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SecurityPkg: enhance secure boot Config Dxe & Time Based AuthVariable.
[mirror_edk2.git] / SecurityPkg / Library / AuthVariableLib / AuthService.c
1 /** @file
2 Implement authentication services for the authenticated variables.
3
4 Caution: This module requires additional review when modified.
5 This driver will have external input - variable data. It may be input in SMM mode.
6 This external input must be validated carefully to avoid security issue like
7 buffer overflow, integer overflow.
8 Variable attribute should also be checked to avoid authentication bypass.
9 The whole SMM authentication variable design relies on the integrity of flash part and SMM.
10 which is assumed to be protected by platform. All variable code and metadata in flash/SMM Memory
11 may not be modified without authorization. If platform fails to protect these resources,
12 the authentication service provided in this driver will be broken, and the behavior is undefined.
13
14 ProcessVarWithPk(), ProcessVarWithKek() and ProcessVariable() are the function to do
15 variable authentication.
16
17 VerifyTimeBasedPayloadAndUpdate() and VerifyCounterBasedPayload() are sub function to do verification.
18 They will do basic validation for authentication data structure, then call crypto library
19 to verify the signature.
20
21 Copyright (c) 2009 - 2017, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>
22 This program and the accompanying materials
23 are licensed and made available under the terms and conditions of the BSD License
24 which accompanies this distribution. The full text of the license may be found at
25 http://opensource.org/licenses/bsd-license.php
26
27 THE PROGRAM IS DISTRIBUTED UNDER THE BSD LICENSE ON AN "AS IS" BASIS,
28 WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR REPRESENTATIONS OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED.
29
30 **/
31
32 #include "AuthServiceInternal.h"
33
34 //
35 // Public Exponent of RSA Key.
36 //
37 CONST UINT8 mRsaE[] = { 0x01, 0x00, 0x01 };
38
39 CONST UINT8 mSha256OidValue[] = { 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x01 };
40
41 //
42 // Requirement for different signature type which have been defined in UEFI spec.
43 // These data are used to perform SignatureList format check while setting PK/KEK variable.
44 //
45 EFI_SIGNATURE_ITEM mSupportSigItem[] = {
46 //{SigType, SigHeaderSize, SigDataSize }
47 {EFI_CERT_SHA256_GUID, 0, 32 },
48 {EFI_CERT_RSA2048_GUID, 0, 256 },
49 {EFI_CERT_RSA2048_SHA256_GUID, 0, 256 },
50 {EFI_CERT_SHA1_GUID, 0, 20 },
51 {EFI_CERT_RSA2048_SHA1_GUID, 0, 256 },
52 {EFI_CERT_X509_GUID, 0, ((UINT32) ~0)},
53 {EFI_CERT_SHA224_GUID, 0, 28 },
54 {EFI_CERT_SHA384_GUID, 0, 48 },
55 {EFI_CERT_SHA512_GUID, 0, 64 },
56 {EFI_CERT_X509_SHA256_GUID, 0, 48 },
57 {EFI_CERT_X509_SHA384_GUID, 0, 64 },
58 {EFI_CERT_X509_SHA512_GUID, 0, 80 }
59 };
60
61 /**
62 Finds variable in storage blocks of volatile and non-volatile storage areas.
63
64 This code finds variable in storage blocks of volatile and non-volatile storage areas.
65 If VariableName is an empty string, then we just return the first
66 qualified variable without comparing VariableName and VendorGuid.
67
68 @param[in] VariableName Name of the variable to be found.
69 @param[in] VendorGuid Variable vendor GUID to be found.
70 @param[out] Data Pointer to data address.
71 @param[out] DataSize Pointer to data size.
72
73 @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER If VariableName is not an empty string,
74 while VendorGuid is NULL.
75 @retval EFI_SUCCESS Variable successfully found.
76 @retval EFI_NOT_FOUND Variable not found
77
78 **/
79 EFI_STATUS
80 AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (
81 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,
82 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,
83 OUT VOID **Data,
84 OUT UINTN *DataSize
85 )
86 {
87 EFI_STATUS Status;
88 AUTH_VARIABLE_INFO AuthVariableInfo;
89
90 ZeroMem (&AuthVariableInfo, sizeof (AuthVariableInfo));
91 Status = mAuthVarLibContextIn->FindVariable (
92 VariableName,
93 VendorGuid,
94 &AuthVariableInfo
95 );
96 *Data = AuthVariableInfo.Data;
97 *DataSize = AuthVariableInfo.DataSize;
98 return Status;
99 }
100
101 /**
102 Update the variable region with Variable information.
103
104 @param[in] VariableName Name of variable.
105 @param[in] VendorGuid Guid of variable.
106 @param[in] Data Data pointer.
107 @param[in] DataSize Size of Data.
108 @param[in] Attributes Attribute value of the variable.
109
110 @retval EFI_SUCCESS The update operation is success.
111 @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.
112 @retval EFI_WRITE_PROTECTED Variable is write-protected.
113 @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES There is not enough resource.
114
115 **/
116 EFI_STATUS
117 AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariable (
118 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,
119 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,
120 IN VOID *Data,
121 IN UINTN DataSize,
122 IN UINT32 Attributes
123 )
124 {
125 AUTH_VARIABLE_INFO AuthVariableInfo;
126
127 ZeroMem (&AuthVariableInfo, sizeof (AuthVariableInfo));
128 AuthVariableInfo.VariableName = VariableName;
129 AuthVariableInfo.VendorGuid = VendorGuid;
130 AuthVariableInfo.Data = Data;
131 AuthVariableInfo.DataSize = DataSize;
132 AuthVariableInfo.Attributes = Attributes;
133
134 return mAuthVarLibContextIn->UpdateVariable (
135 &AuthVariableInfo
136 );
137 }
138
139 /**
140 Update the variable region with Variable information.
141
142 @param[in] VariableName Name of variable.
143 @param[in] VendorGuid Guid of variable.
144 @param[in] Data Data pointer.
145 @param[in] DataSize Size of Data.
146 @param[in] Attributes Attribute value of the variable.
147 @param[in] KeyIndex Index of associated public key.
148 @param[in] MonotonicCount Value of associated monotonic count.
149
150 @retval EFI_SUCCESS The update operation is success.
151 @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.
152 @retval EFI_WRITE_PROTECTED Variable is write-protected.
153 @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES There is not enough resource.
154
155 **/
156 EFI_STATUS
157 AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariableWithMonotonicCount (
158 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,
159 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,
160 IN VOID *Data,
161 IN UINTN DataSize,
162 IN UINT32 Attributes,
163 IN UINT32 KeyIndex,
164 IN UINT64 MonotonicCount
165 )
166 {
167 AUTH_VARIABLE_INFO AuthVariableInfo;
168
169 ZeroMem (&AuthVariableInfo, sizeof (AuthVariableInfo));
170 AuthVariableInfo.VariableName = VariableName;
171 AuthVariableInfo.VendorGuid = VendorGuid;
172 AuthVariableInfo.Data = Data;
173 AuthVariableInfo.DataSize = DataSize;
174 AuthVariableInfo.Attributes = Attributes;
175 AuthVariableInfo.PubKeyIndex = KeyIndex;
176 AuthVariableInfo.MonotonicCount = MonotonicCount;
177
178 return mAuthVarLibContextIn->UpdateVariable (
179 &AuthVariableInfo
180 );
181 }
182
183 /**
184 Update the variable region with Variable information.
185
186 @param[in] VariableName Name of variable.
187 @param[in] VendorGuid Guid of variable.
188 @param[in] Data Data pointer.
189 @param[in] DataSize Size of Data.
190 @param[in] Attributes Attribute value of the variable.
191 @param[in] TimeStamp Value of associated TimeStamp.
192
193 @retval EFI_SUCCESS The update operation is success.
194 @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.
195 @retval EFI_WRITE_PROTECTED Variable is write-protected.
196 @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES There is not enough resource.
197
198 **/
199 EFI_STATUS
200 AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariableWithTimeStamp (
201 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,
202 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,
203 IN VOID *Data,
204 IN UINTN DataSize,
205 IN UINT32 Attributes,
206 IN EFI_TIME *TimeStamp
207 )
208 {
209 EFI_STATUS FindStatus;
210 VOID *OrgData;
211 UINTN OrgDataSize;
212 AUTH_VARIABLE_INFO AuthVariableInfo;
213
214 FindStatus = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (
215 VariableName,
216 VendorGuid,
217 &OrgData,
218 &OrgDataSize
219 );
220
221 //
222 // EFI_VARIABLE_APPEND_WRITE attribute only effects for existing variable
223 //
224 if (!EFI_ERROR (FindStatus) && ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_APPEND_WRITE) != 0)) {
225 if ((CompareGuid (VendorGuid, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid) &&
226 ((StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE) == 0) || (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1) == 0) ||
227 (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE2) == 0))) ||
228 (CompareGuid (VendorGuid, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid) && (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME) == 0))) {
229 //
230 // For variables with formatted as EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST, the driver shall not perform an append of
231 // EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA values that are already part of the existing variable value.
232 //
233 FilterSignatureList (
234 OrgData,
235 OrgDataSize,
236 Data,
237 &DataSize
238 );
239 }
240 }
241
242 ZeroMem (&AuthVariableInfo, sizeof (AuthVariableInfo));
243 AuthVariableInfo.VariableName = VariableName;
244 AuthVariableInfo.VendorGuid = VendorGuid;
245 AuthVariableInfo.Data = Data;
246 AuthVariableInfo.DataSize = DataSize;
247 AuthVariableInfo.Attributes = Attributes;
248 AuthVariableInfo.TimeStamp = TimeStamp;
249 return mAuthVarLibContextIn->UpdateVariable (
250 &AuthVariableInfo
251 );
252 }
253
254 /**
255 Determine whether this operation needs a physical present user.
256
257 @param[in] VariableName Name of the Variable.
258 @param[in] VendorGuid GUID of the Variable.
259
260 @retval TRUE This variable is protected, only a physical present user could set this variable.
261 @retval FALSE This variable is not protected.
262
263 **/
264 BOOLEAN
265 NeedPhysicallyPresent(
266 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,
267 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid
268 )
269 {
270 if ((CompareGuid (VendorGuid, &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid) && (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME) == 0))
271 || (CompareGuid (VendorGuid, &gEfiCustomModeEnableGuid) && (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_CUSTOM_MODE_NAME) == 0))) {
272 return TRUE;
273 }
274
275 return FALSE;
276 }
277
278 /**
279 Determine whether the platform is operating in Custom Secure Boot mode.
280
281 @retval TRUE The platform is operating in Custom mode.
282 @retval FALSE The platform is operating in Standard mode.
283
284 **/
285 BOOLEAN
286 InCustomMode (
287 VOID
288 )
289 {
290 EFI_STATUS Status;
291 VOID *Data;
292 UINTN DataSize;
293
294 Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (EFI_CUSTOM_MODE_NAME, &gEfiCustomModeEnableGuid, &Data, &DataSize);
295 if (!EFI_ERROR (Status) && (*(UINT8 *) Data == CUSTOM_SECURE_BOOT_MODE)) {
296 return TRUE;
297 }
298
299 return FALSE;
300 }
301
302 /**
303 Get available public key index.
304
305 @param[in] PubKey Pointer to Public Key data.
