFI_SUCCESS Update platform mode successfully.\r
739\r
740**/\r
741EFI_STATUS\r
742UpdatePlatformMode (\r
743 IN UINT32 Mode\r
744 )\r
745{\r
746 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
747 VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK Variable;\r
0c18794e 748 UINT8 SecureBootMode;\r
beda2356 749 UINT8 SecureBootEnable;\r
750 UINTN VariableDataSize;\r
2d3fb919 751\r
0c18794e 752 Status = FindVariable (\r
2d3fb919 753 EFI_SETUP_MODE_NAME,\r
754 &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
755 &Variable,\r
ecc722ad 756 &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,\r
757 FALSE\r
0c18794e 758 );\r
759 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
760 return Status;\r
761 }\r
762\r
05a643f9 763 //\r
764 // Update the value of SetupMode variable by a simple mem copy, this could avoid possible\r
765 // variable storage reclaim at runtime.\r
766 //\r
767 mPlatformMode = (UINT8) Mode;\r
768 CopyMem (GetVariableDataPtr (Variable.CurrPtr), &mPlatformMode, sizeof(UINT8));\r
0c18794e 769\r
2d3fb919 770 if (AtRuntime ()) {\r
771 //\r
772 // SecureBoot Variable indicates whether the platform firmware is operating\r
773 // in Secure boot mode (1) or not (0), so we should not change SecureBoot\r
774 // Variable in runtime.\r
775 //\r
776 return Status;\r
777 }\r
778\r
0c18794e 779 //\r
780 // Check "SecureBoot" variable's existence.\r
781 // If it doesn't exist, firmware has no capability to perform driver signing verification,\r
782 // then set "SecureBoot" to 0.\r
783 //\r
784 Status = FindVariable (\r
2d3fb919 785 EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME,\r
786 &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
787 &Variable,\r
ecc722ad 788 &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,\r
789 FALSE\r
0c18794e 790 );\r
791 //\r
792 // If "SecureBoot" variable exists, then check "SetupMode" variable update.\r
793 // If "SetupMode" variable is USER_MODE, "SecureBoot" variable is set to 1.\r
794 // If "SetupMode" variable is SETUP_MODE, "SecureBoot" variable is set to 0.\r
795 //\r
796 if (Variable.CurrPtr == NULL) {\r
797 SecureBootMode = SECURE_BOOT_MODE_DISABLE;\r
798 } else {\r
799 if (mPlatformMode == USER_MODE) {\r
800 SecureBootMode = SECURE_BOOT_MODE_ENABLE;\r
801 } else if (mPlatformMode == SETUP_MODE) {\r
802 SecureBootMode = SECURE_BOOT_MODE_DISABLE;\r
803 } else {\r
804 return EFI_NOT_FOUND;\r
805 }\r
806 }\r
807\r
beda2356 808 Status = UpdateVariable (\r
0c18794e 809 EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME,\r
810 &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
811 &SecureBootMode,\r
812 sizeof(UINT8),\r
0ba17ade 813 EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS,\r
0c18794e 814 0,\r
815 0,\r
816 &Variable,\r
817 NULL\r
818 );\r
beda2356 819 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
820 return Status;\r
821 }\r
822\r
823 //\r
824 // Check "SecureBootEnable" variable's existence. It can enable/disable secure boot feature.\r
825 //\r
826 Status = FindVariable (\r
2d3fb919 827 EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME,\r
828 &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid,\r
829 &Variable,\r
ecc722ad 830 &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,\r
831 FALSE\r
beda2356 832 );\r
2d3fb919 833\r
beda2356 834 if (SecureBootMode == SECURE_BOOT_MODE_ENABLE) {\r
835 //\r
836 // Create the "SecureBootEnable" variable as secure boot is enabled.\r
837 //\r
838 SecureBootEnable = SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE;\r
839 VariableDataSize = sizeof (SecureBootEnable);\r
840 } else {\r
841 //\r
2d3fb919 842 // Delete the "SecureBootEnable" variable if this variable exist as "SecureBoot"\r
beda2356 843 // variable is not in secure boot state.\r
844 //\r
845 if (Variable.CurrPtr == NULL || EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
846 return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
847 }\r
848 SecureBootEnable = SECURE_BOOT_DISABLE;\r
849 VariableDataSize = 0;\r
850 }\r
2d3fb919 851\r
beda2356 852 Status = UpdateVariable (\r
2d3fb919 853 EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME,\r
854 &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid,\r
855 &SecureBootEnable,\r
856 VariableDataSize,\r
857 EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS,\r
858 0,\r
859 0,\r
beda2356 860 &Variable,\r
861 NULL\r
862 );\r
863 return Status;\r
0c18794e 864}\r
865\r
d912bad7 866/**\r
20333c6d 867 Check input data form to make sure it is a valid EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST for PK/KEK/db/dbx/dbt variable.\r
d912bad7 868\r
869 @param[in] VariableName Name of Variable to be check.\r
870 @param[in] VendorGuid Variable vendor GUID.\r
871 @param[in] Data Point to the variable data to be checked.\r
872 @param[in] DataSize Size of Data.\r
873\r
874 @return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid signature list format.\r
875 @return EFI_SUCCESS Passed signature list format check successfully.\r
20333c6d 876\r
d912bad7 877**/\r
878EFI_STATUS\r
879CheckSignatureListFormat(\r
880 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r
881 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r
882 IN VOID *Data,\r
883 IN UINTN DataSize\r
884 )\r
885{\r
886 EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *SigList;\r
887 UINTN SigDataSize;\r
888 UINT32 Index;\r
889 UINT32 SigCount;\r
890 BOOLEAN IsPk;\r
e77f9ef6 891 VOID *RsaContext;\r
892 EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *CertData;\r
893 UINTN CertLen;\r
d912bad7 894\r
895 if (DataSize == 0) {\r
896 return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
897 }\r
898\r
899 ASSERT (VariableName != NULL && VendorGuid != NULL && Data != NULL);\r
900\r
901 if (CompareGuid (VendorGuid, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid) && (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME) == 0)){\r
902 IsPk = TRUE;\r
20333c6d
QL		 903 } else if ((CompareGuid (VendorGuid, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid) && (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME) == 0)) ||\r
904 (CompareGuid (VendorGuid, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid) &&\r
905 ((StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE) == 0) || (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1) == 0) ||\r
906 (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE2) == 0)))) {\r
d912bad7 907 IsPk = FALSE;\r
908 } else {\r
909 return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
910 }\r
911\r
912 SigCount = 0;\r
913 SigList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) Data;\r
914 SigDataSize = DataSize;\r
e77f9ef6 915 RsaContext = NULL;\r
d912bad7 916\r
917 //\r
918 // Walk throuth the input signature list and check the data format.\r
919 // If any signature is incorrectly formed, the whole check will fail.\r
920 //\r
921 while ((SigDataSize > 0) && (SigDataSize >= SigList->SignatureListSize)) {\r
922 for (Index = 0; Index < (sizeof (mSupportSigItem) / sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_ITEM)); Index++ ) {\r
923 if (CompareGuid (&SigList->SignatureType, &mSupportSigItem[Index].SigType)) {\r
924 //\r
20333c6d 925 // The value of SignatureSize should always be 16 (size of SignatureOwner\r
d912bad7 926 // component) add the data length according to signature type.\r
927 //\r
20333c6d 928 if (mSupportSigItem[Index].SigDataSize != ((UINT32) ~0) &&\r
d912bad7 929 (SigList->SignatureSize - sizeof (EFI_GUID)) != mSupportSigItem[Index].SigDataSize) {\r
930 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
931 }\r
932 if (mSupportSigItem[Index].SigHeaderSize != ((UINTN) ~0) &&\r
933 SigList->SignatureHeaderSize != mSupportSigItem[Index].SigHeaderSize) {\r
934 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
935 }\r
936 break;\r
937 }\r
938 }\r
939\r
940 if (Index == (sizeof (mSupportSigItem) / sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_ITEM))) {\r
941 //\r
942 // Undefined signature type.\r
943 //\r
944 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
945 }\r
946\r
e77f9ef6 947 if (CompareGuid (&SigList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Guid)) {\r
948 //\r
949 // Try to retrieve the RSA public key from the X.509 certificate.\r
950 // If this operation fails, it's not a valid certificate.\r
951 //\r
952 RsaContext = RsaNew ();\r
953 if (RsaContext == NULL) {\r
954 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
955 }\r
