# It also provides the definitions(including PPIs/PROTOCOLs/GUIDs and library classes)\r
# and libraries instances, which are used for those features.\r
#\r
-# Copyright (c) 2009 - 2017, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>\r
+# Copyright (c) 2009 - 2018, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>\r
# (C) Copyright 2015 Hewlett Packard Enterprise Development LP <BR>\r
# Copyright (c) 2017, Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved. <BR>\r
# This program and the accompanying materials are licensed and made available under\r
PACKAGE_NAME = SecurityPkg\r
PACKAGE_UNI_FILE = SecurityPkg.uni\r
PACKAGE_GUID = 4EFC4F66-6219-4427-B780-FB99F470767F\r
- PACKAGE_VERSION = 0.97\r
+ PACKAGE_VERSION = 0.98\r
\r
[Includes]\r
Include\r
\r
[LibraryClasses]\r
## @libraryclass Provides hash interfaces from different implementations.\r
- # \r
+ #\r
HashLib|Include/Library/HashLib.h\r
- \r
+\r
## @libraryclass Provides a platform specific interface to detect physically present user.\r
#\r
PlatformSecureLib|Include/Library/PlatformSecureLib.h\r
- \r
+\r
## @libraryclass Provides interfaces to handle TPM 1.2 request.\r
#\r
TcgPhysicalPresenceLib|Include/Library/TcgPhysicalPresenceLib.h\r
- \r
+\r
## @libraryclass Provides support for TCG PP >= 128 Vendor Specific PPI Operation.\r
#\r
TcgPpVendorLib|Include/Library/TcgPpVendorLib.h\r
- \r
+\r
## @libraryclass Provides interfaces for other modules to send TPM 2.0 command.\r
#\r
Tpm2CommandLib|Include/Library/Tpm2CommandLib.h\r
- \r
+\r
## @libraryclass Provides interfaces on how to access TPM 2.0 hardware device.\r
#\r
Tpm2DeviceLib|Include/Library/Tpm2DeviceLib.h\r
- \r
+\r
## @libraryclass Provides interfaces for other modules to send TPM 1.2 command.\r
#\r
Tpm12CommandLib|Include/Library/Tpm12CommandLib.h\r
- \r
+\r
## @libraryclass Provides interfaces on how to access TPM 1.2 hardware device.\r
#\r
Tpm12DeviceLib|Include/Library/Tpm12DeviceLib.h\r
- \r
+\r
## @libraryclass Provides TPM Interface Specification (TIS) interfaces for TPM command.\r
#\r
TpmCommLib|Include/Library/TpmCommLib.h\r
- \r
- ## @libraryclass Provides interfaces to handle TPM 2.0 request.\r
- #\r
- TrEEPhysicalPresenceLib|Include/Library/TrEEPhysicalPresenceLib.h\r
- \r
- ## @libraryclass Provides support for TrEE PP >= 128 Vendor Specific PPI Operation.\r
- #\r
- TrEEPpVendorLib|Include/Library/TrEEPpVendorLib.h\r
- \r
- ## @libraryclass Provides support for TCG Physical Presence Interface (PPI) specification \r
+\r
+ ## @libraryclass Provides support for TCG Physical Presence Interface (PPI) specification\r
# >= 128 Vendor Specific PPI Operation.\r
#\r
Tcg2PpVendorLib|Include/Library/TcgPpVendorLib.h\r
- \r
+\r
## @libraryclass Handle TPM 2.0 physical presence request from OS.\r
#\r
Tcg2PhysicalPresenceLib|Include/Library/Tcg2PhysicalPresenceLib.h\r
#\r
TcgStorageOpalLib|Include/Library/TcgStorageOpalLib.h\r
\r
- ## @libraryclass Provides interfaces about Opal commond special for Opal password solution.\r
- #\r
- OpalPasswordSupportLib|Include/Library/OpalPasswordSupportLib.h\r
-\r
[Guids]\r
## Security package token space guid.\r
# Include/Guid/SecurityPkgTokenSpace.h\r
gEfiCustomModeEnableGuid = { 0xc076ec0c, 0x7028, 0x4399, { 0xa0, 0x72, 0x71, 0xee, 0x5c, 0x44, 0x8b, 0x9f } }\r
\r
## GUID used to "VendorKeysNv" variable to record the out of band secure boot keys modification.\r
- # This variable is a read-only NV variable that indicates whether someone other than the platform vendor has used a \r
+ # This variable is a read-only NV variable that indicates whether someone other than the platform vendor has used a\r
