0c18794e |
1 | /** @file\r |
2 | Implement authentication services for the authenticated variable\r |
3 | service in UEFI2.2.\r |
4 | \r |
5 | Copyright (c) 2009 - 2011, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>\r |
6 | This program and the accompanying materials \r |
7 | are licensed and made available under the terms and conditions of the BSD License \r |
8 | which accompanies this distribution. The full text of the license may be found at \r |
9 | http://opensource.org/licenses/bsd-license.php\r |
10 | \r |
11 | THE PROGRAM IS DISTRIBUTED UNDER THE BSD LICENSE ON AN "AS IS" BASIS, \r |
12 | WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR REPRESENTATIONS OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED.\r |
13 | \r |
14 | **/\r |
15 | \r |
16 | #include "Variable.h"\r |
17 | #include "AuthService.h"\r |
18 | \r |
19 | ///\r |
20 | /// Global database array for scratch\r |
21 | /// \r |
22 | UINT8 mPubKeyStore[MAX_KEYDB_SIZE];\r |
23 | UINT32 mPubKeyNumber;\r |
24 | UINT32 mPlatformMode;\r |
25 | EFI_GUID mSignatureSupport[SIGSUPPORT_NUM] = {EFI_CERT_RSA2048_SHA256_GUID, EFI_CERT_RSA2048_SHA1_GUID};\r |
26 | //\r |
27 | // Public Exponent of RSA Key.\r |
28 | //\r |
29 | CONST UINT8 mRsaE[] = { 0x01, 0x00, 0x01 };\r |
30 | //\r |
31 | // Hash context pointer\r |
32 | //\r |
33 | VOID *mHashCtx = NULL;\r |
34 | \r |
35 | \r |
36 | //\r |
37 | // Pointer to runtime buffer. \r |
38 | // For "Append" operation to an existing variable, a read/modify/write operation \r |
39 | // is supported by firmware internally. Reserve runtime buffer to cache previous \r |
40 | // variable data in runtime phase because memory allocation is forbidden in virtual mode.\r |
41 | //\r |
42 | VOID *mStorageArea = NULL;\r |
43 | \r |
44 | /**\r |
45 | Update platform mode.\r |
46 | \r |
47 | @param[in] Mode SETUP_MODE or USER_MODE.\r |
48 | \r |
49 | @return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.\r |
50 | @return EFI_SUCCESS Update platform mode successfully.\r |
51 | \r |
52 | **/\r |
53 | EFI_STATUS\r |
54 | UpdatePlatformMode (\r |
55 | IN UINT32 Mode\r |
56 | );\r |
57 | \r |
58 | /**\r |
59 | Initializes for authenticated varibale service.\r |
60 | \r |
61 | @retval EFI_SUCCESS Function successfully executed.\r |
62 | @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES Fail to allocate enough memory resources.\r |
63 | \r |
64 | **/\r |
65 | EFI_STATUS\r |
66 | AutenticatedVariableServiceInitialize (\r |
67 | VOID\r |
68 | )\r |
69 | {\r |
70 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r |
71 | VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK Variable;\r |
72 | UINT8 VarValue;\r |
73 | UINT32 VarAttr;\r |
74 | UINT8 *Data;\r |
75 | UINTN DataSize;\r |
76 | UINTN CtxSize;\r |
77 | //\r |
78 | // Initialize hash context.\r |
79 | //\r |
80 | CtxSize = Sha256GetContextSize ();\r |
81 | mHashCtx = AllocateRuntimePool (CtxSize);\r |
82 | if (mHashCtx == NULL) {\r |
83 | return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r |
84 | }\r |
85 | \r |
86 | //\r |
87 | // Reserved runtime buffer for "Append" operation in virtual mode.\r |
88 | //\r |
89 | mStorageArea = AllocateRuntimePool (PcdGet32 (PcdMaxAppendVariableSize));\r |
90 | if (mStorageArea == NULL) {\r |
91 | return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r |
92 | }\r |
93 | \r |
94 | //\r |
95 | // Check "AuthVarKeyDatabase" variable's existence. \r |
96 | // If it doesn't exist, create a new one with initial value of 0 and EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS set. \r |
97 | //\r |
98 | Status = FindVariable (\r |
99 | AUTHVAR_KEYDB_NAME, \r |
100 | &gEfiAuthenticatedVariableGuid, \r |
101 | &Variable, \r |
102 | &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal\r |
103 | );\r |
104 | \r |
105 | if (Variable.CurrPtr == NULL) {\r |
106 | VarAttr = EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS;\r |
107 | VarValue = 0;\r |
108 | mPubKeyNumber = 0;\r |
109 | Status = UpdateVariable (\r |
110 | AUTHVAR_KEYDB_NAME,\r |
111 | &gEfiAuthenticatedVariableGuid,\r |
112 | &VarValue,\r |
113 | sizeof(UINT8),\r |
114 | VarAttr,\r |
115 | 0,\r |
116 | 0,\r |
117 | &Variable,\r |
118 | NULL\r |
119 | );\r |
120 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r |
121 | return Status;\r |
122 | }\r |
123 | } else {\r |
124 | //\r |
125 | // Load database in global variable for cache.\r |
126 | //\r |
127 | DataSize = DataSizeOfVariable (Variable.CurrPtr);\r |
128 | Data = GetVariableDataPtr (Variable.CurrPtr);\r |
129 | ASSERT ((DataSize != 0) && (Data != NULL));\r |
130 | CopyMem (mPubKeyStore, (UINT8 *) Data, DataSize);\r |
131 | mPubKeyNumber = (UINT32) (DataSize / EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE);\r |
132 | }\r |
133 | //\r |
134 | // Check "SetupMode" variable's existence. \r |
135 | // If it doesn't exist, check PK database's existence to determine the value.\r |
136 | // Then create a new one with EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS set. \r |
137 | //\r |
138 | Status = FindVariable (\r |
139 | EFI_SETUP_MODE_NAME, \r |
140 | &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, \r |
141 | &Variable, \r |
142 | &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal\r |
143 | );\r |
144 | \r |
145 | if (Variable.CurrPtr == NULL) {\r |
146 | Status = FindVariable (\r |
147 | EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME, \r |
148 | &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, \r |
149 | &Variable, \r |
150 | &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal\r |
151 | );\r |
152 | if (Variable.CurrPtr == NULL) {\r |
153 | mPlatformMode = SETUP_MODE;\r |
154 | } else {\r |
155 | mPlatformMode = USER_MODE;\r |
156 | }\r |
157 | \r |
158 | VarAttr = EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS;\r |
159 | Status = UpdateVariable (\r |
160 | EFI_SETUP_MODE_NAME,\r |
161 | &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r |
