PACKAGE_NAME = MdeModulePkg\r
PACKAGE_UNI_FILE = MdeModulePkg.uni\r
PACKAGE_GUID = BA0D78D6-2CAF-414b-BD4D-B6762A894288\r
- PACKAGE_VERSION = 0.96\r
+ PACKAGE_VERSION = 0.97\r
\r
[Includes]\r
Include\r
# Include/Guid/MdeModuleHii.h\r
gEfiIfrTianoGuid = { 0xf0b1735, 0x87a0, 0x4193, {0xb2, 0x66, 0x53, 0x8c, 0x38, 0xaf, 0x48, 0xce }}\r
\r
+ ## Guid for EDKII implementation extension, used to indaicate there are bit fields in the varstore.\r
+ # Include/Guid/MdeModuleHii.h\r
+ gEdkiiIfrBitVarstoreGuid = {0x82DDD68B, 0x9163, 0x4187, {0x9B, 0x27, 0x20, 0xA8, 0xFD, 0x60,0xA7, 0x1D}}\r
+\r
## Guid for Framework vfr GUIDed opcodes.\r
# Include/Guid/MdeModuleHii.h\r
gEfiIfrFrameworkGuid = { 0x31ca5d1a, 0xd511, 0x4931, { 0xb7, 0x82, 0xae, 0x6b, 0x2b, 0x17, 0x8c, 0xd7 }}\r
## Include/Protocol/VarErrorFlag.h\r
gEdkiiVarErrorFlagGuid = { 0x4b37fe8, 0xf6ae, 0x480b, { 0xbd, 0xd5, 0x37, 0xd9, 0x8c, 0x5e, 0x89, 0xaa } }\r
\r
+ ## GUID indicates the BROTLI custom compress/decompress algorithm.\r
+ gBrotliCustomDecompressGuid = { 0x3D532050, 0x5CDA, 0x4FD0, { 0x87, 0x9E, 0x0F, 0x7F, 0x63, 0x0D, 0x5A, 0xFB }}\r
+\r
## GUID indicates the LZMA custom compress/decompress algorithm.\r
# Include/Guid/LzmaDecompress.h\r
gLzmaCustomDecompressGuid = { 0xEE4E5898, 0x3914, 0x4259, { 0x9D, 0x6E, 0xDC, 0x7B, 0xD7, 0x94, 0x03, 0xCF }}\r
gEdkiiNonDiscoverableUhciDeviceGuid = { 0xA8CDA0A2, 0x4F37, 0x4A1B, {0x8E, 0x10, 0x8E, 0xF3, 0xCC, 0x3B, 0xF3, 0xA8 } }\r
gEdkiiNonDiscoverableXhciDeviceGuid = { 0xB1BE0BC5, 0x6C28, 0x442D, {0xAA, 0x37, 0x15, 0x1B, 0x42, 0x57, 0xBD, 0x78 } }\r
\r
+ ## Include/Guid/PlatformHasAcpi.h\r
+ gEdkiiPlatformHasAcpiGuid = { 0xf0966b41, 0xc23f, 0x41b9, { 0x96, 0x04, 0x0f, 0xf7, 0xe1, 0x11, 0x96, 0x5a } }\r
+\r
[Ppis]\r
## Include/Ppi/AtaController.h\r
gPeiAtaControllerPpiGuid = { 0xa45e60d1, 0xc719, 0x44aa, { 0xb0, 0x7a, 0xaa, 0x77, 0x7f, 0x85, 0x90, 0x6d }}\r
## Include/Ppi/SdMmcHostController.h\r
gEdkiiPeiSdMmcHostControllerPpiGuid = { 0xb30dfeed, 0x947f, 0x4396, { 0xb1, 0x5a, 0xdf, 0xbd, 0xb9, 0x16, 0xdc, 0x24 }}\r
\r
+ ## Include/Ppi/IoMmu.h\r
+ gEdkiiIoMmuPpiGuid = { 0x70b0af26, 0xf847, 0x4bb6, { 0xaa, 0xb9, 0xcd, 0xe8, 0x4f, 0xc6, 0x14, 0x31 } }\r
+\r
[Protocols]\r
## Load File protocol provides capability to load and unload EFI image into memory and execute it.\r
# Include/Protocol/LoadPe32Image.h\r
## Include/Protocol/NonDiscoverableDevice.h\r
gEdkiiNonDiscoverableDeviceProtocolGuid = { 0x0d51905b, 0xb77e, 0x452a, {0xa2, 0xc0, 0xec, 0xa0, 0xcc, 0x8d, 0x51, 0x4a } }\r
\r
+ ## Include/Protocol/IoMmu.h\r
+ gEdkiiIoMmuProtocolGuid = { 0x4e939de9, 0xd948, 0x4b0f, { 0x88, 0xed, 0xe6, 0xe1, 0xce, 0x51, 0x7c, 0x1e } }\r
+\r
+ ## Include/Protocol/SmmEndofS3Resume.h\r
