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0c18794e | 1 | /** @file\r |
2 | Implement authentication services for the authenticated variable\r | |
3 | service in UEFI2.2.\r | |
4 | \r | |
5 | Copyright (c) 2009 - 2011, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>\r | |
2d3fb919 | 6 | This program and the accompanying materials\r |
7 | are licensed and made available under the terms and conditions of the BSD License\r | |
8 | which accompanies this distribution. The full text of the license may be found at\r | |
0c18794e | 9 | http://opensource.org/licenses/bsd-license.php\r |
10 | \r | |
2d3fb919 | 11 | THE PROGRAM IS DISTRIBUTED UNDER THE BSD LICENSE ON AN "AS IS" BASIS,\r |
0c18794e | 12 | WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR REPRESENTATIONS OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED.\r |
13 | \r | |
14 | **/\r | |
15 | \r | |
16 | #include "Variable.h"\r | |
17 | #include "AuthService.h"\r | |
18 | \r | |
19 | ///\r | |
20 | /// Global database array for scratch\r | |
2d3fb919 | 21 | ///\r |
0c18794e | 22 | UINT8 mPubKeyStore[MAX_KEYDB_SIZE];\r |
23 | UINT32 mPubKeyNumber;\r | |
24 | UINT32 mPlatformMode;\r | |
25 | EFI_GUID mSignatureSupport[SIGSUPPORT_NUM] = {EFI_CERT_RSA2048_SHA256_GUID, EFI_CERT_RSA2048_SHA1_GUID};\r | |
26 | //\r | |
27 | // Public Exponent of RSA Key.\r | |
28 | //\r | |
29 | CONST UINT8 mRsaE[] = { 0x01, 0x00, 0x01 };\r | |
30 | //\r | |
31 | // Hash context pointer\r | |
32 | //\r | |
33 | VOID *mHashCtx = NULL;\r | |
34 | \r | |
0c18794e | 35 | //\r |
2d3fb919 | 36 | // Pointer to runtime buffer.\r |
37 | // For "Append" operation to an existing variable, a read/modify/write operation\r | |
38 | // is supported by firmware internally. Reserve runtime buffer to cache previous\r | |
0c18794e | 39 | // variable data in runtime phase because memory allocation is forbidden in virtual mode.\r |
40 | //\r | |
41 | VOID *mStorageArea = NULL;\r | |
42 | \r | |
2d3fb919 | 43 | //\r |
44 | // The serialization of the values of the VariableName, VendorGuid and Attributes\r | |
45 | // parameters of the SetVariable() call and the TimeStamp component of the\r | |
46 | // EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 descriptor followed by the variable's new value\r | |
47 | // i.e. (VariableName, VendorGuid, Attributes, TimeStamp, Data)\r | |
48 | //\r | |
49 | UINT8 *mSerializationRuntimeBuffer = NULL;\r | |
50 | \r | |
0c18794e | 51 | /**\r |
2d3fb919 | 52 | Internal function to delete a Variable given its name and GUID, no authentication\r |
53 | required.\r | |
0c18794e | 54 | \r |
2d3fb919 | 55 | @param[in] VariableName Name of the Variable.\r |
56 | @param[in] VendorGuid GUID of the Variable.\r | |
0c18794e | 57 | \r |
2d3fb919 | 58 | @retval EFI_SUCCESS Variable deleted successfully.\r |
59 | @retval Others The driver failded to start the device.\r | |
0c18794e | 60 | \r |
61 | **/\r | |
62 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
2d3fb919 | 63 | DeleteVariable (\r |
64 | IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r | |
65 | IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid\r | |
66 | )\r | |
67 | {\r | |
68 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r | |
69 | VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK Variable;\r | |
70 | \r | |
71 | Status = FindVariable (VariableName, VendorGuid, &Variable, &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal);\r | |
72 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
73 | return EFI_SUCCESS;\r | |
74 | }\r | |
75 | \r | |
76 | ASSERT (Variable.CurrPtr != NULL);\r | |
77 | return UpdateVariable (VariableName, VendorGuid, NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, &Variable, NULL);\r | |
78 | }\r | |
0c18794e | 79 | \r |
80 | /**\r | |
81 | Initializes for authenticated varibale service.\r | |
82 | \r | |
83 | @retval EFI_SUCCESS Function successfully executed.\r | |
84 | @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES Fail to allocate enough memory resources.\r | |
85 | \r | |
86 | **/\r | |
87 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
88 | AutenticatedVariableServiceInitialize (\r | |
89 | VOID\r | |
90 | )\r | |
91 | {\r | |
92 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r | |
93 | VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK Variable;\r | |
7aaf2fd6 | 94 | VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK PkVariable;\r |
0c18794e | 95 | UINT8 VarValue;\r |
96 | UINT32 VarAttr;\r | |
97 | UINT8 *Data;\r | |
98 | UINTN DataSize;\r | |
99 | UINTN CtxSize;\r | |
beda2356 | 100 | UINT8 SecureBootMode;\r |
101 | UINT8 SecureBootEnable;\r | |
2d3fb919 | 102 | \r |
0c18794e | 103 | //\r |
104 | // Initialize hash context.\r | |
105 | //\r | |
106 | CtxSize = Sha256GetContextSize ();\r | |
107 | mHashCtx = AllocateRuntimePool (CtxSize);\r | |
108 | if (mHashCtx == NULL) {\r | |
109 | return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r | |
110 | }\r | |
111 | \r | |
112 | //\r | |
113 | // Reserved runtime buffer for "Append" operation in virtual mode.\r | |
114 | //\r | |
2d3fb919 | 115 | mStorageArea = AllocateRuntimePool (PcdGet32 (PcdMaxVariableSize));\r |
0c18794e | 116 | if (mStorageArea == NULL) {\r |
117 | return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r | |
118 | }\r | |
119 | \r | |
120 | //\r | |
2d3fb919 | 121 | // Prepare runtime buffer for serialized data of time-based authenticated\r |
122 | // Variable, i.e. (VariableName, VendorGuid, Attributes, TimeStamp, Data).\r | |
123 | //\r | |
124 | mSerializationRuntimeBuffer = AllocateRuntimePool (PcdGet32 (PcdMaxVariableSize) + sizeof (EFI_GUID) + sizeof (UINT32) + sizeof (EFI_TIME));\r | |
125 | if (mSerializationRuntimeBuffer == NULL) {\r | |
126 | return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r | |
127 | }\r | |
128 | \r | |
129 | //\r | |
130 | // Check "AuthVarKeyDatabase" variable's existence.\r | |
131 | // If it doesn't exist, create a new one with initial value of 0 and EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS set.\r | |
0c18794e | 132 | //\r |
133 | Status = FindVariable (\r | |
2d3fb919 | 134 | AUTHVAR_KEYDB_NAME,\r |
135 | &gEfiAuthenticatedVariableGuid,\r | |
136 | &Variable,\r | |
0c18794e | 137 | &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal\r |
138 | );\r | |
139 | \r | |
140 | if (Variable.CurrPtr == NULL) {\r | |
141 | VarAttr = EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS;\r | |
142 | VarValue = 0;\r | |
143 | mPubKeyNumber = 0;\r | |
144 | Status = UpdateVariable (\r | |
145 | AUTHVAR_KEYDB_NAME,\r | |
146 | &gEfiAuthenticatedVariableGuid,\r | |
147 | &VarValue,\r | |
148 | sizeof(UINT8),\r | |
149 | VarAttr,\r | |
150 | 0,\r | |
151 | 0,\r | |
152 | &Variable,\r | |
153 | NULL\r | |
154 | );\r | |
155 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
156 | return Status;\r | |
157 | }\r | |
158 | } else {\r | |
159 | //\r | |
160 | // Load database in global variable for cache.\r | |
161 | //\r | |
162 | DataSize = DataSizeOfVariable (Variable.CurrPtr);\r | |
163 | Data = GetVariableDataPtr (Variable.CurrPtr);\r | |
164 | ASSERT ((DataSize != 0) && (Data != NULL));\r | |
165 | CopyMem (mPubKeyStore, (UINT8 *) Data, DataSize);\r | |
166 | mPubKeyNumber = (UINT32) (DataSize / EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE);\r | |
167 | }\r | |
7aaf2fd6 | 168 | \r |
169 | FindVariable (EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, &PkVariable, &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal);\r | |
170 | if (PkVariable.CurrPtr == NULL) {\r | |
171 | DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Variable %s does not exist.\n", EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME));\r | |
172 | } else {\r | |
173 | DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Variable %s exists.\n", EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME));\r | |
174 | }\r | |
175 | \r | |
0c18794e | 176 | //\r |
2d3fb919 | 177 | // Check "SetupMode" variable's existence.\r |
0c18794e | 178 | // If it doesn't exist, check PK database's existence to determine the value.\r |
2d3fb919 | 179 | // Then create a new one with EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS set.\r |
0c18794e | 180 | //\r |