162 | &mPlatformMode,\r |
163 | sizeof(UINT8),\r |
164 | VarAttr,\r |
165 | 0,\r |
166 | 0,\r |
167 | &Variable,\r |
168 | NULL\r |
169 | );\r |
170 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r |
171 | return Status;\r |
172 | }\r |
173 | } else {\r |
174 | mPlatformMode = *(GetVariableDataPtr (Variable.CurrPtr));\r |
175 | }\r |
176 | //\r |
177 | // Check "SignatureSupport" variable's existence. \r |
178 | // If it doesn't exist, then create a new one with EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS set. \r |
179 | //\r |
180 | Status = FindVariable (\r |
181 | EFI_SIGNATURE_SUPPORT_NAME, \r |
182 | &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, \r |
183 | &Variable, \r |
184 | &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal\r |
185 | );\r |
186 | \r |
187 | if (Variable.CurrPtr == NULL) {\r |
188 | VarAttr = EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS;\r |
189 | Status = UpdateVariable (\r |
190 | EFI_SIGNATURE_SUPPORT_NAME,\r |
191 | &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r |
192 | mSignatureSupport,\r |
193 | SIGSUPPORT_NUM * sizeof(EFI_GUID),\r |
194 | VarAttr,\r |
195 | 0,\r |
196 | 0,\r |
197 | &Variable,\r |
198 | NULL\r |
199 | );\r |
200 | }\r |
201 | \r |
202 | //\r |
203 | // Detect whether a secure platform-specific method to clear PK(Platform Key)\r |
204 | // is configured by platform owner. This method is provided for users force to clear PK \r |
205 | // in case incorrect enrollment mis-haps.\r |
206 | //\r |
207 | if (ForceClearPK ()) {\r |
208 | //\r |
209 | // 1. Check whether PK is existing, and clear PK if existing\r |
210 | //\r |
211 | FindVariable (\r |
212 | EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME, \r |
213 | &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, \r |
214 | &Variable, \r |
215 | &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal\r |
216 | );\r |
217 | if (Variable.CurrPtr != NULL) {\r |
218 | VarAttr = EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS;\r |
219 | Status = UpdateVariable (\r |
220 | EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME,\r |
221 | &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r |
222 | NULL,\r |
223 | 0,\r |
224 | VarAttr,\r |
225 | 0,\r |
226 | 0,\r |
227 | &Variable,\r |
228 | NULL\r |
229 | );\r |
230 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r |
231 | return Status;\r |
232 | }\r |
233 | }\r |
234 | \r |
235 | //\r |
236 | // 2. Update "SetupMode" variable to SETUP_MODE\r |
237 | //\r |
238 | UpdatePlatformMode (SETUP_MODE);\r |
239 | }\r |
240 | return Status;\r |
241 | }\r |
242 | \r |
243 | /**\r |
244 | Add public key in store and return its index.\r |
245 | \r |
246 | @param[in] PubKey Input pointer to Public Key data\r |
247 | \r |
248 | @return Index of new added item\r |
249 | \r |
250 | **/\r |
251 | UINT32\r |
252 | AddPubKeyInStore (\r |
253 | IN UINT8 *PubKey\r |
254 | )\r |
255 | {\r |
256 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r |
257 | BOOLEAN IsFound;\r |
258 | UINT32 Index;\r |
259 | VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK Variable;\r |
260 | UINT8 *Ptr;\r |
261 | \r |
262 | if (PubKey == NULL) {\r |
263 | return 0;\r |
264 | }\r |
265 | \r |
266 | Status = FindVariable (\r |
267 | AUTHVAR_KEYDB_NAME,\r |
268 | &gEfiAuthenticatedVariableGuid,\r |
269 | &Variable,\r |
270 | &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal\r |
271 | );\r |
272 | ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status);\r |
273 | //\r |
274 | // Check whether the public key entry does exist.\r |
275 | //\r |
276 | IsFound = FALSE;\r |
277 | for (Ptr = mPubKeyStore, Index = 1; Index <= mPubKeyNumber; Index++) {\r |
278 | if (CompareMem (Ptr, PubKey, EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE) == 0) {\r |
279 | IsFound = TRUE;\r |
280 | break;\r |
281 | }\r |
282 | Ptr += EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE;\r |
283 | }\r |
284 | \r |
285 | if (!IsFound) {\r |
286 | //\r |
287 | // Add public key in database.\r |
288 | //\r |
289 | if (mPubKeyNumber == MAX_KEY_NUM) {\r |
290 | //\r |
291 | // Notes: Database is full, need enhancement here, currently just return 0.\r |
292 | //\r |
293 | return 0;\r |
294 | }\r |
295 | \r |
296 | CopyMem (mPubKeyStore + mPubKeyNumber * EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE, PubKey, EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE);\r |
297 | Index = ++mPubKeyNumber;\r |
298 | //\r |
299 | // Update public key database variable.\r |
300 | //\r |
301 | Status = UpdateVariable (\r |
302 | AUTHVAR_KEYDB_NAME,\r |
303 | &gEfiAuthenticatedVariableGuid,\r |
304 | mPubKeyStore,\r |
305 | mPubKeyNumber * EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE,\r |
306 | EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS,\r |
307 | 0,\r |
308 | 0,\r |
309 | &Variable,\r |
310 | NULL\r |
311 | );\r |
312 | ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status);\r |
313 | }\r |
314 | \r |
315 | return Index;\r |
316 | }\r |
317 | \r |
318 | /**\r |
319 | Verify data payload with AuthInfo in EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SHA256 type.\r |
320 | Follow the steps in UEFI2.2.\r |
321 | \r |
322 | @param[in] Data Pointer to data with AuthInfo.\r |
323 | @param[in] DataSize Size of Data.\r |
324 | @param[in] PubKey Public key used for verification.\r |
325 | \r |
326 | @return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.\r |
327 | @retval EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION If authentication failed.\r |
328 | @return EFI_SUCCESS Authentication successful.\r |
329 | \r |
330 | **/\r |
331 | EFI_STATUS\r |
332 | VerifyCounterBasedPayload (\r |
333 | IN UINT8 *Data,\r |
334 | IN UINTN DataSize,\r |
335 | IN UINT8 *PubKey\r |
336 | )\r |
337 | {\r |
338 | BOOLEAN Status;\r |
339 | EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION *CertData;\r |
340 | EFI_CERT_BLOCK_RSA_2048_SHA256 *CertBlock;\r |