+ gEdkiiSmmEndOfS3ResumeProtocolGuid = { 0x96f5296d, 0x05f7, 0x4f3c, {0x84, 0x67, 0xe4, 0x56, 0x89, 0x0e, 0x0c, 0xb5 } }\r
+\r
+ ## Include/Protocol/SmmMemoryAttribute.h\r
+ gEdkiiSmmMemoryAttributeProtocolGuid = { 0x69b792ea, 0x39ce, 0x402d, { 0xa2, 0xa6, 0xf7, 0x21, 0xde, 0x35, 0x1d, 0xfe } }\r
+\r
#\r
# [Error.gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid]\r
# 0x80000001 | Invalid value provided.\r
# @ValidList 0x80000006 | 0x03058002\r
gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdErrorCodeSetVariable|0x03058002|UINT32|0x30001040\r
\r
+ ## Mask to control the NULL address detection in code for different phases.\r
+ # If enabled, accessing NULL address in UEFI or SMM code can be caught.<BR><BR>\r
+ # BIT0 - Enable NULL pointer detection for UEFI.<BR>\r
+ # BIT1 - Enable NULL pointer detection for SMM.<BR>\r
+ # BIT2..6 - Reserved for future uses.<BR>\r
+ # BIT7 - Disable NULL pointer detection just after EndOfDxe. <BR>\r
+ # This is a workaround for those unsolvable NULL access issues in\r
+ # OptionROM, boot loader, etc. It can also help to avoid unnecessary\r
+ # exception caused by legacy memory (0-4095) access after EndOfDxe,\r
+ # such as Windows 7 boot on Qemu.<BR>\r
+ # @Prompt Enable NULL address detection.\r
+ gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdNullPointerDetectionPropertyMask|0x0|UINT8|0x30001050\r
+\r
+ ## Init Value in Temp Stack to be shared between SEC and PEI_CORE\r
+ # SEC fills the full temp stack with this values. When switch stack, PeiCore can check\r
+ # this value in the temp stack to know how many stack has been used.\r
+ # @Prompt Init Value in Temp Stack\r
+ gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdInitValueInTempStack|0x5AA55AA5|UINT32|0x30001051\r
+\r
+ ## Indicates which type allocation need guard page.\r
+ # Below is bit mask for this PCD: (Order is same as UEFI spec)<BR>\r
+ # EfiReservedMemoryType 0x0000000000000001<BR>\r
+ # EfiLoaderCode 0x0000000000000002<BR>\r
+ # EfiLoaderData 0x0000000000000004<BR>\r
+ # EfiBootServicesCode 0x0000000000000008<BR>\r
+ # EfiBootServicesData 0x0000000000000010<BR>\r
+ # EfiRuntimeServicesCode 0x0000000000000020<BR>\r
+ # EfiRuntimeServicesData 0x0000000000000040<BR>\r
+ # EfiConventionalMemory 0x0000000000000080<BR>\r
+ # EfiUnusableMemory 0x0000000000000100<BR>\r
+ # EfiACPIReclaimMemory 0x0000000000000200<BR>\r
+ # EfiACPIMemoryNVS 0x0000000000000400<BR>\r
+ # EfiMemoryMappedIO 0x0000000000000800<BR>\r
+ # EfiMemoryMappedIOPortSpace 0x0000000000001000<BR>\r
+ # EfiPalCode 0x0000000000002000<BR>\r
+ # EfiPersistentMemory 0x0000000000004000<BR>\r
+ # OEM Reserved 0x4000000000000000<BR>\r
+ # OS Reserved 0x8000000000000000<BR>\r