181 | Status = FindVariable (\r | |
2d3fb919 | 182 | EFI_SETUP_MODE_NAME,\r |
183 | &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r | |
184 | &Variable,\r | |
0c18794e | 185 | &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal\r |
186 | );\r | |
187 | \r | |
188 | if (Variable.CurrPtr == NULL) {\r | |
7aaf2fd6 | 189 | if (PkVariable.CurrPtr == NULL) {\r |
0c18794e | 190 | mPlatformMode = SETUP_MODE;\r |
191 | } else {\r | |
192 | mPlatformMode = USER_MODE;\r | |
193 | }\r | |
194 | \r | |
2d3fb919 | 195 | VarAttr = EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS;\r |
0c18794e | 196 | Status = UpdateVariable (\r |
197 | EFI_SETUP_MODE_NAME,\r | |
198 | &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r | |
199 | &mPlatformMode,\r | |
200 | sizeof(UINT8),\r | |
201 | VarAttr,\r | |
202 | 0,\r | |
203 | 0,\r | |
204 | &Variable,\r | |
205 | NULL\r | |
206 | );\r | |
207 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
208 | return Status;\r | |
209 | }\r | |
210 | } else {\r | |
211 | mPlatformMode = *(GetVariableDataPtr (Variable.CurrPtr));\r | |
212 | }\r | |
213 | //\r | |
2d3fb919 | 214 | // Check "SignatureSupport" variable's existence.\r |
215 | // If it doesn't exist, then create a new one with EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS set.\r | |
0c18794e | 216 | //\r |
217 | Status = FindVariable (\r | |
2d3fb919 | 218 | EFI_SIGNATURE_SUPPORT_NAME,\r |
219 | &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r | |
220 | &Variable,\r | |
0c18794e | 221 | &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal\r |
222 | );\r | |
223 | \r | |
224 | if (Variable.CurrPtr == NULL) {\r | |
225 | VarAttr = EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS;\r | |
226 | Status = UpdateVariable (\r | |
227 | EFI_SIGNATURE_SUPPORT_NAME,\r | |
228 | &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r | |
229 | mSignatureSupport,\r | |
230 | SIGSUPPORT_NUM * sizeof(EFI_GUID),\r | |
231 | VarAttr,\r | |
232 | 0,\r | |
233 | 0,\r | |
234 | &Variable,\r | |
235 | NULL\r | |
236 | );\r | |
237 | }\r | |
beda2356 | 238 | \r |
239 | //\r | |
240 | // If "SecureBootEnable" variable exists, then update "SecureBoot" variable.\r | |
2d3fb919 | 241 | // If "SecureBootEnable" variable is SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE and in USER_MODE, Set "SecureBoot" variable to SECURE_BOOT_MODE_ENABLE.\r |
beda2356 | 242 | // If "SecureBootEnable" variable is SECURE_BOOT_DISABLE, Set "SecureBoot" variable to SECURE_BOOT_MODE_DISABLE.\r |
243 | //\r | |
2d3fb919 | 244 | SecureBootEnable = SECURE_BOOT_MODE_DISABLE;\r |
beda2356 | 245 | FindVariable (EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME, &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid, &Variable, &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal);\r |
246 | if (Variable.CurrPtr != NULL) {\r | |
247 | SecureBootEnable = *(GetVariableDataPtr (Variable.CurrPtr));\r | |
2d3fb919 | 248 | } else if (mPlatformMode == USER_MODE) {\r |
249 | //\r | |
250 | // "SecureBootEnable" not exist, initialize it in USER_MODE.\r | |
251 | //\r | |
252 | SecureBootEnable = SECURE_BOOT_MODE_ENABLE;\r | |
beda2356 | 253 | Status = UpdateVariable (\r |
2d3fb919 | 254 | EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME,\r |
255 | &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid,\r | |
256 | &SecureBootEnable,\r | |
257 | sizeof (UINT8),\r | |
258 | EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS,\r | |
259 | 0,\r | |
260 | 0,\r | |
beda2356 | 261 | &Variable,\r |
262 | NULL\r | |
263 | );\r | |
264 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
265 | return Status;\r | |
266 | }\r | |
267 | }\r | |
268 | \r | |
2d3fb919 | 269 | if (SecureBootEnable == SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE && mPlatformMode == USER_MODE) {\r |
270 | SecureBootMode = SECURE_BOOT_MODE_ENABLE;\r | |
271 | } else {\r | |
272 | SecureBootMode = SECURE_BOOT_MODE_DISABLE;\r | |
273 | }\r | |
274 | FindVariable (EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, &Variable, &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal);\r | |
275 | Status = UpdateVariable (\r | |
276 | EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME,\r | |
277 | &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r | |
278 | &SecureBootMode,\r | |
279 | sizeof (UINT8),\r | |
280 | EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS,\r | |
281 | 0,\r | |
282 | 0,\r | |
283 | &Variable,\r | |
284 | NULL\r | |
285 | );\r | |
286 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
287 | return Status;\r | |
288 | }\r | |
289 | \r | |
7aaf2fd6 | 290 | DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Variable %s is %x\n", EFI_SETUP_MODE_NAME, mPlatformMode));\r |
291 | DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Variable %s is %x\n", EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME, SecureBootMode));\r | |
292 | DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Variable %s is %x\n", EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME, SecureBootEnable));\r | |
293 | \r | |
0c18794e | 294 | //\r |
295 | // Detect whether a secure platform-specific method to clear PK(Platform Key)\r | |
2d3fb919 | 296 | // is configured by platform owner. This method is provided for users force to clear PK\r |
0c18794e | 297 | // in case incorrect enrollment mis-haps.\r |
298 | //\r | |
299 | if (ForceClearPK ()) {\r | |
7aaf2fd6 | 300 | DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Variable PK/KEK/DB/DBX will be cleared in clear PK mode.\n"));\r |
301 | \r | |
0c18794e | 302 | //\r |
2d3fb919 | 303 | // 1. Clear PK.\r |
0c18794e | 304 | //\r |
2d3fb919 | 305 | Status = DeleteVariable (EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid);\r |
306 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
307 | return Status;\r | |
0c18794e | 308 | }\r |
309 | \r | |
310 | //\r | |
2d3fb919 | 311 | // 2. Update "SetupMode" variable to SETUP_MODE.\r |
0c18794e | 312 | //\r |
313 | UpdatePlatformMode (SETUP_MODE);\r | |
2d3fb919 | 314 | \r |
315 | //\r | |
316 | // 3. Clear KEK, DB and DBX.\r | |
317 | //\r | |
318 | DeleteVariable (EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid);\r | |
319 | DeleteVariable (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid);\r | |
320 | DeleteVariable (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid);\r | |
0c18794e | 321 | }\r |
2d3fb919 | 322 | \r |
0c18794e | 323 | return Status;\r |
324 | }\r | |
325 | \r | |
326 | /**\r | |
327 | Add public key in store and return its index.\r | |
328 | \r | |
329 | @param[in] PubKey Input pointer to Public Key data\r | |
330 | \r | |
331 | @return Index of new added item\r | |
332 | \r | |
333 | **/\r | |
334 | UINT32\r | |
335 | AddPubKeyInStore (\r | |
336 | IN UINT8 *PubKey\r | |
337 | )\r | |
338 | {\r | |
339 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r | |
340 | BOOLEAN IsFound;\r | |
341 | UINT32 Index;\r | |
342 | VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK Variable;\r | |
343 | UINT8 *Ptr;\r | |
344 | \r | |
345 | if (PubKey == NULL) {\r | |
346 | return 0;\r | |
347 | }\r | |
348 | \r | |
349 | Status = FindVariable (\r | |
350 | AUTHVAR_KEYDB_NAME,\r | |
351 | &gEfiAuthenticatedVariableGuid,\r | |
352 | &Variable,\r | |
353 | &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal\r | |
354 | );\r | |
355 | ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status);\r | |
356 | //\r | |
357 | // Check whether the public key entry does exist.\r | |
358 | //\r | |
359 | IsFound = FALSE;\r | |
360 | for (Ptr = mPubKeyStore, Index = 1; Index <= mPubKeyNumber; Index++) {\r | |
361 | if (CompareMem (Ptr, PubKey, EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE) == 0) {\r | |
362 | IsFound = TRUE;\r | |
363 | break;\r | |
364 | }\r | |
365 | Ptr += EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE;\r | |
366 | }\r | |
367 | \r | |
368 | if (!IsFound) {\r | |
369 | //\r | |
370 | // Add public key in database.\r | |
371 | //\r | |
372 | if (mPubKeyNumber == MAX_KEY_NUM) {\r | |
373 | //\r | |
374 | // Notes: Database is full, need enhancement here, currently just return 0.\r | |
375 | //\r | |
376 | return 0;\r | |
377 | }\r | |
378 | \r | |