341 | UINT8 Digest[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE];\r |
342 | VOID *Rsa;\r |
343 | \r |
344 | Rsa = NULL;\r |
345 | CertData = NULL;\r |
346 | CertBlock = NULL;\r |
347 | \r |
348 | if (Data == NULL || PubKey == NULL) {\r |
349 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r |
350 | }\r |
351 | \r |
352 | CertData = (EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION *) Data;\r |
353 | CertBlock = (EFI_CERT_BLOCK_RSA_2048_SHA256 *) (CertData->AuthInfo.CertData);\r |
354 | \r |
355 | //\r |
356 | // wCertificateType should be WIN_CERT_TYPE_EFI_GUID.\r |
357 | // Cert type should be EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SHA256.\r |
358 | //\r |
359 | if ((CertData->AuthInfo.Hdr.wCertificateType != WIN_CERT_TYPE_EFI_GUID) ||\r |
360 | !CompareGuid (&CertData->AuthInfo.CertType, &gEfiCertRsa2048Sha256Guid)\r |
361 | ) {\r |
362 | //\r |
363 | // Invalid AuthInfo type, return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION.\r |
364 | //\r |
365 | return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r |
366 | }\r |
367 | //\r |
368 | // Hash data payload with SHA256.\r |
369 | //\r |
370 | ZeroMem (Digest, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE);\r |
371 | Status = Sha256Init (mHashCtx);\r |
372 | if (!Status) {\r |
373 | goto Done;\r |
374 | }\r |
375 | Status = Sha256Update (mHashCtx, Data + AUTHINFO_SIZE, (UINTN) (DataSize - AUTHINFO_SIZE));\r |
376 | if (!Status) {\r |
377 | goto Done;\r |
378 | }\r |
379 | //\r |
380 | // Hash Monotonic Count.\r |
381 | //\r |
382 | Status = Sha256Update (mHashCtx, &CertData->MonotonicCount, sizeof (UINT64));\r |
383 | if (!Status) {\r |
384 | goto Done;\r |
385 | }\r |
386 | Status = Sha256Final (mHashCtx, Digest);\r |
387 | if (!Status) {\r |
388 | goto Done;\r |
389 | }\r |
390 | //\r |
391 | // Generate & Initialize RSA Context.\r |
392 | //\r |
393 | Rsa = RsaNew ();\r |
394 | ASSERT (Rsa != NULL);\r |
395 | // \r |
396 | // Set RSA Key Components.\r |
397 | // NOTE: Only N and E are needed to be set as RSA public key for signature verification.\r |
398 | //\r |
399 | Status = RsaSetKey (Rsa, RsaKeyN, PubKey, EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE);\r |
400 | if (!Status) {\r |
401 | goto Done;\r |
402 | }\r |
403 | Status = RsaSetKey (Rsa, RsaKeyE, mRsaE, sizeof (mRsaE));\r |
404 | if (!Status) {\r |
405 | goto Done;\r |
406 | }\r |
407 | //\r |
408 | // Verify the signature.\r |
409 | //\r |
410 | Status = RsaPkcs1Verify (\r |
411 | Rsa, \r |
412 | Digest, \r |
413 | SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE, \r |
414 | CertBlock->Signature, \r |
415 | EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SHA256_SIZE\r |
416 | );\r |
417 | \r |
418 | Done:\r |
419 | if (Rsa != NULL) {\r |
420 | RsaFree (Rsa);\r |
421 | }\r |
422 | if (Status) {\r |
423 | return EFI_SUCCESS;\r |
424 | } else {\r |
425 | return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r |
426 | }\r |
427 | }\r |
428 | \r |
429 | \r |
430 | /**\r |
431 | Update platform mode.\r |
432 | \r |
433 | @param[in] Mode SETUP_MODE or USER_MODE.\r |
434 | \r |
435 | @return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.\r |
436 | @return EFI_SUCCESS Update platform mode successfully.\r |
437 | \r |
438 | **/\r |
439 | EFI_STATUS\r |
440 | UpdatePlatformMode (\r |
441 | IN UINT32 Mode\r |
442 | )\r |
443 | {\r |
444 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r |
445 | VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK Variable;\r |
446 | UINT32 VarAttr;\r |
447 | UINT8 SecureBootMode;\r |
448 | \r |
449 | Status = FindVariable (\r |
450 | EFI_SETUP_MODE_NAME, \r |
451 | &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, \r |
452 | &Variable, \r |
453 | &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal\r |
454 | );\r |
455 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r |
456 | return Status;\r |
457 | }\r |
458 | \r |
459 | mPlatformMode = Mode;\r |
460 | VarAttr = EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS;\r |
461 | Status = UpdateVariable (\r |
462 | EFI_SETUP_MODE_NAME,\r |
463 | &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r |
464 | &mPlatformMode,\r |
465 | sizeof(UINT8),\r |
466 | VarAttr,\r |
467 | 0,\r |
468 | 0,\r |
469 | &Variable,\r |
470 | NULL\r |
471 | );\r |
472 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r |
473 | return Status;\r |
474 | }\r |
475 | \r |
476 | //\r |
477 | // Check "SecureBoot" variable's existence.\r |
478 | // If it doesn't exist, firmware has no capability to perform driver signing verification,\r |
479 | // then set "SecureBoot" to 0.\r |
480 | //\r |
481 | Status = FindVariable (\r |
482 | EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME, \r |
483 | &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, \r |
484 | &Variable, \r |
485 | &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal\r |
486 | );\r |
487 | //\r |
488 | // If "SecureBoot" variable exists, then check "SetupMode" variable update.\r |
489 | // If "SetupMode" variable is USER_MODE, "SecureBoot" variable is set to 1.\r |
490 | // If "SetupMode" variable is SETUP_MODE, "SecureBoot" variable is set to 0.\r |
491 | //\r |
492 | if (Variable.CurrPtr == NULL) {\r |
493 | SecureBootMode = SECURE_BOOT_MODE_DISABLE;\r |
494 | } else {\r |
495 | if (mPlatformMode == USER_MODE) {\r |
496 | SecureBootMode = SECURE_BOOT_MODE_ENABLE;\r |
497 | } else if (mPlatformMode == SETUP_MODE) {\r |
498 | SecureBootMode = SECURE_BOOT_MODE_DISABLE;\r |
499 | } else {\r |
500 | return EFI_NOT_FOUND;\r |
501 | }\r |
502 | }\r |
503 | \r |
504 | VarAttr = EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS;\r |
505 | return UpdateVariable (\r |
506 | EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME,\r |
507 | &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r |
508 | &SecureBootMode,\r |
509 | sizeof(UINT8),\r |
510 | VarAttr,\r |
