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1 | /** @file\r | |
2 | Implement image verification services for secure boot service in UEFI2.3.1.\r | |
3 | \r | |
4 | Caution: This file requires additional review when modified.\r | |
5 | This library will have external input - PE/COFF image.\r | |
6 | This external input must be validated carefully to avoid security issue like\r | |
7 | buffer overflow, integer overflow.\r | |
8 | \r | |
9 | DxeImageVerificationLibImageRead() function will make sure the PE/COFF image content\r | |
10 | read is within the image buffer.\r | |
11 | \r | |
12 | DxeImageVerificationHandler(), HashPeImageByType(), HashPeImage() function will accept\r | |
13 | untrusted PE/COFF image and validate its data structure within this image buffer before use.\r | |
14 | \r | |
15 | Copyright (c) 2009 - 2014, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>\r | |
16 | This program and the accompanying materials\r | |
17 | are licensed and made available under the terms and conditions of the BSD License\r | |
18 | which accompanies this distribution. The full text of the license may be found at\r | |
19 | http://opensource.org/licenses/bsd-license.php\r | |
20 | \r | |
21 | THE PROGRAM IS DISTRIBUTED UNDER THE BSD LICENSE ON AN "AS IS" BASIS,\r | |
22 | WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR REPRESENTATIONS OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED.\r | |
23 | \r | |
24 | **/\r | |
25 | \r | |
26 | #include "DxeImageVerificationLib.h"\r | |
27 | \r | |
28 | //\r | |
29 | // Caution: This is used by a function which may receive untrusted input.\r | |
30 | // These global variables hold PE/COFF image data, and they should be validated before use.\r | |
31 | //\r | |
32 | EFI_IMAGE_OPTIONAL_HEADER_PTR_UNION mNtHeader;\r | |
33 | UINT32 mPeCoffHeaderOffset;\r | |
34 | EFI_GUID mCertType;\r | |
35 | \r | |
36 | //\r | |
37 | // Information on current PE/COFF image\r | |
38 | //\r | |
39 | UINTN mImageSize;\r | |
40 | UINT8 *mImageBase = NULL;\r | |
41 | UINT8 mImageDigest[MAX_DIGEST_SIZE];\r | |
42 | UINTN mImageDigestSize;\r | |
43 | \r | |
44 | //\r | |
45 | // Notify string for authorization UI.\r | |
46 | //\r | |
47 | CHAR16 mNotifyString1[MAX_NOTIFY_STRING_LEN] = L"Image verification pass but not found in authorized database!";\r | |
48 | CHAR16 mNotifyString2[MAX_NOTIFY_STRING_LEN] = L"Launch this image anyway? (Yes/Defer/No)";\r | |
49 | //\r | |
50 | // Public Exponent of RSA Key.\r | |
51 | //\r | |
52 | CONST UINT8 mRsaE[] = { 0x01, 0x00, 0x01 };\r | |
53 | \r | |
54 | \r | |
55 | //\r | |
56 | // OID ASN.1 Value for Hash Algorithms\r | |
57 | //\r | |
58 | UINT8 mHashOidValue[] = {\r | |
59 | 0x2B, 0x0E, 0x03, 0x02, 0x1A, // OBJ_sha1\r | |
60 | 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x04, // OBJ_sha224\r | |
61 | 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x01, // OBJ_sha256\r | |
62 | 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x02, // OBJ_sha384\r | |
63 | 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x03, // OBJ_sha512\r | |
64 | };\r | |
65 | \r | |
66 | HASH_TABLE mHash[] = {\r | |
67 | { L"SHA1", 20, &mHashOidValue[0], 5, Sha1GetContextSize, Sha1Init, Sha1Update, Sha1Final },\r | |
68 | { L"SHA224", 28, &mHashOidValue[5], 9, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL },\r | |
69 | { L"SHA256", 32, &mHashOidValue[14], 9, Sha256GetContextSize, Sha256Init, Sha256Update, Sha256Final},\r | |
70 | { L"SHA384", 48, &mHashOidValue[23], 9, Sha384GetContextSize, Sha384Init, Sha384Update, Sha384Final},\r | |
71 | { L"SHA512", 64, &mHashOidValue[32], 9, Sha512GetContextSize, Sha512Init, Sha512Update, Sha512Final}\r | |
72 | };\r | |
73 | \r | |
74 | /**\r | |
75 | SecureBoot Hook for processing image verification.\r | |
76 | \r | |
77 | @param[in] VariableName Name of Variable to be found.\r | |
78 | @param[in] VendorGuid Variable vendor GUID.\r | |
79 | @param[in] DataSize Size of Data found. If size is less than the\r | |
80 | data, this value contains the required size.\r | |
81 | @param[in] Data Data pointer.\r | |
82 | \r | |
83 | **/\r | |
84 | VOID\r | |
85 | EFIAPI\r | |
86 | SecureBootHook (\r | |
87 | IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r | |
88 | IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r | |
89 | IN UINTN DataSize,\r | |
90 | IN VOID *Data\r | |
91 | );\r | |
92 | \r | |
93 | /**\r | |
94 | Reads contents of a PE/COFF image in memory buffer.\r | |
95 | \r | |
96 | Caution: This function may receive untrusted input.\r | |
97 | PE/COFF image is external input, so this function will make sure the PE/COFF image content\r | |
98 | read is within the image buffer.\r | |
99 | \r | |
100 | @param FileHandle Pointer to the file handle to read the PE/COFF image.\r | |
101 | @param FileOffset Offset into the PE/COFF image to begin the read operation.\r | |
102 | @param ReadSize On input, the size in bytes of the requested read operation.\r | |
103 | On output, the number of bytes actually read.\r | |
104 | @param Buffer Output buffer that contains the data read from the PE/COFF image.\r | |
105 | \r | |
106 | @retval EFI_SUCCESS The specified portion of the PE/COFF image was read and the size\r | |
107 | **/\r | |
108 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
109 | EFIAPI\r | |
110 | DxeImageVerificationLibImageRead (\r | |
111 | IN VOID *FileHandle,\r | |
112 | IN UINTN FileOffset,\r | |
113 | IN OUT UINTN *ReadSize,\r | |
114 | OUT VOID *Buffer\r | |
115 | )\r | |
116 | {\r | |
117 | UINTN EndPosition;\r | |
118 | \r | |
119 | if (FileHandle == NULL || ReadSize == NULL || Buffer == NULL) {\r | |
120 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r | |
121 | }\r | |
122 | \r | |
123 | if (MAX_ADDRESS - FileOffset < *ReadSize) {\r | |
124 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r | |
125 | }\r | |
126 | \r | |
127 | EndPosition = FileOffset + *ReadSize;\r | |
128 | if (EndPosition > mImageSize) {\r | |
129 | *ReadSize = (UINT32)(mImageSize - FileOffset);\r | |
130 | }\r | |
131 | \r | |
132 | if (FileOffset >= mImageSize) {\r | |
133 | *ReadSize = 0;\r | |
134 | }\r | |
135 | \r | |
136 | CopyMem (Buffer, (UINT8 *)((UINTN) FileHandle + FileOffset), *ReadSize);\r | |
137 | \r | |
138 | return EFI_SUCCESS;\r | |
139 | }\r | |
140 | \r | |
141 | \r | |
142 | /**\r | |
143 | Get the image type.\r | |
144 | \r | |
145 | @param[in] File This is a pointer to the device path of the file that is\r | |
146 | being dispatched.\r | |
147 | \r | |
148 | @return UINT32 Image Type\r | |
149 | \r | |
150 | **/\r | |
151 | UINT32\r | |
152 | GetImageType (\r | |
153 | IN CONST EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *File\r | |
154 | )\r | |
155 | {\r | |
156 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r | |
157 | EFI_HANDLE DeviceHandle;\r | |
158 | EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *TempDevicePath;\r | |
159 | EFI_BLOCK_IO_PROTOCOL *BlockIo;\r | |
160 | \r | |
161 | if (File == NULL) {\r | |
162 | return IMAGE_UNKNOWN;\r | |
163 | }\r | |
164 | \r | |
165 | //\r | |
166 | // First check to see if File is from a Firmware Volume\r | |
167 | //\r | |
168 | DeviceHandle = NULL;\r | |
169 | TempDevicePath = (EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *) File;\r | |
170 | Status = gBS->LocateDevicePath (\r | |
171 | &gEfiFirmwareVolume2ProtocolGuid,\r | |
172 | &TempDevicePath,\r | |
173 | &DeviceHandle\r | |
174 | );\r | |
175 | if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
176 | Status = gBS->OpenProtocol (\r | |
177 | DeviceHandle,\r | |
178 | &gEfiFirmwareVolume2ProtocolGuid,\r | |
179 | NULL,\r | |
180 | NULL,\r | |
181 | NULL,\r | |
182 | EFI_OPEN_PROTOCOL_TEST_PROTOCOL\r | |
183 | );\r | |
184 | if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
185 | return IMAGE_FROM_FV;\r | |
186 | }\r | |
187 | }\r | |
188 | \r | |
189 | //\r | |
190 | // Next check to see if File is from a Block I/O device\r | |
191 | //\r | |
192 | DeviceHandle = NULL;\r | |
193 | TempDevicePath = (EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *) File;\r | |
194 | Status = gBS->LocateDevicePath (\r | |
195 | &gEfiBlockIoProtocolGuid,\r | |
196 | &TempDevicePath,\r | |
197 | &DeviceHandle\r | |
198 | );\r | |
199 | if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
200 | BlockIo = NULL;\r | |
201 | Status = gBS->OpenProtocol (\r | |
202 | DeviceHandle,\r | |
203 | &gEfiBlockIoProtocolGuid,\r | |
204 | (VOID **) &BlockIo,\r | |
205 | NULL,\r | |
206 | NULL,\r | |
207 | EFI_OPEN_PROTOCOL_GET_PROTOCOL\r | |
208 | );\r | |
209 | if (!EFI_ERROR (Status) && BlockIo != NULL) {\r | |
210 | if (BlockIo->Media != NULL) {\r | |
211 | if (BlockIo->Media->RemovableMedia) {\r | |
212 | //\r | |
213 | // Block I/O is present and specifies the media is removable\r | |
214 | //\r | |
215 | return IMAGE_FROM_REMOVABLE_MEDIA;\r | |
216 | } else {\r | |
217 | //\r | |
218 | // Block I/O is present and specifies the media is not removable\r | |
219 | //\r | |
220 | return IMAGE_FROM_FIXED_MEDIA;\r | |
221 | }\r | |
222 | }\r | |
223 | }\r | |
224 | }\r | |
225 | \r | |
226 | //\r | |
227 | // File is not in a Firmware Volume or on a Block I/O device, so check to see if\r | |
228 | // the device path supports the Simple File System Protocol.\r | |
229 | //\r | |
230 | DeviceHandle = NULL;\r | |
231 | TempDevicePath = (EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *) File;\r | |
232 | Status = gBS->LocateDevicePath (\r | |
233 | &gEfiSimpleFileSystemProtocolGuid,\r | |
234 | &TempDevicePath,\r | |
235 | &DeviceHandle\r | |
236 | );\r | |
237 | if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
238 | //\r | |
239 | // Simple File System is present without Block I/O, so assume media is fixed.\r | |
240 | //\r | |
241 | return IMAGE_FROM_FIXED_MEDIA;\r | |
242 | }\r | |
243 | \r | |
244 | //\r | |
245 | // File is not from an FV, Block I/O or Simple File System, so the only options\r | |