956 CertData = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) SigList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + SigList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r
957 CertLen = SigList->SignatureSize - sizeof (EFI_GUID);\r
958 if (!RsaGetPublicKeyFromX509 (CertData->SignatureData, CertLen, &RsaContext)) {\r
959 RsaFree (RsaContext);\r
960 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
961 }\r
962 RsaFree (RsaContext);\r
963 }\r
964\r
d912bad7 965 if ((SigList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - SigList->SignatureHeaderSize) % SigList->SignatureSize != 0) {\r
966 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
967 }\r
968 SigCount += (SigList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - SigList->SignatureHeaderSize) / SigList->SignatureSize;\r
20333c6d 969\r
d912bad7 970 SigDataSize -= SigList->SignatureListSize;\r
971 SigList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) SigList + SigList->SignatureListSize);\r
972 }\r
973\r
974 if (((UINTN) SigList - (UINTN) Data) != DataSize) {\r
975 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
976 }\r
977\r
978 if (IsPk && SigCount > 1) {\r
979 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
980 }\r
981\r
982 return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
983}\r
984\r
a555940b
FS		 985/**\r
986 Update "VendorKeys" variable to record the out of band secure boot key modification.\r
987\r
988 @return EFI_SUCCESS Variable is updated successfully.\r
989 @return Others Failed to update variable.\r
20333c6d 990\r
a555940b
FS		 991**/\r
992EFI_STATUS\r
993VendorKeyIsModified (\r
994 VOID\r
995 )\r
996{\r
997 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
998 VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK Variable;\r
999\r
1000 if (mVendorKeyState == VENDOR_KEYS_MODIFIED) {\r
1001 return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
1002 }\r
1003 mVendorKeyState = VENDOR_KEYS_MODIFIED;\r
20333c6d 1004\r
a555940b
FS		 1005 FindVariable (EFI_VENDOR_KEYS_NV_VARIABLE_NAME, &gEfiVendorKeysNvGuid, &Variable, &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal, FALSE);\r
1006 Status = UpdateVariable (\r
1007 EFI_VENDOR_KEYS_NV_VARIABLE_NAME,\r
1008 &gEfiVendorKeysNvGuid,\r
1009 &mVendorKeyState,\r
1010 sizeof (UINT8),\r
1011 EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS,\r
1012 0,\r
1013 0,\r
1014 &Variable,\r
1015 NULL\r
1016 );\r
1017 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
1018 return Status;\r
1019 }\r
1020\r
1021 FindVariable (EFI_VENDOR_KEYS_VARIABLE_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, &Variable, &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal, FALSE);\r
1022 return UpdateVariable (\r
1023 EFI_VENDOR_KEYS_VARIABLE_NAME,\r
1024 &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
1025 &mVendorKeyState,\r
1026 sizeof (UINT8),\r
1027 EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS,\r
1028 0,\r
1029 0,\r
1030 &Variable,\r
1031 NULL\r
1032 );\r
1033}\r
1034\r
0c18794e 1035/**\r
1036 Process variable with platform key for verification.\r
1037\r
dc204d5a
JY		 1038 Caution: This function may receive untrusted input.\r
1039 This function may be invoked in SMM mode, and datasize and data are external input.\r
1040 This function will do basic validation, before parse the data.\r
1041 This function will parse the authentication carefully to avoid security issues, like\r
1042 buffer overflow, integer overflow.\r
1043 This function will check attribute carefully to avoid authentication bypass.\r
1044\r
0c18794e 1045 @param[in] VariableName Name of Variable to be found.\r
1046 @param[in] VendorGuid Variable vendor GUID.\r
1047 @param[in] Data Data pointer.\r
1048 @param[in] DataSize Size of Data found. If size is less than the\r
1049 data, this value contains the required size.\r
1050 @param[in] Variable The variable information which is used to keep track of variable usage.\r
1051 @param[in] Attributes Attribute value of the variable\r
1052 @param[in] IsPk Indicate whether it is to process pk.\r
1053\r
1054 @return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.\r
2d3fb919 1055 @return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION The variable does NOT pass the validation.\r
1056 check carried out by the firmware.\r
0c18794e 1057 @return EFI_SUCCESS Variable passed validation successfully.\r
1058\r
1059**/\r
1060EFI_STATUS\r
1061ProcessVarWithPk (\r
1062 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r
1063 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r
1064 IN VOID *Data,\r
1065 IN UINTN DataSize,\r
1066 IN VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK *Variable,\r
1067 IN UINT32 Attributes OPTIONAL,\r
1068 IN BOOLEAN IsPk\r
1069 )\r
1070{\r
1071 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
0c18794e 1072 BOOLEAN Del;\r
2d3fb919 1073 UINT8 *Payload;\r
1074 UINTN PayloadSize;\r
0c18794e 1075\r
20333c6d 1076 if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE) == 0 ||\r
8c1babfd 1077 (Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) == 0) {\r
0c18794e 1078 //\r
20333c6d 1079 // PK, KEK and db/dbx/dbt should set EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE attribute and should be a time-based\r
8c1babfd 1080 // authenticated variable.\r
0c18794e 1081 //\r
1082 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
1083 }\r
1084\r
785d84ea 1085 Del = FALSE;\r
1086 if ((InCustomMode() && UserPhysicalPresent()) || (mPlatformMode == SETUP_MODE && !IsPk)) {\r
8c1babfd 1087 Payload = (UINT8 *) Data + AUTHINFO2_SIZE (Data);\r
1088 PayloadSize = DataSize - AUTHINFO2_SIZE (Data);\r
785d84ea 1089 if (PayloadSize == 0) {\r
1090 Del = TRUE;\r
1091 }\r
2d3fb919 1092\r
d912bad7 1093 Status = CheckSignatureListFormat(VariableName, VendorGuid, Payload, PayloadSize);\r
1094 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
1095 return Status;\r
1096 }\r
1097\r
2d3fb919 1098 Status = UpdateVariable (\r
1099 VariableName,\r
1100 VendorGuid,\r
1101 Payload,\r
1102 PayloadSize,\r
1103 Attributes,\r
1104 0,\r
8c1babfd 1105 0,\r
2d3fb919 1106 Variable,\r
8c1babfd 1107 &((EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 *) Data)->TimeStamp\r
2d3fb919 1108 );\r
a555940b
FS		 1109 if (EFI_ERROR(Status)) {\r
1110 return Status;\r
1111 }\r
1112\r
5ecc20b5 1113 if ((mPlatformMode != SETUP_MODE) || IsPk) {\r
a555940b
FS		 1114 Status = VendorKeyIsModified ();\r
1115 }\r
785d84ea 1116 } else if (mPlatformMode == USER_MODE) {\r
1117 //\r
1118 // Verify against X509 Cert in PK database.\r
1119 //\r
1120 Status = VerifyTimeBasedPayload (\r
1121 VariableName,\r
1122 VendorGuid,\r
1123 Data,\r
1124 DataSize,\r
1125 Variable,\r
1126 Attributes,\r
1127 AuthVarTypePk,\r
1128 &Del\r
1129 );\r
1130 } else {\r
1131 //\r
1132 // Verify against the certificate in data payload.\r
1133 //\r
1134 Status = VerifyTimeBasedPayload (\r
1135 VariableName,\r
1136 VendorGuid,\r
1137 Data,\r
1138 DataSize,\r
1139 Variable,\r
1140 Attributes,\r
1141 AuthVarTypePayload,\r
1142 &Del\r
1143 );\r
1144 }\r
ecc722ad 1145\r
785d84ea 1146 if (!EFI_ERROR(Status) && IsPk) {\r
1147 if (mPlatformMode == SETUP_MODE && !Del) {\r
1148 //\r
1149 // If enroll PK in setup mode, need change to user mode.\r
1150 //\r
1151 Status = UpdatePlatformMode (USER_MODE);\r
1152 } else if (mPlatformMode == USER_MODE && Del){\r
1153 //\r
1154 // If delete PK in user mode, need change to setup mode.\r
1155 //\r
1156 Status = UpdatePlatformMode (SETUP_MODE);\r
1157 }\r
0c18794e 1158 }\r
1159\r
1160 return Status;\r
1161}\r
1162\r
1163/**\r
1164 Process variable with key exchange key for verification.\r
1165\r
dc204d5a
JY		 1166 Caution: This function may receive untrusted input.\r
1167 This function may be invoked in SMM mode, and datasize and data are external input.\r
1168 This function will do basic validation, before parse the data.\r
1169 This function will parse the authentication carefully to avoid security issues, like\r
1170 buffer overflow, integer overflow.\r
1171 This function will check attribute carefully to avoid authentication bypass.\r
1172\r
0c18794e 1173 @param[in] VariableName Name of Variable to be found.\r
1174 @param[in] VendorGuid Variable vendor GUID.\r
1175 @param[in] Data Data pointer.\r
1176 @param[in] DataSize Size of Data found. If size is less than the\r
1177 data, this value contains the required size.\r
1178 @param[in] Variable The variable information which is used to keep track of variable usage.\r
1179 @param[in] Attributes Attribute value of the variable.\r
1180\r
