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[mirror_edk2.git] / SecurityPkg / VariableAuthenticated / RuntimeDxe / AuthService.c
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0c18794e 1/** @file\r
2 Implement authentication services for the authenticated variable\r
3 service in UEFI2.2.\r
4\r
dc204d5a
JY		 5 Caution: This module requires additional review when modified.\r
6 This driver will have external input - variable data. It may be input in SMM mode.\r
7 This external input must be validated carefully to avoid security issue like\r
8 buffer overflow, integer overflow.\r
9 Variable attribute should also be checked to avoid authentication bypass.\r
10\r
11 ProcessVarWithPk(), ProcessVarWithKek() and ProcessVariable() are the function to do\r
12 variable authentication.\r
13\r
14 VerifyTimeBasedPayload() and VerifyCounterBasedPayload() are sub function to do verification.\r
15 They will do basic validation for authentication data structure, then call crypto library\r
16 to verify the signature.\r
17\r
ecc722ad 18Copyright (c) 2009 - 2012, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>\r
2d3fb919 19This program and the accompanying materials\r
20are licensed and made available under the terms and conditions of the BSD License\r
21which accompanies this distribution. The full text of the license may be found at\r
0c18794e 22http://opensource.org/licenses/bsd-license.php\r
23\r
2d3fb919 24THE PROGRAM IS DISTRIBUTED UNDER THE BSD LICENSE ON AN "AS IS" BASIS,\r
0c18794e 25WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR REPRESENTATIONS OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED.\r
26\r
27**/\r
28\r
29#include "Variable.h"\r
30#include "AuthService.h"\r
31\r
32///\r
33/// Global database array for scratch\r
2d3fb919 34///\r
0c18794e 35UINT8 mPubKeyStore[MAX_KEYDB_SIZE];\r
36UINT32 mPubKeyNumber;\r
f6e23353 37UINT8 mCertDbStore[MAX_CERTDB_SIZE];\r
0c18794e 38UINT32 mPlatformMode;\r
ae09f979 39EFI_GUID mSignatureSupport[] = {EFI_CERT_SHA1_GUID, EFI_CERT_SHA256_GUID, EFI_CERT_RSA2048_GUID, EFI_CERT_X509_GUID};\r
0c18794e 40//\r
41// Public Exponent of RSA Key.\r
42//\r
43CONST UINT8 mRsaE[] = { 0x01, 0x00, 0x01 };\r
44//\r
45// Hash context pointer\r
46//\r
47VOID *mHashCtx = NULL;\r
48\r
0c18794e 49//\r
2d3fb919 50// Pointer to runtime buffer.\r
51// For "Append" operation to an existing variable, a read/modify/write operation\r
52// is supported by firmware internally. Reserve runtime buffer to cache previous\r
0c18794e 53// variable data in runtime phase because memory allocation is forbidden in virtual mode.\r
54//\r
55VOID *mStorageArea = NULL;\r
56\r
2d3fb919 57//\r
58// The serialization of the values of the VariableName, VendorGuid and Attributes\r
59// parameters of the SetVariable() call and the TimeStamp component of the\r
60// EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 descriptor followed by the variable's new value\r
61// i.e. (VariableName, VendorGuid, Attributes, TimeStamp, Data)\r
62//\r
63UINT8 *mSerializationRuntimeBuffer = NULL;\r
64\r
d912bad7 65//\r
66// Requirement for different signature type which have been defined in UEFI spec.\r
67// These data are used to peform SignatureList format check while setting PK/KEK variable.\r
68//\r
69EFI_SIGNATURE_ITEM mSupportSigItem[] = {\r
70//{SigType, SigHeaderSize, SigDataSize }\r
71 {EFI_CERT_SHA256_GUID, 0, 32 },\r
72 {EFI_CERT_RSA2048_GUID, 0, 256 },\r
73 {EFI_CERT_RSA2048_SHA256_GUID, 0, 256 },\r
74 {EFI_CERT_SHA1_GUID, 0, 20 },\r
75 {EFI_CERT_RSA2048_SHA1_GUID, 0, 256 },\r
76 {EFI_CERT_X509_GUID, 0, ((UINT32) ~0)},\r
77 {EFI_CERT_SHA224_GUID, 0, 28 },\r
78 {EFI_CERT_SHA384_GUID, 0, 48 },\r
79 {EFI_CERT_SHA512_GUID, 0, 64 }\r
80};\r
81\r
ecc722ad 82/**\r
83 Determine whether this operation needs a physical present user.\r
84\r
85 @param[in] VariableName Name of the Variable.\r
86 @param[in] VendorGuid GUID of the Variable.\r
87\r
88 @retval TRUE This variable is protected, only a physical present user could set this variable.\r
89 @retval FALSE This variable is not protected.\r
90 \r
91**/\r
92BOOLEAN\r
93NeedPhysicallyPresent(\r
94 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r
95 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid\r
96 )\r
97{\r
98 if ((CompareGuid (VendorGuid, &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid) && (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME) == 0))\r
99 || (CompareGuid (VendorGuid, &gEfiCustomModeEnableGuid) && (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_CUSTOM_MODE_NAME) == 0))) {\r
100 return TRUE;\r
101 }\r
102 \r
103 return FALSE;\r
104}\r
105\r
106/**\r
107 Determine whether the platform is operating in Custom Secure Boot mode.\r
108\r
109 @retval TRUE The platform is operating in Custom mode.\r
110 @retval FALSE The platform is operating in Standard mode.\r
111\r
112**/\r
113BOOLEAN\r
114InCustomMode (\r
115 VOID\r
116 )\r
117{\r
118 VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK Variable;\r
119\r
120 FindVariable (EFI_CUSTOM_MODE_NAME, &gEfiCustomModeEnableGuid, &Variable, &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal, FALSE);\r
121 if (Variable.CurrPtr != NULL && *(GetVariableDataPtr (Variable.CurrPtr)) == CUSTOM_SECURE_BOOT_MODE) {\r
122 return TRUE;\r
123 }\r
124 \r
125 return FALSE;\r
126}\r
127\r
128\r
0c18794e 129/**\r
2d3fb919 130 Internal function to delete a Variable given its name and GUID, no authentication\r
131 required.\r
0c18794e 132\r
2d3fb919 133 @param[in] VariableName Name of the Variable.\r
134 @param[in] VendorGuid GUID of the Variable.\r
0c18794e 135\r
2d3fb919 136 @retval EFI_SUCCESS Variable deleted successfully.\r
137 @retval Others The driver failded to start the device.\r
0c18794e 138\r
139**/\r
140EFI_STATUS\r
2d3fb919 141DeleteVariable (\r
142 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r
143 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid\r
144 )\r
145{\r
146 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
147 VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK Variable;\r
148\r
ecc722ad 149 Status = FindVariable (VariableName, VendorGuid, &Variable, &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal, FALSE);\r
2d3fb919 150 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
151 return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
152 }\r
153\r
154 ASSERT (Variable.CurrPtr != NULL);\r
155 return UpdateVariable (VariableName, VendorGuid, NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, &Variable, NULL);\r
156}\r
0c18794e 157\r
158/**\r
159 Initializes for authenticated varibale service.\r
160\r
161 @retval EFI_SUCCESS Function successfully executed.\r
162 @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES Fail to allocate enough memory resources.\r
163\r
164**/\r
165EFI_STATUS\r
166AutenticatedVariableServiceInitialize (\r
167 VOID\r
168 )\r
169{\r
170 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
171 VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK Variable;\r
7aaf2fd6 172 VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK PkVariable;\r
0c18794e 173 UINT8 VarValue;\r
174 UINT32 VarAttr;\r
175 UINT8 *Data;\r
176 UINTN DataSize;\r
177 UINTN CtxSize;\r
beda2356 178 UINT8 SecureBootMode;\r
179 UINT8 SecureBootEnable;\r
ecc722ad 180 UINT8 CustomMode;\r
ed47ae02 181 UINT32 ListSize;\r
2d3fb919 182\r
0c18794e 183 //\r
184 // Initialize hash context.\r
185 //\r
186 CtxSize = Sha256GetContextSize ();\r
187 mHashCtx = AllocateRuntimePool (CtxSize);\r
188 if (mHashCtx == NULL) {\r
189 return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
190 }\r
191\r
192 //\r
193 // Reserved runtime buffer for "Append" operation in virtual mode.\r
194 //\r
2d3fb919 195 mStorageArea = AllocateRuntimePool (PcdGet32 (PcdMaxVariableSize));\r
0c18794e 196 if (mStorageArea == NULL) {\r
197 return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
198 }\r
199\r
200 //\r
2d3fb919 201 // Prepare runtime buffer for serialized data of time-based authenticated\r
202 // Variable, i.e. (VariableName, VendorGuid, Attributes, TimeStamp, Data).\r
203 //\r
204 mSerializationRuntimeBuffer = AllocateRuntimePool (PcdGet32 (PcdMaxVariableSize) + sizeof (EFI_GUID) + sizeof (UINT32) + sizeof (EFI_TIME));\r
205 if (mSerializationRuntimeBuffer == NULL) {\r
206 return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
207 }\r
208\r
209 //\r
210 // Check "AuthVarKeyDatabase" variable's existence.\r
211 // If it doesn't exist, create a new one with initial value of 0 and EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS set.\r
0c18794e 212 //\r
213 Status = FindVariable (\r
2d3fb919 214 AUTHVAR_KEYDB_NAME,\r
215 &gEfiAuthenticatedVariableGuid,\r
216 &Variable,\r
ecc722ad 217 &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,\r
218 FALSE\r
0c18794e 219 );\r
220\r
221 if (Variable.CurrPtr == NULL) {\r
222 VarAttr = EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS;\r
223 VarValue = 0;\r
224 mPubKeyNumber = 0;\r
225 Status = UpdateVariable (\r
226 AUTHVAR_KEYDB_NAME,\r
227 &gEfiAuthenticatedVariableGuid,\r
228 &VarValue,\r
229 sizeof(UINT8),\r
230 VarAttr,\r
231 0,\r
232 0,\r
233 &Variable,\r
234 NULL\r
235 );\r
236 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
237 return Status;\r
238 }\r
239 } else {\r
240 //\r
241 // Load database in global variable for cache.\r
242 //\r
243 DataSize = DataSizeOfVariable (Variable.CurrPtr);\r
244 Data = GetVariableDataPtr (Variable.CurrPtr);\r
245 ASSERT ((DataSize != 0) && (Data != NULL));\r
246 CopyMem (mPubKeyStore, (UINT8 *) Data, DataSize);\r
247 mPubKeyNumber = (UINT32) (DataSize / EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE);\r
248 }\r
7aaf2fd6 249\r
ecc722ad 250 FindVariable (EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, &PkVariable, &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal, FALSE);\r
7aaf2fd6 251 if (PkVariable.CurrPtr == NULL) {\r
252 DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Variable %s does not exist.\n", EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME));\r
253 } else {\r
254 DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Variable %s exists.\n", EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME));\r
255 }\r
256 \r
0c18794e 257 //\r
