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0c18794e | 1 | /** @file\r |
2 | Implement authentication services for the authenticated variable\r | |
3 | service in UEFI2.2.\r | |
4 | \r | |
dc204d5a JY |
5 | Caution: This module requires additional review when modified.\r |
6 | This driver will have external input - variable data. It may be input in SMM mode.\r | |
7 | This external input must be validated carefully to avoid security issue like\r | |
8 | buffer overflow, integer overflow.\r | |
9 | Variable attribute should also be checked to avoid authentication bypass.\r | |
10 | \r | |
11 | ProcessVarWithPk(), ProcessVarWithKek() and ProcessVariable() are the function to do\r | |
12 | variable authentication.\r | |
13 | \r | |
14 | VerifyTimeBasedPayload() and VerifyCounterBasedPayload() are sub function to do verification.\r | |
15 | They will do basic validation for authentication data structure, then call crypto library\r | |
16 | to verify the signature.\r | |
17 | \r | |
25da08c8 | 18 | Copyright (c) 2009 - 2014, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>\r |
2d3fb919 | 19 | This program and the accompanying materials\r |
20 | are licensed and made available under the terms and conditions of the BSD License\r | |
21 | which accompanies this distribution. The full text of the license may be found at\r | |
0c18794e | 22 | http://opensource.org/licenses/bsd-license.php\r |
23 | \r | |
2d3fb919 | 24 | THE PROGRAM IS DISTRIBUTED UNDER THE BSD LICENSE ON AN "AS IS" BASIS,\r |
0c18794e | 25 | WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR REPRESENTATIONS OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED.\r |
26 | \r | |
27 | **/\r | |
28 | \r | |
29 | #include "Variable.h"\r | |
30 | #include "AuthService.h"\r | |
31 | \r | |
32 | ///\r | |
33 | /// Global database array for scratch\r | |
2d3fb919 | 34 | ///\r |
0c18794e | 35 | UINT8 mPubKeyStore[MAX_KEYDB_SIZE];\r |
36 | UINT32 mPubKeyNumber;\r | |
f6e23353 | 37 | UINT8 mCertDbStore[MAX_CERTDB_SIZE];\r |
0c18794e | 38 | UINT32 mPlatformMode;\r |
a555940b FS |
39 | UINT8 mVendorKeyState;\r |
40 | \r | |
ae09f979 | 41 | EFI_GUID mSignatureSupport[] = {EFI_CERT_SHA1_GUID, EFI_CERT_SHA256_GUID, EFI_CERT_RSA2048_GUID, EFI_CERT_X509_GUID};\r |
0c18794e | 42 | //\r |
43 | // Public Exponent of RSA Key.\r | |
44 | //\r | |
45 | CONST UINT8 mRsaE[] = { 0x01, 0x00, 0x01 };\r | |
46 | //\r | |
47 | // Hash context pointer\r | |
48 | //\r | |
49 | VOID *mHashCtx = NULL;\r | |
50 | \r | |
2d3fb919 | 51 | //\r |
52 | // The serialization of the values of the VariableName, VendorGuid and Attributes\r | |
53 | // parameters of the SetVariable() call and the TimeStamp component of the\r | |
54 | // EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 descriptor followed by the variable's new value\r | |
55 | // i.e. (VariableName, VendorGuid, Attributes, TimeStamp, Data)\r | |
56 | //\r | |
57 | UINT8 *mSerializationRuntimeBuffer = NULL;\r | |
58 | \r | |
d912bad7 | 59 | //\r |
60 | // Requirement for different signature type which have been defined in UEFI spec.\r | |
61 | // These data are used to peform SignatureList format check while setting PK/KEK variable.\r | |
62 | //\r | |
63 | EFI_SIGNATURE_ITEM mSupportSigItem[] = {\r | |
64 | //{SigType, SigHeaderSize, SigDataSize }\r | |
65 | {EFI_CERT_SHA256_GUID, 0, 32 },\r | |
66 | {EFI_CERT_RSA2048_GUID, 0, 256 },\r | |
67 | {EFI_CERT_RSA2048_SHA256_GUID, 0, 256 },\r | |
68 | {EFI_CERT_SHA1_GUID, 0, 20 },\r | |
69 | {EFI_CERT_RSA2048_SHA1_GUID, 0, 256 },\r | |
70 | {EFI_CERT_X509_GUID, 0, ((UINT32) ~0)},\r | |
71 | {EFI_CERT_SHA224_GUID, 0, 28 },\r | |
72 | {EFI_CERT_SHA384_GUID, 0, 48 },\r | |
73 | {EFI_CERT_SHA512_GUID, 0, 64 }\r | |
74 | };\r | |
75 | \r | |
ecc722ad | 76 | /**\r |
77 | Determine whether this operation needs a physical present user.\r | |
78 | \r | |
79 | @param[in] VariableName Name of the Variable.\r | |
80 | @param[in] VendorGuid GUID of the Variable.\r | |
81 | \r | |
82 | @retval TRUE This variable is protected, only a physical present user could set this variable.\r | |
83 | @retval FALSE This variable is not protected.\r | |
84 | \r | |
85 | **/\r | |
86 | BOOLEAN\r | |
87 | NeedPhysicallyPresent(\r | |
88 | IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r | |
89 | IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid\r | |
90 | )\r | |
91 | {\r | |
92 | if ((CompareGuid (VendorGuid, &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid) && (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME) == 0))\r | |
93 | || (CompareGuid (VendorGuid, &gEfiCustomModeEnableGuid) && (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_CUSTOM_MODE_NAME) == 0))) {\r | |
94 | return TRUE;\r | |
95 | }\r | |
96 | \r | |
97 | return FALSE;\r | |
98 | }\r | |
99 | \r | |
100 | /**\r | |
101 | Determine whether the platform is operating in Custom Secure Boot mode.\r | |
102 | \r | |
103 | @retval TRUE The platform is operating in Custom mode.\r | |
104 | @retval FALSE The platform is operating in Standard mode.\r | |
105 | \r | |
106 | **/\r | |
107 | BOOLEAN\r | |
108 | InCustomMode (\r | |
109 | VOID\r | |
110 | )\r | |
111 | {\r | |
112 | VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK Variable;\r | |
113 | \r | |
114 | FindVariable (EFI_CUSTOM_MODE_NAME, &gEfiCustomModeEnableGuid, &Variable, &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal, FALSE);\r | |
115 | if (Variable.CurrPtr != NULL && *(GetVariableDataPtr (Variable.CurrPtr)) == CUSTOM_SECURE_BOOT_MODE) {\r | |
116 | return TRUE;\r | |
117 | }\r | |
118 | \r | |
119 | return FALSE;\r | |
120 | }\r | |
121 | \r | |
122 | \r | |
0c18794e | 123 | /**\r |
2d3fb919 | 124 | Internal function to delete a Variable given its name and GUID, no authentication\r |
125 | required.\r | |
0c18794e | 126 | \r |
2d3fb919 | 127 | @param[in] VariableName Name of the Variable.\r |
128 | @param[in] VendorGuid GUID of the Variable.\r | |
0c18794e | 129 | \r |
2d3fb919 | 130 | @retval EFI_SUCCESS Variable deleted successfully.\r |
131 | @retval Others The driver failded to start the device.\r | |
0c18794e | 132 | \r |
133 | **/\r | |
134 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
2d3fb919 | 135 | DeleteVariable (\r |
136 | IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r | |
137 | IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid\r | |
138 | )\r | |
139 | {\r | |
140 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r | |
141 | VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK Variable;\r | |
142 | \r | |
ecc722ad | 143 | Status = FindVariable (VariableName, VendorGuid, &Variable, &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal, FALSE);\r |
2d3fb919 | 144 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r |
145 | return EFI_SUCCESS;\r | |
146 | }\r | |
147 | \r | |
148 | ASSERT (Variable.CurrPtr != NULL);\r | |
149 | return UpdateVariable (VariableName, VendorGuid, NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, &Variable, NULL);\r | |
150 | }\r | |
0c18794e | 151 | \r |
152 | /**\r | |
153 | Initializes for authenticated varibale service.\r | |
154 | \r | |
155 | @retval EFI_SUCCESS Function successfully executed.\r | |
156 | @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES Fail to allocate enough memory resources.\r | |
157 | \r | |
158 | **/\r | |
159 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
160 | AutenticatedVariableServiceInitialize (\r | |
161 | VOID\r | |
162 | )\r | |
163 | {\r | |
164 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r | |
165 | VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK Variable;\r | |
7aaf2fd6 | 166 | VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK PkVariable;\r |
0c18794e | 167 | UINT8 VarValue;\r |
168 | UINT32 VarAttr;\r | |
169 | UINT8 *Data;\r | |
170 | UINTN DataSize;\r | |
171 | UINTN CtxSize;\r | |
beda2356 | 172 | UINT8 SecureBootMode;\r |
173 | UINT8 SecureBootEnable;\r | |
ecc722ad | 174 | UINT8 CustomMode;\r |
ed47ae02 | 175 | UINT32 ListSize;\r |
2d3fb919 | 176 | \r |
0c18794e | 177 | //\r |
178 | // Initialize hash context.\r | |
179 | //\r | |
180 | CtxSize = Sha256GetContextSize ();\r | |
181 | mHashCtx = AllocateRuntimePool (CtxSize);\r | |
182 | if (mHashCtx == NULL) {\r | |
183 | return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r | |
184 | }\r | |
185 | \r | |
0c18794e | 186 | //\r |
2d3fb919 | 187 | // Prepare runtime buffer for serialized data of time-based authenticated\r |
188 | // Variable, i.e. (VariableName, VendorGuid, Attributes, TimeStamp, Data).\r | |
189 | //\r | |
190 | mSerializationRuntimeBuffer = AllocateRuntimePool (PcdGet32 (PcdMaxVariableSize) + sizeof (EFI_GUID) + sizeof (UINT32) + sizeof (EFI_TIME));\r | |
191 | if (mSerializationRuntimeBuffer == NULL) {\r | |
192 | return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r | |
193 | }\r | |
194 | \r | |
195 | //\r | |
196 | // Check "AuthVarKeyDatabase" variable's existence.\r | |
197 | // If it doesn't exist, create a new one with initial value of 0 and EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS set.\r | |
0c18794e | 198 | //\r |
199 | Status = FindVariable (\r | |
2d3fb919 | 200 | AUTHVAR_KEYDB_NAME,\r |
201 | &gEfiAuthenticatedVariableGuid,\r | |
202 | &Variable,\r | |
ecc722ad | 203 | &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,\r |
204 | FALSE\r | |
0c18794e | 205 | );\r |
206 | \r | |
207 | if (Variable.CurrPtr == NULL) {\r | |
208 | VarAttr = EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS;\r | |
209 | VarValue = 0;\r | |
210 | mPubKeyNumber = 0;\r | |
211 | Status = UpdateVariable (\r | |
212 | AUTHVAR_KEYDB_NAME,\r | |
213 | &gEfiAuthenticatedVariableGuid,\r | |
214 | &VarValue,\r | |
215 | sizeof(UINT8),\r | |
216 | VarAttr,\r | |
217 | 0,\r | |
218 | 0,\r | |
219 | &Variable,\r | |
220 | NULL\r | |
221 | );\r | |
222 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
223 | return Status;\r | |
224 | }\r | |
225 | } else {\r | |
226 | //\r | |
227 | // Load database in global variable for cache.\r | |
228 | //\r | |
229 | DataSize = DataSizeOfVariable (Variable.CurrPtr);\r | |
230 | Data = GetVariableDataPtr (Variable.CurrPtr);\r | |
231 | ASSERT ((DataSize != 0) && (Data != NULL));\r | |
232 | CopyMem (mPubKeyStore, (UINT8 *) Data, DataSize);\r | |
233 | mPubKeyNumber = (UINT32) (DataSize / EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE);\r | |
234 | }\r | |
7aaf2fd6 | 235 | \r |
ecc722ad | 236 | FindVariable (EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, &PkVariable, &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal, FALSE);\r |
7aaf2fd6 | 237 | if (PkVariable.CurrPtr == NULL) {\r |
238 | DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Variable %s does not exist.\n", EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME));\r | |
239 | } else {\r | |
240 | DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Variable %s exists.\n", EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME));\r | |
241 | }\r | |
242 | \r | |
0c18794e | 243 | //\r |
a555940b | 244 | // Create "SetupMode" variable with BS+RT attribute set.\r |
0c18794e | 245 | //\r |
05a643f9 | 246 | FindVariable (EFI_SETUP_MODE_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, &Variable, &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal, FALSE);\r |
247 | if (PkVariable.CurrPtr == NULL) {\r | |
248 | mPlatformMode = SETUP_MODE;\r | |
249 | } else {\r | |
250 | mPlatformMode = USER_MODE;\r | |
251 | }\r | |
252 | Status = UpdateVariable (\r | |
2d3fb919 | 253 | EFI_SETUP_MODE_NAME,\r |
254 | &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r | |
05a643f9 | 255 | &mPlatformMode,\r |
256 | sizeof(UINT8),\r | |
257 | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS,\r | |
258 | 0,\r | |
259 | 0,\r | |
2d3fb919 | 260 | &Variable,\r |
05a643f9 | 261 | NULL\r |
0c18794e | 262 | );\r |
05a643f9 | 263 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r |
264 | return Status;\r | |
0c18794e | 265 | }\r |
05a643f9 | 266 | \r |
0c18794e | 267 | //\r |
a555940b | 268 | // Create "SignatureSupport" variable with BS+RT attribute set.\r |
0c18794e | 269 | //\r |
05a643f9 | 270 | FindVariable (EFI_SIGNATURE_SUPPORT_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, &Variable, &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal, FALSE);\r |
271 | Status = UpdateVariable (\r | |
272 | EFI_SIGNATURE_SUPPORT_NAME,\r | |
273 | &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r | |
274 | mSignatureSupport,\r | |
275 | sizeof(mSignatureSupport),\r | |
276 | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS,\r | |
277 | 0,\r | |
278 | 0,\r | |
279 | &Variable,\r | |
280 | NULL\r | |
281 | );\r | |
282 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
283 | return Status;\r | |
0c18794e | 284 | }\r |
beda2356 | 285 | \r |
286 | //\r | |
287 | // If "SecureBootEnable" variable exists, then update "SecureBoot" variable.\r | |
2d3fb919 | 288 | // If "SecureBootEnable" variable is SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE and in USER_MODE, Set "SecureBoot" variable to SECURE_BOOT_MODE_ENABLE.\r |
