WrapPkcs7Data(), Pkcs7GetSigners(), Pkcs7Verify() will get UEFI Authenticated\r
Variable and will do basic check for data structure.\r
\r
-Copyright (c) 2009 - 2015, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>\r
+Copyright (c) 2009 - 2017, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>\r
This program and the accompanying materials\r
are licensed and made available under the terms and conditions of the BSD License\r
which accompanies this distribution. The full text of the license may be found at\r
STACK_OF(X509) *CertStack;\r
BOOLEAN Status;\r
INT32 Result;\r
+ BUF_MEM *Ptr;\r
INT32 Length;\r
VOID *Buffer;\r
\r
goto _Exit;\r
}\r
\r
- Length = (INT32)(((BUF_MEM *) CertBio->ptr)->length);\r
+ BIO_get_mem_ptr (CertBio, &Ptr);\r
+ Length = (INT32)(Ptr->length);\r
if (Length <= 0) {\r
goto _Exit;\r
}\r
in a ContentInfo structure.\r
\r
If P7Data, CertStack, StackLength, TrustedCert or CertLength is NULL, then\r
- return FALSE. If P7Length overflow, then return FAlSE.\r
+ return FALSE. If P7Length overflow, then return FALSE.\r
\r
Caution: This function may receive untrusted input.\r
UEFI Authenticated Variable is external input, so this function will do basic\r
@param[in] P7Data Pointer to the PKCS#7 message to verify.\r
@param[in] P7Length Length of the PKCS#7 message in bytes.\r
@param[out] CertStack Pointer to Signer's certificates retrieved from P7Data.\r
- It's caller's responsiblity to free the buffer.\r
+ It's caller's responsibility to free the buffer.\r
@param[out] StackLength Length of signer's certificates in bytes.\r
@param[out] TrustedCert Pointer to a trusted certificate from Signer's certificates.\r
- It's caller's responsiblity to free the buffer.\r
+ It's caller's responsibility to free the buffer.\r
@param[out] CertLength Length of the trusted certificate in bytes.\r
\r
@retval TRUE The operation is finished successfully.\r
}\r
\r
/**\r
- Verifies the validility of a PKCS#7 signed data as described in "PKCS #7:\r
+ Retrieves all embedded certificates from PKCS#7 signed data as described in "PKCS #7:\r
+ Cryptographic Message Syntax Standard", and outputs two certificate lists chained and\r
+ unchained to the signer's certificates.\r
+ The input signed data could be wrapped in a ContentInfo structure.\r
+\r
+ @param[in] P7Data Pointer to the PKCS#7 message.\r
+ @param[in] P7Length Length of the PKCS#7 message in bytes.\r
+ @param[out] SignerChainCerts Pointer to the certificates list chained to signer's\r
+ certificate. It's caller's responsibility to free the buffer.\r
+ @param[out] ChainLength Length of the chained certificates list buffer in bytes.\r
+ @param[out] UnchainCerts Pointer to the unchained certificates lists. It's caller's\r
+ responsibility to free the buffer.\r
+ @param[out] UnchainLength Length of the unchained certificates list buffer in bytes.\r
+\r
+ @retval TRUE The operation is finished successfully.\r
+ @retval FALSE Error occurs during the operation.\r
+\r
+**/\r
+BOOLEAN\r
+EFIAPI\r
+Pkcs7GetCertificatesList (\r
+ IN CONST UINT8 *P7Data,\r
+ IN UINTN P7Length,\r
+ OUT UINT8 **SignerChainCerts,\r
+ OUT UINTN *ChainLength,\r
+ OUT UINT8 **UnchainCerts,\r
+ OUT UINTN *UnchainLength\r
+ )\r
+{\r
+ BOOLEAN Status;\r
+ UINT8 *NewP7Data;\r
+ UINTN NewP7Length;\r
+ BOOLEAN Wrapped;\r
+ UINT8 Index;\r
+ PKCS7 *Pkcs7;\r
+ X509_STORE_CTX *CertCtx;\r
+ STACK_OF(X509) *CtxChain;\r
+ STACK_OF(X509) *CtxUntrusted;\r
+ X509 *CtxCert;\r
+ STACK_OF(X509) *Signers;\r
+ X509 *Signer;\r
+ X509 *Cert;\r
+ X509 *Issuer;\r
+ X509_NAME *IssuerName;\r
+ UINT8 *CertBuf;\r
+ UINT8 *OldBuf;\r
+ UINTN BufferSize;\r
+ UINTN OldSize;\r
+ UINT8 *SingleCert;\r
+ UINTN CertSize;\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Initializations\r
+ //\r
+ Status = FALSE;\r
+ NewP7Data = NULL;\r
+ Pkcs7 = NULL;\r
+ CertCtx = NULL;\r
+ CtxChain = NULL;\r
+ CtxCert = NULL;\r
+ CtxUntrusted = NULL;\r
+ Cert = NULL;\r
+ SingleCert = NULL;\r
+ CertBuf = NULL;\r
+ OldBuf = NULL;\r
+ Signers = NULL;\r
+\r
+ ZeroMem (&CertCtx, sizeof (CertCtx));\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Parameter Checking\r
+ //\r
+ if ((P7Data == NULL) || (SignerChainCerts == NULL) || (ChainLength == NULL) ||\r