05a643f9 258 // Create "SetupMode" varable with BS+RT attribute set.\r
0c18794e 259 //\r
05a643f9 260 FindVariable (EFI_SETUP_MODE_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, &Variable, &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal, FALSE);\r
261 if (PkVariable.CurrPtr == NULL) {\r
262 mPlatformMode = SETUP_MODE;\r
263 } else {\r
264 mPlatformMode = USER_MODE;\r
265 }\r
266 Status = UpdateVariable (\r
2d3fb919 267 EFI_SETUP_MODE_NAME,\r
268 &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
05a643f9 269 &mPlatformMode,\r
270 sizeof(UINT8),\r
271 EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS,\r
272 0,\r
273 0,\r
2d3fb919 274 &Variable,\r
05a643f9 275 NULL\r
0c18794e 276 );\r
05a643f9 277 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
278 return Status;\r
0c18794e 279 }\r
05a643f9 280 \r
0c18794e 281 //\r
05a643f9 282 // Create "SignatureSupport" varable with BS+RT attribute set.\r
0c18794e 283 //\r
05a643f9 284 FindVariable (EFI_SIGNATURE_SUPPORT_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, &Variable, &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal, FALSE);\r
285 Status = UpdateVariable (\r
286 EFI_SIGNATURE_SUPPORT_NAME,\r
287 &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
288 mSignatureSupport,\r
289 sizeof(mSignatureSupport),\r
290 EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS,\r
291 0,\r
292 0,\r
293 &Variable,\r
294 NULL\r
295 );\r
296 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
297 return Status;\r
0c18794e 298 }\r
beda2356 299\r
300 //\r
301 // If "SecureBootEnable" variable exists, then update "SecureBoot" variable.\r
2d3fb919 302 // If "SecureBootEnable" variable is SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE and in USER_MODE, Set "SecureBoot" variable to SECURE_BOOT_MODE_ENABLE.\r
beda2356 303 // If "SecureBootEnable" variable is SECURE_BOOT_DISABLE, Set "SecureBoot" variable to SECURE_BOOT_MODE_DISABLE.\r
304 //\r
8f8ca22e 305 SecureBootEnable = SECURE_BOOT_DISABLE;\r
ecc722ad 306 FindVariable (EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME, &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid, &Variable, &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal, FALSE);\r
beda2356 307 if (Variable.CurrPtr != NULL) {\r
308 SecureBootEnable = *(GetVariableDataPtr (Variable.CurrPtr));\r
2d3fb919 309 } else if (mPlatformMode == USER_MODE) {\r
310 //\r
311 // "SecureBootEnable" not exist, initialize it in USER_MODE.\r
312 //\r
8f8ca22e 313 SecureBootEnable = SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE;\r
beda2356 314 Status = UpdateVariable (\r
2d3fb919 315 EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME,\r
316 &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid,\r
317 &SecureBootEnable,\r
318 sizeof (UINT8),\r
319 EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS,\r
320 0,\r
321 0,\r
beda2356 322 &Variable,\r
323 NULL\r
324 );\r
325 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
326 return Status;\r
327 }\r
328 }\r
329\r
05a643f9 330 //\r
331 // Create "SecureBoot" varable with BS+RT attribute set.\r
332 //\r
2d3fb919 333 if (SecureBootEnable == SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE && mPlatformMode == USER_MODE) {\r
334 SecureBootMode = SECURE_BOOT_MODE_ENABLE;\r
335 } else {\r
336 SecureBootMode = SECURE_BOOT_MODE_DISABLE;\r
337 }\r
ecc722ad 338 FindVariable (EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, &Variable, &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal, FALSE);\r
2d3fb919 339 Status = UpdateVariable (\r
340 EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME,\r
341 &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
342 &SecureBootMode,\r
343 sizeof (UINT8),\r
05a643f9 344 EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS,\r
2d3fb919 345 0,\r
346 0,\r
347 &Variable,\r
348 NULL\r
349 );\r
350 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
351 return Status;\r
352 }\r
353\r
7aaf2fd6 354 DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Variable %s is %x\n", EFI_SETUP_MODE_NAME, mPlatformMode));\r
355 DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Variable %s is %x\n", EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME, SecureBootMode));\r
356 DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Variable %s is %x\n", EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME, SecureBootEnable));\r
357\r
0c18794e 358 //\r
ecc722ad 359 // Check "CustomMode" variable's existence.\r
0c18794e 360 //\r
ecc722ad 361 FindVariable (EFI_CUSTOM_MODE_NAME, &gEfiCustomModeEnableGuid, &Variable, &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal, FALSE);\r
362 if (Variable.CurrPtr != NULL) {\r
363 CustomMode = *(GetVariableDataPtr (Variable.CurrPtr));\r
364 } else {\r
0c18794e 365 //\r
ecc722ad 366 // "CustomMode" not exist, initialize it in STANDARD_SECURE_BOOT_MODE.\r
0c18794e 367 //\r
ecc722ad 368 CustomMode = STANDARD_SECURE_BOOT_MODE;\r
369 Status = UpdateVariable (\r
370 EFI_CUSTOM_MODE_NAME,\r
371 &gEfiCustomModeEnableGuid,\r
372 &CustomMode,\r
373 sizeof (UINT8),\r
374 EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS,\r
375 0,\r
376 0,\r
377 &Variable,\r
378 NULL\r
379 );\r
2d3fb919 380 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
381 return Status;\r
0c18794e 382 }\r
0c18794e 383 }\r
ecc722ad 384 \r
385 DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Variable %s is %x\n", EFI_CUSTOM_MODE_NAME, CustomMode));\r
2d3fb919 386\r
ed47ae02 387 //\r
388 // Check "certdb" variable's existence.\r
389 // If it doesn't exist, then create a new one with \r
390 // EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS set.\r
391 //\r
392 Status = FindVariable (\r
393 EFI_CERT_DB_NAME,\r
394 &gEfiCertDbGuid,\r
395 &Variable,\r
396 &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,\r
397 FALSE\r
398 );\r
399\r
400 if (Variable.CurrPtr == NULL) {\r
401 VarAttr = EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS;\r
f6e23353 402 ListSize = sizeof (UINT32);\r
ed47ae02 403 Status = UpdateVariable (\r
404 EFI_CERT_DB_NAME,\r
405 &gEfiCertDbGuid,\r
406 &ListSize,\r
407 sizeof (UINT32),\r
408 VarAttr,\r
409 0,\r
410 0,\r
411 &Variable,\r
412 NULL\r
413 );\r
f6e23353 414 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
415 return Status;\r
416 }\r
ed47ae02 417 } \r
418\r
0c18794e 419 return Status;\r
420}\r
421\r
422/**\r
423 Add public key in store and return its index.\r
424\r
425 @param[in] PubKey Input pointer to Public Key data\r
426\r
427 @return Index of new added item\r
428\r
429**/\r
430UINT32\r
431AddPubKeyInStore (\r
432 IN UINT8 *PubKey\r
433 )\r
434{\r
435 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
436 BOOLEAN IsFound;\r
437 UINT32 Index;\r
438 VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK Variable;\r
439 UINT8 *Ptr;\r
440\r
441 if (PubKey == NULL) {\r
442 return 0;\r
443 }\r
444\r
445 Status = FindVariable (\r
446 AUTHVAR_KEYDB_NAME,\r
447 &gEfiAuthenticatedVariableGuid,\r
448 &Variable,\r
ecc722ad 449 &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,\r
450 FALSE\r
0c18794e 451 );\r
452 ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status);\r
453 //\r
454 // Check whether the public key entry does exist.\r
455 //\r
456 IsFound = FALSE;\r
457 for (Ptr = mPubKeyStore, Index = 1; Index <= mPubKeyNumber; Index++) {\r
458 if (CompareMem (Ptr, PubKey, EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE) == 0) {\r
459 IsFound = TRUE;\r
460 break;\r
461 }\r
462 Ptr += EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE;\r
463 }\r
464\r
465 if (!IsFound) {\r
466 //\r
467 // Add public key in database.\r
468 //\r
469 if (mPubKeyNumber == MAX_KEY_NUM) {\r
470 //\r
471 // Notes: Database is full, need enhancement here, currently just return 0.\r
472 //\r
473 return 0;\r
474 }\r
475\r
476 CopyMem (mPubKeyStore + mPubKeyNumber * EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE, PubKey, EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE);\r
477 Index = ++mPubKeyNumber;\r
478 //\r
479 // Update public key database variable.\r
480 //\r
481 Status = UpdateVariable (\r
482 AUTHVAR_KEYDB_NAME,\r
483 &gEfiAuthenticatedVariableGuid,\r
484 mPubKeyStore,\r
485 mPubKeyNumber * EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE,\r
486 EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS,\r
487 0,\r
488 0,\r
489 &Variable,\r
490 NULL\r
491 );\r
492 ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status);\r
493 }\r
494\r
495 return Index;\r
496}\r
497\r
498/**\r
85560919 499 Verify data payload with AuthInfo in EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SHA256_GUID type.\r
0c18794e 500 Follow the steps in UEFI2.2.\r
501\r
dc204d5a
JY		 502 Caution: This function may receive untrusted input.\r
503 This function may be invoked in SMM mode, and datasize and data are external input.\r
504 This function will do basic validation, before parse the data.\r
505 This function will parse the authentication carefully to avoid security issues, like\r
506 buffer overflow, integer overflow.\r
507\r
0c18794e 508 @param[in] Data Pointer to data with AuthInfo.\r
509 @param[in] DataSize Size of Data.\r
510 @param[in] PubKey Public key used for verification.\r
511\r
2d3fb919 512 @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.\r
0c18794e 513 @retval EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION If authentication failed.\r
2d3fb919 514 @retval EFI_SUCCESS Authentication successful.\r
0c18794e 515\r
516**/\r
517EFI_STATUS\r
518VerifyCounterBasedPayload (\r
519 IN UINT8 *Data,\r
520 IN UINTN DataSize,\r
521 IN UINT8 *PubKey\r
522 )\r
523{\r
524 BOOLEAN Status;\r
525 EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION *CertData;\r
526 EFI_CERT_BLOCK_RSA_2048_SHA256 *CertBlock;\r
527 UINT8 Digest[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE];\r
528 VOID *Rsa;\r
529\r
530 Rsa = NULL;\r
531 CertData = NULL;\r
532 CertBlock = NULL;\r
533\r
534 if (Data == NULL || PubKey == NULL) {\r
535 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
536 }\r
537\r
538 CertData = (EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION *) Data;\r
539 CertBlock = (EFI_CERT_BLOCK_RSA_2048_SHA256 *) (CertData->AuthInfo.CertData);\r