beda2356 | 289 | // If "SecureBootEnable" variable is SECURE_BOOT_DISABLE, Set "SecureBoot" variable to SECURE_BOOT_MODE_DISABLE.\r |
290 | //\r | |
8f8ca22e | 291 | SecureBootEnable = SECURE_BOOT_DISABLE;\r |
ecc722ad | 292 | FindVariable (EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME, &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid, &Variable, &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal, FALSE);\r |
beda2356 | 293 | if (Variable.CurrPtr != NULL) {\r |
294 | SecureBootEnable = *(GetVariableDataPtr (Variable.CurrPtr));\r | |
2d3fb919 | 295 | } else if (mPlatformMode == USER_MODE) {\r |
296 | //\r | |
297 | // "SecureBootEnable" not exist, initialize it in USER_MODE.\r | |
298 | //\r | |
8f8ca22e | 299 | SecureBootEnable = SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE;\r |
beda2356 | 300 | Status = UpdateVariable (\r |
2d3fb919 | 301 | EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME,\r |
302 | &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid,\r | |
303 | &SecureBootEnable,\r | |
304 | sizeof (UINT8),\r | |
305 | EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS,\r | |
306 | 0,\r | |
307 | 0,\r | |
beda2356 | 308 | &Variable,\r |
309 | NULL\r | |
310 | );\r | |
311 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
312 | return Status;\r | |
313 | }\r | |
314 | }\r | |
315 | \r | |
05a643f9 | 316 | //\r |
a555940b | 317 | // Create "SecureBoot" variable with BS+RT attribute set.\r |
05a643f9 | 318 | //\r |
2d3fb919 | 319 | if (SecureBootEnable == SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE && mPlatformMode == USER_MODE) {\r |
320 | SecureBootMode = SECURE_BOOT_MODE_ENABLE;\r | |
321 | } else {\r | |
322 | SecureBootMode = SECURE_BOOT_MODE_DISABLE;\r | |
323 | }\r | |
ecc722ad | 324 | FindVariable (EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, &Variable, &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal, FALSE);\r |
2d3fb919 | 325 | Status = UpdateVariable (\r |
326 | EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME,\r | |
327 | &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r | |
328 | &SecureBootMode,\r | |
329 | sizeof (UINT8),\r | |
05a643f9 | 330 | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS,\r |
2d3fb919 | 331 | 0,\r |
332 | 0,\r | |
333 | &Variable,\r | |
334 | NULL\r | |
335 | );\r | |
336 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
337 | return Status;\r | |
338 | }\r | |
339 | \r | |
7aaf2fd6 | 340 | DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Variable %s is %x\n", EFI_SETUP_MODE_NAME, mPlatformMode));\r |
341 | DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Variable %s is %x\n", EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME, SecureBootMode));\r | |
342 | DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Variable %s is %x\n", EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME, SecureBootEnable));\r | |
343 | \r | |
0c18794e | 344 | //\r |
f71ed839 | 345 | // Initialize "CustomMode" in STANDARD_SECURE_BOOT_MODE state.\r |
0c18794e | 346 | //\r |
ecc722ad | 347 | FindVariable (EFI_CUSTOM_MODE_NAME, &gEfiCustomModeEnableGuid, &Variable, &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal, FALSE);\r |
f71ed839 | 348 | CustomMode = STANDARD_SECURE_BOOT_MODE;\r |
349 | Status = UpdateVariable (\r | |
350 | EFI_CUSTOM_MODE_NAME,\r | |
351 | &gEfiCustomModeEnableGuid,\r | |
352 | &CustomMode,\r | |
353 | sizeof (UINT8),\r | |
354 | EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS,\r | |
355 | 0,\r | |
356 | 0,\r | |
357 | &Variable,\r | |
358 | NULL\r | |
359 | );\r | |
360 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
361 | return Status;\r | |
0c18794e | 362 | }\r |
ecc722ad | 363 | \r |
364 | DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Variable %s is %x\n", EFI_CUSTOM_MODE_NAME, CustomMode));\r | |
2d3fb919 | 365 | \r |
ed47ae02 | 366 | //\r |
367 | // Check "certdb" variable's existence.\r | |
368 | // If it doesn't exist, then create a new one with \r | |
369 | // EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS set.\r | |
370 | //\r | |
371 | Status = FindVariable (\r | |
372 | EFI_CERT_DB_NAME,\r | |
373 | &gEfiCertDbGuid,\r | |
374 | &Variable,\r | |
375 | &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,\r | |
376 | FALSE\r | |
377 | );\r | |
378 | \r | |
379 | if (Variable.CurrPtr == NULL) {\r | |
380 | VarAttr = EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS;\r | |
f6e23353 | 381 | ListSize = sizeof (UINT32);\r |
ed47ae02 | 382 | Status = UpdateVariable (\r |
383 | EFI_CERT_DB_NAME,\r | |
384 | &gEfiCertDbGuid,\r | |
385 | &ListSize,\r | |
386 | sizeof (UINT32),\r | |
387 | VarAttr,\r | |
388 | 0,\r | |
389 | 0,\r | |
390 | &Variable,\r | |
391 | NULL\r | |
392 | );\r | |
f6e23353 | 393 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r |
394 | return Status;\r | |
395 | }\r | |
ed47ae02 | 396 | } \r |
397 | \r | |
a555940b FS |
398 | //\r |
399 | // Check "VendorKeysNv" variable's existence and create "VendorKeys" variable accordingly.\r | |
400 | //\r | |
401 | FindVariable (EFI_VENDOR_KEYS_NV_VARIABLE_NAME, &gEfiVendorKeysNvGuid, &Variable, &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal, FALSE);\r | |
402 | if (Variable.CurrPtr != NULL) {\r | |
403 | mVendorKeyState = *(GetVariableDataPtr (Variable.CurrPtr));\r | |
404 | } else {\r | |
405 | //\r | |
406 | // "VendorKeysNv" not exist, initialize it in VENDOR_KEYS_VALID state.\r | |
407 | //\r | |
408 | mVendorKeyState = VENDOR_KEYS_VALID;\r | |
409 | Status = UpdateVariable (\r | |
410 | EFI_VENDOR_KEYS_NV_VARIABLE_NAME,\r | |
411 | &gEfiVendorKeysNvGuid,\r | |
412 | &mVendorKeyState,\r | |
413 | sizeof (UINT8),\r | |
414 | EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS,\r | |
415 | 0,\r | |
416 | 0,\r | |
417 | &Variable,\r | |
418 | NULL\r | |
419 | );\r | |
420 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
421 | return Status;\r | |
422 | }\r | |
423 | }\r | |
424 | \r | |
425 | //\r | |
426 | // Create "VendorKeys" variable with BS+RT attribute set.\r | |
427 | //\r | |
428 | FindVariable (EFI_VENDOR_KEYS_VARIABLE_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, &Variable, &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal, FALSE);\r | |
429 | Status = UpdateVariable (\r | |
430 | EFI_VENDOR_KEYS_VARIABLE_NAME,\r | |
431 | &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r | |
432 | &mVendorKeyState,\r | |
433 | sizeof (UINT8),\r | |
434 | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS,\r | |
435 | 0,\r | |
436 | 0,\r | |
437 | &Variable,\r | |
438 | NULL\r | |
439 | );\r | |
440 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
441 | return Status;\r | |
442 | }\r | |
443 | \r | |
444 | DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Variable %s is %x\n", EFI_VENDOR_KEYS_VARIABLE_NAME, mVendorKeyState));\r | |
445 | \r | |
0c18794e | 446 | return Status;\r |
447 | }\r | |
448 | \r | |
449 | /**\r | |
450 | Add public key in store and return its index.\r | |
451 | \r | |
452 | @param[in] PubKey Input pointer to Public Key data\r | |
453 | \r | |
454 | @return Index of new added item\r | |
455 | \r | |
456 | **/\r | |
457 | UINT32\r | |
458 | AddPubKeyInStore (\r | |
9a12e582 DG |
459 | IN UINT8 *PubKey,\r |
460 | IN VARIABLE_ENTRY_CONSISTENCY *VariableDataEntry\r | |
0c18794e | 461 | )\r |
462 | {\r | |
9a12e582 DG |
463 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r |
464 | BOOLEAN IsFound;\r | |
465 | UINT32 Index;\r | |
466 | VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK Variable;\r | |
467 | UINT8 *Ptr;\r | |
468 | UINT8 *Data;\r | |
469 | UINTN DataSize;\r | |
470 | VARIABLE_ENTRY_CONSISTENCY PublicKeyEntry;\r | |
471 | UINT32 Attributes;\r | |
0c18794e | 472 | \r |
473 | if (PubKey == NULL) {\r | |
474 | return 0;\r | |
475 | }\r | |
476 | \r | |
477 | Status = FindVariable (\r | |
478 | AUTHVAR_KEYDB_NAME,\r | |
479 | &gEfiAuthenticatedVariableGuid,\r | |
480 | &Variable,\r | |
ecc722ad | 481 | &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,\r |
482 | FALSE\r | |
0c18794e | 483 | );\r |
ca5a7d87 | 484 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r |
25da08c8 | 485 | DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Get public key database variable failure, Status = %r\n", Status));\r |
ca5a7d87 | 486 | return 0;\r |
487 | }\r | |
488 | \r | |
0c18794e | 489 | //\r |
490 | // Check whether the public key entry does exist.\r | |
491 | //\r | |
492 | IsFound = FALSE;\r | |
493 | for (Ptr = mPubKeyStore, Index = 1; Index <= mPubKeyNumber; Index++) {\r | |
494 | if (CompareMem (Ptr, PubKey, EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE) == 0) {\r | |
495 | IsFound = TRUE;\r | |
496 | break;\r | |
497 | }\r | |
498 | Ptr += EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE;\r | |
499 | }\r | |
500 | \r | |
501 | if (!IsFound) {\r | |
502 | //\r | |
503 | // Add public key in database.\r | |
504 | //\r | |
505 | if (mPubKeyNumber == MAX_KEY_NUM) {\r | |
506 | //\r | |
83758cdc | 507 | // Public key dadatase is full, try to reclaim invalid key.\r |
0c18794e | 508 | //\r |
83758cdc | 509 | if (AtRuntime ()) {\r |
510 | //\r | |
511 | // NV storage can't reclaim at runtime.\r | |
512 | //\r | |
513 | return 0;\r | |
514 | }\r | |
515 | \r | |
516 | Status = Reclaim (\r | |
517 | mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal.NonVolatileVariableBase,\r | |
518 | &mVariableModuleGlobal->NonVolatileLastVariableOffset,\r | |
519 | FALSE,\r | |
520 | NULL,\r | |
7baf3c69 SZ |
521 | NULL,\r |
522 | 0,\r | |
83758cdc | 523 | TRUE\r |
524 | );\r | |
525 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
526 | return 0;\r | |
527 | }\r | |
528 | \r | |
529 | Status = FindVariable (\r | |
530 | AUTHVAR_KEYDB_NAME,\r | |
531 | &gEfiAuthenticatedVariableGuid,\r | |
532 | &Variable,\r | |
533 | &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,\r | |
534 | FALSE\r | |
535 | );\r | |
ca5a7d87 | 536 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r |
25da08c8 | 537 | DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Get public key database variable failure, Status = %r\n", Status));\r |
ca5a7d87 | 538 | return 0;\r |
539 | }\r | |
83758cdc | 540 | \r |
541 | DataSize = DataSizeOfVariable (Variable.CurrPtr);\r | |
542 | Data = GetVariableDataPtr (Variable.CurrPtr);\r | |
543 | ASSERT ((DataSize != 0) && (Data != NULL));\r | |
544 | CopyMem (mPubKeyStore, (UINT8 *) Data, DataSize);\r | |
545 | mPubKeyNumber = (UINT32) (DataSize / EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE);\r | |
546 | \r | |
547 | if (mPubKeyNumber == MAX_KEY_NUM) {\r | |
548 | return 0;\r | |
549 | } \r | |
0c18794e | 550 | }\r |
551 | \r | |
9a12e582 DG |
552 | //\r |
553 | // Check the variable space for both public key and variable data.\r | |
554 | //\r | |
555 | PublicKeyEntry.VariableSize = (mPubKeyNumber + 1) * EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE;\r | |
556 | PublicKeyEntry.Guid = &gEfiAuthenticatedVariableGuid;\r | |
557 | PublicKeyEntry.Name = AUTHVAR_KEYDB_NAME;\r | |
558 | Attributes = VARIABLE_ATTRIBUTE_NV_BS_RT | EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS;\r | |
559 | \r | |
560 | if (!CheckRemainingSpaceForConsistency (Attributes, &PublicKeyEntry, VariableDataEntry, NULL)) {\r | |
561 | //\r | |
562 | // No enough variable space.\r | |
563 | //\r | |
564 | return 0;\r | |
565 | }\r | |
566 | \r | |
0c18794e | 567 | CopyMem (mPubKeyStore + mPubKeyNumber * EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE, PubKey, EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE);\r |
568 | Index = ++mPubKeyNumber;\r | |
569 | //\r | |
570 | // Update public key database variable.\r | |
571 | //\r | |
572 | Status = UpdateVariable (\r | |
573 | AUTHVAR_KEYDB_NAME,\r | |
574 | &gEfiAuthenticatedVariableGuid,\r | |
575 | mPubKeyStore,\r | |
576 | mPubKeyNumber * EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE,\r | |
9a12e582 | 577 | Attributes,\r |
0c18794e | 578 | 0,\r |
579 | 0,\r | |
580 | &Variable,\r | |
581 | NULL\r | |
582 | );\r | |
25da08c8 DG |
583 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r |
584 | DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Update public key database variable failure, Status = %r\n", Status));\r | |
585 | return 0;\r | |
586 | }\r | |
0c18794e | 587 | }\r |
588 | \r | |
589 | return Index;\r | |
590 | }\r | |
591 | \r | |
592 | /**\r | |
85560919 | 593 | Verify data payload with AuthInfo in EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SHA256_GUID type.\r |
0c18794e | 594 | Follow the steps in UEFI2.2.\r |
595 | \r | |
dc204d5a JY |
596 | Caution: This function may receive untrusted input.\r |
597 | This function may be invoked in SMM mode, and datasize and data are external input.\r | |
598 | This function will do basic validation, before parse the data.\r | |
599 | This function will parse the authentication carefully to avoid security issues, like\r | |
600 | buffer overflow, integer overflow.\r | |
601 | \r | |
0c18794e | 602 | @param[in] Data Pointer to data with AuthInfo.\r |
603 | @param[in] DataSize Size of Data.\r | |
604 | @param[in] PubKey Public key used for verification.\r | |
