[mirror_edk2.git] / SecurityPkg / VariableAuthenticated / SecureBootConfigDxe / SecureBootConfigImpl.c

/** @file\r
  HII Config Access protocol implementation of SecureBoot configuration module.\r
\r
Copyright (c) 2011 - 2017, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>\r
(C) Copyright 2018 Hewlett Packard Enterprise Development LP<BR>\r
This program and the accompanying materials\r
are licensed and made available under the terms and conditions of the BSD License\r
which accompanies this distribution.  The full text of the license may be found at\r
http://opensource.org/licenses/bsd-license.php\r
\r
THE PROGRAM IS DISTRIBUTED UNDER THE BSD LICENSE ON AN "AS IS" BASIS,\r
WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR REPRESENTATIONS OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED.\r
\r
**/\r
\r
#include "SecureBootConfigImpl.h"\r
#include <Library/BaseCryptLib.h>\r
\r
CHAR16              mSecureBootStorageName[] = L"SECUREBOOT_CONFIGURATION";\r
\r
SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_DATA         mSecureBootConfigPrivateDateTemplate = {\r
  SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_DATA_SIGNATURE,\r
  {\r
    SecureBootExtractConfig,\r
    SecureBootRouteConfig,\r
    SecureBootCallback\r
  }\r
};\r
\r
HII_VENDOR_DEVICE_PATH          mSecureBootHiiVendorDevicePath = {\r
  {\r
    {\r
      HARDWARE_DEVICE_PATH,\r
      HW_VENDOR_DP,\r
      {\r
        (UINT8) (sizeof (VENDOR_DEVICE_PATH)),\r
        (UINT8) ((sizeof (VENDOR_DEVICE_PATH)) >> 8)\r
      }\r
    },\r
    SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_FORM_SET_GUID\r
  },\r
  {\r
    END_DEVICE_PATH_TYPE,\r
    END_ENTIRE_DEVICE_PATH_SUBTYPE,\r
    {\r
      (UINT8) (END_DEVICE_PATH_LENGTH),\r
      (UINT8) ((END_DEVICE_PATH_LENGTH) >> 8)\r
    }\r
  }\r
};\r
\r
\r
BOOLEAN mIsEnterSecureBootForm = FALSE;\r
\r
//\r
// OID ASN.1 Value for Hash Algorithms\r
//\r
UINT8 mHashOidValue[] = {\r
  0x2A, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xF7, 0x0D, 0x02, 0x05,         // OBJ_md5\r
  0x2B, 0x0E, 0x03, 0x02, 0x1A,                           // OBJ_sha1\r
  0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x04,   // OBJ_sha224\r
  0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x01,   // OBJ_sha256\r
  0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x02,   // OBJ_sha384\r
  0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x03,   // OBJ_sha512\r
  };\r
\r
HASH_TABLE mHash[] = {\r
  { L"SHA224", 28, &mHashOidValue[13], 9, NULL,                 NULL,       NULL,         NULL       },\r
  { L"SHA256", 32, &mHashOidValue[22], 9, Sha256GetContextSize, Sha256Init, Sha256Update, Sha256Final},\r
  { L"SHA384", 48, &mHashOidValue[31], 9, Sha384GetContextSize, Sha384Init, Sha384Update, Sha384Final},\r
  { L"SHA512", 64, &mHashOidValue[40], 9, Sha512GetContextSize, Sha512Init, Sha512Update, Sha512Final}\r
};\r
\r
//\r
// Variable Definitions\r
//\r
UINT32            mPeCoffHeaderOffset = 0;\r
WIN_CERTIFICATE   *mCertificate = NULL;\r
IMAGE_TYPE        mImageType;\r
UINT8             *mImageBase = NULL;\r
UINTN             mImageSize = 0;\r
UINT8             mImageDigest[MAX_DIGEST_SIZE];\r
UINTN             mImageDigestSize;\r
EFI_GUID          mCertType;\r
EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATA_DIRECTORY    *mSecDataDir = NULL;\r
EFI_IMAGE_OPTIONAL_HEADER_PTR_UNION  mNtHeader;\r
\r
//\r
// Possible DER-encoded certificate file suffixes, end with NULL pointer.\r
//\r
CHAR16* mDerEncodedSuffix[] = {\r
  L".cer",\r
  L".der",\r
  L".crt",\r
  NULL\r
};\r
CHAR16* mSupportX509Suffix = L"*.cer/der/crt";\r
\r
SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_DATA  *gSecureBootPrivateData = NULL;\r
\r
/**\r
  This code cleans up enrolled file by closing file & free related resources attached to\r
  enrolled file.\r
\r
  @param[in] FileContext            FileContext cached in SecureBootConfig driver\r
\r
**/\r
VOID\r
CloseEnrolledFile(\r
  IN SECUREBOOT_FILE_CONTEXT *FileContext\r
)\r
{\r
  if (FileContext->FHandle != NULL) {\r
    CloseFile (FileContext->FHandle);\r
    FileContext->FHandle = NULL;\r
  }\r
\r
  if (FileContext->FileName != NULL){\r
    FreePool(FileContext->FileName);\r
    FileContext->FileName = NULL;\r
  }\r
  FileContext->FileType = UNKNOWN_FILE_TYPE;\r
\r
}\r
\r
/**\r
  This code checks if the FileSuffix is one of the possible DER-encoded certificate suffix.\r
\r
  @param[in] FileSuffix            The suffix of the input certificate file\r
\r
  @retval    TRUE           It's a DER-encoded certificate.\r
  @retval    FALSE          It's NOT a DER-encoded certificate.\r
\r
**/\r
BOOLEAN\r
IsDerEncodeCertificate (\r
  IN CONST CHAR16         *FileSuffix\r
)\r
{\r
  UINTN     Index;\r
  for (Index = 0; mDerEncodedSuffix[Index] != NULL; Index++) {\r
    if (StrCmp (FileSuffix, mDerEncodedSuffix[Index]) == 0) {\r
      return TRUE;\r
    }\r
  }\r
  return FALSE;\r
}\r
\r
/**\r
  This code checks if the file content complies with EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 format\r
The function reads file content but won't open/close given FileHandle.\r
\r
  @param[in] FileHandle            The FileHandle to be checked\r
\r
  @retval    TRUE            The content is EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 format.\r
  @retval    FALSE          The content is NOT a EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 format.\r
\r
**/\r
BOOLEAN\r
IsAuthentication2Format (\r
  IN   EFI_FILE_HANDLE    FileHandle\r
)\r
{\r
  EFI_STATUS                     Status;\r
  EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2  *Auth2;\r
  BOOLEAN                        IsAuth2Format;\r
\r
  IsAuth2Format = FALSE;\r
\r
  //\r
  // Read the whole file content\r
  //\r
  Status = ReadFileContent(\r
             FileHandle,\r
             (VOID **) &mImageBase,\r
             &mImageSize,\r
             0\r
             );\r
  if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
    goto ON_EXIT;\r
  }\r
\r
  Auth2 = (EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 *)mImageBase;\r
  if (Auth2->AuthInfo.Hdr.wCertificateType != WIN_CERT_TYPE_EFI_GUID) {\r
    goto ON_EXIT;\r
  }\r
\r
  if (CompareGuid(&gEfiCertPkcs7Guid, &Auth2->AuthInfo.CertType)) {\r
    IsAuth2Format = TRUE;\r
  }\r
\r
ON_EXIT:\r
  //\r
  // Do not close File. simply check file content\r
  //\r
  if (mImageBase != NULL) {\r
    FreePool (mImageBase);\r
    mImageBase = NULL;\r
  }\r
\r
  return IsAuth2Format;\r
}\r
\r
/**\r
  Set Secure Boot option into variable space.\r
\r
  @param[in] VarValue              The option of Secure Boot.\r
\r
  @retval    EFI_SUCCESS           The operation is finished successfully.\r
  @retval    Others                Other errors as indicated.\r
\r
**/\r
EFI_STATUS\r
SaveSecureBootVariable (\r
  IN UINT8                         VarValue\r
  )\r
{\r
  EFI_STATUS                       Status;\r
\r
  Status = gRT->SetVariable (\r
             EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME,\r
             &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid,\r
             EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS,\r
             sizeof (UINT8),\r
             &VarValue\r
             );\r
  return Status;\r
}\r
\r
/**\r
  Create a time based data payload by concatenating the EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2\r
  descriptor with the input data. NO authentication is required in this function.\r
\r
  @param[in, out]   DataSize       On input, the size of Data buffer in bytes.\r
                                   On output, the size of data returned in Data\r
                                   buffer in bytes.\r
  @param[in, out]   Data           On input, Pointer to data buffer to be wrapped or\r
                                   pointer to NULL to wrap an empty payload.\r
                                   On output, Pointer to the new payload date buffer allocated from pool,\r
                                   it's caller's responsibility to free the memory when finish using it.\r
\r
  @retval EFI_SUCCESS              Create time based payload successfully.\r
  @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES     There are not enough memory resourses to create time based payload.\r
  @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER    The parameter is invalid.\r
  @retval Others                   Unexpected error happens.\r
\r
**/\r
EFI_STATUS\r
CreateTimeBasedPayload (\r
  IN OUT UINTN            *DataSize,\r
  IN OUT UINT8            **Data\r
  )\r
{\r
  EFI_STATUS                       Status;\r
  UINT8                            *NewData;\r
  UINT8                            *Payload;\r
  UINTN                            PayloadSize;\r
  EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2    *DescriptorData;\r
  UINTN                            DescriptorSize;\r
  EFI_TIME                         Time;\r
\r
  if (Data == NULL || DataSize == NULL) {\r
    return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
  }\r
\r
  //\r
  // In Setup mode or Custom mode, the variable does not need to be signed but the\r
  // parameters to the SetVariable() call still need to be prepared as authenticated\r
  // variable. So we create EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_2 descriptor without certificate\r
  // data in it.\r
  //\r
  Payload     = *Data;\r
  PayloadSize = *DataSize;\r
\r
  DescriptorSize    = OFFSET_OF (EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2, AuthInfo) + OFFSET_OF (WIN_CERTIFICATE_UEFI_GUID, CertData);\r
  NewData = (UINT8*) AllocateZeroPool (DescriptorSize + PayloadSize);\r
  if (NewData == NULL) {\r
    return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
  }\r
\r
  if ((Payload != NULL) && (PayloadSize != 0)) {\r
    CopyMem (NewData + DescriptorSize, Payload, PayloadSize);\r
  }\r
\r
  DescriptorData = (EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 *) (NewData);\r
\r
  ZeroMem (&Time, sizeof (EFI_TIME));\r
  Status = gRT->GetTime (&Time, NULL);\r
  if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
    FreePool(NewData);\r
    return Status;\r
  }\r
  Time.Pad1       = 0;\r
  Time.Nanosecond = 0;\r
  Time.TimeZone   = 0;\r
  Time.Daylight   = 0;\r
  Time.Pad2       = 0;\r
  CopyMem (&DescriptorData->TimeStamp, &Time, sizeof (EFI_TIME));\r
\r
  DescriptorData->AuthInfo.Hdr.dwLength         = OFFSET_OF (WIN_CERTIFICATE_UEFI_GUID, CertData);\r
  DescriptorData->AuthInfo.Hdr.wRevision        = 0x0200;\r
  DescriptorData->AuthInfo.Hdr.wCertificateType = WIN_CERT_TYPE_EFI_GUID;\r
  CopyGuid (&DescriptorData->AuthInfo.CertType, &gEfiCertPkcs7Guid);\r
\r
  if (Payload != NULL) {\r
    FreePool(Payload);\r
  }\r
\r
  *DataSize = DescriptorSize + PayloadSize;\r
  *Data     = NewData;\r
  return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
}\r
\r
/**\r
  Internal helper function to delete a Variable given its name and GUID, NO authentication\r
  required.\r
\r
  @param[in]      VariableName            Name of the Variable.\r
  @param[in]      VendorGuid              GUID of the Variable.\r
\r
  @retval EFI_SUCCESS              Variable deleted successfully.\r
  @retval Others                   The driver failed to start the device.\r
\r
**/\r
EFI_STATUS\r
DeleteVariable (\r
  IN  CHAR16                    *VariableName,\r
  IN  EFI_GUID                  *VendorGuid\r
  )\r
{\r
  EFI_STATUS              Status;\r
  VOID*                   Variable;\r
  UINT8                   *Data;\r
  UINTN                   DataSize;\r
  UINT32                  Attr;\r
\r
  GetVariable2 (VariableName, VendorGuid, &Variable, NULL);\r
  if (Variable == NULL) {\r
    return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
  }\r
  FreePool (Variable);\r
\r
  Data     = NULL;\r
  DataSize = 0;\r
  Attr     = EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS\r
             | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS;\r
\r
  Status = CreateTimeBasedPayload (&DataSize, &Data);\r
  if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
    DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Fail to create time-based data payload: %r", Status));\r
    return Status;\r
  }\r
\r
  Status = gRT->SetVariable (\r
                  VariableName,\r
                  VendorGuid,\r
                  Attr,\r
                  DataSize,\r
                  Data\r