# mechanism not defined by the UEFI Specification to transition the system to setup mode or to update secure boot keys.\r
# Include/Guid/AuthenticatedVariableFormat.h\r
gEfiVendorKeysNvGuid = { 0x9073e4e0, 0x60ec, 0x4b6e, { 0x99, 0x3, 0x4c, 0x22, 0x3c, 0x26, 0xf, 0x3c } }\r
## GUID used to "PhysicalPresence" variable and "PhysicalPresenceFlags" variable for TPM request and response.\r
# Include/Guid/PhysicalPresenceData.h\r
gEfiPhysicalPresenceGuid = { 0xf6499b1, 0xe9ad, 0x493d, { 0xb9, 0xc2, 0x2f, 0x90, 0x81, 0x5c, 0x6c, 0xbc }}\r
- \r
+\r
## GUID used to "Tcg2PhysicalPresence" variable and "Tcg2PhysicalPresenceFlags" variable for TPM2 request and response.\r
# Include/Guid/Tcg2PhysicalPresenceData.h\r
gEfiTcg2PhysicalPresenceGuid = { 0xaeb9c5c1, 0x94f1, 0x4d02, { 0xbf, 0xd9, 0x46, 0x2, 0xdb, 0x2d, 0x3c, 0x54 }}\r
## GUID used for FormSet.\r
# Include/Guid/TcgConfigHii.h\r
gTcgConfigFormSetGuid = { 0xb0f901e4, 0xc424, 0x45de, { 0x90, 0x81, 0x95, 0xe2, 0xb, 0xde, 0x6f, 0xb5 }}\r
- \r
+\r
## GUID used for FormSet and config variable.\r
# Include/Guid/Tcg2ConfigHii.h\r
gTcg2ConfigFormSetGuid = {0x6339d487, 0x26ba, 0x424b, { 0x9a, 0x5d, 0x68, 0x7e, 0x25, 0xd7, 0x40, 0xbc }}\r
- \r
+\r
## GUID used for FormSet.\r
# Include/Guid/SecureBootConfigHii.h\r
gSecureBootConfigFormSetGuid = { 0x5daf50a5, 0xea81, 0x4de2, {0x8f, 0x9b, 0xca, 0xbd, 0xa9, 0xcf, 0x5c, 0x14}}\r
\r
- ## GUID used to "TrEEPhysicalPresence" variable and "TrEEPhysicalPresenceFlags" variable for TPM2 request and response.\r
- # Include/Guid/TrEEPhysicalPresenceData.h\r
- gEfiTrEEPhysicalPresenceGuid = { 0xf24643c2, 0xc622, 0x494e, { 0x8a, 0xd, 0x46, 0x32, 0x57, 0x9c, 0x2d, 0x5b }}\r
-\r
## GUID value used for PcdTpmInstanceGuid to indicate TPM is disabled.\r
# Include/Guid/TpmInstance.h\r
gEfiTpmDeviceInstanceNoneGuid = { 0x00000000, 0x0000, 0x0000, { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 } }\r
- \r
+\r
## GUID value used for PcdTpmInstanceGuid to indicate TPM 1.2 device is selected to support.\r
# Include/Guid/TpmInstance.h\r
gEfiTpmDeviceInstanceTpm12Guid = { 0x8b01e5b6, 0x4f19, 0x46e8, { 0xab, 0x93, 0x1c, 0x53, 0x67, 0x1b, 0x90, 0xcc } }\r
- \r
+\r
## GUID value used for PcdTpmInstanceGuid to indicate discrete TPM 2.0 device is selected to support.\r
# Include/Guid/TpmInstance.h\r
gEfiTpmDeviceInstanceTpm20DtpmGuid = { 0x286bf25a, 0xc2c3, 0x408c, { 0xb3, 0xb4, 0x25, 0xe6, 0x75, 0x8b, 0x73, 0x17 } }\r
- \r
+\r
## GUID used to select supported TPM instance from UI.\r
# Include/Guid/TpmInstance.h\r
gEfiTpmDeviceSelectedGuid = { 0x7f4158d3, 0x74d, 0x456d, { 0x8c, 0xb2, 0x1, 0xf9, 0xc8, 0xf7, 0x9d, 0xaa } }\r
\r
- ## GUID used for FormSet and config variable.\r
- # Include/Guid/TrEEConfigHii.h\r
- gTrEEConfigFormSetGuid = {0xc54b425f, 0xaa79, 0x48b4, { 0x98, 0x1f, 0x99, 0x8b, 0x3c, 0x4b, 0x64, 0x1c }}\r
-\r
## Include/OpalPasswordExtraInfoVariable.h\r
gOpalExtraInfoVariableGuid = {0x44a2ad5d, 0x612c, 0x47b3, {0xb0, 0x6e, 0xc8, 0xf5, 0x0b, 0xfb, 0xf0, 0x7d}}\r
\r
#\r
\r
[PcdsFixedAtBuild, PcdsPatchableInModule]\r
- ## Image verification policy for OptionRom. Only following values are valid:<BR><BR>\r
- # NOTE: Do NOT use 0x5 and 0x2 since it violates the UEFI specification and has been removed.<BR>\r
- # 0x00000000 Always trust the image.<BR>\r
- # 0x00000001 Never trust the image.<BR>\r
- # 0x00000002 Allow execution when there is security violation.<BR>\r
- # 0x00000003 Defer execution when there is security violation.<BR>\r
- # 0x00000004 Deny execution when there is security violation.<BR>\r
- # 0x00000005 Query user when there is security violation.<BR>\r
- # @Prompt Set policy for the image from OptionRom.\r
- # @ValidRange 0x80000001 | 0x00000000 - 0x00000005\r
- gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOptionRomImageVerificationPolicy|0x04|UINT32|0x00000001\r
-\r
## Image verification policy for removable media which includes CD-ROM, Floppy, USB and network.\r
# Only following values are valid:<BR><BR>\r
# NOTE: Do NOT use 0x5 and 0x2 since it violates the UEFI specification and has been removed.<BR>\r
# 0x00000004 Deny execution when there is security violation.<BR>\r
# 0x00000005 Query user when there is security violation.<BR>\r
# @Prompt Set policy for the image from fixed media.\r
- # @ValidRange 0x80000001 | 0x00000000 - 0x00000005 \r
+ # @ValidRange 0x80000001 | 0x00000000 - 0x00000005\r
gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdFixedMediaImageVerificationPolicy|0x04|UINT32|0x00000003\r
\r
- ## Defer Image Load policy settings. The policy is bitwise. \r
- # If a bit is set, the image from corresponding device will be trusted when loading. Or \r
+ ## Defer Image Load policy settings. The policy is bitwise.\r
+ # If a bit is set, the image from corresponding device will be trusted when loading. Or\r
# the image will be deferred. The deferred image will be checked after user is identified.<BR><BR>\r
# BIT0 - Image from unknown device. <BR>\r
# BIT1 - Image from firmware volume.<BR>\r
# BIT3 - Image from removable media which includes CD-ROM, Floppy, USB and network.<BR>\r
# BIT4 - Image from fixed media device which includes hard disk.<BR>\r
# @Prompt Set policy whether trust image before user identification.\r
- # @ValidRange 0x80000002 | 0x00000000 - 0x0000001F \r
+ # @ValidRange 0x80000002 | 0x00000000 - 0x0000001F\r
gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdDeferImageLoadPolicy|0x0000001F|UINT32|0x0000004\r
\r
## Null-terminated Unicode string of the file name that is the default name to save USB credential.\r
## The size of Append variable buffer. This buffer is reserved for runtime use, OS can append data into one existing variable.\r
# Note: This PCD is not been used.\r
# @Prompt Max variable size for append operation.\r
- gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdMaxAppendVariableSize|0x2000|UINT32|0x30000005 \r
+ gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdMaxAppendVariableSize|0x2000|UINT32|0x30000005\r
\r
## Specifies the type of TCG platform that contains TPM chip.<BR><BR>\r
# If 0, TCG platform type is PC client.<BR>\r
# If 1, TCG platform type is PC server.<BR>\r
# @Prompt Select platform type.\r
- # @ValidRange 0x80000001 | 0x00 - 0x1 \r
+ # @ValidRange 0x80000001 | 0x00 - 0x1\r
gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTpmPlatformClass|0|UINT8|0x00000006\r
- \r
+\r
## Progress Code for TPM device subclass definitions.<BR><BR>\r
# EFI_PERIPHERAL_TPM = (EFI_PERIPHERAL | 0x000D0000) = 0x010D0000<BR>\r
# @Prompt Status Code for TPM device definitions\r
gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdStatusCodeSubClassTpmDevice|0x010D0000|UINT32|0x00000007\r
\r
[PcdsFixedAtBuild, PcdsPatchableInModule, PcdsDynamic, PcdsDynamicEx]\r
+ ## Image verification policy for OptionRom. Only following values are valid:<BR><BR>\r
+ # NOTE: Do NOT use 0x5 and 0x2 since it violates the UEFI specification and has been removed.<BR>\r
+ # 0x00000000 Always trust the image.<BR>\r
+ # 0x00000001 Never trust the image.<BR>\r
+ # 0x00000002 Allow execution when there is security violation.<BR>\r
+ # 0x00000003 Defer execution when there is security violation.<BR>\r
+ # 0x00000004 Deny execution when there is security violation.<BR>\r
+ # 0x00000005 Query user when there is security violation.<BR>\r
+ # @Prompt Set policy for the image from OptionRom.\r
+ # @ValidRange 0x80000001 | 0x00000000 - 0x00000005\r
+ gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOptionRomImageVerificationPolicy|0x04|UINT32|0x00000001\r
+\r
## Indicates the presence or absence of the platform operator during firmware booting.\r
- # If platform operator is not physical presence during boot. TPM will be locked and the TPM commands \r
+ # If platform operator is not physical presence during boot. TPM will be locked and the TPM commands\r
# that required operator physical presence can not run.<BR><BR>\r
# TRUE - The platform operator is physically present.<BR>\r
# FALSE - The platform operator is not physically present.<BR>\r
gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTpmPhysicalPresence|TRUE|BOOLEAN|0x00010001\r
\r
[PcdsFixedAtBuild, PcdsPatchableInModule, PcdsDynamic, PcdsDynamicEx]\r
- ## Indicates whether TPM physical presence is locked during platform initialization. \r
+ ## Indicates whether TPM physical presence is locked during platform initialization.\r
# Once it is locked, it can not be unlocked for TPM life time.<BR><BR>\r
# TRUE - Lock TPM physical presence asserting method.<BR>\r
# FALSE - Not lock TPM physical presence asserting method.<BR>\r
# If 0, no initialization needed - most likely used for chipset SRTM solution, in which TPM is already initialized.<BR>\r
# If 1, initialization needed.<BR>\r
# @Prompt TPM 2.0 device initialization policy.<BR>\r
- # @ValidRange 0x80000001 | 0x00 - 0x1 \r
+ # @ValidRange 0x80000001 | 0x00 - 0x1\r
gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTpm2InitializationPolicy|1|UINT8|0x0001000A\r
\r
## This PCD indicates the initialization policy for TPM 1.2.<BR><BR>\r
# If 0, no initialization needed - most likely used for chipset SRTM solution, in which TPM is already initialized.<BR>\r
# If 1, initialization needed.<BR>\r
# @Prompt TPM 1.2 device initialization policy.\r
- # @ValidRange 0x80000001 | 0x00 - 0x1 \r
+ # @ValidRange 0x80000001 | 0x00 - 0x1\r
gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTpmInitializationPolicy|1|UINT8|0x0001000B\r
\r
## This PCD indicates the TPM 2.0 SelfTest policy.<BR><BR>\r
# if 0, no SelfTest needed - most likely used for fTPM, because it might already be tested.<BR>\r
# if 1, SelfTest needed.<BR>\r
# @Prompt TPM 2.0 device selftest.\r
- # @ValidRange 0x80000001 | 0x00 - 0x1 \r
+ # @ValidRange 0x80000001 | 0x00 - 0x1\r
gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTpm2SelfTestPolicy|1|UINT8|0x0001000C\r
\r
## This PCD indicates Static Core Root of Trust for Measurement (SCRTM) policy using TPM 2.0.<BR><BR>\r
# if 0, no SCRTM measurement needed - In this case, it is already done.<BR>\r
# if 1, SCRTM measurement done by BIOS.<BR>\r
# @Prompt SCRTM policy setting for TPM 2.0 device.\r
- # @ValidRange 0x80000001 | 0x00 - 0x1 \r
+ # @ValidRange 0x80000001 | 0x00 - 0x1\r
gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTpm2ScrtmPolicy|1|UINT8|0x0001000D\r
\r
## This PCD indicates Static Core Root of Trust for Measurement (SCRTM) policy using TPM 1.2.<BR><BR>\r
# if 0, no SCRTM measurement needed - In this case, it is already done.<BR>\r
# if 1, SCRTM measurement done by BIOS.<BR>\r
# @Prompt SCRTM policy setting for TPM 1.2 device\r
- # @ValidRange 0x80000001 | 0x00 - 0x1 \r
+ # @ValidRange 0x80000001 | 0x00 - 0x1\r
gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTpmScrtmPolicy|1|UINT8|0x0001000E\r
\r
## Guid name to identify TPM instance.<BR><BR>\r
# 0 means dynamic get from supported HASH algorithm\r
# @Prompt OEM configurated number of PCR banks.\r
gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTcg2NumberOfPCRBanks|0x0|UINT32|0x00010015\r
- \r
+\r