306
307 @return Public key index, 0 if no any public key index available.
308
309 **/
310 UINT32
311 GetAvailableKeyIndex (
312 IN UINT8 *PubKey
313 )
314 {
315 EFI_STATUS Status;
316 UINT8 *Data;
317 UINTN DataSize;
318 UINT8 *Ptr;
319 UINT32 Index;
320 BOOLEAN IsFound;
321 EFI_GUID VendorGuid;
322 CHAR16 Name[1];
323 AUTH_VARIABLE_INFO AuthVariableInfo;
324 UINT32 KeyIndex;
325
326 Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (
327 AUTHVAR_KEYDB_NAME,
328 &gEfiAuthenticatedVariableGuid,
329 (VOID **) &Data,
330 &DataSize
331 );
332 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
333 DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Get public key database variable failure, Status = %r\n", Status));
334 return 0;
335 }
336
337 if (mPubKeyNumber == mMaxKeyNumber) {
338 Name[0] = 0;
339 AuthVariableInfo.VariableName = Name;
340 ZeroMem (&VendorGuid, sizeof (VendorGuid));
341 AuthVariableInfo.VendorGuid = &VendorGuid;
342 mPubKeyNumber = 0;
343 //
344 // Collect valid key data.
345 //
346 do {
347 Status = mAuthVarLibContextIn->FindNextVariable (AuthVariableInfo.VariableName, AuthVariableInfo.VendorGuid, &AuthVariableInfo);
348 if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
349 if (AuthVariableInfo.PubKeyIndex != 0) {
350 for (Ptr = Data; Ptr < (Data + DataSize); Ptr += sizeof (AUTHVAR_KEY_DB_DATA)) {
351 if (ReadUnaligned32 (&(((AUTHVAR_KEY_DB_DATA *) Ptr)->KeyIndex)) == AuthVariableInfo.PubKeyIndex) {
352 //
353 // Check if the key data has been collected.
354 //
355 for (Index = 0; Index < mPubKeyNumber; Index++) {
356 if (ReadUnaligned32 (&(((AUTHVAR_KEY_DB_DATA *) mPubKeyStore + Index)->KeyIndex)) == AuthVariableInfo.PubKeyIndex) {
357 break;
358 }
359 }
360 if (Index == mPubKeyNumber) {
361 //
362 // New key data.
363 //
364 CopyMem ((AUTHVAR_KEY_DB_DATA *) mPubKeyStore + mPubKeyNumber, Ptr, sizeof (AUTHVAR_KEY_DB_DATA));
365 mPubKeyNumber++;
366 }
367 break;
368 }
369 }
370 }
371 }
372 } while (Status != EFI_NOT_FOUND);
373
374 //
375 // No available space to add new public key.
376 //
377 if (mPubKeyNumber == mMaxKeyNumber) {
378 return 0;
379 }
380 }
381
382 //
383 // Find available public key index.
384 //
385 for (KeyIndex = 1; KeyIndex <= mMaxKeyNumber; KeyIndex++) {
386 IsFound = FALSE;
387 for (Ptr = mPubKeyStore; Ptr < (mPubKeyStore + mPubKeyNumber * sizeof (AUTHVAR_KEY_DB_DATA)); Ptr += sizeof (AUTHVAR_KEY_DB_DATA)) {
388 if (ReadUnaligned32 (&(((AUTHVAR_KEY_DB_DATA *) Ptr)->KeyIndex)) == KeyIndex) {
389 IsFound = TRUE;
390 break;
391 }
392 }
393 if (!IsFound) {
394 break;
395 }
396 }
397
398 return KeyIndex;
399 }
400
401 /**
402 Add public key in store and return its index.
403
404 @param[in] PubKey Input pointer to Public Key data.
405 @param[in] VariableDataEntry The variable data entry.
406
407 @return Index of new added public key.
408
409 **/
410 UINT32
411 AddPubKeyInStore (
412 IN UINT8 *PubKey,
413 IN VARIABLE_ENTRY_CONSISTENCY *VariableDataEntry
414 )
415 {
416 EFI_STATUS Status;
417 UINT32 Index;
418 VARIABLE_ENTRY_CONSISTENCY PublicKeyEntry;
419 UINT32 Attributes;
420 UINT32 KeyIndex;
421
422 if (PubKey == NULL) {
423 return 0;
424 }
425
426 //
427 // Check whether the public key entry does exist.
428 //
429 for (Index = 0; Index < mPubKeyNumber; Index++) {
430 if (CompareMem (((AUTHVAR_KEY_DB_DATA *) mPubKeyStore + Index)->KeyData, PubKey, EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE) == 0) {
431 return ReadUnaligned32 (&(((AUTHVAR_KEY_DB_DATA *) mPubKeyStore + Index)->KeyIndex));
432 }
433 }
434
435 KeyIndex = GetAvailableKeyIndex (PubKey);
436 if (KeyIndex == 0) {
437 return 0;
438 }
439
440 //
441 // Check the variable space for both public key and variable data.
442 //
443 PublicKeyEntry.VariableSize = (mPubKeyNumber + 1) * sizeof (AUTHVAR_KEY_DB_DATA);
444 PublicKeyEntry.Guid = &gEfiAuthenticatedVariableGuid;
445 PublicKeyEntry.Name = AUTHVAR_KEYDB_NAME;
446 Attributes = VARIABLE_ATTRIBUTE_NV_BS_RT | EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS;
447
448 if (!mAuthVarLibContextIn->CheckRemainingSpaceForConsistency (Attributes, &PublicKeyEntry, VariableDataEntry, NULL)) {
449 //
450 // No enough variable space.
451 //
452 return 0;
453 }
454
455 WriteUnaligned32 (&(((AUTHVAR_KEY_DB_DATA *) mPubKeyStore + mPubKeyNumber)->KeyIndex), KeyIndex);
456 CopyMem (((AUTHVAR_KEY_DB_DATA *) mPubKeyStore + mPubKeyNumber)->KeyData, PubKey, EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE);
457 mPubKeyNumber++;
458
459 //
460 // Update public key database variable.
461 //
462 Status = AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariable (
463 AUTHVAR_KEYDB_NAME,
464 &gEfiAuthenticatedVariableGuid,
465 mPubKeyStore,
466 mPubKeyNumber * sizeof (AUTHVAR_KEY_DB_DATA),
467 Attributes
468 );
469 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
470 DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Update public key database variable failure, Status = %r\n", Status));
471 return 0;
472 }
473
474 return KeyIndex;
475 }
476
477 /**
478 Verify data payload with AuthInfo in EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SHA256_GUID type.
479 Follow the steps in UEFI2.2.
480
481 Caution: This function may receive untrusted input.
482 This function may be invoked in SMM mode, and datasize and data are external input.
483 This function will do basic validation, before parse the data.
484 This function will parse the authentication carefully to avoid security issues, like
485 buffer overflow, integer overflow.
486
487 @param[in] Data Pointer to data with AuthInfo.
488 @param[in] DataSize Size of Data.
489 @param[in] PubKey Public key used for verification.
490
491 @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.
492 @retval EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION If authentication failed.
493 @retval EFI_SUCCESS Authentication successful.
494
495 **/
496 EFI_STATUS
497 VerifyCounterBasedPayload (
498 IN UINT8 *Data,
499 IN UINTN DataSize,
500 IN UINT8 *PubKey
501 )
502 {
503 BOOLEAN Status;
504 EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION *CertData;
505 EFI_CERT_BLOCK_RSA_2048_SHA256 *CertBlock;
506 UINT8 Digest[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE];
507 VOID *Rsa;
508 UINTN PayloadSize;
509
510 PayloadSize = DataSize - AUTHINFO_SIZE;
511 Rsa = NULL;
512 CertData = NULL;
513 CertBlock = NULL;
514
515 if (Data == NULL || PubKey == NULL) {
516 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
517 }
518
519 CertData = (EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION *) Data;
520 CertBlock = (EFI_CERT_BLOCK_RSA_2048_SHA256 *) (CertData->AuthInfo.CertData);
521
522 //
523 // wCertificateType should be WIN_CERT_TYPE_EFI_GUID.
524 // Cert type should be EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SHA256_GUID.
525 //
526 if ((CertData->AuthInfo.Hdr.wCertificateType != WIN_CERT_TYPE_EFI_GUID) ||
527 !CompareGuid (&CertData->AuthInfo.CertType, &gEfiCertTypeRsa2048Sha256Guid)) {
528 //
529 // Invalid AuthInfo type, return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION.
530 //
531 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;
532 }
533 //
534 // Hash data payload with SHA256.
535 //
536 ZeroMem (Digest, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE);
537 Status = Sha256Init (mHashCtx);
538 if (!Status) {
539 goto Done;
540 }
541 Status = Sha256Update (mHashCtx, Data + AUTHINFO_SIZE, PayloadSize);
542 if (!Status) {
543 goto Done;
544 }
545 //
546 // Hash Size.
547 //
548 Status = Sha256Update (mHashCtx, &PayloadSize, sizeof (UINTN));
549 if (!Status) {
550 goto Done;
551 }
552 //
553 // Hash Monotonic Count.
554 //
555 Status = Sha256Update (mHashCtx, &CertData->MonotonicCount, sizeof (UINT64));
556 if (!Status) {
557 goto Done;
558 }
559 Status = Sha256Final (mHashCtx, Digest);
560 if (!Status) {
561 goto Done;
562 }
563 //
564 // Generate & Initialize RSA Context.
565 //
566 Rsa = RsaNew ();
567 ASSERT (Rsa != NULL);
568 //
569 // Set RSA Key Components.
570 // NOTE: Only N and E are needed to be set as RSA public key for signature verification.
571 //
572 Status = RsaSetKey (Rsa, RsaKeyN, PubKey, EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE);
573 if (!Status) {
574 goto Done;
575 }
576 Status = RsaSetKey (Rsa, RsaKeyE, mRsaE, sizeof (mRsaE));
577 if (!Status) {
578 goto Done;
579 }
580 //
581 // Verify the signature.
582 //
583 Status = RsaPkcs1Verify (
584 Rsa,
585 Digest,
586 SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE,
587 CertBlock->Signature,
588 EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SHA256_SIZE
589 );
590
591 Done:
592 if (Rsa != NULL) {
593 RsaFree (Rsa);
594 }
595 if (Status) {
596 return EFI_SUCCESS;
597 } else {
598 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;
599 }
600 }
601
602 /**
603 Update platform mode.
604
605 @param[in] Mode SETUP_MODE or USER_MODE.
606
607 @return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.
608 @return EFI_SUCCESS Update platform mode successfully.
609
610 **/
611 EFI_STATUS
612 UpdatePlatformMode (
613 IN UINT32 Mode
614 )
615 {
616 EFI_STATUS Status;
617 VOID *Data;
618 UINTN DataSize;
619 UINT8 SecureBootMode;
620 UINT8 SecureBootEnable;
621 UINTN VariableDataSize;
622
623 Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (
624 EFI_SETUP_MODE_NAME,
625 &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,
626 &Data,
627 &DataSize
628 );
629 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
630 return Status;
631 }
632
633 //
634 // Update the value of SetupMode variable by a simple mem copy, this could avoid possible
635 // variable storage reclaim at runtime.