                  );\r
  if (Data != NULL) {\r
    FreePool (Data);\r
  }\r
  return Status;\r
}\r
\r
/**\r
\r
  Set the platform secure boot mode into "Custom" or "Standard" mode.\r
\r
  @param[in]   SecureBootMode        New secure boot mode: STANDARD_SECURE_BOOT_MODE or\r
                                     CUSTOM_SECURE_BOOT_MODE.\r
\r
  @return EFI_SUCCESS                The platform has switched to the special mode successfully.\r
  @return other                      Fail to operate the secure boot mode.\r
\r
**/\r
EFI_STATUS\r
SetSecureBootMode (\r
  IN     UINT8         SecureBootMode\r
  )\r
{\r
  return gRT->SetVariable (\r
                EFI_CUSTOM_MODE_NAME,\r
                &gEfiCustomModeEnableGuid,\r
                EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS,\r
                sizeof (UINT8),\r
                &SecureBootMode\r
                );\r
}\r
\r
/**\r
  Generate the PK signature list from the X509 Certificate storing file (.cer)\r
\r
  @param[in]   X509File              FileHandle of X509 Certificate storing file.\r
  @param[out]  PkCert                Point to the data buffer to store the signature list.\r
\r
  @return EFI_UNSUPPORTED            Unsupported Key Length.\r
  @return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES       There are not enough memory resourses to form the signature list.\r
\r
**/\r
EFI_STATUS\r
CreatePkX509SignatureList (\r
  IN    EFI_FILE_HANDLE             X509File,\r
  OUT   EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST          **PkCert\r
  )\r
{\r
  EFI_STATUS              Status;\r
  UINT8                   *X509Data;\r
  UINTN                   X509DataSize;\r
  EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA      *PkCertData;\r
\r
  X509Data = NULL;\r
  PkCertData = NULL;\r
  X509DataSize = 0;\r
\r
  Status = ReadFileContent (X509File, (VOID**) &X509Data, &X509DataSize, 0);\r
  if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
    goto ON_EXIT;\r
  }\r
  ASSERT (X509Data != NULL);\r
\r
  //\r
  // Allocate space for PK certificate list and initialize it.\r
  // Create PK database entry with SignatureHeaderSize equals 0.\r
  //\r
  *PkCert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST*) AllocateZeroPool (\r
              sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1\r
              + X509DataSize\r
              );\r
  if (*PkCert == NULL) {\r
    Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
    goto ON_EXIT;\r
  }\r
\r
  (*PkCert)->SignatureListSize   = (UINT32) (sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST)\r
                                    + sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1\r
                                    + X509DataSize);\r
  (*PkCert)->SignatureSize       = (UINT32) (sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1 + X509DataSize);\r
  (*PkCert)->SignatureHeaderSize = 0;\r
  CopyGuid (&(*PkCert)->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Guid);\r
  PkCertData                     = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA*) ((UINTN)(*PkCert)\r
                                                          + sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST)\r
                                                          + (*PkCert)->SignatureHeaderSize);\r
  CopyGuid (&PkCertData->SignatureOwner, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid);\r
  //\r
  // Fill the PK database with PKpub data from X509 certificate file.\r
  //\r
  CopyMem (&(PkCertData->SignatureData[0]), X509Data, X509DataSize);\r
\r
ON_EXIT:\r
\r
  if (X509Data != NULL) {\r
    FreePool (X509Data);\r
  }\r
\r
  if (EFI_ERROR(Status) && *PkCert != NULL) {\r
    FreePool (*PkCert);\r
    *PkCert = NULL;\r
  }\r
\r
  return Status;\r
}\r
\r
/**\r
  Enroll new PK into the System without original PK's authentication.\r
\r
  The SignatureOwner GUID will be the same with PK's vendorguid.\r
\r
  @param[in] PrivateData     The module's private data.\r
\r
  @retval   EFI_SUCCESS            New PK enrolled successfully.\r
  @retval   EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER  The parameter is invalid.\r
  @retval   EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES   Could not allocate needed resources.\r
\r
**/\r
EFI_STATUS\r
EnrollPlatformKey (\r
   IN  SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_DATA*   Private\r
  )\r
{\r
  EFI_STATUS                      Status;\r
  UINT32                          Attr;\r
  UINTN                           DataSize;\r
  EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST              *PkCert;\r
  UINT16*                         FilePostFix;\r
  UINTN                           NameLength;\r
\r
  if (Private->FileContext->FileName == NULL) {\r
    return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
  }\r
\r
  PkCert = NULL;\r
\r
  Status = SetSecureBootMode(CUSTOM_SECURE_BOOT_MODE);\r
  if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
    return Status;\r
  }\r
\r
  //\r
  // Parse the file's postfix. Only support DER encoded X.509 certificate files.\r
  //\r
  NameLength = StrLen (Private->FileContext->FileName);\r
  if (NameLength <= 4) {\r
    return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
  }\r
  FilePostFix = Private->FileContext->FileName + NameLength - 4;\r
  if (!IsDerEncodeCertificate(FilePostFix)) {\r
    DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Unsupported file type, only DER encoded certificate (%s) is supported.", mSupportX509Suffix));\r
    return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
  }\r
  DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "FileName= %s\n", Private->FileContext->FileName));\r
  DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "FilePostFix = %s\n", FilePostFix));\r
\r
  //\r
  // Prase the selected PK file and generature PK certificate list.\r
  //\r
  Status = CreatePkX509SignatureList (\r
            Private->FileContext->FHandle,\r
            &PkCert\r
            );\r
  if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
    goto ON_EXIT;\r
  }\r
  ASSERT (PkCert != NULL);\r
\r
  //\r
  // Set Platform Key variable.\r
  //\r
  Attr = EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS\r
          | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS;\r
  DataSize = PkCert->SignatureListSize;\r
  Status = CreateTimeBasedPayload (&DataSize, (UINT8**) &PkCert);\r
  if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
    DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Fail to create time-based data payload: %r", Status));\r
    goto ON_EXIT;\r
  }\r
\r
  Status = gRT->SetVariable(\r
                  EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME,\r
                  &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
                  Attr,\r
                  DataSize,\r
                  PkCert\r
                  );\r
  if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
    if (Status == EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES) {\r
      DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Enroll PK failed with out of resource.\n"));\r
    }\r
    goto ON_EXIT;\r
  }\r
\r
ON_EXIT:\r
\r
  if (PkCert != NULL) {\r
    FreePool(PkCert);\r
  }\r
\r
  CloseEnrolledFile(Private->FileContext);\r
\r
  return Status;\r
}\r
\r
/**\r
  Remove the PK variable.\r
\r
  @retval EFI_SUCCESS    Delete PK successfully.\r
  @retval Others         Could not allow to delete PK.\r
\r
**/\r
EFI_STATUS\r
DeletePlatformKey (\r
  VOID\r
)\r
{\r
  EFI_STATUS Status;\r
\r
  Status = SetSecureBootMode(CUSTOM_SECURE_BOOT_MODE);\r
  if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
    return Status;\r
  }\r
\r
  Status = DeleteVariable (\r
             EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME,\r
             &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid\r
             );\r
  return Status;\r
}\r
\r
/**\r
  Enroll a new KEK item from public key storing file (*.pbk).\r
\r
  @param[in] PrivateData           The module's private data.\r
\r
  @retval   EFI_SUCCESS            New KEK enrolled successfully.\r
  @retval   EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER  The parameter is invalid.\r
  @retval   EFI_UNSUPPORTED        Unsupported command.\r
  @retval   EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES   Could not allocate needed resources.\r
\r
**/\r
EFI_STATUS\r
EnrollRsa2048ToKek (\r
  IN SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_DATA *Private\r
  )\r
{\r
  EFI_STATUS                      Status;\r
  UINT32                          Attr;\r
  UINTN                           DataSize;\r
  EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST              *KekSigList;\r
  UINTN                           KeyBlobSize;\r
  UINT8                           *KeyBlob;\r
  CPL_KEY_INFO                    *KeyInfo;\r
  EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA              *KEKSigData;\r
  UINTN                           KekSigListSize;\r
  UINT8                           *KeyBuffer;\r
  UINTN                           KeyLenInBytes;\r
\r
  Attr        = 0;\r
  DataSize    = 0;\r
  KeyBuffer   = NULL;\r
  KeyBlobSize = 0;\r
  KeyBlob     = NULL;\r
  KeyInfo     = NULL;\r
  KEKSigData  = NULL;\r
  KekSigList  = NULL;\r
  KekSigListSize = 0;\r
\r
  //\r
  // Form the KeKpub certificate list into EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST type.\r
  // First, We have to parse out public key data from the pbk key file.\r
  //\r
  Status = ReadFileContent (\r
             Private->FileContext->FHandle,\r
             (VOID**) &KeyBlob,\r
             &KeyBlobSize,\r
             0\r
             );\r
  if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
    goto ON_EXIT;\r
  }\r
  ASSERT (KeyBlob != NULL);\r
  KeyInfo = (CPL_KEY_INFO *) KeyBlob;\r
  if (KeyInfo->KeyLengthInBits / 8 != WIN_CERT_UEFI_RSA2048_SIZE) {\r
    DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Unsupported key length, Only RSA2048 is supported.\n"));\r
    Status = EFI_UNSUPPORTED;\r
    goto ON_EXIT;\r
  }\r
\r
  //\r
  // Convert the Public key to fix octet string format represented in RSA PKCS#1.\r
  //\r
  KeyLenInBytes = KeyInfo->KeyLengthInBits / 8;\r
  KeyBuffer = AllocateZeroPool (KeyLenInBytes);\r
  if (KeyBuffer == NULL) {\r
    Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
    goto ON_EXIT;\r
  }\r
  Int2OctStr (\r
    (UINTN*) (KeyBlob + sizeof (CPL_KEY_INFO)),\r
    KeyLenInBytes / sizeof (UINTN),\r
    KeyBuffer,\r
    KeyLenInBytes\r
    );\r
  CopyMem(KeyBlob + sizeof(CPL_KEY_INFO), KeyBuffer, KeyLenInBytes);\r
\r
  //\r
  // Form an new EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST.\r
  //\r
  KekSigListSize = sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST)\r
                     + sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1\r
                     + WIN_CERT_UEFI_RSA2048_SIZE;\r
\r
  KekSigList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST*) AllocateZeroPool (KekSigListSize);\r
  if (KekSigList == NULL) {\r
    Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
    goto ON_EXIT;\r
  }\r
\r
  KekSigList->SignatureListSize   = sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST)\r
                                  + sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1\r
                                  + WIN_CERT_UEFI_RSA2048_SIZE;\r
  KekSigList->SignatureHeaderSize = 0;\r
  KekSigList->SignatureSize = sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1 + WIN_CERT_UEFI_RSA2048_SIZE;\r
  CopyGuid (&KekSigList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertRsa2048Guid);\r
\r
  KEKSigData = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA*)((UINT8*)KekSigList + sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST));\r
  CopyGuid (&KEKSigData->SignatureOwner, Private->SignatureGUID);\r
  CopyMem (\r
    KEKSigData->SignatureData,\r
    KeyBlob + sizeof(CPL_KEY_INFO),\r
    WIN_CERT_UEFI_RSA2048_SIZE\r
    );\r
\r
  //\r
  // Check if KEK entry has been already existed.\r
  // If true, use EFI_VARIABLE_APPEND_WRITE attribute to append the\r
  // new KEK to original variable.\r
  //\r
  Attr = EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS\r
         | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS;\r
  Status = CreateTimeBasedPayload (&KekSigListSize, (UINT8**) &KekSigList);\r
