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[mirror_edk2.git] / SecurityPkg / VariableAuthenticated / RuntimeDxe / AuthService.c
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0c18794e 1/** @file\r
2 Implement authentication services for the authenticated variable\r
3 service in UEFI2.2.\r
4\r
ecc722ad 5Copyright (c) 2009 - 2012, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>\r
2d3fb919 6This program and the accompanying materials\r
7are licensed and made available under the terms and conditions of the BSD License\r
8which accompanies this distribution. The full text of the license may be found at\r
0c18794e 9http://opensource.org/licenses/bsd-license.php\r
10\r
2d3fb919 11THE PROGRAM IS DISTRIBUTED UNDER THE BSD LICENSE ON AN "AS IS" BASIS,\r
0c18794e 12WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR REPRESENTATIONS OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED.\r
13\r
14**/\r
15\r
16#include "Variable.h"\r
17#include "AuthService.h"\r
18\r
19///\r
20/// Global database array for scratch\r
2d3fb919 21///\r
0c18794e 22UINT8 mPubKeyStore[MAX_KEYDB_SIZE];\r
23UINT32 mPubKeyNumber;\r
24UINT32 mPlatformMode;\r
ae09f979 25EFI_GUID mSignatureSupport[] = {EFI_CERT_SHA1_GUID, EFI_CERT_SHA256_GUID, EFI_CERT_RSA2048_GUID, EFI_CERT_X509_GUID};\r
0c18794e 26//\r
27// Public Exponent of RSA Key.\r
28//\r
29CONST UINT8 mRsaE[] = { 0x01, 0x00, 0x01 };\r
30//\r
31// Hash context pointer\r
32//\r
33VOID *mHashCtx = NULL;\r
34\r
0c18794e 35//\r
2d3fb919 36// Pointer to runtime buffer.\r
37// For "Append" operation to an existing variable, a read/modify/write operation\r
38// is supported by firmware internally. Reserve runtime buffer to cache previous\r
0c18794e 39// variable data in runtime phase because memory allocation is forbidden in virtual mode.\r
40//\r
41VOID *mStorageArea = NULL;\r
42\r
2d3fb919 43//\r
44// The serialization of the values of the VariableName, VendorGuid and Attributes\r
45// parameters of the SetVariable() call and the TimeStamp component of the\r
46// EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 descriptor followed by the variable's new value\r
47// i.e. (VariableName, VendorGuid, Attributes, TimeStamp, Data)\r
48//\r
49UINT8 *mSerializationRuntimeBuffer = NULL;\r
50\r
d912bad7 51//\r
52// Requirement for different signature type which have been defined in UEFI spec.\r
53// These data are used to peform SignatureList format check while setting PK/KEK variable.\r
54//\r
55EFI_SIGNATURE_ITEM mSupportSigItem[] = {\r
56//{SigType, SigHeaderSize, SigDataSize }\r
57 {EFI_CERT_SHA256_GUID, 0, 32 },\r
58 {EFI_CERT_RSA2048_GUID, 0, 256 },\r
59 {EFI_CERT_RSA2048_SHA256_GUID, 0, 256 },\r
60 {EFI_CERT_SHA1_GUID, 0, 20 },\r
61 {EFI_CERT_RSA2048_SHA1_GUID, 0, 256 },\r
62 {EFI_CERT_X509_GUID, 0, ((UINT32) ~0)},\r
63 {EFI_CERT_SHA224_GUID, 0, 28 },\r
64 {EFI_CERT_SHA384_GUID, 0, 48 },\r
65 {EFI_CERT_SHA512_GUID, 0, 64 }\r
66};\r
67\r
ecc722ad 68/**\r
69 Determine whether this operation needs a physical present user.\r
70\r
71 @param[in] VariableName Name of the Variable.\r
72 @param[in] VendorGuid GUID of the Variable.\r
73\r
74 @retval TRUE This variable is protected, only a physical present user could set this variable.\r
75 @retval FALSE This variable is not protected.\r
76 \r
77**/\r
78BOOLEAN\r
79NeedPhysicallyPresent(\r
80 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r
81 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid\r
82 )\r
83{\r
84 if ((CompareGuid (VendorGuid, &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid) && (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME) == 0))\r
85 || (CompareGuid (VendorGuid, &gEfiCustomModeEnableGuid) && (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_CUSTOM_MODE_NAME) == 0))) {\r
86 return TRUE;\r
87 }\r
88 \r
89 return FALSE;\r
90}\r
91\r
92/**\r
93 Determine whether the platform is operating in Custom Secure Boot mode.\r
94\r
95 @retval TRUE The platform is operating in Custom mode.\r
96 @retval FALSE The platform is operating in Standard mode.\r
97\r
98**/\r
99BOOLEAN\r
100InCustomMode (\r
101 VOID\r
102 )\r
103{\r
104 VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK Variable;\r
105\r
106 FindVariable (EFI_CUSTOM_MODE_NAME, &gEfiCustomModeEnableGuid, &Variable, &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal, FALSE);\r
107 if (Variable.CurrPtr != NULL && *(GetVariableDataPtr (Variable.CurrPtr)) == CUSTOM_SECURE_BOOT_MODE) {\r
108 return TRUE;\r
109 }\r
110 \r
111 return FALSE;\r
112}\r
113\r
114\r
0c18794e 115/**\r
2d3fb919 116 Internal function to delete a Variable given its name and GUID, no authentication\r
117 required.\r
0c18794e 118\r
2d3fb919 119 @param[in] VariableName Name of the Variable.\r
120 @param[in] VendorGuid GUID of the Variable.\r
0c18794e 121\r
2d3fb919 122 @retval EFI_SUCCESS Variable deleted successfully.\r
123 @retval Others The driver failded to start the device.\r
0c18794e 124\r
125**/\r
126EFI_STATUS\r
2d3fb919 127DeleteVariable (\r
128 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r
129 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid\r
130 )\r
131{\r
132 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
133 VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK Variable;\r
134\r
ecc722ad 135 Status = FindVariable (VariableName, VendorGuid, &Variable, &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal, FALSE);\r
2d3fb919 136 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
137 return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
138 }\r
139\r
140 ASSERT (Variable.CurrPtr != NULL);\r
141 return UpdateVariable (VariableName, VendorGuid, NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, &Variable, NULL);\r
142}\r
0c18794e 143\r
144/**\r
145 Initializes for authenticated varibale service.\r
146\r
147 @retval EFI_SUCCESS Function successfully executed.\r
148 @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES Fail to allocate enough memory resources.\r
149\r
150**/\r
151EFI_STATUS\r
152AutenticatedVariableServiceInitialize (\r
153 VOID\r
154 )\r
155{\r
156 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
157 VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK Variable;\r
7aaf2fd6 158 VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK PkVariable;\r
0c18794e 159 UINT8 VarValue;\r
160 UINT32 VarAttr;\r
161 UINT8 *Data;\r
162 UINTN DataSize;\r
163 UINTN CtxSize;\r
beda2356 164 UINT8 SecureBootMode;\r
165 UINT8 SecureBootEnable;\r
ecc722ad 166 UINT8 CustomMode;\r
ed47ae02 167 UINT32 ListSize;\r
2d3fb919 168\r
0c18794e 169 //\r
170 // Initialize hash context.\r
171 //\r
172 CtxSize = Sha256GetContextSize ();\r
173 mHashCtx = AllocateRuntimePool (CtxSize);\r
174 if (mHashCtx == NULL) {\r
175 return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
176 }\r
177\r
178 //\r
179 // Reserved runtime buffer for "Append" operation in virtual mode.\r
180 //\r
2d3fb919 181 mStorageArea = AllocateRuntimePool (PcdGet32 (PcdMaxVariableSize));\r
0c18794e 182 if (mStorageArea == NULL) {\r
183 return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
184 }\r
185\r
186 //\r
2d3fb919 187 // Prepare runtime buffer for serialized data of time-based authenticated\r
188 // Variable, i.e. (VariableName, VendorGuid, Attributes, TimeStamp, Data).\r
189 //\r
190 mSerializationRuntimeBuffer = AllocateRuntimePool (PcdGet32 (PcdMaxVariableSize) + sizeof (EFI_GUID) + sizeof (UINT32) + sizeof (EFI_TIME));\r
191 if (mSerializationRuntimeBuffer == NULL) {\r
192 return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
193 }\r
194\r
195 //\r
196 // Check "AuthVarKeyDatabase" variable's existence.\r
197 // If it doesn't exist, create a new one with initial value of 0 and EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS set.\r
0c18794e 198 //\r
199 Status = FindVariable (\r
2d3fb919 200 AUTHVAR_KEYDB_NAME,\r
201 &gEfiAuthenticatedVariableGuid,\r
202 &Variable,\r
ecc722ad 203 &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,\r
204 FALSE\r
0c18794e 205 );\r
206\r
207 if (Variable.CurrPtr == NULL) {\r
208 VarAttr = EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS;\r
209 VarValue = 0;\r
210 mPubKeyNumber = 0;\r
211 Status = UpdateVariable (\r
212 AUTHVAR_KEYDB_NAME,\r
213 &gEfiAuthenticatedVariableGuid,\r
214 &VarValue,\r
215 sizeof(UINT8),\r
216 VarAttr,\r
217 0,\r
218 0,\r
219 &Variable,\r
220 NULL\r
221 );\r
222 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
223 return Status;\r
224 }\r
225 } else {\r
226 //\r
227 // Load database in global variable for cache.\r
228 //\r
229 DataSize = DataSizeOfVariable (Variable.CurrPtr);\r
230 Data = GetVariableDataPtr (Variable.CurrPtr);\r
231 ASSERT ((DataSize != 0) && (Data != NULL));\r
232 CopyMem (mPubKeyStore, (UINT8 *) Data, DataSize);\r
233 mPubKeyNumber = (UINT32) (DataSize / EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE);\r
234 }\r
7aaf2fd6 235\r
ecc722ad 236 FindVariable (EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, &PkVariable, &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal, FALSE);\r
7aaf2fd6 237 if (PkVariable.CurrPtr == NULL) {\r
238 DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Variable %s does not exist.\n", EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME));\r
239 } else {\r
240 DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Variable %s exists.\n", EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME));\r
241 }\r
242 \r
0c18794e 243 //\r
2d3fb919 244 // Check "SetupMode" variable's existence.\r
0c18794e 245 // If it doesn't exist, check PK database's existence to determine the value.\r