540\r
541 //\r
542 // wCertificateType should be WIN_CERT_TYPE_EFI_GUID.\r
85560919 543 // Cert type should be EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SHA256_GUID.\r
0c18794e 544 //\r
545 if ((CertData->AuthInfo.Hdr.wCertificateType != WIN_CERT_TYPE_EFI_GUID) ||\r
85560919 546 !CompareGuid (&CertData->AuthInfo.CertType, &gEfiCertTypeRsa2048Sha256Guid)\r
0c18794e 547 ) {\r
548 //\r
549 // Invalid AuthInfo type, return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION.\r
550 //\r
551 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r
552 }\r
553 //\r
554 // Hash data payload with SHA256.\r
555 //\r
556 ZeroMem (Digest, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE);\r
557 Status = Sha256Init (mHashCtx);\r
558 if (!Status) {\r
559 goto Done;\r
560 }\r
561 Status = Sha256Update (mHashCtx, Data + AUTHINFO_SIZE, (UINTN) (DataSize - AUTHINFO_SIZE));\r
562 if (!Status) {\r
563 goto Done;\r
564 }\r
565 //\r
566 // Hash Monotonic Count.\r
567 //\r
568 Status = Sha256Update (mHashCtx, &CertData->MonotonicCount, sizeof (UINT64));\r
569 if (!Status) {\r
570 goto Done;\r
571 }\r
572 Status = Sha256Final (mHashCtx, Digest);\r
573 if (!Status) {\r
574 goto Done;\r
575 }\r
576 //\r
577 // Generate & Initialize RSA Context.\r
578 //\r
579 Rsa = RsaNew ();\r
580 ASSERT (Rsa != NULL);\r
2d3fb919 581 //\r
0c18794e 582 // Set RSA Key Components.\r
583 // NOTE: Only N and E are needed to be set as RSA public key for signature verification.\r
584 //\r
585 Status = RsaSetKey (Rsa, RsaKeyN, PubKey, EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE);\r
586 if (!Status) {\r
587 goto Done;\r
588 }\r
589 Status = RsaSetKey (Rsa, RsaKeyE, mRsaE, sizeof (mRsaE));\r
590 if (!Status) {\r
591 goto Done;\r
592 }\r
593 //\r
594 // Verify the signature.\r
595 //\r
596 Status = RsaPkcs1Verify (\r
2d3fb919 597 Rsa,\r
598 Digest,\r
599 SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE,\r
600 CertBlock->Signature,\r
0c18794e 601 EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SHA256_SIZE\r
602 );\r
603\r
604Done:\r
605 if (Rsa != NULL) {\r
606 RsaFree (Rsa);\r
607 }\r
608 if (Status) {\r
609 return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
610 } else {\r
611 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r
612 }\r
613}\r
614\r
0c18794e 615/**\r
616 Update platform mode.\r
617\r
618 @param[in] Mode SETUP_MODE or USER_MODE.\r
619\r
620 @return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.\r
621 @return EFI_SUCCESS Update platform mode successfully.\r
622\r
623**/\r
624EFI_STATUS\r
625UpdatePlatformMode (\r
626 IN UINT32 Mode\r
627 )\r
628{\r
629 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
630 VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK Variable;\r
631 UINT32 VarAttr;\r
632 UINT8 SecureBootMode;\r
beda2356 633 UINT8 SecureBootEnable;\r
634 UINTN VariableDataSize;\r
2d3fb919 635\r
0c18794e 636 Status = FindVariable (\r
2d3fb919 637 EFI_SETUP_MODE_NAME,\r
638 &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
639 &Variable,\r
ecc722ad 640 &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,\r
641 FALSE\r
0c18794e 642 );\r
643 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
644 return Status;\r
645 }\r
646\r
05a643f9 647 //\r
648 // Update the value of SetupMode variable by a simple mem copy, this could avoid possible\r
649 // variable storage reclaim at runtime.\r
650 //\r
651 mPlatformMode = (UINT8) Mode;\r
652 CopyMem (GetVariableDataPtr (Variable.CurrPtr), &mPlatformMode, sizeof(UINT8));\r
0c18794e 653\r
2d3fb919 654 if (AtRuntime ()) {\r
655 //\r
656 // SecureBoot Variable indicates whether the platform firmware is operating\r
657 // in Secure boot mode (1) or not (0), so we should not change SecureBoot\r
658 // Variable in runtime.\r
659 //\r
660 return Status;\r
661 }\r
662\r
0c18794e 663 //\r
664 // Check "SecureBoot" variable's existence.\r
665 // If it doesn't exist, firmware has no capability to perform driver signing verification,\r
666 // then set "SecureBoot" to 0.\r
667 //\r
668 Status = FindVariable (\r
2d3fb919 669 EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME,\r
670 &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
671 &Variable,\r
ecc722ad 672 &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,\r
673 FALSE\r
0c18794e 674 );\r
675 //\r
676 // If "SecureBoot" variable exists, then check "SetupMode" variable update.\r
677 // If "SetupMode" variable is USER_MODE, "SecureBoot" variable is set to 1.\r
678 // If "SetupMode" variable is SETUP_MODE, "SecureBoot" variable is set to 0.\r
679 //\r
680 if (Variable.CurrPtr == NULL) {\r
681 SecureBootMode = SECURE_BOOT_MODE_DISABLE;\r
682 } else {\r
683 if (mPlatformMode == USER_MODE) {\r
684 SecureBootMode = SECURE_BOOT_MODE_ENABLE;\r
685 } else if (mPlatformMode == SETUP_MODE) {\r
686 SecureBootMode = SECURE_BOOT_MODE_DISABLE;\r
687 } else {\r
688 return EFI_NOT_FOUND;\r
689 }\r
690 }\r
691\r
2d3fb919 692 VarAttr = EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS;\r
beda2356 693 Status = UpdateVariable (\r
0c18794e 694 EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME,\r
695 &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
696 &SecureBootMode,\r
697 sizeof(UINT8),\r
698 VarAttr,\r
699 0,\r
700 0,\r
701 &Variable,\r
702 NULL\r
703 );\r
beda2356 704 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
705 return Status;\r
706 }\r
707\r
708 //\r
709 // Check "SecureBootEnable" variable's existence. It can enable/disable secure boot feature.\r
710 //\r
711 Status = FindVariable (\r
2d3fb919 712 EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME,\r
713 &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid,\r
714 &Variable,\r
ecc722ad 715 &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,\r
716 FALSE\r
beda2356 717 );\r
2d3fb919 718\r
beda2356 719 if (SecureBootMode == SECURE_BOOT_MODE_ENABLE) {\r
720 //\r
721 // Create the "SecureBootEnable" variable as secure boot is enabled.\r
722 //\r
723 SecureBootEnable = SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE;\r
724 VariableDataSize = sizeof (SecureBootEnable);\r
725 } else {\r
726 //\r
2d3fb919 727 // Delete the "SecureBootEnable" variable if this variable exist as "SecureBoot"\r
beda2356 728 // variable is not in secure boot state.\r
729 //\r
730 if (Variable.CurrPtr == NULL || EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
731 return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
732 }\r
733 SecureBootEnable = SECURE_BOOT_DISABLE;\r
734 VariableDataSize = 0;\r
735 }\r
2d3fb919 736\r
beda2356 737 Status = UpdateVariable (\r
2d3fb919 738 EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME,\r
739 &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid,\r
740 &SecureBootEnable,\r
741 VariableDataSize,\r
742 EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS,\r
743 0,\r
744 0,\r
beda2356 745 &Variable,\r
746 NULL\r
747 );\r
748 return Status;\r
0c18794e 749}\r
750\r
d912bad7 751/**\r
e77f9ef6 752 Check input data form to make sure it is a valid EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST for PK/KEK/db/dbx variable.\r
d912bad7 753\r
754 @param[in] VariableName Name of Variable to be check.\r
755 @param[in] VendorGuid Variable vendor GUID.\r
756 @param[in] Data Point to the variable data to be checked.\r
757 @param[in] DataSize Size of Data.\r
758\r
759 @return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid signature list format.\r
760 @return EFI_SUCCESS Passed signature list format check successfully.\r
761 \r
762**/\r
763EFI_STATUS\r
764CheckSignatureListFormat(\r
765 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r
766 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r
767 IN VOID *Data,\r
768 IN UINTN DataSize\r
769 )\r
770{\r
771 EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *SigList;\r
772 UINTN SigDataSize;\r
773 UINT32 Index;\r
774 UINT32 SigCount;\r
775 BOOLEAN IsPk;\r
e77f9ef6 776 VOID *RsaContext;\r
777 EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *CertData;\r
778 UINTN CertLen;\r
d912bad7 779\r
780 if (DataSize == 0) {\r
781 return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
782 }\r
783\r
784 ASSERT (VariableName != NULL && VendorGuid != NULL && Data != NULL);\r
785\r
786 if (CompareGuid (VendorGuid, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid) && (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME) == 0)){\r
787 IsPk = TRUE;\r
e77f9ef6 788 } else if ((CompareGuid (VendorGuid, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid) && StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME) == 0) ||\r
789 (CompareGuid (VendorGuid, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid) && \r
790 (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE) == 0 || StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1) == 0))){\r
d912bad7 791 IsPk = FALSE;\r
792 } else {\r
793 return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
794 }\r
795\r
796 SigCount = 0;\r
797 SigList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) Data;\r
798 SigDataSize = DataSize;\r
e77f9ef6 799 RsaContext = NULL;\r
d912bad7 800\r
801 //\r
802 // Walk throuth the input signature list and check the data format.\r
803 // If any signature is incorrectly formed, the whole check will fail.\r
804 //\r
805 while ((SigDataSize > 0) && (SigDataSize >= SigList->SignatureListSize)) {\r
806 for (Index = 0; Index < (sizeof (mSupportSigItem) / sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_ITEM)); Index++ ) {\r
807 if (CompareGuid (&SigList->SignatureType, &mSupportSigItem[Index].SigType)) {\r
808 //\r
809 // The value of SignatureSize should always be 16 (size of SignatureOwner \r
810 // component) add the data length according to signature type.\r
811 //\r
812 if (mSupportSigItem[Index].SigDataSize != ((UINT32) ~0) && \r
813 (SigList->SignatureSize - sizeof (EFI_GUID)) != mSupportSigItem[Index].SigDataSize) {\r
814 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
815 }\r
816 if (mSupportSigItem[Index].SigHeaderSize != ((UINTN) ~0) &&\r
817 SigList->SignatureHeaderSize != mSupportSigItem[Index].SigHeaderSize) {\r
818 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
819 }\r
820 break;\r
821 }\r
822 }\r
823\r