  if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
    DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Fail to create time-based data payload: %r", Status));\r
    goto ON_EXIT;\r
  }\r
\r
  Status = gRT->GetVariable(\r
                  EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME,\r
                  &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
                  NULL,\r
                  &DataSize,\r
                  NULL\r
                  );\r
  if (Status == EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {\r
    Attr |= EFI_VARIABLE_APPEND_WRITE;\r
  } else if (Status != EFI_NOT_FOUND) {\r
    goto ON_EXIT;\r
  }\r
\r
  //\r
  // Done. Now we have formed the correct KEKpub database item, just set it into variable storage,\r
  //\r
  Status = gRT->SetVariable(\r
                  EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME,\r
                  &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
                  Attr,\r
                  KekSigListSize,\r
                  KekSigList\r
                  );\r
  if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
    goto ON_EXIT;\r
  }\r
\r
ON_EXIT:\r
\r
  CloseEnrolledFile(Private->FileContext);\r
\r
  if (Private->SignatureGUID != NULL) {\r
    FreePool (Private->SignatureGUID);\r
    Private->SignatureGUID = NULL;\r
  }\r
\r
  if (KeyBlob != NULL) {\r
    FreePool (KeyBlob);\r
  }\r
  if (KeyBuffer != NULL) {\r
    FreePool (KeyBuffer);\r
  }\r
  if (KekSigList != NULL) {\r
    FreePool (KekSigList);\r
  }\r
\r
  return Status;\r
}\r
\r
/**\r
  Enroll a new KEK item from X509 certificate file.\r
\r
  @param[in] PrivateData           The module's private data.\r
\r
  @retval   EFI_SUCCESS            New X509 is enrolled successfully.\r
  @retval   EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER  The parameter is invalid.\r
  @retval   EFI_UNSUPPORTED        Unsupported command.\r
  @retval   EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES   Could not allocate needed resources.\r
\r
**/\r
EFI_STATUS\r
EnrollX509ToKek (\r
  IN SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_DATA *Private\r
  )\r
{\r
  EFI_STATUS                        Status;\r
  UINTN                             X509DataSize;\r
  VOID                              *X509Data;\r
  EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA                *KEKSigData;\r
  EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST                *KekSigList;\r
  UINTN                             DataSize;\r
  UINTN                             KekSigListSize;\r
  UINT32                            Attr;\r
\r
  X509Data       = NULL;\r
  X509DataSize   = 0;\r
  KekSigList     = NULL;\r
  KekSigListSize = 0;\r
  DataSize       = 0;\r
  KEKSigData     = NULL;\r
\r
  Status = ReadFileContent (\r
             Private->FileContext->FHandle,\r
             &X509Data,\r
             &X509DataSize,\r
             0\r
             );\r
  if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
    goto ON_EXIT;\r
  }\r
  ASSERT (X509Data != NULL);\r
\r
  KekSigListSize = sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1 + X509DataSize;\r
  KekSigList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST*) AllocateZeroPool (KekSigListSize);\r
  if (KekSigList == NULL) {\r
    Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
    goto ON_EXIT;\r
  }\r
\r
  //\r
  // Fill Certificate Database parameters.\r
  //\r
  KekSigList->SignatureListSize   = (UINT32) KekSigListSize;\r
  KekSigList->SignatureHeaderSize = 0;\r
  KekSigList->SignatureSize = (UINT32) (sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1 + X509DataSize);\r
  CopyGuid (&KekSigList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Guid);\r
\r
  KEKSigData = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA*) ((UINT8*) KekSigList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST));\r
  CopyGuid (&KEKSigData->SignatureOwner, Private->SignatureGUID);\r
  CopyMem (KEKSigData->SignatureData, X509Data, X509DataSize);\r
\r
  //\r
  // Check if KEK been already existed.\r
  // If true, use EFI_VARIABLE_APPEND_WRITE attribute to append the\r
  // new kek to original variable\r
  //\r
  Attr = EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS\r
          | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS;\r
  Status = CreateTimeBasedPayload (&KekSigListSize, (UINT8**) &KekSigList);\r
  if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
    DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Fail to create time-based data payload: %r", Status));\r
    goto ON_EXIT;\r
  }\r
\r
  Status = gRT->GetVariable(\r
                  EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME,\r
                  &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
                  NULL,\r
                  &DataSize,\r
                  NULL\r
                  );\r
  if (Status == EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {\r
    Attr |= EFI_VARIABLE_APPEND_WRITE;\r
  } else if (Status != EFI_NOT_FOUND) {\r
    goto ON_EXIT;\r
  }\r
\r
  Status = gRT->SetVariable(\r
                  EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME,\r
                  &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
                  Attr,\r
                  KekSigListSize,\r
                  KekSigList\r
                  );\r
  if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
    goto ON_EXIT;\r
  }\r
\r
ON_EXIT:\r
\r
  CloseEnrolledFile(Private->FileContext);\r
\r
  if (Private->SignatureGUID != NULL) {\r
    FreePool (Private->SignatureGUID);\r
    Private->SignatureGUID = NULL;\r
  }\r
\r
  if (KekSigList != NULL) {\r
    FreePool (KekSigList);\r
  }\r
\r
  return Status;\r
}\r
\r
/**\r
  Enroll new KEK into the System without PK's authentication.\r
  The SignatureOwner GUID will be Private->SignatureGUID.\r
\r
  @param[in] PrivateData     The module's private data.\r
\r
  @retval   EFI_SUCCESS            New KEK enrolled successful.\r
  @retval   EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER  The parameter is invalid.\r
  @retval   others                 Fail to enroll KEK data.\r
\r
**/\r
EFI_STATUS\r
EnrollKeyExchangeKey (\r
  IN SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_DATA *Private\r
  )\r
{\r
  UINT16*     FilePostFix;\r
  EFI_STATUS  Status;\r
  UINTN       NameLength;\r
\r
  if ((Private->FileContext->FHandle == NULL) || (Private->FileContext->FileName == NULL) || (Private->SignatureGUID == NULL)) {\r
    return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
  }\r
\r
  Status = SetSecureBootMode(CUSTOM_SECURE_BOOT_MODE);\r
  if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
    return Status;\r
  }\r
\r
  //\r
  // Parse the file's postfix. Supports DER-encoded X509 certificate,\r
  // and .pbk as RSA public key file.\r
  //\r
  NameLength = StrLen (Private->FileContext->FileName);\r
  if (NameLength <= 4) {\r
    return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
  }\r
  FilePostFix = Private->FileContext->FileName + NameLength - 4;\r
  if (IsDerEncodeCertificate(FilePostFix)) {\r
    return EnrollX509ToKek (Private);\r
  } else if (CompareMem (FilePostFix, L".pbk",4) == 0) {\r
    return EnrollRsa2048ToKek (Private);\r
  } else {\r
    //\r
    // File type is wrong, simply close it\r
    //\r
    CloseEnrolledFile(Private->FileContext);\r
\r
    return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
  }\r
}\r
\r
/**\r
  Enroll a new X509 certificate into Signature Database (DB or DBX or DBT) without\r
  KEK's authentication.\r
\r
  @param[in] PrivateData     The module's private data.\r
  @param[in] VariableName    Variable name of signature database, must be\r
                             EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE or EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1.\r
\r
  @retval   EFI_SUCCESS            New X509 is enrolled successfully.\r
  @retval   EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES   Could not allocate needed resources.\r
\r
**/\r
EFI_STATUS\r
EnrollX509toSigDB (\r
  IN SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_DATA *Private,\r
  IN CHAR16                         *VariableName\r
  )\r
{\r
  EFI_STATUS                        Status;\r
  UINTN                             X509DataSize;\r
  VOID                              *X509Data;\r
  EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST                *SigDBCert;\r
  EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA                *SigDBCertData;\r
  VOID                              *Data;\r
  UINTN                             DataSize;\r
  UINTN                             SigDBSize;\r
  UINT32                            Attr;\r
\r
  X509DataSize  = 0;\r
  SigDBSize     = 0;\r
  DataSize      = 0;\r
  X509Data      = NULL;\r
  SigDBCert     = NULL;\r
  SigDBCertData = NULL;\r
  Data          = NULL;\r
\r
  Status = ReadFileContent (\r
             Private->FileContext->FHandle,\r
             &X509Data,\r
             &X509DataSize,\r
             0\r
             );\r
  if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
    goto ON_EXIT;\r
  }\r
  ASSERT (X509Data != NULL);\r
\r
  SigDBSize = sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1 + X509DataSize;\r
\r
  Data = AllocateZeroPool (SigDBSize);\r
  if (Data == NULL) {\r
    Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
    goto ON_EXIT;\r
  }\r
\r
  //\r
  // Fill Certificate Database parameters.\r
  //\r
  SigDBCert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST*) Data;\r
  SigDBCert->SignatureListSize   = (UINT32) SigDBSize;\r
  SigDBCert->SignatureHeaderSize = 0;\r
  SigDBCert->SignatureSize = (UINT32) (sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1 + X509DataSize);\r
  CopyGuid (&SigDBCert->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Guid);\r
\r
  SigDBCertData = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA*) ((UINT8* ) SigDBCert + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST));\r
  CopyGuid (&SigDBCertData->SignatureOwner, Private->SignatureGUID);\r
  CopyMem ((UINT8* ) (SigDBCertData->SignatureData), X509Data, X509DataSize);\r
\r
  //\r
  // Check if signature database entry has been already existed.\r
  // If true, use EFI_VARIABLE_APPEND_WRITE attribute to append the\r
  // new signature data to original variable\r
  //\r
  Attr = EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS\r
          | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS;\r
  Status = CreateTimeBasedPayload (&SigDBSize, (UINT8**) &Data);\r
  if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
    DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Fail to create time-based data payload: %r", Status));\r
    goto ON_EXIT;\r
  }\r
\r
  Status = gRT->GetVariable(\r
                  VariableName,\r
                  &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid,\r
                  NULL,\r
                  &DataSize,\r
                  NULL\r
                  );\r
  if (Status == EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {\r
    Attr |= EFI_VARIABLE_APPEND_WRITE;\r
  } else if (Status != EFI_NOT_FOUND) {\r
    goto ON_EXIT;\r
  }\r
\r
  Status = gRT->SetVariable(\r
                  VariableName,\r
                  &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid,\r
                  Attr,\r
                  SigDBSize,\r
                  Data\r
                  );\r
  if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
    goto ON_EXIT;\r
  }\r
\r
ON_EXIT:\r
\r
  CloseEnrolledFile(Private->FileContext);\r
\r
  if (Private->SignatureGUID != NULL) {\r
    FreePool (Private->SignatureGUID);\r
    Private->SignatureGUID = NULL;\r
  }\r
\r
  if (Data != NULL) {\r
    FreePool (Data);\r
  }\r
\r
  if (X509Data != NULL) {\r
    FreePool (X509Data);\r
  }\r
\r
  return Status;\r
}\r
\r
/**\r
  Check whether signature is in specified database.\r
\r
  @param[in]  VariableName        Name of database variable that is searched in.\r
  @param[in]  Signature           Pointer to signature that is searched for.\r
  @param[in]  SignatureSize       Size of Signature.\r
\r
  @return TRUE                    Found the signature in the variable database.\r
  @return FALSE                   Not found the signature in the variable database.\r
