Fix compatibility issue when using IPF image with PE32 magic value in the OptionalHeader.
[mirror_edk2.git] / SecurityPkg / Library / DxeImageVerificationLib / DxeImageVerificationLib.c
1 /** @file
2 Implement image verification services for secure boot service in UEFI2.3.1.
3
4 Copyright (c) 2009 - 2012, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>
5 This program and the accompanying materials
6 are licensed and made available under the terms and conditions of the BSD License
7 which accompanies this distribution. The full text of the license may be found at
8 http://opensource.org/licenses/bsd-license.php
9
10 THE PROGRAM IS DISTRIBUTED UNDER THE BSD LICENSE ON AN "AS IS" BASIS,
11 WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR REPRESENTATIONS OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED.
12
13 **/
14
15 #include "DxeImageVerificationLib.h"
16
17 EFI_IMAGE_OPTIONAL_HEADER_PTR_UNION mNtHeader;
18 UINTN mImageSize;
19 UINT32 mPeCoffHeaderOffset;
20 UINT8 mImageDigest[MAX_DIGEST_SIZE];
21 UINTN mImageDigestSize;
22 EFI_IMAGE_DATA_DIRECTORY *mSecDataDir = NULL;
23 UINT8 *mImageBase = NULL;
24 EFI_GUID mCertType;
25
26 //
27 // Notify string for authorization UI.
28 //
29 CHAR16 mNotifyString1[MAX_NOTIFY_STRING_LEN] = L"Image verification pass but not found in authorized database!";
30 CHAR16 mNotifyString2[MAX_NOTIFY_STRING_LEN] = L"Launch this image anyway? (Yes/Defer/No)";
31 //
32 // Public Exponent of RSA Key.
33 //
34 CONST UINT8 mRsaE[] = { 0x01, 0x00, 0x01 };
35
36
37 //
38 // OID ASN.1 Value for Hash Algorithms
39 //
40 UINT8 mHashOidValue[] = {
41 0x2A, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xF7, 0x0D, 0x02, 0x05, // OBJ_md5
42 0x2B, 0x0E, 0x03, 0x02, 0x1A, // OBJ_sha1
43 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x04, // OBJ_sha224
44 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x01, // OBJ_sha256
45 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x02, // OBJ_sha384
46 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x03, // OBJ_sha512
47 };
48
49 HASH_TABLE mHash[] = {
50 { L"SHA1", 20, &mHashOidValue[8], 5, Sha1GetContextSize, Sha1Init, Sha1Update, Sha1Final },
51 { L"SHA224", 28, &mHashOidValue[13], 9, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL },
52 { L"SHA256", 32, &mHashOidValue[22], 9, Sha256GetContextSize,Sha256Init, Sha256Update, Sha256Final},
53 { L"SHA384", 48, &mHashOidValue[31], 9, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL },
54 { L"SHA512", 64, &mHashOidValue[40], 9, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL }
55 };
56
57 /**
58 Reads contents of a PE/COFF image in memory buffer.
59
60 @param FileHandle Pointer to the file handle to read the PE/COFF image.
61 @param FileOffset Offset into the PE/COFF image to begin the read operation.
62 @param ReadSize On input, the size in bytes of the requested read operation.
63 On output, the number of bytes actually read.
64 @param Buffer Output buffer that contains the data read from the PE/COFF image.
65
66 @retval EFI_SUCCESS The specified portion of the PE/COFF image was read and the size
67 **/
68 EFI_STATUS
69 EFIAPI
70 DxeImageVerificationLibImageRead (
71 IN VOID *FileHandle,
72 IN UINTN FileOffset,
73 IN OUT UINTN *ReadSize,
74 OUT VOID *Buffer
75 )
76 {
77 UINTN EndPosition;
78
79 if (FileHandle == NULL || ReadSize == NULL || Buffer == NULL) {
80 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
81 }
82
83 if (MAX_ADDRESS - FileOffset < *ReadSize) {
84 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
85 }
86
87 EndPosition = FileOffset + *ReadSize;
88 if (EndPosition > mImageSize) {
89 *ReadSize = (UINT32)(mImageSize - FileOffset);
90 }
91
92 if (FileOffset >= mImageSize) {
93 *ReadSize = 0;
94 }
95
96 CopyMem (Buffer, (UINT8 *)((UINTN) FileHandle + FileOffset), *ReadSize);
97
98 return EFI_SUCCESS;
99 }
100
101
102 /**
103 Get the image type.
104
105 @param[in] File This is a pointer to the device path of the file that is
106 being dispatched.
107
108 @return UINT32 Image Type
109
110 **/
111 UINT32
112 GetImageType (
113 IN CONST EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *File
114 )
115 {
116 EFI_STATUS Status;
117 EFI_HANDLE DeviceHandle;
118 EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *TempDevicePath;
119 EFI_BLOCK_IO_PROTOCOL *BlockIo;
120
121 //
122 // First check to see if File is from a Firmware Volume
123 //
124 DeviceHandle = NULL;
125 TempDevicePath = (EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *) File;
126 Status = gBS->LocateDevicePath (
127 &gEfiFirmwareVolume2ProtocolGuid,
128 &TempDevicePath,
129 &DeviceHandle
130 );
131 if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
132 Status = gBS->OpenProtocol (
133 DeviceHandle,
134 &gEfiFirmwareVolume2ProtocolGuid,
135 NULL,
136 NULL,
137 NULL,
138 EFI_OPEN_PROTOCOL_TEST_PROTOCOL
139 );
140 if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
141 return IMAGE_FROM_FV;
142 }
143 }
144
145 //
146 // Next check to see if File is from a Block I/O device
147 //
148 DeviceHandle = NULL;
149 TempDevicePath = (EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *) File;
150 Status = gBS->LocateDevicePath (
151 &gEfiBlockIoProtocolGuid,
152 &TempDevicePath,
153 &DeviceHandle
154 );
155 if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
156 BlockIo = NULL;
157 Status = gBS->OpenProtocol (
158 DeviceHandle,
159 &gEfiBlockIoProtocolGuid,
160 (VOID **) &BlockIo,
161 NULL,
162 NULL,
163 EFI_OPEN_PROTOCOL_GET_PROTOCOL
164 );
165 if (!EFI_ERROR (Status) && BlockIo != NULL) {
166 if (BlockIo->Media != NULL) {
167 if (BlockIo->Media->RemovableMedia) {
168 //
169 // Block I/O is present and specifies the media is removable
170 //
171 return IMAGE_FROM_REMOVABLE_MEDIA;
172 } else {
173 //
174 // Block I/O is present and specifies the media is not removable
175 //
176 return IMAGE_FROM_FIXED_MEDIA;
177 }
178 }
179 }
180 }
181
182 //
183 // File is not in a Firmware Volume or on a Block I/O device, so check to see if
184 // the device path supports the Simple File System Protocol.
185 //
186 DeviceHandle = NULL;
187 TempDevicePath = (EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *) File;
188 Status = gBS->LocateDevicePath (
189 &gEfiSimpleFileSystemProtocolGuid,
190 &TempDevicePath,
191 &DeviceHandle
192 );
193 if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
194 //
195 // Simple File System is present without Block I/O, so assume media is fixed.