824 if (Index == (sizeof (mSupportSigItem) / sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_ITEM))) {\r
825 //\r
826 // Undefined signature type.\r
827 //\r
828 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
829 }\r
830\r
e77f9ef6 831 if (CompareGuid (&SigList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Guid)) {\r
832 //\r
833 // Try to retrieve the RSA public key from the X.509 certificate.\r
834 // If this operation fails, it's not a valid certificate.\r
835 //\r
836 RsaContext = RsaNew ();\r
837 if (RsaContext == NULL) {\r
838 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
839 }\r
840 CertData = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) SigList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + SigList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r
841 CertLen = SigList->SignatureSize - sizeof (EFI_GUID);\r
842 if (!RsaGetPublicKeyFromX509 (CertData->SignatureData, CertLen, &RsaContext)) {\r
843 RsaFree (RsaContext);\r
844 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
845 }\r
846 RsaFree (RsaContext);\r
847 }\r
848\r
d912bad7 849 if ((SigList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - SigList->SignatureHeaderSize) % SigList->SignatureSize != 0) {\r
850 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
851 }\r
852 SigCount += (SigList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - SigList->SignatureHeaderSize) / SigList->SignatureSize;\r
853 \r
854 SigDataSize -= SigList->SignatureListSize;\r
855 SigList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) SigList + SigList->SignatureListSize);\r
856 }\r
857\r
858 if (((UINTN) SigList - (UINTN) Data) != DataSize) {\r
859 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
860 }\r
861\r
862 if (IsPk && SigCount > 1) {\r
863 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
864 }\r
865\r
866 return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
867}\r
868\r
0c18794e 869/**\r
870 Process variable with platform key for verification.\r
871\r
dc204d5a
JY		 872 Caution: This function may receive untrusted input.\r
873 This function may be invoked in SMM mode, and datasize and data are external input.\r
874 This function will do basic validation, before parse the data.\r
875 This function will parse the authentication carefully to avoid security issues, like\r
876 buffer overflow, integer overflow.\r
877 This function will check attribute carefully to avoid authentication bypass.\r
878\r
0c18794e 879 @param[in] VariableName Name of Variable to be found.\r
880 @param[in] VendorGuid Variable vendor GUID.\r
881 @param[in] Data Data pointer.\r
882 @param[in] DataSize Size of Data found. If size is less than the\r
883 data, this value contains the required size.\r
884 @param[in] Variable The variable information which is used to keep track of variable usage.\r
885 @param[in] Attributes Attribute value of the variable\r
886 @param[in] IsPk Indicate whether it is to process pk.\r
887\r
888 @return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.\r
2d3fb919 889 @return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION The variable does NOT pass the validation.\r
890 check carried out by the firmware.\r
0c18794e 891 @return EFI_SUCCESS Variable passed validation successfully.\r
892\r
893**/\r
894EFI_STATUS\r
895ProcessVarWithPk (\r
896 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r
897 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r
898 IN VOID *Data,\r
899 IN UINTN DataSize,\r
900 IN VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK *Variable,\r
901 IN UINT32 Attributes OPTIONAL,\r
902 IN BOOLEAN IsPk\r
903 )\r
904{\r
905 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
0c18794e 906 BOOLEAN Del;\r
2d3fb919 907 UINT8 *Payload;\r
908 UINTN PayloadSize;\r
0c18794e 909\r
8c1babfd 910 if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE) == 0 || \r
911 (Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) == 0) {\r
0c18794e 912 //\r
05a643f9 913 // PK, KEK and db/dbx should set EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE attribute and should be a time-based\r
8c1babfd 914 // authenticated variable.\r
0c18794e 915 //\r
916 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
917 }\r
918\r
785d84ea 919 Del = FALSE;\r
920 if ((InCustomMode() && UserPhysicalPresent()) || (mPlatformMode == SETUP_MODE && !IsPk)) {\r
8c1babfd 921 Payload = (UINT8 *) Data + AUTHINFO2_SIZE (Data);\r
922 PayloadSize = DataSize - AUTHINFO2_SIZE (Data);\r
785d84ea 923 if (PayloadSize == 0) {\r
924 Del = TRUE;\r
925 }\r
2d3fb919 926\r
d912bad7 927 Status = CheckSignatureListFormat(VariableName, VendorGuid, Payload, PayloadSize);\r
928 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
929 return Status;\r
930 }\r
931\r
2d3fb919 932 Status = UpdateVariable (\r
933 VariableName,\r
934 VendorGuid,\r
935 Payload,\r
936 PayloadSize,\r
937 Attributes,\r
938 0,\r
8c1babfd 939 0,\r
2d3fb919 940 Variable,\r
8c1babfd 941 &((EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 *) Data)->TimeStamp\r
2d3fb919 942 );\r
785d84ea 943 } else if (mPlatformMode == USER_MODE) {\r
944 //\r
945 // Verify against X509 Cert in PK database.\r
946 //\r
947 Status = VerifyTimeBasedPayload (\r
948 VariableName,\r
949 VendorGuid,\r
950 Data,\r
951 DataSize,\r
952 Variable,\r
953 Attributes,\r
954 AuthVarTypePk,\r
955 &Del\r
956 );\r
957 } else {\r
958 //\r
959 // Verify against the certificate in data payload.\r
960 //\r
961 Status = VerifyTimeBasedPayload (\r
962 VariableName,\r
963 VendorGuid,\r
964 Data,\r
965 DataSize,\r
966 Variable,\r
967 Attributes,\r
968 AuthVarTypePayload,\r
969 &Del\r
970 );\r
971 }\r
ecc722ad 972\r
785d84ea 973 if (!EFI_ERROR(Status) && IsPk) {\r
974 if (mPlatformMode == SETUP_MODE && !Del) {\r
975 //\r
976 // If enroll PK in setup mode, need change to user mode.\r
977 //\r
978 Status = UpdatePlatformMode (USER_MODE);\r
979 } else if (mPlatformMode == USER_MODE && Del){\r
980 //\r
981 // If delete PK in user mode, need change to setup mode.\r
982 //\r
983 Status = UpdatePlatformMode (SETUP_MODE);\r
984 }\r
0c18794e 985 }\r
986\r
987 return Status;\r
988}\r
989\r
990/**\r
991 Process variable with key exchange key for verification.\r
992\r
dc204d5a
JY		 993 Caution: This function may receive untrusted input.\r
994 This function may be invoked in SMM mode, and datasize and data are external input.\r
995 This function will do basic validation, before parse the data.\r
996 This function will parse the authentication carefully to avoid security issues, like\r
997 buffer overflow, integer overflow.\r
998 This function will check attribute carefully to avoid authentication bypass.\r
999\r
0c18794e 1000 @param[in] VariableName Name of Variable to be found.\r
1001 @param[in] VendorGuid Variable vendor GUID.\r
1002 @param[in] Data Data pointer.\r
1003 @param[in] DataSize Size of Data found. If size is less than the\r
1004 data, this value contains the required size.\r
1005 @param[in] Variable The variable information which is used to keep track of variable usage.\r
1006 @param[in] Attributes Attribute value of the variable.\r
1007\r
1008 @return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.\r
2d3fb919 1009 @return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION The variable does NOT pass the validation\r
1010 check carried out by the firmware.\r
0c18794e 1011 @return EFI_SUCCESS Variable pass validation successfully.\r
1012\r
1013**/\r
1014EFI_STATUS\r
1015ProcessVarWithKek (\r
1016 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r
1017 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r
1018 IN VOID *Data,\r
1019 IN UINTN DataSize,\r
1020 IN VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK *Variable,\r
1021 IN UINT32 Attributes OPTIONAL\r
1022 )\r
1023{\r
1024 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
2d3fb919 1025 UINT8 *Payload;\r
1026 UINTN PayloadSize;\r
ecc722ad 1027\r
8c1babfd 1028 if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE) == 0 ||\r
1029 (Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) == 0) {\r
ecc722ad 1030 //\r
8c1babfd 1031 // DB and DBX should set EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE attribute and should be a time-based\r
1032 // authenticated variable.\r
ecc722ad 1033 //\r
1034 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
1035 }\r
0c18794e 1036\r
ecc722ad 1037 Status = EFI_SUCCESS;\r
1038 if (mPlatformMode == USER_MODE && !(InCustomMode() && UserPhysicalPresent())) {\r
8c1babfd 1039 //\r
1040 // Time-based, verify against X509 Cert KEK.\r
1041 //\r
1042 return VerifyTimeBasedPayload (\r
1043 VariableName,\r
1044 VendorGuid,\r
1045 Data,\r
1046 DataSize,\r
1047 Variable,\r
1048 Attributes,\r
1049 AuthVarTypeKek,\r
1050 NULL\r
1051 );\r
0c18794e 1052 } else {\r
1053 //\r
ecc722ad 1054 // If in setup mode or custom secure boot mode, no authentication needed.\r
0c18794e 1055 //\r
8c1babfd 1056 Payload = (UINT8 *) Data + AUTHINFO2_SIZE (Data);\r
1057 PayloadSize = DataSize - AUTHINFO2_SIZE (Data);\r
2d3fb919 1058\r
e77f9ef6 1059 Status = CheckSignatureListFormat(VariableName, VendorGuid, Payload, PayloadSize);\r
1060 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
1061 return Status;\r
1062 }\r
1063 \r
0c18794e 1064 Status = UpdateVariable (\r
2d3fb919 1065 VariableName,\r
1066 VendorGuid,\r
1067 Payload,\r
1068 PayloadSize,\r
1069 Attributes,\r
1070 0,\r
8c1babfd 1071 0,\r
0c18794e 1072 Variable,\r
8c1babfd 1073 &((EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 *) Data)->TimeStamp\r
0c18794e 1074 );\r
1075 }\r
1076\r
1077 return Status;\r
1078}\r
1079\r
1080/**\r
1081 Process variable with EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS/EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS set\r
1082\r
dc204d5a
JY		 1083 Caution: This function may receive untrusted input.\r
1084 This function may be invoked in SMM mode, and datasize and data are external input.\r
1085 This function will do basic validation, before parse the data.\r
1086 This function will parse the authentication carefully to avoid security issues, like\r
1087 buffer overflow, integer overflow.\r
1088 This function will check attribute carefully to avoid authentication bypass.\r
1089\r
0c18794e 1090 @param[in] VariableName Name of Variable to be found.\r