2d3fb919 246 // Then create a new one with EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS set.\r
0c18794e 247 //\r
248 Status = FindVariable (\r
2d3fb919 249 EFI_SETUP_MODE_NAME,\r
250 &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
251 &Variable,\r
ecc722ad 252 &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,\r
253 FALSE\r
0c18794e 254 );\r
255\r
256 if (Variable.CurrPtr == NULL) {\r
7aaf2fd6 257 if (PkVariable.CurrPtr == NULL) {\r
0c18794e 258 mPlatformMode = SETUP_MODE;\r
259 } else {\r
260 mPlatformMode = USER_MODE;\r
261 }\r
262\r
2d3fb919 263 VarAttr = EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS;\r
0c18794e 264 Status = UpdateVariable (\r
265 EFI_SETUP_MODE_NAME,\r
266 &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
267 &mPlatformMode,\r
268 sizeof(UINT8),\r
269 VarAttr,\r
270 0,\r
271 0,\r
272 &Variable,\r
273 NULL\r
274 );\r
275 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
276 return Status;\r
277 }\r
278 } else {\r
279 mPlatformMode = *(GetVariableDataPtr (Variable.CurrPtr));\r
280 }\r
281 //\r
2d3fb919 282 // Check "SignatureSupport" variable's existence.\r
283 // If it doesn't exist, then create a new one with EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS set.\r
0c18794e 284 //\r
285 Status = FindVariable (\r
2d3fb919 286 EFI_SIGNATURE_SUPPORT_NAME,\r
287 &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
288 &Variable,\r
ecc722ad 289 &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,\r
290 FALSE\r
0c18794e 291 );\r
292\r
293 if (Variable.CurrPtr == NULL) {\r
294 VarAttr = EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS;\r
295 Status = UpdateVariable (\r
296 EFI_SIGNATURE_SUPPORT_NAME,\r
297 &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
298 mSignatureSupport,\r
ae09f979 299 sizeof(mSignatureSupport),\r
0c18794e 300 VarAttr,\r
301 0,\r
302 0,\r
303 &Variable,\r
304 NULL\r
305 );\r
306 }\r
beda2356 307\r
308 //\r
309 // If "SecureBootEnable" variable exists, then update "SecureBoot" variable.\r
2d3fb919 310 // If "SecureBootEnable" variable is SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE and in USER_MODE, Set "SecureBoot" variable to SECURE_BOOT_MODE_ENABLE.\r
beda2356 311 // If "SecureBootEnable" variable is SECURE_BOOT_DISABLE, Set "SecureBoot" variable to SECURE_BOOT_MODE_DISABLE.\r
312 //\r
2d3fb919 313 SecureBootEnable = SECURE_BOOT_MODE_DISABLE;\r
ecc722ad 314 FindVariable (EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME, &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid, &Variable, &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal, FALSE);\r
beda2356 315 if (Variable.CurrPtr != NULL) {\r
316 SecureBootEnable = *(GetVariableDataPtr (Variable.CurrPtr));\r
2d3fb919 317 } else if (mPlatformMode == USER_MODE) {\r
318 //\r
319 // "SecureBootEnable" not exist, initialize it in USER_MODE.\r
320 //\r
321 SecureBootEnable = SECURE_BOOT_MODE_ENABLE;\r
beda2356 322 Status = UpdateVariable (\r
2d3fb919 323 EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME,\r
324 &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid,\r
325 &SecureBootEnable,\r
326 sizeof (UINT8),\r
327 EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS,\r
328 0,\r
329 0,\r
beda2356 330 &Variable,\r
331 NULL\r
332 );\r
333 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
334 return Status;\r
335 }\r
336 }\r
337\r
2d3fb919 338 if (SecureBootEnable == SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE && mPlatformMode == USER_MODE) {\r
339 SecureBootMode = SECURE_BOOT_MODE_ENABLE;\r
340 } else {\r
341 SecureBootMode = SECURE_BOOT_MODE_DISABLE;\r
342 }\r
ecc722ad 343 FindVariable (EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, &Variable, &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal, FALSE);\r
2d3fb919 344 Status = UpdateVariable (\r
345 EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME,\r
346 &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
347 &SecureBootMode,\r
348 sizeof (UINT8),\r
349 EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS,\r
350 0,\r
351 0,\r
352 &Variable,\r
353 NULL\r
354 );\r
355 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
356 return Status;\r
357 }\r
358\r
7aaf2fd6 359 DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Variable %s is %x\n", EFI_SETUP_MODE_NAME, mPlatformMode));\r
360 DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Variable %s is %x\n", EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME, SecureBootMode));\r
361 DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Variable %s is %x\n", EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME, SecureBootEnable));\r
362\r
0c18794e 363 //\r
ecc722ad 364 // Check "CustomMode" variable's existence.\r
0c18794e 365 //\r
ecc722ad 366 FindVariable (EFI_CUSTOM_MODE_NAME, &gEfiCustomModeEnableGuid, &Variable, &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal, FALSE);\r
367 if (Variable.CurrPtr != NULL) {\r
368 CustomMode = *(GetVariableDataPtr (Variable.CurrPtr));\r
369 } else {\r
0c18794e 370 //\r
ecc722ad 371 // "CustomMode" not exist, initialize it in STANDARD_SECURE_BOOT_MODE.\r
0c18794e 372 //\r
ecc722ad 373 CustomMode = STANDARD_SECURE_BOOT_MODE;\r
374 Status = UpdateVariable (\r
375 EFI_CUSTOM_MODE_NAME,\r
376 &gEfiCustomModeEnableGuid,\r
377 &CustomMode,\r
378 sizeof (UINT8),\r
379 EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS,\r
380 0,\r
381 0,\r
382 &Variable,\r
383 NULL\r
384 );\r
2d3fb919 385 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
386 return Status;\r
0c18794e 387 }\r
0c18794e 388 }\r
ecc722ad 389 \r
390 DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Variable %s is %x\n", EFI_CUSTOM_MODE_NAME, CustomMode));\r
2d3fb919 391\r
ed47ae02 392 //\r
393 // Check "certdb" variable's existence.\r
394 // If it doesn't exist, then create a new one with \r
395 // EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS set.\r
396 //\r
397 Status = FindVariable (\r
398 EFI_CERT_DB_NAME,\r
399 &gEfiCertDbGuid,\r
400 &Variable,\r
401 &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,\r
402 FALSE\r
403 );\r
404\r
405 if (Variable.CurrPtr == NULL) {\r
406 VarAttr = EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS;\r
407 ListSize = 0;\r
408 Status = UpdateVariable (\r
409 EFI_CERT_DB_NAME,\r
410 &gEfiCertDbGuid,\r
411 &ListSize,\r
412 sizeof (UINT32),\r
413 VarAttr,\r
414 0,\r
415 0,\r
416 &Variable,\r
417 NULL\r
418 );\r
419\r
420 } \r
421\r
0c18794e 422 return Status;\r
423}\r
424\r
425/**\r
426 Add public key in store and return its index.\r
427\r
428 @param[in] PubKey Input pointer to Public Key data\r
429\r
430 @return Index of new added item\r
431\r
432**/\r
433UINT32\r
434AddPubKeyInStore (\r
435 IN UINT8 *PubKey\r
436 )\r
437{\r
438 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
439 BOOLEAN IsFound;\r
440 UINT32 Index;\r
441 VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK Variable;\r
442 UINT8 *Ptr;\r
443\r
444 if (PubKey == NULL) {\r
445 return 0;\r
446 }\r
447\r
448 Status = FindVariable (\r
449 AUTHVAR_KEYDB_NAME,\r
450 &gEfiAuthenticatedVariableGuid,\r
451 &Variable,\r
ecc722ad 452 &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,\r
453 FALSE\r
0c18794e 454 );\r
455 ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status);\r
456 //\r
457 // Check whether the public key entry does exist.\r
458 //\r
459 IsFound = FALSE;\r
460 for (Ptr = mPubKeyStore, Index = 1; Index <= mPubKeyNumber; Index++) {\r
461 if (CompareMem (Ptr, PubKey, EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE) == 0) {\r
462 IsFound = TRUE;\r
463 break;\r
464 }\r
465 Ptr += EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE;\r
466 }\r
467\r
468 if (!IsFound) {\r
469 //\r
470 // Add public key in database.\r
471 //\r
472 if (mPubKeyNumber == MAX_KEY_NUM) {\r
473 //\r
474 // Notes: Database is full, need enhancement here, currently just return 0.\r
475 //\r
476 return 0;\r
477 }\r
478\r
479 CopyMem (mPubKeyStore + mPubKeyNumber * EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE, PubKey, EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE);\r
480 Index = ++mPubKeyNumber;\r
481 //\r
482 // Update public key database variable.\r
483 //\r
484 Status = UpdateVariable (\r
485 AUTHVAR_KEYDB_NAME,\r
486 &gEfiAuthenticatedVariableGuid,\r
487 mPubKeyStore,\r
488 mPubKeyNumber * EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE,\r
489 EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS,\r
490 0,\r
491 0,\r
492 &Variable,\r
493 NULL\r
494 );\r
495 ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status);\r
496 }\r
497\r
498 return Index;\r
499}\r
500\r
501/**\r
85560919 502 Verify data payload with AuthInfo in EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SHA256_GUID type.\r
0c18794e 503 Follow the steps in UEFI2.2.\r
504\r
505 @param[in] Data Pointer to data with AuthInfo.\r
506 @param[in] DataSize Size of Data.\r
507 @param[in] PubKey Public key used for verification.\r
508\r
2d3fb919 509 @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.\r
0c18794e 510 @retval EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION If authentication failed.\r
2d3fb919 511 @retval EFI_SUCCESS Authentication successful.\r
0c18794e 512\r
513**/\r
514EFI_STATUS\r
515VerifyCounterBasedPayload (\r
516 IN UINT8 *Data,\r
517 IN UINTN DataSize,\r
518 IN UINT8 *PubKey\r
519 )\r
520{\r
521 BOOLEAN Status;\r
522 EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION *CertData;\r
523 EFI_CERT_BLOCK_RSA_2048_SHA256 *CertBlock;\r
524 UINT8 Digest[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE];\r
525 VOID *Rsa;\r
526\r
527 Rsa = NULL;\r
528 CertData = NULL;\r
529 CertBlock = NULL;\r
530\r