636 //
637 mPlatformMode = (UINT8) Mode;
638 CopyMem (Data, &mPlatformMode, sizeof(UINT8));
639
640 if (mAuthVarLibContextIn->AtRuntime ()) {
641 //
642 // SecureBoot Variable indicates whether the platform firmware is operating
643 // in Secure boot mode (1) or not (0), so we should not change SecureBoot
644 // Variable in runtime.
645 //
646 return Status;
647 }
648
649 //
650 // Check "SecureBoot" variable's existence.
651 // If it doesn't exist, firmware has no capability to perform driver signing verification,
652 // then set "SecureBoot" to 0.
653 //
654 Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (
655 EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME,
656 &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,
657 &Data,
658 &DataSize
659 );
660 //
661 // If "SecureBoot" variable exists, then check "SetupMode" variable update.
662 // If "SetupMode" variable is USER_MODE, "SecureBoot" variable is set to 1.
663 // If "SetupMode" variable is SETUP_MODE, "SecureBoot" variable is set to 0.
664 //
665 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
666 SecureBootMode = SECURE_BOOT_MODE_DISABLE;
667 } else {
668 if (mPlatformMode == USER_MODE) {
669 SecureBootMode = SECURE_BOOT_MODE_ENABLE;
670 } else if (mPlatformMode == SETUP_MODE) {
671 SecureBootMode = SECURE_BOOT_MODE_DISABLE;
672 } else {
673 return EFI_NOT_FOUND;
674 }
675 }
676
677 Status = AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariable (
678 EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME,
679 &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,
680 &SecureBootMode,
681 sizeof(UINT8),
682 EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS
683 );
684 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
685 return Status;
686 }
687
688 //
689 // Check "SecureBootEnable" variable's existence. It can enable/disable secure boot feature.
690 //
691 Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (
692 EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME,
693 &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid,
694 &Data,
695 &DataSize
696 );
697
698 if (SecureBootMode == SECURE_BOOT_MODE_ENABLE) {
699 //
700 // Create the "SecureBootEnable" variable as secure boot is enabled.
701 //
702 SecureBootEnable = SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE;
703 VariableDataSize = sizeof (SecureBootEnable);
704 } else {
705 //
706 // Delete the "SecureBootEnable" variable if this variable exist as "SecureBoot"
707 // variable is not in secure boot state.
708 //
709 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
710 return EFI_SUCCESS;
711 }
712 SecureBootEnable = SECURE_BOOT_DISABLE;
713 VariableDataSize = 0;
714 }
715
716 Status = AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariable (
717 EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME,
718 &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid,
719 &SecureBootEnable,
720 VariableDataSize,
721 EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS
722 );
723 return Status;
724 }
725
726 /**
727 Check input data form to make sure it is a valid EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST for PK/KEK/db/dbx/dbt variable.
728
729 @param[in] VariableName Name of Variable to be check.
730 @param[in] VendorGuid Variable vendor GUID.
731 @param[in] Data Point to the variable data to be checked.
732 @param[in] DataSize Size of Data.
733
734 @return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid signature list format.
735 @return EFI_SUCCESS Passed signature list format check successfully.
736
737 **/
738 EFI_STATUS
739 CheckSignatureListFormat(
740 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,
741 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,
742 IN VOID *Data,
743 IN UINTN DataSize
744 )
745 {
746 EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *SigList;
747 UINTN SigDataSize;
748 UINT32 Index;
749 UINT32 SigCount;
750 BOOLEAN IsPk;
751 VOID *RsaContext;
752 EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *CertData;
753 UINTN CertLen;
754
755 if (DataSize == 0) {
756 return EFI_SUCCESS;
757 }
758
759 ASSERT (VariableName != NULL && VendorGuid != NULL && Data != NULL);
760
761 if (CompareGuid (VendorGuid, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid) && (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME) == 0)){
762 IsPk = TRUE;
763 } else if ((CompareGuid (VendorGuid, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid) && (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME) == 0)) ||
764 (CompareGuid (VendorGuid, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid) &&
765 ((StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE) == 0) || (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1) == 0) ||
766 (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE2) == 0)))) {
767 IsPk = FALSE;
768 } else {
769 return EFI_SUCCESS;
770 }
771
772 SigCount = 0;
773 SigList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) Data;
774 SigDataSize = DataSize;
775 RsaContext = NULL;
776
777 //
778 // Walk throuth the input signature list and check the data format.
779 // If any signature is incorrectly formed, the whole check will fail.
780 //
781 while ((SigDataSize > 0) && (SigDataSize >= SigList->SignatureListSize)) {
782 for (Index = 0; Index < (sizeof (mSupportSigItem) / sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_ITEM)); Index++ ) {
783 if (CompareGuid (&SigList->SignatureType, &mSupportSigItem[Index].SigType)) {
784 //
785 // The value of SignatureSize should always be 16 (size of SignatureOwner
786 // component) add the data length according to signature type.
787 //
788 if (mSupportSigItem[Index].SigDataSize != ((UINT32) ~0) &&
789 (SigList->SignatureSize - sizeof (EFI_GUID)) != mSupportSigItem[Index].SigDataSize) {
790 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
791 }
792 if (mSupportSigItem[Index].SigHeaderSize != ((UINT32) ~0) &&
793 SigList->SignatureHeaderSize != mSupportSigItem[Index].SigHeaderSize) {
794 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
795 }
796 break;
797 }
798 }
799
800 if (Index == (sizeof (mSupportSigItem) / sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_ITEM))) {
801 //
802 // Undefined signature type.
803 //
804 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
805 }
806
807 if (CompareGuid (&SigList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Guid)) {
808 //
809 // Try to retrieve the RSA public key from the X.509 certificate.
810 // If this operation fails, it's not a valid certificate.
811 //
812 RsaContext = RsaNew ();
813 if (RsaContext == NULL) {
814 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
815 }
816 CertData = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) SigList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + SigList->SignatureHeaderSize);
817 CertLen = SigList->SignatureSize - sizeof (EFI_GUID);
818 if (!RsaGetPublicKeyFromX509 (CertData->SignatureData, CertLen, &RsaContext)) {
819 RsaFree (RsaContext);
820 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
821 }
822 RsaFree (RsaContext);
823 }
824
825 if ((SigList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - SigList->SignatureHeaderSize) % SigList->SignatureSize != 0) {
826 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
827 }
828 SigCount += (SigList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - SigList->SignatureHeaderSize) / SigList->SignatureSize;
829
830 SigDataSize -= SigList->SignatureListSize;
831 SigList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) SigList + SigList->SignatureListSize);
832 }
833
834 if (((UINTN) SigList - (UINTN) Data) != DataSize) {
835 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
836 }
837
838 if (IsPk && SigCount > 1) {
839 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
840 }
841
842 return EFI_SUCCESS;
843 }
844
845 /**
846 Update "VendorKeys" variable to record the out of band secure boot key modification.
847
848 @return EFI_SUCCESS Variable is updated successfully.
849 @return Others Failed to update variable.
850
851 **/
852 EFI_STATUS
853 VendorKeyIsModified (
854 VOID
855 )
856 {
857 EFI_STATUS Status;
858
859 if (mVendorKeyState == VENDOR_KEYS_MODIFIED) {
860 return EFI_SUCCESS;
861 }
862 mVendorKeyState = VENDOR_KEYS_MODIFIED;
863
864 Status = AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariable (
865 EFI_VENDOR_KEYS_NV_VARIABLE_NAME,
866 &gEfiVendorKeysNvGuid,
867 &mVendorKeyState,
868 sizeof (UINT8),
869 EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS
870 );
871 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
872 return Status;
873 }
874
875 return AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariable (
876 EFI_VENDOR_KEYS_VARIABLE_NAME,
877 &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,
878 &mVendorKeyState,
879 sizeof (UINT8),
880 EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS
881 );
882 }
883
884 /**
885 Process variable with platform key for verification.
886
887 Caution: This function may receive untrusted input.
888 This function may be invoked in SMM mode, and datasize and data are external input.
889 This function will do basic validation, before parse the data.
890 This function will parse the authentication carefully to avoid security issues, like
891 buffer overflow, integer overflow.
892 This function will check attribute carefully to avoid authentication bypass.
893
894 @param[in] VariableName Name of Variable to be found.
895 @param[in] VendorGuid Variable vendor GUID.
896 @param[in] Data Data pointer.
897 @param[in] DataSize Size of Data found. If size is less than the
898 data, this value contains the required size.
899 @param[in] Attributes Attribute value of the variable
900 @param[in] IsPk Indicate whether it is to process pk.
901
902 @return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.
903 @return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION The variable does NOT pass the validation.
904 check carried out by the firmware.
905 @return EFI_SUCCESS Variable passed validation successfully.
906
907 **/
908 EFI_STATUS
909 ProcessVarWithPk (
910 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,
911 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,
912 IN VOID *Data,
913 IN UINTN DataSize,
914 IN UINT32 Attributes OPTIONAL,
915 IN BOOLEAN IsPk
916 )
917 {
918 EFI_STATUS Status;
919 BOOLEAN Del;
920 UINT8 *Payload;
921 UINTN PayloadSize;
922
923 if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE) == 0 ||
924 (Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) == 0) {
925 //
926 // PK, KEK and db/dbx/dbt should set EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE attribute and should be a time-based
927 // authenticated variable.
928 //
929 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
930 }
931
932 //
933 // Init state of Del. State may change due to secure check
934 //
935 Del = FALSE;
936 if ((InCustomMode() && UserPhysicalPresent()) || (mPlatformMode == SETUP_MODE && !IsPk)) {
937 Payload = (UINT8 *) Data + AUTHINFO2_SIZE (Data);
938 PayloadSize = DataSize - AUTHINFO2_SIZE (Data);
939 if (PayloadSize == 0) {
940 Del = TRUE;
941 }
942
943 Status = CheckSignatureListFormat(VariableName, VendorGuid, Payload, PayloadSize);
944 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
945 return Status;
946 }
947
948 Status = AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariableWithTimeStamp (
949 VariableName,
950 VendorGuid,
951 Payload,
952 PayloadSize,
953 Attributes,
954 &((EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 *) Data)->TimeStamp
955 );
956 if (EFI_ERROR(Status)) {
957 return Status;
958 }
959
960 if ((mPlatformMode != SETUP_MODE) || IsPk) {
961 Status = VendorKeyIsModified ();
962 }
963 } else if (mPlatformMode == USER_MODE) {
964 //
965 // Verify against X509 Cert in PK database.
966 //
967 Status = VerifyTimeBasedPayloadAndUpdate (
968 VariableName,
969 VendorGuid,
970 Data,
971 DataSize,
972 Attributes,
973 AuthVarTypePk,
974 &Del
975 );
976 } else {
977 //
978 // Verify against the certificate in data payload.
979 //
980 Status = VerifyTimeBasedPayloadAndUpdate (
981 VariableName,
982 VendorGuid,
983 Data,
984 DataSize,
985 Attributes,
986 AuthVarTypePayload,
987 &Del
988 );
989 }
990
991 if (!EFI_ERROR(Status) && IsPk) {
992 if (mPlatformMode == SETUP_MODE && !Del) {
993 //
994 // If enroll PK in setup mode, need change to user mode.
995 //
996 Status = UpdatePlatformMode (USER_MODE);
997 } else if (mPlatformMode == USER_MODE && Del){
998 //
999 // If delete PK in user mode, need change to setup mode.