## Provides one or more SHA 256 Hashes of the RSA 2048 public keys used to verify Recovery and Capsule Update images\r
# WARNING: The default value is treated as test key. Please do not use default value in the production.\r
# @Prompt One or more SHA 256 Hashes of RSA 2048 bit public keys used to verify Recovery and Capsule Update images\r
gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTcgPhysicalPresenceInterfaceVer|"1.3"|VOID*|0x00000008\r
\r
## Indicate whether a physical presence user exist.\r
- # When it is configured to Dynamic or DynamicEx, it can be set through detection using \r
+ # When it is configured to Dynamic or DynamicEx, it can be set through detection using\r
# a platform-specific method (e.g. Button pressed) in a actual platform in early boot phase.<BR><BR>\r
# @Prompt A physical presence user status\r
gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdUserPhysicalPresence|FALSE|BOOLEAN|0x00010019\r
# @Prompt Initial setting of TCG2 Persistent Firmware Management Flags\r
gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTcg2PhysicalPresenceFlags|0x300E2|UINT32|0x0001001B\r
\r
+ ## Indicate current TPM2 Interrupt Number reported by _CRS control method.<BR><BR>\r
+ # TPM2 Interrupt feature is disabled If the pcd is set to 0.<BR>\r
+ # @Prompt Current TPM2 Interrupt Number\r
+ gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTpm2CurrentIrqNum|0x00|UINT32|0x0001001C\r
+\r
+ ## Indicate platform possible TPM2 Interrupt Number reported by _PRS control method.<BR><BR>\r
+ # Possible TPM2 Interrupt Number Buffer will not be reported if TPM2 Interrupt feature is disabled.<BR>\r
+ # @Prompt Possible TPM2 Interrupt Number buffer\r
+ gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTpm2PossibleIrqNumBuf|{0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00}|VOID*|0x0001001D\r
+\r
[PcdsDynamic, PcdsDynamicEx]\r
\r
## This PCD indicates Hash mask for TPM 2.0. Bit definition strictly follows TCG Algorithm Registry.<BR><BR>\r
# BIT2 - SHA384.<BR>\r
# BIT3 - SHA512.<BR>\r
# @Prompt Hash mask for TPM 2.0\r
- # @ValidRange 0x80000001 | 0x00000000 - 0x0000000F \r
+ # @ValidRange 0x80000001 | 0x00000000 - 0x0000000F\r
gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTpm2HashMask|0x0000000F|UINT32|0x00010010\r
\r
## This PCD indicated final BIOS supported Hash mask.\r
# linked, and the value of this PCD should be got in module entrypoint.\r
# @Prompt Hash Algorithm bitmap.\r
gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTcg2HashAlgorithmBitmap|0xFFFFFFFF|UINT32|0x00010016\r
- \r
+\r
+ ## This PCD indicates current active TPM interface type.\r
+ # Accodingt to TCG PTP spec 1.3, there are 3 types defined in TPM2_PTP_INTERFACE_TYPE.<BR>\r
+ # 0x00 - FIFO interface as defined in TIS 1.3 is active.<BR>\r
+ # 0x01 - FIFO interface as defined in PTP for TPM 2.0 is active.<BR>\r
+ # 0x02 - CRB interface is active.<BR>\r
+ # 0xFF - Contains no current active TPM interface type.<BR>\r
+ #\r
+ # @Prompt current active TPM interface type.\r
+ gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdActiveTpmInterfaceType|0xFF|UINT8|0x0001001E\r
+\r
+ ## This PCD records IdleByass status supported by current active TPM interface.\r
+ # Accodingt to TCG PTP spec 1.3, TPM with CRB interface can skip idle state and\r
+ # diretcly move to CmdReady state. <BR>\r
+ # 0x00 - Do not support IdleByPass.<BR>\r
+ # 0x01 - Support IdleByPass.<BR>\r
+ # 0xFF - IdleByPass State is not synced with TPM hardware.<BR>\r
+ #\r
+ # @Prompt IdleByass status supported by current active TPM interface.\r
+ gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdCRBIdleByPass|0xFF|UINT8|0x0001001F\r
+\r
[UserExtensions.TianoCore."ExtraFiles"]\r
SecurityPkgExtra.uni\r
projects / mirror_edk2.git / blobdiff