531 if (Data == NULL || PubKey == NULL) {\r
532 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
533 }\r
534\r
535 CertData = (EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION *) Data;\r
536 CertBlock = (EFI_CERT_BLOCK_RSA_2048_SHA256 *) (CertData->AuthInfo.CertData);\r
537\r
538 //\r
539 // wCertificateType should be WIN_CERT_TYPE_EFI_GUID.\r
85560919 540 // Cert type should be EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SHA256_GUID.\r
0c18794e 541 //\r
542 if ((CertData->AuthInfo.Hdr.wCertificateType != WIN_CERT_TYPE_EFI_GUID) ||\r
85560919 543 !CompareGuid (&CertData->AuthInfo.CertType, &gEfiCertTypeRsa2048Sha256Guid)\r
0c18794e 544 ) {\r
545 //\r
546 // Invalid AuthInfo type, return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION.\r
547 //\r
548 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r
549 }\r
550 //\r
551 // Hash data payload with SHA256.\r
552 //\r
553 ZeroMem (Digest, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE);\r
554 Status = Sha256Init (mHashCtx);\r
555 if (!Status) {\r
556 goto Done;\r
557 }\r
558 Status = Sha256Update (mHashCtx, Data + AUTHINFO_SIZE, (UINTN) (DataSize - AUTHINFO_SIZE));\r
559 if (!Status) {\r
560 goto Done;\r
561 }\r
562 //\r
563 // Hash Monotonic Count.\r
564 //\r
565 Status = Sha256Update (mHashCtx, &CertData->MonotonicCount, sizeof (UINT64));\r
566 if (!Status) {\r
567 goto Done;\r
568 }\r
569 Status = Sha256Final (mHashCtx, Digest);\r
570 if (!Status) {\r
571 goto Done;\r
572 }\r
573 //\r
574 // Generate & Initialize RSA Context.\r
575 //\r
576 Rsa = RsaNew ();\r
577 ASSERT (Rsa != NULL);\r
2d3fb919 578 //\r
0c18794e 579 // Set RSA Key Components.\r
580 // NOTE: Only N and E are needed to be set as RSA public key for signature verification.\r
581 //\r
582 Status = RsaSetKey (Rsa, RsaKeyN, PubKey, EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE);\r
583 if (!Status) {\r
584 goto Done;\r
585 }\r
586 Status = RsaSetKey (Rsa, RsaKeyE, mRsaE, sizeof (mRsaE));\r
587 if (!Status) {\r
588 goto Done;\r
589 }\r
590 //\r
591 // Verify the signature.\r
592 //\r
593 Status = RsaPkcs1Verify (\r
2d3fb919 594 Rsa,\r
595 Digest,\r
596 SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE,\r
597 CertBlock->Signature,\r
0c18794e 598 EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SHA256_SIZE\r
599 );\r
600\r
601Done:\r
602 if (Rsa != NULL) {\r
603 RsaFree (Rsa);\r
604 }\r
605 if (Status) {\r
606 return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
607 } else {\r
608 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r
609 }\r
610}\r
611\r
0c18794e 612/**\r
613 Update platform mode.\r
614\r
615 @param[in] Mode SETUP_MODE or USER_MODE.\r
616\r
617 @return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.\r
618 @return EFI_SUCCESS Update platform mode successfully.\r
619\r
620**/\r
621EFI_STATUS\r
622UpdatePlatformMode (\r
623 IN UINT32 Mode\r
624 )\r
625{\r
626 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
627 VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK Variable;\r
628 UINT32 VarAttr;\r
629 UINT8 SecureBootMode;\r
beda2356 630 UINT8 SecureBootEnable;\r
631 UINTN VariableDataSize;\r
2d3fb919 632\r
0c18794e 633 Status = FindVariable (\r
2d3fb919 634 EFI_SETUP_MODE_NAME,\r
635 &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
636 &Variable,\r
ecc722ad 637 &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,\r
638 FALSE\r
0c18794e 639 );\r
640 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
641 return Status;\r
642 }\r
643\r
644 mPlatformMode = Mode;\r
2d3fb919 645 VarAttr = EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS;\r
0c18794e 646 Status = UpdateVariable (\r
647 EFI_SETUP_MODE_NAME,\r
648 &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
649 &mPlatformMode,\r
650 sizeof(UINT8),\r
651 VarAttr,\r
652 0,\r
653 0,\r
654 &Variable,\r
655 NULL\r
656 );\r
657 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
658 return Status;\r
659 }\r
660\r
2d3fb919 661 if (AtRuntime ()) {\r
662 //\r
663 // SecureBoot Variable indicates whether the platform firmware is operating\r
664 // in Secure boot mode (1) or not (0), so we should not change SecureBoot\r
665 // Variable in runtime.\r
666 //\r
667 return Status;\r
668 }\r
669\r
0c18794e 670 //\r
671 // Check "SecureBoot" variable's existence.\r
672 // If it doesn't exist, firmware has no capability to perform driver signing verification,\r
673 // then set "SecureBoot" to 0.\r
674 //\r
675 Status = FindVariable (\r
2d3fb919 676 EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME,\r
677 &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
678 &Variable,\r
ecc722ad 679 &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,\r
680 FALSE\r
0c18794e 681 );\r
682 //\r
683 // If "SecureBoot" variable exists, then check "SetupMode" variable update.\r
684 // If "SetupMode" variable is USER_MODE, "SecureBoot" variable is set to 1.\r
685 // If "SetupMode" variable is SETUP_MODE, "SecureBoot" variable is set to 0.\r
686 //\r
687 if (Variable.CurrPtr == NULL) {\r
688 SecureBootMode = SECURE_BOOT_MODE_DISABLE;\r
689 } else {\r
690 if (mPlatformMode == USER_MODE) {\r
691 SecureBootMode = SECURE_BOOT_MODE_ENABLE;\r
692 } else if (mPlatformMode == SETUP_MODE) {\r
693 SecureBootMode = SECURE_BOOT_MODE_DISABLE;\r
694 } else {\r
695 return EFI_NOT_FOUND;\r
696 }\r
697 }\r
698\r
2d3fb919 699 VarAttr = EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS;\r
beda2356 700 Status = UpdateVariable (\r
0c18794e 701 EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME,\r
702 &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
703 &SecureBootMode,\r
704 sizeof(UINT8),\r
705 VarAttr,\r
706 0,\r
707 0,\r
708 &Variable,\r
709 NULL\r
710 );\r
beda2356 711 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
712 return Status;\r
713 }\r
714\r
715 //\r
716 // Check "SecureBootEnable" variable's existence. It can enable/disable secure boot feature.\r
717 //\r
718 Status = FindVariable (\r
2d3fb919 719 EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME,\r
720 &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid,\r
721 &Variable,\r
ecc722ad 722 &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,\r
723 FALSE\r
beda2356 724 );\r
2d3fb919 725\r
beda2356 726 if (SecureBootMode == SECURE_BOOT_MODE_ENABLE) {\r
727 //\r
728 // Create the "SecureBootEnable" variable as secure boot is enabled.\r
729 //\r
730 SecureBootEnable = SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE;\r
731 VariableDataSize = sizeof (SecureBootEnable);\r
732 } else {\r
733 //\r
2d3fb919 734 // Delete the "SecureBootEnable" variable if this variable exist as "SecureBoot"\r
beda2356 735 // variable is not in secure boot state.\r
736 //\r
737 if (Variable.CurrPtr == NULL || EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
738 return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
739 }\r
740 SecureBootEnable = SECURE_BOOT_DISABLE;\r
741 VariableDataSize = 0;\r
742 }\r
2d3fb919 743\r
beda2356 744 Status = UpdateVariable (\r
2d3fb919 745 EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME,\r
746 &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid,\r
747 &SecureBootEnable,\r
748 VariableDataSize,\r
749 EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS,\r
750 0,\r
751 0,\r
beda2356 752 &Variable,\r
753 NULL\r
754 );\r
755 return Status;\r
0c18794e 756}\r
757\r
d912bad7 758/**\r
759 Check input data form to make sure it is a valid EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST for PK/KEK variable.\r
760\r
761 @param[in] VariableName Name of Variable to be check.\r
762 @param[in] VendorGuid Variable vendor GUID.\r
763 @param[in] Data Point to the variable data to be checked.\r
764 @param[in] DataSize Size of Data.\r
765\r
766 @return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid signature list format.\r
767 @return EFI_SUCCESS Passed signature list format check successfully.\r
768 \r
769**/\r
770EFI_STATUS\r
771CheckSignatureListFormat(\r
772 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r
773 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r
774 IN VOID *Data,\r
775 IN UINTN DataSize\r
776 )\r
777{\r
778 EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *SigList;\r
779 UINTN SigDataSize;\r
780 UINT32 Index;\r
781 UINT32 SigCount;\r
782 BOOLEAN IsPk;\r
783\r
784 if (DataSize == 0) {\r
785 return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
786 }\r
787\r
788 ASSERT (VariableName != NULL && VendorGuid != NULL && Data != NULL);\r
789\r
790 if (CompareGuid (VendorGuid, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid) && (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME) == 0)){\r
791 IsPk = TRUE;\r
792 } else if (CompareGuid (VendorGuid, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid) && (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME) == 0)) {\r
793 IsPk = FALSE;\r
794 } else {\r
795 return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
796 }\r
797\r
798 SigCount = 0;\r
799 SigList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) Data;\r
800 SigDataSize = DataSize;\r
801\r
802 //\r
803 // Walk throuth the input signature list and check the data format.\r
804 // If any signature is incorrectly formed, the whole check will fail.\r
805 //\r
806 while ((SigDataSize > 0) && (SigDataSize >= SigList->SignatureListSize)) {\r
807 for (Index = 0; Index < (sizeof (mSupportSigItem) / sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_ITEM)); Index++ ) {\r
808 if (CompareGuid (&SigList->SignatureType, &mSupportSigItem[Index].SigType)) {\r
809 //\r
810 // The value of SignatureSize should always be 16 (size of SignatureOwner \r