1181 @return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.\r
2d3fb919 1182 @return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION The variable does NOT pass the validation\r
1183 check carried out by the firmware.\r
0c18794e 1184 @return EFI_SUCCESS Variable pass validation successfully.\r
1185\r
1186**/\r
1187EFI_STATUS\r
1188ProcessVarWithKek (\r
1189 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r
1190 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r
1191 IN VOID *Data,\r
1192 IN UINTN DataSize,\r
1193 IN VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK *Variable,\r
1194 IN UINT32 Attributes OPTIONAL\r
1195 )\r
1196{\r
1197 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
2d3fb919 1198 UINT8 *Payload;\r
1199 UINTN PayloadSize;\r
ecc722ad 1200\r
8c1babfd 1201 if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE) == 0 ||\r
1202 (Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) == 0) {\r
ecc722ad 1203 //\r
20333c6d 1204 // DB, DBX and DBT should set EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE attribute and should be a time-based\r
8c1babfd 1205 // authenticated variable.\r
ecc722ad 1206 //\r
1207 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
1208 }\r
0c18794e 1209\r
ecc722ad 1210 Status = EFI_SUCCESS;\r
1211 if (mPlatformMode == USER_MODE && !(InCustomMode() && UserPhysicalPresent())) {\r
8c1babfd 1212 //\r
1213 // Time-based, verify against X509 Cert KEK.\r
1214 //\r
1215 return VerifyTimeBasedPayload (\r
1216 VariableName,\r
1217 VendorGuid,\r
1218 Data,\r
1219 DataSize,\r
1220 Variable,\r
1221 Attributes,\r
1222 AuthVarTypeKek,\r
1223 NULL\r
1224 );\r
0c18794e 1225 } else {\r
1226 //\r
ecc722ad 1227 // If in setup mode or custom secure boot mode, no authentication needed.\r
0c18794e 1228 //\r
8c1babfd 1229 Payload = (UINT8 *) Data + AUTHINFO2_SIZE (Data);\r
1230 PayloadSize = DataSize - AUTHINFO2_SIZE (Data);\r
2d3fb919 1231\r
e77f9ef6 1232 Status = CheckSignatureListFormat(VariableName, VendorGuid, Payload, PayloadSize);\r
1233 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
1234 return Status;\r
1235 }\r
20333c6d 1236\r
0c18794e 1237 Status = UpdateVariable (\r
2d3fb919 1238 VariableName,\r
1239 VendorGuid,\r
1240 Payload,\r
1241 PayloadSize,\r
1242 Attributes,\r
1243 0,\r
8c1babfd 1244 0,\r
0c18794e 1245 Variable,\r
8c1babfd 1246 &((EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 *) Data)->TimeStamp\r
0c18794e 1247 );\r
a555940b
FS		 1248 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
1249 return Status;\r
1250 }\r
1251\r
1252 if (mPlatformMode != SETUP_MODE) {\r
1253 Status = VendorKeyIsModified ();\r
1254 }\r
0c18794e 1255 }\r
1256\r
1257 return Status;\r
1258}\r
1259\r
f6c50319
SZ		 1260/**\r
1261 Check if it is to delete auth variable.\r
1262\r
1263 @param[in] Data Data pointer.\r
1264 @param[in] DataSize Size of Data.\r
1265 @param[in] Variable The variable information which is used to keep track of variable usage.\r
1266 @param[in] Attributes Attribute value of the variable.\r
1267\r
1268 @retval TRUE It is to delete auth variable.\r
1269 @retval FALSE It is not to delete auth variable.\r
1270\r
1271**/\r
1272BOOLEAN\r
1273IsDeleteAuthVariable (\r
1274 IN VOID *Data,\r
1275 IN UINTN DataSize,\r
1276 IN VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK *Variable,\r
1277 IN UINT32 Attributes\r
1278 )\r
1279{\r
1280 BOOLEAN Del;\r
f6c50319
SZ		 1281 UINTN PayloadSize;\r
1282\r
1283 Del = FALSE;\r
1284\r
1285 //\r
1286 // To delete a variable created with the EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS\r
1287 // or the EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS attribute,\r
1288 // SetVariable must be used with attributes matching the existing variable\r
1289 // and the DataSize set to the size of the AuthInfo descriptor.\r
1290 //\r
1291 if ((Variable->CurrPtr != NULL) &&\r
1292 (Attributes == Variable->CurrPtr->Attributes) &&\r
1293 ((Attributes & (EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS)) != 0)) {\r
1294 if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0) {\r
f6c50319
SZ		 1295 PayloadSize = DataSize - AUTHINFO2_SIZE (Data);\r
1296 if (PayloadSize == 0) {\r
1297 Del = TRUE;\r
1298 }\r
1299 } else {\r
f6c50319
SZ		 1300 PayloadSize = DataSize - AUTHINFO_SIZE;\r
1301 if (PayloadSize == 0) {\r
1302 Del = TRUE;\r
1303 }\r
1304 }\r
1305 }\r
1306\r
1307 return Del;\r
1308}\r
1309\r
0c18794e 1310/**\r
1311 Process variable with EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS/EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS set\r
1312\r
dc204d5a
JY		 1313 Caution: This function may receive untrusted input.\r
1314 This function may be invoked in SMM mode, and datasize and data are external input.\r
1315 This function will do basic validation, before parse the data.\r
1316 This function will parse the authentication carefully to avoid security issues, like\r
1317 buffer overflow, integer overflow.\r
1318 This function will check attribute carefully to avoid authentication bypass.\r
1319\r
0c18794e 1320 @param[in] VariableName Name of Variable to be found.\r
1321 @param[in] VendorGuid Variable vendor GUID.\r
1322\r
1323 @param[in] Data Data pointer.\r
f6c50319 1324 @param[in] DataSize Size of Data.\r
0c18794e 1325 @param[in] Variable The variable information which is used to keep track of variable usage.\r
1326 @param[in] Attributes Attribute value of the variable.\r
1327\r
1328 @return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.\r
1329 @return EFI_WRITE_PROTECTED Variable is write-protected and needs authentication with\r
1330 EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS set.\r
275beb2b 1331 @return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES The Database to save the public key is full.\r
0c18794e 1332 @return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION The variable is with EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS\r
2d3fb919 1333 set, but the AuthInfo does NOT pass the validation\r
1334 check carried out by the firmware.\r
0c18794e 1335 @return EFI_SUCCESS Variable is not write-protected or pass validation successfully.\r
1336\r
1337**/\r
1338EFI_STATUS\r
1339ProcessVariable (\r
1340 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r
1341 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r
1342 IN VOID *Data,\r
1343 IN UINTN DataSize,\r
1344 IN VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK *Variable,\r
1345 IN UINT32 Attributes\r
1346 )\r
1347{\r
1348 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
1349 BOOLEAN IsDeletion;\r
1350 BOOLEAN IsFirstTime;\r
1351 UINT8 *PubKey;\r
1352 EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION *CertData;\r
1353 EFI_CERT_BLOCK_RSA_2048_SHA256 *CertBlock;\r
1354 UINT32 KeyIndex;\r
1355 UINT64 MonotonicCount;\r
9a12e582 1356 VARIABLE_ENTRY_CONSISTENCY VariableDataEntry;\r
0c18794e 1357\r
2d3fb919 1358 KeyIndex = 0;\r
0c18794e 1359 CertData = NULL;\r
1360 CertBlock = NULL;\r
1361 PubKey = NULL;\r
1362 IsDeletion = FALSE;\r
aef8cea9 1363 Status = EFI_SUCCESS;\r
0c18794e 1364\r
856236ca 1365 if (IsDeleteAuthVariable (Data, DataSize, Variable, Attributes) && UserPhysicalPresent()) {\r
ecc722ad 1366 //\r
f6c50319 1367 // Allow the delete operation of common authenticated variable at user physical presence.\r
ecc722ad 1368 //\r
856236ca
SZ		 1369 if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0) {\r
1370 Status = DeleteCertsFromDb (VariableName, VendorGuid);\r
f6c50319 1371 }\r
856236ca
SZ		 1372 if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
1373 Status = UpdateVariable (\r
1374 VariableName,\r
1375 VendorGuid,\r
1376 NULL,\r
1377 0,\r
1378 0,\r
1379 0,\r
1380 0,\r
1381 Variable,\r
1382 NULL\r
1383 );\r
f6c50319 1384 }\r
856236ca
SZ		 1385 return Status;\r
1386 }\r
1387\r
1388 if (NeedPhysicallyPresent (VariableName, VendorGuid) && !UserPhysicalPresent()) {\r
1389 //\r
1390 // This variable is protected, only physical present user could modify its value.\r
1391 //\r
1392 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r
ecc722ad 1393 }\r
20333c6d 1394\r
89be2b03 1395 //\r
1396 // A time-based authenticated variable and a count-based authenticated variable\r
1397 // can't be updated by each other.\r
20333c6d
QL		 1398 //\r
1399 if (Variable->CurrPtr != NULL) {\r
89be2b03 1400 if (((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0) &&\r
1401 ((Variable->CurrPtr->Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0)) {\r
20333c6d 1402 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r