1000 //
1001 Status = UpdatePlatformMode (SETUP_MODE);
1002 }
1003 }
1004
1005 return Status;
1006 }
1007
1008 /**
1009 Process variable with key exchange key for verification.
1010
1011 Caution: This function may receive untrusted input.
1012 This function may be invoked in SMM mode, and datasize and data are external input.
1013 This function will do basic validation, before parse the data.
1014 This function will parse the authentication carefully to avoid security issues, like
1015 buffer overflow, integer overflow.
1016 This function will check attribute carefully to avoid authentication bypass.
1017
1018 @param[in] VariableName Name of Variable to be found.
1019 @param[in] VendorGuid Variable vendor GUID.
1020 @param[in] Data Data pointer.
1021 @param[in] DataSize Size of Data found. If size is less than the
1022 data, this value contains the required size.
1023 @param[in] Attributes Attribute value of the variable.
1024
1025 @return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.
1026 @return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION The variable does NOT pass the validation
1027 check carried out by the firmware.
1028 @return EFI_SUCCESS Variable pass validation successfully.
1029
1030 **/
1031 EFI_STATUS
1032 ProcessVarWithKek (
1033 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,
1034 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,
1035 IN VOID *Data,
1036 IN UINTN DataSize,
1037 IN UINT32 Attributes OPTIONAL
1038 )
1039 {
1040 EFI_STATUS Status;
1041 UINT8 *Payload;
1042 UINTN PayloadSize;
1043
1044 if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE) == 0 ||
1045 (Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) == 0) {
1046 //
1047 // DB, DBX and DBT should set EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE attribute and should be a time-based
1048 // authenticated variable.
1049 //
1050 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
1051 }
1052
1053 Status = EFI_SUCCESS;
1054 if (mPlatformMode == USER_MODE && !(InCustomMode() && UserPhysicalPresent())) {
1055 //
1056 // Time-based, verify against X509 Cert KEK.
1057 //
1058 return VerifyTimeBasedPayloadAndUpdate (
1059 VariableName,
1060 VendorGuid,
1061 Data,
1062 DataSize,
1063 Attributes,
1064 AuthVarTypeKek,
1065 NULL
1066 );
1067 } else {
1068 //
1069 // If in setup mode or custom secure boot mode, no authentication needed.
1070 //
1071 Payload = (UINT8 *) Data + AUTHINFO2_SIZE (Data);
1072 PayloadSize = DataSize - AUTHINFO2_SIZE (Data);
1073
1074 Status = CheckSignatureListFormat(VariableName, VendorGuid, Payload, PayloadSize);
1075 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
1076 return Status;
1077 }
1078
1079 Status = AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariableWithTimeStamp (
1080 VariableName,
1081 VendorGuid,
1082 Payload,
1083 PayloadSize,
1084 Attributes,
1085 &((EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 *) Data)->TimeStamp
1086 );
1087 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
1088 return Status;
1089 }
1090
1091 if (mPlatformMode != SETUP_MODE) {
1092 Status = VendorKeyIsModified ();
1093 }
1094 }
1095
1096 return Status;
1097 }
1098
1099 /**
1100 Check if it is to delete auth variable.
1101
1102 @param[in] OrgAttributes Original attribute value of the variable.
1103 @param[in] Data Data pointer.
1104 @param[in] DataSize Size of Data.
1105 @param[in] Attributes Attribute value of the variable.
1106
1107 @retval TRUE It is to delete auth variable.
1108 @retval FALSE It is not to delete auth variable.
1109
1110 **/
1111 BOOLEAN
1112 IsDeleteAuthVariable (
1113 IN UINT32 OrgAttributes,
1114 IN VOID *Data,
1115 IN UINTN DataSize,
1116 IN UINT32 Attributes
1117 )
1118 {
1119 BOOLEAN Del;
1120 UINTN PayloadSize;
1121
1122 Del = FALSE;
1123
1124 //
1125 // To delete a variable created with the EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS
1126 // or the EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS attribute,
1127 // SetVariable must be used with attributes matching the existing variable
1128 // and the DataSize set to the size of the AuthInfo descriptor.
1129 //
1130 if ((Attributes == OrgAttributes) &&
1131 ((Attributes & (EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS)) != 0)) {
1132 if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0) {
1133 PayloadSize = DataSize - AUTHINFO2_SIZE (Data);
1134 if (PayloadSize == 0) {
1135 Del = TRUE;
1136 }
1137 } else {
1138 PayloadSize = DataSize - AUTHINFO_SIZE;
1139 if (PayloadSize == 0) {
1140 Del = TRUE;
1141 }
1142 }
1143 }
1144
1145 return Del;
1146 }
1147
1148 /**
1149 Process variable with EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS/EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS set
1150
1151 Caution: This function may receive untrusted input.
1152 This function may be invoked in SMM mode, and datasize and data are external input.
1153 This function will do basic validation, before parse the data.
1154 This function will parse the authentication carefully to avoid security issues, like
1155 buffer overflow, integer overflow.
1156 This function will check attribute carefully to avoid authentication bypass.
1157
1158 @param[in] VariableName Name of the variable.
1159 @param[in] VendorGuid Variable vendor GUID.
1160 @param[in] Data Data pointer.
1161 @param[in] DataSize Size of Data.
1162 @param[in] Attributes Attribute value of the variable.
1163
1164 @return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.
1165 @return EFI_WRITE_PROTECTED Variable is write-protected and needs authentication with
1166 EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS set.
1167 @return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES The Database to save the public key is full.
1168 @return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION The variable is with EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS
1169 set, but the AuthInfo does NOT pass the validation
1170 check carried out by the firmware.
1171 @return EFI_SUCCESS Variable is not write-protected or pass validation successfully.
1172
1173 **/
1174 EFI_STATUS
1175 ProcessVariable (
1176 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,
1177 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,
1178 IN VOID *Data,
1179 IN UINTN DataSize,
1180 IN UINT32 Attributes
1181 )
1182 {
1183 EFI_STATUS Status;
1184 BOOLEAN IsDeletion;
1185 BOOLEAN IsFirstTime;
1186 UINT8 *PubKey;
1187 EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION *CertData;
1188 EFI_CERT_BLOCK_RSA_2048_SHA256 *CertBlock;
1189 UINT32 KeyIndex;
1190 UINT64 MonotonicCount;
1191 VARIABLE_ENTRY_CONSISTENCY VariableDataEntry;
1192 UINT32 Index;
1193 AUTH_VARIABLE_INFO OrgVariableInfo;
1194
1195 KeyIndex = 0;
1196 CertData = NULL;
1197 CertBlock = NULL;
1198 PubKey = NULL;
1199 IsDeletion = FALSE;
1200 Status = EFI_SUCCESS;
1201
1202 ZeroMem (&OrgVariableInfo, sizeof (OrgVariableInfo));
1203 Status = mAuthVarLibContextIn->FindVariable (
1204 VariableName,
1205 VendorGuid,
1206 &OrgVariableInfo
1207 );
1208
1209 if ((!EFI_ERROR (Status)) && IsDeleteAuthVariable (OrgVariableInfo.Attributes, Data, DataSize, Attributes) && UserPhysicalPresent()) {
1210 //
1211 // Allow the delete operation of common authenticated variable at user physical presence.
1212 //
1213 Status = AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariable (
1214 VariableName,
1215 VendorGuid,
1216 NULL,
1217 0,
1218 0
1219 );
1220 if (!EFI_ERROR (Status) && ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0)) {
1221 Status = DeleteCertsFromDb (VariableName, VendorGuid, Attributes);
1222 }
1223
1224 return Status;
1225 }
1226
1227 if (NeedPhysicallyPresent (VariableName, VendorGuid) && !UserPhysicalPresent()) {
1228 //
1229 // This variable is protected, only physical present user could modify its value.
1230 //
1231 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;
1232 }
1233
1234 //
1235 // A time-based authenticated variable and a count-based authenticated variable
1236 // can't be updated by each other.
1237 //
1238 if (OrgVariableInfo.Data != NULL) {
1239 if (((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0) &&
1240 ((OrgVariableInfo.Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0)) {
1241 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;
1242 }
1243
1244 if (((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0) &&
1245 ((OrgVariableInfo.Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0)) {
1246 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;
1247 }
1248 }
1249
1250 //
1251 // Process Time-based Authenticated variable.
1252 //
1253 if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0) {
1254 return VerifyTimeBasedPayloadAndUpdate (
1255 VariableName,
1256 VendorGuid,
1257 Data,
1258 DataSize,
1259 Attributes,
1260 AuthVarTypePriv,
1261 NULL
1262 );
1263 }
1264
1265 //
1266 // Determine if first time SetVariable with the EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS.
1267 //
1268 if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0) {
1269 //
1270 // Determine current operation type.
1271 //
1272 if (DataSize == AUTHINFO_SIZE) {
1273 IsDeletion = TRUE;
1274 }
1275 //
1276 // Determine whether this is the first time with EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS set.
1277 //
1278 if (OrgVariableInfo.Data == NULL) {
1279 IsFirstTime = TRUE;
1280 } else if ((OrgVariableInfo.Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) == 0) {
1281 IsFirstTime = TRUE;
1282 } else {
1283 KeyIndex = OrgVariableInfo.PubKeyIndex;
1284 IsFirstTime = FALSE;
1285 }
1286 } else if ((OrgVariableInfo.Data != NULL) &&
1287 ((OrgVariableInfo.Attributes & (EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS)) != 0)
1288 ) {
1289 //
1290 // If the variable is already write-protected, it always needs authentication before update.
1291 //
1292 return EFI_WRITE_PROTECTED;
1293 } else {
1294 //
1295 // If without EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS, set and attributes collision.
1296 // That means it is not authenticated variable, just update variable as usual.
1297 //
1298 Status = AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariable (VariableName, VendorGuid, Data, DataSize, Attributes);
1299 return Status;
1300 }
1301
1302 //
1303 // Get PubKey and check Monotonic Count value corresponding to the variable.
1304 //
1305 CertData = (EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION *) Data;
1306 CertBlock = (EFI_CERT_BLOCK_RSA_2048_SHA256 *) (CertData->AuthInfo.CertData);
1307 PubKey = CertBlock->PublicKey;
1308
1309 //
1310 // Update Monotonic Count value.
1311 //
1312 MonotonicCount = CertData->MonotonicCount;
1313
1314 if (!IsFirstTime) {
1315 //
1316 // 2 cases need to check here
1317 // 1. Internal PubKey variable. PubKeyIndex is always 0
1318 // 2. Other counter-based AuthVariable. Check input PubKey.
1319 //
1320 if (KeyIndex == 0) {
1321 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;
1322 }
1323 for (Index = 0; Index < mPubKeyNumber; Index++) {
1324 if (ReadUnaligned32 (&(((AUTHVAR_KEY_DB_DATA *) mPubKeyStore + Index)->KeyIndex)) == KeyIndex) {
1325 if (CompareMem (((AUTHVAR_KEY_DB_DATA *) mPubKeyStore + Index)->KeyData, PubKey, EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE) == 0) {
1326 break;
1327 } else {
1328 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;
1329 }
1330 }
1331 }
1332 if (Index == mPubKeyNumber) {
1333 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;
1334 }
1335
1336 //
1337 // Compare the current monotonic count and ensure that it is greater than the last SetVariable
1338 // operation with the EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS attribute set.