246 | // left are a PCI Option ROM and a Load File Protocol such as a PXE Boot from a NIC.\r | |
247 | //\r | |
248 | TempDevicePath = (EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *) File;\r | |
249 | while (!IsDevicePathEndType (TempDevicePath)) {\r | |
250 | switch (DevicePathType (TempDevicePath)) {\r | |
251 | \r | |
252 | case MEDIA_DEVICE_PATH:\r | |
253 | if (DevicePathSubType (TempDevicePath) == MEDIA_RELATIVE_OFFSET_RANGE_DP) {\r | |
254 | return IMAGE_FROM_OPTION_ROM;\r | |
255 | }\r | |
256 | break;\r | |
257 | \r | |
258 | case MESSAGING_DEVICE_PATH:\r | |
259 | if (DevicePathSubType(TempDevicePath) == MSG_MAC_ADDR_DP) {\r | |
260 | return IMAGE_FROM_REMOVABLE_MEDIA;\r | |
261 | }\r | |
262 | break;\r | |
263 | \r | |
264 | default:\r | |
265 | break;\r | |
266 | }\r | |
267 | TempDevicePath = NextDevicePathNode (TempDevicePath);\r | |
268 | }\r | |
269 | return IMAGE_UNKNOWN;\r | |
270 | }\r | |
271 | \r | |
272 | /**\r | |
273 | Caculate hash of Pe/Coff image based on the authenticode image hashing in\r | |
274 | PE/COFF Specification 8.0 Appendix A\r | |
275 | \r | |
276 | Caution: This function may receive untrusted input.\r | |
277 | PE/COFF image is external input, so this function will validate its data structure\r | |
278 | within this image buffer before use.\r | |
279 | \r | |
280 | @param[in] HashAlg Hash algorithm type.\r | |
281 | \r | |
282 | @retval TRUE Successfully hash image.\r | |
283 | @retval FALSE Fail in hash image.\r | |
284 | \r | |
285 | **/\r | |
286 | BOOLEAN\r | |
287 | HashPeImage (\r | |
288 | IN UINT32 HashAlg\r | |
289 | )\r | |
290 | {\r | |
291 | BOOLEAN Status;\r | |
292 | UINT16 Magic;\r | |
293 | EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER *Section;\r | |
294 | VOID *HashCtx;\r | |
295 | UINTN CtxSize;\r | |
296 | UINT8 *HashBase;\r | |
297 | UINTN HashSize;\r | |
298 | UINTN SumOfBytesHashed;\r | |
299 | EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER *SectionHeader;\r | |
300 | UINTN Index;\r | |
301 | UINTN Pos;\r | |
302 | UINT32 CertSize;\r | |
303 | UINT32 NumberOfRvaAndSizes;\r | |
304 | \r | |
305 | HashCtx = NULL;\r | |
306 | SectionHeader = NULL;\r | |
307 | Status = FALSE;\r | |
308 | \r | |
309 | if ((HashAlg >= HASHALG_MAX)) {\r | |
310 | return FALSE;\r | |
311 | }\r | |
312 | \r | |
313 | //\r | |
314 | // Initialize context of hash.\r | |
315 | //\r | |
316 | ZeroMem (mImageDigest, MAX_DIGEST_SIZE);\r | |
317 | \r | |
318 | switch (HashAlg) {\r | |
319 | case HASHALG_SHA1:\r | |
320 | mImageDigestSize = SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE;\r | |
321 | mCertType = gEfiCertSha1Guid;\r | |
322 | break;\r | |
323 | \r | |
324 | case HASHALG_SHA256:\r | |
325 | mImageDigestSize = SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE;\r | |
326 | mCertType = gEfiCertSha256Guid;\r | |
327 | break;\r | |
328 | \r | |
329 | case HASHALG_SHA384:\r | |
330 | mImageDigestSize = SHA384_DIGEST_SIZE;\r | |
331 | mCertType = gEfiCertSha384Guid;\r | |
332 | break;\r | |
333 | \r | |
334 | case HASHALG_SHA512:\r | |
335 | mImageDigestSize = SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE;\r | |
336 | mCertType = gEfiCertSha512Guid;\r | |
337 | break;\r | |
338 | \r | |
339 | default:\r | |
340 | return FALSE;\r | |
341 | }\r | |
342 | \r | |
343 | CtxSize = mHash[HashAlg].GetContextSize();\r | |
344 | \r | |
345 | HashCtx = AllocatePool (CtxSize);\r | |
346 | if (HashCtx == NULL) {\r | |
347 | return FALSE;\r | |
348 | }\r | |
349 | \r | |
350 | // 1. Load the image header into memory.\r | |
351 | \r | |
352 | // 2. Initialize a SHA hash context.\r | |
353 | Status = mHash[HashAlg].HashInit(HashCtx);\r | |
354 | \r | |
355 | if (!Status) {\r | |
356 | goto Done;\r | |
357 | }\r | |
358 | \r | |
359 | //\r | |
360 | // Measuring PE/COFF Image Header;\r | |
361 | // But CheckSum field and SECURITY data directory (certificate) are excluded\r | |
362 | //\r | |
363 | if (mNtHeader.Pe32->FileHeader.Machine == IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_IA64 && mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {\r | |
364 | //\r | |
365 | // NOTE: Some versions of Linux ELILO for Itanium have an incorrect magic value\r | |
366 | // in the PE/COFF Header. If the MachineType is Itanium(IA64) and the\r | |
367 | // Magic value in the OptionalHeader is EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC\r | |
368 | // then override the magic value to EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR64_MAGIC\r | |
369 | //\r | |
370 | Magic = EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR64_MAGIC;\r | |
371 | } else {\r | |
372 | //\r | |
373 | // Get the magic value from the PE/COFF Optional Header\r | |
374 | //\r | |
375 | Magic = mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.Magic;\r | |
376 | }\r | |
377 | \r | |
378 | //\r | |
379 | // 3. Calculate the distance from the base of the image header to the image checksum address.\r | |
380 | // 4. Hash the image header from its base to beginning of the image checksum.\r | |
381 | //\r | |
382 | HashBase = mImageBase;\r | |
383 | if (Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {\r | |
384 | //\r | |
385 | // Use PE32 offset.\r | |
386 | //\r | |
387 | HashSize = (UINTN) ((UINT8 *) (&mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.CheckSum) - HashBase);\r | |
388 | NumberOfRvaAndSizes = mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.NumberOfRvaAndSizes;\r | |
389 | } else if (Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR64_MAGIC) {\r | |
390 | //\r | |
391 | // Use PE32+ offset.\r | |
392 | //\r | |
393 | HashSize = (UINTN) ((UINT8 *) (&mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.CheckSum) - HashBase);\r | |
394 | NumberOfRvaAndSizes = mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.NumberOfRvaAndSizes;\r | |
395 | } else {\r | |
396 | //\r | |
397 | // Invalid header magic number.\r | |
398 | //\r | |
399 | Status = FALSE;\r | |
400 | goto Done;\r | |
401 | }\r | |
402 | \r | |
403 | Status = mHash[HashAlg].HashUpdate(HashCtx, HashBase, HashSize);\r | |
404 | if (!Status) {\r | |
405 | goto Done;\r | |
406 | }\r | |
407 | \r | |
408 | //\r | |
409 | // 5. Skip over the image checksum (it occupies a single ULONG).\r | |
410 | //\r | |
411 | if (NumberOfRvaAndSizes <= EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY) {\r | |
412 | //\r | |
413 | // 6. Since there is no Cert Directory in optional header, hash everything\r | |
414 | // from the end of the checksum to the end of image header.\r | |
415 | //\r | |
416 | if (Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {\r | |
417 | //\r | |
418 | // Use PE32 offset.\r | |
419 | //\r | |
420 | HashBase = (UINT8 *) &mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.CheckSum + sizeof (UINT32);\r | |
421 | HashSize = mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.SizeOfHeaders - (UINTN) (HashBase - mImageBase);\r | |
422 | } else {\r | |
423 | //\r | |
424 | // Use PE32+ offset.\r | |
425 | //\r | |
426 | HashBase = (UINT8 *) &mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.CheckSum + sizeof (UINT32);\r | |
427 | HashSize = mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.SizeOfHeaders - (UINTN) (HashBase - mImageBase);\r | |
428 | }\r | |
429 | \r | |
430 | if (HashSize != 0) {\r | |
431 | Status = mHash[HashAlg].HashUpdate(HashCtx, HashBase, HashSize);\r | |
432 | if (!Status) {\r | |
433 | goto Done;\r | |
434 | }\r | |
435 | }\r | |
436 | } else {\r | |
437 | //\r | |
438 | // 7. Hash everything from the end of the checksum to the start of the Cert Directory.\r | |
439 | //\r | |
440 | if (Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {\r | |
441 | //\r | |
442 | // Use PE32 offset.\r | |
443 | //\r | |
444 | HashBase = (UINT8 *) &mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.CheckSum + sizeof (UINT32);\r | |
445 | HashSize = (UINTN) ((UINT8 *) (&mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY]) - HashBase);\r | |
446 | } else {\r | |
447 | //\r | |
448 | // Use PE32+ offset.\r | |
449 | //\r | |
450 | HashBase = (UINT8 *) &mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.CheckSum + sizeof (UINT32);\r | |
451 | HashSize = (UINTN) ((UINT8 *) (&mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY]) - HashBase);\r | |
452 | }\r | |
453 | \r | |
454 | if (HashSize != 0) {\r | |
455 | Status = mHash[HashAlg].HashUpdate(HashCtx, HashBase, HashSize);\r | |
456 | if (!Status) {\r | |
457 | goto Done;\r | |
458 | }\r | |
459 | }\r | |
460 | \r | |
461 | //\r | |
462 | // 8. Skip over the Cert Directory. (It is sizeof(IMAGE_DATA_DIRECTORY) bytes.)\r | |
463 | // 9. Hash everything from the end of the Cert Directory to the end of image header.\r | |
464 | //\r | |
465 | if (Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {\r | |
466 | //\r | |
467 | // Use PE32 offset\r | |
468 | //\r | |
469 | HashBase = (UINT8 *) &mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY + 1];\r | |
470 | HashSize = mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.SizeOfHeaders - (UINTN) (HashBase - mImageBase);\r | |
471 | } else {\r | |
472 | //\r | |
473 | // Use PE32+ offset.\r | |
474 | //\r | |
475 | HashBase = (UINT8 *) &mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY + 1];\r | |
476 | HashSize = mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.SizeOfHeaders - (UINTN) (HashBase - mImageBase);\r | |
477 | }\r | |
478 | \r | |
479 | if (HashSize != 0) {\r | |
480 | Status = mHash[HashAlg].HashUpdate(HashCtx, HashBase, HashSize);\r | |
481 | if (!Status) {\r | |
482 | goto Done;\r | |
483 | }\r | |
484 | }\r | |
485 | }\r | |
486 | \r | |
487 | //\r | |
488 | // 10. Set the SUM_OF_BYTES_HASHED to the size of the header.\r | |
489 | //\r | |
490 | if (Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {\r | |
491 | //\r | |
492 | // Use PE32 offset.\r | |
493 | //\r | |
494 | SumOfBytesHashed = mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.SizeOfHeaders;\r | |