89be2b03 1403 }\r
20333c6d
QL		 1404\r
1405 if (((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0) &&\r
89be2b03 1406 ((Variable->CurrPtr->Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0)) {\r
20333c6d 1407 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r
89be2b03 1408 }\r
1409 }\r
20333c6d 1410\r
0c18794e 1411 //\r
1412 // Process Time-based Authenticated variable.\r
1413 //\r
1414 if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0) {\r
ed47ae02 1415 return VerifyTimeBasedPayload (\r
1416 VariableName,\r
1417 VendorGuid,\r
1418 Data,\r
1419 DataSize,\r
1420 Variable,\r
1421 Attributes,\r
1422 AuthVarTypePriv,\r
1423 NULL\r
1424 );\r
0c18794e 1425 }\r
2d3fb919 1426\r
0c18794e 1427 //\r
1428 // Determine if first time SetVariable with the EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS.\r
1429 //\r
1430 if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0) {\r
1431 //\r
1432 // Determine current operation type.\r
1433 //\r
1434 if (DataSize == AUTHINFO_SIZE) {\r
1435 IsDeletion = TRUE;\r
1436 }\r
1437 //\r
1438 // Determine whether this is the first time with EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS set.\r
1439 //\r
1440 if (Variable->CurrPtr == NULL) {\r
1441 IsFirstTime = TRUE;\r
1442 } else if ((Variable->CurrPtr->Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) == 0) {\r
1443 IsFirstTime = TRUE;\r
1444 } else {\r
1445 KeyIndex = Variable->CurrPtr->PubKeyIndex;\r
1446 IsFirstTime = FALSE;\r
1447 }\r
20333c6d 1448 } else if ((Variable->CurrPtr != NULL) &&\r
389c8779 1449 ((Variable->CurrPtr->Attributes & (EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS)) != 0)\r
1450 ) {\r
0c18794e 1451 //\r
1452 // If the variable is already write-protected, it always needs authentication before update.\r
1453 //\r
1454 return EFI_WRITE_PROTECTED;\r
1455 } else {\r
1456 //\r
1457 // If without EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS, set and attributes collision.\r
1458 // That means it is not authenticated variable, just update variable as usual.\r
1459 //\r
1460 Status = UpdateVariable (VariableName, VendorGuid, Data, DataSize, Attributes, 0, 0, Variable, NULL);\r
1461 return Status;\r
1462 }\r
1463\r
1464 //\r
1465 // Get PubKey and check Monotonic Count value corresponding to the variable.\r
1466 //\r
1467 CertData = (EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION *) Data;\r
1468 CertBlock = (EFI_CERT_BLOCK_RSA_2048_SHA256 *) (CertData->AuthInfo.CertData);\r
1469 PubKey = CertBlock->PublicKey;\r
1470\r
1471 //\r
1472 // Update Monotonic Count value.\r
1473 //\r
1474 MonotonicCount = CertData->MonotonicCount;\r
1475\r
1476 if (!IsFirstTime) {\r
1477 //\r
8c83d0c0 1478 // 2 cases need to check here\r
20333c6d 1479 // 1. Internal PubKey variable. PubKeyIndex is always 0\r
8c83d0c0 1480 // 2. Other counter-based AuthVariable. Check input PubKey.\r
0c18794e 1481 //\r
8c83d0c0 1482 if (KeyIndex == 0 || CompareMem (PubKey, mPubKeyStore + (KeyIndex - 1) * EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE, EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE) != 0) {\r
0c18794e 1483 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r
1484 }\r
1485 //\r
1486 // Compare the current monotonic count and ensure that it is greater than the last SetVariable\r
1487 // operation with the EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS attribute set.\r
1488 //\r
1489 if (CertData->MonotonicCount <= Variable->CurrPtr->MonotonicCount) {\r
1490 //\r
1491 // Monotonic count check fail, suspicious replay attack, return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION.\r
1492 //\r
1493 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r
1494 }\r
2d3fb919 1495 }\r
0c18794e 1496 //\r
1497 // Verify the certificate in Data payload.\r
1498 //\r
1499 Status = VerifyCounterBasedPayload (Data, DataSize, PubKey);\r
1500 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
1501 return Status;\r
1502 }\r
2d3fb919 1503\r
0c18794e 1504 //\r
1505 // Now, the signature has been verified!\r
1506 //\r
1507 if (IsFirstTime && !IsDeletion) {\r
9a12e582
DG		 1508 VariableDataEntry.VariableSize = DataSize - AUTHINFO_SIZE;\r
1509 VariableDataEntry.Guid = VendorGuid;\r
1510 VariableDataEntry.Name = VariableName;\r
1511\r
0c18794e 1512 //\r
1513 // Update public key database variable if need.\r
1514 //\r
9a12e582 1515 KeyIndex = AddPubKeyInStore (PubKey, &VariableDataEntry);\r
4e33001c 1516 if (KeyIndex == 0) {\r
275beb2b 1517 return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
4e33001c 1518 }\r
0c18794e 1519 }\r
1520\r
1521 //\r
1522 // Verification pass.\r
1523 //\r
1524 return UpdateVariable (VariableName, VendorGuid, (UINT8*)Data + AUTHINFO_SIZE, DataSize - AUTHINFO_SIZE, Attributes, KeyIndex, MonotonicCount, Variable, NULL);\r
1525}\r
1526\r
2d3fb919 1527/**\r
1528 Merge two buffers which formatted as EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST. Only the new EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA\r
1529 will be appended to the original EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST, duplicate EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA\r
1530 will be ignored.\r
1531\r
732d199d 1532 @param[in, out] Data Pointer to original EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST.\r
1533 @param[in] DataSize Size of Data buffer.\r
20333c6d 1534 @param[in] FreeBufSize Size of free data buffer\r
732d199d 1535 @param[in] NewData Pointer to new EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST to be appended.\r
1536 @param[in] NewDataSize Size of NewData buffer.\r
1537 @param[out] MergedBufSize Size of the merged buffer\r
2d3fb919 1538\r
732d199d 1539 @return EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL if input Data buffer overflowed\r
2d3fb919 1540\r
1541**/\r
732d199d 1542EFI_STATUS\r
2d3fb919 1543AppendSignatureList (\r
1544 IN OUT VOID *Data,\r
1545 IN UINTN DataSize,\r
732d199d 1546 IN UINTN FreeBufSize,\r
2d3fb919 1547 IN VOID *NewData,\r
732d199d 1548 IN UINTN NewDataSize,\r
1549 OUT UINTN *MergedBufSize\r
2d3fb919 1550 )\r
1551{\r
1552 EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *CertList;\r
1553 EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *Cert;\r
1554 UINTN CertCount;\r
1555 EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *NewCertList;\r
1556 EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *NewCert;\r
1557 UINTN NewCertCount;\r
1558 UINTN Index;\r
1559 UINTN Index2;\r
1560 UINTN Size;\r
1561 UINT8 *Tail;\r
1562 UINTN CopiedCount;\r
1563 UINTN SignatureListSize;\r
1564 BOOLEAN IsNewCert;\r
1565\r
1566 Tail = (UINT8 *) Data + DataSize;\r
1567\r
1568 NewCertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) NewData;\r
1569 while ((NewDataSize > 0) && (NewDataSize >= NewCertList->SignatureListSize)) {\r
1570 NewCert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) NewCertList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + NewCertList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r
1571 NewCertCount = (NewCertList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - NewCertList->SignatureHeaderSize) / NewCertList->SignatureSize;\r
1572\r
1573 CopiedCount = 0;\r
1574 for (Index = 0; Index < NewCertCount; Index++) {\r
1575 IsNewCert = TRUE;\r
1576\r
1577 Size = DataSize;\r
1578 CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) Data;\r
1579 while ((Size > 0) && (Size >= CertList->SignatureListSize)) {\r
1580 if (CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &NewCertList->SignatureType) &&\r
1581 (CertList->SignatureSize == NewCertList->SignatureSize)) {\r
1582 Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r
1583 CertCount = (CertList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - CertList->SignatureHeaderSize) / CertList->SignatureSize;\r
1584 for (Index2 = 0; Index2 < CertCount; Index2++) {\r
1585 //\r
1586 // Iterate each Signature Data in this Signature List.\r
1587 //\r
1588 if (CompareMem (NewCert, Cert, CertList->SignatureSize) == 0) {\r
1589 IsNewCert = FALSE;\r
1590 break;\r
1591 }\r
1592 Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) Cert + CertList->SignatureSize);\r
1593 }\r
1594 }\r
1595\r
1596 if (!IsNewCert) {\r
1597 break;\r
1598 }\r
1599 Size -= CertList->SignatureListSize;\r
1600 CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + CertList->SignatureListSize);\r
1601 }\r
1602\r
1603 if (IsNewCert) {\r
1604 //\r
1605 // New EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA, append it.\r
1606 //\r
1607 if (CopiedCount == 0) {\r