1339 //
1340 if (MonotonicCount <= OrgVariableInfo.MonotonicCount) {
1341 //
1342 // Monotonic count check fail, suspicious replay attack, return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION.
1343 //
1344 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;
1345 }
1346 }
1347 //
1348 // Verify the certificate in Data payload.
1349 //
1350 Status = VerifyCounterBasedPayload (Data, DataSize, PubKey);
1351 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
1352 return Status;
1353 }
1354
1355 //
1356 // Now, the signature has been verified!
1357 //
1358 if (IsFirstTime && !IsDeletion) {
1359 VariableDataEntry.VariableSize = DataSize - AUTHINFO_SIZE;
1360 VariableDataEntry.Guid = VendorGuid;
1361 VariableDataEntry.Name = VariableName;
1362
1363 //
1364 // Update public key database variable if need.
1365 //
1366 KeyIndex = AddPubKeyInStore (PubKey, &VariableDataEntry);
1367 if (KeyIndex == 0) {
1368 return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;
1369 }
1370 }
1371
1372 //
1373 // Verification pass.
1374 //
1375 return AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariableWithMonotonicCount (VariableName, VendorGuid, (UINT8*)Data + AUTHINFO_SIZE, DataSize - AUTHINFO_SIZE, Attributes, KeyIndex, MonotonicCount);
1376 }
1377
1378 /**
1379 Filter out the duplicated EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA from the new data by comparing to the original data.
1380
1381 @param[in] Data Pointer to original EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST.
1382 @param[in] DataSize Size of Data buffer.
1383 @param[in, out] NewData Pointer to new EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST.
1384 @param[in, out] NewDataSize Size of NewData buffer.
1385
1386 **/
1387 EFI_STATUS
1388 FilterSignatureList (
1389 IN VOID *Data,
1390 IN UINTN DataSize,
1391 IN OUT VOID *NewData,
1392 IN OUT UINTN *NewDataSize
1393 )
1394 {
1395 EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *CertList;
1396 EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *Cert;
1397 UINTN CertCount;
1398 EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *NewCertList;
1399 EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *NewCert;
1400 UINTN NewCertCount;
1401 UINTN Index;
1402 UINTN Index2;
1403 UINTN Size;
1404 UINT8 *Tail;
1405 UINTN CopiedCount;
1406 UINTN SignatureListSize;
1407 BOOLEAN IsNewCert;
1408 UINT8 *TempData;
1409 UINTN TempDataSize;
1410 EFI_STATUS Status;
1411
1412 if (*NewDataSize == 0) {
1413 return EFI_SUCCESS;
1414 }
1415
1416 TempDataSize = *NewDataSize;
1417 Status = mAuthVarLibContextIn->GetScratchBuffer (&TempDataSize, (VOID **) &TempData);
1418 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
1419 return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;
1420 }
1421
1422 Tail = TempData;
1423
1424 NewCertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) NewData;
1425 while ((*NewDataSize > 0) && (*NewDataSize >= NewCertList->SignatureListSize)) {
1426 NewCert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) NewCertList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + NewCertList->SignatureHeaderSize);
1427 NewCertCount = (NewCertList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - NewCertList->SignatureHeaderSize) / NewCertList->SignatureSize;
1428
1429 CopiedCount = 0;
1430 for (Index = 0; Index < NewCertCount; Index++) {
1431 IsNewCert = TRUE;
1432
1433 Size = DataSize;
1434 CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) Data;
1435 while ((Size > 0) && (Size >= CertList->SignatureListSize)) {
1436 if (CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &NewCertList->SignatureType) &&
1437 (CertList->SignatureSize == NewCertList->SignatureSize)) {
1438 Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize);
1439 CertCount = (CertList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - CertList->SignatureHeaderSize) / CertList->SignatureSize;
1440 for (Index2 = 0; Index2 < CertCount; Index2++) {
1441 //
1442 // Iterate each Signature Data in this Signature List.
1443 //
1444 if (CompareMem (NewCert, Cert, CertList->SignatureSize) == 0) {
1445 IsNewCert = FALSE;
1446 break;
1447 }
1448 Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) Cert + CertList->SignatureSize);
1449 }
1450 }
1451
1452 if (!IsNewCert) {
1453 break;
1454 }
1455 Size -= CertList->SignatureListSize;
1456 CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + CertList->SignatureListSize);
1457 }
1458
1459 if (IsNewCert) {
1460 //
1461 // New EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA, keep it.
1462 //
1463 if (CopiedCount == 0) {
1464 //
1465 // Copy EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST header for only once.
1466 //
1467 CopyMem (Tail, NewCertList, sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + NewCertList->SignatureHeaderSize);
1468 Tail = Tail + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + NewCertList->SignatureHeaderSize;
1469 }
1470
1471 CopyMem (Tail, NewCert, NewCertList->SignatureSize);
1472 Tail += NewCertList->SignatureSize;
1473 CopiedCount++;
1474 }
1475
1476 NewCert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) NewCert + NewCertList->SignatureSize);
1477 }
1478
1479 //
1480 // Update SignatureListSize in the kept EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST.
1481 //
1482 if (CopiedCount != 0) {
1483 SignatureListSize = sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + NewCertList->SignatureHeaderSize + (CopiedCount * NewCertList->SignatureSize);
1484 CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) (Tail - SignatureListSize);
1485 CertList->SignatureListSize = (UINT32) SignatureListSize;
1486 }
1487
1488 *NewDataSize -= NewCertList->SignatureListSize;
1489 NewCertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) NewCertList + NewCertList->SignatureListSize);
1490 }
1491
1492 TempDataSize = (Tail - (UINT8 *) TempData);
1493
1494 CopyMem (NewData, TempData, TempDataSize);
1495 *NewDataSize = TempDataSize;
1496
1497 return EFI_SUCCESS;
1498 }
1499
1500 /**
1501 Compare two EFI_TIME data.
1502
1503
1504 @param FirstTime A pointer to the first EFI_TIME data.
1505 @param SecondTime A pointer to the second EFI_TIME data.
1506
1507 @retval TRUE The FirstTime is not later than the SecondTime.
1508 @retval FALSE The FirstTime is later than the SecondTime.
1509
1510 **/
1511 BOOLEAN
1512 AuthServiceInternalCompareTimeStamp (
1513 IN EFI_TIME *FirstTime,
1514 IN EFI_TIME *SecondTime
1515 )
1516 {
1517 if (FirstTime->Year != SecondTime->Year) {
1518 return (BOOLEAN) (FirstTime->Year < SecondTime->Year);
1519 } else if (FirstTime->Month != SecondTime->Month) {
1520 return (BOOLEAN) (FirstTime->Month < SecondTime->Month);
1521 } else if (FirstTime->Day != SecondTime->Day) {
1522 return (BOOLEAN) (FirstTime->Day < SecondTime->Day);
1523 } else if (FirstTime->Hour != SecondTime->Hour) {
1524 return (BOOLEAN) (FirstTime->Hour < SecondTime->Hour);
1525 } else if (FirstTime->Minute != SecondTime->Minute) {
1526 return (BOOLEAN) (FirstTime->Minute < SecondTime->Minute);
1527 }
1528
1529 return (BOOLEAN) (FirstTime->Second <= SecondTime->Second);
1530 }
1531
1532 /**
1533 Find matching signer's certificates for common authenticated variable
1534 by corresponding VariableName and VendorGuid from "certdb" or "certdbv".
1535
1536 The data format of "certdb" or "certdbv":
1537 //
1538 // UINT32 CertDbListSize;
1539 // /// AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA Certs1[];
1540 // /// AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA Certs2[];
1541 // /// ...
1542 // /// AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA Certsn[];
1543 //
1544
1545 @param[in] VariableName Name of authenticated Variable.
1546 @param[in] VendorGuid Vendor GUID of authenticated Variable.
1547 @param[in] Data Pointer to variable "certdb" or "certdbv".
1548 @param[in] DataSize Size of variable "certdb" or "certdbv".
1549 @param[out] CertOffset Offset of matching CertData, from starting of Data.
1550 @param[out] CertDataSize Length of CertData in bytes.
1551 @param[out] CertNodeOffset Offset of matching AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA , from
1552 starting of Data.
1553 @param[out] CertNodeSize Length of AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA in bytes.
1554
1555 @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Any input parameter is invalid.
1556 @retval EFI_NOT_FOUND Fail to find matching certs.
1557 @retval EFI_SUCCESS Find matching certs and output parameters.
1558
1559 **/
1560 EFI_STATUS
1561 FindCertsFromDb (
1562 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,
1563 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,
1564 IN UINT8 *Data,
1565 IN UINTN DataSize,
1566 OUT UINT32 *CertOffset, OPTIONAL
1567 OUT UINT32 *CertDataSize, OPTIONAL
1568 OUT UINT32 *CertNodeOffset,OPTIONAL
1569 OUT UINT32 *CertNodeSize OPTIONAL
1570 )
1571 {
1572 UINT32 Offset;
1573 AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA *Ptr;
1574 UINT32 CertSize;
1575 UINT32 NameSize;
1576 UINT32 NodeSize;
1577 UINT32 CertDbListSize;
1578
1579 if ((VariableName == NULL) || (VendorGuid == NULL) || (Data == NULL)) {
1580 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
1581 }
1582
1583 //
1584 // Check whether DataSize matches recorded CertDbListSize.
1585 //
1586 if (DataSize < sizeof (UINT32)) {
1587 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
1588 }
1589
1590 CertDbListSize = ReadUnaligned32 ((UINT32 *) Data);
1591
1592 if (CertDbListSize != (UINT32) DataSize) {
1593 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
1594 }
1595
1596 Offset = sizeof (UINT32);
1597
1598 //
1599 // Get corresponding certificates by VendorGuid and VariableName.
1600 //
1601 while (Offset < (UINT32) DataSize) {
1602 Ptr = (AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA *) (Data + Offset);
1603 //
1604 // Check whether VendorGuid matches.
1605 //
1606 if (CompareGuid (&Ptr->VendorGuid, VendorGuid)) {
1607 NodeSize = ReadUnaligned32 (&Ptr->CertNodeSize);
1608 NameSize = ReadUnaligned32 (&Ptr->NameSize);
1609 CertSize = ReadUnaligned32 (&Ptr->CertDataSize);
1610
1611 if (NodeSize != sizeof (EFI_GUID) + sizeof (UINT32) * 3 + CertSize +
1612 sizeof (CHAR16) * NameSize) {
1613 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
1614 }
1615
1616 Offset = Offset + sizeof (EFI_GUID) + sizeof (UINT32) * 3;
1617 //
1618 // Check whether VariableName matches.