379 | CopyMem (mPubKeyStore + mPubKeyNumber * EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE, PubKey, EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE);\r | |
380 | Index = ++mPubKeyNumber;\r | |
381 | //\r | |
382 | // Update public key database variable.\r | |
383 | //\r | |
384 | Status = UpdateVariable (\r | |
385 | AUTHVAR_KEYDB_NAME,\r | |
386 | &gEfiAuthenticatedVariableGuid,\r | |
387 | mPubKeyStore,\r | |
388 | mPubKeyNumber * EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE,\r | |
389 | EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS,\r | |
390 | 0,\r | |
391 | 0,\r | |
392 | &Variable,\r | |
393 | NULL\r | |
394 | );\r | |
395 | ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status);\r | |
396 | }\r | |
397 | \r | |
398 | return Index;\r | |
399 | }\r | |
400 | \r | |
401 | /**\r | |
402 | Verify data payload with AuthInfo in EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SHA256 type.\r | |
403 | Follow the steps in UEFI2.2.\r | |
404 | \r | |
405 | @param[in] Data Pointer to data with AuthInfo.\r | |
406 | @param[in] DataSize Size of Data.\r | |
407 | @param[in] PubKey Public key used for verification.\r | |
408 | \r | |
2d3fb919 | 409 | @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.\r |
0c18794e | 410 | @retval EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION If authentication failed.\r |
2d3fb919 | 411 | @retval EFI_SUCCESS Authentication successful.\r |
0c18794e | 412 | \r |
413 | **/\r | |
414 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
415 | VerifyCounterBasedPayload (\r | |
416 | IN UINT8 *Data,\r | |
417 | IN UINTN DataSize,\r | |
418 | IN UINT8 *PubKey\r | |
419 | )\r | |
420 | {\r | |
421 | BOOLEAN Status;\r | |
422 | EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION *CertData;\r | |
423 | EFI_CERT_BLOCK_RSA_2048_SHA256 *CertBlock;\r | |
424 | UINT8 Digest[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE];\r | |
425 | VOID *Rsa;\r | |
426 | \r | |
427 | Rsa = NULL;\r | |
428 | CertData = NULL;\r | |
429 | CertBlock = NULL;\r | |
430 | \r | |
431 | if (Data == NULL || PubKey == NULL) {\r | |
432 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r | |
433 | }\r | |
434 | \r | |
435 | CertData = (EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION *) Data;\r | |
436 | CertBlock = (EFI_CERT_BLOCK_RSA_2048_SHA256 *) (CertData->AuthInfo.CertData);\r | |
437 | \r | |
438 | //\r | |
439 | // wCertificateType should be WIN_CERT_TYPE_EFI_GUID.\r | |
440 | // Cert type should be EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SHA256.\r | |
441 | //\r | |
442 | if ((CertData->AuthInfo.Hdr.wCertificateType != WIN_CERT_TYPE_EFI_GUID) ||\r | |
443 | !CompareGuid (&CertData->AuthInfo.CertType, &gEfiCertRsa2048Sha256Guid)\r | |
444 | ) {\r | |
445 | //\r | |
446 | // Invalid AuthInfo type, return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION.\r | |
447 | //\r | |
448 | return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r | |
449 | }\r | |
450 | //\r | |
451 | // Hash data payload with SHA256.\r | |
452 | //\r | |
453 | ZeroMem (Digest, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE);\r | |
454 | Status = Sha256Init (mHashCtx);\r | |
455 | if (!Status) {\r | |
456 | goto Done;\r | |
457 | }\r | |
458 | Status = Sha256Update (mHashCtx, Data + AUTHINFO_SIZE, (UINTN) (DataSize - AUTHINFO_SIZE));\r | |
459 | if (!Status) {\r | |
460 | goto Done;\r | |
461 | }\r | |
462 | //\r | |
463 | // Hash Monotonic Count.\r | |
464 | //\r | |
465 | Status = Sha256Update (mHashCtx, &CertData->MonotonicCount, sizeof (UINT64));\r | |
466 | if (!Status) {\r | |
467 | goto Done;\r | |
468 | }\r | |
469 | Status = Sha256Final (mHashCtx, Digest);\r | |
470 | if (!Status) {\r | |
471 | goto Done;\r | |
472 | }\r | |
473 | //\r | |
474 | // Generate & Initialize RSA Context.\r | |
475 | //\r | |
476 | Rsa = RsaNew ();\r | |
477 | ASSERT (Rsa != NULL);\r | |
2d3fb919 | 478 | //\r |
0c18794e | 479 | // Set RSA Key Components.\r |
480 | // NOTE: Only N and E are needed to be set as RSA public key for signature verification.\r | |
481 | //\r | |
482 | Status = RsaSetKey (Rsa, RsaKeyN, PubKey, EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE);\r | |
483 | if (!Status) {\r | |
484 | goto Done;\r | |
485 | }\r | |
486 | Status = RsaSetKey (Rsa, RsaKeyE, mRsaE, sizeof (mRsaE));\r | |
487 | if (!Status) {\r | |
488 | goto Done;\r | |
489 | }\r | |
490 | //\r | |
491 | // Verify the signature.\r | |
492 | //\r | |
493 | Status = RsaPkcs1Verify (\r | |
2d3fb919 | 494 | Rsa,\r |
495 | Digest,\r | |
496 | SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE,\r | |
497 | CertBlock->Signature,\r | |
0c18794e | 498 | EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SHA256_SIZE\r |
499 | );\r | |
500 | \r | |
501 | Done:\r | |
502 | if (Rsa != NULL) {\r | |
503 | RsaFree (Rsa);\r | |
504 | }\r | |
505 | if (Status) {\r | |
506 | return EFI_SUCCESS;\r | |
507 | } else {\r | |
508 | return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r | |
509 | }\r | |
510 | }\r | |
511 | \r | |
0c18794e | 512 | /**\r |
513 | Update platform mode.\r | |
514 | \r | |
515 | @param[in] Mode SETUP_MODE or USER_MODE.\r | |
516 | \r | |
517 | @return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.\r | |
518 | @return EFI_SUCCESS Update platform mode successfully.\r | |
519 | \r | |
520 | **/\r | |
521 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
522 | UpdatePlatformMode (\r | |
523 | IN UINT32 Mode\r | |
524 | )\r | |
525 | {\r | |
526 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r | |
527 | VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK Variable;\r | |
528 | UINT32 VarAttr;\r | |
529 | UINT8 SecureBootMode;\r | |
beda2356 | 530 | UINT8 SecureBootEnable;\r |
531 | UINTN VariableDataSize;\r | |
2d3fb919 | 532 | \r |
0c18794e | 533 | Status = FindVariable (\r |
2d3fb919 | 534 | EFI_SETUP_MODE_NAME,\r |
535 | &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r | |
536 | &Variable,\r | |
0c18794e | 537 | &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal\r |
538 | );\r | |
539 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
540 | return Status;\r | |
541 | }\r | |
542 | \r | |
543 | mPlatformMode = Mode;\r | |
2d3fb919 | 544 | VarAttr = EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS;\r |
0c18794e | 545 | Status = UpdateVariable (\r |
546 | EFI_SETUP_MODE_NAME,\r | |
547 | &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r | |
548 | &mPlatformMode,\r | |
549 | sizeof(UINT8),\r | |
550 | VarAttr,\r | |
551 | 0,\r | |
552 | 0,\r | |
553 | &Variable,\r | |
554 | NULL\r | |
555 | );\r | |
556 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
557 | return Status;\r | |
558 | }\r | |
559 | \r | |
2d3fb919 | 560 | if (AtRuntime ()) {\r |
561 | //\r | |
562 | // SecureBoot Variable indicates whether the platform firmware is operating\r | |
563 | // in Secure boot mode (1) or not (0), so we should not change SecureBoot\r | |
564 | // Variable in runtime.\r | |
565 | //\r | |
566 | return Status;\r | |
567 | }\r | |
568 | \r | |
0c18794e | 569 | //\r |
570 | // Check "SecureBoot" variable's existence.\r | |
571 | // If it doesn't exist, firmware has no capability to perform driver signing verification,\r | |
572 | // then set "SecureBoot" to 0.\r | |
573 | //\r | |
574 | Status = FindVariable (\r | |
2d3fb919 | 575 | EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME,\r |
576 | &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r | |
577 | &Variable,\r | |
0c18794e | 578 | &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal\r |
579 | );\r | |
580 | //\r | |
581 | // If "SecureBoot" variable exists, then check "SetupMode" variable update.\r | |
582 | // If "SetupMode" variable is USER_MODE, "SecureBoot" variable is set to 1.\r | |
583 | // If "SetupMode" variable is SETUP_MODE, "SecureBoot" variable is set to 0.\r | |
584 | //\r | |
585 | if (Variable.CurrPtr == NULL) {\r | |
586 | SecureBootMode = SECURE_BOOT_MODE_DISABLE;\r | |
587 | } else {\r | |
588 | if (mPlatformMode == USER_MODE) {\r | |
589 | SecureBootMode = SECURE_BOOT_MODE_ENABLE;\r | |
590 | } else if (mPlatformMode == SETUP_MODE) {\r | |
591 | SecureBootMode = SECURE_BOOT_MODE_DISABLE;\r | |
592 | } else {\r | |
593 | return EFI_NOT_FOUND;\r | |