196 //
197 return IMAGE_FROM_FIXED_MEDIA;
198 }
199
200 //
201 // File is not from an FV, Block I/O or Simple File System, so the only options
202 // left are a PCI Option ROM and a Load File Protocol such as a PXE Boot from a NIC.
203 //
204 TempDevicePath = (EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *) File;
205 while (!IsDevicePathEndType (TempDevicePath)) {
206 switch (DevicePathType (TempDevicePath)) {
207
208 case MEDIA_DEVICE_PATH:
209 if (DevicePathSubType (TempDevicePath) == MEDIA_RELATIVE_OFFSET_RANGE_DP) {
210 return IMAGE_FROM_OPTION_ROM;
211 }
212 break;
213
214 case MESSAGING_DEVICE_PATH:
215 if (DevicePathSubType(TempDevicePath) == MSG_MAC_ADDR_DP) {
216 return IMAGE_FROM_REMOVABLE_MEDIA;
217 }
218 break;
219
220 default:
221 break;
222 }
223 TempDevicePath = NextDevicePathNode (TempDevicePath);
224 }
225 return IMAGE_UNKNOWN;
226 }
227
228 /**
229 Caculate hash of Pe/Coff image based on the authenticode image hashing in
230 PE/COFF Specification 8.0 Appendix A
231
232 @param[in] HashAlg Hash algorithm type.
233
234 @retval TRUE Successfully hash image.
235 @retval FALSE Fail in hash image.
236
237 **/
238 BOOLEAN
239 HashPeImage (
240 IN UINT32 HashAlg
241 )
242 {
243 BOOLEAN Status;
244 UINT16 Magic;
245 EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER *Section;
246 VOID *HashCtx;
247 UINTN CtxSize;
248 UINT8 *HashBase;
249 UINTN HashSize;
250 UINTN SumOfBytesHashed;
251 EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER *SectionHeader;
252 UINTN Index;
253 UINTN Pos;
254 UINT32 CertSize;
255 UINT32 NumberOfRvaAndSizes;
256
257 HashCtx = NULL;
258 SectionHeader = NULL;
259 Status = FALSE;
260
261 if ((HashAlg != HASHALG_SHA1) && (HashAlg != HASHALG_SHA256)) {
262 return FALSE;
263 }
264
265 //
266 // Initialize context of hash.
267 //
268 ZeroMem (mImageDigest, MAX_DIGEST_SIZE);
269
270 if (HashAlg == HASHALG_SHA1) {
271 mImageDigestSize = SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE;
272 mCertType = gEfiCertSha1Guid;
273 } else if (HashAlg == HASHALG_SHA256) {
274 mImageDigestSize = SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE;
275 mCertType = gEfiCertSha256Guid;
276 } else {
277 return FALSE;
278 }
279
280 CtxSize = mHash[HashAlg].GetContextSize();
281
282 HashCtx = AllocatePool (CtxSize);
283 if (HashCtx == NULL) {
284 return FALSE;
285 }
286
287 // 1. Load the image header into memory.
288
289 // 2. Initialize a SHA hash context.
290 Status = mHash[HashAlg].HashInit(HashCtx);
291
292 if (!Status) {
293 goto Done;
294 }
295
296 //
297 // Measuring PE/COFF Image Header;
298 // But CheckSum field and SECURITY data directory (certificate) are excluded
299 //
300 if (mNtHeader.Pe32->FileHeader.Machine == IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_IA64 && mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {
301 //
302 // NOTE: Some versions of Linux ELILO for Itanium have an incorrect magic value
303 // in the PE/COFF Header. If the MachineType is Itanium(IA64) and the
304 // Magic value in the OptionalHeader is EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC
305 // then override the magic value to EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR64_MAGIC
306 //
307 Magic = EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR64_MAGIC;
308 } else {
309 //
310 // Get the magic value from the PE/COFF Optional Header
311 //
312 Magic = mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.Magic;
313 }
314
315 //
316 // 3. Calculate the distance from the base of the image header to the image checksum address.
317 // 4. Hash the image header from its base to beginning of the image checksum.
318 //
319 HashBase = mImageBase;
320 if (Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {
321 //
322 // Use PE32 offset.
323 //
324 HashSize = (UINTN) ((UINT8 *) (&mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.CheckSum) - HashBase);
325 NumberOfRvaAndSizes = mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.NumberOfRvaAndSizes;
326 } else if (Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR64_MAGIC) {
327 //
328 // Use PE32+ offset.
329 //
330 HashSize = (UINTN) ((UINT8 *) (&mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.CheckSum) - HashBase);
331 NumberOfRvaAndSizes = mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.NumberOfRvaAndSizes;
332 } else {
333 //
334 // Invalid header magic number.
335 //
336 Status = FALSE;
337 goto Done;
338 }
339
340 Status = mHash[HashAlg].HashUpdate(HashCtx, HashBase, HashSize);
341 if (!Status) {
342 goto Done;
343 }
344
345 //
346 // 5. Skip over the image checksum (it occupies a single ULONG).
347 //
348 if (NumberOfRvaAndSizes <= EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY) {
349 //
350 // 6. Since there is no Cert Directory in optional header, hash everything
351 // from the end of the checksum to the end of image header.
352 //
353 if (Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {
354 //
355 // Use PE32 offset.
356 //
357 HashBase = (UINT8 *) &mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.CheckSum + sizeof (UINT32);
358 HashSize = mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.SizeOfHeaders - (UINTN) (HashBase - mImageBase);
359 } else {
360 //
361 // Use PE32+ offset.
362 //
363 HashBase = (UINT8 *) &mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.CheckSum + sizeof (UINT32);
364 HashSize = mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.SizeOfHeaders - (UINTN) (HashBase - mImageBase);
365 }
366
367 if (HashSize != 0) {
368 Status = mHash[HashAlg].HashUpdate(HashCtx, HashBase, HashSize);
369 if (!Status) {
370 goto Done;
371 }
372 }
373 } else {
374 //
375 // 7. Hash everything from the end of the checksum to the start of the Cert Directory.
376 //
377 if (Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {
378 //
379 // Use PE32 offset.
380 //
381 HashBase = (UINT8 *) &mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.CheckSum + sizeof (UINT32);
382 HashSize = (UINTN) ((UINT8 *) (&mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY]) - HashBase);
383 } else {
384 //
385 // Use PE32+ offset.
386 //
387 HashBase = (UINT8 *) &mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.CheckSum + sizeof (UINT32);
388 HashSize = (UINTN) ((UINT8 *) (&mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY]) - HashBase);
389 }
390
391 if (HashSize != 0) {
392 Status = mHash[HashAlg].HashUpdate(HashCtx, HashBase, HashSize);
393 if (!Status) {
394 goto Done;
395 }
396 }
397
398 //
399 // 8. Skip over the Cert Directory. (It is sizeof(IMAGE_DATA_DIRECTORY) bytes.)
400 // 9. Hash everything from the end of the Cert Directory to the end of image header.
401 //
402 if (Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {
403 //
404 // Use PE32 offset
405 //
406 HashBase = (UINT8 *) &mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY + 1];
407 HashSize = mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.SizeOfHeaders - (UINTN) (HashBase - mImageBase);
408 } else {
409 //
410 // Use PE32+ offset.