732d199d 1608 if (FreeBufSize < sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + NewCertList->SignatureHeaderSize) {\r
1609 return EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;\r
1610 }\r
1611\r
2d3fb919 1612 //\r
1613 // Copy EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST header for only once.\r
1614 //\r
732d199d 1615\r
2d3fb919 1616 CopyMem (Tail, NewCertList, sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + NewCertList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r
1617 Tail = Tail + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + NewCertList->SignatureHeaderSize;\r
732d199d 1618 FreeBufSize -= sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + NewCertList->SignatureHeaderSize;\r
2d3fb919 1619 }\r
1620\r
732d199d 1621 if (FreeBufSize < NewCertList->SignatureSize) {\r
1622 return EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;\r
1623 }\r
2d3fb919 1624 CopyMem (Tail, NewCert, NewCertList->SignatureSize);\r
1625 Tail += NewCertList->SignatureSize;\r
732d199d 1626 FreeBufSize -= NewCertList->SignatureSize;\r
2d3fb919 1627 CopiedCount++;\r
1628 }\r
1629\r
1630 NewCert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) NewCert + NewCertList->SignatureSize);\r
1631 }\r
1632\r
1633 //\r
1634 // Update SignatureListSize in newly appended EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST.\r
1635 //\r
1636 if (CopiedCount != 0) {\r
1637 SignatureListSize = sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + NewCertList->SignatureHeaderSize + (CopiedCount * NewCertList->SignatureSize);\r
1638 CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) (Tail - SignatureListSize);\r
1639 CertList->SignatureListSize = (UINT32) SignatureListSize;\r
1640 }\r
1641\r
1642 NewDataSize -= NewCertList->SignatureListSize;\r
1643 NewCertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) NewCertList + NewCertList->SignatureListSize);\r
1644 }\r
1645\r
732d199d 1646 *MergedBufSize = (Tail - (UINT8 *) Data);\r
1647 return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
2d3fb919 1648}\r
1649\r
0c18794e 1650/**\r
1651 Compare two EFI_TIME data.\r
1652\r
1653\r
1654 @param FirstTime A pointer to the first EFI_TIME data.\r
1655 @param SecondTime A pointer to the second EFI_TIME data.\r
1656\r
1657 @retval TRUE The FirstTime is not later than the SecondTime.\r
1658 @retval FALSE The FirstTime is later than the SecondTime.\r
1659\r
1660**/\r
1661BOOLEAN\r
1662CompareTimeStamp (\r
1663 IN EFI_TIME *FirstTime,\r
1664 IN EFI_TIME *SecondTime\r
1665 )\r
1666{\r
1667 if (FirstTime->Year != SecondTime->Year) {\r
1668 return (BOOLEAN) (FirstTime->Year < SecondTime->Year);\r
1669 } else if (FirstTime->Month != SecondTime->Month) {\r
1670 return (BOOLEAN) (FirstTime->Month < SecondTime->Month);\r
1671 } else if (FirstTime->Day != SecondTime->Day) {\r
1672 return (BOOLEAN) (FirstTime->Day < SecondTime->Day);\r
1673 } else if (FirstTime->Hour != SecondTime->Hour) {\r
1674 return (BOOLEAN) (FirstTime->Hour < SecondTime->Hour);\r
1675 } else if (FirstTime->Minute != SecondTime->Minute) {\r
42ed7604 1676 return (BOOLEAN) (FirstTime->Minute < SecondTime->Minute);\r
2d3fb919 1677 }\r
0c18794e 1678\r
1679 return (BOOLEAN) (FirstTime->Second <= SecondTime->Second);\r
1680}\r
1681\r
ed47ae02 1682/**\r
1683 Find matching signer's certificates for common authenticated variable\r
1684 by corresponding VariableName and VendorGuid from "certdb".\r
1685\r
1686 The data format of "certdb":\r
1687 //\r
1688 // UINT32 CertDbListSize;\r
1689 // /// AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA Certs1[];\r
1690 // /// AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA Certs2[];\r
1691 // /// ...\r
1692 // /// AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA Certsn[];\r
1693 //\r
1694\r
1695 @param[in] VariableName Name of authenticated Variable.\r
1696 @param[in] VendorGuid Vendor GUID of authenticated Variable.\r
1697 @param[in] Data Pointer to variable "certdb".\r
1698 @param[in] DataSize Size of variable "certdb".\r
1699 @param[out] CertOffset Offset of matching CertData, from starting of Data.\r
1700 @param[out] CertDataSize Length of CertData in bytes.\r
1701 @param[out] CertNodeOffset Offset of matching AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA , from\r
1702 starting of Data.\r
1703 @param[out] CertNodeSize Length of AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA in bytes.\r
1704\r
1705 @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Any input parameter is invalid.\r
1706 @retval EFI_NOT_FOUND Fail to find matching certs.\r
1707 @retval EFI_SUCCESS Find matching certs and output parameters.\r
1708\r
1709**/\r
1710EFI_STATUS\r
1711FindCertsFromDb (\r
1712 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r
1713 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r
1714 IN UINT8 *Data,\r
1715 IN UINTN DataSize,\r
1716 OUT UINT32 *CertOffset, OPTIONAL\r
1717 OUT UINT32 *CertDataSize, OPTIONAL\r
1718 OUT UINT32 *CertNodeOffset,OPTIONAL\r
1719 OUT UINT32 *CertNodeSize OPTIONAL\r
1720 )\r
1721{\r
1722 UINT32 Offset;\r
1723 AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA *Ptr;\r
1724 UINT32 CertSize;\r
1725 UINT32 NameSize;\r
1726 UINT32 NodeSize;\r
1727 UINT32 CertDbListSize;\r
1728\r
1729 if ((VariableName == NULL) || (VendorGuid == NULL) || (Data == NULL)) {\r
1730 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
1731 }\r
1732\r
1733 //\r
1734 // Check whether DataSize matches recorded CertDbListSize.\r
1735 //\r
1736 if (DataSize < sizeof (UINT32)) {\r
1737 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
1738 }\r
1739\r
1740 CertDbListSize = ReadUnaligned32 ((UINT32 *) Data);\r
1741\r
1742 if (CertDbListSize != (UINT32) DataSize) {\r
1743 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
1744 }\r
1745\r
1746 Offset = sizeof (UINT32);\r
1747\r
1748 //\r
1749 // Get corresponding certificates by VendorGuid and VariableName.\r
1750 //\r
1751 while (Offset < (UINT32) DataSize) {\r
1752 Ptr = (AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA *) (Data + Offset);\r
1753 //\r
1754 // Check whether VendorGuid matches.\r
1755 //\r
1756 if (CompareGuid (&Ptr->VendorGuid, VendorGuid)) {\r
1757 NodeSize = ReadUnaligned32 (&Ptr->CertNodeSize);\r
1758 NameSize = ReadUnaligned32 (&Ptr->NameSize);\r
1759 CertSize = ReadUnaligned32 (&Ptr->CertDataSize);\r
1760\r
1761 if (NodeSize != sizeof (EFI_GUID) + sizeof (UINT32) * 3 + CertSize +\r
1762 sizeof (CHAR16) * NameSize) {\r
1763 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
1764 }\r
1765\r
1766 Offset = Offset + sizeof (EFI_GUID) + sizeof (UINT32) * 3;\r
1767 //\r
1768 // Check whether VariableName matches.\r
1769 //\r
20333c6d 1770 if ((NameSize == StrLen (VariableName)) &&\r
ed47ae02 1771 (CompareMem (Data + Offset, VariableName, NameSize * sizeof (CHAR16)) == 0)) {\r
1772 Offset = Offset + NameSize * sizeof (CHAR16);\r
1773\r
1774 if (CertOffset != NULL) {\r
1775 *CertOffset = Offset;\r
1776 }\r
1777\r
1778 if (CertDataSize != NULL) {\r
20333c6d 1779 *CertDataSize = CertSize;\r
ed47ae02 1780 }\r
1781\r
1782 if (CertNodeOffset != NULL) {\r
1783 *CertNodeOffset = (UINT32) ((UINT8 *) Ptr - Data);\r
1784 }\r
1785\r
1786 if (CertNodeSize != NULL) {\r
1787 *CertNodeSize = NodeSize;\r
1788 }\r
1789\r
1790 return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
1791 } else {\r
1792 Offset = Offset + NameSize * sizeof (CHAR16) + CertSize;\r
1793 }\r
1794 } else {\r
1795 NodeSize = ReadUnaligned32 (&Ptr->CertNodeSize);\r
1796 Offset = Offset + NodeSize;\r
1797 }\r
1798 }\r
1799\r
20333c6d 1800 return EFI_NOT_FOUND;\r
ed47ae02 1801}\r
1802\r
1803/**\r
1804 Retrieve signer's certificates for common authenticated variable\r
1805 by corresponding VariableName and VendorGuid from "certdb".\r
1806\r
1807 @param[in] VariableName Name of authenticated Variable.\r
1808 @param[in] VendorGuid Vendor GUID of authenticated Variable.\r
1809 @param[out] CertData Pointer to signer's certificates.\r
1810 @param[out] CertDataSize Length of CertData in bytes.\r
1811\r
1812 @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Any input parameter is invalid.\r
1813 @retval EFI_NOT_FOUND Fail to find "certdb" or matching certs.\r
1814 @retval EFI_SUCCESS Get signer's certificates successfully.\r
1815\r
1816**/\r
1817EFI_STATUS\r
1818GetCertsFromDb (\r
1819 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r
1820 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r
1821 OUT UINT8 **CertData,\r
1822 OUT UINT32 *CertDataSize\r