594 | }\r | |
595 | }\r | |
596 | \r | |
2d3fb919 | 597 | VarAttr = EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS;\r |
beda2356 | 598 | Status = UpdateVariable (\r |
0c18794e | 599 | EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME,\r |
600 | &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r | |
601 | &SecureBootMode,\r | |
602 | sizeof(UINT8),\r | |
603 | VarAttr,\r | |
604 | 0,\r | |
605 | 0,\r | |
606 | &Variable,\r | |
607 | NULL\r | |
608 | );\r | |
beda2356 | 609 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r |
610 | return Status;\r | |
611 | }\r | |
612 | \r | |
613 | //\r | |
614 | // Check "SecureBootEnable" variable's existence. It can enable/disable secure boot feature.\r | |
615 | //\r | |
616 | Status = FindVariable (\r | |
2d3fb919 | 617 | EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME,\r |
618 | &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid,\r | |
619 | &Variable,\r | |
beda2356 | 620 | &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal\r |
621 | );\r | |
2d3fb919 | 622 | \r |
beda2356 | 623 | if (SecureBootMode == SECURE_BOOT_MODE_ENABLE) {\r |
624 | //\r | |
625 | // Create the "SecureBootEnable" variable as secure boot is enabled.\r | |
626 | //\r | |
627 | SecureBootEnable = SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE;\r | |
628 | VariableDataSize = sizeof (SecureBootEnable);\r | |
629 | } else {\r | |
630 | //\r | |
2d3fb919 | 631 | // Delete the "SecureBootEnable" variable if this variable exist as "SecureBoot"\r |
beda2356 | 632 | // variable is not in secure boot state.\r |
633 | //\r | |
634 | if (Variable.CurrPtr == NULL || EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
635 | return EFI_SUCCESS;\r | |
636 | }\r | |
637 | SecureBootEnable = SECURE_BOOT_DISABLE;\r | |
638 | VariableDataSize = 0;\r | |
639 | }\r | |
2d3fb919 | 640 | \r |
beda2356 | 641 | Status = UpdateVariable (\r |
2d3fb919 | 642 | EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME,\r |
643 | &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid,\r | |
644 | &SecureBootEnable,\r | |
645 | VariableDataSize,\r | |
646 | EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS,\r | |
647 | 0,\r | |
648 | 0,\r | |
beda2356 | 649 | &Variable,\r |
650 | NULL\r | |
651 | );\r | |
652 | return Status;\r | |
0c18794e | 653 | }\r |
654 | \r | |
655 | /**\r | |
656 | Process variable with platform key for verification.\r | |
657 | \r | |
658 | @param[in] VariableName Name of Variable to be found.\r | |
659 | @param[in] VendorGuid Variable vendor GUID.\r | |
660 | @param[in] Data Data pointer.\r | |
661 | @param[in] DataSize Size of Data found. If size is less than the\r | |
662 | data, this value contains the required size.\r | |
663 | @param[in] Variable The variable information which is used to keep track of variable usage.\r | |
664 | @param[in] Attributes Attribute value of the variable\r | |
665 | @param[in] IsPk Indicate whether it is to process pk.\r | |
666 | \r | |
667 | @return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.\r | |
2d3fb919 | 668 | @return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION The variable does NOT pass the validation.\r |
669 | check carried out by the firmware.\r | |
0c18794e | 670 | @return EFI_SUCCESS Variable passed validation successfully.\r |
671 | \r | |
672 | **/\r | |
673 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
674 | ProcessVarWithPk (\r | |
675 | IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r | |
676 | IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r | |
677 | IN VOID *Data,\r | |
678 | IN UINTN DataSize,\r | |
679 | IN VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK *Variable,\r | |
680 | IN UINT32 Attributes OPTIONAL,\r | |
681 | IN BOOLEAN IsPk\r | |
682 | )\r | |
683 | {\r | |
684 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r | |
685 | VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK PkVariable;\r | |
686 | EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *OldPkList;\r | |
687 | EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *OldPkData;\r | |
688 | EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION *CertData;\r | |
689 | BOOLEAN TimeBase;\r | |
690 | BOOLEAN Del;\r | |
2d3fb919 | 691 | UINT8 *Payload;\r |
692 | UINTN PayloadSize;\r | |
693 | UINT64 MonotonicCount;\r | |
694 | EFI_TIME *TimeStamp;\r | |
0c18794e | 695 | \r |
696 | if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE) == 0) {\r | |
697 | //\r | |
698 | // PK and KEK should set EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE attribute.\r | |
699 | //\r | |
700 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r | |
701 | }\r | |
702 | \r | |
703 | if (mPlatformMode == USER_MODE) {\r | |
704 | \r | |
705 | if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0) {\r | |
706 | //\r | |
707 | // EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS attribute means time-based X509 Cert PK.\r | |
708 | //\r | |
709 | TimeBase = TRUE;\r | |
710 | } else if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0) {\r | |
711 | //\r | |
712 | // EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS attribute means counter-based RSA-2048 Cert PK.\r | |
713 | //\r | |
714 | TimeBase = FALSE;\r | |
715 | } else {\r | |
716 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r | |
717 | }\r | |
718 | \r | |
719 | if (TimeBase) {\r | |
720 | //\r | |
721 | // Verify against X509 Cert PK.\r | |
722 | //\r | |
723 | Del = FALSE;\r | |
724 | Status = VerifyTimeBasedPayload (VariableName, VendorGuid, Data, DataSize, Variable, Attributes, TRUE, &Del);\r | |
725 | if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
726 | //\r | |
727 | // If delete PK in user mode, need change to setup mode.\r | |
728 | //\r | |
729 | if (Del && IsPk) {\r | |
730 | Status = UpdatePlatformMode (SETUP_MODE);\r | |
731 | }\r | |
732 | }\r | |
733 | return Status;\r | |
734 | } else {\r | |
735 | //\r | |
736 | // Verify against RSA2048 Cert PK.\r | |
737 | //\r | |
738 | CertData = (EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION *) Data;\r | |
739 | if ((Variable->CurrPtr != NULL) && (CertData->MonotonicCount <= Variable->CurrPtr->MonotonicCount)) {\r | |
740 | //\r | |
741 | // Monotonic count check fail, suspicious replay attack, return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION.\r | |
742 | //\r | |
743 | return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r | |
744 | }\r | |
745 | //\r | |
746 | // Get platform key from variable.\r | |
747 | //\r | |
748 | Status = FindVariable (\r | |
2d3fb919 | 749 | EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME,\r |
750 | &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r | |
751 | &PkVariable,\r | |
0c18794e | 752 | &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal\r |
753 | );\r | |
754 | ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status);\r | |
2d3fb919 | 755 | \r |
0c18794e | 756 | OldPkList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) GetVariableDataPtr (PkVariable.CurrPtr);\r |
757 | OldPkData = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) OldPkList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + OldPkList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r | |
758 | Status = VerifyCounterBasedPayload (Data, DataSize, OldPkData->SignatureData);\r | |
759 | if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
760 | Status = UpdateVariable (\r | |
2d3fb919 | 761 | VariableName,\r |
762 | VendorGuid,\r | |
763 | (UINT8*)Data + AUTHINFO_SIZE,\r | |
764 | DataSize - AUTHINFO_SIZE,\r | |
765 | Attributes,\r | |
766 | 0,\r | |
767 | CertData->MonotonicCount,\r | |
0c18794e | 768 | Variable,\r |
769 | NULL\r | |
770 | );\r | |
2d3fb919 | 771 | \r |
0c18794e | 772 | if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r |
773 | //\r | |
774 | // If delete PK in user mode, need change to setup mode.\r | |
775 | //\r | |
776 | if ((DataSize == AUTHINFO_SIZE) && IsPk) {\r | |
777 | Status = UpdatePlatformMode (SETUP_MODE);\r | |
778 | }\r | |
779 | }\r | |
780 | }\r | |
781 | }\r | |
782 | } else {\r | |
2d3fb919 | 783 | //\r |
784 | // Process PK or KEK in Setup mode.\r | |
785 | //\r | |
786 | if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0) {\r | |