1091 @param[in] VendorGuid Variable vendor GUID.\r
1092\r
1093 @param[in] Data Data pointer.\r
1094 @param[in] DataSize Size of Data found. If size is less than the\r
1095 data, this value contains the required size.\r
1096 @param[in] Variable The variable information which is used to keep track of variable usage.\r
1097 @param[in] Attributes Attribute value of the variable.\r
1098\r
1099 @return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.\r
1100 @return EFI_WRITE_PROTECTED Variable is write-protected and needs authentication with\r
1101 EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS set.\r
1102 @return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION The variable is with EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS\r
2d3fb919 1103 set, but the AuthInfo does NOT pass the validation\r
1104 check carried out by the firmware.\r
0c18794e 1105 @return EFI_SUCCESS Variable is not write-protected or pass validation successfully.\r
1106\r
1107**/\r
1108EFI_STATUS\r
1109ProcessVariable (\r
1110 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r
1111 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r
1112 IN VOID *Data,\r
1113 IN UINTN DataSize,\r
1114 IN VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK *Variable,\r
1115 IN UINT32 Attributes\r
1116 )\r
1117{\r
1118 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
1119 BOOLEAN IsDeletion;\r
1120 BOOLEAN IsFirstTime;\r
1121 UINT8 *PubKey;\r
1122 EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION *CertData;\r
1123 EFI_CERT_BLOCK_RSA_2048_SHA256 *CertBlock;\r
1124 UINT32 KeyIndex;\r
1125 UINT64 MonotonicCount;\r
1126\r
2d3fb919 1127 KeyIndex = 0;\r
0c18794e 1128 CertData = NULL;\r
1129 CertBlock = NULL;\r
1130 PubKey = NULL;\r
1131 IsDeletion = FALSE;\r
1132\r
ecc722ad 1133 if (NeedPhysicallyPresent(VariableName, VendorGuid) && !UserPhysicalPresent()) {\r
1134 //\r
1135 // This variable is protected, only physical present user could modify its value.\r
1136 //\r
1137 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r
1138 }\r
1139 \r
0c18794e 1140 //\r
1141 // Process Time-based Authenticated variable.\r
1142 //\r
1143 if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0) {\r
ed47ae02 1144 return VerifyTimeBasedPayload (\r
1145 VariableName,\r
1146 VendorGuid,\r
1147 Data,\r
1148 DataSize,\r
1149 Variable,\r
1150 Attributes,\r
1151 AuthVarTypePriv,\r
1152 NULL\r
1153 );\r
0c18794e 1154 }\r
2d3fb919 1155\r
0c18794e 1156 //\r
1157 // Determine if first time SetVariable with the EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS.\r
1158 //\r
1159 if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0) {\r
1160 //\r
1161 // Determine current operation type.\r
1162 //\r
1163 if (DataSize == AUTHINFO_SIZE) {\r
1164 IsDeletion = TRUE;\r
1165 }\r
1166 //\r
1167 // Determine whether this is the first time with EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS set.\r
1168 //\r
1169 if (Variable->CurrPtr == NULL) {\r
1170 IsFirstTime = TRUE;\r
1171 } else if ((Variable->CurrPtr->Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) == 0) {\r
1172 IsFirstTime = TRUE;\r
1173 } else {\r
1174 KeyIndex = Variable->CurrPtr->PubKeyIndex;\r
1175 IsFirstTime = FALSE;\r
1176 }\r
389c8779 1177 } else if ((Variable->CurrPtr != NULL) && \r
1178 ((Variable->CurrPtr->Attributes & (EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS)) != 0)\r
1179 ) {\r
0c18794e 1180 //\r
1181 // If the variable is already write-protected, it always needs authentication before update.\r
1182 //\r
1183 return EFI_WRITE_PROTECTED;\r
1184 } else {\r
1185 //\r
1186 // If without EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS, set and attributes collision.\r
1187 // That means it is not authenticated variable, just update variable as usual.\r
1188 //\r
1189 Status = UpdateVariable (VariableName, VendorGuid, Data, DataSize, Attributes, 0, 0, Variable, NULL);\r
1190 return Status;\r
1191 }\r
1192\r
1193 //\r
1194 // Get PubKey and check Monotonic Count value corresponding to the variable.\r
1195 //\r
1196 CertData = (EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION *) Data;\r
1197 CertBlock = (EFI_CERT_BLOCK_RSA_2048_SHA256 *) (CertData->AuthInfo.CertData);\r
1198 PubKey = CertBlock->PublicKey;\r
1199\r
1200 //\r
1201 // Update Monotonic Count value.\r
1202 //\r
1203 MonotonicCount = CertData->MonotonicCount;\r
1204\r
1205 if (!IsFirstTime) {\r
1206 //\r
1207 // Check input PubKey.\r
1208 //\r
1209 if (CompareMem (PubKey, mPubKeyStore + (KeyIndex - 1) * EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE, EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE) != 0) {\r
1210 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r
1211 }\r
1212 //\r
1213 // Compare the current monotonic count and ensure that it is greater than the last SetVariable\r
1214 // operation with the EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS attribute set.\r
1215 //\r
1216 if (CertData->MonotonicCount <= Variable->CurrPtr->MonotonicCount) {\r
1217 //\r
1218 // Monotonic count check fail, suspicious replay attack, return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION.\r
1219 //\r
1220 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r
1221 }\r
2d3fb919 1222 }\r
0c18794e 1223 //\r
1224 // Verify the certificate in Data payload.\r
1225 //\r
1226 Status = VerifyCounterBasedPayload (Data, DataSize, PubKey);\r
1227 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
1228 return Status;\r
1229 }\r
2d3fb919 1230\r
0c18794e 1231 //\r
1232 // Now, the signature has been verified!\r
1233 //\r
1234 if (IsFirstTime && !IsDeletion) {\r
1235 //\r
1236 // Update public key database variable if need.\r
1237 //\r
1238 KeyIndex = AddPubKeyInStore (PubKey);\r
4e33001c 1239 if (KeyIndex == 0) {\r
1240 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r
1241 }\r
0c18794e 1242 }\r
1243\r
1244 //\r
1245 // Verification pass.\r
1246 //\r
1247 return UpdateVariable (VariableName, VendorGuid, (UINT8*)Data + AUTHINFO_SIZE, DataSize - AUTHINFO_SIZE, Attributes, KeyIndex, MonotonicCount, Variable, NULL);\r
1248}\r
1249\r
2d3fb919 1250/**\r
1251 Merge two buffers which formatted as EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST. Only the new EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA\r
1252 will be appended to the original EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST, duplicate EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA\r
1253 will be ignored.\r
1254\r
1255 @param[in, out] Data Pointer to original EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST.\r
1256 @param[in] DataSize Size of Data buffer.\r
1257 @param[in] NewData Pointer to new EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST to be appended.\r
1258 @param[in] NewDataSize Size of NewData buffer.\r
1259\r
1260 @return Size of the merged buffer.\r
1261\r
1262**/\r
1263UINTN\r
1264AppendSignatureList (\r
1265 IN OUT VOID *Data,\r
1266 IN UINTN DataSize,\r
1267 IN VOID *NewData,\r
1268 IN UINTN NewDataSize\r
1269 )\r
1270{\r
1271 EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *CertList;\r
1272 EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *Cert;\r
1273 UINTN CertCount;\r
1274 EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *NewCertList;\r
1275 EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *NewCert;\r
1276 UINTN NewCertCount;\r
1277 UINTN Index;\r
1278 UINTN Index2;\r
1279 UINTN Size;\r
1280 UINT8 *Tail;\r
1281 UINTN CopiedCount;\r
1282 UINTN SignatureListSize;\r
1283 BOOLEAN IsNewCert;\r
1284\r
1285 Tail = (UINT8 *) Data + DataSize;\r
1286\r
1287 NewCertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) NewData;\r
1288 while ((NewDataSize > 0) && (NewDataSize >= NewCertList->SignatureListSize)) {\r
1289 NewCert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) NewCertList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + NewCertList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r
1290 NewCertCount = (NewCertList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - NewCertList->SignatureHeaderSize) / NewCertList->SignatureSize;\r
1291\r
1292 CopiedCount = 0;\r
1293 for (Index = 0; Index < NewCertCount; Index++) {\r
1294 IsNewCert = TRUE;\r
1295\r
1296 Size = DataSize;\r
1297 CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) Data;\r
1298 while ((Size > 0) && (Size >= CertList->SignatureListSize)) {\r
1299 if (CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &NewCertList->SignatureType) &&\r
1300 (CertList->SignatureSize == NewCertList->SignatureSize)) {\r
1301 Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r
1302 CertCount = (CertList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - CertList->SignatureHeaderSize) / CertList->SignatureSize;\r
1303 for (Index2 = 0; Index2 < CertCount; Index2++) {\r
1304 //\r
1305 // Iterate each Signature Data in this Signature List.\r
1306 //\r
1307 if (CompareMem (NewCert, Cert, CertList->SignatureSize) == 0) {\r
1308 IsNewCert = FALSE;\r
1309 break;\r
1310 }\r
1311 Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) Cert + CertList->SignatureSize);\r
1312 }\r
1313 }\r
1314\r
1315 if (!IsNewCert) {\r
1316 break;\r
1317 }\r
1318 Size -= CertList->SignatureListSize;\r
1319 CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + CertList->SignatureListSize);\r
1320 }\r
1321\r
1322 if (IsNewCert) {\r
1323 //\r
1324 // New EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA, append it.\r
1325 //\r
1326 if (CopiedCount == 0) {\r
1327 //\r
1328 // Copy EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST header for only once.\r
1329 //\r
1330 CopyMem (Tail, NewCertList, sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + NewCertList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r
1331 Tail = Tail + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + NewCertList->SignatureHeaderSize;\r
1332 }\r
1333\r
1334 CopyMem (Tail, NewCert, NewCertList->SignatureSize);\r
1335 Tail += NewCertList->SignatureSize;\r
1336 CopiedCount++;\r
1337 }\r
1338\r
1339 NewCert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) NewCert + NewCertList->SignatureSize);\r
1340 }\r
1341\r
1342 //\r