+ (UnchainCerts == NULL) || (UnchainLength == NULL) || (P7Length > INT_MAX)) {\r
+ return Status;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ *SignerChainCerts = NULL;\r
+ *ChainLength = 0;\r
+ *UnchainCerts = NULL;\r
+ *UnchainLength = 0;\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Construct a new PKCS#7 data wrapping with ContentInfo structure if needed.\r
+ //\r
+ Status = WrapPkcs7Data (P7Data, P7Length, &Wrapped, &NewP7Data, &NewP7Length);\r
+ if (!Status || (NewP7Length > INT_MAX)) {\r
+ goto _Error;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Decodes PKCS#7 SignedData\r
+ //\r
+ Pkcs7 = d2i_PKCS7 (NULL, (const unsigned char **) &NewP7Data, (int) NewP7Length);\r
+ if ((Pkcs7 == NULL) || (!PKCS7_type_is_signed (Pkcs7))) {\r
+ goto _Error;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Obtains Signer's Certificate from PKCS#7 data\r
+ // NOTE: Only one signer case will be handled in this function, which means SignerInfos\r
+ // should include only one signer's certificate.\r
+ //\r
+ Signers = PKCS7_get0_signers (Pkcs7, NULL, PKCS7_BINARY);\r
+ if ((Signers == NULL) || (sk_X509_num (Signers) != 1)) {\r
+ goto _Error;\r
+ }\r
+ Signer = sk_X509_value (Signers, 0);\r
+\r
+ CertCtx = X509_STORE_CTX_new ();\r
+ if (CertCtx == NULL) {\r
+ goto _Error;\r
+ }\r
+ if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init (CertCtx, NULL, Signer, Pkcs7->d.sign->cert)) {\r
+ goto _Error;\r
+ }\r
+ //\r
+ // Initialize Chained & Untrusted stack\r
+ //\r
+ CtxChain = X509_STORE_CTX_get0_chain (CertCtx);\r
+ CtxCert = X509_STORE_CTX_get0_cert (CertCtx);\r
+ if (CtxChain == NULL) {\r
+ if (((CtxChain = sk_X509_new_null ()) == NULL) ||\r
+ (!sk_X509_push (CtxChain, CtxCert))) {\r
+ goto _Error;\r
+ }\r
+ }\r
+ CtxUntrusted = X509_STORE_CTX_get0_untrusted (CertCtx);\r
+ if (CtxUntrusted != NULL) {\r
+ (VOID)sk_X509_delete_ptr (CtxUntrusted, Signer);\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Build certificates stack chained from Signer's certificate.\r
+ //\r
+ Cert = Signer;\r
+ for (; ;) {\r
+ //\r
+ // Self-Issue checking\r
+ //\r
+ Issuer = NULL;\r
+ if (X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer (&Issuer, CertCtx, Cert) == 1) {\r
+ if (X509_cmp (Issuer, Cert) == 0) {\r
+ break;\r
+ }\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Found the issuer of the current certificate\r
+ //\r
+ if (CtxUntrusted != NULL) {\r
+ Issuer = NULL;\r
+ IssuerName = X509_get_issuer_name (Cert);\r
+ Issuer = X509_find_by_subject (CtxUntrusted, IssuerName);\r
+ if (Issuer != NULL) {\r
+ if (!sk_X509_push (CtxChain, Issuer)) {\r
+ goto _Error;\r
+ }\r
+ (VOID)sk_X509_delete_ptr (CtxUntrusted, Issuer);\r
+\r
+ Cert = Issuer;\r
+ continue;\r
+ }\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ break;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Converts Chained and Untrusted Certificate to Certificate Buffer in following format:\r
+ // UINT8 CertNumber;\r
+ // UINT32 Cert1Length;\r
+ // UINT8 Cert1[];\r
+ // UINT32 Cert2Length;\r
+ // UINT8 Cert2[];\r
+ // ...\r
+ // UINT32 CertnLength;\r
+ // UINT8 Certn[];\r
+ //\r
+\r
+ if (CtxChain != NULL) {\r
+ BufferSize = sizeof (UINT8);\r
+ OldSize = BufferSize;\r
+ CertBuf = NULL;\r
+\r
+ for (Index = 0; ; Index++) {\r
+ Status = X509PopCertificate (CtxChain, &SingleCert, &CertSize);\r
+ if (!Status) {\r
+ break;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ OldSize = BufferSize;\r
+ OldBuf = CertBuf;\r
+ BufferSize = OldSize + CertSize + sizeof (UINT32);\r
+ CertBuf = malloc (BufferSize);\r
+\r
+ if (CertBuf == NULL) {\r
+ Status = FALSE;\r
+ goto _Error;\r
+ }\r
+ if (OldBuf != NULL) {\r
+ CopyMem (CertBuf, OldBuf, OldSize);\r
+ free (OldBuf);\r
+ OldBuf = NULL;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ WriteUnaligned32 ((UINT32 *) (CertBuf + OldSize), (UINT32) CertSize);\r
+ CopyMem (CertBuf + OldSize + sizeof (UINT32), SingleCert, CertSize);\r
+\r
+ free (SingleCert);\r
+ SingleCert = NULL;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ if (CertBuf != NULL) {\r
+ //\r
+ // Update CertNumber.\r
+ //\r
+ CertBuf[0] = Index;\r
+\r
+ *SignerChainCerts = CertBuf;\r