787 | //\r | |
788 | // Time-based Authentication descriptor.\r | |
789 | //\r | |
790 | MonotonicCount = 0;\r | |
791 | TimeStamp = &((EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 *) Data)->TimeStamp;\r | |
792 | Payload = (UINT8 *) Data + AUTHINFO2_SIZE (Data);\r | |
793 | PayloadSize = DataSize - AUTHINFO2_SIZE (Data);\r | |
794 | } else if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0) {\r | |
795 | //\r | |
796 | // Counter-based Authentication descriptor.\r | |
797 | //\r | |
798 | MonotonicCount = ((EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION *) Data)->MonotonicCount;\r | |
799 | TimeStamp = NULL;\r | |
800 | Payload = (UINT8*) Data + AUTHINFO_SIZE;\r | |
801 | PayloadSize = DataSize - AUTHINFO_SIZE;\r | |
802 | } else {\r | |
803 | //\r | |
804 | // No Authentication descriptor.\r | |
805 | //\r | |
806 | MonotonicCount = 0;\r | |
807 | TimeStamp = NULL;\r | |
808 | Payload = Data;\r | |
809 | PayloadSize = DataSize;\r | |
810 | }\r | |
811 | \r | |
812 | Status = UpdateVariable (\r | |
813 | VariableName,\r | |
814 | VendorGuid,\r | |
815 | Payload,\r | |
816 | PayloadSize,\r | |
817 | Attributes,\r | |
818 | 0,\r | |
819 | MonotonicCount,\r | |
820 | Variable,\r | |
821 | TimeStamp\r | |
822 | );\r | |
0c18794e | 823 | //\r |
824 | // If enroll PK in setup mode, need change to user mode.\r | |
825 | //\r | |
826 | if ((DataSize != 0) && IsPk) {\r | |
827 | Status = UpdatePlatformMode (USER_MODE);\r | |
828 | }\r | |
829 | }\r | |
830 | \r | |
831 | return Status;\r | |
832 | }\r | |
833 | \r | |
834 | /**\r | |
835 | Process variable with key exchange key for verification.\r | |
836 | \r | |
837 | @param[in] VariableName Name of Variable to be found.\r | |
838 | @param[in] VendorGuid Variable vendor GUID.\r | |
839 | @param[in] Data Data pointer.\r | |
840 | @param[in] DataSize Size of Data found. If size is less than the\r | |
841 | data, this value contains the required size.\r | |
842 | @param[in] Variable The variable information which is used to keep track of variable usage.\r | |
843 | @param[in] Attributes Attribute value of the variable.\r | |
844 | \r | |
845 | @return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.\r | |
2d3fb919 | 846 | @return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION The variable does NOT pass the validation\r |
847 | check carried out by the firmware.\r | |
0c18794e | 848 | @return EFI_SUCCESS Variable pass validation successfully.\r |
849 | \r | |
850 | **/\r | |
851 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
852 | ProcessVarWithKek (\r | |
853 | IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r | |
854 | IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r | |
855 | IN VOID *Data,\r | |
856 | IN UINTN DataSize,\r | |
857 | IN VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK *Variable,\r | |
858 | IN UINT32 Attributes OPTIONAL\r | |
859 | )\r | |
860 | {\r | |
861 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r | |
862 | VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK KekVariable;\r | |
863 | EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *KekList;\r | |
864 | EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *KekItem;\r | |
865 | UINT32 KekCount;\r | |
866 | EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION *CertData;\r | |
867 | EFI_CERT_BLOCK_RSA_2048_SHA256 *CertBlock;\r | |
868 | BOOLEAN IsFound;\r | |
869 | UINT32 Index;\r | |
870 | UINT32 KekDataSize;\r | |
2d3fb919 | 871 | UINT8 *Payload;\r |
872 | UINTN PayloadSize;\r | |
873 | UINT64 MonotonicCount;\r | |
0c18794e | 874 | \r |
875 | if (mPlatformMode == USER_MODE) {\r | |
876 | if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) == 0) {\r | |
877 | //\r | |
878 | // In user mode, should set EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS attribute.\r | |
879 | //\r | |
880 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r | |
881 | }\r | |
882 | \r | |
883 | CertData = (EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION *) Data;\r | |
884 | CertBlock = (EFI_CERT_BLOCK_RSA_2048_SHA256 *) (CertData->AuthInfo.CertData);\r | |
885 | if ((Variable->CurrPtr != NULL) && (CertData->MonotonicCount <= Variable->CurrPtr->MonotonicCount)) {\r | |
886 | //\r | |
887 | // Monotonic count check fail, suspicious replay attack, return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION.\r | |
888 | //\r | |
889 | return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r | |
890 | }\r | |
891 | //\r | |
892 | // Get KEK database from variable.\r | |
893 | //\r | |
894 | Status = FindVariable (\r | |
2d3fb919 | 895 | EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME,\r |
896 | &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r | |
897 | &KekVariable,\r | |
0c18794e | 898 | &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal\r |
899 | );\r | |
900 | ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status);\r | |
901 | \r | |
902 | KekDataSize = KekVariable.CurrPtr->DataSize;\r | |
903 | KekList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) GetVariableDataPtr (KekVariable.CurrPtr);\r | |
904 | \r | |
905 | //\r | |
906 | // Enumerate all Kek items in this list to verify the variable certificate data.\r | |
907 | // If anyone is authenticated successfully, it means the variable is correct!\r | |
908 | //\r | |
909 | IsFound = FALSE;\r | |
910 | while ((KekDataSize > 0) && (KekDataSize >= KekList->SignatureListSize)) {\r | |
911 | if (CompareGuid (&KekList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertRsa2048Guid)) {\r | |
912 | KekItem = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) KekList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + KekList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r | |
913 | KekCount = (KekList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - KekList->SignatureHeaderSize) / KekList->SignatureSize;\r | |
914 | for (Index = 0; Index < KekCount; Index++) {\r | |
915 | if (CompareMem (KekItem->SignatureData, CertBlock->PublicKey, EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE) == 0) {\r | |
916 | IsFound = TRUE;\r | |
917 | break;\r | |
918 | }\r | |
919 | KekItem = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) KekItem + KekList->SignatureSize);\r | |
920 | }\r | |
921 | }\r | |
922 | KekDataSize -= KekList->SignatureListSize;\r | |
923 | KekList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) KekList + KekList->SignatureListSize);\r | |
924 | }\r | |
2d3fb919 | 925 | \r |
0c18794e | 926 | if (!IsFound) {\r |
927 | return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r | |
928 | }\r | |
929 | \r | |
930 | Status = VerifyCounterBasedPayload (Data, DataSize, CertBlock->PublicKey);\r | |
931 | if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
932 | Status = UpdateVariable (\r | |
2d3fb919 | 933 | VariableName,\r |
934 | VendorGuid,\r | |
935 | (UINT8*)Data + AUTHINFO_SIZE,\r | |
936 | DataSize - AUTHINFO_SIZE,\r | |
937 | Attributes,\r | |
938 | 0,\r | |
939 | CertData->MonotonicCount,\r | |
0c18794e | 940 | Variable,\r |
941 | NULL\r | |
942 | );\r | |
943 | }\r | |
944 | } else {\r | |
945 | //\r | |
946 | // If in setup mode, no authentication needed.\r | |
947 | //\r | |
2d3fb919 | 948 | if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0) {\r |
949 | //\r | |
950 | // Counter-based Authentication descriptor.\r | |
951 | //\r | |
952 | MonotonicCount = ((EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION *) Data)->MonotonicCount;\r | |
953 | Payload = (UINT8*) Data + AUTHINFO_SIZE;\r | |
954 | PayloadSize = DataSize - AUTHINFO_SIZE;\r | |
955 | } else {\r | |
956 | //\r | |
957 | // No Authentication descriptor.\r | |
958 | //\r | |
959 | MonotonicCount = 0;\r | |
960 | Payload = Data;\r | |
961 | PayloadSize = DataSize;\r | |
962 | }\r | |
963 | \r | |
0c18794e | 964 | Status = UpdateVariable (\r |
2d3fb919 | 965 | VariableName,\r |
966 | VendorGuid,\r | |
967 | Payload,\r | |
968 | PayloadSize,\r | |
969 | Attributes,\r | |
970 | 0,\r | |
971 | MonotonicCount,\r | |
0c18794e | 972 | Variable,\r |
973 | NULL\r | |
974 | );\r | |
975 | }\r | |
976 | \r | |
977 | return Status;\r | |
978 | }\r | |
979 | \r | |
980 | /**\r | |