1343 // Update SignatureListSize in newly appended EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST.\r
1344 //\r
1345 if (CopiedCount != 0) {\r
1346 SignatureListSize = sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + NewCertList->SignatureHeaderSize + (CopiedCount * NewCertList->SignatureSize);\r
1347 CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) (Tail - SignatureListSize);\r
1348 CertList->SignatureListSize = (UINT32) SignatureListSize;\r
1349 }\r
1350\r
1351 NewDataSize -= NewCertList->SignatureListSize;\r
1352 NewCertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) NewCertList + NewCertList->SignatureListSize);\r
1353 }\r
1354\r
1355 return (Tail - (UINT8 *) Data);\r
1356}\r
1357\r
0c18794e 1358/**\r
1359 Compare two EFI_TIME data.\r
1360\r
1361\r
1362 @param FirstTime A pointer to the first EFI_TIME data.\r
1363 @param SecondTime A pointer to the second EFI_TIME data.\r
1364\r
1365 @retval TRUE The FirstTime is not later than the SecondTime.\r
1366 @retval FALSE The FirstTime is later than the SecondTime.\r
1367\r
1368**/\r
1369BOOLEAN\r
1370CompareTimeStamp (\r
1371 IN EFI_TIME *FirstTime,\r
1372 IN EFI_TIME *SecondTime\r
1373 )\r
1374{\r
1375 if (FirstTime->Year != SecondTime->Year) {\r
1376 return (BOOLEAN) (FirstTime->Year < SecondTime->Year);\r
1377 } else if (FirstTime->Month != SecondTime->Month) {\r
1378 return (BOOLEAN) (FirstTime->Month < SecondTime->Month);\r
1379 } else if (FirstTime->Day != SecondTime->Day) {\r
1380 return (BOOLEAN) (FirstTime->Day < SecondTime->Day);\r
1381 } else if (FirstTime->Hour != SecondTime->Hour) {\r
1382 return (BOOLEAN) (FirstTime->Hour < SecondTime->Hour);\r
1383 } else if (FirstTime->Minute != SecondTime->Minute) {\r
42ed7604 1384 return (BOOLEAN) (FirstTime->Minute < SecondTime->Minute);\r
2d3fb919 1385 }\r
0c18794e 1386\r
1387 return (BOOLEAN) (FirstTime->Second <= SecondTime->Second);\r
1388}\r
1389\r
ed47ae02 1390/**\r
1391 Find matching signer's certificates for common authenticated variable\r
1392 by corresponding VariableName and VendorGuid from "certdb".\r
1393\r
1394 The data format of "certdb":\r
1395 //\r
1396 // UINT32 CertDbListSize;\r
1397 // /// AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA Certs1[];\r
1398 // /// AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA Certs2[];\r
1399 // /// ...\r
1400 // /// AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA Certsn[];\r
1401 //\r
1402\r
1403 @param[in] VariableName Name of authenticated Variable.\r
1404 @param[in] VendorGuid Vendor GUID of authenticated Variable.\r
1405 @param[in] Data Pointer to variable "certdb".\r
1406 @param[in] DataSize Size of variable "certdb".\r
1407 @param[out] CertOffset Offset of matching CertData, from starting of Data.\r
1408 @param[out] CertDataSize Length of CertData in bytes.\r
1409 @param[out] CertNodeOffset Offset of matching AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA , from\r
1410 starting of Data.\r
1411 @param[out] CertNodeSize Length of AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA in bytes.\r
1412\r
1413 @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Any input parameter is invalid.\r
1414 @retval EFI_NOT_FOUND Fail to find matching certs.\r
1415 @retval EFI_SUCCESS Find matching certs and output parameters.\r
1416\r
1417**/\r
1418EFI_STATUS\r
1419FindCertsFromDb (\r
1420 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r
1421 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r
1422 IN UINT8 *Data,\r
1423 IN UINTN DataSize,\r
1424 OUT UINT32 *CertOffset, OPTIONAL\r
1425 OUT UINT32 *CertDataSize, OPTIONAL\r
1426 OUT UINT32 *CertNodeOffset,OPTIONAL\r
1427 OUT UINT32 *CertNodeSize OPTIONAL\r
1428 )\r
1429{\r
1430 UINT32 Offset;\r
1431 AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA *Ptr;\r
1432 UINT32 CertSize;\r
1433 UINT32 NameSize;\r
1434 UINT32 NodeSize;\r
1435 UINT32 CertDbListSize;\r
1436\r
1437 if ((VariableName == NULL) || (VendorGuid == NULL) || (Data == NULL)) {\r
1438 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
1439 }\r
1440\r
1441 //\r
1442 // Check whether DataSize matches recorded CertDbListSize.\r
1443 //\r
1444 if (DataSize < sizeof (UINT32)) {\r
1445 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
1446 }\r
1447\r
1448 CertDbListSize = ReadUnaligned32 ((UINT32 *) Data);\r
1449\r
1450 if (CertDbListSize != (UINT32) DataSize) {\r
1451 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
1452 }\r
1453\r
1454 Offset = sizeof (UINT32);\r
1455\r
1456 //\r
1457 // Get corresponding certificates by VendorGuid and VariableName.\r
1458 //\r
1459 while (Offset < (UINT32) DataSize) {\r
1460 Ptr = (AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA *) (Data + Offset);\r
1461 //\r
1462 // Check whether VendorGuid matches.\r
1463 //\r
1464 if (CompareGuid (&Ptr->VendorGuid, VendorGuid)) {\r
1465 NodeSize = ReadUnaligned32 (&Ptr->CertNodeSize);\r
1466 NameSize = ReadUnaligned32 (&Ptr->NameSize);\r
1467 CertSize = ReadUnaligned32 (&Ptr->CertDataSize);\r
1468\r
1469 if (NodeSize != sizeof (EFI_GUID) + sizeof (UINT32) * 3 + CertSize +\r
1470 sizeof (CHAR16) * NameSize) {\r
1471 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
1472 }\r
1473\r
1474 Offset = Offset + sizeof (EFI_GUID) + sizeof (UINT32) * 3;\r
1475 //\r
1476 // Check whether VariableName matches.\r
1477 //\r
1478 if ((NameSize == StrLen (VariableName)) && \r
1479 (CompareMem (Data + Offset, VariableName, NameSize * sizeof (CHAR16)) == 0)) {\r
1480 Offset = Offset + NameSize * sizeof (CHAR16);\r
1481\r
1482 if (CertOffset != NULL) {\r
1483 *CertOffset = Offset;\r
1484 }\r
1485\r
1486 if (CertDataSize != NULL) {\r
1487 *CertDataSize = CertSize; \r
1488 }\r
1489\r
1490 if (CertNodeOffset != NULL) {\r
1491 *CertNodeOffset = (UINT32) ((UINT8 *) Ptr - Data);\r
1492 }\r
1493\r
1494 if (CertNodeSize != NULL) {\r
1495 *CertNodeSize = NodeSize;\r
1496 }\r
1497\r
1498 return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
1499 } else {\r
1500 Offset = Offset + NameSize * sizeof (CHAR16) + CertSize;\r
1501 }\r
1502 } else {\r
1503 NodeSize = ReadUnaligned32 (&Ptr->CertNodeSize);\r
1504 Offset = Offset + NodeSize;\r
1505 }\r
1506 }\r
1507\r
1508 return EFI_NOT_FOUND; \r
1509}\r
1510\r
1511/**\r
1512 Retrieve signer's certificates for common authenticated variable\r
1513 by corresponding VariableName and VendorGuid from "certdb".\r
1514\r
1515 @param[in] VariableName Name of authenticated Variable.\r
1516 @param[in] VendorGuid Vendor GUID of authenticated Variable.\r
1517 @param[out] CertData Pointer to signer's certificates.\r
1518 @param[out] CertDataSize Length of CertData in bytes.\r
1519\r
1520 @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Any input parameter is invalid.\r
1521 @retval EFI_NOT_FOUND Fail to find "certdb" or matching certs.\r
1522 @retval EFI_SUCCESS Get signer's certificates successfully.\r
1523\r
1524**/\r
1525EFI_STATUS\r
1526GetCertsFromDb (\r
1527 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r
1528 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r
1529 OUT UINT8 **CertData,\r
1530 OUT UINT32 *CertDataSize\r
1531 )\r
1532{\r
1533 VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK CertDbVariable;\r
1534 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
1535 UINT8 *Data;\r
1536 UINTN DataSize;\r
1537 UINT32 CertOffset;\r
1538\r
1539 if ((VariableName == NULL) || (VendorGuid == NULL) || (CertData == NULL) || (CertDataSize == NULL)) {\r
1540 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
1541 }\r
1542 \r
1543 //\r
1544 // Get variable "certdb".\r
1545 //\r
1546 Status = FindVariable (\r
1547 EFI_CERT_DB_NAME,\r
1548 &gEfiCertDbGuid,\r
1549 &CertDbVariable,\r
1550 &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,\r
1551 FALSE\r
1552 ); \r
1553 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
1554 return Status;\r
1555 }\r
1556\r
1557 DataSize = DataSizeOfVariable (CertDbVariable.CurrPtr);\r
1558 Data = GetVariableDataPtr (CertDbVariable.CurrPtr);\r
1559 if ((DataSize == 0) || (Data == NULL)) {\r
1560 ASSERT (FALSE);\r
1561 return EFI_NOT_FOUND;\r
1562 }\r
1563\r
1564 Status = FindCertsFromDb (\r
1565 VariableName,\r
1566 VendorGuid,\r
1567 Data,\r
1568 DataSize,\r
1569 &CertOffset,\r
1570 CertDataSize,\r
1571 NULL,\r
1572 NULL\r
1573 );\r
1574\r
1575 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
1576 return Status;\r
1577 }\r
1578\r
1579 *CertData = Data + CertOffset;\r
1580 return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
1581}\r
1582\r
1583/**\r
1584 Delete matching signer's certificates when deleting common authenticated\r
1585 variable by corresponding VariableName and VendorGuid from "certdb".\r
1586\r
1587 @param[in] VariableName Name of authenticated Variable.\r
1588 @param[in] VendorGuid Vendor GUID of authenticated Variable.\r
1589\r
1590 @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Any input parameter is invalid.\r
1591 @retval EFI_NOT_FOUND Fail to find "certdb" or matching certs.\r
1592 @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES The operation is failed due to lack of resources.\r
1593 @retval EFI_SUCCESS The operation is completed successfully.\r
1594\r
1595**/\r
1596EFI_STATUS\r
1597DeleteCertsFromDb (\r
1598 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r
1599 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid\r
1600 )\r
1601{\r
1602 VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK CertDbVariable;\r
1603 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
1604 UINT8 *Data;\r
1605 UINTN DataSize;\r
1606 UINT32 VarAttr;\r
1607 UINT32 CertNodeOffset;\r
1608 UINT32 CertNodeSize;\r
1609 UINT8 *NewCertDb;\r
1610 UINT32 NewCertDbSize;\r
1611\r
1612 if ((VariableName == NULL) || (VendorGuid == NULL)) {\r
1613 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
1614 }\r
1615 \r
1616 //\r
1617 // Get variable "certdb".\r
1618 //\r
1619 Status = FindVariable (\r
1620 EFI_CERT_DB_NAME,\r
1621 &gEfiCertDbGuid,\r
1622 &CertDbVariable,\r
1623 &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,\r
1624 FALSE\r
1625 ); \r
1626 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
1627 return Status;\r
1628 }\r
1629\r
1630 DataSize = DataSizeOfVariable (CertDbVariable.CurrPtr);\r
1631 Data = GetVariableDataPtr (CertDbVariable.CurrPtr);\r