605 | \r | |
2d3fb919 | 606 | @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.\r |
0c18794e | 607 | @retval EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION If authentication failed.\r |
2d3fb919 | 608 | @retval EFI_SUCCESS Authentication successful.\r |
0c18794e | 609 | \r |
610 | **/\r | |
611 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
612 | VerifyCounterBasedPayload (\r | |
613 | IN UINT8 *Data,\r | |
614 | IN UINTN DataSize,\r | |
615 | IN UINT8 *PubKey\r | |
616 | )\r | |
617 | {\r | |
618 | BOOLEAN Status;\r | |
619 | EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION *CertData;\r | |
620 | EFI_CERT_BLOCK_RSA_2048_SHA256 *CertBlock;\r | |
621 | UINT8 Digest[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE];\r | |
622 | VOID *Rsa;\r | |
275beb2b | 623 | UINTN PayloadSize;\r |
624 | \r | |
625 | PayloadSize = DataSize - AUTHINFO_SIZE;\r | |
0c18794e | 626 | Rsa = NULL;\r |
627 | CertData = NULL;\r | |
628 | CertBlock = NULL;\r | |
629 | \r | |
630 | if (Data == NULL || PubKey == NULL) {\r | |
631 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r | |
632 | }\r | |
633 | \r | |
634 | CertData = (EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION *) Data;\r | |
635 | CertBlock = (EFI_CERT_BLOCK_RSA_2048_SHA256 *) (CertData->AuthInfo.CertData);\r | |
636 | \r | |
637 | //\r | |
638 | // wCertificateType should be WIN_CERT_TYPE_EFI_GUID.\r | |
85560919 | 639 | // Cert type should be EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SHA256_GUID.\r |
0c18794e | 640 | //\r |
641 | if ((CertData->AuthInfo.Hdr.wCertificateType != WIN_CERT_TYPE_EFI_GUID) ||\r | |
85560919 | 642 | !CompareGuid (&CertData->AuthInfo.CertType, &gEfiCertTypeRsa2048Sha256Guid)\r |
0c18794e | 643 | ) {\r |
644 | //\r | |
645 | // Invalid AuthInfo type, return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION.\r | |
646 | //\r | |
647 | return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r | |
648 | }\r | |
649 | //\r | |
650 | // Hash data payload with SHA256.\r | |
651 | //\r | |
652 | ZeroMem (Digest, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE);\r | |
653 | Status = Sha256Init (mHashCtx);\r | |
654 | if (!Status) {\r | |
655 | goto Done;\r | |
656 | }\r | |
275beb2b | 657 | Status = Sha256Update (mHashCtx, Data + AUTHINFO_SIZE, PayloadSize);\r |
658 | if (!Status) {\r | |
659 | goto Done;\r | |
660 | }\r | |
661 | //\r | |
662 | // Hash Size.\r | |
663 | //\r | |
664 | Status = Sha256Update (mHashCtx, &PayloadSize, sizeof (UINTN));\r | |
0c18794e | 665 | if (!Status) {\r |
666 | goto Done;\r | |
667 | }\r | |
668 | //\r | |
669 | // Hash Monotonic Count.\r | |
670 | //\r | |
671 | Status = Sha256Update (mHashCtx, &CertData->MonotonicCount, sizeof (UINT64));\r | |
672 | if (!Status) {\r | |
673 | goto Done;\r | |
674 | }\r | |
675 | Status = Sha256Final (mHashCtx, Digest);\r | |
676 | if (!Status) {\r | |
677 | goto Done;\r | |
678 | }\r | |
679 | //\r | |
680 | // Generate & Initialize RSA Context.\r | |
681 | //\r | |
682 | Rsa = RsaNew ();\r | |
683 | ASSERT (Rsa != NULL);\r | |
2d3fb919 | 684 | //\r |
0c18794e | 685 | // Set RSA Key Components.\r |
686 | // NOTE: Only N and E are needed to be set as RSA public key for signature verification.\r | |
687 | //\r | |
688 | Status = RsaSetKey (Rsa, RsaKeyN, PubKey, EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE);\r | |
689 | if (!Status) {\r | |
690 | goto Done;\r | |
691 | }\r | |
692 | Status = RsaSetKey (Rsa, RsaKeyE, mRsaE, sizeof (mRsaE));\r | |
693 | if (!Status) {\r | |
694 | goto Done;\r | |
695 | }\r | |
696 | //\r | |
697 | // Verify the signature.\r | |
698 | //\r | |
699 | Status = RsaPkcs1Verify (\r | |
2d3fb919 | 700 | Rsa,\r |
701 | Digest,\r | |
702 | SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE,\r | |
703 | CertBlock->Signature,\r | |
0c18794e | 704 | EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SHA256_SIZE\r |
705 | );\r | |
706 | \r | |
707 | Done:\r | |
708 | if (Rsa != NULL) {\r | |
709 | RsaFree (Rsa);\r | |
710 | }\r | |
711 | if (Status) {\r | |
712 | return EFI_SUCCESS;\r | |
713 | } else {\r | |
714 | return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r | |
715 | }\r | |
716 | }\r | |
717 | \r | |
0c18794e | 718 | /**\r |
719 | Update platform mode.\r | |
720 | \r | |
721 | @param[in] Mode SETUP_MODE or USER_MODE.\r | |
722 | \r | |
723 | @return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.\r | |
724 | @return EFI_SUCCESS Update platform mode successfully.\r | |
725 | \r | |
726 | **/\r | |
727 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
728 | UpdatePlatformMode (\r | |
729 | IN UINT32 Mode\r | |
730 | )\r | |
731 | {\r | |
732 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r | |
733 | VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK Variable;\r | |
0c18794e | 734 | UINT8 SecureBootMode;\r |
beda2356 | 735 | UINT8 SecureBootEnable;\r |
736 | UINTN VariableDataSize;\r | |
2d3fb919 | 737 | \r |
0c18794e | 738 | Status = FindVariable (\r |
2d3fb919 | 739 | EFI_SETUP_MODE_NAME,\r |
740 | &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r | |
741 | &Variable,\r | |
ecc722ad | 742 | &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,\r |
743 | FALSE\r | |
0c18794e | 744 | );\r |
745 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
746 | return Status;\r | |
747 | }\r | |
748 | \r | |
05a643f9 | 749 | //\r |
750 | // Update the value of SetupMode variable by a simple mem copy, this could avoid possible\r | |
751 | // variable storage reclaim at runtime.\r | |
752 | //\r | |
753 | mPlatformMode = (UINT8) Mode;\r | |
754 | CopyMem (GetVariableDataPtr (Variable.CurrPtr), &mPlatformMode, sizeof(UINT8));\r | |
0c18794e | 755 | \r |
2d3fb919 | 756 | if (AtRuntime ()) {\r |
757 | //\r | |
758 | // SecureBoot Variable indicates whether the platform firmware is operating\r | |
759 | // in Secure boot mode (1) or not (0), so we should not change SecureBoot\r | |
760 | // Variable in runtime.\r | |
761 | //\r | |
762 | return Status;\r | |
763 | }\r | |
764 | \r | |
0c18794e | 765 | //\r |
766 | // Check "SecureBoot" variable's existence.\r | |
767 | // If it doesn't exist, firmware has no capability to perform driver signing verification,\r | |
768 | // then set "SecureBoot" to 0.\r | |
769 | //\r | |
770 | Status = FindVariable (\r | |
2d3fb919 | 771 | EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME,\r |
772 | &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r | |
773 | &Variable,\r | |
ecc722ad | 774 | &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,\r |
775 | FALSE\r | |
0c18794e | 776 | );\r |
777 | //\r | |
778 | // If "SecureBoot" variable exists, then check "SetupMode" variable update.\r | |
779 | // If "SetupMode" variable is USER_MODE, "SecureBoot" variable is set to 1.\r | |
780 | // If "SetupMode" variable is SETUP_MODE, "SecureBoot" variable is set to 0.\r | |
781 | //\r | |
782 | if (Variable.CurrPtr == NULL) {\r | |
783 | SecureBootMode = SECURE_BOOT_MODE_DISABLE;\r | |
784 | } else {\r | |
785 | if (mPlatformMode == USER_MODE) {\r | |
786 | SecureBootMode = SECURE_BOOT_MODE_ENABLE;\r | |
787 | } else if (mPlatformMode == SETUP_MODE) {\r | |
788 | SecureBootMode = SECURE_BOOT_MODE_DISABLE;\r | |
789 | } else {\r | |
790 | return EFI_NOT_FOUND;\r | |
791 | }\r | |
792 | }\r | |
793 | \r | |
beda2356 | 794 | Status = UpdateVariable (\r |
0c18794e | 795 | EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME,\r |
796 | &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r | |
797 | &SecureBootMode,\r | |
798 | sizeof(UINT8),\r | |
0ba17ade | 799 | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS,\r |
0c18794e | 800 | 0,\r |
801 | 0,\r | |
802 | &Variable,\r | |
803 | NULL\r | |
804 | );\r | |
beda2356 | 805 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r |
806 | return Status;\r | |
807 | }\r | |
808 | \r | |
809 | //\r | |
810 | // Check "SecureBootEnable" variable's existence. It can enable/disable secure boot feature.\r | |
811 | //\r | |
812 | Status = FindVariable (\r | |
2d3fb919 | 813 | EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME,\r |
814 | &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid,\r | |
815 | &Variable,\r | |
ecc722ad | 816 | &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,\r |
817 | FALSE\r | |
beda2356 | 818 | );\r |
2d3fb919 | 819 | \r |
beda2356 | 820 | if (SecureBootMode == SECURE_BOOT_MODE_ENABLE) {\r |
821 | //\r | |
822 | // Create the "SecureBootEnable" variable as secure boot is enabled.\r | |
823 | //\r | |
824 | SecureBootEnable = SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE;\r | |
825 | VariableDataSize = sizeof (SecureBootEnable);\r | |
826 | } else {\r | |
827 | //\r | |
2d3fb919 | 828 | // Delete the "SecureBootEnable" variable if this variable exist as "SecureBoot"\r |
beda2356 | 829 | // variable is not in secure boot state.\r |
830 | //\r | |
831 | if (Variable.CurrPtr == NULL || EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
832 | return EFI_SUCCESS;\r | |
833 | }\r | |
834 | SecureBootEnable = SECURE_BOOT_DISABLE;\r | |
835 | VariableDataSize = 0;\r | |
836 | }\r | |
2d3fb919 | 837 | \r |
beda2356 | 838 | Status = UpdateVariable (\r |
2d3fb919 | 839 | EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME,\r |
840 | &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid,\r | |
841 | &SecureBootEnable,\r | |
842 | VariableDataSize,\r | |
843 | EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS,\r | |
844 | 0,\r | |
845 | 0,\r | |
beda2356 | 846 | &Variable,\r |
847 | NULL\r | |
848 | );\r | |
849 | return Status;\r | |
0c18794e | 850 | }\r |
851 | \r | |
d912bad7 | 852 | /**\r |
e77f9ef6 | 853 | Check input data form to make sure it is a valid EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST for PK/KEK/db/dbx variable.\r |
d912bad7 | 854 | \r |
855 | @param[in] VariableName Name of Variable to be check.\r | |
856 | @param[in] VendorGuid Variable vendor GUID.\r | |
857 | @param[in] Data Point to the variable data to be checked.\r | |
858 | @param[in] DataSize Size of Data.\r | |
859 | \r | |
860 | @return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid signature list format.\r | |
861 | @return EFI_SUCCESS Passed signature list format check successfully.\r | |
862 | \r | |
863 | **/\r | |
864 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
865 | CheckSignatureListFormat(\r | |
866 | IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r | |
867 | IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r | |
868 | IN VOID *Data,\r | |
869 | IN UINTN DataSize\r | |
870 | )\r | |
871 | {\r | |
872 | EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *SigList;\r | |
873 | UINTN SigDataSize;\r | |
874 | UINT32 Index;\r | |
875 | UINT32 SigCount;\r | |
876 | BOOLEAN IsPk;\r | |
e77f9ef6 | 877 | VOID *RsaContext;\r |
878 | EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *CertData;\r | |
879 | UINTN CertLen;\r | |
d912bad7 | 880 | \r |
881 | if (DataSize == 0) {\r | |
882 | return EFI_SUCCESS;\r | |
883 | }\r | |
884 | \r | |
885 | ASSERT (VariableName != NULL && VendorGuid != NULL && Data != NULL);\r | |
886 | \r | |
887 | if (CompareGuid (VendorGuid, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid) && (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME) == 0)){\r | |
888 | IsPk = TRUE;\r | |
e77f9ef6 | 889 | } else if ((CompareGuid (VendorGuid, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid) && StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME) == 0) ||\r |
890 | (CompareGuid (VendorGuid, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid) && \r | |
891 | (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE) == 0 || StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1) == 0))){\r | |
d912bad7 | 892 | IsPk = FALSE;\r |
893 | } else {\r | |
894 | return EFI_SUCCESS;\r | |
895 | }\r | |
896 | \r | |
897 | SigCount = 0;\r | |
898 | SigList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) Data;\r | |
899 | SigDataSize = DataSize;\r | |
e77f9ef6 | 900 | RsaContext = NULL;\r |
d912bad7 | 901 | \r |
902 | //\r | |
903 | // Walk throuth the input signature list and check the data format.\r | |
904 | // If any signature is incorrectly formed, the whole check will fail.\r | |
905 | //\r | |
906 | while ((SigDataSize > 0) && (SigDataSize >= SigList->SignatureListSize)) {\r | |
907 | for (Index = 0; Index < (sizeof (mSupportSigItem) / sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_ITEM)); Index++ ) {\r | |
908 | if (CompareGuid (&SigList->SignatureType, &mSupportSigItem[Index].SigType)) {\r | |
909 | //\r | |
910 | // The value of SignatureSize should always be 16 (size of SignatureOwner \r | |
911 | // component) add the data length according to signature type.\r | |
912 | //\r | |
913 | if (mSupportSigItem[Index].SigDataSize != ((UINT32) ~0) && \r | |
914 | (SigList->SignatureSize - sizeof (EFI_GUID)) != mSupportSigItem[Index].SigDataSize) {\r | |
915 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r | |
916 | }\r | |
917 | if (mSupportSigItem[Index].SigHeaderSize != ((UINTN) ~0) &&\r | |