1823 )\r
1824{\r
1825 VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK CertDbVariable;\r
1826 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
1827 UINT8 *Data;\r
1828 UINTN DataSize;\r
1829 UINT32 CertOffset;\r
1830\r
1831 if ((VariableName == NULL) || (VendorGuid == NULL) || (CertData == NULL) || (CertDataSize == NULL)) {\r
1832 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
1833 }\r
20333c6d 1834\r
ed47ae02 1835 //\r
1836 // Get variable "certdb".\r
1837 //\r
1838 Status = FindVariable (\r
1839 EFI_CERT_DB_NAME,\r
1840 &gEfiCertDbGuid,\r
1841 &CertDbVariable,\r
1842 &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,\r
1843 FALSE\r
20333c6d 1844 );\r
ed47ae02 1845 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
1846 return Status;\r
1847 }\r
1848\r
1849 DataSize = DataSizeOfVariable (CertDbVariable.CurrPtr);\r
1850 Data = GetVariableDataPtr (CertDbVariable.CurrPtr);\r
1851 if ((DataSize == 0) || (Data == NULL)) {\r
1852 ASSERT (FALSE);\r
1853 return EFI_NOT_FOUND;\r
1854 }\r
1855\r
1856 Status = FindCertsFromDb (\r
1857 VariableName,\r
1858 VendorGuid,\r
1859 Data,\r
1860 DataSize,\r
1861 &CertOffset,\r
1862 CertDataSize,\r
1863 NULL,\r
1864 NULL\r
1865 );\r
1866\r
1867 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
1868 return Status;\r
1869 }\r
1870\r
1871 *CertData = Data + CertOffset;\r
1872 return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
1873}\r
1874\r
1875/**\r
1876 Delete matching signer's certificates when deleting common authenticated\r
1877 variable by corresponding VariableName and VendorGuid from "certdb".\r
1878\r
1879 @param[in] VariableName Name of authenticated Variable.\r
1880 @param[in] VendorGuid Vendor GUID of authenticated Variable.\r
1881\r
1882 @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Any input parameter is invalid.\r
1883 @retval EFI_NOT_FOUND Fail to find "certdb" or matching certs.\r
1884 @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES The operation is failed due to lack of resources.\r
1885 @retval EFI_SUCCESS The operation is completed successfully.\r
1886\r
1887**/\r
1888EFI_STATUS\r
1889DeleteCertsFromDb (\r
1890 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r
1891 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid\r
1892 )\r
1893{\r
1894 VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK CertDbVariable;\r
1895 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
1896 UINT8 *Data;\r
1897 UINTN DataSize;\r
1898 UINT32 VarAttr;\r
1899 UINT32 CertNodeOffset;\r
1900 UINT32 CertNodeSize;\r
1901 UINT8 *NewCertDb;\r
1902 UINT32 NewCertDbSize;\r
1903\r
1904 if ((VariableName == NULL) || (VendorGuid == NULL)) {\r
1905 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
1906 }\r
20333c6d 1907\r
ed47ae02 1908 //\r
1909 // Get variable "certdb".\r
1910 //\r
1911 Status = FindVariable (\r
1912 EFI_CERT_DB_NAME,\r
1913 &gEfiCertDbGuid,\r
1914 &CertDbVariable,\r
1915 &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,\r
1916 FALSE\r
20333c6d 1917 );\r
ed47ae02 1918 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
1919 return Status;\r
1920 }\r
1921\r
1922 DataSize = DataSizeOfVariable (CertDbVariable.CurrPtr);\r
1923 Data = GetVariableDataPtr (CertDbVariable.CurrPtr);\r
1924 if ((DataSize == 0) || (Data == NULL)) {\r
1925 ASSERT (FALSE);\r
1926 return EFI_NOT_FOUND;\r
1927 }\r
1928\r
1929 if (DataSize == sizeof (UINT32)) {\r
1930 //\r
1931 // There is no certs in certdb.\r
1932 //\r
1933 return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
1934 }\r
1935\r
1936 //\r
1937 // Get corresponding cert node from certdb.\r
1938 //\r
1939 Status = FindCertsFromDb (\r
1940 VariableName,\r
1941 VendorGuid,\r
1942 Data,\r
1943 DataSize,\r
1944 NULL,\r
1945 NULL,\r
1946 &CertNodeOffset,\r
1947 &CertNodeSize\r
1948 );\r
1949\r
1950 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
1951 return Status;\r
1952 }\r
1953\r
1954 if (DataSize < (CertNodeOffset + CertNodeSize)) {\r
1955 return EFI_NOT_FOUND;\r
1956 }\r
1957\r
1958 //\r
1959 // Construct new data content of variable "certdb".\r
1960 //\r
1961 NewCertDbSize = (UINT32) DataSize - CertNodeSize;\r
f6e23353 1962 NewCertDb = (UINT8*) mCertDbStore;\r
ed47ae02 1963\r
1964 //\r
1965 // Copy the DB entries before deleting node.\r
1966 //\r
1967 CopyMem (NewCertDb, Data, CertNodeOffset);\r
1968 //\r
1969 // Update CertDbListSize.\r
1970 //\r
1971 CopyMem (NewCertDb, &NewCertDbSize, sizeof (UINT32));\r
1972 //\r
1973 // Copy the DB entries after deleting node.\r
1974 //\r
1975 if (DataSize > (CertNodeOffset + CertNodeSize)) {\r
1976 CopyMem (\r
1977 NewCertDb + CertNodeOffset,\r
1978 Data + CertNodeOffset + CertNodeSize,\r
1979 DataSize - CertNodeOffset - CertNodeSize\r
1980 );\r
1981 }\r
1982\r
1983 //\r
1984 // Set "certdb".\r
20333c6d
QL		 1985 //\r
1986 VarAttr = EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS;\r
ed47ae02 1987 Status = UpdateVariable (\r
1988 EFI_CERT_DB_NAME,\r
1989 &gEfiCertDbGuid,\r
1990 NewCertDb,\r
1991 NewCertDbSize,\r
1992 VarAttr,\r
1993 0,\r
1994 0,\r
1995 &CertDbVariable,\r
1996 NULL\r
1997 );\r
1998\r
ed47ae02 1999 return Status;\r
2000}\r
2001\r
2002/**\r
2003 Insert signer's certificates for common authenticated variable with VariableName\r
2004 and VendorGuid in AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA to "certdb".\r
2005\r
2006 @param[in] VariableName Name of authenticated Variable.\r
2007 @param[in] VendorGuid Vendor GUID of authenticated Variable.\r
2008 @param[in] CertData Pointer to signer's certificates.\r
2009 @param[in] CertDataSize Length of CertData in bytes.\r
2010\r
2011 @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Any input parameter is invalid.\r
2012 @retval EFI_ACCESS_DENIED An AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA entry with same VariableName\r
2013 and VendorGuid already exists.\r
2014 @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES The operation is failed due to lack of resources.\r
2015 @retval EFI_SUCCESS Insert an AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA entry to "certdb"\r
2016\r
2017**/\r
2018EFI_STATUS\r
2019InsertCertsToDb (\r
2020 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r
2021 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r
2022 IN UINT8 *CertData,\r
2023 IN UINTN CertDataSize\r
2024 )\r
2025{\r
2026 VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK CertDbVariable;\r
2027 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
2028 UINT8 *Data;\r
2029 UINTN DataSize;\r
2030 UINT32 VarAttr;\r
2031 UINT8 *NewCertDb;\r
2032 UINT32 NewCertDbSize;\r
2033 UINT32 CertNodeSize;\r
2034 UINT32 NameSize;\r
2035 AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA *Ptr;\r
2036\r
2037 if ((VariableName == NULL) || (VendorGuid == NULL) || (CertData == NULL)) {\r
2038 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
2039 }\r
20333c6d 2040\r
ed47ae02 2041 //\r
2042 // Get variable "certdb".\r
2043 //\r
2044 Status = FindVariable (\r
2045 EFI_CERT_DB_NAME,\r
2046 &gEfiCertDbGuid,\r
2047 &CertDbVariable,\r
2048 &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,\r
2049 FALSE\r
20333c6d 2050 );\r
ed47ae02 2051 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
2052 return Status;\r
2053 }\r
2054\r
2055 DataSize = DataSizeOfVariable (CertDbVariable.CurrPtr);\r
2056 Data = GetVariableDataPtr (CertDbVariable.CurrPtr);\r
2057 if ((DataSize == 0) || (Data == NULL)) {\r
2058 ASSERT (FALSE);\r
2059 return EFI_NOT_FOUND;\r
2060 }\r
2061\r
2062 //\r
2063 // Find whether matching cert node already exists in "certdb".\r
2064 // If yes return error.\r
2065 //\r
2066 Status = FindCertsFromDb (\r
2067 VariableName,\r
2068 VendorGuid,\r
2069 Data,\r
2070 DataSize,\r
2071 NULL,\r
2072 NULL,\r
2073 NULL,\r
2074 NULL\r
2075 );\r
2076\r
2077 if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
2078 ASSERT (FALSE);\r
2079 return EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;\r
2080 }\r
2081\r
2082 //\r
2083 // Construct new data content of variable "certdb".\r
2084 //\r
2085 NameSize = (UINT32) StrLen (VariableName);\r
20333c6d 2086 CertNodeSize = sizeof (AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA) + (UINT32) CertDataSize + NameSize * sizeof (CHAR16);\r
f6e23353 2087 NewCertDbSize = (UINT32) DataSize + CertNodeSize;\r
4ccef561 2088 if (NewCertDbSize > mMaxCertDbSize) {\r
ed47ae02 2089 return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
2090 }\r
f6e23353 2091 NewCertDb = (UINT8*) mCertDbStore;\r
ed47ae02 2092\r
2093 //\r