511 | 0,\r |
512 | 0,\r |
513 | &Variable,\r |
514 | NULL\r |
515 | );\r |
516 | }\r |
517 | \r |
518 | /**\r |
519 | Process variable with platform key for verification.\r |
520 | \r |
521 | @param[in] VariableName Name of Variable to be found.\r |
522 | @param[in] VendorGuid Variable vendor GUID.\r |
523 | @param[in] Data Data pointer.\r |
524 | @param[in] DataSize Size of Data found. If size is less than the\r |
525 | data, this value contains the required size.\r |
526 | @param[in] Variable The variable information which is used to keep track of variable usage.\r |
527 | @param[in] Attributes Attribute value of the variable\r |
528 | @param[in] IsPk Indicate whether it is to process pk.\r |
529 | \r |
530 | @return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.\r |
531 | @return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION The variable does NOT pass the validation. \r |
532 | check carried out by the firmware. \r |
533 | @return EFI_SUCCESS Variable passed validation successfully.\r |
534 | \r |
535 | **/\r |
536 | EFI_STATUS\r |
537 | ProcessVarWithPk (\r |
538 | IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r |
539 | IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r |
540 | IN VOID *Data,\r |
541 | IN UINTN DataSize,\r |
542 | IN VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK *Variable,\r |
543 | IN UINT32 Attributes OPTIONAL,\r |
544 | IN BOOLEAN IsPk\r |
545 | )\r |
546 | {\r |
547 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r |
548 | VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK PkVariable;\r |
549 | EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *OldPkList;\r |
550 | EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *OldPkData;\r |
551 | EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION *CertData;\r |
552 | BOOLEAN TimeBase;\r |
553 | BOOLEAN Del;\r |
554 | \r |
555 | if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE) == 0) {\r |
556 | //\r |
557 | // PK and KEK should set EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE attribute.\r |
558 | //\r |
559 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r |
560 | }\r |
561 | \r |
562 | if (mPlatformMode == USER_MODE) {\r |
563 | \r |
564 | if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0) {\r |
565 | //\r |
566 | // EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS attribute means time-based X509 Cert PK.\r |
567 | //\r |
568 | TimeBase = TRUE;\r |
569 | } else if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0) {\r |
570 | //\r |
571 | // EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS attribute means counter-based RSA-2048 Cert PK.\r |
572 | //\r |
573 | TimeBase = FALSE;\r |
574 | } else {\r |
575 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r |
576 | }\r |
577 | \r |
578 | if (TimeBase) {\r |
579 | //\r |
580 | // Verify against X509 Cert PK.\r |
581 | //\r |
582 | Del = FALSE;\r |
583 | Status = VerifyTimeBasedPayload (VariableName, VendorGuid, Data, DataSize, Variable, Attributes, TRUE, &Del);\r |
584 | if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r |
585 | //\r |
586 | // If delete PK in user mode, need change to setup mode.\r |
587 | //\r |
588 | if (Del && IsPk) {\r |
589 | Status = UpdatePlatformMode (SETUP_MODE);\r |
590 | }\r |
591 | }\r |
592 | return Status;\r |
593 | } else {\r |
594 | //\r |
595 | // Verify against RSA2048 Cert PK.\r |
596 | //\r |
597 | CertData = (EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION *) Data;\r |
598 | if ((Variable->CurrPtr != NULL) && (CertData->MonotonicCount <= Variable->CurrPtr->MonotonicCount)) {\r |
599 | //\r |
600 | // Monotonic count check fail, suspicious replay attack, return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION.\r |
601 | //\r |
602 | return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r |
603 | }\r |
604 | //\r |
605 | // Get platform key from variable.\r |
606 | //\r |
607 | Status = FindVariable (\r |
608 | EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME, \r |
609 | &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, \r |
610 | &PkVariable, \r |
611 | &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal\r |
612 | );\r |
613 | ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status);\r |
614 | \r |
615 | OldPkList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) GetVariableDataPtr (PkVariable.CurrPtr);\r |
616 | OldPkData = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) OldPkList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + OldPkList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r |
617 | Status = VerifyCounterBasedPayload (Data, DataSize, OldPkData->SignatureData);\r |
618 | if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r |
619 | Status = UpdateVariable (\r |
620 | VariableName, \r |
621 | VendorGuid, \r |
622 | (UINT8*)Data + AUTHINFO_SIZE, \r |
623 | DataSize - AUTHINFO_SIZE, \r |
624 | Attributes, \r |
625 | 0, \r |
626 | CertData->MonotonicCount, \r |
627 | Variable,\r |
628 | NULL\r |
629 | );\r |
630 | \r |
631 | if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r |
632 | //\r |
633 | // If delete PK in user mode, need change to setup mode.\r |
634 | //\r |
635 | if ((DataSize == AUTHINFO_SIZE) && IsPk) {\r |
636 | Status = UpdatePlatformMode (SETUP_MODE);\r |
637 | }\r |
638 | }\r |
639 | }\r |
640 | }\r |
641 | } else {\r |
642 | Status = UpdateVariable (VariableName, VendorGuid, Data, DataSize, Attributes, 0, 0, Variable, NULL);\r |
643 | //\r |
644 | // If enroll PK in setup mode, need change to user mode.\r |
645 | //\r |
646 | if ((DataSize != 0) && IsPk) {\r |
647 | Status = UpdatePlatformMode (USER_MODE);\r |
648 | }\r |
649 | }\r |
650 | \r |
651 | return Status;\r |
652 | }\r |
653 | \r |
654 | /**\r |
655 | Process variable with key exchange key for verification.\r |
656 | \r |
657 | @param[in] VariableName Name of Variable to be found.\r |
658 | @param[in] VendorGuid Variable vendor GUID.\r |