495 | } else {\r | |
496 | //\r | |
497 | // Use PE32+ offset\r | |
498 | //\r | |
499 | SumOfBytesHashed = mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.SizeOfHeaders;\r | |
500 | }\r | |
501 | \r | |
502 | \r | |
503 | Section = (EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER *) (\r | |
504 | mImageBase +\r | |
505 | mPeCoffHeaderOffset +\r | |
506 | sizeof (UINT32) +\r | |
507 | sizeof (EFI_IMAGE_FILE_HEADER) +\r | |
508 | mNtHeader.Pe32->FileHeader.SizeOfOptionalHeader\r | |
509 | );\r | |
510 | \r | |
511 | //\r | |
512 | // 11. Build a temporary table of pointers to all the IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER\r | |
513 | // structures in the image. The 'NumberOfSections' field of the image\r | |
514 | // header indicates how big the table should be. Do not include any\r | |
515 | // IMAGE_SECTION_HEADERs in the table whose 'SizeOfRawData' field is zero.\r | |
516 | //\r | |
517 | SectionHeader = (EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER *) AllocateZeroPool (sizeof (EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER) * mNtHeader.Pe32->FileHeader.NumberOfSections);\r | |
518 | if (SectionHeader == NULL) {\r | |
519 | Status = FALSE;\r | |
520 | goto Done;\r | |
521 | }\r | |
522 | //\r | |
523 | // 12. Using the 'PointerToRawData' in the referenced section headers as\r | |
524 | // a key, arrange the elements in the table in ascending order. In other\r | |
525 | // words, sort the section headers according to the disk-file offset of\r | |
526 | // the section.\r | |
527 | //\r | |
528 | for (Index = 0; Index < mNtHeader.Pe32->FileHeader.NumberOfSections; Index++) {\r | |
529 | Pos = Index;\r | |
530 | while ((Pos > 0) && (Section->PointerToRawData < SectionHeader[Pos - 1].PointerToRawData)) {\r | |
531 | CopyMem (&SectionHeader[Pos], &SectionHeader[Pos - 1], sizeof (EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER));\r | |
532 | Pos--;\r | |
533 | }\r | |
534 | CopyMem (&SectionHeader[Pos], Section, sizeof (EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER));\r | |
535 | Section += 1;\r | |
536 | }\r | |
537 | \r | |
538 | //\r | |
539 | // 13. Walk through the sorted table, bring the corresponding section\r | |
540 | // into memory, and hash the entire section (using the 'SizeOfRawData'\r | |
541 | // field in the section header to determine the amount of data to hash).\r | |
542 | // 14. Add the section's 'SizeOfRawData' to SUM_OF_BYTES_HASHED .\r | |
543 | // 15. Repeat steps 13 and 14 for all the sections in the sorted table.\r | |
544 | //\r | |
545 | for (Index = 0; Index < mNtHeader.Pe32->FileHeader.NumberOfSections; Index++) {\r | |
546 | Section = &SectionHeader[Index];\r | |
547 | if (Section->SizeOfRawData == 0) {\r | |
548 | continue;\r | |
549 | }\r | |
550 | HashBase = mImageBase + Section->PointerToRawData;\r | |
551 | HashSize = (UINTN) Section->SizeOfRawData;\r | |
552 | \r | |
553 | Status = mHash[HashAlg].HashUpdate(HashCtx, HashBase, HashSize);\r | |
554 | if (!Status) {\r | |
555 | goto Done;\r | |
556 | }\r | |
557 | \r | |
558 | SumOfBytesHashed += HashSize;\r | |
559 | }\r | |
560 | \r | |
561 | //\r | |
562 | // 16. If the file size is greater than SUM_OF_BYTES_HASHED, there is extra\r | |
563 | // data in the file that needs to be added to the hash. This data begins\r | |
564 | // at file offset SUM_OF_BYTES_HASHED and its length is:\r | |
565 | // FileSize - (CertDirectory->Size)\r | |
566 | //\r | |
567 | if (mImageSize > SumOfBytesHashed) {\r | |
568 | HashBase = mImageBase + SumOfBytesHashed;\r | |
569 | \r | |
570 | if (NumberOfRvaAndSizes <= EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY) {\r | |
571 | CertSize = 0;\r | |
572 | } else {\r | |
573 | if (Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {\r | |
574 | //\r | |
575 | // Use PE32 offset.\r | |
576 | //\r | |
577 | CertSize = mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY].Size;\r | |
578 | } else {\r | |
579 | //\r | |
580 | // Use PE32+ offset.\r | |
581 | //\r | |
582 | CertSize = mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY].Size;\r | |
583 | }\r | |
584 | }\r | |
585 | \r | |
586 | if (mImageSize > CertSize + SumOfBytesHashed) {\r | |
587 | HashSize = (UINTN) (mImageSize - CertSize - SumOfBytesHashed);\r | |
588 | \r | |
589 | Status = mHash[HashAlg].HashUpdate(HashCtx, HashBase, HashSize);\r | |
590 | if (!Status) {\r | |
591 | goto Done;\r | |
592 | }\r | |
593 | } else if (mImageSize < CertSize + SumOfBytesHashed) {\r | |
594 | Status = FALSE;\r | |
595 | goto Done;\r | |
596 | }\r | |
597 | }\r | |
598 | \r | |
599 | Status = mHash[HashAlg].HashFinal(HashCtx, mImageDigest);\r | |
600 | \r | |
601 | Done:\r | |
602 | if (HashCtx != NULL) {\r | |
603 | FreePool (HashCtx);\r | |
604 | }\r | |
605 | if (SectionHeader != NULL) {\r | |
606 | FreePool (SectionHeader);\r | |
607 | }\r | |
608 | return Status;\r | |
609 | }\r | |
610 | \r | |
611 | /**\r | |
612 | Recognize the Hash algorithm in PE/COFF Authenticode and caculate hash of\r | |
613 | Pe/Coff image based on the authenticode image hashing in PE/COFF Specification\r | |
614 | 8.0 Appendix A\r | |
615 | \r | |
616 | Caution: This function may receive untrusted input.\r | |
617 | PE/COFF image is external input, so this function will validate its data structure\r | |
618 | within this image buffer before use.\r | |
619 | \r | |
620 | @param[in] AuthData Pointer to the Authenticode Signature retrieved from signed image.\r | |
621 | @param[in] AuthDataSize Size of the Authenticode Signature in bytes.\r | |
622 | \r | |
623 | @retval EFI_UNSUPPORTED Hash algorithm is not supported.\r | |
624 | @retval EFI_SUCCESS Hash successfully.\r | |
625 | \r | |
626 | **/\r | |
627 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
628 | HashPeImageByType (\r | |
629 | IN UINT8 *AuthData,\r | |
630 | IN UINTN AuthDataSize\r | |
631 | )\r | |
632 | {\r | |
633 | UINT8 Index;\r | |
634 | \r | |
635 | for (Index = 0; Index < HASHALG_MAX; Index++) {\r | |
636 | //\r | |
637 | // Check the Hash algorithm in PE/COFF Authenticode.\r | |
638 | // According to PKCS#7 Definition:\r | |
639 | // SignedData ::= SEQUENCE {\r | |
640 | // version Version,\r | |
641 | // digestAlgorithms DigestAlgorithmIdentifiers,\r | |
642 | // contentInfo ContentInfo,\r | |
643 | // .... }\r | |
644 | // The DigestAlgorithmIdentifiers can be used to determine the hash algorithm in PE/COFF hashing\r | |
645 | // This field has the fixed offset (+32) in final Authenticode ASN.1 data.\r | |
646 | // Fixed offset (+32) is calculated based on two bytes of length encoding.\r | |
647 | //\r | |
648 | if ((*(AuthData + 1) & TWO_BYTE_ENCODE) != TWO_BYTE_ENCODE) {\r | |
649 | //\r | |
650 | // Only support two bytes of Long Form of Length Encoding.\r | |
651 | //\r | |
652 | continue;\r | |
653 | }\r | |
654 | \r | |
655 | if (AuthDataSize < 32 + mHash[Index].OidLength) {\r | |
656 | return EFI_UNSUPPORTED;\r | |
657 | }\r | |
658 | \r | |
659 | if (CompareMem (AuthData + 32, mHash[Index].OidValue, mHash[Index].OidLength) == 0) {\r | |
660 | break;\r | |
661 | }\r | |
662 | }\r | |
663 | \r | |
664 | if (Index == HASHALG_MAX) {\r | |
665 | return EFI_UNSUPPORTED;\r | |
666 | }\r | |
667 | \r | |
668 | //\r | |
669 | // HASH PE Image based on Hash algorithm in PE/COFF Authenticode.\r | |
670 | //\r | |
671 | if (!HashPeImage(Index)) {\r | |
672 | return EFI_UNSUPPORTED;\r | |
673 | }\r | |
674 | \r | |
675 | return EFI_SUCCESS;\r | |
676 | }\r | |
677 | \r | |
678 | \r | |
679 | /**\r | |
680 | Returns the size of a given image execution info table in bytes.\r | |
681 | \r | |
682 | This function returns the size, in bytes, of the image execution info table specified by\r | |
683 | ImageExeInfoTable. If ImageExeInfoTable is NULL, then 0 is returned.\r | |
684 | \r | |
685 | @param ImageExeInfoTable A pointer to a image execution info table structure.\r | |
686 | \r | |
687 | @retval 0 If ImageExeInfoTable is NULL.\r | |
688 | @retval Others The size of a image execution info table in bytes.\r | |
689 | \r | |
690 | **/\r | |
691 | UINTN\r | |
692 | GetImageExeInfoTableSize (\r | |
693 | EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO_TABLE *ImageExeInfoTable\r | |
694 | )\r | |
695 | {\r | |
696 | UINTN Index;\r | |
697 | EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO *ImageExeInfoItem;\r | |
698 | UINTN TotalSize;\r | |
699 | \r | |
700 | if (ImageExeInfoTable == NULL) {\r | |
701 | return 0;\r | |
702 | }\r | |
703 | \r | |
704 | ImageExeInfoItem = (EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO *) ((UINT8 *) ImageExeInfoTable + sizeof (EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO_TABLE));\r | |
705 | TotalSize = sizeof (EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO_TABLE);\r | |
706 | for (Index = 0; Index < ImageExeInfoTable->NumberOfImages; Index++) {\r | |
707 | TotalSize += ReadUnaligned32 ((UINT32 *) &ImageExeInfoItem->InfoSize);\r | |
708 | ImageExeInfoItem = (EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO *) ((UINT8 *) ImageExeInfoItem + ReadUnaligned32 ((UINT32 *) &ImageExeInfoItem->InfoSize));\r | |
709 | }\r | |
710 | \r | |
711 | return TotalSize;\r | |
712 | }\r | |
713 | \r | |
714 | /**\r | |
715 | Create an Image Execution Information Table entry and add it to system configuration table.\r | |
716 | \r | |
717 | @param[in] Action Describes the action taken by the firmware regarding this image.\r | |
718 | @param[in] Name Input a null-terminated, user-friendly name.\r | |
719 | @param[in] DevicePath Input device path pointer.\r | |
720 | @param[in] Signature Input signature info in EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST data structure.\r | |
721 | @param[in] SignatureSize Size of signature.\r | |
722 | \r | |
723 | **/\r | |
724 | VOID\r | |
725 | AddImageExeInfo (\r | |
726 | IN EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_ACTION Action,\r | |
727 | IN CHAR16 *Name OPTIONAL,\r | |
