## @file SecurityPkg.dec\r
-# This package includes the security drivers, defintions(including PPIs/PROTOCOLs/GUIDs \r
-# and library classes) and libraries instances.\r
+# Provides security features that conform to TCG/UEFI industry standards\r
#\r
-# Copyright (c) 2009 - 2014, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>\r
+# The security features include secure boot, measured boot and user identification.\r
+# It also provides the definitions(including PPIs/PROTOCOLs/GUIDs and library classes)\r
+# and libraries instances, which are used for those features.\r
+#\r
+# Copyright (c) 2009 - 2015, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>\r
+# (C) Copyright 2015 Hewlett Packard Enterprise Development LP <BR>\r
# This program and the accompanying materials are licensed and made available under\r
# the terms and conditions of the BSD License which accompanies this distribution.\r
# The full text of the license may be found at\r
[Defines]\r
DEC_SPECIFICATION = 0x00010005\r
PACKAGE_NAME = SecurityPkg\r
- PACKAGE_GUID = 24369CAC-6AA6-4fb8-88DB-90BF061668AD\r
- PACKAGE_VERSION = 0.93\r
+ PACKAGE_UNI_FILE = SecurityPkg.uni\r
+ PACKAGE_GUID = 4EFC4F66-6219-4427-B780-FB99F470767F\r
+ PACKAGE_VERSION = 0.96\r
\r
[Includes]\r
Include\r
#\r
TcgPhysicalPresenceLib|Include/Library/TcgPhysicalPresenceLib.h\r
\r
+ ## @libraryclass Provides support for TCG PP >= 128 Vendor Specific PPI Operation.\r
+ #\r
+ TcgPpVendorLib|Include/Library/TcgPpVendorLib.h\r
+ \r
## @libraryclass Provides interfaces for other modules to send TPM 2.0 command.\r
#\r
Tpm2CommandLib|Include/Library/Tpm2CommandLib.h\r
## @libraryclass Provides TPM Interface Specification (TIS) interfaces for TPM command.\r
#\r
TpmCommLib|Include/Library/TpmCommLib.h\r
- \r
- ## @libraryclass Provides common interfaces about TPM measurement for other modules.\r
- #\r
- TpmMeasurementLib|Include/Library/TpmMeasurementLib.h\r
\r
## @libraryclass Provides interfaces to handle TPM 2.0 request.\r
#\r
TrEEPhysicalPresenceLib|Include/Library/TrEEPhysicalPresenceLib.h\r
+ \r
+ ## @libraryclass Provides support for TrEE PP >= 128 Vendor Specific PPI Operation.\r
+ #\r
+ TrEEPpVendorLib|Include/Library/TrEEPpVendorLib.h\r
+ \r
+ ## @libraryclass Provides support for TCG Physical Presence Interface (PPI) specification \r
+ # >= 128 Vendor Specific PPI Operation.\r
+ #\r
+ Tcg2PpVendorLib|Include/Library/TcgPpVendorLib.h\r
+ \r
+ ## @libraryclass Handle TPM 2.0 physical presence request from OS.\r
+ #\r
+ Tcg2PhysicalPresenceLib|Include/Library/Tcg2PhysicalPresenceLib.h\r
\r
[Guids]\r
- ## Security package token space guid\r
+ ## Security package token space guid.\r
# Include/Guid/SecurityPkgTokenSpace.h\r
gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid = { 0xd3fb176, 0x9569, 0x4d51, { 0xa3, 0xef, 0x7d, 0x61, 0xc6, 0x4f, 0xea, 0xba }}\r
- \r
- ## Guid acted as the authenticated variable store header's signature, and to specify the variable list entries put in the EFI system table.\r
- # Include/Guid/AuthenticatedVariableFormat.h\r
- gEfiAuthenticatedVariableGuid = { 0xaaf32c78, 0x947b, 0x439a, { 0xa1, 0x80, 0x2e, 0x14, 0x4e, 0xc3, 0x77, 0x92 } }\r