\r
**/\r
BOOLEAN\r
IsSignatureFoundInDatabase (\r
  IN CHAR16             *VariableName,\r
  IN UINT8              *Signature,\r
  IN UINTN              SignatureSize\r
  )\r
{\r
  EFI_STATUS          Status;\r
  EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST  *CertList;\r
  EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA  *Cert;\r
  UINTN               DataSize;\r
  UINT8               *Data;\r
  UINTN               Index;\r
  UINTN               CertCount;\r
  BOOLEAN             IsFound;\r
\r
  //\r
  // Read signature database variable.\r
  //\r
  IsFound   = FALSE;\r
  Data      = NULL;\r
  DataSize  = 0;\r
  Status    = gRT->GetVariable (VariableName, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, NULL, &DataSize, NULL);\r
  if (Status != EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {\r
    return FALSE;\r
  }\r
\r
  Data = (UINT8 *) AllocateZeroPool (DataSize);\r
  if (Data == NULL) {\r
    return FALSE;\r
  }\r
\r
  Status = gRT->GetVariable (VariableName, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, NULL, &DataSize, Data);\r
  if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
    goto Done;\r
  }\r
\r
  //\r
  // Enumerate all signature data in SigDB to check if executable's signature exists.\r
  //\r
  CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) Data;\r
  while ((DataSize > 0) && (DataSize >= CertList->SignatureListSize)) {\r
    CertCount = (CertList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - CertList->SignatureHeaderSize) / CertList->SignatureSize;\r
    Cert      = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r
    if ((CertList->SignatureSize == sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1 + SignatureSize) && (CompareGuid(&CertList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Guid))) {\r
      for (Index = 0; Index < CertCount; Index++) {\r
        if (CompareMem (Cert->SignatureData, Signature, SignatureSize) == 0) {\r
          //\r
          // Find the signature in database.\r
          //\r
          IsFound = TRUE;\r
          break;\r
        }\r
        Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) Cert + CertList->SignatureSize);\r
      }\r
\r
      if (IsFound) {\r
        break;\r
      }\r
    }\r
\r
    DataSize -= CertList->SignatureListSize;\r
    CertList  = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + CertList->SignatureListSize);\r
  }\r
\r
Done:\r
  if (Data != NULL) {\r
    FreePool (Data);\r
  }\r
\r
  return IsFound;\r
}\r
\r
/**\r
  Calculate the hash of a certificate data with the specified hash algorithm.\r
\r
  @param[in]    CertData  The certificate data to be hashed.\r
  @param[in]    CertSize  The certificate size in bytes.\r
  @param[in]    HashAlg   The specified hash algorithm.\r
  @param[out]   CertHash  The output digest of the certificate\r
\r
  @retval TRUE            Successfully got the hash of the CertData.\r
  @retval FALSE           Failed to get the hash of CertData.\r
\r
**/\r
BOOLEAN\r
CalculateCertHash (\r
  IN  UINT8                 *CertData,\r
  IN  UINTN                 CertSize,\r
  IN  UINT32                HashAlg,\r
  OUT UINT8                 *CertHash\r
  )\r
{\r
  BOOLEAN                   Status;\r
  VOID                      *HashCtx;\r
  UINTN                     CtxSize;\r
  UINT8                     *TBSCert;\r
  UINTN                     TBSCertSize;\r
\r
  HashCtx = NULL;\r
  Status  = FALSE;\r
\r
  if (HashAlg >= HASHALG_MAX) {\r
    return FALSE;\r
  }\r
\r
  //\r
  // Retrieve the TBSCertificate for Hash Calculation.\r
  //\r
  if (!X509GetTBSCert (CertData, CertSize, &TBSCert, &TBSCertSize)) {\r
    return FALSE;\r
  }\r
\r
  //\r
  // 1. Initialize context of hash.\r
  //\r
  CtxSize = mHash[HashAlg].GetContextSize ();\r
  HashCtx = AllocatePool (CtxSize);\r
  ASSERT (HashCtx != NULL);\r
\r
  //\r
  // 2. Initialize a hash context.\r
  //\r
  Status = mHash[HashAlg].HashInit (HashCtx);\r
  if (!Status) {\r
    goto Done;\r
  }\r
\r
  //\r
  // 3. Calculate the hash.\r
  //\r
  Status  = mHash[HashAlg].HashUpdate (HashCtx, TBSCert, TBSCertSize);\r
  if (!Status) {\r
    goto Done;\r
  }\r
\r
  //\r
  // 4. Get the hash result.\r
  //\r
  ZeroMem (CertHash, mHash[HashAlg].DigestLength);\r
  Status  = mHash[HashAlg].HashFinal (HashCtx, CertHash);\r
\r
Done:\r
  if (HashCtx != NULL) {\r
    FreePool (HashCtx);\r
  }\r
\r
  return Status;\r
}\r
\r
/**\r
  Check whether the hash of an X.509 certificate is in forbidden database (DBX).\r
\r
  @param[in]  Certificate       Pointer to X.509 Certificate that is searched for.\r
  @param[in]  CertSize          Size of X.509 Certificate.\r
\r
  @return TRUE               Found the certificate hash in the forbidden database.\r
  @return FALSE              Certificate hash is Not found in the forbidden database.\r
\r
**/\r
BOOLEAN\r
IsCertHashFoundInDbx (\r
  IN  UINT8               *Certificate,\r
  IN  UINTN               CertSize\r
  )\r
{\r
  BOOLEAN                 IsFound;\r
  EFI_STATUS              Status;\r
  EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST      *DbxList;\r
  EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA      *CertHash;\r
  UINTN                   CertHashCount;\r
  UINTN                   Index;\r
  UINT32                  HashAlg;\r
  UINT8                   CertDigest[MAX_DIGEST_SIZE];\r
  UINT8                   *DbxCertHash;\r
  UINTN                   SiglistHeaderSize;\r
  UINT8                   *Data;\r
  UINTN                   DataSize;\r
\r
  IsFound  = FALSE;\r
  HashAlg  = HASHALG_MAX;\r
  Data     = NULL;\r
\r
  //\r
  // Read signature database variable.\r
  //\r
  DataSize  = 0;\r
  Status    = gRT->GetVariable (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, NULL, &DataSize, NULL);\r
  if (Status != EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {\r
    return FALSE;\r
  }\r
\r
  Data = (UINT8 *) AllocateZeroPool (DataSize);\r
  if (Data == NULL) {\r
    return FALSE;\r
  }\r
\r
  Status = gRT->GetVariable (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, NULL, &DataSize, Data);\r
  if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
    goto Done;\r
  }\r
\r
  //\r
  // Check whether the certificate hash exists in the forbidden database.\r
  //\r
  DbxList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) Data;\r
  while ((DataSize > 0) && (DataSize >= DbxList->SignatureListSize)) {\r
    //\r
    // Determine Hash Algorithm of Certificate in the forbidden database.\r
    //\r
    if (CompareGuid (&DbxList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Sha256Guid)) {\r
      HashAlg = HASHALG_SHA256;\r
    } else if (CompareGuid (&DbxList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Sha384Guid)) {\r
      HashAlg = HASHALG_SHA384;\r
    } else if (CompareGuid (&DbxList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Sha512Guid)) {\r
      HashAlg = HASHALG_SHA512;\r
    } else {\r
      DataSize -= DbxList->SignatureListSize;\r
      DbxList   = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) DbxList + DbxList->SignatureListSize);\r
      continue;\r
    }\r
\r
    //\r
    // Calculate the hash value of current db certificate for comparision.\r
    //\r
    if (!CalculateCertHash (Certificate, CertSize, HashAlg, CertDigest)) {\r
      goto Done;\r
    }\r
\r
    SiglistHeaderSize = sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + DbxList->SignatureHeaderSize;\r
    CertHash          = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) DbxList + SiglistHeaderSize);\r
    CertHashCount     = (DbxList->SignatureListSize - SiglistHeaderSize) / DbxList->SignatureSize;\r
    for (Index = 0; Index < CertHashCount; Index++) {\r
      //\r
      // Iterate each Signature Data Node within this CertList for verify.\r
      //\r
      DbxCertHash = CertHash->SignatureData;\r
      if (CompareMem (DbxCertHash, CertDigest, mHash[HashAlg].DigestLength) == 0) {\r
        //\r
        // Hash of Certificate is found in forbidden database.\r
        //\r
        IsFound = TRUE;\r
        goto Done;\r
      }\r
      CertHash = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertHash + DbxList->SignatureSize);\r
    }\r
\r
    DataSize -= DbxList->SignatureListSize;\r
    DbxList   = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) DbxList + DbxList->SignatureListSize);\r
  }\r
\r
Done:\r
  if (Data != NULL) {\r
    FreePool (Data);\r
  }\r
\r
  return IsFound;\r
}\r
\r
/**\r
  Check whether the signature list exists in given variable data.\r
\r
  It searches the signature list for the ceritificate hash by CertType.\r
  If the signature list is found, get the offset of Database for the\r
  next hash of a certificate.\r
\r
  @param[in]  Database      Variable data to save signature list.\r
  @param[in]  DatabaseSize  Variable size.\r
  @param[in]  SignatureType The type of the signature.\r
  @param[out] Offset        The offset to save a new hash of certificate.\r
\r
  @return TRUE       The signature list is found in the forbidden database.\r
  @return FALSE      The signature list is not found in the forbidden database.\r
**/\r
BOOLEAN\r
GetSignaturelistOffset (\r
  IN  EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST  *Database,\r
  IN  UINTN               DatabaseSize,\r
  IN  EFI_GUID            *SignatureType,\r
  OUT UINTN               *Offset\r
  )\r
{\r
  EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST      *SigList;\r
  UINTN                   SiglistSize;\r
\r
  if ((Database == NULL) || (DatabaseSize == 0)) {\r
    *Offset = 0;\r
    return FALSE;\r
  }\r
\r
  SigList     = Database;\r
  SiglistSize = DatabaseSize;\r
  while ((SiglistSize > 0) && (SiglistSize >= SigList->SignatureListSize)) {\r
    if (CompareGuid (&SigList->SignatureType, SignatureType)) {\r
      *Offset = DatabaseSize - SiglistSize;\r
      return TRUE;\r
    }\r
    SiglistSize -= SigList->SignatureListSize;\r
    SigList      = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) SigList + SigList->SignatureListSize);\r
  }\r
  *Offset = 0;\r
  return FALSE;\r
}\r
\r
/**\r
  Enroll a new X509 certificate hash into Signature Database (dbx) without\r
  KEK's authentication.\r
\r
  @param[in] PrivateData      The module's private data.\r
  @param[in] HashAlg          The hash algorithm to enroll the certificate.\r
  @param[in] RevocationDate   The revocation date of the certificate.\r
  @param[in] RevocationTime   The revocation time of the certificate.\r
  @param[in] AlwaysRevocation Indicate whether the certificate is always revoked.\r
\r
  @retval   EFI_SUCCESS            New X509 is enrolled successfully.\r
  @retval   EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER  The parameter is invalid.\r
  @retval   EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES   Could not allocate needed resources.\r
\r
**/\r
EFI_STATUS\r
EnrollX509HashtoSigDB (\r
  IN SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_DATA *Private,\r
  IN UINT32                         HashAlg,\r
  IN EFI_HII_DATE                   *RevocationDate,\r
  IN EFI_HII_TIME                   *RevocationTime,\r
  IN BOOLEAN                        AlwaysRevocation\r
  )\r
{\r
  EFI_STATUS          Status;\r
  UINTN               X509DataSize;\r
  VOID                *X509Data;\r
  EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST  *SignatureList;\r
  UINTN               SignatureListSize;\r
  UINT8               *Data;\r
  UINT8               *NewData;\r
  UINTN               DataSize;\r
  UINTN               DbSize;\r
  UINT32              Attr;\r
  EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA  *SignatureData;\r
  UINTN               SignatureSize;\r
  EFI_GUID            SignatureType;\r
  UINTN               Offset;\r
  UINT8               CertHash[MAX_DIGEST_SIZE];\r
  UINT16*             FilePostFix;\r
  UINTN               NameLength;\r
  EFI_TIME            *Time;\r
\r
  X509DataSize  = 0;\r
  DbSize        = 0;\r
  X509Data      = NULL;\r
  SignatureData = NULL;\r
  SignatureList = NULL;\r
  Data          = NULL;\r
  NewData       = NULL;\r
\r
  if ((Private->FileContext->FileName == NULL) || (Private->FileContext->FHandle == NULL) || (Private->SignatureGUID == NULL)) {\r
    return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
  }\r
\r
  Status = SetSecureBootMode (CUSTOM_SECURE_BOOT_MODE);\r
  if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