411 //
412 HashBase = (UINT8 *) &mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY + 1];
413 HashSize = mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.SizeOfHeaders - (UINTN) (HashBase - mImageBase);
414 }
415
416 if (HashSize != 0) {
417 Status = mHash[HashAlg].HashUpdate(HashCtx, HashBase, HashSize);
418 if (!Status) {
419 goto Done;
420 }
421 }
422 }
423
424 //
425 // 10. Set the SUM_OF_BYTES_HASHED to the size of the header.
426 //
427 if (Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {
428 //
429 // Use PE32 offset.
430 //
431 SumOfBytesHashed = mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.SizeOfHeaders;
432 } else {
433 //
434 // Use PE32+ offset
435 //
436 SumOfBytesHashed = mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.SizeOfHeaders;
437 }
438
439
440 Section = (EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER *) (
441 mImageBase +
442 mPeCoffHeaderOffset +
443 sizeof (UINT32) +
444 sizeof (EFI_IMAGE_FILE_HEADER) +
445 mNtHeader.Pe32->FileHeader.SizeOfOptionalHeader
446 );
447
448 //
449 // 11. Build a temporary table of pointers to all the IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER
450 // structures in the image. The 'NumberOfSections' field of the image
451 // header indicates how big the table should be. Do not include any
452 // IMAGE_SECTION_HEADERs in the table whose 'SizeOfRawData' field is zero.
453 //
454 SectionHeader = (EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER *) AllocateZeroPool (sizeof (EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER) * mNtHeader.Pe32->FileHeader.NumberOfSections);
455 if (SectionHeader == NULL) {
456 Status = FALSE;
457 goto Done;
458 }
459 //
460 // 12. Using the 'PointerToRawData' in the referenced section headers as
461 // a key, arrange the elements in the table in ascending order. In other
462 // words, sort the section headers according to the disk-file offset of
463 // the section.
464 //
465 for (Index = 0; Index < mNtHeader.Pe32->FileHeader.NumberOfSections; Index++) {
466 Pos = Index;
467 while ((Pos > 0) && (Section->PointerToRawData < SectionHeader[Pos - 1].PointerToRawData)) {
468 CopyMem (&SectionHeader[Pos], &SectionHeader[Pos - 1], sizeof (EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER));
469 Pos--;
470 }
471 CopyMem (&SectionHeader[Pos], Section, sizeof (EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER));
472 Section += 1;
473 }
474
475 //
476 // 13. Walk through the sorted table, bring the corresponding section
477 // into memory, and hash the entire section (using the 'SizeOfRawData'
478 // field in the section header to determine the amount of data to hash).
479 // 14. Add the section's 'SizeOfRawData' to SUM_OF_BYTES_HASHED .
480 // 15. Repeat steps 13 and 14 for all the sections in the sorted table.
481 //
482 for (Index = 0; Index < mNtHeader.Pe32->FileHeader.NumberOfSections; Index++) {
483 Section = &SectionHeader[Index];
484 if (Section->SizeOfRawData == 0) {
485 continue;
486 }
487 HashBase = mImageBase + Section->PointerToRawData;
488 HashSize = (UINTN) Section->SizeOfRawData;
489
490 Status = mHash[HashAlg].HashUpdate(HashCtx, HashBase, HashSize);
491 if (!Status) {
492 goto Done;
493 }
494
495 SumOfBytesHashed += HashSize;
496 }
497
498 //
499 // 16. If the file size is greater than SUM_OF_BYTES_HASHED, there is extra
500 // data in the file that needs to be added to the hash. This data begins
501 // at file offset SUM_OF_BYTES_HASHED and its length is:
502 // FileSize - (CertDirectory->Size)
503 //
504 if (mImageSize > SumOfBytesHashed) {
505 HashBase = mImageBase + SumOfBytesHashed;
506
507 if (NumberOfRvaAndSizes <= EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY) {
508 CertSize = 0;
509 } else {
510 if (Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {
511 //
512 // Use PE32 offset.
513 //
514 CertSize = mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY].Size;
515 } else {
516 //
517 // Use PE32+ offset.
518 //
519 CertSize = mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY].Size;
520 }
521 }
522
523 if (mImageSize > CertSize + SumOfBytesHashed) {
524 HashSize = (UINTN) (mImageSize - CertSize - SumOfBytesHashed);
525
526 Status = mHash[HashAlg].HashUpdate(HashCtx, HashBase, HashSize);
527 if (!Status) {
528 goto Done;
529 }
530 } else if (mImageSize < CertSize + SumOfBytesHashed) {
531 Status = FALSE;
532 goto Done;
533 }
534 }
535
536 Status = mHash[HashAlg].HashFinal(HashCtx, mImageDigest);
537
538 Done:
539 if (HashCtx != NULL) {
540 FreePool (HashCtx);
541 }
542 if (SectionHeader != NULL) {
543 FreePool (SectionHeader);
544 }
545 return Status;
546 }
547
548 /**
549 Recognize the Hash algorithm in PE/COFF Authenticode and caculate hash of
550 Pe/Coff image based on the authenticode image hashing in PE/COFF Specification
551 8.0 Appendix A
552
553 @retval EFI_UNSUPPORTED Hash algorithm is not supported.
554 @retval EFI_SUCCESS Hash successfully.
555
556 **/
557 EFI_STATUS
558 HashPeImageByType (
559 VOID
560 )
561 {
562 UINT8 Index;
563 WIN_CERTIFICATE_EFI_PKCS *PkcsCertData;
564
565 PkcsCertData = (WIN_CERTIFICATE_EFI_PKCS *) (mImageBase + mSecDataDir->VirtualAddress);
566
567 if (PkcsCertData->Hdr.dwLength < sizeof (WIN_CERTIFICATE_EFI_PKCS) + 32) {
568 return EFI_UNSUPPORTED;
569 }
570
571 for (Index = 0; Index < HASHALG_MAX; Index++) {
572 //
573 // Check the Hash algorithm in PE/COFF Authenticode.
574 // According to PKCS#7 Definition:
575 // SignedData ::= SEQUENCE {
576 // version Version,
577 // digestAlgorithms DigestAlgorithmIdentifiers,
578 // contentInfo ContentInfo,
579 // .... }
580 // The DigestAlgorithmIdentifiers can be used to determine the hash algorithm in PE/COFF hashing
581 // This field has the fixed offset (+32) in final Authenticode ASN.1 data.
582 // Fixed offset (+32) is calculated based on two bytes of length encoding.
583 //
584 if ((*(PkcsCertData->CertData + 1) & TWO_BYTE_ENCODE) != TWO_BYTE_ENCODE) {
585 //
586 // Only support two bytes of Long Form of Length Encoding.
587 //
588 continue;
589 }
590
591 if (PkcsCertData->Hdr.dwLength < sizeof (WIN_CERTIFICATE_EFI_PKCS) + 32 + mHash[Index].OidLength) {
592 return EFI_UNSUPPORTED;
593 }
594
595 if (CompareMem (PkcsCertData->CertData + 32, mHash[Index].OidValue, mHash[Index].OidLength) == 0) {
596 break;
597 }
598 }
599
600 if (Index == HASHALG_MAX) {
601 return EFI_UNSUPPORTED;
602 }
603
604 //
605 // HASH PE Image based on Hash algorithm in PE/COFF Authenticode.