+ *ChainLength = BufferSize;\r
+ }\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ if (CtxUntrusted != NULL) {\r
+ BufferSize = sizeof (UINT8);\r
+ OldSize = BufferSize;\r
+ CertBuf = NULL;\r
+\r
+ for (Index = 0; ; Index++) {\r
+ Status = X509PopCertificate (CtxUntrusted, &SingleCert, &CertSize);\r
+ if (!Status) {\r
+ break;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ OldSize = BufferSize;\r
+ OldBuf = CertBuf;\r
+ BufferSize = OldSize + CertSize + sizeof (UINT32);\r
+ CertBuf = malloc (BufferSize);\r
+\r
+ if (CertBuf == NULL) {\r
+ Status = FALSE;\r
+ goto _Error;\r
+ }\r
+ if (OldBuf != NULL) {\r
+ CopyMem (CertBuf, OldBuf, OldSize);\r
+ free (OldBuf);\r
+ OldBuf = NULL;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ WriteUnaligned32 ((UINT32 *) (CertBuf + OldSize), (UINT32) CertSize);\r
+ CopyMem (CertBuf + OldSize + sizeof (UINT32), SingleCert, CertSize);\r
+\r
+ free (SingleCert);\r
+ SingleCert = NULL;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ if (CertBuf != NULL) {\r
+ //\r
+ // Update CertNumber.\r
+ //\r
+ CertBuf[0] = Index;\r
+\r
+ *UnchainCerts = CertBuf;\r
+ *UnchainLength = BufferSize;\r
+ }\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ Status = TRUE;\r
+\r
+_Error:\r
+ //\r
+ // Release Resources.\r
+ //\r
+ if (!Wrapped && (NewP7Data != NULL)) {\r
+ free (NewP7Data);\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ if (Pkcs7 != NULL) {\r
+ PKCS7_free (Pkcs7);\r
+ }\r
+ sk_X509_free (Signers);\r
+\r
+ if (CertCtx != NULL) {\r
+ X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup (CertCtx);\r
+ X509_STORE_CTX_free (CertCtx);\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ if (SingleCert != NULL) {\r
+ free (SingleCert);\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ if (OldBuf != NULL) {\r
+ free (OldBuf);\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ if (!Status && (CertBuf != NULL)) {\r
+ free (CertBuf);\r
+ *SignerChainCerts = NULL;\r
+ *UnchainCerts = NULL;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ return Status;\r
+}\r
+\r
+/**\r
+ Verifies the validity of a PKCS#7 signed data as described in "PKCS #7:\r
Cryptographic Message Syntax Standard". The input signed data could be wrapped\r
in a ContentInfo structure.\r
\r
If P7Data, TrustedCert or InData is NULL, then return FALSE.\r
- If P7Length, CertLength or DataLength overflow, then return FAlSE.\r
+ If P7Length, CertLength or DataLength overflow, then return FALSE.\r
\r
Caution: This function may receive untrusted input.\r
UEFI Authenticated Variable is external input, so this function will do basic\r
\r
//\r
// Allow partial certificate chains, terminated by a non-self-signed but\r
- // still trusted intermediate certificate.\r
+ // still trusted intermediate certificate. Also disable time checks.\r
//\r
- X509_STORE_set_flags (CertStore, X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN);\r
+ X509_STORE_set_flags (CertStore,\r
+ X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN | X509_V_FLAG_NO_CHECK_TIME);\r
\r
//\r
// OpenSSL PKCS7 Verification by default checks for SMIME (email signing) and\r
data could be wrapped in a ContentInfo structure.\r
\r
If P7Data, Content, or ContentSize is NULL, then return FALSE. If P7Length overflow,\r
- then return FAlSE. If the P7Data is not correctly formatted, then return FALSE.\r
+ then return FALSE. If the P7Data is not correctly formatted, then return FALSE.\r
\r
Caution: This function may receive untrusted input. So this function will do\r
basic check for PKCS#7 data structure.\r
@param[in] P7Data Pointer to the PKCS#7 signed data to process.\r
@param[in] P7Length Length of the PKCS#7 signed data in bytes.\r
@param[out] Content Pointer to the extracted content from the PKCS#7 signedData.\r
- It's caller's responsiblity to free the buffer.\r
+ It's caller's responsibility to free the buffer.\r
@param[out] ContentSize The size of the extracted content in bytes.\r
\r
@retval TRUE The P7Data was correctly formatted for processing.\r
@retval FALSE The P7Data was not correctly formatted for processing.\r
\r
-*/\r
+**/\r
BOOLEAN\r
EFIAPI\r
Pkcs7GetAttachedContent (\r
projects / mirror_edk2.git / blobdiff