    return Status;\r
  }\r
\r
  //\r
  // Parse the file's postfix.\r
  //\r
  NameLength = StrLen (Private->FileContext->FileName);\r
  if (NameLength <= 4) {\r
    return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
  }\r
  FilePostFix = Private->FileContext->FileName + NameLength - 4;\r
  if (!IsDerEncodeCertificate(FilePostFix)) {\r
    //\r
    // Only supports DER-encoded X509 certificate.\r
    //\r
    return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
  }\r
\r
  //\r
  // Get the certificate from file and calculate its hash.\r
  //\r
  Status = ReadFileContent (\r
             Private->FileContext->FHandle,\r
             &X509Data,\r
             &X509DataSize,\r
             0\r
             );\r
  if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
    goto ON_EXIT;\r
  }\r
  ASSERT (X509Data != NULL);\r
\r
  if (!CalculateCertHash (X509Data, X509DataSize, HashAlg, CertHash)) {\r
    goto ON_EXIT;\r
  }\r
\r
  //\r
  // Get the variable for enrollment.\r
  //\r
  DataSize = 0;\r
  Status   = gRT->GetVariable (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, NULL, &DataSize, NULL);\r
  if (Status == EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {\r
    Data = (UINT8 *) AllocateZeroPool (DataSize);\r
    if (Data == NULL) {\r
      return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
    }\r
\r
    Status = gRT->GetVariable (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, NULL, &DataSize, Data);\r
    if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
      goto ON_EXIT;\r
    }\r
  }\r
\r
  //\r
  // Allocate memory for Signature and fill the Signature\r
  //\r
  SignatureSize = sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1 + sizeof (EFI_TIME) + mHash[HashAlg].DigestLength;\r
  SignatureData = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) AllocateZeroPool (SignatureSize);\r
  if (SignatureData == NULL) {\r
    return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
  }\r
  CopyGuid (&SignatureData->SignatureOwner, Private->SignatureGUID);\r
  CopyMem (SignatureData->SignatureData, CertHash, mHash[HashAlg].DigestLength);\r
\r
  //\r
  // Fill the time.\r
  //\r
  if (!AlwaysRevocation) {\r
    Time = (EFI_TIME *)(&SignatureData->SignatureData + mHash[HashAlg].DigestLength);\r
    Time->Year   = RevocationDate->Year;\r
    Time->Month  = RevocationDate->Month;\r
    Time->Day    = RevocationDate->Day;\r
    Time->Hour   = RevocationTime->Hour;\r
    Time->Minute = RevocationTime->Minute;\r
    Time->Second = RevocationTime->Second;\r
  }\r
\r
  //\r
  // Determine the GUID for certificate hash.\r
  //\r
  switch (HashAlg) {\r
  case HASHALG_SHA256:\r
    SignatureType = gEfiCertX509Sha256Guid;\r
    break;\r
  case HASHALG_SHA384:\r
    SignatureType = gEfiCertX509Sha384Guid;\r
    break;\r
  case HASHALG_SHA512:\r
    SignatureType = gEfiCertX509Sha512Guid;\r
    break;\r
  default:\r
    return FALSE;\r
  }\r
\r
  //\r
  // Add signature into the new variable data buffer\r
  //\r
  if (GetSignaturelistOffset((EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *)Data, DataSize, &SignatureType, &Offset)) {\r
    //\r
    // Add the signature to the found signaturelist.\r
    //\r
    DbSize  = DataSize + SignatureSize;\r
    NewData = AllocateZeroPool (DbSize);\r
    if (NewData == NULL) {\r
      Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
      goto ON_EXIT;\r
    }\r
\r
    SignatureList     = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *)(Data + Offset);\r
    SignatureListSize = (UINTN) ReadUnaligned32 ((UINT32 *)&SignatureList->SignatureListSize);\r
    CopyMem (NewData, Data, Offset + SignatureListSize);\r
\r
    SignatureList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *)(NewData + Offset);\r
    WriteUnaligned32 ((UINT32 *) &SignatureList->SignatureListSize, (UINT32)(SignatureListSize + SignatureSize));\r
\r
    Offset += SignatureListSize;\r
    CopyMem (NewData + Offset, SignatureData, SignatureSize);\r
    CopyMem (NewData + Offset + SignatureSize, Data + Offset, DataSize - Offset);\r
\r
    FreePool (Data);\r
    Data     = NewData;\r
    DataSize = DbSize;\r
  } else {\r
    //\r
    // Create a new signaturelist, and add the signature into the signaturelist.\r
    //\r
    DbSize  = DataSize + sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + SignatureSize;\r
    NewData = AllocateZeroPool (DbSize);\r
    if (NewData == NULL) {\r
      Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
      goto ON_EXIT;\r
    }\r
    //\r
    // Fill Certificate Database parameters.\r
    //\r
    SignatureList     = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST*) (NewData + DataSize);\r
    SignatureListSize = sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + SignatureSize;\r
    WriteUnaligned32 ((UINT32 *) &SignatureList->SignatureListSize, (UINT32) SignatureListSize);\r
    WriteUnaligned32 ((UINT32 *) &SignatureList->SignatureSize, (UINT32) SignatureSize);\r
    CopyGuid (&SignatureList->SignatureType, &SignatureType);\r
    CopyMem ((UINT8* ) SignatureList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST), SignatureData, SignatureSize);\r
    if ((DataSize != 0) && (Data != NULL)) {\r
      CopyMem (NewData, Data, DataSize);\r
      FreePool (Data);\r
    }\r
    Data     = NewData;\r
    DataSize = DbSize;\r
  }\r
\r
  Status = CreateTimeBasedPayload (&DataSize, (UINT8**) &Data);\r
  if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
    goto ON_EXIT;\r
  }\r
\r
  Attr = EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS\r
          | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS;\r
  Status = gRT->SetVariable(\r
                  EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1,\r
                  &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid,\r
                  Attr,\r
                  DataSize,\r
                  Data\r
                  );\r
  if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
    goto ON_EXIT;\r
  }\r
\r
ON_EXIT:\r
\r
  CloseEnrolledFile(Private->FileContext);\r
\r
  if (Private->SignatureGUID != NULL) {\r
    FreePool (Private->SignatureGUID);\r
    Private->SignatureGUID = NULL;\r
  }\r
\r
  if (Data != NULL) {\r
    FreePool (Data);\r
  }\r
\r
  if (SignatureData != NULL) {\r
    FreePool (SignatureData);\r
  }\r
\r
  if (X509Data != NULL) {\r
    FreePool (X509Data);\r
  }\r
\r
  return Status;\r
}\r
\r
/**\r
  Check whether a certificate from a file exists in dbx.\r
\r
  @param[in] PrivateData     The module's private data.\r
  @param[in] VariableName    Variable name of signature database, must be\r
                             EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1.\r
\r
  @retval   TRUE             The X509 certificate is found in dbx successfully.\r
  @retval   FALSE            The X509 certificate is not found in dbx.\r
**/\r
BOOLEAN\r
IsX509CertInDbx (\r
  IN SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_DATA *Private,\r
  IN CHAR16                         *VariableName\r
  )\r
{\r
  EFI_STATUS          Status;\r
  UINTN               X509DataSize;\r
  VOID                *X509Data;\r
  BOOLEAN             IsFound;\r
\r
  //\r
  //  Read the certificate from file\r
  //\r
  X509DataSize  = 0;\r
  X509Data      = NULL;\r
  Status = ReadFileContent (\r
             Private->FileContext->FHandle,\r
             &X509Data,\r
             &X509DataSize,\r
             0\r
             );\r
  if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
    return FALSE;\r
  }\r
\r
  //\r
  // Check the raw certificate.\r
  //\r
  IsFound = FALSE;\r
  if (IsSignatureFoundInDatabase (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1, X509Data, X509DataSize)) {\r
    IsFound = TRUE;\r
    goto ON_EXIT;\r
  }\r
\r
  //\r
  // Check the hash of certificate.\r
  //\r
  if (IsCertHashFoundInDbx (X509Data, X509DataSize)) {\r
    IsFound = TRUE;\r
    goto ON_EXIT;\r
  }\r
\r
ON_EXIT:\r
  if (X509Data != NULL) {\r
    FreePool (X509Data);\r
  }\r
\r
  return IsFound;\r
}\r
\r
/**\r
  Reads contents of a PE/COFF image in memory buffer.\r
\r
  Caution: This function may receive untrusted input.\r
  PE/COFF image is external input, so this function will make sure the PE/COFF image content\r
  read is within the image buffer.\r
\r
  @param  FileHandle      Pointer to the file handle to read the PE/COFF image.\r
  @param  FileOffset      Offset into the PE/COFF image to begin the read operation.\r
  @param  ReadSize        On input, the size in bytes of the requested read operation.\r
                          On output, the number of bytes actually read.\r
  @param  Buffer          Output buffer that contains the data read from the PE/COFF image.\r
\r
  @retval EFI_SUCCESS     The specified portion of the PE/COFF image was read and the size\r
**/\r
EFI_STATUS\r
EFIAPI\r
SecureBootConfigImageRead (\r
  IN     VOID    *FileHandle,\r
  IN     UINTN   FileOffset,\r
  IN OUT UINTN   *ReadSize,\r
  OUT    VOID    *Buffer\r
  )\r
{\r
  UINTN               EndPosition;\r
\r
  if (FileHandle == NULL || ReadSize == NULL || Buffer == NULL) {\r
    return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
  }\r
\r
  if (MAX_ADDRESS - FileOffset < *ReadSize) {\r
    return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
  }\r
\r
  EndPosition = FileOffset + *ReadSize;\r
  if (EndPosition > mImageSize) {\r
    *ReadSize = (UINT32)(mImageSize - FileOffset);\r
  }\r
\r
  if (FileOffset >= mImageSize) {\r
    *ReadSize = 0;\r
  }\r
\r
  CopyMem (Buffer, (UINT8 *)((UINTN) FileHandle + FileOffset), *ReadSize);\r
\r
  return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
}\r
\r
/**\r
  Load PE/COFF image information into internal buffer and check its validity.\r
\r
  @retval   EFI_SUCCESS         Successful\r
  @retval   EFI_UNSUPPORTED     Invalid PE/COFF file\r
  @retval   EFI_ABORTED         Serious error occurs, like file I/O error etc.\r
\r
**/\r
EFI_STATUS\r
LoadPeImage (\r
  VOID\r
  )\r
{\r
  EFI_IMAGE_DOS_HEADER                  *DosHdr;\r
  EFI_IMAGE_NT_HEADERS32                *NtHeader32;\r
  EFI_IMAGE_NT_HEADERS64                *NtHeader64;\r
  PE_COFF_LOADER_IMAGE_CONTEXT          ImageContext;\r
  EFI_STATUS                            Status;\r
\r
  NtHeader32 = NULL;\r
  NtHeader64 = NULL;\r
\r
  ZeroMem (&ImageContext, sizeof (ImageContext));\r
  ImageContext.Handle    = (VOID *) mImageBase;\r
  ImageContext.ImageRead = (PE_COFF_LOADER_READ_FILE) SecureBootConfigImageRead;\r
\r
  //\r
  // Get information about the image being loaded\r
  //\r
  Status = PeCoffLoaderGetImageInfo (&ImageContext);\r
  if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
    //\r
    // The information can't be got from the invalid PeImage\r
    //\r
    DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "SecureBootConfigDxe: PeImage invalid. \n"));\r
    return Status;\r
  }\r
\r
  //\r
  // Read the Dos header\r
  //\r
  DosHdr = (EFI_IMAGE_DOS_HEADER*)(mImageBase);\r
  if (DosHdr->e_magic == EFI_IMAGE_DOS_SIGNATURE)\r
  {\r
    //\r
    // DOS image header is present,\r
    // So read the PE header after the DOS image header\r
    //\r
    mPeCoffHeaderOffset = DosHdr->e_lfanew;\r
  }\r
  else\r
  {\r
    mPeCoffHeaderOffset = 0;\r
  }\r
\r
  //\r
  // Read PE header and check the signature validity and machine compatibility\r
  //\r
  NtHeader32 = (EFI_IMAGE_NT_HEADERS32*) (mImageBase + mPeCoffHeaderOffset);\r
  if (NtHeader32->Signature != EFI_IMAGE_NT_SIGNATURE)\r
  {\r
    return EFI_UNSUPPORTED;\r
  }\r
\r
  mNtHeader.Pe32 = NtHeader32;\r
\r
  //\r
  // Check the architecture field of PE header and get the Certificate Data Directory data\r
  // Note the size of FileHeader field is constant for both IA32 and X64 arch\r
  //\r
  if ((NtHeader32->FileHeader.Machine == EFI_IMAGE_MACHINE_IA32)\r
      || (NtHeader32->FileHeader.Machine == EFI_IMAGE_MACHINE_EBC)\r
      || (NtHeader32->FileHeader.Machine == EFI_IMAGE_MACHINE_ARMTHUMB_MIXED)) {\r
    //\r
    // 32-bits Architecture\r
    //\r
    mImageType = ImageType_IA32;\r
    mSecDataDir = (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATA_DIRECTORY*) &(NtHeader32->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY]);\r
  }\r
  else if ((NtHeader32->FileHeader.Machine == EFI_IMAGE_MACHINE_IA64)\r
          || (NtHeader32->FileHeader.Machine == EFI_IMAGE_MACHINE_X64)\r