811 // component) add the data length according to signature type.\r
812 //\r
813 if (mSupportSigItem[Index].SigDataSize != ((UINT32) ~0) && \r
814 (SigList->SignatureSize - sizeof (EFI_GUID)) != mSupportSigItem[Index].SigDataSize) {\r
815 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
816 }\r
817 if (mSupportSigItem[Index].SigHeaderSize != ((UINTN) ~0) &&\r
818 SigList->SignatureHeaderSize != mSupportSigItem[Index].SigHeaderSize) {\r
819 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
820 }\r
821 break;\r
822 }\r
823 }\r
824\r
825 if (Index == (sizeof (mSupportSigItem) / sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_ITEM))) {\r
826 //\r
827 // Undefined signature type.\r
828 //\r
829 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
830 }\r
831\r
832 if ((SigList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - SigList->SignatureHeaderSize) % SigList->SignatureSize != 0) {\r
833 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
834 }\r
835 SigCount += (SigList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - SigList->SignatureHeaderSize) / SigList->SignatureSize;\r
836 \r
837 SigDataSize -= SigList->SignatureListSize;\r
838 SigList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) SigList + SigList->SignatureListSize);\r
839 }\r
840\r
841 if (((UINTN) SigList - (UINTN) Data) != DataSize) {\r
842 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
843 }\r
844\r
845 if (IsPk && SigCount > 1) {\r
846 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
847 }\r
848\r
849 return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
850}\r
851\r
0c18794e 852/**\r
853 Process variable with platform key for verification.\r
854\r
855 @param[in] VariableName Name of Variable to be found.\r
856 @param[in] VendorGuid Variable vendor GUID.\r
857 @param[in] Data Data pointer.\r
858 @param[in] DataSize Size of Data found. If size is less than the\r
859 data, this value contains the required size.\r
860 @param[in] Variable The variable information which is used to keep track of variable usage.\r
861 @param[in] Attributes Attribute value of the variable\r
862 @param[in] IsPk Indicate whether it is to process pk.\r
863\r
864 @return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.\r
2d3fb919 865 @return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION The variable does NOT pass the validation.\r
866 check carried out by the firmware.\r
0c18794e 867 @return EFI_SUCCESS Variable passed validation successfully.\r
868\r
869**/\r
870EFI_STATUS\r
871ProcessVarWithPk (\r
872 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r
873 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r
874 IN VOID *Data,\r
875 IN UINTN DataSize,\r
876 IN VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK *Variable,\r
877 IN UINT32 Attributes OPTIONAL,\r
878 IN BOOLEAN IsPk\r
879 )\r
880{\r
881 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
0c18794e 882 BOOLEAN Del;\r
2d3fb919 883 UINT8 *Payload;\r
884 UINTN PayloadSize;\r
0c18794e 885\r
8c1babfd 886 if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE) == 0 || \r
887 (Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) == 0) {\r
0c18794e 888 //\r
8c1babfd 889 // PK and KEK should set EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE attribute and should be a time-based\r
890 // authenticated variable.\r
0c18794e 891 //\r
892 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
893 }\r
894\r
ecc722ad 895 if (mPlatformMode == USER_MODE && !(InCustomMode() && UserPhysicalPresent())) {\r
8c1babfd 896 //\r
897 // Verify against X509 Cert PK.\r
898 //\r
899 Del = FALSE;\r
900 Status = VerifyTimeBasedPayload (\r
901 VariableName,\r
902 VendorGuid,\r
903 Data,\r
904 DataSize,\r
905 Variable,\r
906 Attributes,\r
907 AuthVarTypePk,\r
908 &Del\r
909 );\r
910 if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
0c18794e 911 //\r
8c1babfd 912 // If delete PK in user mode, need change to setup mode.\r
0c18794e 913 //\r
8c1babfd 914 if (Del && IsPk) {\r
915 Status = UpdatePlatformMode (SETUP_MODE);\r
0c18794e 916 }\r
917 }\r
8c1babfd 918 return Status;\r
0c18794e 919 } else {\r
2d3fb919 920 //\r
ecc722ad 921 // Process PK or KEK in Setup mode or Custom Secure Boot mode.\r
2d3fb919 922 //\r
8c1babfd 923 Payload = (UINT8 *) Data + AUTHINFO2_SIZE (Data);\r
924 PayloadSize = DataSize - AUTHINFO2_SIZE (Data);\r
2d3fb919 925\r
d912bad7 926 Status = CheckSignatureListFormat(VariableName, VendorGuid, Payload, PayloadSize);\r
927 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
928 return Status;\r
929 }\r
930\r
2d3fb919 931 Status = UpdateVariable (\r
932 VariableName,\r
933 VendorGuid,\r
934 Payload,\r
935 PayloadSize,\r
936 Attributes,\r
937 0,\r
8c1babfd 938 0,\r
2d3fb919 939 Variable,\r
8c1babfd 940 &((EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 *) Data)->TimeStamp\r
2d3fb919 941 );\r
ecc722ad 942\r
943 if (IsPk) {\r
944 if (PayloadSize != 0) {\r
945 //\r
946 // If enroll PK in setup mode, need change to user mode.\r
947 //\r
948 Status = UpdatePlatformMode (USER_MODE);\r
949 } else {\r
950 //\r
951 // If delete PK in custom mode, need change to setup mode.\r
952 //\r
953 UpdatePlatformMode (SETUP_MODE);\r
954 }\r
955 } \r
0c18794e 956 }\r
957\r
958 return Status;\r
959}\r
960\r
961/**\r
962 Process variable with key exchange key for verification.\r
963\r
964 @param[in] VariableName Name of Variable to be found.\r
965 @param[in] VendorGuid Variable vendor GUID.\r
966 @param[in] Data Data pointer.\r
967 @param[in] DataSize Size of Data found. If size is less than the\r
968 data, this value contains the required size.\r
969 @param[in] Variable The variable information which is used to keep track of variable usage.\r
970 @param[in] Attributes Attribute value of the variable.\r
971\r
972 @return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.\r
2d3fb919 973 @return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION The variable does NOT pass the validation\r
974 check carried out by the firmware.\r
0c18794e 975 @return EFI_SUCCESS Variable pass validation successfully.\r
976\r
977**/\r
978EFI_STATUS\r
979ProcessVarWithKek (\r
980 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r
981 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r
982 IN VOID *Data,\r
983 IN UINTN DataSize,\r
984 IN VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK *Variable,\r
985 IN UINT32 Attributes OPTIONAL\r
986 )\r
987{\r
988 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
2d3fb919 989 UINT8 *Payload;\r
990 UINTN PayloadSize;\r
ecc722ad 991\r
8c1babfd 992 if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE) == 0 ||\r
993 (Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) == 0) {\r
ecc722ad 994 //\r
8c1babfd 995 // DB and DBX should set EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE attribute and should be a time-based\r
996 // authenticated variable.\r
ecc722ad 997 //\r
998 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
999 }\r
0c18794e 1000\r
ecc722ad 1001 Status = EFI_SUCCESS;\r
1002 if (mPlatformMode == USER_MODE && !(InCustomMode() && UserPhysicalPresent())) {\r
8c1babfd 1003 //\r
1004 // Time-based, verify against X509 Cert KEK.\r
1005 //\r
1006 return VerifyTimeBasedPayload (\r
1007 VariableName,\r
1008 VendorGuid,\r
1009 Data,\r
1010 DataSize,\r
1011 Variable,\r
1012 Attributes,\r
1013 AuthVarTypeKek,\r
1014 NULL\r
1015 );\r
0c18794e 1016 } else {\r
1017 //\r
ecc722ad 1018 // If in setup mode or custom secure boot mode, no authentication needed.\r
0c18794e 1019 //\r
8c1babfd 1020 Payload = (UINT8 *) Data + AUTHINFO2_SIZE (Data);\r
1021 PayloadSize = DataSize - AUTHINFO2_SIZE (Data);\r
2d3fb919 1022\r
0c18794e 1023 Status = UpdateVariable (\r
2d3fb919 1024 VariableName,\r
1025 VendorGuid,\r
1026 Payload,\r
1027 PayloadSize,\r
1028 Attributes,\r
1029 0,\r
8c1babfd 1030 0,\r
0c18794e 1031 Variable,\r
8c1babfd 1032 &((EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 *) Data)->TimeStamp\r
0c18794e 1033 );\r
1034 }\r
1035\r
1036 return Status;\r
1037}\r
1038\r
1039/**\r
1040 Process variable with EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS/EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS set\r
1041\r
1042 @param[in] VariableName Name of Variable to be found.\r
1043 @param[in] VendorGuid Variable vendor GUID.\r
1044\r
1045 @param[in] Data Data pointer.\r
1046 @param[in] DataSize Size of Data found. If size is less than the\r
1047 data, this value contains the required size.\r
1048 @param[in] Variable The variable information which is used to keep track of variable usage.\r
1049 @param[in] Attributes Attribute value of the variable.\r
1050\r
1051 @return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.\r
1052 @return EFI_WRITE_PROTECTED Variable is write-protected and needs authentication with\r
1053 EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS set.\r
1054 @return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION The variable is with EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS\r
2d3fb919 1055 set, but the AuthInfo does NOT pass the validation\r
1056 check carried out by the firmware.\r
0c18794e 1057 @return EFI_SUCCESS Variable is not write-protected or pass validation successfully.\r
1058\r
1059**/\r
1060EFI_STATUS\r
1061ProcessVariable (\r
1062 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r
1063 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r
1064 IN VOID *Data,\r
1065 IN UINTN DataSize,\r
1066 IN VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK *Variable,\r
1067 IN UINT32 Attributes\r
1068 )\r
1069{\r
1070 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