1619 //
1620 if ((NameSize == StrLen (VariableName)) &&
1621 (CompareMem (Data + Offset, VariableName, NameSize * sizeof (CHAR16)) == 0)) {
1622 Offset = Offset + NameSize * sizeof (CHAR16);
1623
1624 if (CertOffset != NULL) {
1625 *CertOffset = Offset;
1626 }
1627
1628 if (CertDataSize != NULL) {
1629 *CertDataSize = CertSize;
1630 }
1631
1632 if (CertNodeOffset != NULL) {
1633 *CertNodeOffset = (UINT32) ((UINT8 *) Ptr - Data);
1634 }
1635
1636 if (CertNodeSize != NULL) {
1637 *CertNodeSize = NodeSize;
1638 }
1639
1640 return EFI_SUCCESS;
1641 } else {
1642 Offset = Offset + NameSize * sizeof (CHAR16) + CertSize;
1643 }
1644 } else {
1645 NodeSize = ReadUnaligned32 (&Ptr->CertNodeSize);
1646 Offset = Offset + NodeSize;
1647 }
1648 }
1649
1650 return EFI_NOT_FOUND;
1651 }
1652
1653 /**
1654 Retrieve signer's certificates for common authenticated variable
1655 by corresponding VariableName and VendorGuid from "certdb"
1656 or "certdbv" according to authenticated variable attributes.
1657
1658 @param[in] VariableName Name of authenticated Variable.
1659 @param[in] VendorGuid Vendor GUID of authenticated Variable.
1660 @param[in] Attributes Attributes of authenticated variable.
1661 @param[out] CertData Pointer to signer's certificates.
1662 @param[out] CertDataSize Length of CertData in bytes.
1663
1664 @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Any input parameter is invalid.
1665 @retval EFI_NOT_FOUND Fail to find "certdb"/"certdbv" or matching certs.
1666 @retval EFI_SUCCESS Get signer's certificates successfully.
1667
1668 **/
1669 EFI_STATUS
1670 GetCertsFromDb (
1671 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,
1672 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,
1673 IN UINT32 Attributes,
1674 OUT UINT8 **CertData,
1675 OUT UINT32 *CertDataSize
1676 )
1677 {
1678 EFI_STATUS Status;
1679 UINT8 *Data;
1680 UINTN DataSize;
1681 UINT32 CertOffset;
1682 CHAR16 *DbName;
1683
1684 if ((VariableName == NULL) || (VendorGuid == NULL) || (CertData == NULL) || (CertDataSize == NULL)) {
1685 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
1686 }
1687
1688
1689 if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE) != 0) {
1690 //
1691 // Get variable "certdb".
1692 //
1693 DbName = EFI_CERT_DB_NAME;
1694 } else {
1695 //
1696 // Get variable "certdbv".
1697 //
1698 DbName = EFI_CERT_DB_VOLATILE_NAME;
1699 }
1700
1701 //
1702 // Get variable "certdb" or "certdbv".
1703 //
1704 Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (
1705 DbName,
1706 &gEfiCertDbGuid,
1707 (VOID **) &Data,
1708 &DataSize
1709 );
1710 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
1711 return Status;
1712 }
1713
1714 if ((DataSize == 0) || (Data == NULL)) {
1715 ASSERT (FALSE);
1716 return EFI_NOT_FOUND;
1717 }
1718
1719 Status = FindCertsFromDb (
1720 VariableName,
1721 VendorGuid,
1722 Data,
1723 DataSize,
1724 &CertOffset,
1725 CertDataSize,
1726 NULL,
1727 NULL
1728 );
1729
1730 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
1731 return Status;
1732 }
1733
1734 *CertData = Data + CertOffset;
1735 return EFI_SUCCESS;
1736 }
1737
1738 /**
1739 Delete matching signer's certificates when deleting common authenticated
1740 variable by corresponding VariableName and VendorGuid from "certdb" or
1741 "certdbv" according to authenticated variable attributes.
1742
1743 @param[in] VariableName Name of authenticated Variable.
1744 @param[in] VendorGuid Vendor GUID of authenticated Variable.
1745 @param[in] Attributes Attributes of authenticated variable.
1746
1747 @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Any input parameter is invalid.
1748 @retval EFI_NOT_FOUND Fail to find "certdb"/"certdbv" or matching certs.
1749 @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES The operation is failed due to lack of resources.
1750 @retval EFI_SUCCESS The operation is completed successfully.
1751
1752 **/
1753 EFI_STATUS
1754 DeleteCertsFromDb (
1755 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,
1756 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,
1757 IN UINT32 Attributes
1758 )
1759 {
1760 EFI_STATUS Status;
1761 UINT8 *Data;
1762 UINTN DataSize;
1763 UINT32 VarAttr;
1764 UINT32 CertNodeOffset;
1765 UINT32 CertNodeSize;
1766 UINT8 *NewCertDb;
1767 UINT32 NewCertDbSize;
1768 CHAR16 *DbName;
1769
1770 if ((VariableName == NULL) || (VendorGuid == NULL)) {
1771 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
1772 }
1773
1774 if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE) != 0) {
1775 //
1776 // Get variable "certdb".
1777 //
1778 DbName = EFI_CERT_DB_NAME;
1779 VarAttr = EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS;
1780 } else {
1781 //
1782 // Get variable "certdbv".
1783 //
1784 DbName = EFI_CERT_DB_VOLATILE_NAME;
1785 VarAttr = EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS;
1786 }
1787
1788 Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (
1789 DbName,
1790 &gEfiCertDbGuid,
1791 (VOID **) &Data,
1792 &DataSize
1793 );
1794
1795 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
1796 return Status;
1797 }
1798
1799 if ((DataSize == 0) || (Data == NULL)) {
1800 ASSERT (FALSE);
1801 return EFI_NOT_FOUND;
1802 }
1803
1804 if (DataSize == sizeof (UINT32)) {
1805 //
1806 // There is no certs in "certdb" or "certdbv".
1807 //
1808 return EFI_SUCCESS;
1809 }
1810
1811 //
1812 // Get corresponding cert node from "certdb" or "certdbv".
1813 //
1814 Status = FindCertsFromDb (
1815 VariableName,
1816 VendorGuid,
1817 Data,
1818 DataSize,
1819 NULL,
1820 NULL,
1821 &CertNodeOffset,
1822 &CertNodeSize
1823 );
1824
1825 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
1826 return Status;
1827 }
1828
1829 if (DataSize < (CertNodeOffset + CertNodeSize)) {
1830 return EFI_NOT_FOUND;
1831 }
1832
1833 //
1834 // Construct new data content of variable "certdb" or "certdbv".
1835 //
1836 NewCertDbSize = (UINT32) DataSize - CertNodeSize;
1837 NewCertDb = (UINT8*) mCertDbStore;
1838
1839 //
1840 // Copy the DB entries before deleting node.
1841 //
1842 CopyMem (NewCertDb, Data, CertNodeOffset);
1843 //
1844 // Update CertDbListSize.
1845 //
1846 CopyMem (NewCertDb, &NewCertDbSize, sizeof (UINT32));
1847 //
1848 // Copy the DB entries after deleting node.
1849 //
1850 if (DataSize > (CertNodeOffset + CertNodeSize)) {
1851 CopyMem (
1852 NewCertDb + CertNodeOffset,
1853 Data + CertNodeOffset + CertNodeSize,
1854 DataSize - CertNodeOffset - CertNodeSize
1855 );
1856 }
1857
1858 //
1859 // Set "certdb" or "certdbv".
1860 //
1861 Status = AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariable (
1862 DbName,
1863 &gEfiCertDbGuid,
1864 NewCertDb,
1865 NewCertDbSize,
1866 VarAttr
1867 );
1868
1869 return Status;
1870 }
1871
1872 /**
1873 Insert signer's certificates for common authenticated variable with VariableName
1874 and VendorGuid in AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA to "certdb" or "certdbv" according to
1875 time based authenticated variable attributes.
1876
1877 @param[in] VariableName Name of authenticated Variable.
1878 @param[in] VendorGuid Vendor GUID of authenticated Variable.
1879 @param[in] Attributes Attributes of authenticated variable.
1880 @param[in] CertData Pointer to signer's certificates.
1881 @param[in] CertDataSize Length of CertData in bytes.
1882
1883 @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Any input parameter is invalid.
1884 @retval EFI_ACCESS_DENIED An AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA entry with same VariableName
1885 and VendorGuid already exists.
1886 @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES The operation is failed due to lack of resources.
1887 @retval EFI_SUCCESS Insert an AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA entry to "certdb" or "certdbv"
1888
1889 **/
1890 EFI_STATUS
1891 InsertCertsToDb (
1892 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,
1893 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,
1894 IN UINT32 Attributes,
1895 IN UINT8 *CertData,
1896 IN UINTN CertDataSize
1897 )
1898 {
1899 EFI_STATUS Status;
1900 UINT8 *Data;
1901 UINTN DataSize;
1902 UINT32 VarAttr;
1903 UINT8 *NewCertDb;
1904 UINT32 NewCertDbSize;
1905 UINT32 CertNodeSize;
1906 UINT32 NameSize;
1907 AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA *Ptr;
1908 CHAR16 *DbName;
1909
1910 if ((VariableName == NULL) || (VendorGuid == NULL) || (CertData == NULL)) {
1911 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
1912 }
1913
1914 if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE) != 0) {
1915 //
1916 // Get variable "certdb".
1917 //
1918 DbName = EFI_CERT_DB_NAME;
1919 VarAttr = EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS;
1920 } else {
1921 //
1922 // Get variable "certdbv".
1923 //
1924 DbName = EFI_CERT_DB_VOLATILE_NAME;
1925 VarAttr = EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS;
1926 }
1927
1928 //
1929 // Get variable "certdb" or "certdbv".
1930 //
1931 Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (
1932 DbName,
1933 &gEfiCertDbGuid,
1934 (VOID **) &Data,
1935 &DataSize
1936 );
1937 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
1938 return Status;
1939 }
1940
1941 if ((DataSize == 0) || (Data == NULL)) {
1942 ASSERT (FALSE);
1943 return EFI_NOT_FOUND;
1944 }
1945
1946 //
1947 // Find whether matching cert node already exists in "certdb" or "certdbv".
1948 // If yes return error.
1949 //
1950 Status = FindCertsFromDb (
1951 VariableName,
1952 VendorGuid,
1953 Data,
1954 DataSize,
1955 NULL,
1956 NULL,
1957 NULL,
1958 NULL
1959 );
1960
1961 if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
1962 ASSERT (FALSE);
1963 return EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;
1964 }
1965
1966 //
1967 // Construct new data content of variable "certdb" or "certdbv".
1968 //
1969 NameSize = (UINT32) StrLen (VariableName);
1970 CertNodeSize = sizeof (AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA) + (UINT32) CertDataSize + NameSize * sizeof (CHAR16);
1971 NewCertDbSize = (UINT32) DataSize + CertNodeSize;
1972 if (NewCertDbSize > mMaxCertDbSize) {
1973 return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;
1974 }
1975 NewCertDb = (UINT8*) mCertDbStore;
1976
1977 //
1978 // Copy the DB entries before inserting node.
1979 //
1980 CopyMem (NewCertDb, Data, DataSize);
1981 //
1982 // Update CertDbListSize.
1983 //
1984 CopyMem (NewCertDb, &NewCertDbSize, sizeof (UINT32));
1985 //
1986 // Construct new cert node.
1987 //
1988 Ptr = (AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA *) (NewCertDb + DataSize);
1989 CopyGuid (&Ptr->VendorGuid, VendorGuid);
1990 CopyMem (&Ptr->CertNodeSize, &CertNodeSize, sizeof (UINT32));
1991 CopyMem (&Ptr->NameSize, &NameSize, sizeof (UINT32));
1992 CopyMem (&Ptr->CertDataSize, &CertDataSize, sizeof (UINT32));
1993
1994 CopyMem (
1995 (UINT8 *) Ptr + sizeof (AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA),
1996 VariableName,
1997 NameSize * sizeof (CHAR16)
1998 );
1999
2000 CopyMem (
2001 (UINT8 *) Ptr + sizeof (AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA) + NameSize * sizeof (CHAR16),
2002 CertData,
2003 CertDataSize
2004 );
2005
2006 //
2007 // Set "certdb" or "certdbv".