918 | SigList->SignatureHeaderSize != mSupportSigItem[Index].SigHeaderSize) {\r | |
919 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r | |
920 | }\r | |
921 | break;\r | |
922 | }\r | |
923 | }\r | |
924 | \r | |
925 | if (Index == (sizeof (mSupportSigItem) / sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_ITEM))) {\r | |
926 | //\r | |
927 | // Undefined signature type.\r | |
928 | //\r | |
929 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r | |
930 | }\r | |
931 | \r | |
e77f9ef6 | 932 | if (CompareGuid (&SigList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Guid)) {\r |
933 | //\r | |
934 | // Try to retrieve the RSA public key from the X.509 certificate.\r | |
935 | // If this operation fails, it's not a valid certificate.\r | |
936 | //\r | |
937 | RsaContext = RsaNew ();\r | |
938 | if (RsaContext == NULL) {\r | |
939 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r | |
940 | }\r | |
941 | CertData = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) SigList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + SigList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r | |
942 | CertLen = SigList->SignatureSize - sizeof (EFI_GUID);\r | |
943 | if (!RsaGetPublicKeyFromX509 (CertData->SignatureData, CertLen, &RsaContext)) {\r | |
944 | RsaFree (RsaContext);\r | |
945 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r | |
946 | }\r | |
947 | RsaFree (RsaContext);\r | |
948 | }\r | |
949 | \r | |
d912bad7 | 950 | if ((SigList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - SigList->SignatureHeaderSize) % SigList->SignatureSize != 0) {\r |
951 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r | |
952 | }\r | |
953 | SigCount += (SigList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - SigList->SignatureHeaderSize) / SigList->SignatureSize;\r | |
954 | \r | |
955 | SigDataSize -= SigList->SignatureListSize;\r | |
956 | SigList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) SigList + SigList->SignatureListSize);\r | |
957 | }\r | |
958 | \r | |
959 | if (((UINTN) SigList - (UINTN) Data) != DataSize) {\r | |
960 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r | |
961 | }\r | |
962 | \r | |
963 | if (IsPk && SigCount > 1) {\r | |
964 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r | |
965 | }\r | |
966 | \r | |
967 | return EFI_SUCCESS;\r | |
968 | }\r | |
969 | \r | |
a555940b FS |
970 | /**\r |
971 | Update "VendorKeys" variable to record the out of band secure boot key modification.\r | |
972 | \r | |
973 | @return EFI_SUCCESS Variable is updated successfully.\r | |
974 | @return Others Failed to update variable.\r | |
975 | \r | |
976 | **/\r | |
977 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
978 | VendorKeyIsModified (\r | |
979 | VOID\r | |
980 | )\r | |
981 | {\r | |
982 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r | |
983 | VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK Variable;\r | |
984 | \r | |
985 | if (mVendorKeyState == VENDOR_KEYS_MODIFIED) {\r | |
986 | return EFI_SUCCESS;\r | |
987 | }\r | |
988 | mVendorKeyState = VENDOR_KEYS_MODIFIED;\r | |
989 | \r | |
990 | FindVariable (EFI_VENDOR_KEYS_NV_VARIABLE_NAME, &gEfiVendorKeysNvGuid, &Variable, &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal, FALSE);\r | |
991 | Status = UpdateVariable (\r | |
992 | EFI_VENDOR_KEYS_NV_VARIABLE_NAME,\r | |
993 | &gEfiVendorKeysNvGuid,\r | |
994 | &mVendorKeyState,\r | |
995 | sizeof (UINT8),\r | |
996 | EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS,\r | |
997 | 0,\r | |
998 | 0,\r | |
999 | &Variable,\r | |
1000 | NULL\r | |
1001 | );\r | |
1002 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
1003 | return Status;\r | |
1004 | }\r | |
1005 | \r | |
1006 | FindVariable (EFI_VENDOR_KEYS_VARIABLE_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, &Variable, &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal, FALSE);\r | |
1007 | return UpdateVariable (\r | |
1008 | EFI_VENDOR_KEYS_VARIABLE_NAME,\r | |
1009 | &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r | |
1010 | &mVendorKeyState,\r | |
1011 | sizeof (UINT8),\r | |
1012 | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS,\r | |
1013 | 0,\r | |
1014 | 0,\r | |
1015 | &Variable,\r | |
1016 | NULL\r | |
1017 | );\r | |
1018 | }\r | |
1019 | \r | |
0c18794e | 1020 | /**\r |
1021 | Process variable with platform key for verification.\r | |
1022 | \r | |
dc204d5a JY |
1023 | Caution: This function may receive untrusted input.\r |
1024 | This function may be invoked in SMM mode, and datasize and data are external input.\r | |
1025 | This function will do basic validation, before parse the data.\r | |
1026 | This function will parse the authentication carefully to avoid security issues, like\r | |
1027 | buffer overflow, integer overflow.\r | |
1028 | This function will check attribute carefully to avoid authentication bypass.\r | |
1029 | \r | |
0c18794e | 1030 | @param[in] VariableName Name of Variable to be found.\r |
1031 | @param[in] VendorGuid Variable vendor GUID.\r | |
1032 | @param[in] Data Data pointer.\r | |
1033 | @param[in] DataSize Size of Data found. If size is less than the\r | |
1034 | data, this value contains the required size.\r | |
1035 | @param[in] Variable The variable information which is used to keep track of variable usage.\r | |
1036 | @param[in] Attributes Attribute value of the variable\r | |
1037 | @param[in] IsPk Indicate whether it is to process pk.\r | |
1038 | \r | |
1039 | @return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.\r | |
2d3fb919 | 1040 | @return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION The variable does NOT pass the validation.\r |
1041 | check carried out by the firmware.\r | |
0c18794e | 1042 | @return EFI_SUCCESS Variable passed validation successfully.\r |
1043 | \r | |
1044 | **/\r | |
1045 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
1046 | ProcessVarWithPk (\r | |
1047 | IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r | |
1048 | IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r | |
1049 | IN VOID *Data,\r | |
1050 | IN UINTN DataSize,\r | |
1051 | IN VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK *Variable,\r | |
1052 | IN UINT32 Attributes OPTIONAL,\r | |
1053 | IN BOOLEAN IsPk\r | |
1054 | )\r | |
1055 | {\r | |
1056 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r | |
0c18794e | 1057 | BOOLEAN Del;\r |
2d3fb919 | 1058 | UINT8 *Payload;\r |
1059 | UINTN PayloadSize;\r | |
0c18794e | 1060 | \r |
8c1babfd | 1061 | if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE) == 0 || \r |
1062 | (Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) == 0) {\r | |
0c18794e | 1063 | //\r |
05a643f9 | 1064 | // PK, KEK and db/dbx should set EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE attribute and should be a time-based\r |
8c1babfd | 1065 | // authenticated variable.\r |
0c18794e | 1066 | //\r |
1067 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r | |
1068 | }\r | |
1069 | \r | |
785d84ea | 1070 | Del = FALSE;\r |
1071 | if ((InCustomMode() && UserPhysicalPresent()) || (mPlatformMode == SETUP_MODE && !IsPk)) {\r | |
8c1babfd | 1072 | Payload = (UINT8 *) Data + AUTHINFO2_SIZE (Data);\r |
1073 | PayloadSize = DataSize - AUTHINFO2_SIZE (Data);\r | |
785d84ea | 1074 | if (PayloadSize == 0) {\r |
1075 | Del = TRUE;\r | |
1076 | }\r | |
2d3fb919 | 1077 | \r |
d912bad7 | 1078 | Status = CheckSignatureListFormat(VariableName, VendorGuid, Payload, PayloadSize);\r |
1079 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
1080 | return Status;\r | |
1081 | }\r | |
1082 | \r | |
2d3fb919 | 1083 | Status = UpdateVariable (\r |
1084 | VariableName,\r | |
1085 | VendorGuid,\r | |
1086 | Payload,\r | |
1087 | PayloadSize,\r | |
1088 | Attributes,\r | |
1089 | 0,\r | |
8c1babfd | 1090 | 0,\r |
2d3fb919 | 1091 | Variable,\r |
8c1babfd | 1092 | &((EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 *) Data)->TimeStamp\r |
2d3fb919 | 1093 | );\r |
a555940b FS |
1094 | if (EFI_ERROR(Status)) {\r |
1095 | return Status;\r | |
1096 | }\r | |
1097 | \r | |
5ecc20b5 | 1098 | if ((mPlatformMode != SETUP_MODE) || IsPk) {\r |
a555940b FS |
1099 | Status = VendorKeyIsModified ();\r |
1100 | }\r | |
785d84ea | 1101 | } else if (mPlatformMode == USER_MODE) {\r |
1102 | //\r | |
1103 | // Verify against X509 Cert in PK database.\r | |
1104 | //\r | |
1105 | Status = VerifyTimeBasedPayload (\r | |
1106 | VariableName,\r | |
1107 | VendorGuid,\r | |
1108 | Data,\r | |
1109 | DataSize,\r | |
1110 | Variable,\r | |
1111 | Attributes,\r | |
1112 | AuthVarTypePk,\r | |
1113 | &Del\r | |
1114 | );\r | |
1115 | } else {\r | |
1116 | //\r | |
1117 | // Verify against the certificate in data payload.\r | |
1118 | //\r | |
1119 | Status = VerifyTimeBasedPayload (\r | |
1120 | VariableName,\r | |
1121 | VendorGuid,\r | |
1122 | Data,\r | |
1123 | DataSize,\r | |
1124 | Variable,\r | |
1125 | Attributes,\r | |
1126 | AuthVarTypePayload,\r | |
1127 | &Del\r | |
1128 | );\r | |
1129 | }\r | |
ecc722ad | 1130 | \r |
785d84ea | 1131 | if (!EFI_ERROR(Status) && IsPk) {\r |
1132 | if (mPlatformMode == SETUP_MODE && !Del) {\r | |
1133 | //\r | |
1134 | // If enroll PK in setup mode, need change to user mode.\r | |
1135 | //\r | |
1136 | Status = UpdatePlatformMode (USER_MODE);\r | |
1137 | } else if (mPlatformMode == USER_MODE && Del){\r | |
1138 | //\r | |
1139 | // If delete PK in user mode, need change to setup mode.\r | |
1140 | //\r | |
1141 | Status = UpdatePlatformMode (SETUP_MODE);\r | |
1142 | }\r | |
0c18794e | 1143 | }\r |
1144 | \r | |
1145 | return Status;\r | |
1146 | }\r | |
1147 | \r | |
1148 | /**\r | |
1149 | Process variable with key exchange key for verification.\r | |
1150 | \r | |
dc204d5a JY |
1151 | Caution: This function may receive untrusted input.\r |
1152 | This function may be invoked in SMM mode, and datasize and data are external input.\r | |
1153 | This function will do basic validation, before parse the data.\r | |
1154 | This function will parse the authentication carefully to avoid security issues, like\r | |
1155 | buffer overflow, integer overflow.\r | |
1156 | This function will check attribute carefully to avoid authentication bypass.\r | |
1157 | \r | |
0c18794e | 1158 | @param[in] VariableName Name of Variable to be found.\r |
1159 | @param[in] VendorGuid Variable vendor GUID.\r | |
1160 | @param[in] Data Data pointer.\r | |
1161 | @param[in] DataSize Size of Data found. If size is less than the\r | |
1162 | data, this value contains the required size.\r | |
1163 | @param[in] Variable The variable information which is used to keep track of variable usage.\r | |
1164 | @param[in] Attributes Attribute value of the variable.\r | |
1165 | \r | |
1166 | @return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.\r | |
2d3fb919 | 1167 | @return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION The variable does NOT pass the validation\r |
1168 | check carried out by the firmware.\r | |
0c18794e | 1169 | @return EFI_SUCCESS Variable pass validation successfully.\r |
1170 | \r | |
1171 | **/\r | |
1172 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
1173 | ProcessVarWithKek (\r | |
1174 | IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r | |
1175 | IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r | |
1176 | IN VOID *Data,\r | |
1177 | IN UINTN DataSize,\r | |
1178 | IN VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK *Variable,\r | |
1179 | IN UINT32 Attributes OPTIONAL\r | |
1180 | )\r | |
1181 | {\r | |
1182 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r | |
2d3fb919 | 1183 | UINT8 *Payload;\r |
1184 | UINTN PayloadSize;\r | |
ecc722ad | 1185 | \r |
8c1babfd | 1186 | if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE) == 0 ||\r |
1187 | (Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) == 0) {\r | |
ecc722ad | 1188 | //\r |
8c1babfd | 1189 | // DB and DBX should set EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE attribute and should be a time-based\r |
1190 | // authenticated variable.\r | |
ecc722ad | 1191 | //\r |
1192 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r | |
1193 | }\r | |
0c18794e | 1194 | \r |
ecc722ad | 1195 | Status = EFI_SUCCESS;\r |
1196 | if (mPlatformMode == USER_MODE && !(InCustomMode() && UserPhysicalPresent())) {\r | |
8c1babfd | 1197 | //\r |
1198 | // Time-based, verify against X509 Cert KEK.\r | |
1199 | //\r | |
1200 | return VerifyTimeBasedPayload (\r | |
1201 | VariableName,\r | |
1202 | VendorGuid,\r | |
1203 | Data,\r | |
1204 | DataSize,\r | |
1205 | Variable,\r | |
1206 | Attributes,\r | |
1207 | AuthVarTypeKek,\r | |
1208 | NULL\r | |
1209 | );\r | |
0c18794e | 1210 | } else {\r |
1211 | //\r | |
ecc722ad | 1212 | // If in setup mode or custom secure boot mode, no authentication needed.\r |
0c18794e | 1213 | //\r |
8c1babfd | 1214 | Payload = (UINT8 *) Data + AUTHINFO2_SIZE (Data);\r |
1215 | PayloadSize = DataSize - AUTHINFO2_SIZE (Data);\r | |
2d3fb919 | 1216 | \r |
e77f9ef6 | 1217 | Status = CheckSignatureListFormat(VariableName, VendorGuid, Payload, PayloadSize);\r |
1218 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