1071 BOOLEAN IsDeletion;\r
1072 BOOLEAN IsFirstTime;\r
1073 UINT8 *PubKey;\r
1074 EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION *CertData;\r
1075 EFI_CERT_BLOCK_RSA_2048_SHA256 *CertBlock;\r
1076 UINT32 KeyIndex;\r
1077 UINT64 MonotonicCount;\r
1078\r
2d3fb919 1079 KeyIndex = 0;\r
0c18794e 1080 CertData = NULL;\r
1081 CertBlock = NULL;\r
1082 PubKey = NULL;\r
1083 IsDeletion = FALSE;\r
1084\r
ecc722ad 1085 if (NeedPhysicallyPresent(VariableName, VendorGuid) && !UserPhysicalPresent()) {\r
1086 //\r
1087 // This variable is protected, only physical present user could modify its value.\r
1088 //\r
1089 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r
1090 }\r
1091 \r
0c18794e 1092 //\r
1093 // Process Time-based Authenticated variable.\r
1094 //\r
1095 if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0) {\r
ed47ae02 1096 return VerifyTimeBasedPayload (\r
1097 VariableName,\r
1098 VendorGuid,\r
1099 Data,\r
1100 DataSize,\r
1101 Variable,\r
1102 Attributes,\r
1103 AuthVarTypePriv,\r
1104 NULL\r
1105 );\r
0c18794e 1106 }\r
2d3fb919 1107\r
0c18794e 1108 //\r
1109 // Determine if first time SetVariable with the EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS.\r
1110 //\r
1111 if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0) {\r
1112 //\r
1113 // Determine current operation type.\r
1114 //\r
1115 if (DataSize == AUTHINFO_SIZE) {\r
1116 IsDeletion = TRUE;\r
1117 }\r
1118 //\r
1119 // Determine whether this is the first time with EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS set.\r
1120 //\r
1121 if (Variable->CurrPtr == NULL) {\r
1122 IsFirstTime = TRUE;\r
1123 } else if ((Variable->CurrPtr->Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) == 0) {\r
1124 IsFirstTime = TRUE;\r
1125 } else {\r
1126 KeyIndex = Variable->CurrPtr->PubKeyIndex;\r
1127 IsFirstTime = FALSE;\r
1128 }\r
389c8779 1129 } else if ((Variable->CurrPtr != NULL) && \r
1130 ((Variable->CurrPtr->Attributes & (EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS)) != 0)\r
1131 ) {\r
0c18794e 1132 //\r
1133 // If the variable is already write-protected, it always needs authentication before update.\r
1134 //\r
1135 return EFI_WRITE_PROTECTED;\r
1136 } else {\r
1137 //\r
1138 // If without EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS, set and attributes collision.\r
1139 // That means it is not authenticated variable, just update variable as usual.\r
1140 //\r
1141 Status = UpdateVariable (VariableName, VendorGuid, Data, DataSize, Attributes, 0, 0, Variable, NULL);\r
1142 return Status;\r
1143 }\r
1144\r
1145 //\r
1146 // Get PubKey and check Monotonic Count value corresponding to the variable.\r
1147 //\r
1148 CertData = (EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION *) Data;\r
1149 CertBlock = (EFI_CERT_BLOCK_RSA_2048_SHA256 *) (CertData->AuthInfo.CertData);\r
1150 PubKey = CertBlock->PublicKey;\r
1151\r
1152 //\r
1153 // Update Monotonic Count value.\r
1154 //\r
1155 MonotonicCount = CertData->MonotonicCount;\r
1156\r
1157 if (!IsFirstTime) {\r
1158 //\r
1159 // Check input PubKey.\r
1160 //\r
1161 if (CompareMem (PubKey, mPubKeyStore + (KeyIndex - 1) * EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE, EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE) != 0) {\r
1162 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r
1163 }\r
1164 //\r
1165 // Compare the current monotonic count and ensure that it is greater than the last SetVariable\r
1166 // operation with the EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS attribute set.\r
1167 //\r
1168 if (CertData->MonotonicCount <= Variable->CurrPtr->MonotonicCount) {\r
1169 //\r
1170 // Monotonic count check fail, suspicious replay attack, return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION.\r
1171 //\r
1172 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r
1173 }\r
2d3fb919 1174 }\r
0c18794e 1175 //\r
1176 // Verify the certificate in Data payload.\r
1177 //\r
1178 Status = VerifyCounterBasedPayload (Data, DataSize, PubKey);\r
1179 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
1180 return Status;\r
1181 }\r
2d3fb919 1182\r
0c18794e 1183 //\r
1184 // Now, the signature has been verified!\r
1185 //\r
1186 if (IsFirstTime && !IsDeletion) {\r
1187 //\r
1188 // Update public key database variable if need.\r
1189 //\r
1190 KeyIndex = AddPubKeyInStore (PubKey);\r
4e33001c 1191 if (KeyIndex == 0) {\r
1192 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r
1193 }\r
0c18794e 1194 }\r
1195\r
1196 //\r
1197 // Verification pass.\r
1198 //\r
1199 return UpdateVariable (VariableName, VendorGuid, (UINT8*)Data + AUTHINFO_SIZE, DataSize - AUTHINFO_SIZE, Attributes, KeyIndex, MonotonicCount, Variable, NULL);\r
1200}\r
1201\r
2d3fb919 1202/**\r
1203 Merge two buffers which formatted as EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST. Only the new EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA\r
1204 will be appended to the original EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST, duplicate EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA\r
1205 will be ignored.\r
1206\r
1207 @param[in, out] Data Pointer to original EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST.\r
1208 @param[in] DataSize Size of Data buffer.\r
1209 @param[in] NewData Pointer to new EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST to be appended.\r
1210 @param[in] NewDataSize Size of NewData buffer.\r
1211\r
1212 @return Size of the merged buffer.\r
1213\r
1214**/\r
1215UINTN\r
1216AppendSignatureList (\r
1217 IN OUT VOID *Data,\r
1218 IN UINTN DataSize,\r
1219 IN VOID *NewData,\r
1220 IN UINTN NewDataSize\r
1221 )\r
1222{\r
1223 EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *CertList;\r
1224 EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *Cert;\r
1225 UINTN CertCount;\r
1226 EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *NewCertList;\r
1227 EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *NewCert;\r
1228 UINTN NewCertCount;\r
1229 UINTN Index;\r
1230 UINTN Index2;\r
1231 UINTN Size;\r
1232 UINT8 *Tail;\r
1233 UINTN CopiedCount;\r
1234 UINTN SignatureListSize;\r
1235 BOOLEAN IsNewCert;\r
1236\r
1237 Tail = (UINT8 *) Data + DataSize;\r
1238\r
1239 NewCertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) NewData;\r
1240 while ((NewDataSize > 0) && (NewDataSize >= NewCertList->SignatureListSize)) {\r
1241 NewCert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) NewCertList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + NewCertList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r
1242 NewCertCount = (NewCertList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - NewCertList->SignatureHeaderSize) / NewCertList->SignatureSize;\r
1243\r
1244 CopiedCount = 0;\r
1245 for (Index = 0; Index < NewCertCount; Index++) {\r
1246 IsNewCert = TRUE;\r
1247\r
1248 Size = DataSize;\r
1249 CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) Data;\r
1250 while ((Size > 0) && (Size >= CertList->SignatureListSize)) {\r
1251 if (CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &NewCertList->SignatureType) &&\r
1252 (CertList->SignatureSize == NewCertList->SignatureSize)) {\r
1253 Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r
1254 CertCount = (CertList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - CertList->SignatureHeaderSize) / CertList->SignatureSize;\r
1255 for (Index2 = 0; Index2 < CertCount; Index2++) {\r
1256 //\r
1257 // Iterate each Signature Data in this Signature List.\r
1258 //\r
1259 if (CompareMem (NewCert, Cert, CertList->SignatureSize) == 0) {\r
1260 IsNewCert = FALSE;\r
1261 break;\r
1262 }\r
1263 Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) Cert + CertList->SignatureSize);\r
1264 }\r
1265 }\r
1266\r
1267 if (!IsNewCert) {\r
1268 break;\r
1269 }\r
1270 Size -= CertList->SignatureListSize;\r
1271 CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + CertList->SignatureListSize);\r
1272 }\r
1273\r
1274 if (IsNewCert) {\r
1275 //\r
1276 // New EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA, append it.\r
1277 //\r
1278 if (CopiedCount == 0) {\r
1279 //\r
1280 // Copy EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST header for only once.\r
1281 //\r
1282 CopyMem (Tail, NewCertList, sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + NewCertList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r
1283 Tail = Tail + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + NewCertList->SignatureHeaderSize;\r
1284 }\r
1285\r
1286 CopyMem (Tail, NewCert, NewCertList->SignatureSize);\r
1287 Tail += NewCertList->SignatureSize;\r
1288 CopiedCount++;\r
1289 }\r
1290\r
1291 NewCert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) NewCert + NewCertList->SignatureSize);\r
1292 }\r
1293\r
1294 //\r
1295 // Update SignatureListSize in newly appended EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST.\r
1296 //\r
1297 if (CopiedCount != 0) {\r
1298 SignatureListSize = sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + NewCertList->SignatureHeaderSize + (CopiedCount * NewCertList->SignatureSize);\r
1299 CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) (Tail - SignatureListSize);\r
1300 CertList->SignatureListSize = (UINT32) SignatureListSize;\r
1301 }\r
1302\r
1303 NewDataSize -= NewCertList->SignatureListSize;\r
1304 NewCertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) NewCertList + NewCertList->SignatureListSize);\r
1305 }\r
1306\r
1307 return (Tail - (UINT8 *) Data);\r
1308}\r
1309\r
0c18794e 1310/**\r
1311 Compare two EFI_TIME data.\r
1312\r
1313\r
1314 @param FirstTime A pointer to the first EFI_TIME data.\r