728 | IN CONST EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *DevicePath,\r | |
729 | IN EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *Signature OPTIONAL,\r | |
730 | IN UINTN SignatureSize\r | |
731 | )\r | |
732 | {\r | |
733 | EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO_TABLE *ImageExeInfoTable;\r | |
734 | EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO_TABLE *NewImageExeInfoTable;\r | |
735 | EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO *ImageExeInfoEntry;\r | |
736 | UINTN ImageExeInfoTableSize;\r | |
737 | UINTN NewImageExeInfoEntrySize;\r | |
738 | UINTN NameStringLen;\r | |
739 | UINTN DevicePathSize;\r | |
740 | \r | |
741 | ImageExeInfoTable = NULL;\r | |
742 | NewImageExeInfoTable = NULL;\r | |
743 | ImageExeInfoEntry = NULL;\r | |
744 | NameStringLen = 0;\r | |
745 | \r | |
746 | if (DevicePath == NULL) {\r | |
747 | return ;\r | |
748 | }\r | |
749 | \r | |
750 | if (Name != NULL) {\r | |
751 | NameStringLen = StrSize (Name);\r | |
752 | } else {\r | |
753 | NameStringLen = sizeof (CHAR16);\r | |
754 | }\r | |
755 | \r | |
756 | EfiGetSystemConfigurationTable (&gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, (VOID **) &ImageExeInfoTable);\r | |
757 | if (ImageExeInfoTable != NULL) {\r | |
758 | //\r | |
759 | // The table has been found!\r | |
760 | // We must enlarge the table to accomodate the new exe info entry.\r | |
761 | //\r | |
762 | ImageExeInfoTableSize = GetImageExeInfoTableSize (ImageExeInfoTable);\r | |
763 | } else {\r | |
764 | //\r | |
765 | // Not Found!\r | |
766 | // We should create a new table to append to the configuration table.\r | |
767 | //\r | |
768 | ImageExeInfoTableSize = sizeof (EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO_TABLE);\r | |
769 | }\r | |
770 | \r | |
771 | DevicePathSize = GetDevicePathSize (DevicePath);\r | |
772 | NewImageExeInfoEntrySize = sizeof (EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO) - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + NameStringLen + DevicePathSize + SignatureSize;\r | |
773 | NewImageExeInfoTable = (EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO_TABLE *) AllocateRuntimePool (ImageExeInfoTableSize + NewImageExeInfoEntrySize);\r | |
774 | if (NewImageExeInfoTable == NULL) {\r | |
775 | return ;\r | |
776 | }\r | |
777 | \r | |
778 | if (ImageExeInfoTable != NULL) {\r | |
779 | CopyMem (NewImageExeInfoTable, ImageExeInfoTable, ImageExeInfoTableSize);\r | |
780 | } else {\r | |
781 | NewImageExeInfoTable->NumberOfImages = 0;\r | |
782 | }\r | |
783 | NewImageExeInfoTable->NumberOfImages++;\r | |
784 | ImageExeInfoEntry = (EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO *) ((UINT8 *) NewImageExeInfoTable + ImageExeInfoTableSize);\r | |
785 | //\r | |
786 | // Update new item's information.\r | |
787 | //\r | |
788 | WriteUnaligned32 ((UINT32 *) ImageExeInfoEntry, Action);\r | |
789 | WriteUnaligned32 ((UINT32 *) ((UINT8 *) ImageExeInfoEntry + sizeof (EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_ACTION)), (UINT32) NewImageExeInfoEntrySize);\r | |
790 | \r | |
791 | if (Name != NULL) {\r | |
792 | CopyMem ((UINT8 *) ImageExeInfoEntry + sizeof (EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_ACTION) + sizeof (UINT32), Name, NameStringLen);\r | |
793 | } else {\r | |
794 | ZeroMem ((UINT8 *) ImageExeInfoEntry + sizeof (EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_ACTION) + sizeof (UINT32), sizeof (CHAR16));\r | |
795 | }\r | |
796 | CopyMem (\r | |
797 | (UINT8 *) ImageExeInfoEntry + sizeof (EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_ACTION) + sizeof (UINT32) + NameStringLen,\r | |
798 | DevicePath,\r | |
799 | DevicePathSize\r | |
800 | );\r | |
801 | if (Signature != NULL) {\r | |
802 | CopyMem (\r | |
803 | (UINT8 *) ImageExeInfoEntry + sizeof (EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_ACTION) + sizeof (UINT32) + NameStringLen + DevicePathSize,\r | |
804 | Signature,\r | |
805 | SignatureSize\r | |
806 | );\r | |
807 | }\r | |
808 | //\r | |
809 | // Update/replace the image execution table.\r | |
810 | //\r | |
811 | gBS->InstallConfigurationTable (&gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, (VOID *) NewImageExeInfoTable);\r | |
812 | \r | |
813 | //\r | |
814 | // Free Old table data!\r | |
815 | //\r | |
816 | if (ImageExeInfoTable != NULL) {\r | |
817 | FreePool (ImageExeInfoTable);\r | |
818 | }\r | |
819 | }\r | |
820 | \r | |
821 | /**\r | |
822 | Check whether the hash of an given X.509 certificate is in forbidden database (DBX).\r | |
823 | \r | |
824 | @param[in] Certificate Pointer to X.509 Certificate that is searched for.\r | |
825 | @param[in] CertSize Size of X.509 Certificate.\r | |
826 | @param[in] SignatureList Pointer to the Signature List in forbidden database.\r | |
827 | @param[in] SignatureListSize Size of Signature List.\r | |
828 | @param[out] RevocationTime Return the time that the certificate was revoked.\r | |
829 | \r | |
830 | @return TRUE The certificate hash is found in the forbidden database.\r | |
831 | @return FALSE The certificate hash is not found in the forbidden database.\r | |
832 | \r | |
833 | **/\r | |
834 | BOOLEAN\r | |
835 | IsCertHashFoundInDatabase (\r | |
836 | IN UINT8 *Certificate,\r | |
837 | IN UINTN CertSize,\r | |
838 | IN EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *SignatureList,\r | |
839 | IN UINTN SignatureListSize,\r | |
840 | OUT EFI_TIME *RevocationTime\r | |
841 | )\r | |
842 | {\r | |
843 | BOOLEAN IsFound;\r | |
844 | BOOLEAN Status;\r | |
845 | EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *DbxList;\r | |
846 | UINTN DbxSize;\r | |
847 | EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *CertHash;\r | |
848 | UINTN CertHashCount;\r | |
849 | UINTN Index;\r | |
850 | UINT32 HashAlg;\r | |
851 | VOID *HashCtx;\r | |
852 | UINT8 CertDigest[MAX_DIGEST_SIZE];\r | |
853 | UINT8 *DbxCertHash;\r | |
854 | UINTN SiglistHeaderSize;\r | |
855 | UINT8 *TBSCert;\r | |
856 | UINTN TBSCertSize;\r | |
857 | \r | |
858 | IsFound = FALSE;\r | |
859 | DbxList = SignatureList;\r | |
860 | DbxSize = SignatureListSize;\r | |
861 | HashCtx = NULL;\r | |
862 | HashAlg = HASHALG_MAX;\r | |
863 | \r | |
864 | if ((RevocationTime == NULL) || (DbxList == NULL)) {\r | |
865 | return FALSE;\r | |
866 | }\r | |
867 | \r | |
868 | //\r | |
869 | // Retrieve the TBSCertificate from the X.509 Certificate.\r | |
870 | //\r | |
871 | if (!X509GetTBSCert (Certificate, CertSize, &TBSCert, &TBSCertSize)) {\r | |
872 | return FALSE;\r | |
873 | }\r | |
874 | \r | |
875 | while ((DbxSize > 0) && (SignatureListSize >= DbxList->SignatureListSize)) {\r | |
876 | //\r | |
877 | // Determine Hash Algorithm of Certificate in the forbidden database.\r | |
878 | //\r | |
879 | if (CompareGuid (&DbxList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Sha256Guid)) {\r | |
880 | HashAlg = HASHALG_SHA256;\r | |
881 | } else if (CompareGuid (&DbxList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Sha384Guid)) {\r | |
882 | HashAlg = HASHALG_SHA384;\r | |
883 | } else if (CompareGuid (&DbxList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Sha512Guid)) {\r | |
884 | HashAlg = HASHALG_SHA512;\r | |
885 | } else {\r | |
886 | DbxSize -= DbxList->SignatureListSize;\r | |
887 | DbxList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) DbxList + DbxList->SignatureListSize);\r | |
888 | continue;\r | |
889 | }\r | |
890 | \r | |
891 | //\r | |
892 | // Calculate the hash value of current TBSCertificate for comparision.\r | |
893 | //\r | |
894 | if (mHash[HashAlg].GetContextSize == NULL) {\r | |
895 | goto Done;\r | |
896 | }\r | |
897 | ZeroMem (CertDigest, MAX_DIGEST_SIZE);\r | |
898 | HashCtx = AllocatePool (mHash[HashAlg].GetContextSize ());\r | |
899 | if (HashCtx == NULL) {\r | |
900 | goto Done;\r | |
901 | }\r | |
902 | Status = mHash[HashAlg].HashInit (HashCtx);\r | |
903 | if (!Status) {\r | |
904 | goto Done;\r | |
905 | }\r | |
906 | Status = mHash[HashAlg].HashUpdate (HashCtx, TBSCert, TBSCertSize);\r | |
907 | if (!Status) {\r | |
908 | goto Done;\r | |
909 | }\r | |
910 | Status = mHash[HashAlg].HashFinal (HashCtx, CertDigest);\r | |
911 | if (!Status) {\r | |
912 | goto Done;\r | |
913 | }\r | |
914 | \r | |
915 | SiglistHeaderSize = sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + DbxList->SignatureHeaderSize;\r | |
916 | CertHash = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) DbxList + SiglistHeaderSize);\r | |
917 | CertHashCount = (DbxList->SignatureListSize - SiglistHeaderSize) / DbxList->SignatureSize;\r | |
918 | for (Index = 0; Index < CertHashCount; Index++) {\r | |
919 | //\r | |
920 | // Iterate each Signature Data Node within this CertList for verify.\r | |
921 | //\r | |
922 | DbxCertHash = CertHash->SignatureData;\r | |
923 | if (CompareMem (DbxCertHash, CertDigest, mHash[HashAlg].DigestLength) == 0) {\r | |
924 | //\r | |
925 | // Hash of Certificate is found in forbidden database.\r | |
926 | //\r | |
927 | IsFound = TRUE;\r | |
928 | \r | |
929 | //\r | |
930 | // Return the revocation time.\r | |
931 | //\r | |
932 | CopyMem (RevocationTime, (EFI_TIME *)(DbxCertHash + mHash[HashAlg].DigestLength), sizeof (EFI_TIME));\r | |
933 | goto Done;\r | |
934 | }\r | |
935 | CertHash = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertHash + DbxList->SignatureSize);\r | |
936 | }\r | |
937 | \r | |
938 | DbxSize -= DbxList->SignatureListSize;\r | |
939 | DbxList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) DbxList + DbxList->SignatureListSize);\r | |
940 | }\r | |
941 | \r | |
942 | Done:\r | |
943 | if (HashCtx != NULL) {\r | |
944 | FreePool (HashCtx);\r | |
945 | }\r | |
946 | \r | |
947 | return IsFound;\r | |
948 | }\r | |
949 | \r | |
950 | /**\r | |
951 | Check whether signature is in specified database.\r | |
952 | \r | |
953 | @param[in] VariableName Name of database variable that is searched in.\r | |
954 | @param[in] Signature Pointer to signature that is searched for.\r | |