1219 | return Status;\r | |
1220 | }\r | |
1221 | \r | |
0c18794e | 1222 | Status = UpdateVariable (\r |
2d3fb919 | 1223 | VariableName,\r |
1224 | VendorGuid,\r | |
1225 | Payload,\r | |
1226 | PayloadSize,\r | |
1227 | Attributes,\r | |
1228 | 0,\r | |
8c1babfd | 1229 | 0,\r |
0c18794e | 1230 | Variable,\r |
8c1babfd | 1231 | &((EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 *) Data)->TimeStamp\r |
0c18794e | 1232 | );\r |
a555940b FS |
1233 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r |
1234 | return Status;\r | |
1235 | }\r | |
1236 | \r | |
1237 | if (mPlatformMode != SETUP_MODE) {\r | |
1238 | Status = VendorKeyIsModified ();\r | |
1239 | }\r | |
0c18794e | 1240 | }\r |
1241 | \r | |
1242 | return Status;\r | |
1243 | }\r | |
1244 | \r | |
1245 | /**\r | |
1246 | Process variable with EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS/EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS set\r | |
1247 | \r | |
dc204d5a JY |
1248 | Caution: This function may receive untrusted input.\r |
1249 | This function may be invoked in SMM mode, and datasize and data are external input.\r | |
1250 | This function will do basic validation, before parse the data.\r | |
1251 | This function will parse the authentication carefully to avoid security issues, like\r | |
1252 | buffer overflow, integer overflow.\r | |
1253 | This function will check attribute carefully to avoid authentication bypass.\r | |
1254 | \r | |
0c18794e | 1255 | @param[in] VariableName Name of Variable to be found.\r |
1256 | @param[in] VendorGuid Variable vendor GUID.\r | |
1257 | \r | |
1258 | @param[in] Data Data pointer.\r | |
1259 | @param[in] DataSize Size of Data found. If size is less than the\r | |
1260 | data, this value contains the required size.\r | |
1261 | @param[in] Variable The variable information which is used to keep track of variable usage.\r | |
1262 | @param[in] Attributes Attribute value of the variable.\r | |
1263 | \r | |
1264 | @return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.\r | |
1265 | @return EFI_WRITE_PROTECTED Variable is write-protected and needs authentication with\r | |
1266 | EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS set.\r | |
275beb2b | 1267 | @return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES The Database to save the public key is full.\r |
0c18794e | 1268 | @return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION The variable is with EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS\r |
2d3fb919 | 1269 | set, but the AuthInfo does NOT pass the validation\r |
1270 | check carried out by the firmware.\r | |
0c18794e | 1271 | @return EFI_SUCCESS Variable is not write-protected or pass validation successfully.\r |
1272 | \r | |
1273 | **/\r | |
1274 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
1275 | ProcessVariable (\r | |
1276 | IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r | |
1277 | IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r | |
1278 | IN VOID *Data,\r | |
1279 | IN UINTN DataSize,\r | |
1280 | IN VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK *Variable,\r | |
1281 | IN UINT32 Attributes\r | |
1282 | )\r | |
1283 | {\r | |
1284 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r | |
1285 | BOOLEAN IsDeletion;\r | |
1286 | BOOLEAN IsFirstTime;\r | |
1287 | UINT8 *PubKey;\r | |
1288 | EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION *CertData;\r | |
1289 | EFI_CERT_BLOCK_RSA_2048_SHA256 *CertBlock;\r | |
1290 | UINT32 KeyIndex;\r | |
1291 | UINT64 MonotonicCount;\r | |
9a12e582 | 1292 | VARIABLE_ENTRY_CONSISTENCY VariableDataEntry;\r |
0c18794e | 1293 | \r |
2d3fb919 | 1294 | KeyIndex = 0;\r |
0c18794e | 1295 | CertData = NULL;\r |
1296 | CertBlock = NULL;\r | |
1297 | PubKey = NULL;\r | |
1298 | IsDeletion = FALSE;\r | |
1299 | \r | |
ecc722ad | 1300 | if (NeedPhysicallyPresent(VariableName, VendorGuid) && !UserPhysicalPresent()) {\r |
1301 | //\r | |
1302 | // This variable is protected, only physical present user could modify its value.\r | |
1303 | //\r | |
1304 | return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r | |
1305 | }\r | |
1306 | \r | |
89be2b03 | 1307 | //\r |
1308 | // A time-based authenticated variable and a count-based authenticated variable\r | |
1309 | // can't be updated by each other.\r | |
1310 | // \r | |
1311 | if (Variable->CurrPtr != NULL) { \r | |
1312 | if (((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0) &&\r | |
1313 | ((Variable->CurrPtr->Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0)) {\r | |
1314 | return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION; \r | |
1315 | }\r | |
1316 | \r | |
1317 | if (((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0) && \r | |
1318 | ((Variable->CurrPtr->Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0)) {\r | |
1319 | return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION; \r | |
1320 | }\r | |
1321 | }\r | |
1322 | \r | |
0c18794e | 1323 | //\r |
1324 | // Process Time-based Authenticated variable.\r | |
1325 | //\r | |
1326 | if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0) {\r | |
ed47ae02 | 1327 | return VerifyTimeBasedPayload (\r |
1328 | VariableName,\r | |
1329 | VendorGuid,\r | |
1330 | Data,\r | |
1331 | DataSize,\r | |
1332 | Variable,\r | |
1333 | Attributes,\r | |
1334 | AuthVarTypePriv,\r | |
1335 | NULL\r | |
1336 | );\r | |
0c18794e | 1337 | }\r |
2d3fb919 | 1338 | \r |
0c18794e | 1339 | //\r |
1340 | // Determine if first time SetVariable with the EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS.\r | |
1341 | //\r | |
1342 | if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0) {\r | |
1343 | //\r | |
1344 | // Determine current operation type.\r | |
1345 | //\r | |
1346 | if (DataSize == AUTHINFO_SIZE) {\r | |
1347 | IsDeletion = TRUE;\r | |
1348 | }\r | |
1349 | //\r | |
1350 | // Determine whether this is the first time with EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS set.\r | |
1351 | //\r | |
1352 | if (Variable->CurrPtr == NULL) {\r | |
1353 | IsFirstTime = TRUE;\r | |
1354 | } else if ((Variable->CurrPtr->Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) == 0) {\r | |
1355 | IsFirstTime = TRUE;\r | |
1356 | } else {\r | |
1357 | KeyIndex = Variable->CurrPtr->PubKeyIndex;\r | |
1358 | IsFirstTime = FALSE;\r | |
1359 | }\r | |
389c8779 | 1360 | } else if ((Variable->CurrPtr != NULL) && \r |
1361 | ((Variable->CurrPtr->Attributes & (EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS)) != 0)\r | |
1362 | ) {\r | |
0c18794e | 1363 | //\r |
1364 | // If the variable is already write-protected, it always needs authentication before update.\r | |
1365 | //\r | |
1366 | return EFI_WRITE_PROTECTED;\r | |
1367 | } else {\r | |
1368 | //\r | |
1369 | // If without EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS, set and attributes collision.\r | |
1370 | // That means it is not authenticated variable, just update variable as usual.\r | |
1371 | //\r | |
1372 | Status = UpdateVariable (VariableName, VendorGuid, Data, DataSize, Attributes, 0, 0, Variable, NULL);\r | |
1373 | return Status;\r | |
1374 | }\r | |
1375 | \r | |
1376 | //\r | |
1377 | // Get PubKey and check Monotonic Count value corresponding to the variable.\r | |
1378 | //\r | |
1379 | CertData = (EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION *) Data;\r | |
1380 | CertBlock = (EFI_CERT_BLOCK_RSA_2048_SHA256 *) (CertData->AuthInfo.CertData);\r | |
1381 | PubKey = CertBlock->PublicKey;\r | |
1382 | \r | |
1383 | //\r | |
1384 | // Update Monotonic Count value.\r | |
1385 | //\r | |
1386 | MonotonicCount = CertData->MonotonicCount;\r | |
1387 | \r | |
1388 | if (!IsFirstTime) {\r | |
1389 | //\r | |
1390 | // Check input PubKey.\r | |
1391 | //\r | |
1392 | if (CompareMem (PubKey, mPubKeyStore + (KeyIndex - 1) * EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE, EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE) != 0) {\r | |
1393 | return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r | |
1394 | }\r | |
1395 | //\r | |
1396 | // Compare the current monotonic count and ensure that it is greater than the last SetVariable\r | |
1397 | // operation with the EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS attribute set.\r | |
1398 | //\r | |
1399 | if (CertData->MonotonicCount <= Variable->CurrPtr->MonotonicCount) {\r | |
1400 | //\r | |
1401 | // Monotonic count check fail, suspicious replay attack, return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION.\r | |
1402 | //\r | |
1403 | return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r | |
1404 | }\r | |
2d3fb919 | 1405 | }\r |
0c18794e | 1406 | //\r |
1407 | // Verify the certificate in Data payload.\r | |
1408 | //\r | |
1409 | Status = VerifyCounterBasedPayload (Data, DataSize, PubKey);\r | |
1410 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
1411 | return Status;\r | |
1412 | }\r | |
2d3fb919 | 1413 | \r |
0c18794e | 1414 | //\r |
1415 | // Now, the signature has been verified!\r | |
1416 | //\r | |
1417 | if (IsFirstTime && !IsDeletion) {\r | |
9a12e582 DG |
1418 | VariableDataEntry.VariableSize = DataSize - AUTHINFO_SIZE;\r |
1419 | VariableDataEntry.Guid = VendorGuid;\r | |
1420 | VariableDataEntry.Name = VariableName;\r | |
1421 | \r | |
0c18794e | 1422 | //\r |
1423 | // Update public key database variable if need.\r | |
1424 | //\r | |
9a12e582 | 1425 | KeyIndex = AddPubKeyInStore (PubKey, &VariableDataEntry);\r |
4e33001c | 1426 | if (KeyIndex == 0) {\r |
275beb2b | 1427 | return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r |
4e33001c | 1428 | }\r |
0c18794e | 1429 | }\r |
1430 | \r | |
1431 | //\r | |
1432 | // Verification pass.\r | |
1433 | //\r | |
1434 | return UpdateVariable (VariableName, VendorGuid, (UINT8*)Data + AUTHINFO_SIZE, DataSize - AUTHINFO_SIZE, Attributes, KeyIndex, MonotonicCount, Variable, NULL);\r | |
1435 | }\r | |
1436 | \r | |
2d3fb919 | 1437 | /**\r |
1438 | Merge two buffers which formatted as EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST. Only the new EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA\r | |
1439 | will be appended to the original EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST, duplicate EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA\r | |
1440 | will be ignored.\r | |
1441 | \r | |
732d199d | 1442 | @param[in, out] Data Pointer to original EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST.\r |
1443 | @param[in] DataSize Size of Data buffer.\r | |
1444 | @param[in] FreeBufSize Size of free data buffer \r | |
1445 | @param[in] NewData Pointer to new EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST to be appended.\r | |
1446 | @param[in] NewDataSize Size of NewData buffer.\r | |
1447 | @param[out] MergedBufSize Size of the merged buffer\r | |
2d3fb919 | 1448 | \r |
732d199d | 1449 | @return EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL if input Data buffer overflowed\r |
2d3fb919 | 1450 | \r |
1451 | **/\r | |
732d199d | 1452 | EFI_STATUS\r |
2d3fb919 | 1453 | AppendSignatureList (\r |
1454 | IN OUT VOID *Data,\r | |
1455 | IN UINTN DataSize,\r | |
732d199d | 1456 | IN UINTN FreeBufSize,\r |
2d3fb919 | 1457 | IN VOID *NewData,\r |
732d199d | 1458 | IN UINTN NewDataSize,\r |
1459 | OUT UINTN *MergedBufSize\r | |
2d3fb919 | 1460 | )\r |
1461 | {\r | |
1462 | EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *CertList;\r | |
1463 | EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *Cert;\r | |
1464 | UINTN CertCount;\r | |
1465 | EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *NewCertList;\r | |
1466 | EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *NewCert;\r | |
1467 | UINTN NewCertCount;\r | |
1468 | UINTN Index;\r | |
1469 | UINTN Index2;\r | |
1470 | UINTN Size;\r | |
1471 | UINT8 *Tail;\r | |
1472 | UINTN CopiedCount;\r | |
1473 | UINTN SignatureListSize;\r | |
1474 | BOOLEAN IsNewCert;\r | |
1475 | \r | |
1476 | Tail = (UINT8 *) Data + DataSize;\r | |
1477 | \r | |
1478 | NewCertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) NewData;\r | |
1479 | while ((NewDataSize > 0) && (NewDataSize >= NewCertList->SignatureListSize)) {\r | |
1480 | NewCert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) NewCertList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + NewCertList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r | |
1481 | NewCertCount = (NewCertList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - NewCertList->SignatureHeaderSize) / NewCertList->SignatureSize;\r | |
1482 | \r | |
1483 | CopiedCount = 0;\r | |
1484 | for (Index = 0; Index < NewCertCount; Index++) {\r | |
1485 | IsNewCert = TRUE;\r | |
1486 | \r | |
1487 | Size = DataSize;\r | |
1488 | CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) Data;\r | |
1489 | while ((Size > 0) && (Size >= CertList->SignatureListSize)) {\r | |
1490 | if (CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &NewCertList->SignatureType) &&\r | |
1491 | (CertList->SignatureSize == NewCertList->SignatureSize)) {\r | |
1492 | Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r | |