606 //
607 if (!HashPeImage(Index)) {
608 return EFI_UNSUPPORTED;
609 }
610
611 return EFI_SUCCESS;
612 }
613
614
615 /**
616 Returns the size of a given image execution info table in bytes.
617
618 This function returns the size, in bytes, of the image execution info table specified by
619 ImageExeInfoTable. If ImageExeInfoTable is NULL, then 0 is returned.
620
621 @param ImageExeInfoTable A pointer to a image execution info table structure.
622
623 @retval 0 If ImageExeInfoTable is NULL.
624 @retval Others The size of a image execution info table in bytes.
625
626 **/
627 UINTN
628 GetImageExeInfoTableSize (
629 EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO_TABLE *ImageExeInfoTable
630 )
631 {
632 UINTN Index;
633 EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO *ImageExeInfoItem;
634 UINTN TotalSize;
635
636 if (ImageExeInfoTable == NULL) {
637 return 0;
638 }
639
640 ImageExeInfoItem = (EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO *) ((UINT8 *) ImageExeInfoTable + sizeof (EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO_TABLE));
641 TotalSize = sizeof (EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO_TABLE);
642 for (Index = 0; Index < ImageExeInfoTable->NumberOfImages; Index++) {
643 TotalSize += ReadUnaligned32 ((UINT32 *) &ImageExeInfoItem->InfoSize);
644 ImageExeInfoItem = (EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO *) ((UINT8 *) ImageExeInfoItem + ReadUnaligned32 ((UINT32 *) &ImageExeInfoItem->InfoSize));
645 }
646
647 return TotalSize;
648 }
649
650 /**
651 Create an Image Execution Information Table entry and add it to system configuration table.
652
653 @param[in] Action Describes the action taken by the firmware regarding this image.
654 @param[in] Name Input a null-terminated, user-friendly name.
655 @param[in] DevicePath Input device path pointer.
656 @param[in] Signature Input signature info in EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST data structure.
657 @param[in] SignatureSize Size of signature.
658
659 **/
660 VOID
661 AddImageExeInfo (
662 IN EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_ACTION Action,
663 IN CHAR16 *Name OPTIONAL,
664 IN CONST EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *DevicePath,
665 IN EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *Signature OPTIONAL,
666 IN UINTN SignatureSize
667 )
668 {
669 EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO_TABLE *ImageExeInfoTable;
670 EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO_TABLE *NewImageExeInfoTable;
671 EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO *ImageExeInfoEntry;
672 UINTN ImageExeInfoTableSize;
673 UINTN NewImageExeInfoEntrySize;
674 UINTN NameStringLen;
675 UINTN DevicePathSize;
676
677 ImageExeInfoTable = NULL;
678 NewImageExeInfoTable = NULL;
679 ImageExeInfoEntry = NULL;
680 NameStringLen = 0;
681
682 if (DevicePath == NULL) {
683 return ;
684 }
685
686 if (Name != NULL) {
687 NameStringLen = StrSize (Name);
688 }
689
690 ImageExeInfoTable = NULL;
691 EfiGetSystemConfigurationTable (&gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, (VOID **) &ImageExeInfoTable);
692 if (ImageExeInfoTable != NULL) {
693 //
694 // The table has been found!
695 // We must enlarge the table to accmodate the new exe info entry.
696 //
697 ImageExeInfoTableSize = GetImageExeInfoTableSize (ImageExeInfoTable);
698 } else {
699 //
700 // Not Found!
701 // We should create a new table to append to the configuration table.
702 //
703 ImageExeInfoTableSize = sizeof (EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO_TABLE);
704 }
705
706 DevicePathSize = GetDevicePathSize (DevicePath);
707 NewImageExeInfoEntrySize = sizeof (EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO) + NameStringLen + DevicePathSize + SignatureSize;
708 NewImageExeInfoTable = (EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO_TABLE *) AllocateRuntimePool (ImageExeInfoTableSize + NewImageExeInfoEntrySize);
709 if (NewImageExeInfoTable == NULL) {
710 return ;
711 }
712
713 if (ImageExeInfoTable != NULL) {
714 CopyMem (NewImageExeInfoTable, ImageExeInfoTable, ImageExeInfoTableSize);
715 } else {
716 NewImageExeInfoTable->NumberOfImages = 0;
717 }
718 NewImageExeInfoTable->NumberOfImages++;
719 ImageExeInfoEntry = (EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO *) ((UINT8 *) NewImageExeInfoTable + ImageExeInfoTableSize);
720 //
721 // Update new item's infomation.
722 //
723 WriteUnaligned32 ((UINT32 *) &ImageExeInfoEntry->Action, Action);
724 WriteUnaligned32 ((UINT32 *) &ImageExeInfoEntry->InfoSize, (UINT32) NewImageExeInfoEntrySize);
725
726 if (Name != NULL) {
727 CopyMem ((UINT8 *) &ImageExeInfoEntry->InfoSize + sizeof (UINT32), Name, NameStringLen);
728 }
729 CopyMem (
730 (UINT8 *) &ImageExeInfoEntry->InfoSize + sizeof (UINT32) + NameStringLen,
731 DevicePath,
732 DevicePathSize
733 );
734 if (Signature != NULL) {
735 CopyMem (
736 (UINT8 *) &ImageExeInfoEntry->InfoSize + sizeof (UINT32) + NameStringLen + DevicePathSize,
737 Signature,
738 SignatureSize
739 );
740 }
741 //
742 // Update/replace the image execution table.
743 //
744 gBS->InstallConfigurationTable (&gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, (VOID *) NewImageExeInfoTable);
745
746 //
747 // Free Old table data!
748 //
749 if (ImageExeInfoTable != NULL) {
750 FreePool (ImageExeInfoTable);
751 }
752 }
753
754 /**
755 Discover if the UEFI image is authorized by user's policy setting.
756
757 @param[in] Policy Specify platform's policy setting.
758
759 @retval EFI_ACCESS_DENIED Image is not allowed to run.
760 @retval EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION Image is deferred.
761 @retval EFI_SUCCESS Image is authorized to run.
762
763 **/
764 EFI_STATUS
765 ImageAuthorization (
766 IN UINT32 Policy
767 )
768 {
769 EFI_STATUS Status;
770 EFI_INPUT_KEY Key;
771
772 Status = EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;
773
774 switch (Policy) {
775
776 case QUERY_USER_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION:
777 do {
778 CreatePopUp (EFI_LIGHTGRAY | EFI_BACKGROUND_BLUE, &Key, mNotifyString1, mNotifyString2, NULL);
779 if (Key.UnicodeChar == L'Y' || Key.UnicodeChar == L'y') {
780 Status = EFI_SUCCESS;
781 break;
782 } else if (Key.UnicodeChar == L'N' || Key.UnicodeChar == L'n') {
783 Status = EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;
784 break;
785 } else if (Key.UnicodeChar == L'D' || Key.UnicodeChar == L'd') {
786 Status = EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;
787 break;
788 }
789 } while (TRUE);
790 break;
791
792 case ALLOW_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION:
793 Status = EFI_SUCCESS;
794 break;
795
796 case DEFER_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION:
797 Status = EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;
798 break;
799
800 case DENY_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION:
801 Status = EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;
802 break;
803 }
804
805 return Status;
806 }
807
808 /**
809 Check whether signature is in specified database.
810
811 @param[in] VariableName Name of database variable that is searched in.