          || (NtHeader32->FileHeader.Machine == EFI_IMAGE_MACHINE_AARCH64)) {\r
    //\r
    // 64-bits Architecture\r
    //\r
    mImageType = ImageType_X64;\r
    NtHeader64 = (EFI_IMAGE_NT_HEADERS64 *) (mImageBase + mPeCoffHeaderOffset);\r
    mSecDataDir = (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATA_DIRECTORY*) &(NtHeader64->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY]);\r
  } else {\r
    return EFI_UNSUPPORTED;\r
  }\r
\r
  return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
}\r
\r
/**\r
  Calculate hash of Pe/Coff image based on the authenticode image hashing in\r
  PE/COFF Specification 8.0 Appendix A\r
\r
  Notes: PE/COFF image has been checked by BasePeCoffLib PeCoffLoaderGetImageInfo() in \r
  the function LoadPeImage ().\r
\r
  @param[in]    HashAlg   Hash algorithm type.\r
\r
  @retval TRUE            Successfully hash image.\r
  @retval FALSE           Fail in hash image.\r
\r
**/\r
BOOLEAN\r
HashPeImage (\r
  IN  UINT32                HashAlg\r
  )\r
{\r
  BOOLEAN                   Status;\r
  UINT16                    Magic;\r
  EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER  *Section;\r
  VOID                      *HashCtx;\r
  UINTN                     CtxSize;\r
  UINT8                     *HashBase;\r
  UINTN                     HashSize;\r
  UINTN                     SumOfBytesHashed;\r
  EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER  *SectionHeader;\r
  UINTN                     Index;\r
  UINTN                     Pos;\r
\r
  HashCtx       = NULL;\r
  SectionHeader = NULL;\r
  Status        = FALSE;\r
\r
  if (HashAlg != HASHALG_SHA256) {\r
    return FALSE;\r
  }\r
\r
  //\r
  // Initialize context of hash.\r
  //\r
  ZeroMem (mImageDigest, MAX_DIGEST_SIZE);\r
\r
  mImageDigestSize  = SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE;\r
  mCertType         = gEfiCertSha256Guid;\r
\r
  CtxSize   = mHash[HashAlg].GetContextSize();\r
\r
  HashCtx = AllocatePool (CtxSize);\r
  ASSERT (HashCtx != NULL);\r
\r
  // 1.  Load the image header into memory.\r
\r
  // 2.  Initialize a SHA hash context.\r
  Status = mHash[HashAlg].HashInit(HashCtx);\r
  if (!Status) {\r
    goto Done;\r
  }\r
  //\r
  // Measuring PE/COFF Image Header;\r
  // But CheckSum field and SECURITY data directory (certificate) are excluded\r
  //\r
  if (mNtHeader.Pe32->FileHeader.Machine == IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_IA64 && mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {\r
    //\r
    // NOTE: Some versions of Linux ELILO for Itanium have an incorrect magic value\r
    //       in the PE/COFF Header. If the MachineType is Itanium(IA64) and the\r
    //       Magic value in the OptionalHeader is EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC\r
    //       then override the magic value to EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR64_MAGIC\r
    //\r
    Magic = EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR64_MAGIC;\r
  } else {\r
    //\r
    // Get the magic value from the PE/COFF Optional Header\r
    //\r
    Magic = mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.Magic;\r
  }\r
\r
  //\r
  // 3.  Calculate the distance from the base of the image header to the image checksum address.\r
  // 4.  Hash the image header from its base to beginning of the image checksum.\r
  //\r
  HashBase = mImageBase;\r
  if (Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {\r
    //\r
    // Use PE32 offset.\r
    //\r
    HashSize = (UINTN) (&mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.CheckSum) - (UINTN) HashBase;\r
  } else {\r
    //\r
    // Use PE32+ offset.\r
    //\r
    HashSize = (UINTN) (&mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.CheckSum) - (UINTN) HashBase;\r
  }\r
\r
  Status  = mHash[HashAlg].HashUpdate(HashCtx, HashBase, HashSize);\r
  if (!Status) {\r
    goto Done;\r
  }\r
  //\r
  // 5.  Skip over the image checksum (it occupies a single ULONG).\r
  // 6.  Get the address of the beginning of the Cert Directory.\r
  // 7.  Hash everything from the end of the checksum to the start of the Cert Directory.\r
  //\r
  if (Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {\r
    //\r
    // Use PE32 offset.\r
    //\r
    HashBase = (UINT8 *) &mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.CheckSum + sizeof (UINT32);\r
    HashSize = (UINTN) (&mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY]) - (UINTN) HashBase;\r
  } else {\r
    //\r
    // Use PE32+ offset.\r
    //\r
    HashBase = (UINT8 *) &mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.CheckSum + sizeof (UINT32);\r
    HashSize = (UINTN) (&mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY]) - (UINTN) HashBase;\r
  }\r
\r
  Status  = mHash[HashAlg].HashUpdate(HashCtx, HashBase, HashSize);\r
  if (!Status) {\r
    goto Done;\r
  }\r
  //\r
  // 8.  Skip over the Cert Directory. (It is sizeof(IMAGE_DATA_DIRECTORY) bytes.)\r
  // 9.  Hash everything from the end of the Cert Directory to the end of image header.\r
  //\r
  if (Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {\r
    //\r
    // Use PE32 offset\r
    //\r
    HashBase = (UINT8 *) &mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY + 1];\r
    HashSize = mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.SizeOfHeaders - ((UINTN) (&mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY + 1]) - (UINTN) mImageBase);\r
  } else {\r
    //\r
    // Use PE32+ offset.\r
    //\r
    HashBase = (UINT8 *) &mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY + 1];\r
    HashSize = mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.SizeOfHeaders - ((UINTN) (&mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY + 1]) - (UINTN) mImageBase);\r
  }\r
\r
  Status  = mHash[HashAlg].HashUpdate(HashCtx, HashBase, HashSize);\r
  if (!Status) {\r
    goto Done;\r
  }\r
  //\r
  // 10. Set the SUM_OF_BYTES_HASHED to the size of the header.\r
  //\r
  if (Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {\r
    //\r
    // Use PE32 offset.\r
    //\r
    SumOfBytesHashed = mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.SizeOfHeaders;\r
  } else {\r
    //\r
    // Use PE32+ offset\r
    //\r
    SumOfBytesHashed = mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.SizeOfHeaders;\r
  }\r
\r
  //\r
  // 11. Build a temporary table of pointers to all the IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER\r
  //     structures in the image. The 'NumberOfSections' field of the image\r
  //     header indicates how big the table should be. Do not include any\r
  //     IMAGE_SECTION_HEADERs in the table whose 'SizeOfRawData' field is zero.\r
  //\r
  SectionHeader = (EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER *) AllocateZeroPool (sizeof (EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER) * mNtHeader.Pe32->FileHeader.NumberOfSections);\r
  ASSERT (SectionHeader != NULL);\r
  //\r
  // 12.  Using the 'PointerToRawData' in the referenced section headers as\r
  //      a key, arrange the elements in the table in ascending order. In other\r
  //      words, sort the section headers according to the disk-file offset of\r
  //      the section.\r
  //\r
  Section = (EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER *) (\r
               mImageBase +\r
               mPeCoffHeaderOffset +\r
               sizeof (UINT32) +\r
               sizeof (EFI_IMAGE_FILE_HEADER) +\r
               mNtHeader.Pe32->FileHeader.SizeOfOptionalHeader\r
               );\r
  for (Index = 0; Index < mNtHeader.Pe32->FileHeader.NumberOfSections; Index++) {\r
    Pos = Index;\r
    while ((Pos > 0) && (Section->PointerToRawData < SectionHeader[Pos - 1].PointerToRawData)) {\r
      CopyMem (&SectionHeader[Pos], &SectionHeader[Pos - 1], sizeof (EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER));\r
      Pos--;\r
    }\r
    CopyMem (&SectionHeader[Pos], Section, sizeof (EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER));\r
    Section += 1;\r
  }\r
\r
  //\r
  // 13.  Walk through the sorted table, bring the corresponding section\r
  //      into memory, and hash the entire section (using the 'SizeOfRawData'\r
  //      field in the section header to determine the amount of data to hash).\r
  // 14.  Add the section's 'SizeOfRawData' to SUM_OF_BYTES_HASHED .\r
  // 15.  Repeat steps 13 and 14 for all the sections in the sorted table.\r
  //\r
  for (Index = 0; Index < mNtHeader.Pe32->FileHeader.NumberOfSections; Index++) {\r
    Section = &SectionHeader[Index];\r
    if (Section->SizeOfRawData == 0) {\r
      continue;\r
    }\r
    HashBase  = mImageBase + Section->PointerToRawData;\r
    HashSize  = (UINTN) Section->SizeOfRawData;\r
\r
    Status  = mHash[HashAlg].HashUpdate(HashCtx, HashBase, HashSize);\r
    if (!Status) {\r
      goto Done;\r
    }\r
\r
    SumOfBytesHashed += HashSize;\r
  }\r
\r
  //\r
  // 16.  If the file size is greater than SUM_OF_BYTES_HASHED, there is extra\r
  //      data in the file that needs to be added to the hash. This data begins\r
  //      at file offset SUM_OF_BYTES_HASHED and its length is:\r
  //             FileSize  -  (CertDirectory->Size)\r
  //\r
  if (mImageSize > SumOfBytesHashed) {\r
    HashBase = mImageBase + SumOfBytesHashed;\r
    if (Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {\r
      //\r
      // Use PE32 offset.\r
      //\r
      HashSize = (UINTN)(\r
                 mImageSize -\r
                 mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY].Size -\r
                 SumOfBytesHashed);\r
    } else {\r
      //\r
      // Use PE32+ offset.\r
      //\r
      HashSize = (UINTN)(\r
                 mImageSize -\r
                 mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY].Size -\r
                 SumOfBytesHashed);\r
    }\r
\r
    Status  = mHash[HashAlg].HashUpdate(HashCtx, HashBase, HashSize);\r
    if (!Status) {\r
      goto Done;\r
    }\r
  }\r
\r
  Status  = mHash[HashAlg].HashFinal(HashCtx, mImageDigest);\r
\r
Done:\r
  if (HashCtx != NULL) {\r
    FreePool (HashCtx);\r
  }\r
  if (SectionHeader != NULL) {\r
    FreePool (SectionHeader);\r
  }\r
  return Status;\r
}\r
\r
/**\r
  Recognize the Hash algorithm in PE/COFF Authenticode and calculate hash of\r
  Pe/Coff image based on the authenticated image hashing in PE/COFF Specification\r
  8.0 Appendix A\r
\r
  @retval EFI_UNSUPPORTED             Hash algorithm is not supported.\r
  @retval EFI_SUCCESS                 Hash successfully.\r
\r
**/\r
EFI_STATUS\r
HashPeImageByType (\r
  VOID\r
  )\r
{\r
  UINT8                     Index;\r
  WIN_CERTIFICATE_EFI_PKCS  *PkcsCertData;\r
\r
  PkcsCertData = (WIN_CERTIFICATE_EFI_PKCS *) (mImageBase + mSecDataDir->Offset);\r
\r
  for (Index = 0; Index < HASHALG_MAX; Index++) {\r
    //\r
    // Check the Hash algorithm in PE/COFF Authenticode.\r
    //    According to PKCS#7 Definition:\r
    //        SignedData ::= SEQUENCE {\r
    //            version Version,\r
    //            digestAlgorithms DigestAlgorithmIdentifiers,\r
    //            contentInfo ContentInfo,\r
    //            .... }\r
    //    The DigestAlgorithmIdentifiers can be used to determine the hash algorithm in PE/COFF hashing\r
    //    This field has the fixed offset (+32) in final Authenticode ASN.1 data.\r
    //    Fixed offset (+32) is calculated based on two bytes of length encoding.\r
     //\r
    if ((*(PkcsCertData->CertData + 1) & TWO_BYTE_ENCODE) != TWO_BYTE_ENCODE) {\r
      //\r
      // Only support two bytes of Long Form of Length Encoding.\r
      //\r
      continue;\r
    }\r
\r
    //\r
    if (CompareMem (PkcsCertData->CertData + 32, mHash[Index].OidValue, mHash[Index].OidLength) == 0) {\r
      break;\r
    }\r
  }\r
\r
  if (Index == HASHALG_MAX) {\r
    return EFI_UNSUPPORTED;\r
  }\r
\r
  //\r
  // HASH PE Image based on Hash algorithm in PE/COFF Authenticode.\r
  //\r
  if (!HashPeImage(Index)) {\r
    return EFI_UNSUPPORTED;\r
  }\r
\r
  return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
}\r
\r
/**\r
  Enroll a new executable's signature into Signature Database.\r
\r
  @param[in] PrivateData     The module's private data.\r
  @param[in] VariableName    Variable name of signature database, must be\r
                             EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE, EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1\r