955 | @param[in] CertType Pointer to hash algrithom.\r | |
956 | @param[in] SignatureSize Size of Signature.\r | |
957 | \r | |
958 | @return TRUE Found the signature in the variable database.\r | |
959 | @return FALSE Not found the signature in the variable database.\r | |
960 | \r | |
961 | **/\r | |
962 | BOOLEAN\r | |
963 | IsSignatureFoundInDatabase (\r | |
964 | IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r | |
965 | IN UINT8 *Signature,\r | |
966 | IN EFI_GUID *CertType,\r | |
967 | IN UINTN SignatureSize\r | |
968 | )\r | |
969 | {\r | |
970 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r | |
971 | EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *CertList;\r | |
972 | EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *Cert;\r | |
973 | UINTN DataSize;\r | |
974 | UINT8 *Data;\r | |
975 | UINTN Index;\r | |
976 | UINTN CertCount;\r | |
977 | BOOLEAN IsFound;\r | |
978 | \r | |
979 | //\r | |
980 | // Read signature database variable.\r | |
981 | //\r | |
982 | IsFound = FALSE;\r | |
983 | Data = NULL;\r | |
984 | DataSize = 0;\r | |
985 | Status = gRT->GetVariable (VariableName, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, NULL, &DataSize, NULL);\r | |
986 | if (Status != EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {\r | |
987 | return FALSE;\r | |
988 | }\r | |
989 | \r | |
990 | Data = (UINT8 *) AllocateZeroPool (DataSize);\r | |
991 | if (Data == NULL) {\r | |
992 | return FALSE;\r | |
993 | }\r | |
994 | \r | |
995 | Status = gRT->GetVariable (VariableName, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, NULL, &DataSize, Data);\r | |
996 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
997 | goto Done;\r | |
998 | }\r | |
999 | //\r | |
1000 | // Enumerate all signature data in SigDB to check if executable's signature exists.\r | |
1001 | //\r | |
1002 | CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) Data;\r | |
1003 | while ((DataSize > 0) && (DataSize >= CertList->SignatureListSize)) {\r | |
1004 | CertCount = (CertList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - CertList->SignatureHeaderSize) / CertList->SignatureSize;\r | |
1005 | Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r | |
1006 | if ((CertList->SignatureSize == sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1 + SignatureSize) && (CompareGuid(&CertList->SignatureType, CertType))) {\r | |
1007 | for (Index = 0; Index < CertCount; Index++) {\r | |
1008 | if (CompareMem (Cert->SignatureData, Signature, SignatureSize) == 0) {\r | |
1009 | //\r | |
1010 | // Find the signature in database.\r | |
1011 | //\r | |
1012 | IsFound = TRUE;\r | |
1013 | SecureBootHook (VariableName, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, CertList->SignatureSize, Cert);\r | |
1014 | break;\r | |
1015 | }\r | |
1016 | \r | |
1017 | Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) Cert + CertList->SignatureSize);\r | |
1018 | }\r | |
1019 | \r | |
1020 | if (IsFound) {\r | |
1021 | break;\r | |
1022 | }\r | |
1023 | }\r | |
1024 | \r | |
1025 | DataSize -= CertList->SignatureListSize;\r | |
1026 | CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + CertList->SignatureListSize);\r | |
1027 | }\r | |
1028 | \r | |
1029 | Done:\r | |
1030 | if (Data != NULL) {\r | |
1031 | FreePool (Data);\r | |
1032 | }\r | |
1033 | \r | |
1034 | return IsFound;\r | |
1035 | }\r | |
1036 | \r | |
1037 | /**\r | |
1038 | Check whether the timestamp is valid by comparing the signing time and the revocation time.\r | |
1039 | \r | |
1040 | @param SigningTime A pointer to the signing time.\r | |
1041 | @param RevocationTime A pointer to the revocation time.\r | |
1042 | \r | |
1043 | @retval TRUE The SigningTime is not later than the RevocationTime.\r | |
1044 | @retval FALSE The SigningTime is later than the RevocationTime.\r | |
1045 | \r | |
1046 | **/\r | |
1047 | BOOLEAN\r | |
1048 | IsValidSignatureByTimestamp (\r | |
1049 | IN EFI_TIME *SigningTime,\r | |
1050 | IN EFI_TIME *RevocationTime\r | |
1051 | )\r | |
1052 | {\r | |
1053 | if (SigningTime->Year != RevocationTime->Year) {\r | |
1054 | return (BOOLEAN) (SigningTime->Year < RevocationTime->Year);\r | |
1055 | } else if (SigningTime->Month != RevocationTime->Month) {\r | |
1056 | return (BOOLEAN) (SigningTime->Month < RevocationTime->Month);\r | |
1057 | } else if (SigningTime->Day != RevocationTime->Day) {\r | |
1058 | return (BOOLEAN) (SigningTime->Day < RevocationTime->Day);\r | |
1059 | } else if (SigningTime->Hour != RevocationTime->Hour) {\r | |
1060 | return (BOOLEAN) (SigningTime->Hour < RevocationTime->Hour);\r | |
1061 | } else if (SigningTime->Minute != RevocationTime->Minute) {\r | |
1062 | return (BOOLEAN) (SigningTime->Minute < RevocationTime->Minute);\r | |
1063 | }\r | |
1064 | \r | |
1065 | return (BOOLEAN) (SigningTime->Second <= RevocationTime->Second);\r | |
1066 | }\r | |
1067 | \r | |
1068 | /**\r | |
1069 | Check if the given time value is zero.\r | |
1070 | \r | |
1071 | @param[in] Time Pointer of a time value.\r | |
1072 | \r | |
1073 | @retval TRUE The Time is Zero.\r | |
1074 | @retval FALSE The Time is not Zero.\r | |
1075 | \r | |
1076 | **/\r | |
1077 | BOOLEAN\r | |
1078 | IsTimeZero (\r | |
1079 | IN EFI_TIME *Time\r | |
1080 | )\r | |
1081 | {\r | |
1082 | if ((Time->Year == 0) && (Time->Month == 0) && (Time->Day == 0) &&\r | |
1083 | (Time->Hour == 0) && (Time->Minute == 0) && (Time->Second == 0)) {\r | |
1084 | return TRUE;\r | |
1085 | }\r | |
1086 | \r | |
1087 | return FALSE;\r | |
1088 | }\r | |
1089 | \r | |
1090 | /**\r | |
1091 | Check whether the timestamp signature is valid and the signing time is also earlier than \r | |
1092 | the revocation time.\r | |
1093 | \r | |
1094 | @param[in] AuthData Pointer to the Authenticode signature retrieved from signed image.\r | |
1095 | @param[in] AuthDataSize Size of the Authenticode signature in bytes.\r | |
1096 | @param[in] RevocationTime The time that the certificate was revoked.\r | |
1097 | \r | |
1098 | @retval TRUE Timestamp signature is valid and signing time is no later than the \r | |
1099 | revocation time.\r | |
1100 | @retval FALSE Timestamp signature is not valid or the signing time is later than the\r | |
1101 | revocation time.\r | |
1102 | \r | |
1103 | **/\r | |
1104 | BOOLEAN\r | |
1105 | PassTimestampCheck (\r | |
1106 | IN UINT8 *AuthData,\r | |
1107 | IN UINTN AuthDataSize,\r | |
1108 | IN EFI_TIME *RevocationTime\r | |
1109 | )\r | |
1110 | {\r | |
1111 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r | |
1112 | BOOLEAN VerifyStatus;\r | |
1113 | EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *CertList;\r | |
1114 | EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *Cert;\r | |
1115 | UINT8 *DbtData;\r | |
1116 | UINTN DbtDataSize;\r | |
1117 | UINT8 *RootCert;\r | |
1118 | UINTN RootCertSize;\r | |
1119 | UINTN Index;\r | |
1120 | UINTN CertCount;\r | |
1121 | EFI_TIME SigningTime;\r | |
1122 | \r | |
1123 | //\r | |
1124 | // Variable Initialization\r | |
1125 | //\r | |
1126 | VerifyStatus = FALSE;\r | |
1127 | DbtData = NULL;\r | |
1128 | CertList = NULL;\r | |
1129 | Cert = NULL;\r | |
1130 | RootCert = NULL;\r | |
1131 | RootCertSize = 0;\r | |
1132 | \r | |
1133 | //\r | |
1134 | // If RevocationTime is zero, the certificate shall be considered to always be revoked.\r | |
1135 | //\r | |
1136 | if (IsTimeZero (RevocationTime)) {\r | |
1137 | return FALSE;\r | |
1138 | }\r | |
1139 | \r | |
1140 | //\r | |
1141 | // RevocationTime is non-zero, the certificate should be considered to be revoked from that time and onwards.\r | |
1142 | // Using the dbt to get the trusted TSA certificates.\r | |
1143 | //\r | |
1144 | DbtDataSize = 0;\r | |
1145 | Status = gRT->GetVariable (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE2, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, NULL, &DbtDataSize, NULL);\r | |
1146 | if (Status != EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {\r | |
1147 | goto Done;\r | |
1148 | }\r | |
1149 | DbtData = (UINT8 *) AllocateZeroPool (DbtDataSize);\r | |
1150 | if (DbtData == NULL) {\r | |
1151 | goto Done;\r | |
1152 | }\r | |
1153 | Status = gRT->GetVariable (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE2, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, NULL, &DbtDataSize, (VOID *) DbtData);\r | |
1154 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
1155 | goto Done;\r | |
1156 | }\r | |
1157 | \r | |
1158 | CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) DbtData;\r | |
1159 | while ((DbtDataSize > 0) && (DbtDataSize >= CertList->SignatureListSize)) {\r | |
1160 | if (CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Guid)) {\r | |
1161 | Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r | |
1162 | CertCount = (CertList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - CertList->SignatureHeaderSize) / CertList->SignatureSize;\r | |
1163 | for (Index = 0; Index < CertCount; Index++) {\r | |
1164 | //\r | |
1165 | // Iterate each Signature Data Node within this CertList for verify.\r | |
1166 | //\r | |
1167 | RootCert = Cert->SignatureData;\r | |
1168 | RootCertSize = CertList->SignatureSize - sizeof (EFI_GUID);\r | |
1169 | //\r | |
1170 | // Get the signing time if the timestamp signature is valid.\r | |
1171 | //\r | |
1172 | if (ImageTimestampVerify (AuthData, AuthDataSize, RootCert, RootCertSize, &SigningTime)) {\r | |
1173 | //\r | |
1174 | // The signer signature is valid only when the signing time is earlier than revocation time.\r | |
1175 | //\r | |
1176 | if (IsValidSignatureByTimestamp (&SigningTime, RevocationTime)) {\r | |
1177 | VerifyStatus = TRUE;\r | |
1178 | goto Done;\r | |
1179 | }\r | |
1180 | }\r | |
1181 | Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) Cert + CertList->SignatureSize);\r | |
1182 | }\r | |
1183 | }\r | |
1184 | DbtDataSize -= CertList->SignatureListSize;\r | |
1185 | CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + CertList->SignatureListSize);\r | |