659 | @param[in] Data Data pointer.\r |
660 | @param[in] DataSize Size of Data found. If size is less than the\r |
661 | data, this value contains the required size.\r |
662 | @param[in] Variable The variable information which is used to keep track of variable usage.\r |
663 | @param[in] Attributes Attribute value of the variable.\r |
664 | \r |
665 | @return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.\r |
666 | @return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION The variable does NOT pass the validation \r |
667 | check carried out by the firmware. \r |
668 | @return EFI_SUCCESS Variable pass validation successfully.\r |
669 | \r |
670 | **/\r |
671 | EFI_STATUS\r |
672 | ProcessVarWithKek (\r |
673 | IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r |
674 | IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r |
675 | IN VOID *Data,\r |
676 | IN UINTN DataSize,\r |
677 | IN VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK *Variable,\r |
678 | IN UINT32 Attributes OPTIONAL\r |
679 | )\r |
680 | {\r |
681 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r |
682 | VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK KekVariable;\r |
683 | EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *KekList;\r |
684 | EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *KekItem;\r |
685 | UINT32 KekCount;\r |
686 | EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION *CertData;\r |
687 | EFI_CERT_BLOCK_RSA_2048_SHA256 *CertBlock;\r |
688 | BOOLEAN IsFound;\r |
689 | UINT32 Index;\r |
690 | UINT32 KekDataSize;\r |
691 | \r |
692 | if (mPlatformMode == USER_MODE) {\r |
693 | if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) == 0) {\r |
694 | //\r |
695 | // In user mode, should set EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS attribute.\r |
696 | //\r |
697 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r |
698 | }\r |
699 | \r |
700 | CertData = (EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION *) Data;\r |
701 | CertBlock = (EFI_CERT_BLOCK_RSA_2048_SHA256 *) (CertData->AuthInfo.CertData);\r |
702 | if ((Variable->CurrPtr != NULL) && (CertData->MonotonicCount <= Variable->CurrPtr->MonotonicCount)) {\r |
703 | //\r |
704 | // Monotonic count check fail, suspicious replay attack, return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION.\r |
705 | //\r |
706 | return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r |
707 | }\r |
708 | //\r |
709 | // Get KEK database from variable.\r |
710 | //\r |
711 | Status = FindVariable (\r |
712 | EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME, \r |
713 | &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, \r |
714 | &KekVariable, \r |
715 | &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal\r |
716 | );\r |
717 | ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status);\r |
718 | \r |
719 | KekDataSize = KekVariable.CurrPtr->DataSize;\r |
720 | KekList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) GetVariableDataPtr (KekVariable.CurrPtr);\r |
721 | \r |
722 | //\r |
723 | // Enumerate all Kek items in this list to verify the variable certificate data.\r |
724 | // If anyone is authenticated successfully, it means the variable is correct!\r |
725 | //\r |
726 | IsFound = FALSE;\r |
727 | while ((KekDataSize > 0) && (KekDataSize >= KekList->SignatureListSize)) {\r |
728 | if (CompareGuid (&KekList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertRsa2048Guid)) {\r |
729 | KekItem = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) KekList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + KekList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r |
730 | KekCount = (KekList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - KekList->SignatureHeaderSize) / KekList->SignatureSize;\r |
731 | for (Index = 0; Index < KekCount; Index++) {\r |
732 | if (CompareMem (KekItem->SignatureData, CertBlock->PublicKey, EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE) == 0) {\r |
733 | IsFound = TRUE;\r |
734 | break;\r |
735 | }\r |
736 | KekItem = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) KekItem + KekList->SignatureSize);\r |
737 | }\r |
738 | }\r |
739 | KekDataSize -= KekList->SignatureListSize;\r |
740 | KekList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) KekList + KekList->SignatureListSize);\r |
741 | }\r |
742 | \r |
743 | if (!IsFound) {\r |
744 | return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r |
745 | }\r |
746 | \r |
747 | Status = VerifyCounterBasedPayload (Data, DataSize, CertBlock->PublicKey);\r |
748 | if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r |
749 | Status = UpdateVariable (\r |
750 | VariableName, \r |
751 | VendorGuid, \r |
752 | (UINT8*)Data + AUTHINFO_SIZE, \r |
753 | DataSize - AUTHINFO_SIZE, \r |
754 | Attributes, \r |
755 | 0, \r |
756 | CertData->MonotonicCount, \r |
757 | Variable,\r |
758 | NULL\r |
759 | );\r |
760 | }\r |
761 | } else {\r |
762 | //\r |
763 | // If in setup mode, no authentication needed.\r |
764 | //\r |
765 | Status = UpdateVariable (\r |
766 | VariableName, \r |
767 | VendorGuid, \r |
768 | Data, \r |
769 | DataSize, \r |
770 | Attributes, \r |
771 | 0, \r |
772 | 0, \r |
773 | Variable,\r |
774 | NULL\r |
775 | );\r |
776 | }\r |
777 | \r |
778 | return Status;\r |
779 | }\r |
780 | \r |
781 | /**\r |
782 | Process variable with EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS/EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS set\r |
783 | \r |
784 | @param[in] VariableName Name of Variable to be found.\r |
785 | @param[in] VendorGuid Variable vendor GUID.\r |
786 | \r |
787 | @param[in] Data Data pointer.\r |
788 | @param[in] DataSize Size of Data found. If size is less than the\r |
789 | data, this value contains the required size.\r |
790 | @param[in] Variable The variable information which is used to keep track of variable usage.\r |