2008 //
2009 Status = AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariable (
2010 DbName,
2011 &gEfiCertDbGuid,
2012 NewCertDb,
2013 NewCertDbSize,
2014 VarAttr
2015 );
2016
2017 return Status;
2018 }
2019
2020 /**
2021 Clean up signer's certificates for common authenticated variable
2022 by corresponding VariableName and VendorGuid from "certdb".
2023 System may break down during Timebased Variable update & certdb update,
2024 make them inconsistent, this function is called in AuthVariable Init
2025 to ensure consistency.
2026
2027 @retval EFI_NOT_FOUND Fail to find variable "certdb".
2028 @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES The operation is failed due to lack of resources.
2029 @retval EFI_SUCCESS The operation is completed successfully.
2030
2031 **/
2032 EFI_STATUS
2033 CleanCertsFromDb (
2034 VOID
2035 )
2036 {
2037 UINT32 Offset;
2038 AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA *Ptr;
2039 UINT32 NameSize;
2040 UINT32 NodeSize;
2041 CHAR16 *VariableName;
2042 EFI_STATUS Status;
2043 BOOLEAN CertCleaned;
2044 UINT8 *Data;
2045 UINTN DataSize;
2046 EFI_GUID AuthVarGuid;
2047 AUTH_VARIABLE_INFO AuthVariableInfo;
2048
2049 Status = EFI_SUCCESS;
2050
2051 //
2052 // Get corresponding certificates by VendorGuid and VariableName.
2053 //
2054 do {
2055 CertCleaned = FALSE;
2056
2057 //
2058 // Get latest variable "certdb"
2059 //
2060 Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (
2061 EFI_CERT_DB_NAME,
2062 &gEfiCertDbGuid,
2063 (VOID **) &Data,
2064 &DataSize
2065 );
2066 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
2067 return Status;
2068 }
2069
2070 if ((DataSize == 0) || (Data == NULL)) {
2071 ASSERT (FALSE);
2072 return EFI_NOT_FOUND;
2073 }
2074
2075 Offset = sizeof (UINT32);
2076
2077 while (Offset < (UINT32) DataSize) {
2078 Ptr = (AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA *) (Data + Offset);
2079 NodeSize = ReadUnaligned32 (&Ptr->CertNodeSize);
2080 NameSize = ReadUnaligned32 (&Ptr->NameSize);
2081
2082 //
2083 // Get VarName tailed with '\0'
2084 //
2085 VariableName = AllocateZeroPool((NameSize + 1) * sizeof(CHAR16));
2086 if (VariableName == NULL) {
2087 return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;
2088 }
2089 CopyMem (VariableName, (UINT8 *) Ptr + sizeof (AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA), NameSize * sizeof(CHAR16));
2090 //
2091 // Keep VarGuid aligned
2092 //
2093 CopyMem (&AuthVarGuid, &Ptr->VendorGuid, sizeof(EFI_GUID));
2094
2095 //
2096 // Find corresponding time auth variable
2097 //
2098 ZeroMem (&AuthVariableInfo, sizeof (AuthVariableInfo));
2099 Status = mAuthVarLibContextIn->FindVariable (
2100 VariableName,
2101 &AuthVarGuid,
2102 &AuthVariableInfo
2103 );
2104
2105 if (EFI_ERROR(Status) || (AuthVariableInfo.Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) == 0) {
2106 Status = DeleteCertsFromDb(
2107 VariableName,
2108 &AuthVarGuid,
2109 AuthVariableInfo.Attributes
2110 );
2111 CertCleaned = TRUE;
2112 DEBUG((EFI_D_INFO, "Recovery!! Cert for Auth Variable %s Guid %g is removed for consistency\n", VariableName, &AuthVarGuid));
2113 FreePool(VariableName);
2114 break;
2115 }
2116
2117 FreePool(VariableName);
2118 Offset = Offset + NodeSize;
2119 }
2120 } while (CertCleaned);
2121
2122 return Status;
2123 }
2124
2125 /**
2126 Process variable with EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS set
2127
2128 Caution: This function may receive untrusted input.
2129 This function may be invoked in SMM mode, and datasize and data are external input.
2130 This function will do basic validation, before parse the data.
2131 This function will parse the authentication carefully to avoid security issues, like
2132 buffer overflow, integer overflow.
2133
2134 @param[in] VariableName Name of Variable to be found.
2135 @param[in] VendorGuid Variable vendor GUID.
2136 @param[in] Data Data pointer.
2137 @param[in] DataSize Size of Data found. If size is less than the
2138 data, this value contains the required size.
2139 @param[in] Attributes Attribute value of the variable.
2140 @param[in] AuthVarType Verify against PK, KEK database, private database or certificate in data payload.
2141 @param[in] OrgTimeStamp Pointer to original time stamp,
2142 original variable is not found if NULL.
2143 @param[out] VarPayloadPtr Pointer to variable payload address.
2144 @param[out] VarPayloadSize Pointer to variable payload size.
2145
2146 @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.
2147 @retval EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION The variable does NOT pass the validation
2148 check carried out by the firmware.
2149 @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES Failed to process variable due to lack
2150 of resources.
2151 @retval EFI_SUCCESS Variable pass validation successfully.
2152
2153 **/
2154 EFI_STATUS
2155 VerifyTimeBasedPayload (
2156 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,
2157 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,
2158 IN VOID *Data,
2159 IN UINTN DataSize,
2160 IN UINT32 Attributes,
2161 IN AUTHVAR_TYPE AuthVarType,
2162 IN EFI_TIME *OrgTimeStamp,
2163 OUT UINT8 **VarPayloadPtr,
2164 OUT UINTN *VarPayloadSize
2165 )
2166 {
2167 EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 *CertData;
2168 UINT8 *SigData;
2169 UINT32 SigDataSize;
2170 UINT8 *PayloadPtr;
2171 UINTN PayloadSize;
2172 UINT32 Attr;
2173 BOOLEAN VerifyStatus;
2174 EFI_STATUS Status;
2175 EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *CertList;
2176 EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *Cert;
2177 UINTN Index;
2178 UINTN CertCount;
2179 UINT32 KekDataSize;
2180 UINT8 *NewData;
2181 UINTN NewDataSize;
2182 UINT8 *Buffer;
2183 UINTN Length;
2184 UINT8 *RootCert;
2185 UINTN RootCertSize;
2186 UINT8 *SignerCerts;
2187 UINTN CertStackSize;
2188 UINT8 *CertsInCertDb;
2189 UINT32 CertsSizeinDb;
2190
2191 VerifyStatus = FALSE;
2192 CertData = NULL;
2193 NewData = NULL;
2194 Attr = Attributes;
2195 SignerCerts = NULL;
2196 RootCert = NULL;
2197 CertsInCertDb = NULL;
2198
2199 //
2200 // When the attribute EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS is
2201 // set, then the Data buffer shall begin with an instance of a complete (and serialized)
2202 // EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 descriptor. The descriptor shall be followed by the new
2203 // variable value and DataSize shall reflect the combined size of the descriptor and the new
2204 // variable value. The authentication descriptor is not part of the variable data and is not
2205 // returned by subsequent calls to GetVariable().
2206 //
2207 CertData = (EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 *) Data;
2208
2209 //
2210 // Verify that Pad1, Nanosecond, TimeZone, Daylight and Pad2 components of the
2211 // TimeStamp value are set to zero.
2212 //
2213 if ((CertData->TimeStamp.Pad1 != 0) ||
2214 (CertData->TimeStamp.Nanosecond != 0) ||
2215 (CertData->TimeStamp.TimeZone != 0) ||
2216 (CertData->TimeStamp.Daylight != 0) ||
2217 (CertData->TimeStamp.Pad2 != 0)) {
2218 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;
2219 }
2220
2221 if ((OrgTimeStamp != NULL) && ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_APPEND_WRITE) == 0)) {
2222 if (AuthServiceInternalCompareTimeStamp (&CertData->TimeStamp, OrgTimeStamp)) {
2223 //
2224 // TimeStamp check fail, suspicious replay attack, return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION.
2225 //
2226 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;
2227 }
2228 }
2229
2230 //
2231 // wCertificateType should be WIN_CERT_TYPE_EFI_GUID.
2232 // Cert type should be EFI_CERT_TYPE_PKCS7_GUID.
2233 //
2234 if ((CertData->AuthInfo.Hdr.wCertificateType != WIN_CERT_TYPE_EFI_GUID) ||
2235 !CompareGuid (&CertData->AuthInfo.CertType, &gEfiCertPkcs7Guid)) {
2236 //
2237 // Invalid AuthInfo type, return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION.
2238 //
2239 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;
2240 }
2241
2242 //
2243 // Find out Pkcs7 SignedData which follows the EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 descriptor.
2244 // AuthInfo.Hdr.dwLength is the length of the entire certificate, including the length of the header.
2245 //
2246 SigData = CertData->AuthInfo.CertData;
2247 SigDataSize = CertData->AuthInfo.Hdr.dwLength - (UINT32) (OFFSET_OF (WIN_CERTIFICATE_UEFI_GUID, CertData));
2248
2249 //
2250 // SignedData.digestAlgorithms shall contain the digest algorithm used when preparing the
2251 // signature. Only a digest algorithm of SHA-256 is accepted.
2252 //
2253 // According to PKCS#7 Definition:
2254 // SignedData ::= SEQUENCE {
2255 // version Version,
2256 // digestAlgorithms DigestAlgorithmIdentifiers,
2257 // contentInfo ContentInfo,
2258 // .... }
2259 // The DigestAlgorithmIdentifiers can be used to determine the hash algorithm
2260 // in VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 descriptor.
2261 // This field has the fixed offset (+13) and be calculated based on two bytes of length encoding.
2262 //
2263 if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0) {
2264 if (SigDataSize >= (13 + sizeof (mSha256OidValue))) {
2265 if (((*(SigData + 1) & TWO_BYTE_ENCODE) != TWO_BYTE_ENCODE) ||
2266 (CompareMem (SigData + 13, &mSha256OidValue, sizeof (mSha256OidValue)) != 0)) {
2267 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;
2268 }
2269 }
2270 }
2271
2272 //
2273 // Find out the new data payload which follows Pkcs7 SignedData directly.
2274 //
2275 PayloadPtr = SigData + SigDataSize;
2276 PayloadSize = DataSize - OFFSET_OF_AUTHINFO2_CERT_DATA - (UINTN) SigDataSize;
2277
2278 //
2279 // Construct a serialization buffer of the values of the VariableName, VendorGuid and Attributes
2280 // parameters of the SetVariable() call and the TimeStamp component of the
2281 // EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 descriptor followed by the variable's new value
2282 // i.e. (VariableName, VendorGuid, Attributes, TimeStamp, Data)
2283 //
2284 NewDataSize = PayloadSize + sizeof (EFI_TIME) + sizeof (UINT32) +
2285 sizeof (EFI_GUID) + StrSize (VariableName) - sizeof (CHAR16);
2286
2287 //
2288 // Here is to reuse scratch data area(at the end of volatile variable store)
2289 // to reduce SMRAM consumption for SMM variable driver.