2094 // Copy the DB entries before deleting node.\r
2095 //\r
2096 CopyMem (NewCertDb, Data, DataSize);\r
2097 //\r
2098 // Update CertDbListSize.\r
2099 //\r
2100 CopyMem (NewCertDb, &NewCertDbSize, sizeof (UINT32));\r
2101 //\r
2102 // Construct new cert node.\r
2103 //\r
2104 Ptr = (AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA *) (NewCertDb + DataSize);\r
2105 CopyGuid (&Ptr->VendorGuid, VendorGuid);\r
2106 CopyMem (&Ptr->CertNodeSize, &CertNodeSize, sizeof (UINT32));\r
2107 CopyMem (&Ptr->NameSize, &NameSize, sizeof (UINT32));\r
2108 CopyMem (&Ptr->CertDataSize, &CertDataSize, sizeof (UINT32));\r
20333c6d 2109\r
ed47ae02 2110 CopyMem (\r
2111 (UINT8 *) Ptr + sizeof (AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA),\r
2112 VariableName,\r
2113 NameSize * sizeof (CHAR16)\r
2114 );\r
2115\r
2116 CopyMem (\r
2117 (UINT8 *) Ptr + sizeof (AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA) + NameSize * sizeof (CHAR16),\r
2118 CertData,\r
2119 CertDataSize\r
2120 );\r
20333c6d 2121\r
ed47ae02 2122 //\r
2123 // Set "certdb".\r
20333c6d
QL		 2124 //\r
2125 VarAttr = EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS;\r
ed47ae02 2126 Status = UpdateVariable (\r
2127 EFI_CERT_DB_NAME,\r
2128 &gEfiCertDbGuid,\r
2129 NewCertDb,\r
2130 NewCertDbSize,\r
2131 VarAttr,\r
2132 0,\r
2133 0,\r
2134 &CertDbVariable,\r
2135 NULL\r
2136 );\r
2137\r
ed47ae02 2138 return Status;\r
2139}\r
2140\r
0c18794e 2141/**\r
2142 Process variable with EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS set\r
2143\r
dc204d5a
JY		 2144 Caution: This function may receive untrusted input.\r
2145 This function may be invoked in SMM mode, and datasize and data are external input.\r
2146 This function will do basic validation, before parse the data.\r
2147 This function will parse the authentication carefully to avoid security issues, like\r
2148 buffer overflow, integer overflow.\r
2149\r
0c18794e 2150 @param[in] VariableName Name of Variable to be found.\r
2151 @param[in] VendorGuid Variable vendor GUID.\r
2152 @param[in] Data Data pointer.\r
2153 @param[in] DataSize Size of Data found. If size is less than the\r
2154 data, this value contains the required size.\r
2155 @param[in] Variable The variable information which is used to keep track of variable usage.\r
2156 @param[in] Attributes Attribute value of the variable.\r
785d84ea 2157 @param[in] AuthVarType Verify against PK, KEK database, private database or certificate in data payload.\r
0c18794e 2158 @param[out] VarDel Delete the variable or not.\r
2159\r
2160 @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.\r
2d3fb919 2161 @retval EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION The variable does NOT pass the validation\r
2162 check carried out by the firmware.\r
0c18794e 2163 @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES Failed to process variable due to lack\r
2164 of resources.\r
2165 @retval EFI_SUCCESS Variable pass validation successfully.\r
2166\r
2167**/\r
2168EFI_STATUS\r
2169VerifyTimeBasedPayload (\r
2170 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r
2171 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r
2172 IN VOID *Data,\r
2173 IN UINTN DataSize,\r
2174 IN VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK *Variable,\r
2175 IN UINT32 Attributes,\r
ed47ae02 2176 IN AUTHVAR_TYPE AuthVarType,\r
0c18794e 2177 OUT BOOLEAN *VarDel\r
2178 )\r
2179{\r
2180 UINT8 *RootCert;\r
2181 UINT8 *SigData;\r
2d3fb919 2182 UINT8 *PayloadPtr;\r
0c18794e 2183 UINTN RootCertSize;\r
2184 UINTN Index;\r
2d3fb919 2185 UINTN CertCount;\r
2186 UINTN PayloadSize;\r
0c18794e 2187 UINT32 Attr;\r
2188 UINT32 SigDataSize;\r
2189 UINT32 KekDataSize;\r
0c18794e 2190 BOOLEAN VerifyStatus;\r
2191 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
2192 EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *CertList;\r
2193 EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *Cert;\r
2194 VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK KekVariable;\r
2195 EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 *CertData;\r
2196 UINT8 *NewData;\r
2197 UINTN NewDataSize;\r
2198 VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK PkVariable;\r
2d3fb919 2199 UINT8 *Buffer;\r
2200 UINTN Length;\r
ed47ae02 2201 UINT8 *SignerCerts;\r
ed47ae02 2202 UINTN CertStackSize;\r
2203 UINT8 *CertsInCertDb;\r
2204 UINT32 CertsSizeinDb;\r
0c18794e 2205\r
0c18794e 2206 VerifyStatus = FALSE;\r
2207 CertData = NULL;\r
2208 NewData = NULL;\r
2209 Attr = Attributes;\r
ed47ae02 2210 SignerCerts = NULL;\r
2211 RootCert = NULL;\r
d4193108 2212 CertsInCertDb = NULL;\r
0c18794e 2213\r
2214 //\r
2d3fb919 2215 // When the attribute EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS is\r
0c18794e 2216 // set, then the Data buffer shall begin with an instance of a complete (and serialized)\r
2d3fb919 2217 // EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 descriptor. The descriptor shall be followed by the new\r
2218 // variable value and DataSize shall reflect the combined size of the descriptor and the new\r
2219 // variable value. The authentication descriptor is not part of the variable data and is not\r
0c18794e 2220 // returned by subsequent calls to GetVariable().\r
2221 //\r
2222 CertData = (EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 *) Data;\r
2d3fb919 2223\r
2224 //\r
2225 // Verify that Pad1, Nanosecond, TimeZone, Daylight and Pad2 components of the\r
2226 // TimeStamp value are set to zero.\r
2227 //\r
2228 if ((CertData->TimeStamp.Pad1 != 0) ||\r
2229 (CertData->TimeStamp.Nanosecond != 0) ||\r
2230 (CertData->TimeStamp.TimeZone != 0) ||\r
2231 (CertData->TimeStamp.Daylight != 0) ||\r
2232 (CertData->TimeStamp.Pad2 != 0)) {\r
2e24814a 2233 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r
2d3fb919 2234 }\r
2235\r
0c18794e 2236 if ((Variable->CurrPtr != NULL) && ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_APPEND_WRITE) == 0)) {\r
2237 if (CompareTimeStamp (&CertData->TimeStamp, &Variable->CurrPtr->TimeStamp)) {\r
2238 //\r
2239 // TimeStamp check fail, suspicious replay attack, return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION.\r
2240 //\r
2241 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r
2242 }\r
2243 }\r
2244\r
2245 //\r
2246 // wCertificateType should be WIN_CERT_TYPE_EFI_GUID.\r
2247 // Cert type should be EFI_CERT_TYPE_PKCS7_GUID.\r
2248 //\r
2249 if ((CertData->AuthInfo.Hdr.wCertificateType != WIN_CERT_TYPE_EFI_GUID) ||\r
2d3fb919 2250 !CompareGuid (&CertData->AuthInfo.CertType, &gEfiCertPkcs7Guid)) {\r
0c18794e 2251 //\r
2252 // Invalid AuthInfo type, return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION.\r
2253 //\r
2254 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r
2255 }\r
2d3fb919 2256\r
0c18794e 2257 //\r
2258 // Find out Pkcs7 SignedData which follows the EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 descriptor.\r
2259 // AuthInfo.Hdr.dwLength is the length of the entire certificate, including the length of the header.\r
2260 //\r
2d3fb919 2261 SigData = CertData->AuthInfo.CertData;\r
2262 SigDataSize = CertData->AuthInfo.Hdr.dwLength - (UINT32) (OFFSET_OF (WIN_CERTIFICATE_UEFI_GUID, CertData));\r
648f98d1 2263\r
0c18794e 2264 //\r
2265 // Find out the new data payload which follows Pkcs7 SignedData directly.\r
2266 //\r
2d3fb919 2267 PayloadPtr = SigData + SigDataSize;\r
2268 PayloadSize = DataSize - OFFSET_OF_AUTHINFO2_CERT_DATA - (UINTN) SigDataSize;\r
0c18794e 2269\r
2270 //\r
ba9d087b
SZ		 2271 // Construct a serialization buffer of the values of the VariableName, VendorGuid and Attributes\r
2272 // parameters of the SetVariable() call and the TimeStamp component of the\r
2273 // EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 descriptor followed by the variable's new value\r
2274 // i.e. (VariableName, VendorGuid, Attributes, TimeStamp, Data)\r
0c18794e 2275 //\r
2d3fb919 2276 NewDataSize = PayloadSize + sizeof (EFI_TIME) + sizeof (UINT32) +\r
2277 sizeof (EFI_GUID) + StrSize (VariableName) - sizeof (CHAR16);\r
ba9d087b
SZ		 2278 //\r
2279 // Here is to reuse scratch data area(at the end of volatile variable store)\r
2280 // to reduce SMRAM consumption for SMM variable driver.\r
2281 // The scratch buffer is enough to hold the serialized data and safe to use,\r
2282 // because it will be used at here to do verification only first\r
2283 // and then used in UpdateVariable() for a time based auth variable set.\r
2284 //\r
2285 NewData = (UINT8 *) GetEndPointer ((VARIABLE_STORE_HEADER *) ((UINTN) mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal.VolatileVariableBase));\r