1186 | }\r | |
1187 | \r | |
1188 | Done:\r | |
1189 | if (DbtData != NULL) {\r | |
1190 | FreePool (DbtData);\r | |
1191 | }\r | |
1192 | \r | |
1193 | return VerifyStatus;\r | |
1194 | }\r | |
1195 | \r | |
1196 | /**\r | |
1197 | Check whether the image signature is forbidden by the forbidden database (dbx).\r | |
1198 | The image is forbidden to load if any certificates for signing are revoked before signing time.\r | |
1199 | \r | |
1200 | @param[in] AuthData Pointer to the Authenticode signature retrieved from the signed image.\r | |
1201 | @param[in] AuthDataSize Size of the Authenticode signature in bytes.\r | |
1202 | \r | |
1203 | @retval TRUE Image is forbidden by dbx.\r | |
1204 | @retval FALSE Image is not forbidden by dbx.\r | |
1205 | \r | |
1206 | **/\r | |
1207 | BOOLEAN\r | |
1208 | IsForbiddenByDbx (\r | |
1209 | IN UINT8 *AuthData,\r | |
1210 | IN UINTN AuthDataSize\r | |
1211 | )\r | |
1212 | {\r | |
1213 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r | |
1214 | BOOLEAN IsForbidden;\r | |
1215 | UINT8 *Data;\r | |
1216 | UINTN DataSize;\r | |
1217 | UINTN Index;\r | |
1218 | UINT8 *CertBuffer;\r | |
1219 | UINTN BufferLength;\r | |
1220 | UINT8 *TrustedCert;\r | |
1221 | UINTN TrustedCertLength;\r | |
1222 | UINT8 CertNumber;\r | |
1223 | UINT8 *CertPtr;\r | |
1224 | UINT8 *Cert;\r | |
1225 | UINTN CertSize;\r | |
1226 | EFI_TIME RevocationTime;\r | |
1227 | \r | |
1228 | //\r | |
1229 | // Variable Initialization\r | |
1230 | //\r | |
1231 | IsForbidden = FALSE;\r | |
1232 | Data = NULL;\r | |
1233 | Cert = NULL;\r | |
1234 | CertBuffer = NULL;\r | |
1235 | BufferLength = 0;\r | |
1236 | TrustedCert = NULL;\r | |
1237 | TrustedCertLength = 0;\r | |
1238 | \r | |
1239 | //\r | |
1240 | // The image will not be forbidden if dbx can't be got.\r | |
1241 | //\r | |
1242 | DataSize = 0;\r | |
1243 | Status = gRT->GetVariable (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, NULL, &DataSize, NULL);\r | |
1244 | if (Status != EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {\r | |
1245 | return IsForbidden;\r | |
1246 | }\r | |
1247 | Data = (UINT8 *) AllocateZeroPool (DataSize);\r | |
1248 | if (Data == NULL) {\r | |
1249 | return IsForbidden;\r | |
1250 | }\r | |
1251 | \r | |
1252 | Status = gRT->GetVariable (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, NULL, &DataSize, (VOID *) Data);\r | |
1253 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
1254 | return IsForbidden;\r | |
1255 | }\r | |
1256 | \r | |
1257 | //\r | |
1258 | // Retrieve the certificate stack from AuthData\r | |
1259 | // The output CertStack format will be:\r | |
1260 | // UINT8 CertNumber;\r | |
1261 | // UINT32 Cert1Length;\r | |
1262 | // UINT8 Cert1[];\r | |
1263 | // UINT32 Cert2Length;\r | |
1264 | // UINT8 Cert2[];\r | |
1265 | // ...\r | |
1266 | // UINT32 CertnLength;\r | |
1267 | // UINT8 Certn[];\r | |
1268 | //\r | |
1269 | Pkcs7GetSigners (AuthData, AuthDataSize, &CertBuffer, &BufferLength, &TrustedCert, &TrustedCertLength);\r | |
1270 | if ((BufferLength == 0) || (CertBuffer == NULL)) {\r | |
1271 | IsForbidden = TRUE;\r | |
1272 | goto Done;\r | |
1273 | }\r | |
1274 | \r | |
1275 | //\r | |
1276 | // Check if any certificates in AuthData is in the forbidden database.\r | |
1277 | //\r | |
1278 | CertNumber = (UINT8) (*CertBuffer);\r | |
1279 | CertPtr = CertBuffer + 1;\r | |
1280 | for (Index = 0; Index < CertNumber; Index++) {\r | |
1281 | CertSize = (UINTN) ReadUnaligned32 ((UINT32 *)CertPtr);\r | |
1282 | Cert = (UINT8 *)CertPtr + sizeof (UINT32);\r | |
1283 | if (IsSignatureFoundInDatabase (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1, Cert, &gEfiCertX509Guid, CertSize)) {\r | |
1284 | //\r | |
1285 | // Raw certificate in dbx means the image signed by the certificate is forbidden.\r | |
1286 | //\r | |
1287 | IsForbidden = TRUE;\r | |
1288 | goto Done;\r | |
1289 | }\r | |
1290 | \r | |
1291 | if (IsCertHashFoundInDatabase (Cert, CertSize, (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *)Data, DataSize, &RevocationTime)) {\r | |
1292 | //\r | |
1293 | // Check the timestamp signature and signing time to determine if the image can be trusted.\r | |
1294 | //\r | |
1295 | IsForbidden = TRUE;\r | |
1296 | if (PassTimestampCheck (AuthData, AuthDataSize, &RevocationTime)) {\r | |
1297 | IsForbidden = FALSE;\r | |
1298 | }\r | |
1299 | goto Done;\r | |
1300 | }\r | |
1301 | \r | |
1302 | CertPtr = CertPtr + sizeof (UINT32) + CertSize;\r | |
1303 | }\r | |
1304 | \r | |
1305 | Done:\r | |
1306 | if (Data != NULL) {\r | |
1307 | FreePool (Data);\r | |
1308 | }\r | |
1309 | \r | |
1310 | Pkcs7FreeSigners (CertBuffer);\r | |
1311 | Pkcs7FreeSigners (TrustedCert);\r | |
1312 | \r | |
1313 | return IsForbidden;\r | |
1314 | }\r | |
1315 | \r | |
1316 | /**\r | |
1317 | Check whether the image signature can be verified by the trusted certificates in DB database.\r | |
1318 | \r | |
1319 | @param[in] AuthData Pointer to the Authenticode signature retrieved from signed image.\r | |
1320 | @param[in] AuthDataSize Size of the Authenticode signature in bytes.\r | |
1321 | \r | |
1322 | @retval TRUE Image passed verification using certificate in db.\r | |
1323 | @retval FALSE Image didn't pass verification using certificate in db.\r | |
1324 | \r | |
1325 | **/\r | |
1326 | BOOLEAN\r | |
1327 | IsAllowedByDb (\r | |
1328 | IN UINT8 *AuthData,\r | |
1329 | IN UINTN AuthDataSize\r | |
1330 | )\r | |
1331 | {\r | |
1332 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r | |
1333 | BOOLEAN VerifyStatus;\r | |
1334 | EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *CertList;\r | |
1335 | EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *Cert;\r | |
1336 | UINTN DataSize;\r | |
1337 | UINT8 *Data;\r | |
1338 | UINT8 *RootCert;\r | |
1339 | UINTN RootCertSize;\r | |
1340 | UINTN Index;\r | |
1341 | UINTN CertCount;\r | |
1342 | \r | |
1343 | Data = NULL;\r | |
1344 | CertList = NULL;\r | |
1345 | Cert = NULL;\r | |
1346 | RootCert = NULL;\r | |
1347 | RootCertSize = 0;\r | |
1348 | VerifyStatus = FALSE;\r | |
1349 | \r | |
1350 | DataSize = 0;\r | |
1351 | Status = gRT->GetVariable (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, NULL, &DataSize, NULL);\r | |
1352 | if (Status == EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {\r | |
1353 | Data = (UINT8 *) AllocateZeroPool (DataSize);\r | |
1354 | if (Data == NULL) {\r | |
1355 | return VerifyStatus;\r | |
1356 | }\r | |
1357 | \r | |
1358 | Status = gRT->GetVariable (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, NULL, &DataSize, (VOID *) Data);\r | |
1359 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
1360 | goto Done;\r | |
1361 | }\r | |
1362 | \r | |
1363 | //\r | |
1364 | // Find X509 certificate in Signature List to verify the signature in pkcs7 signed data.\r | |
1365 | //\r | |
1366 | CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) Data;\r | |
1367 | while ((DataSize > 0) && (DataSize >= CertList->SignatureListSize)) {\r | |
1368 | if (CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Guid)) {\r | |
1369 | Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r | |
1370 | CertCount = (CertList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - CertList->SignatureHeaderSize) / CertList->SignatureSize;\r | |
1371 | \r | |
1372 | for (Index = 0; Index < CertCount; Index++) {\r | |
1373 | //\r | |
1374 | // Iterate each Signature Data Node within this CertList for verify.\r | |
1375 | //\r | |
1376 | RootCert = Cert->SignatureData;\r | |
1377 | RootCertSize = CertList->SignatureSize - sizeof (EFI_GUID);\r | |
1378 | \r | |
1379 | //\r | |
1380 | // Call AuthenticodeVerify library to Verify Authenticode struct.\r | |
1381 | //\r | |
1382 | VerifyStatus = AuthenticodeVerify (\r | |
1383 | AuthData,\r | |
1384 | AuthDataSize,\r | |
1385 | RootCert,\r | |
1386 | RootCertSize,\r | |
1387 | mImageDigest,\r | |
1388 | mImageDigestSize\r | |
1389 | );\r | |
1390 | if (VerifyStatus) {\r | |
1391 | SecureBootHook (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, CertList->SignatureSize, Cert);\r | |
1392 | goto Done;\r | |
1393 | }\r | |
1394 | \r | |
1395 | Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) Cert + CertList->SignatureSize);\r | |
1396 | }\r | |
1397 | }\r | |
1398 | \r | |
1399 | DataSize -= CertList->SignatureListSize;\r | |
1400 | CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + CertList->SignatureListSize);\r | |
1401 | }\r | |
1402 | }\r | |
1403 | \r | |
1404 | Done:\r | |
1405 | if (Data != NULL) {\r | |
1406 | FreePool (Data);\r | |
1407 | }\r | |
1408 | \r | |
1409 | return VerifyStatus;\r | |
1410 | }\r | |
1411 | \r | |
1412 | /**\r | |
1413 | Provide verification service for signed images, which include both signature validation\r | |
1414 | and platform policy control. For signature types, both UEFI WIN_CERTIFICATE_UEFI_GUID and\r | |
1415 | MSFT Authenticode type signatures are supported.\r | |
1416 | \r | |
1417 | In this implementation, only verify external executables when in USER MODE.\r | |
1418 | Executables from FV is bypass, so pass in AuthenticationStatus is ignored.\r | |
1419 | \r | |
1420 | The image verification policy is:\r | |
1421 | If the image is signed,\r | |
1422 | At least one valid signature or at least one hash value of the image must match a record\r | |
1423 | in the security database "db", and no valid signature nor any hash value of the image may\r | |
1424 | be reflected in the security database "dbx".\r | |
1425 | Otherwise, the image is not signed,\r | |
1426 | The SHA256 hash value of the image must match a record in the security database "db", and\r | |
1427 | not be reflected in the security data base "dbx".\r | |
1428 | \r | |
1429 | Caution: This function may receive untrusted input.\r | |
1430 | PE/COFF image is external input, so this function will validate its data structure\r | |
1431 | within this image buffer before use.\r | |
1432 | \r | |