981 | Process variable with EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS/EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS set\r | |
982 | \r | |
983 | @param[in] VariableName Name of Variable to be found.\r | |
984 | @param[in] VendorGuid Variable vendor GUID.\r | |
985 | \r | |
986 | @param[in] Data Data pointer.\r | |
987 | @param[in] DataSize Size of Data found. If size is less than the\r | |
988 | data, this value contains the required size.\r | |
989 | @param[in] Variable The variable information which is used to keep track of variable usage.\r | |
990 | @param[in] Attributes Attribute value of the variable.\r | |
991 | \r | |
992 | @return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.\r | |
993 | @return EFI_WRITE_PROTECTED Variable is write-protected and needs authentication with\r | |
994 | EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS set.\r | |
995 | @return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION The variable is with EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS\r | |
2d3fb919 | 996 | set, but the AuthInfo does NOT pass the validation\r |
997 | check carried out by the firmware.\r | |
0c18794e | 998 | @return EFI_SUCCESS Variable is not write-protected or pass validation successfully.\r |
999 | \r | |
1000 | **/\r | |
1001 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
1002 | ProcessVariable (\r | |
1003 | IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r | |
1004 | IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r | |
1005 | IN VOID *Data,\r | |
1006 | IN UINTN DataSize,\r | |
1007 | IN VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK *Variable,\r | |
1008 | IN UINT32 Attributes\r | |
1009 | )\r | |
1010 | {\r | |
1011 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r | |
1012 | BOOLEAN IsDeletion;\r | |
1013 | BOOLEAN IsFirstTime;\r | |
1014 | UINT8 *PubKey;\r | |
1015 | EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION *CertData;\r | |
1016 | EFI_CERT_BLOCK_RSA_2048_SHA256 *CertBlock;\r | |
1017 | UINT32 KeyIndex;\r | |
1018 | UINT64 MonotonicCount;\r | |
1019 | \r | |
2d3fb919 | 1020 | KeyIndex = 0;\r |
0c18794e | 1021 | CertData = NULL;\r |
1022 | CertBlock = NULL;\r | |
1023 | PubKey = NULL;\r | |
1024 | IsDeletion = FALSE;\r | |
1025 | \r | |
1026 | //\r | |
1027 | // Process Time-based Authenticated variable.\r | |
1028 | //\r | |
1029 | if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0) {\r | |
1030 | return VerifyTimeBasedPayload (VariableName, VendorGuid, Data, DataSize, Variable, Attributes, FALSE, NULL);\r | |
1031 | }\r | |
2d3fb919 | 1032 | \r |
0c18794e | 1033 | //\r |
1034 | // Determine if first time SetVariable with the EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS.\r | |
1035 | //\r | |
1036 | if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0) {\r | |
1037 | //\r | |
1038 | // Determine current operation type.\r | |
1039 | //\r | |
1040 | if (DataSize == AUTHINFO_SIZE) {\r | |
1041 | IsDeletion = TRUE;\r | |
1042 | }\r | |
1043 | //\r | |
1044 | // Determine whether this is the first time with EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS set.\r | |
1045 | //\r | |
1046 | if (Variable->CurrPtr == NULL) {\r | |
1047 | IsFirstTime = TRUE;\r | |
1048 | } else if ((Variable->CurrPtr->Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) == 0) {\r | |
1049 | IsFirstTime = TRUE;\r | |
1050 | } else {\r | |
1051 | KeyIndex = Variable->CurrPtr->PubKeyIndex;\r | |
1052 | IsFirstTime = FALSE;\r | |
1053 | }\r | |
1054 | } else if ((Variable->CurrPtr != NULL) &&\r | |
1055 | (Variable->CurrPtr->Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0\r | |
1056 | ) {\r | |
1057 | //\r | |
1058 | // If the variable is already write-protected, it always needs authentication before update.\r | |
1059 | //\r | |
1060 | return EFI_WRITE_PROTECTED;\r | |
1061 | } else {\r | |
1062 | //\r | |
1063 | // If without EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS, set and attributes collision.\r | |
1064 | // That means it is not authenticated variable, just update variable as usual.\r | |
1065 | //\r | |
1066 | Status = UpdateVariable (VariableName, VendorGuid, Data, DataSize, Attributes, 0, 0, Variable, NULL);\r | |
1067 | return Status;\r | |
1068 | }\r | |
1069 | \r | |
1070 | //\r | |
1071 | // Get PubKey and check Monotonic Count value corresponding to the variable.\r | |
1072 | //\r | |
1073 | CertData = (EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION *) Data;\r | |
1074 | CertBlock = (EFI_CERT_BLOCK_RSA_2048_SHA256 *) (CertData->AuthInfo.CertData);\r | |
1075 | PubKey = CertBlock->PublicKey;\r | |
1076 | \r | |
1077 | //\r | |
1078 | // Update Monotonic Count value.\r | |
1079 | //\r | |
1080 | MonotonicCount = CertData->MonotonicCount;\r | |
1081 | \r | |
1082 | if (!IsFirstTime) {\r | |
1083 | //\r | |
1084 | // Check input PubKey.\r | |
1085 | //\r | |
1086 | if (CompareMem (PubKey, mPubKeyStore + (KeyIndex - 1) * EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE, EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE) != 0) {\r | |
1087 | return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r | |
1088 | }\r | |
1089 | //\r | |
1090 | // Compare the current monotonic count and ensure that it is greater than the last SetVariable\r | |
1091 | // operation with the EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS attribute set.\r | |
1092 | //\r | |
1093 | if (CertData->MonotonicCount <= Variable->CurrPtr->MonotonicCount) {\r | |
1094 | //\r | |
1095 | // Monotonic count check fail, suspicious replay attack, return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION.\r | |
1096 | //\r | |
1097 | return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r | |
1098 | }\r | |
2d3fb919 | 1099 | }\r |
0c18794e | 1100 | //\r |
1101 | // Verify the certificate in Data payload.\r | |
1102 | //\r | |
1103 | Status = VerifyCounterBasedPayload (Data, DataSize, PubKey);\r | |
1104 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
1105 | return Status;\r | |
1106 | }\r | |
2d3fb919 | 1107 | \r |
0c18794e | 1108 | //\r |
1109 | // Now, the signature has been verified!\r | |
1110 | //\r | |
1111 | if (IsFirstTime && !IsDeletion) {\r | |
1112 | //\r | |
1113 | // Update public key database variable if need.\r | |
1114 | //\r | |
1115 | KeyIndex = AddPubKeyInStore (PubKey);\r | |
1116 | }\r | |
1117 | \r | |
1118 | //\r | |
1119 | // Verification pass.\r | |
1120 | //\r | |
1121 | return UpdateVariable (VariableName, VendorGuid, (UINT8*)Data + AUTHINFO_SIZE, DataSize - AUTHINFO_SIZE, Attributes, KeyIndex, MonotonicCount, Variable, NULL);\r | |
1122 | }\r | |
1123 | \r | |
2d3fb919 | 1124 | /**\r |
1125 | Merge two buffers which formatted as EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST. Only the new EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA\r | |
1126 | will be appended to the original EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST, duplicate EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA\r | |
1127 | will be ignored.\r | |
1128 | \r | |
1129 | @param[in, out] Data Pointer to original EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST.\r | |
1130 | @param[in] DataSize Size of Data buffer.\r | |
1131 | @param[in] NewData Pointer to new EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST to be appended.\r | |
1132 | @param[in] NewDataSize Size of NewData buffer.\r | |
1133 | \r | |
1134 | @return Size of the merged buffer.\r | |
1135 | \r | |
1136 | **/\r | |
1137 | UINTN\r | |
1138 | AppendSignatureList (\r | |
1139 | IN OUT VOID *Data,\r | |
1140 | IN UINTN DataSize,\r | |
1141 | IN VOID *NewData,\r | |
1142 | IN UINTN NewDataSize\r | |
1143 | )\r | |
1144 | {\r | |
1145 | EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *CertList;\r | |
1146 | EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *Cert;\r | |
1147 | UINTN CertCount;\r | |
1148 | EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *NewCertList;\r | |
1149 | EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *NewCert;\r | |
1150 | UINTN NewCertCount;\r | |
1151 | UINTN Index;\r | |
1152 | UINTN Index2;\r | |
1153 | UINTN Size;\r | |
1154 | UINT8 *Tail;\r | |
1155 | UINTN CopiedCount;\r | |
1156 | UINTN SignatureListSize;\r | |
1157 | BOOLEAN IsNewCert;\r | |