2290 // The scratch buffer is enough to hold the serialized data and safe to use,
2291 // because it is only used at here to do verification temporarily first
2292 // and then used in UpdateVariable() for a time based auth variable set.
2293 //
2294 Status = mAuthVarLibContextIn->GetScratchBuffer (&NewDataSize, (VOID **) &NewData);
2295 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
2296 return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;
2297 }
2298
2299 Buffer = NewData;
2300 Length = StrLen (VariableName) * sizeof (CHAR16);
2301 CopyMem (Buffer, VariableName, Length);
2302 Buffer += Length;
2303
2304 Length = sizeof (EFI_GUID);
2305 CopyMem (Buffer, VendorGuid, Length);
2306 Buffer += Length;
2307
2308 Length = sizeof (UINT32);
2309 CopyMem (Buffer, &Attr, Length);
2310 Buffer += Length;
2311
2312 Length = sizeof (EFI_TIME);
2313 CopyMem (Buffer, &CertData->TimeStamp, Length);
2314 Buffer += Length;
2315
2316 CopyMem (Buffer, PayloadPtr, PayloadSize);
2317
2318 if (AuthVarType == AuthVarTypePk) {
2319 //
2320 // Verify that the signature has been made with the current Platform Key (no chaining for PK).
2321 // First, get signer's certificates from SignedData.
2322 //
2323 VerifyStatus = Pkcs7GetSigners (
2324 SigData,
2325 SigDataSize,
2326 &SignerCerts,
2327 &CertStackSize,
2328 &RootCert,
2329 &RootCertSize
2330 );
2331 if (!VerifyStatus) {
2332 goto Exit;
2333 }
2334
2335 //
2336 // Second, get the current platform key from variable. Check whether it's identical with signer's certificates
2337 // in SignedData. If not, return error immediately.
2338 //
2339 Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (
2340 EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME,
2341 &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,
2342 &Data,
2343 &DataSize
2344 );
2345 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
2346 VerifyStatus = FALSE;
2347 goto Exit;
2348 }
2349 CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) Data;
2350 Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize);
2351 if ((RootCertSize != (CertList->SignatureSize - (sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1))) ||
2352 (CompareMem (Cert->SignatureData, RootCert, RootCertSize) != 0)) {
2353 VerifyStatus = FALSE;
2354 goto Exit;
2355 }
2356
2357 //
2358 // Verify Pkcs7 SignedData via Pkcs7Verify library.
2359 //
2360 VerifyStatus = Pkcs7Verify (
2361 SigData,
2362 SigDataSize,
2363 RootCert,
2364 RootCertSize,
2365 NewData,
2366 NewDataSize
2367 );
2368
2369 } else if (AuthVarType == AuthVarTypeKek) {
2370
2371 //
2372 // Get KEK database from variable.
2373 //
2374 Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (
2375 EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME,
2376 &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,
2377 &Data,
2378 &DataSize
2379 );
2380 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
2381 return Status;
2382 }
2383
2384 //
2385 // Ready to verify Pkcs7 SignedData. Go through KEK Signature Database to find out X.509 CertList.
2386 //
2387 KekDataSize = (UINT32) DataSize;
2388 CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) Data;
2389 while ((KekDataSize > 0) && (KekDataSize >= CertList->SignatureListSize)) {
2390 if (CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Guid)) {
2391 Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize);
2392 CertCount = (CertList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - CertList->SignatureHeaderSize) / CertList->SignatureSize;
2393 for (Index = 0; Index < CertCount; Index++) {
2394 //
2395 // Iterate each Signature Data Node within this CertList for a verify
2396 //
2397 RootCert = Cert->SignatureData;
2398 RootCertSize = CertList->SignatureSize - (sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1);
2399
2400 //
2401 // Verify Pkcs7 SignedData via Pkcs7Verify library.
2402 //
2403 VerifyStatus = Pkcs7Verify (
2404 SigData,
2405 SigDataSize,
2406 RootCert,
2407 RootCertSize,
2408 NewData,
2409 NewDataSize
2410 );
2411 if (VerifyStatus) {
2412 goto Exit;
2413 }
2414 Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) Cert + CertList->SignatureSize);
2415 }
2416 }
2417 KekDataSize -= CertList->SignatureListSize;
2418 CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + CertList->SignatureListSize);
2419 }
2420 } else if (AuthVarType == AuthVarTypePriv) {
2421
2422 //
2423 // Process common authenticated variable except PK/KEK/DB/DBX/DBT.
2424 // Get signer's certificates from SignedData.
2425 //
2426 VerifyStatus = Pkcs7GetSigners (
2427 SigData,
2428 SigDataSize,
2429 &SignerCerts,
2430 &CertStackSize,
2431 &RootCert,
2432 &RootCertSize
2433 );
2434 if (!VerifyStatus) {
2435 goto Exit;
2436 }
2437
2438 //
2439 // Get previously stored signer's certificates from certdb or certdbv for existing
2440 // variable. Check whether they are identical with signer's certificates
2441 // in SignedData. If not, return error immediately.
2442 //
2443 if (OrgTimeStamp != NULL) {
2444 VerifyStatus = FALSE;
2445
2446 Status = GetCertsFromDb (VariableName, VendorGuid, Attributes, &CertsInCertDb, &CertsSizeinDb);
2447 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
2448 goto Exit;
2449 }
2450
2451 if ((CertStackSize != CertsSizeinDb) ||
2452 (CompareMem (SignerCerts, CertsInCertDb, CertsSizeinDb) != 0)) {
2453 goto Exit;
2454 }
2455 }
2456
2457 VerifyStatus = Pkcs7Verify (
2458 SigData,
2459 SigDataSize,
2460 RootCert,
2461 RootCertSize,
2462 NewData,
2463 NewDataSize
2464 );
2465 if (!VerifyStatus) {
2466 goto Exit;
2467 }
2468
2469 if ((OrgTimeStamp == NULL) && (PayloadSize != 0)) {
2470 //
2471 // Insert signer's certificates when adding a new common authenticated variable.
2472 //
2473 Status = InsertCertsToDb (VariableName, VendorGuid, Attributes, SignerCerts, CertStackSize);
2474 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
2475 VerifyStatus = FALSE;
2476 goto Exit;
2477 }
2478 }
2479 } else if (AuthVarType == AuthVarTypePayload) {
2480 CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) PayloadPtr;
2481 Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize);
2482 RootCert = Cert->SignatureData;
2483 RootCertSize = CertList->SignatureSize - (sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1);
2484 //
2485 // Verify Pkcs7 SignedData via Pkcs7Verify library.
2486 //
2487 VerifyStatus = Pkcs7Verify (
2488 SigData,
2489 SigDataSize,
2490 RootCert,
2491 RootCertSize,
2492 NewData,
2493 NewDataSize
2494 );
2495 } else {
2496 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;
2497 }
2498
2499 Exit:
2500
2501 if (AuthVarType == AuthVarTypePk || AuthVarType == AuthVarTypePriv) {
2502 Pkcs7FreeSigners (RootCert);
2503 Pkcs7FreeSigners (SignerCerts);
2504 }
2505
2506 if (!VerifyStatus) {
2507 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;
2508 }
2509
2510 Status = CheckSignatureListFormat(VariableName, VendorGuid, PayloadPtr, PayloadSize);
2511 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
2512 return Status;
2513 }
2514
2515 *VarPayloadPtr = PayloadPtr;
2516 *VarPayloadSize = PayloadSize;
2517
2518 return EFI_SUCCESS;
2519 }
2520
2521 /**
2522 Process variable with EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS set
2523
2524 Caution: This function may receive untrusted input.
2525 This function may be invoked in SMM mode, and datasize and data are external input.
2526 This function will do basic validation, before parse the data.
2527 This function will parse the authentication carefully to avoid security issues, like
2528 buffer overflow, integer overflow.
2529
2530 @param[in] VariableName Name of Variable to be found.
2531 @param[in] VendorGuid Variable vendor GUID.
2532 @param[in] Data Data pointer.
2533 @param[in] DataSize Size of Data found. If size is less than the
2534 data, this value contains the required size.
2535 @param[in] Attributes Attribute value of the variable.
2536 @param[in] AuthVarType Verify against PK, KEK database, private database or certificate in data payload.
2537 @param[out] VarDel Delete the variable or not.
2538
2539 @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.
2540 @retval EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION The variable does NOT pass the validation
2541 check carried out by the firmware.
2542 @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES Failed to process variable due to lack
2543 of resources.
2544 @retval EFI_SUCCESS Variable pass validation successfully.
2545
2546 **/
2547 EFI_STATUS
2548 VerifyTimeBasedPayloadAndUpdate (
2549 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,
2550 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,
2551 IN VOID *Data,
2552 IN UINTN DataSize,
2553 IN UINT32 Attributes,
2554 IN AUTHVAR_TYPE AuthVarType,
2555 OUT BOOLEAN *VarDel
2556 )
2557 {
2558 EFI_STATUS Status;
2559 EFI_STATUS FindStatus;
2560 UINT8 *PayloadPtr;
2561 UINTN PayloadSize;
2562 EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 *CertData;
2563 AUTH_VARIABLE_INFO OrgVariableInfo;
2564 BOOLEAN IsDel;
2565
2566 ZeroMem (&OrgVariableInfo, sizeof (OrgVariableInfo));
2567 FindStatus = mAuthVarLibContextIn->FindVariable (
2568 VariableName,
2569 VendorGuid,
2570 &OrgVariableInfo
2571 );
2572
2573 Status = VerifyTimeBasedPayload (
2574 VariableName,
2575 VendorGuid,
2576 Data,
2577 DataSize,
2578 Attributes,
2579 AuthVarType,
2580 (!EFI_ERROR (FindStatus)) ? OrgVariableInfo.TimeStamp : NULL,
2581 &PayloadPtr,
2582 &PayloadSize
2583 );
2584 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
2585 return Status;
2586 }
2587
2588 if (!EFI_ERROR(FindStatus)
2589 && (PayloadSize == 0)
2590 && ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_APPEND_WRITE) == 0)) {
2591 IsDel = TRUE;
2592 } else {
2593 IsDel = FALSE;
2594 }
2595
2596 CertData = (EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 *) Data;
2597
2598 //
2599 // Final step: Update/Append Variable if it pass Pkcs7Verify
2600 //
2601 Status = AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariableWithTimeStamp (
2602 VariableName,
2603 VendorGuid,
2604 PayloadPtr,
2605 PayloadSize,
2606 Attributes,
2607 &CertData->TimeStamp
2608 );
2609
2610 //
2611 // Delete signer's certificates when delete the common authenticated variable.
2612 //
2613 if (IsDel && AuthVarType == AuthVarTypePriv && !EFI_ERROR(Status) ) {
2614 Status = DeleteCertsFromDb (VariableName, VendorGuid, Attributes);
2615 }
2616
2617 if (VarDel != NULL) {
2618 if (IsDel && !EFI_ERROR(Status)) {
2619 *VarDel = TRUE;
2620 } else {
2621 *VarDel = FALSE;
2622 }
2623 }
2624
2625 return Status;
2626 }
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