1632 if ((DataSize == 0) || (Data == NULL)) {\r
1633 ASSERT (FALSE);\r
1634 return EFI_NOT_FOUND;\r
1635 }\r
1636\r
1637 if (DataSize == sizeof (UINT32)) {\r
1638 //\r
1639 // There is no certs in certdb.\r
1640 //\r
1641 return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
1642 }\r
1643\r
1644 //\r
1645 // Get corresponding cert node from certdb.\r
1646 //\r
1647 Status = FindCertsFromDb (\r
1648 VariableName,\r
1649 VendorGuid,\r
1650 Data,\r
1651 DataSize,\r
1652 NULL,\r
1653 NULL,\r
1654 &CertNodeOffset,\r
1655 &CertNodeSize\r
1656 );\r
1657\r
1658 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
1659 return Status;\r
1660 }\r
1661\r
1662 if (DataSize < (CertNodeOffset + CertNodeSize)) {\r
1663 return EFI_NOT_FOUND;\r
1664 }\r
1665\r
1666 //\r
1667 // Construct new data content of variable "certdb".\r
1668 //\r
1669 NewCertDbSize = (UINT32) DataSize - CertNodeSize;\r
f6e23353 1670 NewCertDb = (UINT8*) mCertDbStore;\r
ed47ae02 1671\r
1672 //\r
1673 // Copy the DB entries before deleting node.\r
1674 //\r
1675 CopyMem (NewCertDb, Data, CertNodeOffset);\r
1676 //\r
1677 // Update CertDbListSize.\r
1678 //\r
1679 CopyMem (NewCertDb, &NewCertDbSize, sizeof (UINT32));\r
1680 //\r
1681 // Copy the DB entries after deleting node.\r
1682 //\r
1683 if (DataSize > (CertNodeOffset + CertNodeSize)) {\r
1684 CopyMem (\r
1685 NewCertDb + CertNodeOffset,\r
1686 Data + CertNodeOffset + CertNodeSize,\r
1687 DataSize - CertNodeOffset - CertNodeSize\r
1688 );\r
1689 }\r
1690\r
1691 //\r
1692 // Set "certdb".\r
1693 // \r
1694 VarAttr = EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS; \r
1695 Status = UpdateVariable (\r
1696 EFI_CERT_DB_NAME,\r
1697 &gEfiCertDbGuid,\r
1698 NewCertDb,\r
1699 NewCertDbSize,\r
1700 VarAttr,\r
1701 0,\r
1702 0,\r
1703 &CertDbVariable,\r
1704 NULL\r
1705 );\r
1706\r
ed47ae02 1707 return Status;\r
1708}\r
1709\r
1710/**\r
1711 Insert signer's certificates for common authenticated variable with VariableName\r
1712 and VendorGuid in AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA to "certdb".\r
1713\r
1714 @param[in] VariableName Name of authenticated Variable.\r
1715 @param[in] VendorGuid Vendor GUID of authenticated Variable.\r
1716 @param[in] CertData Pointer to signer's certificates.\r
1717 @param[in] CertDataSize Length of CertData in bytes.\r
1718\r
1719 @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Any input parameter is invalid.\r
1720 @retval EFI_ACCESS_DENIED An AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA entry with same VariableName\r
1721 and VendorGuid already exists.\r
1722 @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES The operation is failed due to lack of resources.\r
1723 @retval EFI_SUCCESS Insert an AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA entry to "certdb"\r
1724\r
1725**/\r
1726EFI_STATUS\r
1727InsertCertsToDb (\r
1728 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r
1729 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r
1730 IN UINT8 *CertData,\r
1731 IN UINTN CertDataSize\r
1732 )\r
1733{\r
1734 VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK CertDbVariable;\r
1735 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
1736 UINT8 *Data;\r
1737 UINTN DataSize;\r
1738 UINT32 VarAttr;\r
1739 UINT8 *NewCertDb;\r
1740 UINT32 NewCertDbSize;\r
1741 UINT32 CertNodeSize;\r
1742 UINT32 NameSize;\r
1743 AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA *Ptr;\r
1744\r
1745 if ((VariableName == NULL) || (VendorGuid == NULL) || (CertData == NULL)) {\r
1746 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
1747 }\r
1748 \r
1749 //\r
1750 // Get variable "certdb".\r
1751 //\r
1752 Status = FindVariable (\r
1753 EFI_CERT_DB_NAME,\r
1754 &gEfiCertDbGuid,\r
1755 &CertDbVariable,\r
1756 &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,\r
1757 FALSE\r
1758 ); \r
1759 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
1760 return Status;\r
1761 }\r
1762\r
1763 DataSize = DataSizeOfVariable (CertDbVariable.CurrPtr);\r
1764 Data = GetVariableDataPtr (CertDbVariable.CurrPtr);\r
1765 if ((DataSize == 0) || (Data == NULL)) {\r
1766 ASSERT (FALSE);\r
1767 return EFI_NOT_FOUND;\r
1768 }\r
1769\r
1770 //\r
1771 // Find whether matching cert node already exists in "certdb".\r
1772 // If yes return error.\r
1773 //\r
1774 Status = FindCertsFromDb (\r
1775 VariableName,\r
1776 VendorGuid,\r
1777 Data,\r
1778 DataSize,\r
1779 NULL,\r
1780 NULL,\r
1781 NULL,\r
1782 NULL\r
1783 );\r
1784\r
1785 if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
1786 ASSERT (FALSE);\r
1787 return EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;\r
1788 }\r
1789\r
1790 //\r
1791 // Construct new data content of variable "certdb".\r
1792 //\r
1793 NameSize = (UINT32) StrLen (VariableName);\r
1794 CertNodeSize = sizeof (AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA) + (UINT32) CertDataSize + NameSize * sizeof (CHAR16); \r
f6e23353 1795 NewCertDbSize = (UINT32) DataSize + CertNodeSize;\r
1796 if (NewCertDbSize > MAX_CERTDB_SIZE) {\r
ed47ae02 1797 return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
1798 }\r
f6e23353 1799 NewCertDb = (UINT8*) mCertDbStore;\r
ed47ae02 1800\r
1801 //\r
1802 // Copy the DB entries before deleting node.\r
1803 //\r
1804 CopyMem (NewCertDb, Data, DataSize);\r
1805 //\r
1806 // Update CertDbListSize.\r
1807 //\r
1808 CopyMem (NewCertDb, &NewCertDbSize, sizeof (UINT32));\r
1809 //\r
1810 // Construct new cert node.\r
1811 //\r
1812 Ptr = (AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA *) (NewCertDb + DataSize);\r
1813 CopyGuid (&Ptr->VendorGuid, VendorGuid);\r
1814 CopyMem (&Ptr->CertNodeSize, &CertNodeSize, sizeof (UINT32));\r
1815 CopyMem (&Ptr->NameSize, &NameSize, sizeof (UINT32));\r
1816 CopyMem (&Ptr->CertDataSize, &CertDataSize, sizeof (UINT32));\r
1817 \r
1818 CopyMem (\r
1819 (UINT8 *) Ptr + sizeof (AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA),\r
1820 VariableName,\r
1821 NameSize * sizeof (CHAR16)\r
1822 );\r
1823\r
1824 CopyMem (\r
1825 (UINT8 *) Ptr + sizeof (AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA) + NameSize * sizeof (CHAR16),\r
1826 CertData,\r
1827 CertDataSize\r
1828 );\r
1829 \r
1830 //\r
1831 // Set "certdb".\r
1832 // \r
1833 VarAttr = EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS; \r
1834 Status = UpdateVariable (\r
1835 EFI_CERT_DB_NAME,\r
1836 &gEfiCertDbGuid,\r
1837 NewCertDb,\r
1838 NewCertDbSize,\r
1839 VarAttr,\r
1840 0,\r
1841 0,\r
1842 &CertDbVariable,\r
1843 NULL\r
1844 );\r
1845\r
ed47ae02 1846 return Status;\r
1847}\r
1848\r
0c18794e 1849/**\r
1850 Process variable with EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS set\r
1851\r
dc204d5a
JY		 1852 Caution: This function may receive untrusted input.\r
1853 This function may be invoked in SMM mode, and datasize and data are external input.\r
1854 This function will do basic validation, before parse the data.\r
1855 This function will parse the authentication carefully to avoid security issues, like\r
1856 buffer overflow, integer overflow.\r
1857\r
0c18794e 1858 @param[in] VariableName Name of Variable to be found.\r
1859 @param[in] VendorGuid Variable vendor GUID.\r
1860 @param[in] Data Data pointer.\r
1861 @param[in] DataSize Size of Data found. If size is less than the\r
1862 data, this value contains the required size.\r
1863 @param[in] Variable The variable information which is used to keep track of variable usage.\r
1864 @param[in] Attributes Attribute value of the variable.\r
785d84ea 1865 @param[in] AuthVarType Verify against PK, KEK database, private database or certificate in data payload.\r
0c18794e 1866 @param[out] VarDel Delete the variable or not.\r
1867\r
1868 @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.\r
2d3fb919 1869 @retval EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION The variable does NOT pass the validation\r
1870 check carried out by the firmware.\r
0c18794e 1871 @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES Failed to process variable due to lack\r
1872 of resources.\r
1873 @retval EFI_SUCCESS Variable pass validation successfully.\r
1874\r
1875**/\r
1876EFI_STATUS\r
1877VerifyTimeBasedPayload (\r
1878 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r
1879 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r
1880 IN VOID *Data,\r
1881 IN UINTN DataSize,\r
1882 IN VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK *Variable,\r
1883 IN UINT32 Attributes,\r
ed47ae02 1884 IN AUTHVAR_TYPE AuthVarType,\r
0c18794e 1885 OUT BOOLEAN *VarDel\r
1886 )\r
1887{\r
1888 UINT8 *RootCert;\r
1889 UINT8 *SigData;\r
2d3fb919 1890 UINT8 *PayloadPtr;\r
0c18794e 1891 UINTN RootCertSize;\r
1892 UINTN Index;\r
2d3fb919 1893 UINTN CertCount;\r
1894 UINTN PayloadSize;\r
0c18794e 1895 UINT32 Attr;\r
1896 UINT32 SigDataSize;\r
1897 UINT32 KekDataSize;\r
0c18794e 1898 BOOLEAN VerifyStatus;\r
1899 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
1900 EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *CertList;\r
1901 EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *Cert;\r
1902 VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK KekVariable;\r
1903 EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 *CertData;\r
1904 UINT8 *NewData;\r
1905 UINTN NewDataSize;\r
1906 VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK PkVariable;\r
2d3fb919 1907 UINT8 *Buffer;\r
1908 UINTN Length;\r
ed47ae02 1909 UINT8 *SignerCerts;\r
1910 UINT8 *WrapSigData;\r
1911 UINTN CertStackSize;\r
1912 UINT8 *CertsInCertDb;\r
1913 UINT32 CertsSizeinDb;\r
0c18794e 1914\r
0c18794e 1915 VerifyStatus = FALSE;\r
1916 CertData = NULL;\r
1917 NewData = NULL;\r
1918 Attr = Attributes;\r
ed47ae02 1919 WrapSigData = NULL;\r
1920 SignerCerts = NULL;\r
1921 RootCert = NULL;\r
0c18794e 1922\r
1923 //\r
2d3fb919 1924 // When the attribute EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS is\r
0c18794e 1925 // set, then the Data buffer shall begin with an instance of a complete (and serialized)\r
2d3fb919 1926 // EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 descriptor. The descriptor shall be followed by the new\r
1927 // variable value and DataSize shall reflect the combined size of the descriptor and the new\r