1315 @param SecondTime A pointer to the second EFI_TIME data.\r
1316\r
1317 @retval TRUE The FirstTime is not later than the SecondTime.\r
1318 @retval FALSE The FirstTime is later than the SecondTime.\r
1319\r
1320**/\r
1321BOOLEAN\r
1322CompareTimeStamp (\r
1323 IN EFI_TIME *FirstTime,\r
1324 IN EFI_TIME *SecondTime\r
1325 )\r
1326{\r
1327 if (FirstTime->Year != SecondTime->Year) {\r
1328 return (BOOLEAN) (FirstTime->Year < SecondTime->Year);\r
1329 } else if (FirstTime->Month != SecondTime->Month) {\r
1330 return (BOOLEAN) (FirstTime->Month < SecondTime->Month);\r
1331 } else if (FirstTime->Day != SecondTime->Day) {\r
1332 return (BOOLEAN) (FirstTime->Day < SecondTime->Day);\r
1333 } else if (FirstTime->Hour != SecondTime->Hour) {\r
1334 return (BOOLEAN) (FirstTime->Hour < SecondTime->Hour);\r
1335 } else if (FirstTime->Minute != SecondTime->Minute) {\r
1336 return (BOOLEAN) (FirstTime->Minute < FirstTime->Minute);\r
2d3fb919 1337 }\r
0c18794e 1338\r
1339 return (BOOLEAN) (FirstTime->Second <= SecondTime->Second);\r
1340}\r
1341\r
ed47ae02 1342/**\r
1343 Find matching signer's certificates for common authenticated variable\r
1344 by corresponding VariableName and VendorGuid from "certdb".\r
1345\r
1346 The data format of "certdb":\r
1347 //\r
1348 // UINT32 CertDbListSize;\r
1349 // /// AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA Certs1[];\r
1350 // /// AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA Certs2[];\r
1351 // /// ...\r
1352 // /// AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA Certsn[];\r
1353 //\r
1354\r
1355 @param[in] VariableName Name of authenticated Variable.\r
1356 @param[in] VendorGuid Vendor GUID of authenticated Variable.\r
1357 @param[in] Data Pointer to variable "certdb".\r
1358 @param[in] DataSize Size of variable "certdb".\r
1359 @param[out] CertOffset Offset of matching CertData, from starting of Data.\r
1360 @param[out] CertDataSize Length of CertData in bytes.\r
1361 @param[out] CertNodeOffset Offset of matching AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA , from\r
1362 starting of Data.\r
1363 @param[out] CertNodeSize Length of AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA in bytes.\r
1364\r
1365 @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Any input parameter is invalid.\r
1366 @retval EFI_NOT_FOUND Fail to find matching certs.\r
1367 @retval EFI_SUCCESS Find matching certs and output parameters.\r
1368\r
1369**/\r
1370EFI_STATUS\r
1371FindCertsFromDb (\r
1372 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r
1373 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r
1374 IN UINT8 *Data,\r
1375 IN UINTN DataSize,\r
1376 OUT UINT32 *CertOffset, OPTIONAL\r
1377 OUT UINT32 *CertDataSize, OPTIONAL\r
1378 OUT UINT32 *CertNodeOffset,OPTIONAL\r
1379 OUT UINT32 *CertNodeSize OPTIONAL\r
1380 )\r
1381{\r
1382 UINT32 Offset;\r
1383 AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA *Ptr;\r
1384 UINT32 CertSize;\r
1385 UINT32 NameSize;\r
1386 UINT32 NodeSize;\r
1387 UINT32 CertDbListSize;\r
1388\r
1389 if ((VariableName == NULL) || (VendorGuid == NULL) || (Data == NULL)) {\r
1390 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
1391 }\r
1392\r
1393 //\r
1394 // Check whether DataSize matches recorded CertDbListSize.\r
1395 //\r
1396 if (DataSize < sizeof (UINT32)) {\r
1397 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
1398 }\r
1399\r
1400 CertDbListSize = ReadUnaligned32 ((UINT32 *) Data);\r
1401\r
1402 if (CertDbListSize != (UINT32) DataSize) {\r
1403 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
1404 }\r
1405\r
1406 Offset = sizeof (UINT32);\r
1407\r
1408 //\r
1409 // Get corresponding certificates by VendorGuid and VariableName.\r
1410 //\r
1411 while (Offset < (UINT32) DataSize) {\r
1412 Ptr = (AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA *) (Data + Offset);\r
1413 //\r
1414 // Check whether VendorGuid matches.\r
1415 //\r
1416 if (CompareGuid (&Ptr->VendorGuid, VendorGuid)) {\r
1417 NodeSize = ReadUnaligned32 (&Ptr->CertNodeSize);\r
1418 NameSize = ReadUnaligned32 (&Ptr->NameSize);\r
1419 CertSize = ReadUnaligned32 (&Ptr->CertDataSize);\r
1420\r
1421 if (NodeSize != sizeof (EFI_GUID) + sizeof (UINT32) * 3 + CertSize +\r
1422 sizeof (CHAR16) * NameSize) {\r
1423 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
1424 }\r
1425\r
1426 Offset = Offset + sizeof (EFI_GUID) + sizeof (UINT32) * 3;\r
1427 //\r
1428 // Check whether VariableName matches.\r
1429 //\r
1430 if ((NameSize == StrLen (VariableName)) && \r
1431 (CompareMem (Data + Offset, VariableName, NameSize * sizeof (CHAR16)) == 0)) {\r
1432 Offset = Offset + NameSize * sizeof (CHAR16);\r
1433\r
1434 if (CertOffset != NULL) {\r
1435 *CertOffset = Offset;\r
1436 }\r
1437\r
1438 if (CertDataSize != NULL) {\r
1439 *CertDataSize = CertSize; \r
1440 }\r
1441\r
1442 if (CertNodeOffset != NULL) {\r
1443 *CertNodeOffset = (UINT32) ((UINT8 *) Ptr - Data);\r
1444 }\r
1445\r
1446 if (CertNodeSize != NULL) {\r
1447 *CertNodeSize = NodeSize;\r
1448 }\r
1449\r
1450 return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
1451 } else {\r
1452 Offset = Offset + NameSize * sizeof (CHAR16) + CertSize;\r
1453 }\r
1454 } else {\r
1455 NodeSize = ReadUnaligned32 (&Ptr->CertNodeSize);\r
1456 Offset = Offset + NodeSize;\r
1457 }\r
1458 }\r
1459\r
1460 return EFI_NOT_FOUND; \r
1461}\r
1462\r
1463/**\r
1464 Retrieve signer's certificates for common authenticated variable\r
1465 by corresponding VariableName and VendorGuid from "certdb".\r
1466\r
1467 @param[in] VariableName Name of authenticated Variable.\r
1468 @param[in] VendorGuid Vendor GUID of authenticated Variable.\r
1469 @param[out] CertData Pointer to signer's certificates.\r
1470 @param[out] CertDataSize Length of CertData in bytes.\r
1471\r
1472 @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Any input parameter is invalid.\r
1473 @retval EFI_NOT_FOUND Fail to find "certdb" or matching certs.\r
1474 @retval EFI_SUCCESS Get signer's certificates successfully.\r
1475\r
1476**/\r
1477EFI_STATUS\r
1478GetCertsFromDb (\r
1479 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r
1480 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r
1481 OUT UINT8 **CertData,\r
1482 OUT UINT32 *CertDataSize\r
1483 )\r
1484{\r
1485 VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK CertDbVariable;\r
1486 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
1487 UINT8 *Data;\r
1488 UINTN DataSize;\r
1489 UINT32 CertOffset;\r
1490\r
1491 if ((VariableName == NULL) || (VendorGuid == NULL) || (CertData == NULL) || (CertDataSize == NULL)) {\r
1492 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
1493 }\r
1494 \r
1495 //\r
1496 // Get variable "certdb".\r
1497 //\r
1498 Status = FindVariable (\r
1499 EFI_CERT_DB_NAME,\r
1500 &gEfiCertDbGuid,\r
1501 &CertDbVariable,\r
1502 &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,\r
1503 FALSE\r
1504 ); \r
1505 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
1506 return Status;\r
1507 }\r
1508\r
1509 DataSize = DataSizeOfVariable (CertDbVariable.CurrPtr);\r
1510 Data = GetVariableDataPtr (CertDbVariable.CurrPtr);\r
1511 if ((DataSize == 0) || (Data == NULL)) {\r
1512 ASSERT (FALSE);\r
1513 return EFI_NOT_FOUND;\r
1514 }\r
1515\r
1516 Status = FindCertsFromDb (\r
1517 VariableName,\r
1518 VendorGuid,\r
1519 Data,\r
1520 DataSize,\r
1521 &CertOffset,\r
1522 CertDataSize,\r
1523 NULL,\r
1524 NULL\r
1525 );\r
1526\r
1527 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
1528 return Status;\r
1529 }\r
1530\r
1531 *CertData = Data + CertOffset;\r
1532 return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
1533}\r
1534\r
1535/**\r
1536 Delete matching signer's certificates when deleting common authenticated\r
1537 variable by corresponding VariableName and VendorGuid from "certdb".\r
1538\r
1539 @param[in] VariableName Name of authenticated Variable.\r
1540 @param[in] VendorGuid Vendor GUID of authenticated Variable.\r
1541\r
1542 @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Any input parameter is invalid.\r
1543 @retval EFI_NOT_FOUND Fail to find "certdb" or matching certs.\r
1544 @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES The operation is failed due to lack of resources.\r
1545 @retval EFI_SUCCESS The operation is completed successfully.\r
1546\r
1547**/\r
1548EFI_STATUS\r
1549DeleteCertsFromDb (\r
1550 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r
1551 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid\r
1552 )\r
1553{\r
1554 VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK CertDbVariable;\r
1555 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
1556 UINT8 *Data;\r
1557 UINTN DataSize;\r
1558 UINT32 VarAttr;\r
1559 UINT32 CertNodeOffset;\r
1560 UINT32 CertNodeSize;\r
1561 UINT8 *NewCertDb;\r
1562 UINT32 NewCertDbSize;\r
1563\r
1564 if ((VariableName == NULL) || (VendorGuid == NULL)) {\r
1565 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
1566 }\r
1567 \r
1568 //\r
1569 // Get variable "certdb".\r
1570 //\r
1571 Status = FindVariable (\r
1572 EFI_CERT_DB_NAME,\r
1573 &gEfiCertDbGuid,\r
1574 &CertDbVariable,\r
1575 &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,\r
1576 FALSE\r
1577 ); \r
1578 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
1579 return Status;\r
1580 }\r
1581\r
1582 DataSize = DataSizeOfVariable (CertDbVariable.CurrPtr);\r
1583 Data = GetVariableDataPtr (CertDbVariable.CurrPtr);\r
1584 if ((DataSize == 0) || (Data == NULL)) {\r
1585 ASSERT (FALSE);\r
1586 return EFI_NOT_FOUND;\r
1587 }\r
1588\r
1589 if (DataSize == sizeof (UINT32)) {\r
1590 //\r
1591 // There is no certs in certdb.\r
1592 //\r