791 | @param[in] Attributes Attribute value of the variable.\r |
792 | \r |
793 | @return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.\r |
794 | @return EFI_WRITE_PROTECTED Variable is write-protected and needs authentication with\r |
795 | EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS set.\r |
796 | @return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION The variable is with EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS\r |
797 | set, but the AuthInfo does NOT pass the validation \r |
798 | check carried out by the firmware. \r |
799 | @return EFI_SUCCESS Variable is not write-protected or pass validation successfully.\r |
800 | \r |
801 | **/\r |
802 | EFI_STATUS\r |
803 | ProcessVariable (\r |
804 | IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r |
805 | IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r |
806 | IN VOID *Data,\r |
807 | IN UINTN DataSize,\r |
808 | IN VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK *Variable,\r |
809 | IN UINT32 Attributes\r |
810 | )\r |
811 | {\r |
812 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r |
813 | BOOLEAN IsDeletion;\r |
814 | BOOLEAN IsFirstTime;\r |
815 | UINT8 *PubKey;\r |
816 | EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION *CertData;\r |
817 | EFI_CERT_BLOCK_RSA_2048_SHA256 *CertBlock;\r |
818 | UINT32 KeyIndex;\r |
819 | UINT64 MonotonicCount;\r |
820 | \r |
821 | KeyIndex = 0; \r |
822 | CertData = NULL;\r |
823 | CertBlock = NULL;\r |
824 | PubKey = NULL;\r |
825 | IsDeletion = FALSE;\r |
826 | \r |
827 | //\r |
828 | // Process Time-based Authenticated variable.\r |
829 | //\r |
830 | if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0) {\r |
831 | return VerifyTimeBasedPayload (VariableName, VendorGuid, Data, DataSize, Variable, Attributes, FALSE, NULL);\r |
832 | }\r |
833 | \r |
834 | //\r |
835 | // Determine if first time SetVariable with the EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS.\r |
836 | //\r |
837 | if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0) {\r |
838 | //\r |
839 | // Determine current operation type.\r |
840 | //\r |
841 | if (DataSize == AUTHINFO_SIZE) {\r |
842 | IsDeletion = TRUE;\r |
843 | }\r |
844 | //\r |
845 | // Determine whether this is the first time with EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS set.\r |
846 | //\r |
847 | if (Variable->CurrPtr == NULL) {\r |
848 | IsFirstTime = TRUE;\r |
849 | } else if ((Variable->CurrPtr->Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) == 0) {\r |
850 | IsFirstTime = TRUE;\r |
851 | } else {\r |
852 | KeyIndex = Variable->CurrPtr->PubKeyIndex;\r |
853 | IsFirstTime = FALSE;\r |
854 | }\r |
855 | } else if ((Variable->CurrPtr != NULL) &&\r |
856 | (Variable->CurrPtr->Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0\r |
857 | ) {\r |
858 | //\r |
859 | // If the variable is already write-protected, it always needs authentication before update.\r |
860 | //\r |
861 | return EFI_WRITE_PROTECTED;\r |
862 | } else {\r |
863 | //\r |
864 | // If without EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS, set and attributes collision.\r |
865 | // That means it is not authenticated variable, just update variable as usual.\r |
866 | //\r |
867 | Status = UpdateVariable (VariableName, VendorGuid, Data, DataSize, Attributes, 0, 0, Variable, NULL);\r |
868 | return Status;\r |
869 | }\r |
870 | \r |
871 | //\r |
872 | // Get PubKey and check Monotonic Count value corresponding to the variable.\r |
873 | //\r |
874 | CertData = (EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION *) Data;\r |
875 | CertBlock = (EFI_CERT_BLOCK_RSA_2048_SHA256 *) (CertData->AuthInfo.CertData);\r |
876 | PubKey = CertBlock->PublicKey;\r |
877 | \r |
878 | //\r |
879 | // Update Monotonic Count value.\r |
880 | //\r |
881 | MonotonicCount = CertData->MonotonicCount;\r |
882 | \r |
883 | if (!IsFirstTime) {\r |
884 | //\r |
885 | // Check input PubKey.\r |
886 | //\r |
887 | if (CompareMem (PubKey, mPubKeyStore + (KeyIndex - 1) * EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE, EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE) != 0) {\r |
888 | return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r |
889 | }\r |
890 | //\r |
891 | // Compare the current monotonic count and ensure that it is greater than the last SetVariable\r |
892 | // operation with the EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS attribute set.\r |
893 | //\r |
894 | if (CertData->MonotonicCount <= Variable->CurrPtr->MonotonicCount) {\r |
895 | //\r |
896 | // Monotonic count check fail, suspicious replay attack, return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION.\r |
897 | //\r |
898 | return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r |
899 | }\r |
900 | } \r |
901 | //\r |
902 | // Verify the certificate in Data payload.\r |
903 | //\r |
904 | Status = VerifyCounterBasedPayload (Data, DataSize, PubKey);\r |
905 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r |
906 | return Status;\r |
907 | }\r |
908 | \r |
909 | //\r |
910 | // Now, the signature has been verified!\r |
911 | //\r |
912 | if (IsFirstTime && !IsDeletion) {\r |
913 | //\r |
914 | // Update public key database variable if need.\r |
915 | //\r |
916 | KeyIndex = AddPubKeyInStore (PubKey);\r |
917 | }\r |
918 | \r |
919 | //\r |
920 | // Verification pass.\r |
921 | //\r |
922 | return UpdateVariable (VariableName, VendorGuid, (UINT8*)Data + AUTHINFO_SIZE, DataSize - AUTHINFO_SIZE, Attributes, KeyIndex, MonotonicCount, Variable, NULL);\r |
923 | }\r |
924 | \r |
925 | /**\r |
926 | Compare two EFI_TIME data.\r |
927 | \r |
928 | \r |
929 | @param FirstTime A pointer to the first EFI_TIME data.\r |
930 | @param SecondTime A pointer to the second EFI_TIME data.\r |
931 | \r |
932 | @retval TRUE The FirstTime is not later than the SecondTime.\r |
933 | @retval FALSE The FirstTime is later than the SecondTime.\r |
934 | \r |
935 | **/\r |
936 | BOOLEAN\r |