0c18794e 2286\r
2d3fb919 2287 Buffer = NewData;\r
2288 Length = StrLen (VariableName) * sizeof (CHAR16);\r
2289 CopyMem (Buffer, VariableName, Length);\r
2290 Buffer += Length;\r
0c18794e 2291\r
2d3fb919 2292 Length = sizeof (EFI_GUID);\r
2293 CopyMem (Buffer, VendorGuid, Length);\r
2294 Buffer += Length;\r
0c18794e 2295\r
2d3fb919 2296 Length = sizeof (UINT32);\r
2297 CopyMem (Buffer, &Attr, Length);\r
2298 Buffer += Length;\r
0c18794e 2299\r
2d3fb919 2300 Length = sizeof (EFI_TIME);\r
2301 CopyMem (Buffer, &CertData->TimeStamp, Length);\r
2302 Buffer += Length;\r
0c18794e 2303\r
2d3fb919 2304 CopyMem (Buffer, PayloadPtr, PayloadSize);\r
0c18794e 2305\r
ed47ae02 2306 if (AuthVarType == AuthVarTypePk) {\r
0c18794e 2307 //\r
74b5fd7a
FS		 2308 // Verify that the signature has been made with the current Platform Key (no chaining for PK).\r
2309 // First, get signer's certificates from SignedData.\r
2310 //\r
2311 VerifyStatus = Pkcs7GetSigners (\r
2312 SigData,\r
2313 SigDataSize,\r
2314 &SignerCerts,\r
2315 &CertStackSize,\r
2316 &RootCert,\r
2317 &RootCertSize\r
2318 );\r
2319 if (!VerifyStatus) {\r
2320 goto Exit;\r
2321 }\r
2322\r
2323 //\r
2324 // Second, get the current platform key from variable. Check whether it's identical with signer's certificates\r
2325 // in SignedData. If not, return error immediately.\r
0c18794e 2326 //\r
2327 Status = FindVariable (\r
2d3fb919 2328 EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME,\r
2329 &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
2330 &PkVariable,\r
ecc722ad 2331 &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,\r
2332 FALSE\r
0c18794e 2333 );\r
2334 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
74b5fd7a
FS		 2335 VerifyStatus = FALSE;\r
2336 goto Exit;\r
0c18794e 2337 }\r
0c18794e 2338 CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) GetVariableDataPtr (PkVariable.CurrPtr);\r
2339 Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r
74b5fd7a
FS		 2340 if ((RootCertSize != (CertList->SignatureSize - (sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1))) ||\r
2341 (CompareMem (Cert->SignatureData, RootCert, RootCertSize) != 0)) {\r
2342 VerifyStatus = FALSE;\r
2343 goto Exit;\r
2344 }\r
0c18794e 2345\r
2346 //\r
2347 // Verify Pkcs7 SignedData via Pkcs7Verify library.\r
2348 //\r
2349 VerifyStatus = Pkcs7Verify (\r
2350 SigData,\r
2351 SigDataSize,\r
2352 RootCert,\r
2353 RootCertSize,\r
2354 NewData,\r
2355 NewDataSize\r
2356 );\r
2357\r
ed47ae02 2358 } else if (AuthVarType == AuthVarTypeKek) {\r
2d3fb919 2359\r
0c18794e 2360 //\r
2361 // Get KEK database from variable.\r
2362 //\r
2363 Status = FindVariable (\r
2d3fb919 2364 EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME,\r
2365 &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
2366 &KekVariable,\r
ecc722ad 2367 &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,\r
2368 FALSE\r
0c18794e 2369 );\r
2370 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
2371 return Status;\r
2372 }\r
2373\r
2374 //\r
2375 // Ready to verify Pkcs7 SignedData. Go through KEK Signature Database to find out X.509 CertList.\r
2d3fb919 2376 //\r
0c18794e 2377 KekDataSize = KekVariable.CurrPtr->DataSize;\r
2378 CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) GetVariableDataPtr (KekVariable.CurrPtr);\r
2379 while ((KekDataSize > 0) && (KekDataSize >= CertList->SignatureListSize)) {\r
2380 if (CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Guid)) {\r
2381 Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r
2382 CertCount = (CertList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - CertList->SignatureHeaderSize) / CertList->SignatureSize;\r
2383 for (Index = 0; Index < CertCount; Index++) {\r
2384 //\r
2385 // Iterate each Signature Data Node within this CertList for a verify\r
2386 //\r
2387 RootCert = Cert->SignatureData;\r
4e33001c 2388 RootCertSize = CertList->SignatureSize - (sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1);\r
2d3fb919 2389\r
0c18794e 2390 //\r
2391 // Verify Pkcs7 SignedData via Pkcs7Verify library.\r
2392 //\r
2393 VerifyStatus = Pkcs7Verify (\r
2394 SigData,\r
2395 SigDataSize,\r
2396 RootCert,\r
2397 RootCertSize,\r
2398 NewData,\r
2399 NewDataSize\r
2400 );\r
2401 if (VerifyStatus) {\r
2402 goto Exit;\r
2403 }\r
2404 Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) Cert + CertList->SignatureSize);\r
2405 }\r
2406 }\r
2407 KekDataSize -= CertList->SignatureListSize;\r
2408 CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + CertList->SignatureListSize);\r
2409 }\r
ed47ae02 2410 } else if (AuthVarType == AuthVarTypePriv) {\r
2411\r
2412 //\r
20333c6d 2413 // Process common authenticated variable except PK/KEK/DB/DBX/DBT.\r
ed47ae02 2414 // Get signer's certificates from SignedData.\r
2415 //\r
2416 VerifyStatus = Pkcs7GetSigners (\r
2417 SigData,\r
2418 SigDataSize,\r
2419 &SignerCerts,\r
2420 &CertStackSize,\r
2421 &RootCert,\r
2422 &RootCertSize\r
2423 );\r
2424 if (!VerifyStatus) {\r
2425 goto Exit;\r
2426 }\r
2427\r
2428 //\r
2429 // Get previously stored signer's certificates from certdb for existing\r
2430 // variable. Check whether they are identical with signer's certificates\r
2431 // in SignedData. If not, return error immediately.\r
2432 //\r
2433 if ((Variable->CurrPtr != NULL)) {\r
2434 VerifyStatus = FALSE;\r
2435\r
2436 Status = GetCertsFromDb (VariableName, VendorGuid, &CertsInCertDb, &CertsSizeinDb);\r
2437 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
2438 goto Exit;\r
2439 }\r
20333c6d 2440\r
ed47ae02 2441 if ((CertStackSize != CertsSizeinDb) ||\r
2442 (CompareMem (SignerCerts, CertsInCertDb, CertsSizeinDb) != 0)) {\r
2443 goto Exit;\r
2444 }\r
2445 }\r
2446\r
2447 VerifyStatus = Pkcs7Verify (\r
2448 SigData,\r
2449 SigDataSize,\r
2450 RootCert,\r
2451 RootCertSize,\r
2452 NewData,\r
2453 NewDataSize\r
2454 );\r
2455 if (!VerifyStatus) {\r
2456 goto Exit;\r
2457 }\r
2458\r
2459 //\r
2460 // Delete signer's certificates when delete the common authenticated variable.\r
2461 //\r
275beb2b 2462 if ((PayloadSize == 0) && (Variable->CurrPtr != NULL) && ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_APPEND_WRITE) == 0)) {\r
ed47ae02 2463 Status = DeleteCertsFromDb (VariableName, VendorGuid);\r
2464 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
2465 VerifyStatus = FALSE;\r
2466 goto Exit;\r
2467 }\r
275beb2b 2468 } else if (Variable->CurrPtr == NULL && PayloadSize != 0) {\r
ed47ae02 2469 //\r
2470 // Insert signer's certificates when adding a new common authenticated variable.\r
2471 //\r
2472 Status = InsertCertsToDb (VariableName, VendorGuid, SignerCerts, CertStackSize);\r
2473 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
2474 VerifyStatus = FALSE;\r
2475 goto Exit;\r
2476 }\r
2477 }\r
785d84ea 2478 } else if (AuthVarType == AuthVarTypePayload) {\r
2479 CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) PayloadPtr;\r
2480 Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r
2481 RootCert = Cert->SignatureData;\r
2482 RootCertSize = CertList->SignatureSize - (sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1);\r
20333c6d 2483\r
785d84ea 2484 // Verify Pkcs7 SignedData via Pkcs7Verify library.\r
2485 //\r
2486 VerifyStatus = Pkcs7Verify (\r
2487 SigData,\r
2488 SigDataSize,\r
2489 RootCert,\r
2490 RootCertSize,\r
2491 NewData,\r
2492 NewDataSize\r
2493 );\r
ed47ae02 2494 } else {\r
2495 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r
0c18794e 2496 }\r
2497\r
2498Exit:\r
2499\r
74b5fd7a 2500 if (AuthVarType == AuthVarTypePk || AuthVarType == AuthVarTypePriv) {\r
ed47ae02 2501 Pkcs7FreeSigners (RootCert);\r
2502 Pkcs7FreeSigners (SignerCerts);\r
2503 }\r
2504\r
0c18794e 2505 if (!VerifyStatus) {\r
2506 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r
2507 }\r
2508\r
d912bad7 2509 Status = CheckSignatureListFormat(VariableName, VendorGuid, PayloadPtr, PayloadSize);\r
2510 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
2511 return Status;\r
2512 }\r
2513\r
2d3fb919 2514 if ((PayloadSize == 0) && (VarDel != NULL)) {\r
0c18794e 2515 *VarDel = TRUE;\r
2516 }\r
2d3fb919 2517\r
0c18794e 2518 //\r
2519 // Final step: Update/Append Variable if it pass Pkcs7Verify\r
2520 //\r
ed47ae02 2521 return UpdateVariable (\r
2522 VariableName,\r
2523 VendorGuid,\r
2524 PayloadPtr,\r
2525 PayloadSize,\r
2526 Attributes,\r
2527 0,\r
2528 0,\r
2529 Variable,\r
2530 &CertData->TimeStamp\r
2531 );\r
0c18794e 2532}\r
EFI Development Kit II mirror for PVE