1593 return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
1594 }\r
1595\r
1596 //\r
1597 // Get corresponding cert node from certdb.\r
1598 //\r
1599 Status = FindCertsFromDb (\r
1600 VariableName,\r
1601 VendorGuid,\r
1602 Data,\r
1603 DataSize,\r
1604 NULL,\r
1605 NULL,\r
1606 &CertNodeOffset,\r
1607 &CertNodeSize\r
1608 );\r
1609\r
1610 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
1611 return Status;\r
1612 }\r
1613\r
1614 if (DataSize < (CertNodeOffset + CertNodeSize)) {\r
1615 return EFI_NOT_FOUND;\r
1616 }\r
1617\r
1618 //\r
1619 // Construct new data content of variable "certdb".\r
1620 //\r
1621 NewCertDbSize = (UINT32) DataSize - CertNodeSize;\r
1622 NewCertDb = AllocateZeroPool (NewCertDbSize);\r
1623 if (NewCertDb == NULL) {\r
1624 return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
1625 }\r
1626\r
1627 //\r
1628 // Copy the DB entries before deleting node.\r
1629 //\r
1630 CopyMem (NewCertDb, Data, CertNodeOffset);\r
1631 //\r
1632 // Update CertDbListSize.\r
1633 //\r
1634 CopyMem (NewCertDb, &NewCertDbSize, sizeof (UINT32));\r
1635 //\r
1636 // Copy the DB entries after deleting node.\r
1637 //\r
1638 if (DataSize > (CertNodeOffset + CertNodeSize)) {\r
1639 CopyMem (\r
1640 NewCertDb + CertNodeOffset,\r
1641 Data + CertNodeOffset + CertNodeSize,\r
1642 DataSize - CertNodeOffset - CertNodeSize\r
1643 );\r
1644 }\r
1645\r
1646 //\r
1647 // Set "certdb".\r
1648 // \r
1649 VarAttr = EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS; \r
1650 Status = UpdateVariable (\r
1651 EFI_CERT_DB_NAME,\r
1652 &gEfiCertDbGuid,\r
1653 NewCertDb,\r
1654 NewCertDbSize,\r
1655 VarAttr,\r
1656 0,\r
1657 0,\r
1658 &CertDbVariable,\r
1659 NULL\r
1660 );\r
1661\r
1662 FreePool (NewCertDb);\r
1663 return Status;\r
1664}\r
1665\r
1666/**\r
1667 Insert signer's certificates for common authenticated variable with VariableName\r
1668 and VendorGuid in AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA to "certdb".\r
1669\r
1670 @param[in] VariableName Name of authenticated Variable.\r
1671 @param[in] VendorGuid Vendor GUID of authenticated Variable.\r
1672 @param[in] CertData Pointer to signer's certificates.\r
1673 @param[in] CertDataSize Length of CertData in bytes.\r
1674\r
1675 @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Any input parameter is invalid.\r
1676 @retval EFI_ACCESS_DENIED An AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA entry with same VariableName\r
1677 and VendorGuid already exists.\r
1678 @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES The operation is failed due to lack of resources.\r
1679 @retval EFI_SUCCESS Insert an AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA entry to "certdb"\r
1680\r
1681**/\r
1682EFI_STATUS\r
1683InsertCertsToDb (\r
1684 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r
1685 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r
1686 IN UINT8 *CertData,\r
1687 IN UINTN CertDataSize\r
1688 )\r
1689{\r
1690 VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK CertDbVariable;\r
1691 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
1692 UINT8 *Data;\r
1693 UINTN DataSize;\r
1694 UINT32 VarAttr;\r
1695 UINT8 *NewCertDb;\r
1696 UINT32 NewCertDbSize;\r
1697 UINT32 CertNodeSize;\r
1698 UINT32 NameSize;\r
1699 AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA *Ptr;\r
1700\r
1701 if ((VariableName == NULL) || (VendorGuid == NULL) || (CertData == NULL)) {\r
1702 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
1703 }\r
1704 \r
1705 //\r
1706 // Get variable "certdb".\r
1707 //\r
1708 Status = FindVariable (\r
1709 EFI_CERT_DB_NAME,\r
1710 &gEfiCertDbGuid,\r
1711 &CertDbVariable,\r
1712 &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,\r
1713 FALSE\r
1714 ); \r
1715 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
1716 return Status;\r
1717 }\r
1718\r
1719 DataSize = DataSizeOfVariable (CertDbVariable.CurrPtr);\r
1720 Data = GetVariableDataPtr (CertDbVariable.CurrPtr);\r
1721 if ((DataSize == 0) || (Data == NULL)) {\r
1722 ASSERT (FALSE);\r
1723 return EFI_NOT_FOUND;\r
1724 }\r
1725\r
1726 //\r
1727 // Find whether matching cert node already exists in "certdb".\r
1728 // If yes return error.\r
1729 //\r
1730 Status = FindCertsFromDb (\r
1731 VariableName,\r
1732 VendorGuid,\r
1733 Data,\r
1734 DataSize,\r
1735 NULL,\r
1736 NULL,\r
1737 NULL,\r
1738 NULL\r
1739 );\r
1740\r
1741 if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
1742 ASSERT (FALSE);\r
1743 return EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;\r
1744 }\r
1745\r
1746 //\r
1747 // Construct new data content of variable "certdb".\r
1748 //\r
1749 NameSize = (UINT32) StrLen (VariableName);\r
1750 CertNodeSize = sizeof (AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA) + (UINT32) CertDataSize + NameSize * sizeof (CHAR16); \r
1751 NewCertDbSize = (UINT32) DataSize + CertNodeSize; \r
1752 NewCertDb = AllocateZeroPool (NewCertDbSize);\r
1753 if (NewCertDb == NULL) {\r
1754 return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
1755 }\r
1756\r
1757 //\r
1758 // Copy the DB entries before deleting node.\r
1759 //\r
1760 CopyMem (NewCertDb, Data, DataSize);\r
1761 //\r
1762 // Update CertDbListSize.\r
1763 //\r
1764 CopyMem (NewCertDb, &NewCertDbSize, sizeof (UINT32));\r
1765 //\r
1766 // Construct new cert node.\r
1767 //\r
1768 Ptr = (AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA *) (NewCertDb + DataSize);\r
1769 CopyGuid (&Ptr->VendorGuid, VendorGuid);\r
1770 CopyMem (&Ptr->CertNodeSize, &CertNodeSize, sizeof (UINT32));\r
1771 CopyMem (&Ptr->NameSize, &NameSize, sizeof (UINT32));\r
1772 CopyMem (&Ptr->CertDataSize, &CertDataSize, sizeof (UINT32));\r
1773 \r
1774 CopyMem (\r
1775 (UINT8 *) Ptr + sizeof (AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA),\r
1776 VariableName,\r
1777 NameSize * sizeof (CHAR16)\r
1778 );\r
1779\r
1780 CopyMem (\r
1781 (UINT8 *) Ptr + sizeof (AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA) + NameSize * sizeof (CHAR16),\r
1782 CertData,\r
1783 CertDataSize\r
1784 );\r
1785 \r
1786 //\r
1787 // Set "certdb".\r
1788 // \r
1789 VarAttr = EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS; \r
1790 Status = UpdateVariable (\r
1791 EFI_CERT_DB_NAME,\r
1792 &gEfiCertDbGuid,\r
1793 NewCertDb,\r
1794 NewCertDbSize,\r
1795 VarAttr,\r
1796 0,\r
1797 0,\r
1798 &CertDbVariable,\r
1799 NULL\r
1800 );\r
1801\r
1802 FreePool (NewCertDb);\r
1803 return Status;\r
1804}\r
1805\r
0c18794e 1806/**\r
1807 Process variable with EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS set\r
1808\r
1809 @param[in] VariableName Name of Variable to be found.\r
1810 @param[in] VendorGuid Variable vendor GUID.\r
1811 @param[in] Data Data pointer.\r
1812 @param[in] DataSize Size of Data found. If size is less than the\r
1813 data, this value contains the required size.\r
1814 @param[in] Variable The variable information which is used to keep track of variable usage.\r
1815 @param[in] Attributes Attribute value of the variable.\r
ed47ae02 1816 @param[in] AuthVarType Verify against PK or KEK database or private database.\r
0c18794e 1817 @param[out] VarDel Delete the variable or not.\r
1818\r
1819 @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.\r
2d3fb919 1820 @retval EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION The variable does NOT pass the validation\r
1821 check carried out by the firmware.\r
0c18794e 1822 @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES Failed to process variable due to lack\r
1823 of resources.\r
1824 @retval EFI_SUCCESS Variable pass validation successfully.\r
1825\r
1826**/\r
1827EFI_STATUS\r
1828VerifyTimeBasedPayload (\r
1829 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r
1830 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r
1831 IN VOID *Data,\r
1832 IN UINTN DataSize,\r
1833 IN VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK *Variable,\r
1834 IN UINT32 Attributes,\r
ed47ae02 1835 IN AUTHVAR_TYPE AuthVarType,\r
0c18794e 1836 OUT BOOLEAN *VarDel\r
1837 )\r
1838{\r
1839 UINT8 *RootCert;\r
1840 UINT8 *SigData;\r
2d3fb919 1841 UINT8 *PayloadPtr;\r
0c18794e 1842 UINTN RootCertSize;\r
1843 UINTN Index;\r
2d3fb919 1844 UINTN CertCount;\r
1845 UINTN PayloadSize;\r
0c18794e 1846 UINT32 Attr;\r
1847 UINT32 SigDataSize;\r
1848 UINT32 KekDataSize;\r
0c18794e 1849 BOOLEAN VerifyStatus;\r
1850 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
1851 EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *CertList;\r
1852 EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *Cert;\r
1853 VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK KekVariable;\r
1854 EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 *CertData;\r
1855 UINT8 *NewData;\r
1856 UINTN NewDataSize;\r
1857 VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK PkVariable;\r
2d3fb919 1858 UINT8 *Buffer;\r
1859 UINTN Length;\r
ed47ae02 1860 UINT8 *SignerCerts;\r
1861 UINT8 *WrapSigData;\r
1862 UINTN CertStackSize;\r
1863 UINT8 *CertsInCertDb;\r
1864 UINT32 CertsSizeinDb;\r
0c18794e 1865\r
0c18794e 1866 VerifyStatus = FALSE;\r
1867 CertData = NULL;\r
1868 NewData = NULL;\r
1869 Attr = Attributes;\r
ed47ae02 1870 WrapSigData = NULL;\r
1871 SignerCerts = NULL;\r
1872 RootCert = NULL;\r
0c18794e 1873\r
1874 //\r
2d3fb919 1875 // When the attribute EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS is\r
0c18794e 1876 // set, then the Data buffer shall begin with an instance of a complete (and serialized)\r
2d3fb919 1877 // EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 descriptor. The descriptor shall be followed by the new\r
1878 // variable value and DataSize shall reflect the combined size of the descriptor and the new\r