1158 | \r | |
1159 | Tail = (UINT8 *) Data + DataSize;\r | |
1160 | \r | |
1161 | NewCertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) NewData;\r | |
1162 | while ((NewDataSize > 0) && (NewDataSize >= NewCertList->SignatureListSize)) {\r | |
1163 | NewCert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) NewCertList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + NewCertList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r | |
1164 | NewCertCount = (NewCertList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - NewCertList->SignatureHeaderSize) / NewCertList->SignatureSize;\r | |
1165 | \r | |
1166 | CopiedCount = 0;\r | |
1167 | for (Index = 0; Index < NewCertCount; Index++) {\r | |
1168 | IsNewCert = TRUE;\r | |
1169 | \r | |
1170 | Size = DataSize;\r | |
1171 | CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) Data;\r | |
1172 | while ((Size > 0) && (Size >= CertList->SignatureListSize)) {\r | |
1173 | if (CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &NewCertList->SignatureType) &&\r | |
1174 | (CertList->SignatureSize == NewCertList->SignatureSize)) {\r | |
1175 | Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r | |
1176 | CertCount = (CertList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - CertList->SignatureHeaderSize) / CertList->SignatureSize;\r | |
1177 | for (Index2 = 0; Index2 < CertCount; Index2++) {\r | |
1178 | //\r | |
1179 | // Iterate each Signature Data in this Signature List.\r | |
1180 | //\r | |
1181 | if (CompareMem (NewCert, Cert, CertList->SignatureSize) == 0) {\r | |
1182 | IsNewCert = FALSE;\r | |
1183 | break;\r | |
1184 | }\r | |
1185 | Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) Cert + CertList->SignatureSize);\r | |
1186 | }\r | |
1187 | }\r | |
1188 | \r | |
1189 | if (!IsNewCert) {\r | |
1190 | break;\r | |
1191 | }\r | |
1192 | Size -= CertList->SignatureListSize;\r | |
1193 | CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + CertList->SignatureListSize);\r | |
1194 | }\r | |
1195 | \r | |
1196 | if (IsNewCert) {\r | |
1197 | //\r | |
1198 | // New EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA, append it.\r | |
1199 | //\r | |
1200 | if (CopiedCount == 0) {\r | |
1201 | //\r | |
1202 | // Copy EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST header for only once.\r | |
1203 | //\r | |
1204 | CopyMem (Tail, NewCertList, sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + NewCertList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r | |
1205 | Tail = Tail + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + NewCertList->SignatureHeaderSize;\r | |
1206 | }\r | |
1207 | \r | |
1208 | CopyMem (Tail, NewCert, NewCertList->SignatureSize);\r | |
1209 | Tail += NewCertList->SignatureSize;\r | |
1210 | CopiedCount++;\r | |
1211 | }\r | |
1212 | \r | |
1213 | NewCert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) NewCert + NewCertList->SignatureSize);\r | |
1214 | }\r | |
1215 | \r | |
1216 | //\r | |
1217 | // Update SignatureListSize in newly appended EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST.\r | |
1218 | //\r | |
1219 | if (CopiedCount != 0) {\r | |
1220 | SignatureListSize = sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + NewCertList->SignatureHeaderSize + (CopiedCount * NewCertList->SignatureSize);\r | |
1221 | CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) (Tail - SignatureListSize);\r | |
1222 | CertList->SignatureListSize = (UINT32) SignatureListSize;\r | |
1223 | }\r | |
1224 | \r | |
1225 | NewDataSize -= NewCertList->SignatureListSize;\r | |
1226 | NewCertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) NewCertList + NewCertList->SignatureListSize);\r | |
1227 | }\r | |
1228 | \r | |
1229 | return (Tail - (UINT8 *) Data);\r | |
1230 | }\r | |
1231 | \r | |
0c18794e | 1232 | /**\r |
1233 | Compare two EFI_TIME data.\r | |
1234 | \r | |
1235 | \r | |
1236 | @param FirstTime A pointer to the first EFI_TIME data.\r | |
1237 | @param SecondTime A pointer to the second EFI_TIME data.\r | |
1238 | \r | |
1239 | @retval TRUE The FirstTime is not later than the SecondTime.\r | |
1240 | @retval FALSE The FirstTime is later than the SecondTime.\r | |
1241 | \r | |
1242 | **/\r | |
1243 | BOOLEAN\r | |
1244 | CompareTimeStamp (\r | |
1245 | IN EFI_TIME *FirstTime,\r | |
1246 | IN EFI_TIME *SecondTime\r | |
1247 | )\r | |
1248 | {\r | |
1249 | if (FirstTime->Year != SecondTime->Year) {\r | |
1250 | return (BOOLEAN) (FirstTime->Year < SecondTime->Year);\r | |
1251 | } else if (FirstTime->Month != SecondTime->Month) {\r | |
1252 | return (BOOLEAN) (FirstTime->Month < SecondTime->Month);\r | |
1253 | } else if (FirstTime->Day != SecondTime->Day) {\r | |
1254 | return (BOOLEAN) (FirstTime->Day < SecondTime->Day);\r | |
1255 | } else if (FirstTime->Hour != SecondTime->Hour) {\r | |
1256 | return (BOOLEAN) (FirstTime->Hour < SecondTime->Hour);\r | |
1257 | } else if (FirstTime->Minute != SecondTime->Minute) {\r | |
1258 | return (BOOLEAN) (FirstTime->Minute < FirstTime->Minute);\r | |
2d3fb919 | 1259 | }\r |
0c18794e | 1260 | \r |
1261 | return (BOOLEAN) (FirstTime->Second <= SecondTime->Second);\r | |
1262 | }\r | |
1263 | \r | |
1264 | /**\r | |
1265 | Process variable with EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS set\r | |
1266 | \r | |
1267 | @param[in] VariableName Name of Variable to be found.\r | |
1268 | @param[in] VendorGuid Variable vendor GUID.\r | |
1269 | @param[in] Data Data pointer.\r | |
1270 | @param[in] DataSize Size of Data found. If size is less than the\r | |
1271 | data, this value contains the required size.\r | |
1272 | @param[in] Variable The variable information which is used to keep track of variable usage.\r | |
1273 | @param[in] Attributes Attribute value of the variable.\r | |
1274 | @param[in] Pk Verify against PK or KEK database.\r | |
1275 | @param[out] VarDel Delete the variable or not.\r | |
1276 | \r | |
1277 | @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.\r | |
2d3fb919 | 1278 | @retval EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION The variable does NOT pass the validation\r |
1279 | check carried out by the firmware.\r | |
0c18794e | 1280 | @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES Failed to process variable due to lack\r |
1281 | of resources.\r | |
1282 | @retval EFI_SUCCESS Variable pass validation successfully.\r | |
1283 | \r | |
1284 | **/\r | |
1285 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
1286 | VerifyTimeBasedPayload (\r | |
1287 | IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r | |
1288 | IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r | |
1289 | IN VOID *Data,\r | |
1290 | IN UINTN DataSize,\r | |
1291 | IN VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK *Variable,\r | |
1292 | IN UINT32 Attributes,\r | |
1293 | IN BOOLEAN Pk,\r | |
1294 | OUT BOOLEAN *VarDel\r | |
1295 | )\r | |
1296 | {\r | |
1297 | UINT8 *RootCert;\r | |
1298 | UINT8 *SigData;\r | |
2d3fb919 | 1299 | UINT8 *PayloadPtr;\r |
0c18794e | 1300 | UINTN RootCertSize;\r |
1301 | UINTN Index;\r | |
2d3fb919 | 1302 | UINTN CertCount;\r |
1303 | UINTN PayloadSize;\r | |
0c18794e | 1304 | UINT32 Attr;\r |
1305 | UINT32 SigDataSize;\r | |
1306 | UINT32 KekDataSize;\r | |
1307 | BOOLEAN Result;\r | |
1308 | BOOLEAN VerifyStatus;\r | |
1309 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r | |
1310 | EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *CertList;\r | |
1311 | EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *Cert;\r | |
1312 | VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK KekVariable;\r | |
1313 | EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 *CertData;\r | |
1314 | UINT8 *NewData;\r | |
1315 | UINTN NewDataSize;\r | |
1316 | VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK PkVariable;\r | |
2d3fb919 | 1317 | UINT8 *Buffer;\r |
1318 | UINTN Length;\r | |
0c18794e | 1319 | \r |
1320 | Result = FALSE;\r | |
1321 | VerifyStatus = FALSE;\r | |
1322 | CertData = NULL;\r | |
1323 | NewData = NULL;\r | |
1324 | Attr = Attributes;\r | |
1325 | \r | |
1326 | //\r | |
2d3fb919 | 1327 | // When the attribute EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS is\r |
0c18794e | 1328 | // set, then the Data buffer shall begin with an instance of a complete (and serialized)\r |