937 | CompareTimeStamp (\r |
938 | IN EFI_TIME *FirstTime,\r |
939 | IN EFI_TIME *SecondTime\r |
940 | )\r |
941 | {\r |
942 | if (FirstTime->Year != SecondTime->Year) {\r |
943 | return (BOOLEAN) (FirstTime->Year < SecondTime->Year);\r |
944 | } else if (FirstTime->Month != SecondTime->Month) {\r |
945 | return (BOOLEAN) (FirstTime->Month < SecondTime->Month);\r |
946 | } else if (FirstTime->Day != SecondTime->Day) {\r |
947 | return (BOOLEAN) (FirstTime->Day < SecondTime->Day);\r |
948 | } else if (FirstTime->Hour != SecondTime->Hour) {\r |
949 | return (BOOLEAN) (FirstTime->Hour < SecondTime->Hour);\r |
950 | } else if (FirstTime->Minute != SecondTime->Minute) {\r |
951 | return (BOOLEAN) (FirstTime->Minute < FirstTime->Minute);\r |
952 | } \r |
953 | \r |
954 | return (BOOLEAN) (FirstTime->Second <= SecondTime->Second);\r |
955 | }\r |
956 | \r |
957 | /**\r |
958 | Process variable with EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS set\r |
959 | \r |
960 | @param[in] VariableName Name of Variable to be found.\r |
961 | @param[in] VendorGuid Variable vendor GUID.\r |
962 | @param[in] Data Data pointer.\r |
963 | @param[in] DataSize Size of Data found. If size is less than the\r |
964 | data, this value contains the required size.\r |
965 | @param[in] Variable The variable information which is used to keep track of variable usage.\r |
966 | @param[in] Attributes Attribute value of the variable.\r |
967 | @param[in] Pk Verify against PK or KEK database.\r |
968 | @param[out] VarDel Delete the variable or not.\r |
969 | \r |
970 | @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.\r |
971 | @retval EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION The variable does NOT pass the validation \r |
972 | check carried out by the firmware. \r |
973 | @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES Failed to process variable due to lack\r |
974 | of resources.\r |
975 | @retval EFI_SUCCESS Variable pass validation successfully.\r |
976 | \r |
977 | **/\r |
978 | EFI_STATUS\r |
979 | VerifyTimeBasedPayload (\r |
980 | IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r |
981 | IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r |
982 | IN VOID *Data,\r |
983 | IN UINTN DataSize,\r |
984 | IN VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK *Variable,\r |
985 | IN UINT32 Attributes,\r |
986 | IN BOOLEAN Pk,\r |
987 | OUT BOOLEAN *VarDel\r |
988 | )\r |
989 | {\r |
990 | UINT8 *RootCert;\r |
991 | UINT8 *SigData;\r |
992 | UINT8 *PayLoadPtr;\r |
993 | UINTN RootCertSize;\r |
994 | UINTN Index;\r |
995 | UINTN CertCount; \r |
996 | UINTN PayLoadSize; \r |
997 | UINT32 Attr;\r |
998 | UINT32 SigDataSize;\r |
999 | UINT32 KekDataSize;\r |
1000 | BOOLEAN Result;\r |
1001 | BOOLEAN VerifyStatus;\r |
1002 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r |
1003 | EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *CertList;\r |
1004 | EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *Cert;\r |
1005 | VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK KekVariable;\r |
1006 | EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 *CertData;\r |
1007 | UINT8 *NewData;\r |
1008 | UINTN NewDataSize;\r |
1009 | VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK PkVariable;\r |
1010 | \r |
1011 | \r |
1012 | Result = FALSE;\r |
1013 | VerifyStatus = FALSE;\r |
1014 | CertData = NULL;\r |
1015 | NewData = NULL;\r |
1016 | Attr = Attributes;\r |
1017 | \r |
1018 | //\r |
1019 | // When the attribute EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS is \r |
1020 | // set, then the Data buffer shall begin with an instance of a complete (and serialized)\r |
1021 | // EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 descriptor. The descriptor shall be followed by the new \r |
1022 | // variable value and DataSize shall reflect the combined size of the descriptor and the new \r |
1023 | // variable value. The authentication descriptor is not part of the variable data and is not \r |
1024 | // returned by subsequent calls to GetVariable().\r |
1025 | //\r |
1026 | CertData = (EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 *) Data;\r |
1027 | \r |
1028 | if ((Variable->CurrPtr != NULL) && ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_APPEND_WRITE) == 0)) {\r |
1029 | if (CompareTimeStamp (&CertData->TimeStamp, &Variable->CurrPtr->TimeStamp)) {\r |
1030 | //\r |
1031 | // TimeStamp check fail, suspicious replay attack, return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION.\r |
1032 | //\r |
1033 | return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r |
1034 | }\r |
1035 | }\r |
1036 | \r |
1037 | //\r |
1038 | // wCertificateType should be WIN_CERT_TYPE_EFI_GUID.\r |
1039 | // Cert type should be EFI_CERT_TYPE_PKCS7_GUID.\r |
1040 | //\r |
1041 | if ((CertData->AuthInfo.Hdr.wCertificateType != WIN_CERT_TYPE_EFI_GUID) ||\r |
1042 | !CompareGuid (&CertData->AuthInfo.CertType, &gEfiCertPkcs7Guid)\r |
1043 | ) {\r |
1044 | //\r |
1045 | // Invalid AuthInfo type, return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION.\r |
1046 | //\r |
1047 | return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r |
1048 | }\r |
648f98d1 |
1049 | \r |
0c18794e |
1050 | //\r |
1051 | // Find out Pkcs7 SignedData which follows the EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 descriptor.\r |
1052 | // AuthInfo.Hdr.dwLength is the length of the entire certificate, including the length of the header.\r |
1053 | //\r |
648f98d1 |
1054 | SigData = (UINT8*) ((UINTN)Data + OFFSET_OF (EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2, AuthInfo) + OFFSET_OF (WIN_CERTIFICATE_UEFI_GUID, CertData));\r |
1055 | \r |
1056 | //\r |
1057 | // Sanity check to avoid corrupted certificate input.\r |
1058 | //\r |
1059 | if (CertData->AuthInfo.Hdr.dwLength < (UINT32)(OFFSET_OF (WIN_CERTIFICATE_UEFI_GUID, CertData))) {\r |
1060 | return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r |