812 @param[in] Signature Pointer to signature that is searched for.
813 @param[in] CertType Pointer to hash algrithom.
814 @param[in] SignatureSize Size of Signature.
815
816 @return TRUE Found the signature in the variable database.
817 @return FALSE Not found the signature in the variable database.
818
819 **/
820 BOOLEAN
821 IsSignatureFoundInDatabase (
822 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,
823 IN UINT8 *Signature,
824 IN EFI_GUID *CertType,
825 IN UINTN SignatureSize
826 )
827 {
828 EFI_STATUS Status;
829 EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *CertList;
830 EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *Cert;
831 UINTN DataSize;
832 UINT8 *Data;
833 UINTN Index;
834 UINTN CertCount;
835 BOOLEAN IsFound;
836 //
837 // Read signature database variable.
838 //
839 IsFound = FALSE;
840 Data = NULL;
841 DataSize = 0;
842 Status = gRT->GetVariable (VariableName, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, NULL, &DataSize, NULL);
843 if (Status != EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {
844 return FALSE;
845 }
846
847 Data = (UINT8 *) AllocateZeroPool (DataSize);
848 if (Data == NULL) {
849 return FALSE;
850 }
851
852 Status = gRT->GetVariable (VariableName, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, NULL, &DataSize, Data);
853 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
854 goto Done;
855 }
856 //
857 // Enumerate all signature data in SigDB to check if executable's signature exists.
858 //
859 CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) Data;
860 while ((DataSize > 0) && (DataSize >= CertList->SignatureListSize)) {
861 CertCount = (CertList->SignatureListSize - CertList->SignatureHeaderSize) / CertList->SignatureSize;
862 Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize);
863 if ((CertList->SignatureSize == sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1 + SignatureSize) && (CompareGuid(&CertList->SignatureType, CertType))) {
864 for (Index = 0; Index < CertCount; Index++) {
865 if (CompareMem (Cert->SignatureData, Signature, SignatureSize) == 0) {
866 //
867 // Find the signature in database.
868 //
869 IsFound = TRUE;
870 break;
871 }
872
873 Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) Cert + CertList->SignatureSize);
874 }
875
876 if (IsFound) {
877 break;
878 }
879 }
880
881 DataSize -= CertList->SignatureListSize;
882 CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + CertList->SignatureListSize);
883 }
884
885 Done:
886 if (Data != NULL) {
887 FreePool (Data);
888 }
889
890 return IsFound;
891 }
892
893 /**
894 Verify PKCS#7 SignedData using certificate found in Variable which formatted
895 as EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST. The Variable may be PK, KEK, DB or DBX.
896
897 @param VariableName Name of Variable to search for Certificate.
898 @param VendorGuid Variable vendor GUID.
899
900 @retval TRUE Image pass verification.
901 @retval FALSE Image fail verification.
902
903 **/
904 BOOLEAN
905 IsPkcsSignedDataVerifiedBySignatureList (
906 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,
907 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid
908 )
909 {
910 EFI_STATUS Status;
911 BOOLEAN VerifyStatus;
912 WIN_CERTIFICATE_EFI_PKCS *PkcsCertData;
913 EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *CertList;
914 EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *Cert;
915 UINTN DataSize;
916 UINT8 *Data;
917 UINT8 *RootCert;
918 UINTN RootCertSize;
919 UINTN Index;
920 UINTN CertCount;
921
922 Data = NULL;
923 CertList = NULL;
924 Cert = NULL;
925 RootCert = NULL;
926 RootCertSize = 0;
927 VerifyStatus = FALSE;
928 PkcsCertData = (WIN_CERTIFICATE_EFI_PKCS *) (mImageBase + mSecDataDir->VirtualAddress);
929
930 DataSize = 0;
931 Status = gRT->GetVariable (VariableName, VendorGuid, NULL, &DataSize, NULL);
932 if (Status == EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {
933 Data = (UINT8 *) AllocateZeroPool (DataSize);
934 if (Data == NULL) {
935 return VerifyStatus;
936 }
937
938 Status = gRT->GetVariable (VariableName, VendorGuid, NULL, &DataSize, (VOID *) Data);
939 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
940 goto Done;
941 }
942
943 //
944 // Find X509 certificate in Signature List to verify the signature in pkcs7 signed data.
945 //
946 CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) Data;
947 while ((DataSize > 0) && (DataSize >= CertList->SignatureListSize)) {
948 if (CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Guid)) {
949 Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize);
950 CertCount = (CertList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - CertList->SignatureHeaderSize) / CertList->SignatureSize;
951 for (Index = 0; Index < CertCount; Index++) {
952 //
953 // Iterate each Signature Data Node within this CertList for verify.
954 //
955 RootCert = Cert->SignatureData;
956 RootCertSize = CertList->SignatureSize;
957
958 //
959 // Call AuthenticodeVerify library to Verify Authenticode struct.
960 //
961 VerifyStatus = AuthenticodeVerify (
962 PkcsCertData->CertData,
963 PkcsCertData->Hdr.dwLength - sizeof(PkcsCertData->Hdr),
964 RootCert,
965 RootCertSize,
966 mImageDigest,
967 mImageDigestSize
968 );
969 if (VerifyStatus) {
970 goto Done;
971 }
972 Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) Cert + CertList->SignatureSize);
973 }
974 }
975 DataSize -= CertList->SignatureListSize;
976 CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + CertList->SignatureListSize);
977 }
978 }
979
980 Done:
981 if (Data != NULL) {
982 FreePool (Data);
983 }
984
985 return VerifyStatus;
986 }
987
988 /**
989 Verify certificate in WIN_CERT_TYPE_PKCS_SIGNED_DATA format.
990
991 @retval EFI_SUCCESS Image pass verification.
992 @retval EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION Image fail verification.
993
994 **/
995 EFI_STATUS
996 VerifyCertPkcsSignedData (
997 VOID
998 )
999 {
1000 //
1001 // 1: Find certificate from DBX forbidden database for revoked certificate.
1002 //
1003 if (IsPkcsSignedDataVerifiedBySignatureList (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid)) {
1004 //
1005 // DBX is forbidden database, if Authenticode verification pass with
1006 // one of the certificate in DBX, this image should be rejected.
1007 //
1008 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;
1009 }
1010
1011 //
1012 // 2: Find certificate from KEK database and try to verify authenticode struct.
1013 //
1014 if (IsPkcsSignedDataVerifiedBySignatureList (EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid)) {
1015 return EFI_SUCCESS;
1016 }
1017
1018 //
1019 // 3: Find certificate from DB database and try to verify authenticode struct.