1493 | CertCount = (CertList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - CertList->SignatureHeaderSize) / CertList->SignatureSize;\r | |
1494 | for (Index2 = 0; Index2 < CertCount; Index2++) {\r | |
1495 | //\r | |
1496 | // Iterate each Signature Data in this Signature List.\r | |
1497 | //\r | |
1498 | if (CompareMem (NewCert, Cert, CertList->SignatureSize) == 0) {\r | |
1499 | IsNewCert = FALSE;\r | |
1500 | break;\r | |
1501 | }\r | |
1502 | Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) Cert + CertList->SignatureSize);\r | |
1503 | }\r | |
1504 | }\r | |
1505 | \r | |
1506 | if (!IsNewCert) {\r | |
1507 | break;\r | |
1508 | }\r | |
1509 | Size -= CertList->SignatureListSize;\r | |
1510 | CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + CertList->SignatureListSize);\r | |
1511 | }\r | |
1512 | \r | |
1513 | if (IsNewCert) {\r | |
1514 | //\r | |
1515 | // New EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA, append it.\r | |
1516 | //\r | |
1517 | if (CopiedCount == 0) {\r | |
732d199d | 1518 | if (FreeBufSize < sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + NewCertList->SignatureHeaderSize) {\r |
1519 | return EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;\r | |
1520 | }\r | |
1521 | \r | |
2d3fb919 | 1522 | //\r |
1523 | // Copy EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST header for only once.\r | |
1524 | //\r | |
732d199d | 1525 | \r |
2d3fb919 | 1526 | CopyMem (Tail, NewCertList, sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + NewCertList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r |
1527 | Tail = Tail + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + NewCertList->SignatureHeaderSize;\r | |
732d199d | 1528 | FreeBufSize -= sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + NewCertList->SignatureHeaderSize;\r |
2d3fb919 | 1529 | }\r |
1530 | \r | |
732d199d | 1531 | if (FreeBufSize < NewCertList->SignatureSize) {\r |
1532 | return EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;\r | |
1533 | }\r | |
2d3fb919 | 1534 | CopyMem (Tail, NewCert, NewCertList->SignatureSize);\r |
1535 | Tail += NewCertList->SignatureSize;\r | |
732d199d | 1536 | FreeBufSize -= NewCertList->SignatureSize;\r |
2d3fb919 | 1537 | CopiedCount++;\r |
1538 | }\r | |
1539 | \r | |
1540 | NewCert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) NewCert + NewCertList->SignatureSize);\r | |
1541 | }\r | |
1542 | \r | |
1543 | //\r | |
1544 | // Update SignatureListSize in newly appended EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST.\r | |
1545 | //\r | |
1546 | if (CopiedCount != 0) {\r | |
1547 | SignatureListSize = sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + NewCertList->SignatureHeaderSize + (CopiedCount * NewCertList->SignatureSize);\r | |
1548 | CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) (Tail - SignatureListSize);\r | |
1549 | CertList->SignatureListSize = (UINT32) SignatureListSize;\r | |
1550 | }\r | |
1551 | \r | |
1552 | NewDataSize -= NewCertList->SignatureListSize;\r | |
1553 | NewCertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) NewCertList + NewCertList->SignatureListSize);\r | |
1554 | }\r | |
1555 | \r | |
732d199d | 1556 | *MergedBufSize = (Tail - (UINT8 *) Data);\r |
1557 | return EFI_SUCCESS;\r | |
2d3fb919 | 1558 | }\r |
1559 | \r | |
0c18794e | 1560 | /**\r |
1561 | Compare two EFI_TIME data.\r | |
1562 | \r | |
1563 | \r | |
1564 | @param FirstTime A pointer to the first EFI_TIME data.\r | |
1565 | @param SecondTime A pointer to the second EFI_TIME data.\r | |
1566 | \r | |
1567 | @retval TRUE The FirstTime is not later than the SecondTime.\r | |
1568 | @retval FALSE The FirstTime is later than the SecondTime.\r | |
1569 | \r | |
1570 | **/\r | |
1571 | BOOLEAN\r | |
1572 | CompareTimeStamp (\r | |
1573 | IN EFI_TIME *FirstTime,\r | |
1574 | IN EFI_TIME *SecondTime\r | |
1575 | )\r | |
1576 | {\r | |
1577 | if (FirstTime->Year != SecondTime->Year) {\r | |
1578 | return (BOOLEAN) (FirstTime->Year < SecondTime->Year);\r | |
1579 | } else if (FirstTime->Month != SecondTime->Month) {\r | |
1580 | return (BOOLEAN) (FirstTime->Month < SecondTime->Month);\r | |
1581 | } else if (FirstTime->Day != SecondTime->Day) {\r | |
1582 | return (BOOLEAN) (FirstTime->Day < SecondTime->Day);\r | |
1583 | } else if (FirstTime->Hour != SecondTime->Hour) {\r | |
1584 | return (BOOLEAN) (FirstTime->Hour < SecondTime->Hour);\r | |
1585 | } else if (FirstTime->Minute != SecondTime->Minute) {\r | |
42ed7604 | 1586 | return (BOOLEAN) (FirstTime->Minute < SecondTime->Minute);\r |
2d3fb919 | 1587 | }\r |
0c18794e | 1588 | \r |
1589 | return (BOOLEAN) (FirstTime->Second <= SecondTime->Second);\r | |
1590 | }\r | |
1591 | \r | |
ed47ae02 | 1592 | /**\r |
1593 | Find matching signer's certificates for common authenticated variable\r | |
1594 | by corresponding VariableName and VendorGuid from "certdb".\r | |
1595 | \r | |
1596 | The data format of "certdb":\r | |
1597 | //\r | |
1598 | // UINT32 CertDbListSize;\r | |
1599 | // /// AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA Certs1[];\r | |
1600 | // /// AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA Certs2[];\r | |
1601 | // /// ...\r | |
1602 | // /// AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA Certsn[];\r | |
1603 | //\r | |
1604 | \r | |
1605 | @param[in] VariableName Name of authenticated Variable.\r | |
1606 | @param[in] VendorGuid Vendor GUID of authenticated Variable.\r | |
1607 | @param[in] Data Pointer to variable "certdb".\r | |
1608 | @param[in] DataSize Size of variable "certdb".\r | |
1609 | @param[out] CertOffset Offset of matching CertData, from starting of Data.\r | |
1610 | @param[out] CertDataSize Length of CertData in bytes.\r | |
1611 | @param[out] CertNodeOffset Offset of matching AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA , from\r | |
1612 | starting of Data.\r | |
1613 | @param[out] CertNodeSize Length of AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA in bytes.\r | |
1614 | \r | |
1615 | @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Any input parameter is invalid.\r | |
1616 | @retval EFI_NOT_FOUND Fail to find matching certs.\r | |
1617 | @retval EFI_SUCCESS Find matching certs and output parameters.\r | |
1618 | \r | |
1619 | **/\r | |
1620 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
1621 | FindCertsFromDb (\r | |
1622 | IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r | |
1623 | IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r | |
1624 | IN UINT8 *Data,\r | |
1625 | IN UINTN DataSize,\r | |
1626 | OUT UINT32 *CertOffset, OPTIONAL\r | |
1627 | OUT UINT32 *CertDataSize, OPTIONAL\r | |
1628 | OUT UINT32 *CertNodeOffset,OPTIONAL\r | |
1629 | OUT UINT32 *CertNodeSize OPTIONAL\r | |
1630 | )\r | |
1631 | {\r | |
1632 | UINT32 Offset;\r | |
1633 | AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA *Ptr;\r | |
1634 | UINT32 CertSize;\r | |
1635 | UINT32 NameSize;\r | |
1636 | UINT32 NodeSize;\r | |
1637 | UINT32 CertDbListSize;\r | |
1638 | \r | |
1639 | if ((VariableName == NULL) || (VendorGuid == NULL) || (Data == NULL)) {\r | |
1640 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r | |
1641 | }\r | |
1642 | \r | |
1643 | //\r | |
1644 | // Check whether DataSize matches recorded CertDbListSize.\r | |
1645 | //\r | |
1646 | if (DataSize < sizeof (UINT32)) {\r | |
1647 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r | |
1648 | }\r | |
1649 | \r | |
1650 | CertDbListSize = ReadUnaligned32 ((UINT32 *) Data);\r | |
1651 | \r | |
1652 | if (CertDbListSize != (UINT32) DataSize) {\r | |
1653 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r | |
1654 | }\r | |
1655 | \r | |
1656 | Offset = sizeof (UINT32);\r | |
1657 | \r | |
1658 | //\r | |
1659 | // Get corresponding certificates by VendorGuid and VariableName.\r | |
1660 | //\r | |
1661 | while (Offset < (UINT32) DataSize) {\r | |
1662 | Ptr = (AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA *) (Data + Offset);\r | |
1663 | //\r | |
1664 | // Check whether VendorGuid matches.\r | |
1665 | //\r | |
1666 | if (CompareGuid (&Ptr->VendorGuid, VendorGuid)) {\r | |
1667 | NodeSize = ReadUnaligned32 (&Ptr->CertNodeSize);\r | |
1668 | NameSize = ReadUnaligned32 (&Ptr->NameSize);\r | |
1669 | CertSize = ReadUnaligned32 (&Ptr->CertDataSize);\r | |
1670 | \r | |
1671 | if (NodeSize != sizeof (EFI_GUID) + sizeof (UINT32) * 3 + CertSize +\r | |
1672 | sizeof (CHAR16) * NameSize) {\r | |
1673 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r | |
1674 | }\r | |
1675 | \r | |
1676 | Offset = Offset + sizeof (EFI_GUID) + sizeof (UINT32) * 3;\r | |
1677 | //\r | |
1678 | // Check whether VariableName matches.\r | |
1679 | //\r | |
1680 | if ((NameSize == StrLen (VariableName)) && \r | |
1681 | (CompareMem (Data + Offset, VariableName, NameSize * sizeof (CHAR16)) == 0)) {\r | |
1682 | Offset = Offset + NameSize * sizeof (CHAR16);\r | |
1683 | \r | |
1684 | if (CertOffset != NULL) {\r | |
1685 | *CertOffset = Offset;\r | |
1686 | }\r | |
1687 | \r | |
1688 | if (CertDataSize != NULL) {\r | |
1689 | *CertDataSize = CertSize; \r | |
1690 | }\r | |
1691 | \r | |
1692 | if (CertNodeOffset != NULL) {\r | |
1693 | *CertNodeOffset = (UINT32) ((UINT8 *) Ptr - Data);\r | |
1694 | }\r | |
1695 | \r | |
1696 | if (CertNodeSize != NULL) {\r | |
1697 | *CertNodeSize = NodeSize;\r | |
1698 | }\r | |
1699 | \r | |
1700 | return EFI_SUCCESS;\r | |
1701 | } else {\r | |
1702 | Offset = Offset + NameSize * sizeof (CHAR16) + CertSize;\r | |
1703 | }\r | |
1704 | } else {\r | |
1705 | NodeSize = ReadUnaligned32 (&Ptr->CertNodeSize);\r | |
1706 | Offset = Offset + NodeSize;\r | |
1707 | }\r | |
1708 | }\r | |
1709 | \r | |
1710 | return EFI_NOT_FOUND; \r | |
1711 | }\r | |
1712 | \r | |
1713 | /**\r | |
1714 | Retrieve signer's certificates for common authenticated variable\r | |
1715 | by corresponding VariableName and VendorGuid from "certdb".\r | |
1716 | \r | |
1717 | @param[in] VariableName Name of authenticated Variable.\r | |
1718 | @param[in] VendorGuid Vendor GUID of authenticated Variable.\r | |
1719 | @param[out] CertData Pointer to signer's certificates.\r | |
1720 | @param[out] CertDataSize Length of CertData in bytes.\r | |
1721 | \r | |
1722 | @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Any input parameter is invalid.\r | |
1723 | @retval EFI_NOT_FOUND Fail to find "certdb" or matching certs.\r | |
1724 | @retval EFI_SUCCESS Get signer's certificates successfully.\r | |
1725 | \r | |
1726 | **/\r | |
1727 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
1728 | GetCertsFromDb (\r | |
1729 | IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r | |
1730 | IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r | |
1731 | OUT UINT8 **CertData,\r | |
1732 | OUT UINT32 *CertDataSize\r | |
1733 | )\r | |
1734 | {\r | |
1735 | VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK CertDbVariable;\r | |
1736 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r | |
1737 | UINT8 *Data;\r | |
1738 | UINTN DataSize;\r | |
1739 | UINT32 CertOffset;\r | |
1740 | \r | |
1741 | if ((VariableName == NULL) || (VendorGuid == NULL) || (CertData == NULL) || (CertDataSize == NULL)) {\r | |
1742 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r | |
1743 | }\r | |
1744 | \r | |
1745 | //\r | |
1746 | // Get variable "certdb".\r | |
1747 | //\r | |
1748 | Status = FindVariable (\r | |
1749 | EFI_CERT_DB_NAME,\r | |
1750 | &gEfiCertDbGuid,\r | |
1751 | &CertDbVariable,\r | |
1752 | &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,\r | |
1753 | FALSE\r | |
1754 | ); \r | |
1755 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
1756 | return Status;\r | |
1757 | }\r | |
1758 | \r | |
1759 | DataSize = DataSizeOfVariable (CertDbVariable.CurrPtr);\r | |
1760 | Data = GetVariableDataPtr (CertDbVariable.CurrPtr);\r | |
1761 | if ((DataSize == 0) || (Data == NULL)) {\r | |
1762 | ASSERT (FALSE);\r | |
1763 | return EFI_NOT_FOUND;\r | |
1764 | }\r | |
1765 | \r | |
1766 | Status = FindCertsFromDb (\r | |
1767 | VariableName,\r | |
1768 | VendorGuid,\r | |
1769 | Data,\r | |
1770 | DataSize,\r | |
1771 | &CertOffset,\r | |
1772 | CertDataSize,\r | |
1773 | NULL,\r | |
1774 | NULL\r | |
1775 | );\r | |
1776 | \r | |
1777 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
1778 | return Status;\r | |
1779 | }\r | |
1780 | \r | |
1781 | *CertData = Data + CertOffset;\r | |
1782 | return EFI_SUCCESS;\r | |
1783 | }\r | |
1784 | \r | |
1785 | /**\r | |
1786 | Delete matching signer's certificates when deleting common authenticated\r | |
1787 | variable by corresponding VariableName and VendorGuid from "certdb".\r | |
1788 | \r | |
1789 | @param[in] VariableName Name of authenticated Variable.\r | |
1790 | @param[in] VendorGuid Vendor GUID of authenticated Variable.\r | |
1791 | \r | |
1792 | @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Any input parameter is invalid.\r | |
1793 | @retval EFI_NOT_FOUND Fail to find "certdb" or matching certs.\r | |
1794 | @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES The operation is failed due to lack of resources.\r | |
1795 | @retval EFI_SUCCESS The operation is completed successfully.\r | |
1796 | \r | |
1797 | **/\r | |