2d3fb919 | 1329 | // EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 descriptor. The descriptor shall be followed by the new\r |
1330 | // variable value and DataSize shall reflect the combined size of the descriptor and the new\r | |
1331 | // variable value. The authentication descriptor is not part of the variable data and is not\r | |
0c18794e | 1332 | // returned by subsequent calls to GetVariable().\r |
1333 | //\r | |
1334 | CertData = (EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 *) Data;\r | |
2d3fb919 | 1335 | \r |
1336 | //\r | |
1337 | // Verify that Pad1, Nanosecond, TimeZone, Daylight and Pad2 components of the\r | |
1338 | // TimeStamp value are set to zero.\r | |
1339 | //\r | |
1340 | if ((CertData->TimeStamp.Pad1 != 0) ||\r | |
1341 | (CertData->TimeStamp.Nanosecond != 0) ||\r | |
1342 | (CertData->TimeStamp.TimeZone != 0) ||\r | |
1343 | (CertData->TimeStamp.Daylight != 0) ||\r | |
1344 | (CertData->TimeStamp.Pad2 != 0)) {\r | |
1345 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r | |
1346 | }\r | |
1347 | \r | |
0c18794e | 1348 | if ((Variable->CurrPtr != NULL) && ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_APPEND_WRITE) == 0)) {\r |
1349 | if (CompareTimeStamp (&CertData->TimeStamp, &Variable->CurrPtr->TimeStamp)) {\r | |
1350 | //\r | |
1351 | // TimeStamp check fail, suspicious replay attack, return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION.\r | |
1352 | //\r | |
1353 | return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r | |
1354 | }\r | |
1355 | }\r | |
1356 | \r | |
1357 | //\r | |
1358 | // wCertificateType should be WIN_CERT_TYPE_EFI_GUID.\r | |
1359 | // Cert type should be EFI_CERT_TYPE_PKCS7_GUID.\r | |
1360 | //\r | |
1361 | if ((CertData->AuthInfo.Hdr.wCertificateType != WIN_CERT_TYPE_EFI_GUID) ||\r | |
2d3fb919 | 1362 | !CompareGuid (&CertData->AuthInfo.CertType, &gEfiCertPkcs7Guid)) {\r |
0c18794e | 1363 | //\r |
1364 | // Invalid AuthInfo type, return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION.\r | |
1365 | //\r | |
1366 | return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r | |
1367 | }\r | |
2d3fb919 | 1368 | \r |
0c18794e | 1369 | //\r |
1370 | // Find out Pkcs7 SignedData which follows the EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 descriptor.\r | |
1371 | // AuthInfo.Hdr.dwLength is the length of the entire certificate, including the length of the header.\r | |
1372 | //\r | |
2d3fb919 | 1373 | SigData = CertData->AuthInfo.CertData;\r |
1374 | SigDataSize = CertData->AuthInfo.Hdr.dwLength - (UINT32) (OFFSET_OF (WIN_CERTIFICATE_UEFI_GUID, CertData));\r | |
648f98d1 | 1375 | \r |
0c18794e | 1376 | //\r |
1377 | // Find out the new data payload which follows Pkcs7 SignedData directly.\r | |
1378 | //\r | |
2d3fb919 | 1379 | PayloadPtr = SigData + SigDataSize;\r |
1380 | PayloadSize = DataSize - OFFSET_OF_AUTHINFO2_CERT_DATA - (UINTN) SigDataSize;\r | |
0c18794e | 1381 | \r |
1382 | //\r | |
1383 | // Construct a buffer to fill with (VariableName, VendorGuid, Attributes, TimeStamp, Data).\r | |
1384 | //\r | |
2d3fb919 | 1385 | NewDataSize = PayloadSize + sizeof (EFI_TIME) + sizeof (UINT32) +\r |
1386 | sizeof (EFI_GUID) + StrSize (VariableName) - sizeof (CHAR16);\r | |
1387 | NewData = mSerializationRuntimeBuffer;\r | |
0c18794e | 1388 | \r |
2d3fb919 | 1389 | Buffer = NewData;\r |
1390 | Length = StrLen (VariableName) * sizeof (CHAR16);\r | |
1391 | CopyMem (Buffer, VariableName, Length);\r | |
1392 | Buffer += Length;\r | |
0c18794e | 1393 | \r |
2d3fb919 | 1394 | Length = sizeof (EFI_GUID);\r |
1395 | CopyMem (Buffer, VendorGuid, Length);\r | |
1396 | Buffer += Length;\r | |
0c18794e | 1397 | \r |
2d3fb919 | 1398 | Length = sizeof (UINT32);\r |
1399 | CopyMem (Buffer, &Attr, Length);\r | |
1400 | Buffer += Length;\r | |
0c18794e | 1401 | \r |
2d3fb919 | 1402 | Length = sizeof (EFI_TIME);\r |
1403 | CopyMem (Buffer, &CertData->TimeStamp, Length);\r | |
1404 | Buffer += Length;\r | |
0c18794e | 1405 | \r |
2d3fb919 | 1406 | CopyMem (Buffer, PayloadPtr, PayloadSize);\r |
0c18794e | 1407 | \r |
1408 | if (Pk) {\r | |
1409 | //\r | |
1410 | // Get platform key from variable.\r | |
1411 | //\r | |
1412 | Status = FindVariable (\r | |
2d3fb919 | 1413 | EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME,\r |
1414 | &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r | |
1415 | &PkVariable,\r | |
0c18794e | 1416 | &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal\r |
1417 | );\r | |
1418 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
1419 | return Status;\r | |
1420 | }\r | |
1421 | \r | |
1422 | CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) GetVariableDataPtr (PkVariable.CurrPtr);\r | |
1423 | Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r | |
1424 | RootCert = Cert->SignatureData;\r | |
1425 | RootCertSize = CertList->SignatureSize;\r | |
1426 | \r | |
1427 | \r | |
1428 | //\r | |
1429 | // Verify Pkcs7 SignedData via Pkcs7Verify library.\r | |
1430 | //\r | |
1431 | VerifyStatus = Pkcs7Verify (\r | |
1432 | SigData,\r | |
1433 | SigDataSize,\r | |
1434 | RootCert,\r | |
1435 | RootCertSize,\r | |
1436 | NewData,\r | |
1437 | NewDataSize\r | |
1438 | );\r | |
1439 | \r | |
1440 | } else {\r | |
2d3fb919 | 1441 | \r |
0c18794e | 1442 | //\r |
1443 | // Get KEK database from variable.\r | |
1444 | //\r | |
1445 | Status = FindVariable (\r | |
2d3fb919 | 1446 | EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME,\r |
1447 | &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r | |
1448 | &KekVariable,\r | |
0c18794e | 1449 | &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal\r |
1450 | );\r | |
1451 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
1452 | return Status;\r | |
1453 | }\r | |
1454 | \r | |
1455 | //\r | |
1456 | // Ready to verify Pkcs7 SignedData. Go through KEK Signature Database to find out X.509 CertList.\r | |
2d3fb919 | 1457 | //\r |
0c18794e | 1458 | KekDataSize = KekVariable.CurrPtr->DataSize;\r |
1459 | CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) GetVariableDataPtr (KekVariable.CurrPtr);\r | |
1460 | while ((KekDataSize > 0) && (KekDataSize >= CertList->SignatureListSize)) {\r | |
1461 | if (CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Guid)) {\r | |
1462 | Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r | |
1463 | CertCount = (CertList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - CertList->SignatureHeaderSize) / CertList->SignatureSize;\r | |
1464 | for (Index = 0; Index < CertCount; Index++) {\r | |
1465 | //\r | |
1466 | // Iterate each Signature Data Node within this CertList for a verify\r | |
1467 | //\r | |
1468 | RootCert = Cert->SignatureData;\r | |
1469 | RootCertSize = CertList->SignatureSize;\r | |
2d3fb919 | 1470 | \r |
0c18794e | 1471 | //\r |
1472 | // Verify Pkcs7 SignedData via Pkcs7Verify library.\r | |
1473 | //\r | |
1474 | VerifyStatus = Pkcs7Verify (\r | |
1475 | SigData,\r | |
1476 | SigDataSize,\r | |
1477 | RootCert,\r | |
1478 | RootCertSize,\r | |
1479 | NewData,\r | |
1480 | NewDataSize\r | |
1481 | );\r | |
1482 | if (VerifyStatus) {\r | |
1483 | goto Exit;\r | |
1484 | }\r | |
1485 | Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) Cert + CertList->SignatureSize);\r | |
1486 | }\r | |
1487 | }\r | |
1488 | KekDataSize -= CertList->SignatureListSize;\r | |
1489 | CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + CertList->SignatureListSize);\r | |
1490 | }\r | |
1491 | }\r | |
1492 | \r | |
1493 | Exit:\r | |
1494 | \r | |
0c18794e | 1495 | if (!VerifyStatus) {\r |
1496 | return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r | |
1497 | }\r | |
1498 | \r | |
2d3fb919 | 1499 | if ((PayloadSize == 0) && (VarDel != NULL)) {\r |
0c18794e | 1500 | *VarDel = TRUE;\r |
1501 | }\r | |
2d3fb919 | 1502 | \r |
0c18794e | 1503 | //\r |
1504 | // Final step: Update/Append Variable if it pass Pkcs7Verify\r | |
1505 | //\r | |
1506 | return UpdateVariable (\r | |
2d3fb919 | 1507 | VariableName,\r |
1508 | VendorGuid,\r | |
1509 | PayloadPtr,\r | |
1510 | PayloadSize,\r | |
1511 | Attributes,\r | |
1512 | 0,\r | |
1513 | 0,\r | |
0c18794e | 1514 | Variable,\r |
1515 | &CertData->TimeStamp\r | |
1516 | );\r | |
1517 | }\r |