+ # e.g. LoaderCode+LoaderData+BootServicesCode+BootServicesData are needed, 0x1E should be used.<BR>\r
+ # @Prompt The memory type mask for Page Guard.\r
+ gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdHeapGuardPageType|0x0|UINT64|0x30001052\r
+\r
+ ## Indicates which type allocation need guard page.\r
+ # Below is bit mask for this PCD: (Order is same as UEFI spec)<BR>\r
+ # EfiReservedMemoryType 0x0000000000000001<BR>\r
+ # EfiLoaderCode 0x0000000000000002<BR>\r
+ # EfiLoaderData 0x0000000000000004<BR>\r
+ # EfiBootServicesCode 0x0000000000000008<BR>\r
+ # EfiBootServicesData 0x0000000000000010<BR>\r
+ # EfiRuntimeServicesCode 0x0000000000000020<BR>\r
+ # EfiRuntimeServicesData 0x0000000000000040<BR>\r
+ # EfiConventionalMemory 0x0000000000000080<BR>\r
+ # EfiUnusableMemory 0x0000000000000100<BR>\r
+ # EfiACPIReclaimMemory 0x0000000000000200<BR>\r
+ # EfiACPIMemoryNVS 0x0000000000000400<BR>\r
+ # EfiMemoryMappedIO 0x0000000000000800<BR>\r
+ # EfiMemoryMappedIOPortSpace 0x0000000000001000<BR>\r
+ # EfiPalCode 0x0000000000002000<BR>\r
+ # EfiPersistentMemory 0x0000000000004000<BR>\r
+ # OEM Reserved 0x4000000000000000<BR>\r
+ # OS Reserved 0x8000000000000000<BR>\r
+ # e.g. LoaderCode+LoaderData+BootServicesCode+BootServicesData are needed, 0x1E should be used.<BR>\r
+ # @Prompt The memory type mask for Pool Guard.\r
+ gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdHeapGuardPoolType|0x0|UINT64|0x30001053\r
+\r
+ ## This mask is to control Heap Guard behavior.\r
+ # BIT0 - Enable UEFI page guard.<BR>\r
+ # BIT1 - Enable UEFI pool guard.<BR>\r
+ # BIT2 - Enable SMM page guard.<BR>\r
+ # BIT3 - Enable SMM pool guard.<BR>\r
+ # BIT7 - The direction of Guard Page for Pool Guard.\r
+ # 0 - The returned pool is adjacent to the bottom guard page.<BR>\r
+ # 1 - The returned pool is adjacent to the top guard page.<BR>\r
+ # @Prompt The Heap Guard feature mask\r
+ gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdHeapGuardPropertyMask|0x0|UINT8|0x30001054\r
+\r
[PcdsFixedAtBuild, PcdsPatchableInModule]\r
## Dynamic type PCD can be registered callback function for Pcd setting action.\r
# PcdMaxPeiPcdCallBackNumberPerPcdEntry indicates the maximum number of callback function\r
## This PCD holds the address mask for page table entries when memory encryption is\r
# enabled on AMD processors supporting the Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) feature.\r
# This mask should be applied when creating 1:1 virtual to physical mapping tables.\r
- #\r
+ # @Prompt The address mask when memory encryption is enabled.\r
gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdPteMemoryEncryptionAddressOrMask|0x0|UINT64|0x30001047\r
\r
[PcdsPatchableInModule]\r
projects / mirror_edk2.git / blobdiff