1798 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
1799 | DeleteCertsFromDb (\r | |
1800 | IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r | |
1801 | IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid\r | |
1802 | )\r | |
1803 | {\r | |
1804 | VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK CertDbVariable;\r | |
1805 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r | |
1806 | UINT8 *Data;\r | |
1807 | UINTN DataSize;\r | |
1808 | UINT32 VarAttr;\r | |
1809 | UINT32 CertNodeOffset;\r | |
1810 | UINT32 CertNodeSize;\r | |
1811 | UINT8 *NewCertDb;\r | |
1812 | UINT32 NewCertDbSize;\r | |
1813 | \r | |
1814 | if ((VariableName == NULL) || (VendorGuid == NULL)) {\r | |
1815 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r | |
1816 | }\r | |
1817 | \r | |
1818 | //\r | |
1819 | // Get variable "certdb".\r | |
1820 | //\r | |
1821 | Status = FindVariable (\r | |
1822 | EFI_CERT_DB_NAME,\r | |
1823 | &gEfiCertDbGuid,\r | |
1824 | &CertDbVariable,\r | |
1825 | &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,\r | |
1826 | FALSE\r | |
1827 | ); \r | |
1828 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
1829 | return Status;\r | |
1830 | }\r | |
1831 | \r | |
1832 | DataSize = DataSizeOfVariable (CertDbVariable.CurrPtr);\r | |
1833 | Data = GetVariableDataPtr (CertDbVariable.CurrPtr);\r | |
1834 | if ((DataSize == 0) || (Data == NULL)) {\r | |
1835 | ASSERT (FALSE);\r | |
1836 | return EFI_NOT_FOUND;\r | |
1837 | }\r | |
1838 | \r | |
1839 | if (DataSize == sizeof (UINT32)) {\r | |
1840 | //\r | |
1841 | // There is no certs in certdb.\r | |
1842 | //\r | |
1843 | return EFI_SUCCESS;\r | |
1844 | }\r | |
1845 | \r | |
1846 | //\r | |
1847 | // Get corresponding cert node from certdb.\r | |
1848 | //\r | |
1849 | Status = FindCertsFromDb (\r | |
1850 | VariableName,\r | |
1851 | VendorGuid,\r | |
1852 | Data,\r | |
1853 | DataSize,\r | |
1854 | NULL,\r | |
1855 | NULL,\r | |
1856 | &CertNodeOffset,\r | |
1857 | &CertNodeSize\r | |
1858 | );\r | |
1859 | \r | |
1860 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
1861 | return Status;\r | |
1862 | }\r | |
1863 | \r | |
1864 | if (DataSize < (CertNodeOffset + CertNodeSize)) {\r | |
1865 | return EFI_NOT_FOUND;\r | |
1866 | }\r | |
1867 | \r | |
1868 | //\r | |
1869 | // Construct new data content of variable "certdb".\r | |
1870 | //\r | |
1871 | NewCertDbSize = (UINT32) DataSize - CertNodeSize;\r | |
f6e23353 | 1872 | NewCertDb = (UINT8*) mCertDbStore;\r |
ed47ae02 | 1873 | \r |
1874 | //\r | |
1875 | // Copy the DB entries before deleting node.\r | |
1876 | //\r | |
1877 | CopyMem (NewCertDb, Data, CertNodeOffset);\r | |
1878 | //\r | |
1879 | // Update CertDbListSize.\r | |
1880 | //\r | |
1881 | CopyMem (NewCertDb, &NewCertDbSize, sizeof (UINT32));\r | |
1882 | //\r | |
1883 | // Copy the DB entries after deleting node.\r | |
1884 | //\r | |
1885 | if (DataSize > (CertNodeOffset + CertNodeSize)) {\r | |
1886 | CopyMem (\r | |
1887 | NewCertDb + CertNodeOffset,\r | |
1888 | Data + CertNodeOffset + CertNodeSize,\r | |
1889 | DataSize - CertNodeOffset - CertNodeSize\r | |
1890 | );\r | |
1891 | }\r | |
1892 | \r | |
1893 | //\r | |
1894 | // Set "certdb".\r | |
1895 | // \r | |
1896 | VarAttr = EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS; \r | |
1897 | Status = UpdateVariable (\r | |
1898 | EFI_CERT_DB_NAME,\r | |
1899 | &gEfiCertDbGuid,\r | |
1900 | NewCertDb,\r | |
1901 | NewCertDbSize,\r | |
1902 | VarAttr,\r | |
1903 | 0,\r | |
1904 | 0,\r | |
1905 | &CertDbVariable,\r | |
1906 | NULL\r | |
1907 | );\r | |
1908 | \r | |
ed47ae02 | 1909 | return Status;\r |
1910 | }\r | |
1911 | \r | |
1912 | /**\r | |
1913 | Insert signer's certificates for common authenticated variable with VariableName\r | |
1914 | and VendorGuid in AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA to "certdb".\r | |
1915 | \r | |
1916 | @param[in] VariableName Name of authenticated Variable.\r | |
1917 | @param[in] VendorGuid Vendor GUID of authenticated Variable.\r | |
1918 | @param[in] CertData Pointer to signer's certificates.\r | |
1919 | @param[in] CertDataSize Length of CertData in bytes.\r | |
1920 | \r | |
1921 | @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Any input parameter is invalid.\r | |
1922 | @retval EFI_ACCESS_DENIED An AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA entry with same VariableName\r | |
1923 | and VendorGuid already exists.\r | |
1924 | @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES The operation is failed due to lack of resources.\r | |
1925 | @retval EFI_SUCCESS Insert an AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA entry to "certdb"\r | |
1926 | \r | |
1927 | **/\r | |
1928 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
1929 | InsertCertsToDb (\r | |
1930 | IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r | |
1931 | IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r | |
1932 | IN UINT8 *CertData,\r | |
1933 | IN UINTN CertDataSize\r | |
1934 | )\r | |
1935 | {\r | |
1936 | VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK CertDbVariable;\r | |
1937 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r | |
1938 | UINT8 *Data;\r | |
1939 | UINTN DataSize;\r | |
1940 | UINT32 VarAttr;\r | |
1941 | UINT8 *NewCertDb;\r | |
1942 | UINT32 NewCertDbSize;\r | |
1943 | UINT32 CertNodeSize;\r | |
1944 | UINT32 NameSize;\r | |
1945 | AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA *Ptr;\r | |
1946 | \r | |
1947 | if ((VariableName == NULL) || (VendorGuid == NULL) || (CertData == NULL)) {\r | |
1948 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r | |
1949 | }\r | |
1950 | \r | |
1951 | //\r | |
1952 | // Get variable "certdb".\r | |
1953 | //\r | |
1954 | Status = FindVariable (\r | |
1955 | EFI_CERT_DB_NAME,\r | |
1956 | &gEfiCertDbGuid,\r | |
1957 | &CertDbVariable,\r | |
1958 | &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,\r | |
1959 | FALSE\r | |
1960 | ); \r | |
1961 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
1962 | return Status;\r | |
1963 | }\r | |
1964 | \r | |
1965 | DataSize = DataSizeOfVariable (CertDbVariable.CurrPtr);\r | |
1966 | Data = GetVariableDataPtr (CertDbVariable.CurrPtr);\r | |
1967 | if ((DataSize == 0) || (Data == NULL)) {\r | |
1968 | ASSERT (FALSE);\r | |
1969 | return EFI_NOT_FOUND;\r | |
1970 | }\r | |
1971 | \r | |
1972 | //\r | |
1973 | // Find whether matching cert node already exists in "certdb".\r | |
1974 | // If yes return error.\r | |
1975 | //\r | |
1976 | Status = FindCertsFromDb (\r | |
1977 | VariableName,\r | |
1978 | VendorGuid,\r | |
1979 | Data,\r | |
1980 | DataSize,\r | |
1981 | NULL,\r | |
1982 | NULL,\r | |
1983 | NULL,\r | |
1984 | NULL\r | |
1985 | );\r | |
1986 | \r | |
1987 | if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
1988 | ASSERT (FALSE);\r | |
1989 | return EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;\r | |
1990 | }\r | |
1991 | \r | |
1992 | //\r | |
1993 | // Construct new data content of variable "certdb".\r | |
1994 | //\r | |
1995 | NameSize = (UINT32) StrLen (VariableName);\r | |
1996 | CertNodeSize = sizeof (AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA) + (UINT32) CertDataSize + NameSize * sizeof (CHAR16); \r | |
f6e23353 | 1997 | NewCertDbSize = (UINT32) DataSize + CertNodeSize;\r |
1998 | if (NewCertDbSize > MAX_CERTDB_SIZE) {\r | |
ed47ae02 | 1999 | return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r |
2000 | }\r | |
f6e23353 | 2001 | NewCertDb = (UINT8*) mCertDbStore;\r |
ed47ae02 | 2002 | \r |
2003 | //\r | |
2004 | // Copy the DB entries before deleting node.\r | |
2005 | //\r | |
2006 | CopyMem (NewCertDb, Data, DataSize);\r | |
2007 | //\r | |
2008 | // Update CertDbListSize.\r | |
2009 | //\r | |
2010 | CopyMem (NewCertDb, &NewCertDbSize, sizeof (UINT32));\r | |
2011 | //\r | |
2012 | // Construct new cert node.\r | |
2013 | //\r | |
2014 | Ptr = (AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA *) (NewCertDb + DataSize);\r | |
2015 | CopyGuid (&Ptr->VendorGuid, VendorGuid);\r | |
2016 | CopyMem (&Ptr->CertNodeSize, &CertNodeSize, sizeof (UINT32));\r | |
2017 | CopyMem (&Ptr->NameSize, &NameSize, sizeof (UINT32));\r | |
2018 | CopyMem (&Ptr->CertDataSize, &CertDataSize, sizeof (UINT32));\r | |
2019 | \r | |
2020 | CopyMem (\r | |
2021 | (UINT8 *) Ptr + sizeof (AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA),\r | |
2022 | VariableName,\r | |
2023 | NameSize * sizeof (CHAR16)\r | |
2024 | );\r | |
2025 | \r | |
2026 | CopyMem (\r | |
2027 | (UINT8 *) Ptr + sizeof (AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA) + NameSize * sizeof (CHAR16),\r | |
2028 | CertData,\r | |
2029 | CertDataSize\r | |
2030 | );\r | |
2031 | \r | |
2032 | //\r | |
2033 | // Set "certdb".\r | |
2034 | // \r | |
2035 | VarAttr = EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS; \r | |
2036 | Status = UpdateVariable (\r | |
2037 | EFI_CERT_DB_NAME,\r | |
2038 | &gEfiCertDbGuid,\r | |
2039 | NewCertDb,\r | |
2040 | NewCertDbSize,\r | |
2041 | VarAttr,\r | |
2042 | 0,\r | |
2043 | 0,\r | |
2044 | &CertDbVariable,\r | |
2045 | NULL\r | |
2046 | );\r | |
2047 | \r | |
ed47ae02 | 2048 | return Status;\r |
2049 | }\r | |
2050 | \r | |
0c18794e | 2051 | /**\r |
2052 | Process variable with EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS set\r | |
2053 | \r | |
dc204d5a JY |
2054 | Caution: This function may receive untrusted input.\r |
2055 | This function may be invoked in SMM mode, and datasize and data are external input.\r | |
2056 | This function will do basic validation, before parse the data.\r | |
2057 | This function will parse the authentication carefully to avoid security issues, like\r | |
2058 | buffer overflow, integer overflow.\r | |
2059 | \r | |
0c18794e | 2060 | @param[in] VariableName Name of Variable to be found.\r |
2061 | @param[in] VendorGuid Variable vendor GUID.\r | |
2062 | @param[in] Data Data pointer.\r | |
2063 | @param[in] DataSize Size of Data found. If size is less than the\r | |
2064 | data, this value contains the required size.\r | |
2065 | @param[in] Variable The variable information which is used to keep track of variable usage.\r | |
2066 | @param[in] Attributes Attribute value of the variable.\r | |
785d84ea | 2067 | @param[in] AuthVarType Verify against PK, KEK database, private database or certificate in data payload.\r |
0c18794e | 2068 | @param[out] VarDel Delete the variable or not.\r |
2069 | \r | |
2070 | @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.\r | |
2d3fb919 | 2071 | @retval EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION The variable does NOT pass the validation\r |
2072 | check carried out by the firmware.\r | |
0c18794e | 2073 | @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES Failed to process variable due to lack\r |
2074 | of resources.\r | |
2075 | @retval EFI_SUCCESS Variable pass validation successfully.\r | |
2076 | \r | |
2077 | **/\r | |
2078 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
2079 | VerifyTimeBasedPayload (\r | |
2080 | IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r | |
2081 | IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r | |
2082 | IN VOID *Data,\r | |
2083 | IN UINTN DataSize,\r | |
2084 | IN VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK *Variable,\r | |
2085 | IN UINT32 Attributes,\r | |
ed47ae02 | 2086 | IN AUTHVAR_TYPE AuthVarType,\r |
0c18794e | 2087 | OUT BOOLEAN *VarDel\r |
2088 | )\r | |
2089 | {\r | |
2090 | UINT8 *RootCert;\r | |
2091 | UINT8 *SigData;\r | |
2d3fb919 | 2092 | UINT8 *PayloadPtr;\r |
0c18794e | 2093 | UINTN RootCertSize;\r |
2094 | UINTN Index;\r | |
2d3fb919 | 2095 | UINTN CertCount;\r |
2096 | UINTN PayloadSize;\r | |
0c18794e | 2097 | UINT32 Attr;\r |
2098 | UINT32 SigDataSize;\r | |
2099 | UINT32 KekDataSize;\r | |
0c18794e | 2100 | BOOLEAN VerifyStatus;\r |
2101 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r | |
2102 | EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *CertList;\r | |
2103 | EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *Cert;\r | |
2104 | VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK KekVariable;\r | |
2105 | EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 *CertData;\r | |
2106 | UINT8 *NewData;\r | |
2107 | UINTN NewDataSize;\r | |
2108 | VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK PkVariable;\r | |
2d3fb919 | 2109 | UINT8 *Buffer;\r |
2110 | UINTN Length;\r | |
ed47ae02 | 2111 | UINT8 *SignerCerts;\r |
2112 | UINT8 *WrapSigData;\r | |
2113 | UINTN CertStackSize;\r | |
2114 | UINT8 *CertsInCertDb;\r | |
2115 | UINT32 CertsSizeinDb;\r | |
0c18794e | 2116 | \r |
0c18794e | 2117 | VerifyStatus = FALSE;\r |
2118 | CertData = NULL;\r | |
2119 | NewData = NULL;\r | |
2120 | Attr = Attributes;\r | |
ed47ae02 | 2121 | WrapSigData = NULL;\r |
2122 | SignerCerts = NULL;\r | |
2123 | RootCert = NULL;\r | |
0c18794e | 2124 | \r |
2125 | //\r | |
2d3fb919 | 2126 | // When the attribute EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS is\r |
0c18794e | 2127 | // set, then the Data buffer shall begin with an instance of a complete (and serialized)\r |