1020 //
1021 if (IsPkcsSignedDataVerifiedBySignatureList (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid)) {
1022 return EFI_SUCCESS;
1023 } else {
1024 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;
1025 }
1026 }
1027
1028 /**
1029 Verify certificate in WIN_CERTIFICATE_UEFI_GUID format.
1030
1031 @retval EFI_SUCCESS Image pass verification.
1032 @retval EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION Image fail verification.
1033 @retval other error value
1034
1035 **/
1036 EFI_STATUS
1037 VerifyCertUefiGuid (
1038 VOID
1039 )
1040 {
1041 BOOLEAN Status;
1042 WIN_CERTIFICATE_UEFI_GUID *EfiCert;
1043 EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *KekList;
1044 EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *KekItem;
1045 EFI_CERT_BLOCK_RSA_2048_SHA256 *CertBlock;
1046 VOID *Rsa;
1047 UINTN KekCount;
1048 UINTN Index;
1049 UINTN KekDataSize;
1050 BOOLEAN IsFound;
1051 EFI_STATUS Result;
1052
1053 EfiCert = NULL;
1054 KekList = NULL;
1055 KekItem = NULL;
1056 CertBlock = NULL;
1057 Rsa = NULL;
1058 Status = FALSE;
1059 IsFound = FALSE;
1060 KekDataSize = 0;
1061
1062 EfiCert = (WIN_CERTIFICATE_UEFI_GUID *) (mImageBase + mSecDataDir->VirtualAddress);
1063 CertBlock = (EFI_CERT_BLOCK_RSA_2048_SHA256 *) EfiCert->CertData;
1064 if (!CompareGuid (&EfiCert->CertType, &gEfiCertTypeRsa2048Sha256Guid)) {
1065 //
1066 // Invalid Certificate Data Type.
1067 //
1068 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;
1069 }
1070
1071 //
1072 // Get KEK database variable data size
1073 //
1074 Result = gRT->GetVariable (EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, NULL, &KekDataSize, NULL);
1075 if (Result != EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {
1076 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;
1077 }
1078
1079 //
1080 // Get KEK database variable.
1081 //
1082 GetEfiGlobalVariable2 (EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME, (VOID**)&KekList, NULL);
1083 if (KekList == NULL) {
1084 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;
1085 }
1086
1087 //
1088 // Enumerate all Kek items in this list to verify the variable certificate data.
1089 // If anyone is authenticated successfully, it means the variable is correct!
1090 //
1091 while ((KekDataSize > 0) && (KekDataSize >= KekList->SignatureListSize)) {
1092 if (CompareGuid (&KekList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertRsa2048Guid)) {
1093 KekItem = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) KekList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + KekList->SignatureHeaderSize);
1094 KekCount = (KekList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - KekList->SignatureHeaderSize) / KekList->SignatureSize;
1095 for (Index = 0; Index < KekCount; Index++) {
1096 if (CompareMem (KekItem->SignatureData, CertBlock->PublicKey, EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE) == 0) {
1097 IsFound = TRUE;
1098 break;
1099 }
1100 KekItem = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) KekItem + KekList->SignatureSize);
1101 }
1102 }
1103 KekDataSize -= KekList->SignatureListSize;
1104 KekList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) KekList + KekList->SignatureListSize);
1105 }
1106
1107 if (!IsFound) {
1108 //
1109 // Signed key is not a trust one.
1110 //
1111 goto Done;
1112 }
1113
1114 //
1115 // Now, we found the corresponding security policy.
1116 // Verify the data payload.
1117 //
1118 Rsa = RsaNew ();
1119 if (Rsa == NULL) {
1120 Status = FALSE;
1121 goto Done;
1122 }
1123
1124 //
1125 // Set RSA Key Components.
1126 // NOTE: Only N and E are needed to be set as RSA public key for signature verification.
1127 //
1128 Status = RsaSetKey (Rsa, RsaKeyN, CertBlock->PublicKey, EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE);
1129 if (!Status) {
1130 goto Done;
1131 }
1132 Status = RsaSetKey (Rsa, RsaKeyE, mRsaE, sizeof (mRsaE));
1133 if (!Status) {
1134 goto Done;
1135 }
1136 //
1137 // Verify the signature.
1138 //
1139 Status = RsaPkcs1Verify (
1140 Rsa,
1141 mImageDigest,
1142 mImageDigestSize,
1143 CertBlock->Signature,
1144 EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SHA256_SIZE
1145 );
1146
1147 Done:
1148 if (KekList != NULL) {
1149 FreePool (KekList);
1150 }
1151 if (Rsa != NULL ) {
1152 RsaFree (Rsa);
1153 }
1154 if (Status) {
1155 return EFI_SUCCESS;
1156 } else {
1157 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;
1158 }
1159 }
1160
1161 /**
1162 Provide verification service for signed images, which include both signature validation
1163 and platform policy control. For signature types, both UEFI WIN_CERTIFICATE_UEFI_GUID and
1164 MSFT Authenticode type signatures are supported.
1165
1166 In this implementation, only verify external executables when in USER MODE.
1167 Executables from FV is bypass, so pass in AuthenticationStatus is ignored.
1168
1169 The image verification process is:
1170 Is the Image signed?
1171 If yes,
1172 Does the image verify against a certificate (root or intermediate) in the allowed db?
1173 Run it
1174 Image verification fail
1175 Is the Image's Hash not in forbidden database and the Image's Hash in allowed db?
1176 Run it
1177 If no,
1178 Is the Image's Hash in the forbidden database (DBX)?
1179 if yes,
1180 Error out
1181 Is the Image's Hash in the allowed database (DB)?
1182 If yes,
1183 Run it
1184 If no,
1185 Error out
1186
1187 @param[in] AuthenticationStatus
1188 This is the authentication status returned from the security
1189 measurement services for the input file.
1190 @param[in] File This is a pointer to the device path of the file that is
1191 being dispatched. This will optionally be used for logging.
1192 @param[in] FileBuffer File buffer matches the input file device path.
1193 @param[in] FileSize Size of File buffer matches the input file device path.
1194
1195 @retval EFI_SUCCESS The file specified by File did authenticate, and the
1196 platform policy dictates that the DXE Core may use File.
1197 @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Input argument is incorrect.
1198 @retval EFI_OUT_RESOURCE Fail to allocate memory.
1199 @retval EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION The file specified by File did not authenticate, and
1200 the platform policy dictates that File should be placed
1201 in the untrusted state. A file may be promoted from
1202 the untrusted to the trusted state at a future time
1203 with a call to the Trust() DXE Service.
1204 @retval EFI_ACCESS_DENIED The file specified by File did not authenticate, and
1205 the platform policy dictates that File should not be
1206 used for any purpose.