1433 | @param[in] AuthenticationStatus\r | |
1434 | This is the authentication status returned from the security\r | |
1435 | measurement services for the input file.\r | |
1436 | @param[in] File This is a pointer to the device path of the file that is\r | |
1437 | being dispatched. This will optionally be used for logging.\r | |
1438 | @param[in] FileBuffer File buffer matches the input file device path.\r | |
1439 | @param[in] FileSize Size of File buffer matches the input file device path.\r | |
1440 | @param[in] BootPolicy A boot policy that was used to call LoadImage() UEFI service.\r | |
1441 | \r | |
1442 | @retval EFI_SUCCESS The file specified by DevicePath and non-NULL\r | |
1443 | FileBuffer did authenticate, and the platform policy dictates\r | |
1444 | that the DXE Foundation may use the file.\r | |
1445 | @retval EFI_SUCCESS The device path specified by NULL device path DevicePath\r | |
1446 | and non-NULL FileBuffer did authenticate, and the platform\r | |
1447 | policy dictates that the DXE Foundation may execute the image in\r | |
1448 | FileBuffer.\r | |
1449 | @retval EFI_OUT_RESOURCE Fail to allocate memory.\r | |
1450 | @retval EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION The file specified by File did not authenticate, and\r | |
1451 | the platform policy dictates that File should be placed\r | |
1452 | in the untrusted state. The image has been added to the file\r | |
1453 | execution table.\r | |
1454 | @retval EFI_ACCESS_DENIED The file specified by File and FileBuffer did not\r | |
1455 | authenticate, and the platform policy dictates that the DXE\r | |
1456 | Foundation many not use File.\r | |
1457 | \r | |
1458 | **/\r | |
1459 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
1460 | EFIAPI\r | |
1461 | DxeImageVerificationHandler (\r | |
1462 | IN UINT32 AuthenticationStatus,\r | |
1463 | IN CONST EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *File,\r | |
1464 | IN VOID *FileBuffer,\r | |
1465 | IN UINTN FileSize,\r | |
1466 | IN BOOLEAN BootPolicy\r | |
1467 | )\r | |
1468 | {\r | |
1469 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r | |
1470 | UINT16 Magic;\r | |
1471 | EFI_IMAGE_DOS_HEADER *DosHdr;\r | |
1472 | EFI_STATUS VerifyStatus;\r | |
1473 | EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *SignatureList;\r | |
1474 | UINTN SignatureListSize;\r | |
1475 | EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *Signature;\r | |
1476 | EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_ACTION Action;\r | |
1477 | WIN_CERTIFICATE *WinCertificate;\r | |
1478 | UINT32 Policy;\r | |
1479 | UINT8 *SecureBoot;\r | |
1480 | PE_COFF_LOADER_IMAGE_CONTEXT ImageContext;\r | |
1481 | UINT32 NumberOfRvaAndSizes;\r | |
1482 | WIN_CERTIFICATE_EFI_PKCS *PkcsCertData;\r | |
1483 | WIN_CERTIFICATE_UEFI_GUID *WinCertUefiGuid;\r | |
1484 | UINT8 *AuthData;\r | |
1485 | UINTN AuthDataSize;\r | |
1486 | EFI_IMAGE_DATA_DIRECTORY *SecDataDir;\r | |
1487 | UINT32 OffSet;\r | |
1488 | CHAR16 *NameStr;\r | |
1489 | \r | |
1490 | SignatureList = NULL;\r | |
1491 | SignatureListSize = 0;\r | |
1492 | WinCertificate = NULL;\r | |
1493 | SecDataDir = NULL;\r | |
1494 | PkcsCertData = NULL;\r | |
1495 | Action = EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_AUTH_UNTESTED;\r | |
1496 | Status = EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;\r | |
1497 | VerifyStatus = EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;\r | |
1498 | \r | |
1499 | //\r | |
1500 | // Check the image type and get policy setting.\r | |
1501 | //\r | |
1502 | switch (GetImageType (File)) {\r | |
1503 | \r | |
1504 | case IMAGE_FROM_FV:\r | |
1505 | Policy = ALWAYS_EXECUTE;\r | |
1506 | break;\r | |
1507 | \r | |
1508 | case IMAGE_FROM_OPTION_ROM:\r | |
1509 | Policy = PcdGet32 (PcdOptionRomImageVerificationPolicy);\r | |
1510 | break;\r | |
1511 | \r | |
1512 | case IMAGE_FROM_REMOVABLE_MEDIA:\r | |
1513 | Policy = PcdGet32 (PcdRemovableMediaImageVerificationPolicy);\r | |
1514 | break;\r | |
1515 | \r | |
1516 | case IMAGE_FROM_FIXED_MEDIA:\r | |
1517 | Policy = PcdGet32 (PcdFixedMediaImageVerificationPolicy);\r | |
1518 | break;\r | |
1519 | \r | |
1520 | default:\r | |
1521 | Policy = DENY_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r | |
1522 | break;\r | |
1523 | }\r | |
1524 | //\r | |
1525 | // If policy is always/never execute, return directly.\r | |
1526 | //\r | |
1527 | if (Policy == ALWAYS_EXECUTE) {\r | |
1528 | return EFI_SUCCESS;\r | |
1529 | } else if (Policy == NEVER_EXECUTE) {\r | |
1530 | return EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;\r | |
1531 | }\r | |
1532 | \r | |
1533 | //\r | |
1534 | // The policy QUERY_USER_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION and ALLOW_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION\r | |
1535 | // violates the UEFI spec and has been removed.\r | |
1536 | //\r | |
1537 | ASSERT (Policy != QUERY_USER_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION && Policy != ALLOW_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION);\r | |
1538 | if (Policy == QUERY_USER_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION || Policy == ALLOW_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION) {\r | |
1539 | CpuDeadLoop ();\r | |
1540 | }\r | |
1541 | \r | |
1542 | GetEfiGlobalVariable2 (EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME, (VOID**)&SecureBoot, NULL);\r | |
1543 | //\r | |
1544 | // Skip verification if SecureBoot variable doesn't exist.\r | |
1545 | //\r | |
1546 | if (SecureBoot == NULL) {\r | |
1547 | return EFI_SUCCESS;\r | |
1548 | }\r | |
1549 | \r | |
1550 | //\r | |
1551 | // Skip verification if SecureBoot is disabled.\r | |
1552 | //\r | |
1553 | if (*SecureBoot == SECURE_BOOT_MODE_DISABLE) {\r | |
1554 | FreePool (SecureBoot);\r | |
1555 | return EFI_SUCCESS;\r | |
1556 | }\r | |
1557 | FreePool (SecureBoot);\r | |
1558 | \r | |
1559 | //\r | |
1560 | // Read the Dos header.\r | |
1561 | //\r | |
1562 | if (FileBuffer == NULL) {\r | |
1563 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r | |
1564 | }\r | |
1565 | \r | |
1566 | mImageBase = (UINT8 *) FileBuffer;\r | |
1567 | mImageSize = FileSize;\r | |
1568 | \r | |
1569 | ZeroMem (&ImageContext, sizeof (ImageContext));\r | |
1570 | ImageContext.Handle = (VOID *) FileBuffer;\r | |
1571 | ImageContext.ImageRead = (PE_COFF_LOADER_READ_FILE) DxeImageVerificationLibImageRead;\r | |
1572 | \r | |
1573 | //\r | |
1574 | // Get information about the image being loaded\r | |
1575 | //\r | |
1576 | Status = PeCoffLoaderGetImageInfo (&ImageContext);\r | |
1577 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
1578 | //\r | |
1579 | // The information can't be got from the invalid PeImage\r | |
1580 | //\r | |
1581 | goto Done;\r | |
1582 | }\r | |
1583 | \r | |
1584 | Status = EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;\r | |
1585 | \r | |
1586 | DosHdr = (EFI_IMAGE_DOS_HEADER *) mImageBase;\r | |
1587 | if (DosHdr->e_magic == EFI_IMAGE_DOS_SIGNATURE) {\r | |
1588 | //\r | |
1589 | // DOS image header is present,\r | |
1590 | // so read the PE header after the DOS image header.\r | |
1591 | //\r | |
1592 | mPeCoffHeaderOffset = DosHdr->e_lfanew;\r | |
1593 | } else {\r | |
1594 | mPeCoffHeaderOffset = 0;\r | |
1595 | }\r | |
1596 | //\r | |
1597 | // Check PE/COFF image.\r | |
1598 | //\r | |
1599 | mNtHeader.Pe32 = (EFI_IMAGE_NT_HEADERS32 *) (mImageBase + mPeCoffHeaderOffset);\r | |
1600 | if (mNtHeader.Pe32->Signature != EFI_IMAGE_NT_SIGNATURE) {\r | |
1601 | //\r | |
1602 | // It is not a valid Pe/Coff file.\r | |
1603 | //\r | |
1604 | goto Done;\r | |
1605 | }\r | |
1606 | \r | |
1607 | if (mNtHeader.Pe32->FileHeader.Machine == IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_IA64 && mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {\r | |
1608 | //\r | |
1609 | // NOTE: Some versions of Linux ELILO for Itanium have an incorrect magic value\r | |
1610 | // in the PE/COFF Header. If the MachineType is Itanium(IA64) and the\r | |
1611 | // Magic value in the OptionalHeader is EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC\r | |
1612 | // then override the magic value to EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR64_MAGIC\r | |
1613 | //\r | |
1614 | Magic = EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR64_MAGIC;\r | |
1615 | } else {\r | |
1616 | //\r | |
1617 | // Get the magic value from the PE/COFF Optional Header\r | |
1618 | //\r | |
1619 | Magic = mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.Magic;\r | |
1620 | }\r | |
1621 | \r | |
1622 | if (Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {\r | |
1623 | //\r | |
1624 | // Use PE32 offset.\r | |
1625 | //\r | |
1626 | NumberOfRvaAndSizes = mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.NumberOfRvaAndSizes;\r | |
1627 | if (NumberOfRvaAndSizes > EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY) {\r | |
1628 | SecDataDir = (EFI_IMAGE_DATA_DIRECTORY *) &mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY];\r | |
1629 | }\r | |
1630 | } else {\r | |
1631 | //\r | |
1632 | // Use PE32+ offset.\r | |
1633 | //\r | |
1634 | NumberOfRvaAndSizes = mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.NumberOfRvaAndSizes;\r | |
1635 | if (NumberOfRvaAndSizes > EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY) {\r | |
1636 | SecDataDir = (EFI_IMAGE_DATA_DIRECTORY *) &mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY];\r | |
1637 | }\r | |
1638 | }\r | |
1639 | \r | |
1640 | //\r | |
1641 | // Start Image Validation.\r | |
1642 | //\r | |
1643 | if (SecDataDir == NULL || SecDataDir->Size == 0) {\r | |
1644 | //\r | |
1645 | // This image is not signed. The SHA256 hash value of the image must match a record in the security database "db",\r | |
1646 | // and not be reflected in the security data base "dbx".\r | |
1647 | //\r | |
1648 | if (!HashPeImage (HASHALG_SHA256)) {\r | |
1649 | goto Done;\r | |
1650 | }\r | |
1651 | \r | |