1879 // variable value. The authentication descriptor is not part of the variable data and is not\r
0c18794e 1880 // returned by subsequent calls to GetVariable().\r
1881 //\r
1882 CertData = (EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 *) Data;\r
2d3fb919 1883\r
1884 //\r
1885 // Verify that Pad1, Nanosecond, TimeZone, Daylight and Pad2 components of the\r
1886 // TimeStamp value are set to zero.\r
1887 //\r
1888 if ((CertData->TimeStamp.Pad1 != 0) ||\r
1889 (CertData->TimeStamp.Nanosecond != 0) ||\r
1890 (CertData->TimeStamp.TimeZone != 0) ||\r
1891 (CertData->TimeStamp.Daylight != 0) ||\r
1892 (CertData->TimeStamp.Pad2 != 0)) {\r
2e24814a 1893 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r
2d3fb919 1894 }\r
1895\r
0c18794e 1896 if ((Variable->CurrPtr != NULL) && ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_APPEND_WRITE) == 0)) {\r
1897 if (CompareTimeStamp (&CertData->TimeStamp, &Variable->CurrPtr->TimeStamp)) {\r
1898 //\r
1899 // TimeStamp check fail, suspicious replay attack, return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION.\r
1900 //\r
1901 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r
1902 }\r
1903 }\r
1904\r
1905 //\r
1906 // wCertificateType should be WIN_CERT_TYPE_EFI_GUID.\r
1907 // Cert type should be EFI_CERT_TYPE_PKCS7_GUID.\r
1908 //\r
1909 if ((CertData->AuthInfo.Hdr.wCertificateType != WIN_CERT_TYPE_EFI_GUID) ||\r
2d3fb919 1910 !CompareGuid (&CertData->AuthInfo.CertType, &gEfiCertPkcs7Guid)) {\r
0c18794e 1911 //\r
1912 // Invalid AuthInfo type, return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION.\r
1913 //\r
1914 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r
1915 }\r
2d3fb919 1916\r
0c18794e 1917 //\r
1918 // Find out Pkcs7 SignedData which follows the EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 descriptor.\r
1919 // AuthInfo.Hdr.dwLength is the length of the entire certificate, including the length of the header.\r
1920 //\r
2d3fb919 1921 SigData = CertData->AuthInfo.CertData;\r
1922 SigDataSize = CertData->AuthInfo.Hdr.dwLength - (UINT32) (OFFSET_OF (WIN_CERTIFICATE_UEFI_GUID, CertData));\r
648f98d1 1923\r
0c18794e 1924 //\r
1925 // Find out the new data payload which follows Pkcs7 SignedData directly.\r
1926 //\r
2d3fb919 1927 PayloadPtr = SigData + SigDataSize;\r
1928 PayloadSize = DataSize - OFFSET_OF_AUTHINFO2_CERT_DATA - (UINTN) SigDataSize;\r
0c18794e 1929\r
1930 //\r
1931 // Construct a buffer to fill with (VariableName, VendorGuid, Attributes, TimeStamp, Data).\r
1932 //\r
2d3fb919 1933 NewDataSize = PayloadSize + sizeof (EFI_TIME) + sizeof (UINT32) +\r
1934 sizeof (EFI_GUID) + StrSize (VariableName) - sizeof (CHAR16);\r
1935 NewData = mSerializationRuntimeBuffer;\r
0c18794e 1936\r
2d3fb919 1937 Buffer = NewData;\r
1938 Length = StrLen (VariableName) * sizeof (CHAR16);\r
1939 CopyMem (Buffer, VariableName, Length);\r
1940 Buffer += Length;\r
0c18794e 1941\r
2d3fb919 1942 Length = sizeof (EFI_GUID);\r
1943 CopyMem (Buffer, VendorGuid, Length);\r
1944 Buffer += Length;\r
0c18794e 1945\r
2d3fb919 1946 Length = sizeof (UINT32);\r
1947 CopyMem (Buffer, &Attr, Length);\r
1948 Buffer += Length;\r
0c18794e 1949\r
2d3fb919 1950 Length = sizeof (EFI_TIME);\r
1951 CopyMem (Buffer, &CertData->TimeStamp, Length);\r
1952 Buffer += Length;\r
0c18794e 1953\r
2d3fb919 1954 CopyMem (Buffer, PayloadPtr, PayloadSize);\r
0c18794e 1955\r
ed47ae02 1956 if (AuthVarType == AuthVarTypePk) {\r
0c18794e 1957 //\r
1958 // Get platform key from variable.\r
1959 //\r
1960 Status = FindVariable (\r
2d3fb919 1961 EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME,\r
1962 &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
1963 &PkVariable,\r
ecc722ad 1964 &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,\r
1965 FALSE\r
0c18794e 1966 );\r
1967 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
1968 return Status;\r
1969 }\r
1970\r
1971 CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) GetVariableDataPtr (PkVariable.CurrPtr);\r
1972 Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r
1973 RootCert = Cert->SignatureData;\r
4e33001c 1974 RootCertSize = CertList->SignatureSize - (sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1);\r
0c18794e 1975\r
1976\r
1977 //\r
1978 // Verify Pkcs7 SignedData via Pkcs7Verify library.\r
1979 //\r
1980 VerifyStatus = Pkcs7Verify (\r
1981 SigData,\r
1982 SigDataSize,\r
1983 RootCert,\r
1984 RootCertSize,\r
1985 NewData,\r
1986 NewDataSize\r
1987 );\r
1988\r
ed47ae02 1989 } else if (AuthVarType == AuthVarTypeKek) {\r
2d3fb919 1990\r
0c18794e 1991 //\r
1992 // Get KEK database from variable.\r
1993 //\r
1994 Status = FindVariable (\r
2d3fb919 1995 EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME,\r
1996 &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
1997 &KekVariable,\r
ecc722ad 1998 &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,\r
1999 FALSE\r
0c18794e 2000 );\r
2001 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
2002 return Status;\r
2003 }\r
2004\r
2005 //\r
2006 // Ready to verify Pkcs7 SignedData. Go through KEK Signature Database to find out X.509 CertList.\r
2d3fb919 2007 //\r
0c18794e 2008 KekDataSize = KekVariable.CurrPtr->DataSize;\r
2009 CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) GetVariableDataPtr (KekVariable.CurrPtr);\r
2010 while ((KekDataSize > 0) && (KekDataSize >= CertList->SignatureListSize)) {\r
2011 if (CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Guid)) {\r
2012 Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r
2013 CertCount = (CertList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - CertList->SignatureHeaderSize) / CertList->SignatureSize;\r
2014 for (Index = 0; Index < CertCount; Index++) {\r
2015 //\r
2016 // Iterate each Signature Data Node within this CertList for a verify\r
2017 //\r
2018 RootCert = Cert->SignatureData;\r
4e33001c 2019 RootCertSize = CertList->SignatureSize - (sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1);\r
2d3fb919 2020\r
0c18794e 2021 //\r
2022 // Verify Pkcs7 SignedData via Pkcs7Verify library.\r
2023 //\r
2024 VerifyStatus = Pkcs7Verify (\r
2025 SigData,\r
2026 SigDataSize,\r
2027 RootCert,\r
2028 RootCertSize,\r
2029 NewData,\r
2030 NewDataSize\r
2031 );\r
2032 if (VerifyStatus) {\r
2033 goto Exit;\r
2034 }\r
2035 Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) Cert + CertList->SignatureSize);\r
2036 }\r
2037 }\r
2038 KekDataSize -= CertList->SignatureListSize;\r
2039 CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + CertList->SignatureListSize);\r
2040 }\r
ed47ae02 2041 } else if (AuthVarType == AuthVarTypePriv) {\r
2042\r
2043 //\r
2044 // Process common authenticated variable except PK/KEK/DB/DBX.\r
2045 // Get signer's certificates from SignedData.\r
2046 //\r
2047 VerifyStatus = Pkcs7GetSigners (\r
2048 SigData,\r
2049 SigDataSize,\r
2050 &SignerCerts,\r
2051 &CertStackSize,\r
2052 &RootCert,\r
2053 &RootCertSize\r
2054 );\r
2055 if (!VerifyStatus) {\r
2056 goto Exit;\r
2057 }\r
2058\r
2059 //\r
2060 // Get previously stored signer's certificates from certdb for existing\r
2061 // variable. Check whether they are identical with signer's certificates\r
2062 // in SignedData. If not, return error immediately.\r
2063 //\r
2064 if ((Variable->CurrPtr != NULL)) {\r
2065 VerifyStatus = FALSE;\r
2066\r
2067 Status = GetCertsFromDb (VariableName, VendorGuid, &CertsInCertDb, &CertsSizeinDb);\r
2068 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
2069 goto Exit;\r
2070 }\r
2071 \r
2072 if ((CertStackSize != CertsSizeinDb) ||\r
2073 (CompareMem (SignerCerts, CertsInCertDb, CertsSizeinDb) != 0)) {\r
2074 goto Exit;\r
2075 }\r
2076 }\r
2077\r
2078 VerifyStatus = Pkcs7Verify (\r
2079 SigData,\r
2080 SigDataSize,\r
2081 RootCert,\r
2082 RootCertSize,\r
2083 NewData,\r
2084 NewDataSize\r
2085 );\r
2086 if (!VerifyStatus) {\r
2087 goto Exit;\r
2088 }\r
2089\r
2090 //\r
2091 // Delete signer's certificates when delete the common authenticated variable.\r
2092 //\r
2093 if ((PayloadSize == 0) && (Variable->CurrPtr != NULL)) {\r
2094 Status = DeleteCertsFromDb (VariableName, VendorGuid);\r
2095 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
2096 VerifyStatus = FALSE;\r
2097 goto Exit;\r
2098 }\r
2099 } else if (Variable->CurrPtr == NULL) {\r
2100 //\r
2101 // Insert signer's certificates when adding a new common authenticated variable.\r
2102 //\r
2103 Status = InsertCertsToDb (VariableName, VendorGuid, SignerCerts, CertStackSize);\r
2104 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
2105 VerifyStatus = FALSE;\r
2106 goto Exit;\r
2107 }\r
2108 }\r
2109 } else {\r
2110 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r
0c18794e 2111 }\r
2112\r
2113Exit:\r
2114\r
ed47ae02 2115 if (AuthVarType == AuthVarTypePriv) {\r
2116 Pkcs7FreeSigners (RootCert);\r
2117 Pkcs7FreeSigners (SignerCerts);\r
2118 }\r
2119\r
0c18794e 2120 if (!VerifyStatus) {\r
2121 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r
2122 }\r
2123\r
d912bad7 2124 Status = CheckSignatureListFormat(VariableName, VendorGuid, PayloadPtr, PayloadSize);\r
2125 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
2126 return Status;\r
2127 }\r
2128\r
2d3fb919 2129 if ((PayloadSize == 0) && (VarDel != NULL)) {\r
0c18794e 2130 *VarDel = TRUE;\r
2131 }\r
2d3fb919 2132\r
0c18794e 2133 //\r
2134 // Final step: Update/Append Variable if it pass Pkcs7Verify\r
2135 //\r
ed47ae02 2136 return UpdateVariable (\r
2137 VariableName,\r
2138 VendorGuid,\r
2139 PayloadPtr,\r
2140 PayloadSize,\r
2141 Attributes,\r
2142 0,\r
2143 0,\r
2144 Variable,\r
2145 &CertData->TimeStamp\r
2146 );\r
0c18794e 2147}\r
ed47ae02 2148\r