1207
1208 **/
1209 EFI_STATUS
1210 EFIAPI
1211 DxeImageVerificationHandler (
1212 IN UINT32 AuthenticationStatus,
1213 IN CONST EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *File,
1214 IN VOID *FileBuffer,
1215 IN UINTN FileSize
1216 )
1217 {
1218 EFI_STATUS Status;
1219 UINT16 Magic;
1220 EFI_IMAGE_DOS_HEADER *DosHdr;
1221 EFI_STATUS VerifyStatus;
1222 UINT8 *SetupMode;
1223 EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *SignatureList;
1224 UINTN SignatureListSize;
1225 EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *Signature;
1226 EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_ACTION Action;
1227 WIN_CERTIFICATE *WinCertificate;
1228 UINT32 Policy;
1229 UINT8 *SecureBootEnable;
1230 PE_COFF_LOADER_IMAGE_CONTEXT ImageContext;
1231 UINT32 NumberOfRvaAndSizes;
1232 UINT32 CertSize;
1233
1234 if (File == NULL) {
1235 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
1236 }
1237
1238 SignatureList = NULL;
1239 SignatureListSize = 0;
1240 WinCertificate = NULL;
1241 Action = EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_AUTH_UNTESTED;
1242 Status = EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;
1243 //
1244 // Check the image type and get policy setting.
1245 //
1246 switch (GetImageType (File)) {
1247
1248 case IMAGE_FROM_FV:
1249 Policy = ALWAYS_EXECUTE;
1250 break;
1251
1252 case IMAGE_FROM_OPTION_ROM:
1253 Policy = PcdGet32 (PcdOptionRomImageVerificationPolicy);
1254 break;
1255
1256 case IMAGE_FROM_REMOVABLE_MEDIA:
1257 Policy = PcdGet32 (PcdRemovableMediaImageVerificationPolicy);
1258 break;
1259
1260 case IMAGE_FROM_FIXED_MEDIA:
1261 Policy = PcdGet32 (PcdFixedMediaImageVerificationPolicy);
1262 break;
1263
1264 default:
1265 Policy = DENY_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION;
1266 break;
1267 }
1268 //
1269 // If policy is always/never execute, return directly.
1270 //
1271 if (Policy == ALWAYS_EXECUTE) {
1272 return EFI_SUCCESS;
1273 } else if (Policy == NEVER_EXECUTE) {
1274 return EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;
1275 }
1276
1277 GetVariable2 (EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME, &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid, (VOID**)&SecureBootEnable, NULL);
1278 //
1279 // Skip verification if SecureBootEnable variable doesn't exist.
1280 //
1281 if (SecureBootEnable == NULL) {
1282 return EFI_SUCCESS;
1283 }
1284
1285 //
1286 // Skip verification if SecureBootEnable is disabled.
1287 //
1288 if (*SecureBootEnable == SECURE_BOOT_DISABLE) {
1289 FreePool (SecureBootEnable);
1290 return EFI_SUCCESS;
1291 }
1292
1293 FreePool (SecureBootEnable);
1294
1295 GetEfiGlobalVariable2 (EFI_SETUP_MODE_NAME, (VOID**)&SetupMode, NULL);
1296
1297 //
1298 // SetupMode doesn't exist means no AuthVar driver is dispatched,
1299 // skip verification.
1300 //
1301 if (SetupMode == NULL) {
1302 return EFI_SUCCESS;
1303 }
1304
1305 //
1306 // If platform is in SETUP MODE, skip verification.
1307 //
1308 if (*SetupMode == SETUP_MODE) {
1309 FreePool (SetupMode);
1310 return EFI_SUCCESS;
1311 }
1312
1313 FreePool (SetupMode);
1314
1315 //
1316 // Read the Dos header.
1317 //
1318 if (FileBuffer == NULL) {
1319 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
1320 }
1321
1322 mImageBase = (UINT8 *) FileBuffer;
1323 mImageSize = FileSize;
1324
1325 ZeroMem (&ImageContext, sizeof (ImageContext));
1326 ImageContext.Handle = (VOID *) FileBuffer;
1327 ImageContext.ImageRead = (PE_COFF_LOADER_READ_FILE) DxeImageVerificationLibImageRead;
1328
1329 //
1330 // Get information about the image being loaded
1331 //
1332 Status = PeCoffLoaderGetImageInfo (&ImageContext);
1333 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
1334 //
1335 // The information can't be got from the invalid PeImage
1336 //
1337 goto Done;
1338 }
1339
1340 Status = EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;
1341
1342 DosHdr = (EFI_IMAGE_DOS_HEADER *) mImageBase;
1343 if (DosHdr->e_magic == EFI_IMAGE_DOS_SIGNATURE) {
1344 //
1345 // DOS image header is present,
1346 // so read the PE header after the DOS image header.
1347 //
1348 mPeCoffHeaderOffset = DosHdr->e_lfanew;
1349 } else {
1350 mPeCoffHeaderOffset = 0;
1351 }
1352 //
1353 // Check PE/COFF image.
1354 //
1355 mNtHeader.Pe32 = (EFI_IMAGE_NT_HEADERS32 *) (mImageBase + mPeCoffHeaderOffset);
1356 if (mNtHeader.Pe32->Signature != EFI_IMAGE_NT_SIGNATURE) {
1357 //
1358 // It is not a valid Pe/Coff file.
1359 //
1360 goto Done;
1361 }
1362
1363 if (mNtHeader.Pe32->FileHeader.Machine == IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_IA64 && mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {
1364 //
1365 // NOTE: Some versions of Linux ELILO for Itanium have an incorrect magic value
1366 // in the PE/COFF Header. If the MachineType is Itanium(IA64) and the
1367 // Magic value in the OptionalHeader is EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC
1368 // then override the magic value to EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR64_MAGIC
1369 //
1370 Magic = EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR64_MAGIC;
1371 } else {
1372 //
1373 // Get the magic value from the PE/COFF Optional Header
1374 //
1375 Magic = mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.Magic;
1376 }
1377
1378 if (Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {
1379 //
1380 // Use PE32 offset.
1381 //
1382 NumberOfRvaAndSizes = mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.NumberOfRvaAndSizes;
1383 if (NumberOfRvaAndSizes > EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY) {
1384 mSecDataDir = (EFI_IMAGE_DATA_DIRECTORY *) &mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY];
1385 }
1386 } else {
1387 //
1388 // Use PE32+ offset.
1389 //
1390 NumberOfRvaAndSizes = mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.NumberOfRvaAndSizes;
1391 if (NumberOfRvaAndSizes > EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY) {
1392 mSecDataDir = (EFI_IMAGE_DATA_DIRECTORY *) &mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY];
1393 }
1394 }
1395
1396 if ((mSecDataDir == NULL) || ((mSecDataDir != NULL) && (mSecDataDir->Size == 0))) {
1397 //
1398 // This image is not signed.
1399 //
1400 if (!HashPeImage (HASHALG_SHA256)) {
1401 goto Done;
1402 }
1403
1404 if (IsSignatureFoundInDatabase (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1, mImageDigest, &mCertType, mImageDigestSize)) {
1405 //
1406 // Image Hash is in forbidden database (DBX).
1407 //
1408 goto Done;
1409 }
1410
1411 if (IsSignatureFoundInDatabase (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE, mImageDigest, &mCertType, mImageDigestSize)) {
1412 //
1413 // Image Hash is in allowed database (DB).
1414 //
1415 return EFI_SUCCESS;
1416 }
1417
1418 //
1419 // Image Hash is not found in both forbidden and allowed database.
1420 //
1421 goto Done;
1422 }
1423
1424 //
1425 // Verify signature of executables.