1652 | if (IsSignatureFoundInDatabase (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1, mImageDigest, &mCertType, mImageDigestSize)) {\r | |
1653 | //\r | |
1654 | // Image Hash is in forbidden database (DBX).\r | |
1655 | //\r | |
1656 | goto Done;\r | |
1657 | }\r | |
1658 | \r | |
1659 | if (IsSignatureFoundInDatabase (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE, mImageDigest, &mCertType, mImageDigestSize)) {\r | |
1660 | //\r | |
1661 | // Image Hash is in allowed database (DB).\r | |
1662 | //\r | |
1663 | return EFI_SUCCESS;\r | |
1664 | }\r | |
1665 | \r | |
1666 | //\r | |
1667 | // Image Hash is not found in both forbidden and allowed database.\r | |
1668 | //\r | |
1669 | goto Done;\r | |
1670 | }\r | |
1671 | \r | |
1672 | //\r | |
1673 | // Verify the signature of the image, multiple signatures are allowed as per PE/COFF Section 4.7\r | |
1674 | // "Attribute Certificate Table".\r | |
1675 | // The first certificate starts at offset (SecDataDir->VirtualAddress) from the start of the file.\r | |
1676 | //\r | |
1677 | for (OffSet = SecDataDir->VirtualAddress;\r | |
1678 | OffSet < (SecDataDir->VirtualAddress + SecDataDir->Size);\r | |
1679 | OffSet += (WinCertificate->dwLength + ALIGN_SIZE (WinCertificate->dwLength))) {\r | |
1680 | WinCertificate = (WIN_CERTIFICATE *) (mImageBase + OffSet);\r | |
1681 | if ((SecDataDir->VirtualAddress + SecDataDir->Size - OffSet) <= sizeof (WIN_CERTIFICATE) ||\r | |
1682 | (SecDataDir->VirtualAddress + SecDataDir->Size - OffSet) < WinCertificate->dwLength) {\r | |
1683 | break;\r | |
1684 | }\r | |
1685 | \r | |
1686 | //\r | |
1687 | // Verify the image's Authenticode signature, only DER-encoded PKCS#7 signed data is supported.\r | |
1688 | //\r | |
1689 | if (WinCertificate->wCertificateType == WIN_CERT_TYPE_PKCS_SIGNED_DATA) {\r | |
1690 | //\r | |
1691 | // The certificate is formatted as WIN_CERTIFICATE_EFI_PKCS which is described in the\r | |
1692 | // Authenticode specification.\r | |
1693 | //\r | |
1694 | PkcsCertData = (WIN_CERTIFICATE_EFI_PKCS *) WinCertificate;\r | |
1695 | if (PkcsCertData->Hdr.dwLength <= sizeof (PkcsCertData->Hdr)) {\r | |
1696 | break;\r | |
1697 | }\r | |
1698 | AuthData = PkcsCertData->CertData;\r | |
1699 | AuthDataSize = PkcsCertData->Hdr.dwLength - sizeof(PkcsCertData->Hdr);\r | |
1700 | } else if (WinCertificate->wCertificateType == WIN_CERT_TYPE_EFI_GUID) {\r | |
1701 | //\r | |
1702 | // The certificate is formatted as WIN_CERTIFICATE_UEFI_GUID which is described in UEFI Spec.\r | |
1703 | //\r | |
1704 | WinCertUefiGuid = (WIN_CERTIFICATE_UEFI_GUID *) WinCertificate;\r | |
1705 | if (WinCertUefiGuid->Hdr.dwLength <= OFFSET_OF(WIN_CERTIFICATE_UEFI_GUID, CertData)) {\r | |
1706 | break;\r | |
1707 | }\r | |
1708 | if (!CompareGuid (&WinCertUefiGuid->CertType, &gEfiCertPkcs7Guid)) {\r | |
1709 | continue;\r | |
1710 | }\r | |
1711 | AuthData = WinCertUefiGuid->CertData;\r | |
1712 | AuthDataSize = WinCertUefiGuid->Hdr.dwLength - OFFSET_OF(WIN_CERTIFICATE_UEFI_GUID, CertData);\r | |
1713 | } else {\r | |
1714 | if (WinCertificate->dwLength < sizeof (WIN_CERTIFICATE)) {\r | |
1715 | break;\r | |
1716 | }\r | |
1717 | continue;\r | |
1718 | }\r | |
1719 | \r | |
1720 | Status = HashPeImageByType (AuthData, AuthDataSize);\r | |
1721 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
1722 | continue;\r | |
1723 | }\r | |
1724 | \r | |
1725 | //\r | |
1726 | // Check the digital signature against the revoked certificate in forbidden database (dbx).\r | |
1727 | //\r | |
1728 | if (IsForbiddenByDbx (AuthData, AuthDataSize)) {\r | |
1729 | Action = EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_AUTH_SIG_FAILED;\r | |
1730 | VerifyStatus = EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;\r | |
1731 | break;\r | |
1732 | }\r | |
1733 | \r | |
1734 | //\r | |
1735 | // Check the digital signature against the valid certificate in allowed database (db).\r | |
1736 | //\r | |
1737 | if (EFI_ERROR (VerifyStatus)) {\r | |
1738 | if (IsAllowedByDb (AuthData, AuthDataSize)) {\r | |
1739 | VerifyStatus = EFI_SUCCESS;\r | |
1740 | }\r | |
1741 | }\r | |
1742 | \r | |
1743 | //\r | |
1744 | // Check the image's hash value.\r | |
1745 | //\r | |
1746 | if (IsSignatureFoundInDatabase (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1, mImageDigest, &mCertType, mImageDigestSize)) {\r | |
1747 | Action = EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_AUTH_SIG_FOUND;\r | |
1748 | VerifyStatus = EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;\r | |
1749 | break;\r | |
1750 | } else if (EFI_ERROR (VerifyStatus)) {\r | |
1751 | if (IsSignatureFoundInDatabase (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE, mImageDigest, &mCertType, mImageDigestSize)) {\r | |
1752 | VerifyStatus = EFI_SUCCESS;\r | |
1753 | }\r | |
1754 | }\r | |
1755 | }\r | |
1756 | \r | |
1757 | if (OffSet != (SecDataDir->VirtualAddress + SecDataDir->Size)) {\r | |
1758 | //\r | |
1759 | // The Size in Certificate Table or the attribute certicate table is corrupted.\r | |
1760 | //\r | |
1761 | VerifyStatus = EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;\r | |
1762 | }\r | |
1763 | \r | |
1764 | if (!EFI_ERROR (VerifyStatus)) {\r | |
1765 | return EFI_SUCCESS;\r | |
1766 | } else {\r | |
1767 | Status = EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;\r | |
1768 | if (Action == EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_AUTH_SIG_FAILED || Action == EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_AUTH_SIG_FOUND) {\r | |
1769 | //\r | |
1770 | // Get image hash value as executable's signature.\r | |
1771 | //\r | |
1772 | SignatureListSize = sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1 + mImageDigestSize;\r | |
1773 | SignatureList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) AllocateZeroPool (SignatureListSize);\r | |
1774 | if (SignatureList == NULL) {\r | |
1775 | Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r | |
1776 | goto Done;\r | |
1777 | }\r | |
1778 | SignatureList->SignatureHeaderSize = 0;\r | |
1779 | SignatureList->SignatureListSize = (UINT32) SignatureListSize;\r | |
1780 | SignatureList->SignatureSize = (UINT32) mImageDigestSize;\r | |
1781 | CopyMem (&SignatureList->SignatureType, &mCertType, sizeof (EFI_GUID));\r | |
1782 | Signature = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) SignatureList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST));\r | |
1783 | CopyMem (Signature->SignatureData, mImageDigest, mImageDigestSize);\r | |
1784 | }\r | |
1785 | }\r | |
1786 | \r | |
1787 | Done:\r | |
1788 | if (Status != EFI_SUCCESS) {\r | |
1789 | //\r | |
1790 | // Policy decides to defer or reject the image; add its information in image executable information table.\r | |
1791 | //\r | |
1792 | NameStr = ConvertDevicePathToText (File, FALSE, TRUE);\r | |
1793 | AddImageExeInfo (Action, NameStr, File, SignatureList, SignatureListSize);\r | |
1794 | if (NameStr != NULL) {\r | |
1795 | DEBUG((EFI_D_INFO, "The image doesn't pass verification: %s\n", NameStr));\r | |
1796 | FreePool(NameStr);\r | |
1797 | }\r | |
1798 | Status = EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r | |
1799 | }\r | |
1800 | \r | |
1801 | if (SignatureList != NULL) {\r | |
1802 | FreePool (SignatureList);\r | |
1803 | }\r | |
1804 | \r | |
1805 | return Status;\r | |
1806 | }\r | |
1807 | \r | |
1808 | /**\r | |
1809 | On Ready To Boot Services Event notification handler.\r | |
1810 | \r | |
1811 | Add the image execution information table if it is not in system configuration table.\r | |
1812 | \r | |
1813 | @param[in] Event Event whose notification function is being invoked\r | |
1814 | @param[in] Context Pointer to the notification function's context\r | |
1815 | \r | |
1816 | **/\r | |
1817 | VOID\r | |
1818 | EFIAPI\r | |
1819 | OnReadyToBoot (\r | |
1820 | IN EFI_EVENT Event,\r | |
1821 | IN VOID *Context\r | |
1822 | )\r | |
1823 | {\r | |
1824 | EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO_TABLE *ImageExeInfoTable;\r | |
1825 | UINTN ImageExeInfoTableSize;\r | |
1826 | \r | |
1827 | EfiGetSystemConfigurationTable (&gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, (VOID **) &ImageExeInfoTable);\r | |
1828 | if (ImageExeInfoTable != NULL) {\r | |
1829 | return;\r | |
1830 | }\r | |
1831 | \r | |
1832 | ImageExeInfoTableSize = sizeof (EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO_TABLE);\r | |
1833 | ImageExeInfoTable = (EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO_TABLE *) AllocateRuntimePool (ImageExeInfoTableSize);\r | |
1834 | if (ImageExeInfoTable == NULL) {\r | |
1835 | return ;\r | |
1836 | }\r | |
1837 | \r | |
1838 | ImageExeInfoTable->NumberOfImages = 0;\r | |
1839 | gBS->InstallConfigurationTable (&gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, (VOID *) ImageExeInfoTable);\r | |
1840 | \r | |
1841 | }\r | |
1842 | \r | |
1843 | /**\r | |
1844 | Register security measurement handler.\r | |
1845 | \r | |
1846 | @param ImageHandle ImageHandle of the loaded driver.\r | |
1847 | @param SystemTable Pointer to the EFI System Table.\r | |
1848 | \r | |
1849 | @retval EFI_SUCCESS The handlers were registered successfully.\r | |
1850 | **/\r | |
1851 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
1852 | EFIAPI\r | |
1853 | DxeImageVerificationLibConstructor (\r | |
1854 | IN EFI_HANDLE ImageHandle,\r | |
1855 | IN EFI_SYSTEM_TABLE *SystemTable\r | |
1856 | )\r | |
1857 | {\r | |
1858 | EFI_EVENT Event;\r | |
1859 | \r | |
1860 | //\r | |
1861 | // Register the event to publish the image execution table.\r | |
1862 | //\r | |
1863 | EfiCreateEventReadyToBootEx (\r | |
1864 | TPL_CALLBACK,\r | |
1865 | OnReadyToBoot,\r | |
1866 | NULL,\r | |
1867 | &Event\r | |
1868 | );\r | |
1869 | \r | |
1870 | return RegisterSecurity2Handler (\r | |
1871 | DxeImageVerificationHandler,\r | |
1872 | EFI_AUTH_OPERATION_VERIFY_IMAGE | EFI_AUTH_OPERATION_IMAGE_REQUIRED\r | |
1873 | );\r | |
1874 | }\r |