2d3fb919 | 2128 | // EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 descriptor. The descriptor shall be followed by the new\r |
2129 | // variable value and DataSize shall reflect the combined size of the descriptor and the new\r | |
2130 | // variable value. The authentication descriptor is not part of the variable data and is not\r | |
0c18794e | 2131 | // returned by subsequent calls to GetVariable().\r |
2132 | //\r | |
2133 | CertData = (EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 *) Data;\r | |
2d3fb919 | 2134 | \r |
2135 | //\r | |
2136 | // Verify that Pad1, Nanosecond, TimeZone, Daylight and Pad2 components of the\r | |
2137 | // TimeStamp value are set to zero.\r | |
2138 | //\r | |
2139 | if ((CertData->TimeStamp.Pad1 != 0) ||\r | |
2140 | (CertData->TimeStamp.Nanosecond != 0) ||\r | |
2141 | (CertData->TimeStamp.TimeZone != 0) ||\r | |
2142 | (CertData->TimeStamp.Daylight != 0) ||\r | |
2143 | (CertData->TimeStamp.Pad2 != 0)) {\r | |
2e24814a | 2144 | return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r |
2d3fb919 | 2145 | }\r |
2146 | \r | |
0c18794e | 2147 | if ((Variable->CurrPtr != NULL) && ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_APPEND_WRITE) == 0)) {\r |
2148 | if (CompareTimeStamp (&CertData->TimeStamp, &Variable->CurrPtr->TimeStamp)) {\r | |
2149 | //\r | |
2150 | // TimeStamp check fail, suspicious replay attack, return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION.\r | |
2151 | //\r | |
2152 | return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r | |
2153 | }\r | |
2154 | }\r | |
2155 | \r | |
2156 | //\r | |
2157 | // wCertificateType should be WIN_CERT_TYPE_EFI_GUID.\r | |
2158 | // Cert type should be EFI_CERT_TYPE_PKCS7_GUID.\r | |
2159 | //\r | |
2160 | if ((CertData->AuthInfo.Hdr.wCertificateType != WIN_CERT_TYPE_EFI_GUID) ||\r | |
2d3fb919 | 2161 | !CompareGuid (&CertData->AuthInfo.CertType, &gEfiCertPkcs7Guid)) {\r |
0c18794e | 2162 | //\r |
2163 | // Invalid AuthInfo type, return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION.\r | |
2164 | //\r | |
2165 | return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r | |
2166 | }\r | |
2d3fb919 | 2167 | \r |
0c18794e | 2168 | //\r |
2169 | // Find out Pkcs7 SignedData which follows the EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 descriptor.\r | |
2170 | // AuthInfo.Hdr.dwLength is the length of the entire certificate, including the length of the header.\r | |
2171 | //\r | |
2d3fb919 | 2172 | SigData = CertData->AuthInfo.CertData;\r |
2173 | SigDataSize = CertData->AuthInfo.Hdr.dwLength - (UINT32) (OFFSET_OF (WIN_CERTIFICATE_UEFI_GUID, CertData));\r | |
648f98d1 | 2174 | \r |
0c18794e | 2175 | //\r |
2176 | // Find out the new data payload which follows Pkcs7 SignedData directly.\r | |
2177 | //\r | |
2d3fb919 | 2178 | PayloadPtr = SigData + SigDataSize;\r |
2179 | PayloadSize = DataSize - OFFSET_OF_AUTHINFO2_CERT_DATA - (UINTN) SigDataSize;\r | |
0c18794e | 2180 | \r |
2181 | //\r | |
2182 | // Construct a buffer to fill with (VariableName, VendorGuid, Attributes, TimeStamp, Data).\r | |
2183 | //\r | |
2d3fb919 | 2184 | NewDataSize = PayloadSize + sizeof (EFI_TIME) + sizeof (UINT32) +\r |
2185 | sizeof (EFI_GUID) + StrSize (VariableName) - sizeof (CHAR16);\r | |
2186 | NewData = mSerializationRuntimeBuffer;\r | |
0c18794e | 2187 | \r |
2d3fb919 | 2188 | Buffer = NewData;\r |
2189 | Length = StrLen (VariableName) * sizeof (CHAR16);\r | |
2190 | CopyMem (Buffer, VariableName, Length);\r | |
2191 | Buffer += Length;\r | |
0c18794e | 2192 | \r |
2d3fb919 | 2193 | Length = sizeof (EFI_GUID);\r |
2194 | CopyMem (Buffer, VendorGuid, Length);\r | |
2195 | Buffer += Length;\r | |
0c18794e | 2196 | \r |
2d3fb919 | 2197 | Length = sizeof (UINT32);\r |
2198 | CopyMem (Buffer, &Attr, Length);\r | |
2199 | Buffer += Length;\r | |
0c18794e | 2200 | \r |
2d3fb919 | 2201 | Length = sizeof (EFI_TIME);\r |
2202 | CopyMem (Buffer, &CertData->TimeStamp, Length);\r | |
2203 | Buffer += Length;\r | |
0c18794e | 2204 | \r |
2d3fb919 | 2205 | CopyMem (Buffer, PayloadPtr, PayloadSize);\r |
0c18794e | 2206 | \r |
ed47ae02 | 2207 | if (AuthVarType == AuthVarTypePk) {\r |
0c18794e | 2208 | //\r |
74b5fd7a FS |
2209 | // Verify that the signature has been made with the current Platform Key (no chaining for PK).\r |
2210 | // First, get signer's certificates from SignedData.\r | |
2211 | //\r | |
2212 | VerifyStatus = Pkcs7GetSigners (\r | |
2213 | SigData,\r | |
2214 | SigDataSize,\r | |
2215 | &SignerCerts,\r | |
2216 | &CertStackSize,\r | |
2217 | &RootCert,\r | |
2218 | &RootCertSize\r | |
2219 | );\r | |
2220 | if (!VerifyStatus) {\r | |
2221 | goto Exit;\r | |
2222 | }\r | |
2223 | \r | |
2224 | //\r | |
2225 | // Second, get the current platform key from variable. Check whether it's identical with signer's certificates\r | |
2226 | // in SignedData. If not, return error immediately.\r | |
0c18794e | 2227 | //\r |
2228 | Status = FindVariable (\r | |
2d3fb919 | 2229 | EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME,\r |
2230 | &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r | |
2231 | &PkVariable,\r | |
ecc722ad | 2232 | &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,\r |
2233 | FALSE\r | |
0c18794e | 2234 | );\r |
2235 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
74b5fd7a FS |
2236 | VerifyStatus = FALSE;\r |
2237 | goto Exit;\r | |
0c18794e | 2238 | }\r |
0c18794e | 2239 | CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) GetVariableDataPtr (PkVariable.CurrPtr);\r |
2240 | Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r | |
74b5fd7a FS |
2241 | if ((RootCertSize != (CertList->SignatureSize - (sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1))) ||\r |
2242 | (CompareMem (Cert->SignatureData, RootCert, RootCertSize) != 0)) {\r | |
2243 | VerifyStatus = FALSE;\r | |
2244 | goto Exit;\r | |
2245 | }\r | |
0c18794e | 2246 | \r |
2247 | //\r | |
2248 | // Verify Pkcs7 SignedData via Pkcs7Verify library.\r | |
2249 | //\r | |
2250 | VerifyStatus = Pkcs7Verify (\r | |
2251 | SigData,\r | |
2252 | SigDataSize,\r | |
2253 | RootCert,\r | |
2254 | RootCertSize,\r | |
2255 | NewData,\r | |
2256 | NewDataSize\r | |
2257 | );\r | |
2258 | \r | |
ed47ae02 | 2259 | } else if (AuthVarType == AuthVarTypeKek) {\r |
2d3fb919 | 2260 | \r |
0c18794e | 2261 | //\r |
2262 | // Get KEK database from variable.\r | |
2263 | //\r | |
2264 | Status = FindVariable (\r | |
2d3fb919 | 2265 | EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME,\r |
2266 | &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r | |
2267 | &KekVariable,\r | |
ecc722ad | 2268 | &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,\r |
2269 | FALSE\r | |
0c18794e | 2270 | );\r |
2271 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
2272 | return Status;\r | |
2273 | }\r | |
2274 | \r | |
2275 | //\r | |
2276 | // Ready to verify Pkcs7 SignedData. Go through KEK Signature Database to find out X.509 CertList.\r | |
2d3fb919 | 2277 | //\r |
0c18794e | 2278 | KekDataSize = KekVariable.CurrPtr->DataSize;\r |
2279 | CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) GetVariableDataPtr (KekVariable.CurrPtr);\r | |
2280 | while ((KekDataSize > 0) && (KekDataSize >= CertList->SignatureListSize)) {\r | |
2281 | if (CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Guid)) {\r | |
2282 | Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r | |
2283 | CertCount = (CertList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - CertList->SignatureHeaderSize) / CertList->SignatureSize;\r | |
2284 | for (Index = 0; Index < CertCount; Index++) {\r | |
2285 | //\r | |
2286 | // Iterate each Signature Data Node within this CertList for a verify\r | |
2287 | //\r | |
2288 | RootCert = Cert->SignatureData;\r | |
4e33001c | 2289 | RootCertSize = CertList->SignatureSize - (sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1);\r |
2d3fb919 | 2290 | \r |
0c18794e | 2291 | //\r |
2292 | // Verify Pkcs7 SignedData via Pkcs7Verify library.\r | |
2293 | //\r | |
2294 | VerifyStatus = Pkcs7Verify (\r | |
2295 | SigData,\r | |
2296 | SigDataSize,\r | |
2297 | RootCert,\r | |
2298 | RootCertSize,\r | |
2299 | NewData,\r | |
2300 | NewDataSize\r | |
2301 | );\r | |
2302 | if (VerifyStatus) {\r | |
2303 | goto Exit;\r | |
2304 | }\r | |
2305 | Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) Cert + CertList->SignatureSize);\r | |
2306 | }\r | |
2307 | }\r | |
2308 | KekDataSize -= CertList->SignatureListSize;\r | |
2309 | CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + CertList->SignatureListSize);\r | |
2310 | }\r | |
ed47ae02 | 2311 | } else if (AuthVarType == AuthVarTypePriv) {\r |
2312 | \r | |
2313 | //\r | |
2314 | // Process common authenticated variable except PK/KEK/DB/DBX.\r | |
2315 | // Get signer's certificates from SignedData.\r | |
2316 | //\r | |
2317 | VerifyStatus = Pkcs7GetSigners (\r | |
2318 | SigData,\r | |
2319 | SigDataSize,\r | |
2320 | &SignerCerts,\r | |
2321 | &CertStackSize,\r | |
2322 | &RootCert,\r | |
2323 | &RootCertSize\r | |
2324 | );\r | |
2325 | if (!VerifyStatus) {\r | |
2326 | goto Exit;\r | |
2327 | }\r | |
2328 | \r | |
2329 | //\r | |
2330 | // Get previously stored signer's certificates from certdb for existing\r | |
2331 | // variable. Check whether they are identical with signer's certificates\r | |
2332 | // in SignedData. If not, return error immediately.\r | |
2333 | //\r | |
2334 | if ((Variable->CurrPtr != NULL)) {\r | |
2335 | VerifyStatus = FALSE;\r | |
2336 | \r | |
2337 | Status = GetCertsFromDb (VariableName, VendorGuid, &CertsInCertDb, &CertsSizeinDb);\r | |
2338 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
2339 | goto Exit;\r | |
2340 | }\r | |
2341 | \r | |
2342 | if ((CertStackSize != CertsSizeinDb) ||\r | |
2343 | (CompareMem (SignerCerts, CertsInCertDb, CertsSizeinDb) != 0)) {\r | |
2344 | goto Exit;\r | |
2345 | }\r | |
2346 | }\r | |
2347 | \r | |
2348 | VerifyStatus = Pkcs7Verify (\r | |
2349 | SigData,\r | |
2350 | SigDataSize,\r | |
2351 | RootCert,\r | |
2352 | RootCertSize,\r | |
2353 | NewData,\r | |
2354 | NewDataSize\r | |
2355 | );\r | |
2356 | if (!VerifyStatus) {\r | |
2357 | goto Exit;\r | |
2358 | }\r | |
2359 | \r | |
2360 | //\r | |
2361 | // Delete signer's certificates when delete the common authenticated variable.\r | |
2362 | //\r | |
275beb2b | 2363 | if ((PayloadSize == 0) && (Variable->CurrPtr != NULL) && ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_APPEND_WRITE) == 0)) {\r |
ed47ae02 | 2364 | Status = DeleteCertsFromDb (VariableName, VendorGuid);\r |
2365 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
2366 | VerifyStatus = FALSE;\r | |
2367 | goto Exit;\r | |
2368 | }\r | |
275beb2b | 2369 | } else if (Variable->CurrPtr == NULL && PayloadSize != 0) {\r |
ed47ae02 | 2370 | //\r |
2371 | // Insert signer's certificates when adding a new common authenticated variable.\r | |
2372 | //\r | |
2373 | Status = InsertCertsToDb (VariableName, VendorGuid, SignerCerts, CertStackSize);\r | |
2374 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
2375 | VerifyStatus = FALSE;\r | |
2376 | goto Exit;\r | |
2377 | }\r | |
2378 | }\r | |
785d84ea | 2379 | } else if (AuthVarType == AuthVarTypePayload) {\r |
2380 | CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) PayloadPtr;\r | |
2381 | Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r | |
2382 | RootCert = Cert->SignatureData;\r | |
2383 | RootCertSize = CertList->SignatureSize - (sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1);\r | |
2384 | \r | |
2385 | // Verify Pkcs7 SignedData via Pkcs7Verify library.\r | |
2386 | //\r | |
2387 | VerifyStatus = Pkcs7Verify (\r | |
2388 | SigData,\r | |
2389 | SigDataSize,\r | |
2390 | RootCert,\r | |
2391 | RootCertSize,\r | |
2392 | NewData,\r | |
2393 | NewDataSize\r | |
2394 | );\r | |
ed47ae02 | 2395 | } else {\r |
2396 | return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r | |
0c18794e | 2397 | }\r |
2398 | \r | |
2399 | Exit:\r | |
2400 | \r | |
74b5fd7a | 2401 | if (AuthVarType == AuthVarTypePk || AuthVarType == AuthVarTypePriv) {\r |
ed47ae02 | 2402 | Pkcs7FreeSigners (RootCert);\r |
2403 | Pkcs7FreeSigners (SignerCerts);\r | |
2404 | }\r | |
2405 | \r | |
0c18794e | 2406 | if (!VerifyStatus) {\r |
2407 | return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r | |
2408 | }\r | |
2409 | \r | |
d912bad7 | 2410 | Status = CheckSignatureListFormat(VariableName, VendorGuid, PayloadPtr, PayloadSize);\r |
2411 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
2412 | return Status;\r | |
2413 | }\r | |
2414 | \r | |
2d3fb919 | 2415 | if ((PayloadSize == 0) && (VarDel != NULL)) {\r |
0c18794e | 2416 | *VarDel = TRUE;\r |
2417 | }\r | |
2d3fb919 | 2418 | \r |
0c18794e | 2419 | //\r |
2420 | // Final step: Update/Append Variable if it pass Pkcs7Verify\r | |
2421 | //\r | |
ed47ae02 | 2422 | return UpdateVariable (\r |
2423 | VariableName,\r | |
2424 | VendorGuid,\r | |
2425 | PayloadPtr,\r | |
2426 | PayloadSize,\r | |
2427 | Attributes,\r | |
2428 | 0,\r | |
2429 | 0,\r | |
2430 | Variable,\r | |
2431 | &CertData->TimeStamp\r | |
2432 | );\r | |
0c18794e | 2433 | }\r |
ed47ae02 | 2434 | \r |