1426 //
1427 WinCertificate = (WIN_CERTIFICATE *) (mImageBase + mSecDataDir->VirtualAddress);
1428
1429 CertSize = sizeof (WIN_CERTIFICATE);
1430
1431 if ((mSecDataDir->Size <= CertSize) || (mSecDataDir->Size < WinCertificate->dwLength)) {
1432 goto Done;
1433 }
1434
1435 switch (WinCertificate->wCertificateType) {
1436
1437 case WIN_CERT_TYPE_EFI_GUID:
1438 CertSize = sizeof (WIN_CERTIFICATE_UEFI_GUID) + sizeof (EFI_CERT_BLOCK_RSA_2048_SHA256) - sizeof (UINT8);
1439 if (WinCertificate->dwLength < CertSize) {
1440 goto Done;
1441 }
1442
1443 //
1444 // Verify UEFI GUID type.
1445 //
1446 if (!HashPeImage (HASHALG_SHA256)) {
1447 goto Done;
1448 }
1449
1450 VerifyStatus = VerifyCertUefiGuid ();
1451 break;
1452
1453 case WIN_CERT_TYPE_PKCS_SIGNED_DATA:
1454 //
1455 // Verify Pkcs signed data type.
1456 //
1457 Status = HashPeImageByType();
1458 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
1459 goto Done;
1460 }
1461
1462 VerifyStatus = VerifyCertPkcsSignedData ();
1463
1464 //
1465 // For image verification against enrolled certificate(root or intermediate),
1466 // no need to check image's hash in the allowed database.
1467 //
1468 if (!EFI_ERROR (VerifyStatus)) {
1469 if (!IsSignatureFoundInDatabase (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1, mImageDigest, &mCertType, mImageDigestSize)) {
1470 return EFI_SUCCESS;
1471 }
1472 }
1473 break;
1474
1475 default:
1476 goto Done;
1477 }
1478 //
1479 // Get image hash value as executable's signature.
1480 //
1481 SignatureListSize = sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1 + mImageDigestSize;
1482 SignatureList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) AllocateZeroPool (SignatureListSize);
1483 if (SignatureList == NULL) {
1484 Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;
1485 goto Done;
1486 }
1487 SignatureList->SignatureHeaderSize = 0;
1488 SignatureList->SignatureListSize = (UINT32) SignatureListSize;
1489 SignatureList->SignatureSize = (UINT32) mImageDigestSize;
1490 CopyMem (&SignatureList->SignatureType, &mCertType, sizeof (EFI_GUID));
1491 Signature = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) SignatureList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST));
1492 CopyMem (Signature->SignatureData, mImageDigest, mImageDigestSize);
1493 //
1494 // Signature database check after verification.
1495 //
1496 if (EFI_ERROR (VerifyStatus)) {
1497 //
1498 // Verification failure.
1499 //
1500 if (!IsSignatureFoundInDatabase (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1, mImageDigest, &mCertType, mImageDigestSize) &&
1501 IsSignatureFoundInDatabase (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE, mImageDigest, &mCertType, mImageDigestSize)) {
1502 //
1503 // Verification fail, Image Hash is not in forbidden database (DBX),
1504 // and Image Hash is in allowed database (DB).
1505 //
1506 Status = EFI_SUCCESS;
1507 } else {
1508 Action = EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_AUTH_SIG_FAILED;
1509 Status = EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;
1510 }
1511 } else if (IsSignatureFoundInDatabase (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1, Signature->SignatureData, &mCertType, mImageDigestSize)) {
1512 //
1513 // Executable signature verification passes, but is found in forbidden signature database.
1514 //
1515 Action = EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_AUTH_SIG_FOUND;
1516 Status = EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;
1517 } else if (IsSignatureFoundInDatabase (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE, Signature->SignatureData, &mCertType, mImageDigestSize)) {
1518 //
1519 // Executable signature is found in authorized signature database.
1520 //
1521 Status = EFI_SUCCESS;
1522 } else {
1523 //
1524 // Executable signature verification passes, but cannot be found in authorized signature database.
1525 // Get platform policy to determine the action.
1526 //
1527 Action = EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_AUTH_SIG_PASSED;
1528 Status = ImageAuthorization (Policy);
1529 }
1530
1531 Done:
1532 if (Status != EFI_SUCCESS) {
1533 //
1534 // Policy decides to defer or reject the image; add its information in image executable information table.
1535 //
1536 AddImageExeInfo (Action, NULL, File, SignatureList, SignatureListSize);
1537 }
1538
1539 if (SignatureList != NULL) {
1540 FreePool (SignatureList);
1541 }
1542
1543 return Status;
1544 }
1545
1546 /**
1547 When VariableWriteArchProtocol install, create "SecureBoot" variable.
1548
1549 @param[in] Event Event whose notification function is being invoked.
1550 @param[in] Context Pointer to the notification function's context.
1551
1552 **/
1553 VOID
1554 EFIAPI
1555 VariableWriteCallBack (
1556 IN EFI_EVENT Event,
1557 IN VOID *Context
1558 )
1559 {
1560 UINT8 SecureBootMode;
1561 UINT8 *SecureBootModePtr;
1562 EFI_STATUS Status;
1563 VOID *ProtocolPointer;
1564
1565 Status = gBS->LocateProtocol (&gEfiVariableWriteArchProtocolGuid, NULL, &ProtocolPointer);
1566 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
1567 return;
1568 }
1569
1570 //
1571 // Check whether "SecureBoot" variable exists.
1572 // If this library is built-in, it means firmware has capability to perform
1573 // driver signing verification.
1574 //
1575 GetEfiGlobalVariable2 (EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME, (VOID**)&SecureBootModePtr, NULL);
1576 if (SecureBootModePtr == NULL) {
1577 SecureBootMode = SECURE_BOOT_MODE_DISABLE;
1578 //
1579 // Authenticated variable driver will update "SecureBoot" depending on SetupMode variable.
1580 //
1581 gRT->SetVariable (
1582 EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME,
1583 &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,
1584 EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE,
1585 sizeof (UINT8),
1586 &SecureBootMode
1587 );
1588 } else {
1589 FreePool (SecureBootModePtr);
1590 }
1591 }
1592
1593 /**
1594 Register security measurement handler.
1595
1596 @param ImageHandle ImageHandle of the loaded driver.
1597 @param SystemTable Pointer to the EFI System Table.
1598
1599 @retval EFI_SUCCESS The handlers were registered successfully.
1600 **/
1601 EFI_STATUS
1602 EFIAPI
1603 DxeImageVerificationLibConstructor (
1604 IN EFI_HANDLE ImageHandle,
1605 IN EFI_SYSTEM_TABLE *SystemTable
1606 )
1607 {
1608 VOID *Registration;
1609
1610 //
1611 // Register callback function upon VariableWriteArchProtocol.
1612 //
1613 EfiCreateProtocolNotifyEvent (
1614 &gEfiVariableWriteArchProtocolGuid,
1615 TPL_CALLBACK,
1616 VariableWriteCallBack,
1617 NULL,
1618 &Registration
1619 );
1620
1621 return RegisterSecurityHandler (
1622 DxeImageVerificationHandler,
1623 EFI_AUTH_OPERATION_VERIFY_IMAGE | EFI_AUTH_OPERATION_IMAGE_REQUIRED
1624 );
1625 }