                             or EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE2.\r
\r
  @retval   EFI_SUCCESS            New signature is enrolled successfully.\r
  @retval   EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER  The parameter is invalid.\r
  @retval   EFI_UNSUPPORTED        Unsupported command.\r
  @retval   EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES   Could not allocate needed resources.\r
\r
**/\r
EFI_STATUS\r
EnrollAuthentication2Descriptor (\r
  IN SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_DATA *Private,\r
  IN CHAR16                         *VariableName\r
  )\r
{\r
  EFI_STATUS                        Status;\r
  VOID                              *Data;\r
  UINTN                             DataSize;\r
  UINT32                            Attr;\r
\r
  Data = NULL;\r
\r
  //\r
  // DBT only support DER-X509 Cert Enrollment\r
  //\r
  if (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE2) == 0) {\r
    return EFI_UNSUPPORTED;\r
  }\r
\r
  //\r
  // Read the whole file content\r
  //\r
  Status = ReadFileContent(\r
             Private->FileContext->FHandle,\r
             (VOID **) &mImageBase,\r
             &mImageSize,\r
             0\r
             );\r
  if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
    goto ON_EXIT;\r
  }\r
  ASSERT (mImageBase != NULL);\r
\r
  Attr = EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS\r
         | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS;\r
\r
  //\r
  // Check if SigDB variable has been already existed.\r
  // If true, use EFI_VARIABLE_APPEND_WRITE attribute to append the\r
  // new signature data to original variable\r
  //\r
  DataSize = 0;\r
  Status = gRT->GetVariable(\r
                  VariableName,\r
                  &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid,\r
                  NULL,\r
                  &DataSize,\r
                  NULL\r
                  );\r
  if (Status == EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {\r
    Attr |= EFI_VARIABLE_APPEND_WRITE;\r
  } else if (Status != EFI_NOT_FOUND) {\r
    goto ON_EXIT;\r
  }\r
\r
  //\r
  // Diretly set AUTHENTICATION_2 data to SetVariable\r
  //\r
  Status = gRT->SetVariable(\r
                  VariableName,\r
                  &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid,\r
                  Attr,\r
                  mImageSize,\r
                  mImageBase\r
                  );\r
\r
  DEBUG((DEBUG_INFO, "Enroll AUTH_2 data to Var:%s Status: %x\n", VariableName, Status));\r
\r
ON_EXIT:\r
\r
  CloseEnrolledFile(Private->FileContext);\r
\r
  if (Data != NULL) {\r
    FreePool (Data);\r
  }\r
\r
  if (mImageBase != NULL) {\r
    FreePool (mImageBase);\r
    mImageBase = NULL;\r
  }\r
\r
  return Status;\r
\r
}\r
\r
\r
/**\r
  Enroll a new executable's signature into Signature Database.\r
\r
  @param[in] PrivateData     The module's private data.\r
  @param[in] VariableName    Variable name of signature database, must be\r
                             EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE, EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1\r
                             or EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE2.\r
\r
  @retval   EFI_SUCCESS            New signature is enrolled successfully.\r
  @retval   EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER  The parameter is invalid.\r
  @retval   EFI_UNSUPPORTED        Unsupported command.\r
  @retval   EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES   Could not allocate needed resources.\r
\r
**/\r
EFI_STATUS\r
EnrollImageSignatureToSigDB (\r
  IN SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_DATA *Private,\r
  IN CHAR16                         *VariableName\r
  )\r
{\r
  EFI_STATUS                        Status;\r
  EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST                *SigDBCert;\r
  EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA                *SigDBCertData;\r
  VOID                              *Data;\r
  UINTN                             DataSize;\r
  UINTN                             SigDBSize;\r
  UINT32                            Attr;\r
  WIN_CERTIFICATE_UEFI_GUID         *GuidCertData;\r
\r
  Data = NULL;\r
  GuidCertData = NULL;\r
\r
  if (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE2) == 0) {\r
    return EFI_UNSUPPORTED;\r
  }\r
\r
  //\r
  // Form the SigDB certificate list.\r
  // Format the data item into EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST type.\r
  //\r
  // We need to parse executable's signature data from specified signed executable file.\r
  // In current implementation, we simply trust the pass-in signed executable file.\r
  // In reality, it's OS's responsibility to verify the signed executable file.\r
  //\r
\r
  //\r
  // Read the whole file content\r
  //\r
  Status = ReadFileContent(\r
             Private->FileContext->FHandle,\r
             (VOID **) &mImageBase,\r
             &mImageSize,\r
             0\r
             );\r
  if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
    goto ON_EXIT;\r
  }\r
  ASSERT (mImageBase != NULL);\r
\r
  Status = LoadPeImage ();\r
  if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
    goto ON_EXIT;\r
  }\r
\r
  if (mSecDataDir->SizeOfCert == 0) {\r
    if (!HashPeImage (HASHALG_SHA256)) {\r
      Status =  EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r
      goto ON_EXIT;\r
    }\r
  } else {\r
\r
    //\r
    // Read the certificate data\r
    //\r
    mCertificate = (WIN_CERTIFICATE *)(mImageBase + mSecDataDir->Offset);\r
\r
    if (mCertificate->wCertificateType == WIN_CERT_TYPE_EFI_GUID) {\r
      GuidCertData = (WIN_CERTIFICATE_UEFI_GUID*) mCertificate;\r
      if (CompareMem (&GuidCertData->CertType, &gEfiCertTypeRsa2048Sha256Guid, sizeof(EFI_GUID)) != 0) {\r
        Status = EFI_ABORTED;\r
        goto ON_EXIT;\r
      }\r
\r
      if (!HashPeImage (HASHALG_SHA256)) {\r
        Status = EFI_ABORTED;\r
        goto ON_EXIT;;\r
      }\r
\r
    } else if (mCertificate->wCertificateType == WIN_CERT_TYPE_PKCS_SIGNED_DATA) {\r
\r
      Status = HashPeImageByType ();\r
      if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
        goto ON_EXIT;;\r
      }\r
    } else {\r
      Status = EFI_ABORTED;\r
      goto ON_EXIT;\r
    }\r
  }\r
\r
  //\r
  // Create a new SigDB entry.\r
  //\r
  SigDBSize = sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST)\r
              + sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1\r
              + (UINT32) mImageDigestSize;\r
\r
  Data = (UINT8*) AllocateZeroPool (SigDBSize);\r
  if (Data == NULL) {\r
    Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
    goto ON_EXIT;\r
  }\r
\r
  //\r
  // Adjust the Certificate Database parameters.\r
  //\r
  SigDBCert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST*) Data;\r
  SigDBCert->SignatureListSize   = (UINT32) SigDBSize;\r
  SigDBCert->SignatureHeaderSize = 0;\r
  SigDBCert->SignatureSize       = sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1 + (UINT32) mImageDigestSize;\r
  CopyGuid (&SigDBCert->SignatureType, &mCertType);\r
\r
  SigDBCertData = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA*)((UINT8*)SigDBCert + sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST));\r
  CopyGuid (&SigDBCertData->SignatureOwner, Private->SignatureGUID);\r
  CopyMem (SigDBCertData->SignatureData, mImageDigest, mImageDigestSize);\r
\r
  Attr = EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS\r
          | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS;\r
  Status = CreateTimeBasedPayload (&SigDBSize, (UINT8**) &Data);\r
  if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
    DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Fail to create time-based data payload: %r", Status));\r
    goto ON_EXIT;\r
  }\r
\r
  //\r
  // Check if SigDB variable has been already existed.\r
  // If true, use EFI_VARIABLE_APPEND_WRITE attribute to append the\r
  // new signature data to original variable\r
  //\r
  DataSize = 0;\r
  Status = gRT->GetVariable(\r
                  VariableName,\r
                  &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid,\r
                  NULL,\r
                  &DataSize,\r
                  NULL\r
                  );\r
  if (Status == EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {\r
    Attr |= EFI_VARIABLE_APPEND_WRITE;\r
  } else if (Status != EFI_NOT_FOUND) {\r
    goto ON_EXIT;\r
  }\r
\r
  //\r
  // Enroll the variable.\r
  //\r
  Status = gRT->SetVariable(\r
                  VariableName,\r
                  &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid,\r
                  Attr,\r
                  SigDBSize,\r
                  Data\r
                  );\r
  if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
    goto ON_EXIT;\r
  }\r
\r
ON_EXIT:\r
\r
  CloseEnrolledFile(Private->FileContext);\r
\r
  if (Private->SignatureGUID != NULL) {\r
    FreePool (Private->SignatureGUID);\r
    Private->SignatureGUID = NULL;\r
  }\r
\r
  if (Data != NULL) {\r
    FreePool (Data);\r
  }\r
\r
  if (mImageBase != NULL) {\r
    FreePool (mImageBase);\r
    mImageBase = NULL;\r
  }\r
\r
  return Status;\r
}\r
\r
/**\r
  Enroll signature into DB/DBX/DBT without KEK's authentication.\r
  The SignatureOwner GUID will be Private->SignatureGUID.\r
\r
  @param[in] PrivateData     The module's private data.\r
  @param[in] VariableName    Variable name of signature database, must be\r
                             EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE or EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1.\r
\r
  @retval   EFI_SUCCESS            New signature enrolled successfully.\r
  @retval   EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER  The parameter is invalid.\r
  @retval   others                 Fail to enroll signature data.\r
\r
**/\r
EFI_STATUS\r
EnrollSignatureDatabase (\r
  IN SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_DATA     *Private,\r
  IN CHAR16                             *VariableName\r
  )\r
{\r
  UINT16*      FilePostFix;\r
  EFI_STATUS   Status;\r
  UINTN        NameLength;\r
\r
  if ((Private->FileContext->FileName == NULL) || (Private->FileContext->FHandle == NULL) || (Private->SignatureGUID == NULL)) {\r
    return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
  }\r
\r
  Status = SetSecureBootMode (CUSTOM_SECURE_BOOT_MODE);\r
  if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
    return Status;\r
  }\r
\r
  //\r
  // Parse the file's postfix.\r
  //\r
  NameLength = StrLen (Private->FileContext->FileName);\r
  if (NameLength <= 4) {\r
    return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
  }\r
  FilePostFix = Private->FileContext->FileName + NameLength - 4;\r
  if (IsDerEncodeCertificate (FilePostFix)) {\r
    //\r
    // Supports DER-encoded X509 certificate.\r
    //\r
    return EnrollX509toSigDB (Private, VariableName);\r
  } else if (IsAuthentication2Format(Private->FileContext->FHandle)){\r
    return EnrollAuthentication2Descriptor(Private, VariableName);\r
  } else {\r
    return EnrollImageSignatureToSigDB (Private, VariableName);\r
  }\r
}\r
\r
/**\r
  List all signatures in specified signature database (e.g. KEK/DB/DBX/DBT)\r
  by GUID in the page for user to select and delete as needed.\r
\r
  @param[in]    PrivateData         Module's private data.\r
  @param[in]    VariableName        The variable name of the vendor's signature database.\r
  @param[in]    VendorGuid          A unique identifier for the vendor.\r
  @param[in]    LabelNumber         Label number to insert opcodes.\r
  @param[in]    FormId              Form ID of current page.\r
  @param[in]    QuestionIdBase      Base question id of the signature list.\r
\r
  @retval   EFI_SUCCESS             Success to update the signature list page\r
  @retval   EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES    Unable to allocate required resources.\r
\r
**/\r
EFI_STATUS\r
UpdateDeletePage (\r
  IN SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_DATA   *PrivateData,\r
  IN CHAR16                           *VariableName,\r
  IN EFI_GUID                         *VendorGuid,\r
  IN UINT16                           LabelNumber,\r
  IN EFI_FORM_ID                      FormId,\r
  IN EFI_QUESTION_ID                  QuestionIdBase\r
  )\r
{\r
  EFI_STATUS                  Status;\r