1928 // variable value. The authentication descriptor is not part of the variable data and is not\r
0c18794e 1929 // returned by subsequent calls to GetVariable().\r
1930 //\r
1931 CertData = (EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 *) Data;\r
2d3fb919 1932\r
1933 //\r
1934 // Verify that Pad1, Nanosecond, TimeZone, Daylight and Pad2 components of the\r
1935 // TimeStamp value are set to zero.\r
1936 //\r
1937 if ((CertData->TimeStamp.Pad1 != 0) ||\r
1938 (CertData->TimeStamp.Nanosecond != 0) ||\r
1939 (CertData->TimeStamp.TimeZone != 0) ||\r
1940 (CertData->TimeStamp.Daylight != 0) ||\r
1941 (CertData->TimeStamp.Pad2 != 0)) {\r
2e24814a 1942 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r
2d3fb919 1943 }\r
1944\r
0c18794e 1945 if ((Variable->CurrPtr != NULL) && ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_APPEND_WRITE) == 0)) {\r
1946 if (CompareTimeStamp (&CertData->TimeStamp, &Variable->CurrPtr->TimeStamp)) {\r
1947 //\r
1948 // TimeStamp check fail, suspicious replay attack, return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION.\r
1949 //\r
1950 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r
1951 }\r
1952 }\r
1953\r
1954 //\r
1955 // wCertificateType should be WIN_CERT_TYPE_EFI_GUID.\r
1956 // Cert type should be EFI_CERT_TYPE_PKCS7_GUID.\r
1957 //\r
1958 if ((CertData->AuthInfo.Hdr.wCertificateType != WIN_CERT_TYPE_EFI_GUID) ||\r
2d3fb919 1959 !CompareGuid (&CertData->AuthInfo.CertType, &gEfiCertPkcs7Guid)) {\r
0c18794e 1960 //\r
1961 // Invalid AuthInfo type, return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION.\r
1962 //\r
1963 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r
1964 }\r
2d3fb919 1965\r
0c18794e 1966 //\r
1967 // Find out Pkcs7 SignedData which follows the EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 descriptor.\r
1968 // AuthInfo.Hdr.dwLength is the length of the entire certificate, including the length of the header.\r
1969 //\r
2d3fb919 1970 SigData = CertData->AuthInfo.CertData;\r
1971 SigDataSize = CertData->AuthInfo.Hdr.dwLength - (UINT32) (OFFSET_OF (WIN_CERTIFICATE_UEFI_GUID, CertData));\r
648f98d1 1972\r
0c18794e 1973 //\r
1974 // Find out the new data payload which follows Pkcs7 SignedData directly.\r
1975 //\r
2d3fb919 1976 PayloadPtr = SigData + SigDataSize;\r
1977 PayloadSize = DataSize - OFFSET_OF_AUTHINFO2_CERT_DATA - (UINTN) SigDataSize;\r
0c18794e 1978\r
1979 //\r
1980 // Construct a buffer to fill with (VariableName, VendorGuid, Attributes, TimeStamp, Data).\r
1981 //\r
2d3fb919 1982 NewDataSize = PayloadSize + sizeof (EFI_TIME) + sizeof (UINT32) +\r
1983 sizeof (EFI_GUID) + StrSize (VariableName) - sizeof (CHAR16);\r
1984 NewData = mSerializationRuntimeBuffer;\r
0c18794e 1985\r
2d3fb919 1986 Buffer = NewData;\r
1987 Length = StrLen (VariableName) * sizeof (CHAR16);\r
1988 CopyMem (Buffer, VariableName, Length);\r
1989 Buffer += Length;\r
0c18794e 1990\r
2d3fb919 1991 Length = sizeof (EFI_GUID);\r
1992 CopyMem (Buffer, VendorGuid, Length);\r
1993 Buffer += Length;\r
0c18794e 1994\r
2d3fb919 1995 Length = sizeof (UINT32);\r
1996 CopyMem (Buffer, &Attr, Length);\r
1997 Buffer += Length;\r
0c18794e 1998\r
2d3fb919 1999 Length = sizeof (EFI_TIME);\r
2000 CopyMem (Buffer, &CertData->TimeStamp, Length);\r
2001 Buffer += Length;\r
0c18794e 2002\r
2d3fb919 2003 CopyMem (Buffer, PayloadPtr, PayloadSize);\r
0c18794e 2004\r
ed47ae02 2005 if (AuthVarType == AuthVarTypePk) {\r
0c18794e 2006 //\r
2007 // Get platform key from variable.\r
2008 //\r
2009 Status = FindVariable (\r
2d3fb919 2010 EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME,\r
2011 &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
2012 &PkVariable,\r
ecc722ad 2013 &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,\r
2014 FALSE\r
0c18794e 2015 );\r
2016 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
2017 return Status;\r
2018 }\r
2019\r
2020 CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) GetVariableDataPtr (PkVariable.CurrPtr);\r
2021 Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r
2022 RootCert = Cert->SignatureData;\r
4e33001c 2023 RootCertSize = CertList->SignatureSize - (sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1);\r
0c18794e 2024\r
2025\r
2026 //\r
2027 // Verify Pkcs7 SignedData via Pkcs7Verify library.\r
2028 //\r
2029 VerifyStatus = Pkcs7Verify (\r
2030 SigData,\r
2031 SigDataSize,\r
2032 RootCert,\r
2033 RootCertSize,\r
2034 NewData,\r
2035 NewDataSize\r
2036 );\r
2037\r
ed47ae02 2038 } else if (AuthVarType == AuthVarTypeKek) {\r
2d3fb919 2039\r
0c18794e 2040 //\r
2041 // Get KEK database from variable.\r
2042 //\r
2043 Status = FindVariable (\r
2d3fb919 2044 EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME,\r
2045 &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
2046 &KekVariable,\r
ecc722ad 2047 &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,\r
2048 FALSE\r
0c18794e 2049 );\r
2050 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
2051 return Status;\r
2052 }\r
2053\r
2054 //\r
2055 // Ready to verify Pkcs7 SignedData. Go through KEK Signature Database to find out X.509 CertList.\r
2d3fb919 2056 //\r
0c18794e 2057 KekDataSize = KekVariable.CurrPtr->DataSize;\r
2058 CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) GetVariableDataPtr (KekVariable.CurrPtr);\r
2059 while ((KekDataSize > 0) && (KekDataSize >= CertList->SignatureListSize)) {\r
2060 if (CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Guid)) {\r
2061 Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r
2062 CertCount = (CertList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - CertList->SignatureHeaderSize) / CertList->SignatureSize;\r
2063 for (Index = 0; Index < CertCount; Index++) {\r
2064 //\r
2065 // Iterate each Signature Data Node within this CertList for a verify\r
2066 //\r
2067 RootCert = Cert->SignatureData;\r
4e33001c 2068 RootCertSize = CertList->SignatureSize - (sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1);\r
2d3fb919 2069\r
0c18794e 2070 //\r
2071 // Verify Pkcs7 SignedData via Pkcs7Verify library.\r
2072 //\r
2073 VerifyStatus = Pkcs7Verify (\r
2074 SigData,\r
2075 SigDataSize,\r
2076 RootCert,\r
2077 RootCertSize,\r
2078 NewData,\r
2079 NewDataSize\r
2080 );\r
2081 if (VerifyStatus) {\r
2082 goto Exit;\r
2083 }\r
2084 Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) Cert + CertList->SignatureSize);\r
2085 }\r
2086 }\r
2087 KekDataSize -= CertList->SignatureListSize;\r
2088 CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + CertList->SignatureListSize);\r
2089 }\r
ed47ae02 2090 } else if (AuthVarType == AuthVarTypePriv) {\r
2091\r
2092 //\r
2093 // Process common authenticated variable except PK/KEK/DB/DBX.\r
2094 // Get signer's certificates from SignedData.\r
2095 //\r
2096 VerifyStatus = Pkcs7GetSigners (\r
2097 SigData,\r
2098 SigDataSize,\r
2099 &SignerCerts,\r
2100 &CertStackSize,\r
2101 &RootCert,\r
2102 &RootCertSize\r
2103 );\r
2104 if (!VerifyStatus) {\r
2105 goto Exit;\r
2106 }\r
2107\r
2108 //\r
2109 // Get previously stored signer's certificates from certdb for existing\r
2110 // variable. Check whether they are identical with signer's certificates\r
2111 // in SignedData. If not, return error immediately.\r
2112 //\r
2113 if ((Variable->CurrPtr != NULL)) {\r
2114 VerifyStatus = FALSE;\r
2115\r
2116 Status = GetCertsFromDb (VariableName, VendorGuid, &CertsInCertDb, &CertsSizeinDb);\r
2117 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
2118 goto Exit;\r
2119 }\r
2120 \r
2121 if ((CertStackSize != CertsSizeinDb) ||\r
2122 (CompareMem (SignerCerts, CertsInCertDb, CertsSizeinDb) != 0)) {\r
2123 goto Exit;\r
2124 }\r
2125 }\r
2126\r
2127 VerifyStatus = Pkcs7Verify (\r
2128 SigData,\r
2129 SigDataSize,\r
2130 RootCert,\r
2131 RootCertSize,\r
2132 NewData,\r
2133 NewDataSize\r
2134 );\r
2135 if (!VerifyStatus) {\r
2136 goto Exit;\r
2137 }\r
2138\r
2139 //\r
2140 // Delete signer's certificates when delete the common authenticated variable.\r
2141 //\r
2142 if ((PayloadSize == 0) && (Variable->CurrPtr != NULL)) {\r
2143 Status = DeleteCertsFromDb (VariableName, VendorGuid);\r
2144 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
2145 VerifyStatus = FALSE;\r
2146 goto Exit;\r
2147 }\r
2148 } else if (Variable->CurrPtr == NULL) {\r
2149 //\r
2150 // Insert signer's certificates when adding a new common authenticated variable.\r
2151 //\r
2152 Status = InsertCertsToDb (VariableName, VendorGuid, SignerCerts, CertStackSize);\r
2153 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
2154 VerifyStatus = FALSE;\r
2155 goto Exit;\r
2156 }\r
2157 }\r
785d84ea 2158 } else if (AuthVarType == AuthVarTypePayload) {\r
2159 CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) PayloadPtr;\r
2160 Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r
2161 RootCert = Cert->SignatureData;\r
2162 RootCertSize = CertList->SignatureSize - (sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1);\r
2163 \r
2164 // Verify Pkcs7 SignedData via Pkcs7Verify library.\r
2165 //\r
2166 VerifyStatus = Pkcs7Verify (\r
2167 SigData,\r
2168 SigDataSize,\r
2169 RootCert,\r
2170 RootCertSize,\r
2171 NewData,\r
2172 NewDataSize\r
2173 );\r
ed47ae02 2174 } else {\r
2175 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r
0c18794e 2176 }\r
2177\r
2178Exit:\r
2179\r
ed47ae02 2180 if (AuthVarType == AuthVarTypePriv) {\r
2181 Pkcs7FreeSigners (RootCert);\r
2182 Pkcs7FreeSigners (SignerCerts);\r
2183 }\r
2184\r
0c18794e 2185 if (!VerifyStatus) {\r
2186 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r
2187 }\r
2188\r
d912bad7 2189 Status = CheckSignatureListFormat(VariableName, VendorGuid, PayloadPtr, PayloadSize);\r
2190 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
2191 return Status;\r
2192 }\r
2193\r
2d3fb919 2194 if ((PayloadSize == 0) && (VarDel != NULL)) {\r
0c18794e 2195 *VarDel = TRUE;\r
2196 }\r
2d3fb919 2197\r
0c18794e 2198 //\r
2199 // Final step: Update/Append Variable if it pass Pkcs7Verify\r
2200 //\r
ed47ae02 2201 return UpdateVariable (\r
2202 VariableName,\r
2203 VendorGuid,\r
2204 PayloadPtr,\r
2205 PayloadSize,\r
2206 Attributes,\r
2207 0,\r
2208 0,\r
2209 Variable,\r
2210 &CertData->TimeStamp\r
2211 );\r
0c18794e 2212}\r
ed47ae02 2213\r
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