1061 | }\r |
1062 | \r |
1063 | \r |
1064 | \r |
1065 | SigDataSize = CertData->AuthInfo.Hdr.dwLength - (UINT32)(OFFSET_OF (WIN_CERTIFICATE_UEFI_GUID, CertData));\r |
0c18794e |
1066 | \r |
1067 | //\r |
1068 | // Find out the new data payload which follows Pkcs7 SignedData directly.\r |
1069 | //\r |
1070 | PayLoadPtr = (UINT8*) ((UINTN) SigData + (UINTN) SigDataSize);\r |
648f98d1 |
1071 | \r |
1072 | //\r |
1073 | // Sanity check to avoid corrupted certificate input.\r |
1074 | //\r |
1075 | if (DataSize < (OFFSET_OF (EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2, AuthInfo) + OFFSET_OF (WIN_CERTIFICATE_UEFI_GUID, CertData)+ (UINTN) SigDataSize)) {\r |
1076 | return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r |
1077 | }\r |
1078 | \r |
1079 | PayLoadSize = DataSize - OFFSET_OF (EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2, AuthInfo) - OFFSET_OF (WIN_CERTIFICATE_UEFI_GUID, CertData) - (UINTN) SigDataSize;\r |
0c18794e |
1080 | \r |
1081 | \r |
1082 | //\r |
1083 | // Construct a buffer to fill with (VariableName, VendorGuid, Attributes, TimeStamp, Data).\r |
1084 | //\r |
1085 | NewDataSize = PayLoadSize + sizeof (EFI_TIME) + sizeof (UINT32) +\r |
1086 | sizeof (EFI_GUID) + StrSize (VariableName);\r |
1087 | NewData = (UINT8 *) AllocateZeroPool (NewDataSize);\r |
1088 | \r |
1089 | if (NewData == NULL) {\r |
1090 | return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r |
1091 | }\r |
1092 | \r |
1093 | CopyMem (NewData, VariableName, StrSize (VariableName));\r |
1094 | \r |
1095 | CopyMem (NewData + StrSize (VariableName), VendorGuid, sizeof (EFI_GUID));\r |
1096 | \r |
1097 | CopyMem (\r |
1098 | NewData + StrSize (VariableName) + sizeof (EFI_GUID),\r |
1099 | &Attr,\r |
1100 | sizeof (UINT32)\r |
1101 | );\r |
1102 | \r |
1103 | CopyMem (\r |
1104 | NewData + StrSize (VariableName) + sizeof (EFI_GUID) + sizeof (UINT32),\r |
1105 | &CertData->TimeStamp,\r |
1106 | sizeof (EFI_TIME)\r |
1107 | );\r |
1108 | \r |
1109 | CopyMem (NewData + (NewDataSize - PayLoadSize), PayLoadPtr, PayLoadSize);\r |
1110 | \r |
1111 | \r |
1112 | if (Pk) {\r |
1113 | //\r |
1114 | // Get platform key from variable.\r |
1115 | //\r |
1116 | Status = FindVariable (\r |
1117 | EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME, \r |
1118 | &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, \r |
1119 | &PkVariable, \r |
1120 | &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal\r |
1121 | );\r |
1122 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r |
1123 | return Status;\r |
1124 | }\r |
1125 | \r |
1126 | CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) GetVariableDataPtr (PkVariable.CurrPtr);\r |
1127 | Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r |
1128 | RootCert = Cert->SignatureData;\r |
1129 | RootCertSize = CertList->SignatureSize;\r |
1130 | \r |
1131 | \r |
1132 | //\r |
1133 | // Verify Pkcs7 SignedData via Pkcs7Verify library.\r |
1134 | //\r |
1135 | VerifyStatus = Pkcs7Verify (\r |
1136 | SigData,\r |
1137 | SigDataSize,\r |
1138 | RootCert,\r |
1139 | RootCertSize,\r |
1140 | NewData,\r |
1141 | NewDataSize\r |
1142 | );\r |
1143 | \r |
1144 | } else {\r |
1145 | \r |
1146 | //\r |
1147 | // Get KEK database from variable.\r |
1148 | //\r |
1149 | Status = FindVariable (\r |
1150 | EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME, \r |
1151 | &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, \r |
1152 | &KekVariable, \r |
1153 | &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal\r |
1154 | );\r |
1155 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r |
1156 | return Status;\r |
1157 | }\r |
1158 | \r |
1159 | //\r |
1160 | // Ready to verify Pkcs7 SignedData. Go through KEK Signature Database to find out X.509 CertList.\r |
1161 | // \r |
1162 | KekDataSize = KekVariable.CurrPtr->DataSize;\r |
1163 | CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) GetVariableDataPtr (KekVariable.CurrPtr);\r |
1164 | while ((KekDataSize > 0) && (KekDataSize >= CertList->SignatureListSize)) {\r |
1165 | if (CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Guid)) {\r |
1166 | Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r |
1167 | CertCount = (CertList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - CertList->SignatureHeaderSize) / CertList->SignatureSize;\r |
1168 | for (Index = 0; Index < CertCount; Index++) {\r |
1169 | //\r |
1170 | // Iterate each Signature Data Node within this CertList for a verify\r |
1171 | //\r |
1172 | RootCert = Cert->SignatureData;\r |
1173 | RootCertSize = CertList->SignatureSize;\r |
1174 | \r |
1175 | //\r |
1176 | // Verify Pkcs7 SignedData via Pkcs7Verify library.\r |
1177 | //\r |
1178 | VerifyStatus = Pkcs7Verify (\r |
1179 | SigData,\r |
1180 | SigDataSize,\r |
1181 | RootCert,\r |
1182 | RootCertSize,\r |
1183 | NewData,\r |
1184 | NewDataSize\r |
1185 | );\r |
1186 | if (VerifyStatus) {\r |
1187 | goto Exit;\r |
1188 | }\r |
1189 | Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) Cert + CertList->SignatureSize);\r |
1190 | }\r |
1191 | }\r |
1192 | KekDataSize -= CertList->SignatureListSize;\r |
1193 | CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + CertList->SignatureListSize);\r |
1194 | }\r |
1195 | }\r |
1196 | \r |
1197 | Exit:\r |
1198 | \r |
1199 | FreePool (NewData);\r |
1200 | \r |
1201 | if (!VerifyStatus) {\r |
1202 | return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r |
1203 | }\r |
1204 | \r |
1205 | if ((PayLoadSize == 0) && (VarDel != NULL)) {\r |
1206 | *VarDel = TRUE;\r |
1207 | }\r |
1208 | \r |
1209 | //\r |
1210 | // Final step: Update/Append Variable if it pass Pkcs7Verify\r |
1211 | //\r |
1212 | return UpdateVariable (\r |
1213 | VariableName, \r |
1214 | VendorGuid, \r |
1215 | PayLoadPtr, \r |
1216 | PayLoadSize, \r |
1217 | Attributes, \r |
1218 | 0, \r |
1219 | 0, \r |
1220 | Variable,\r |
1221 | &CertData->TimeStamp\r |
1222 | );\r |
1223 | }\r |