  UINT32                      Index;\r
  UINTN                       CertCount;\r
  UINTN                       GuidIndex;\r
  VOID                        *StartOpCodeHandle;\r
  VOID                        *EndOpCodeHandle;\r
  EFI_IFR_GUID_LABEL          *StartLabel;\r
  EFI_IFR_GUID_LABEL          *EndLabel;\r
  UINTN                       DataSize;\r
  UINT8                       *Data;\r
  EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST          *CertList;\r
  EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA          *Cert;\r
  UINT32                      ItemDataSize;\r
  CHAR16                      *GuidStr;\r
  EFI_STRING_ID               GuidID;\r
  EFI_STRING_ID               Help;\r
\r
  Data     = NULL;\r
  CertList = NULL;\r
  Cert     = NULL;\r
  GuidStr  = NULL;\r
  StartOpCodeHandle = NULL;\r
  EndOpCodeHandle   = NULL;\r
\r
  //\r
  // Initialize the container for dynamic opcodes.\r
  //\r
  StartOpCodeHandle = HiiAllocateOpCodeHandle ();\r
  if (StartOpCodeHandle == NULL) {\r
    Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
    goto ON_EXIT;\r
  }\r
\r
  EndOpCodeHandle = HiiAllocateOpCodeHandle ();\r
  if (EndOpCodeHandle == NULL) {\r
    Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
    goto ON_EXIT;\r
  }\r
\r
  //\r
  // Create Hii Extend Label OpCode.\r
  //\r
  StartLabel = (EFI_IFR_GUID_LABEL *) HiiCreateGuidOpCode (\r
                                        StartOpCodeHandle,\r
                                        &gEfiIfrTianoGuid,\r
                                        NULL,\r
                                        sizeof (EFI_IFR_GUID_LABEL)\r
                                        );\r
  StartLabel->ExtendOpCode  = EFI_IFR_EXTEND_OP_LABEL;\r
  StartLabel->Number        = LabelNumber;\r
\r
  EndLabel = (EFI_IFR_GUID_LABEL *) HiiCreateGuidOpCode (\r
                                      EndOpCodeHandle,\r
                                      &gEfiIfrTianoGuid,\r
                                      NULL,\r
                                      sizeof (EFI_IFR_GUID_LABEL)\r
                                      );\r
  EndLabel->ExtendOpCode  = EFI_IFR_EXTEND_OP_LABEL;\r
  EndLabel->Number        = LABEL_END;\r
\r
  //\r
  // Read Variable.\r
  //\r
  DataSize = 0;\r
  Status = gRT->GetVariable (VariableName, VendorGuid, NULL, &DataSize, Data);\r
  if (EFI_ERROR (Status) && Status != EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {\r
    goto ON_EXIT;\r
  }\r
\r
  Data = (UINT8 *) AllocateZeroPool (DataSize);\r
  if (Data == NULL) {\r
    Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
    goto ON_EXIT;\r
  }\r
\r
  Status = gRT->GetVariable (VariableName, VendorGuid, NULL, &DataSize, Data);\r
  if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
    goto ON_EXIT;\r
  }\r
\r
  GuidStr = AllocateZeroPool (100);\r
  if (GuidStr == NULL) {\r
    Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
    goto ON_EXIT;\r
  }\r
\r
  //\r
  // Enumerate all KEK pub data.\r
  //\r
  ItemDataSize = (UINT32) DataSize;\r
  CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) Data;\r
  GuidIndex = 0;\r
\r
  while ((ItemDataSize > 0) && (ItemDataSize >= CertList->SignatureListSize)) {\r
\r
    if (CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertRsa2048Guid)) {\r
      Help = STRING_TOKEN (STR_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SHA256_GUID);\r
    } else if (CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Guid)) {\r
      Help = STRING_TOKEN (STR_CERT_TYPE_PCKS7_GUID);\r
    } else if (CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertSha1Guid)) {\r
      Help = STRING_TOKEN (STR_CERT_TYPE_SHA1_GUID);\r
    } else if (CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertSha256Guid)) {\r
      Help = STRING_TOKEN (STR_CERT_TYPE_SHA256_GUID);\r
    } else if (CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Sha256Guid)) {\r
      Help = STRING_TOKEN (STR_CERT_TYPE_X509_SHA256_GUID);\r
    } else if (CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Sha384Guid)) {\r
      Help = STRING_TOKEN (STR_CERT_TYPE_X509_SHA384_GUID);\r
    } else if (CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Sha512Guid)) {\r
      Help = STRING_TOKEN (STR_CERT_TYPE_X509_SHA512_GUID);\r
    } else {\r
      //\r
      // The signature type is not supported in current implementation.\r
      //\r
      ItemDataSize -= CertList->SignatureListSize;\r
      CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + CertList->SignatureListSize);\r
      continue;\r
    }\r
\r
    CertCount  = (CertList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - CertList->SignatureHeaderSize) / CertList->SignatureSize;\r
    for (Index = 0; Index < CertCount; Index++) {\r
      Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertList\r
                                              + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST)\r
                                              + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize\r
                                              + Index * CertList->SignatureSize);\r
      //\r
      // Display GUID and help\r
      //\r
      GuidToString (&Cert->SignatureOwner, GuidStr, 100);\r
      GuidID  = HiiSetString (PrivateData->HiiHandle, 0, GuidStr, NULL);\r
      HiiCreateCheckBoxOpCode (\r
        StartOpCodeHandle,\r
        (EFI_QUESTION_ID) (QuestionIdBase + GuidIndex++),\r
        0,\r
        0,\r
        GuidID,\r
        Help,\r
        EFI_IFR_FLAG_CALLBACK,\r
        0,\r
        NULL\r
        );\r
    }\r
\r
    ItemDataSize -= CertList->SignatureListSize;\r
    CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + CertList->SignatureListSize);\r
  }\r
\r
ON_EXIT:\r
  HiiUpdateForm (\r
    PrivateData->HiiHandle,\r
    &gSecureBootConfigFormSetGuid,\r
    FormId,\r
    StartOpCodeHandle,\r
    EndOpCodeHandle\r
    );\r
\r
  if (StartOpCodeHandle != NULL) {\r
    HiiFreeOpCodeHandle (StartOpCodeHandle);\r
  }\r
\r
  if (EndOpCodeHandle != NULL) {\r
    HiiFreeOpCodeHandle (EndOpCodeHandle);\r
  }\r
\r
  if (Data != NULL) {\r
    FreePool (Data);\r
  }\r
\r
  if (GuidStr != NULL) {\r
    FreePool (GuidStr);\r
  }\r
\r
  return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
}\r
\r
/**\r
  Delete a KEK entry from KEK database.\r
\r
  @param[in]    PrivateData         Module's private data.\r
  @param[in]    QuestionId          Question id of the KEK item to delete.\r
\r
  @retval   EFI_SUCCESS            Delete kek item successfully.\r
  @retval   EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES   Could not allocate needed resources.\r
\r
**/\r
EFI_STATUS\r
DeleteKeyExchangeKey (\r
  IN SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_DATA   *PrivateData,\r
  IN EFI_QUESTION_ID                  QuestionId\r
  )\r
{\r
  EFI_STATUS                  Status;\r
  UINTN                       DataSize;\r
  UINT8                       *Data;\r
  UINT8                       *OldData;\r
  UINT32                      Attr;\r
  UINT32                      Index;\r
  EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST          *CertList;\r
  EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST          *NewCertList;\r
  EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA          *Cert;\r
  UINTN                       CertCount;\r
  UINT32                      Offset;\r
  BOOLEAN                     IsKEKItemFound;\r
  UINT32                      KekDataSize;\r
  UINTN                       DeleteKekIndex;\r
  UINTN                       GuidIndex;\r
\r
  Data            = NULL;\r
  OldData         = NULL;\r
  CertList        = NULL;\r
  Cert            = NULL;\r
  Attr            = 0;\r
  DeleteKekIndex  = QuestionId - OPTION_DEL_KEK_QUESTION_ID;\r
\r
  Status = SetSecureBootMode(CUSTOM_SECURE_BOOT_MODE);\r
  if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
    return Status;\r
  }\r
\r
  //\r
  // Get original KEK variable.\r
  //\r
  DataSize = 0;\r
  Status = gRT->GetVariable (EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, NULL, &DataSize, NULL);\r
  if (EFI_ERROR(Status) && Status != EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {\r
    goto ON_EXIT;\r
  }\r
\r
  OldData = (UINT8*)AllocateZeroPool(DataSize);\r
  if (OldData == NULL) {\r
    Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
    goto ON_EXIT;\r
  }\r
\r
  Status = gRT->GetVariable (EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, &Attr, &DataSize, OldData);\r
  if (EFI_ERROR(Status)) {\r
    goto ON_EXIT;\r
  }\r
\r
  //\r
  // Allocate space for new variable.\r
  //\r
  Data = (UINT8*) AllocateZeroPool (DataSize);\r
  if (Data == NULL) {\r
    Status  =  EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
    goto ON_EXIT;\r
  }\r
\r
  //\r
  // Enumerate all KEK pub data and erasing the target item.\r
  //\r
  IsKEKItemFound = FALSE;\r
  KekDataSize = (UINT32) DataSize;\r
  CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) OldData;\r
  Offset = 0;\r
  GuidIndex = 0;\r
  while ((KekDataSize > 0) && (KekDataSize >= CertList->SignatureListSize)) {\r
    if (CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertRsa2048Guid) ||\r
        CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Guid)) {\r
      CopyMem (Data + Offset, CertList, (sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize));\r
      NewCertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *)(Data + Offset);\r
      Offset += (sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r
      Cert      = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r
      CertCount  = (CertList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - CertList->SignatureHeaderSize) / CertList->SignatureSize;\r
      for (Index = 0; Index < CertCount; Index++) {\r
        if (GuidIndex == DeleteKekIndex ) {\r
          //\r
          // Find it! Skip it!\r
          //\r
          NewCertList->SignatureListSize -= CertList->SignatureSize;\r
          IsKEKItemFound = TRUE;\r
        } else {\r
          //\r
          // This item doesn't match. Copy it to the Data buffer.\r
          //\r
          CopyMem (Data + Offset, Cert, CertList->SignatureSize);\r
          Offset += CertList->SignatureSize;\r
        }\r
        GuidIndex++;\r
        Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8*) Cert + CertList->SignatureSize);\r
      }\r
    } else {\r
      //\r
      // This List doesn't match. Copy it to the Data buffer.\r
      //\r
      CopyMem (Data + Offset, CertList, CertList->SignatureListSize);\r
      Offset += CertList->SignatureListSize;\r
    }\r
\r
    KekDataSize -= CertList->SignatureListSize;\r
    CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST*) ((UINT8*) CertList + CertList->SignatureListSize);\r
  }\r
\r
  if (!IsKEKItemFound) {\r
    //\r
    // Doesn't find the Kek Item!\r
    //\r
    Status = EFI_NOT_FOUND;\r
    goto ON_EXIT;\r
  }\r
\r
  //\r
  // Delete the Signature header if there is no signature in the list.\r
  //\r
  KekDataSize = Offset;\r
  CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST*) Data;\r
  Offset = 0;\r
  ZeroMem (OldData, KekDataSize);\r
  while ((KekDataSize > 0) && (KekDataSize >= CertList->SignatureListSize)) {\r
    CertCount  = (CertList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - CertList->SignatureHeaderSize) / CertList->SignatureSize;\r
    DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "       CertCount = %x\n", CertCount));\r
    if (CertCount != 0) {\r
      CopyMem (OldData + Offset, CertList, CertList->SignatureListSize);\r
      Offset += CertList->SignatureListSize;\r
    }\r
    KekDataSize -= CertList->SignatureListSize;\r
    CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + CertList->SignatureListSize);\r
  }\r
\r
  DataSize = Offset;\r
  if ((Attr & EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0) {\r
    Status = CreateTimeBasedPayload (&DataSize, &OldData);\r
    if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
      DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Fail to create time-based data payload: %r", Status));\r
      goto ON_EXIT;\r
    }\r
  }\r
\r
  Status = gRT->SetVariable(\r
                  EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME,\r
                  &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
                  Attr,\r
                  DataSize,\r