\r
## GUID used to "SecureBootEnable" variable for the Secure Boot feature enable/disable.\r
# This variable is used for allowing a physically present user to disable Secure Boot via firmware setup without the possession of PKpriv.\r
gEfiCustomModeEnableGuid = { 0xc076ec0c, 0x7028, 0x4399, { 0xa0, 0x72, 0x71, 0xee, 0x5c, 0x44, 0x8b, 0x9f } }\r
\r
## GUID used to "VendorKeysNv" variable to record the out of band secure boot keys modification.\r
- # This variable is a read-only NV varaible that indicates whether someone other than the platform vendor has used a \r
+ # This variable is a read-only NV variable that indicates whether someone other than the platform vendor has used a \r
# mechanism not defined by the UEFI Specification to transition the system to setup mode or to update secure boot keys.\r
# Include/Guid/AuthenticatedVariableFormat.h\r
gEfiVendorKeysNvGuid = { 0x9073e4e0, 0x60ec, 0x4b6e, { 0x99, 0x3, 0x4c, 0x22, 0x3c, 0x26, 0xf, 0x3c } }\r
## GUID used to "certdb" variable to store the signer's certificates for common variables with EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS attribute.\r
# Include/Guid/AuthenticatedVariableFormat.h\r
gEfiCertDbGuid = { 0xd9bee56e, 0x75dc, 0x49d9, { 0xb4, 0xd7, 0xb5, 0x34, 0x21, 0xf, 0x63, 0x7a } }\r
- \r
+\r
+ ## GUID used to "SecureBootMode" variable to save platform secure boot mode\r
+ # Include/Guid/AuthenticatedVariableFormat.h\r
+ gEdkiiSecureBootModeGuid = { 0xc573b77, 0xeb93, 0x4d3d, { 0xaf, 0xfc, 0x5f, 0xeb, 0xca, 0xfb, 0x65, 0xb0 } }\r
+\r
## Hob GUID used to pass a TCG_PCR_EVENT from a TPM PEIM to a TPM DXE Driver.\r
# Include/Guid/TcgEventHob.h\r
gTcgEventEntryHobGuid = { 0x2b9ffb52, 0x1b13, 0x416f, { 0xa8, 0x7b, 0xbc, 0x93, 0xd, 0xef, 0x92, 0xa8 }}\r
\r
+ ## Hob GUID used to pass a TCG_PCR_EVENT_2 from a TPM2 PEIM to a TPM2 DXE Driver.\r
+ ## Include/Guid/TcgEventHob.h\r
+ gTcgEvent2EntryHobGuid = { 0xd26c221e, 0x2430, 0x4c8a, { 0x91, 0x70, 0x3f, 0xcb, 0x45, 0x0, 0x41, 0x3f }}\r
+\r
+ ## HOB GUID used to record TPM device error.\r
+ # Include/Guid/TcgEventHob.h\r
+ gTpmErrorHobGuid = { 0xef598499, 0xb25e, 0x473a, { 0xbf, 0xaf, 0xe7, 0xe5, 0x7d, 0xce, 0x82, 0xc4 }}\r
+\r
## HOB GUID used to pass all PEI measured FV info to DXE Driver.\r
# Include/Guid/MeasuredFvHob.h\r
gMeasuredFvHobGuid = { 0xb2360b42, 0x7173, 0x420a, { 0x86, 0x96, 0x46, 0xca, 0x6b, 0xab, 0x10, 0x60 }}\r
# Include/Guid/PhysicalPresenceData.h\r
gEfiPhysicalPresenceGuid = { 0xf6499b1, 0xe9ad, 0x493d, { 0xb9, 0xc2, 0x2f, 0x90, 0x81, 0x5c, 0x6c, 0xbc }}\r
\r
+ ## GUID used to "Tcg2PhysicalPresence" variable and "Tcg2PhysicalPresenceFlags" variable for TPM2 request and response.\r
+ # Include/Guid/Tcg2PhysicalPresenceData.h\r
+ gEfiTcg2PhysicalPresenceGuid = { 0xaeb9c5c1, 0x94f1, 0x4d02, { 0xbf, 0xd9, 0x46, 0x2, 0xdb, 0x2d, 0x3c, 0x54 }}\r
+\r
## GUID used for form browser, password credential and provider identifier.\r
# Include/Guid/PwdCredentialProviderHii.h\r
gPwdCredentialProviderGuid = { 0x78b9ec8b, 0xc000, 0x46c5, { 0xac, 0x93, 0x24, 0xa0, 0xc1, 0xbb, 0x0, 0xce }}\r
# Include/Guid/TcgConfigHii.h\r
gTcgConfigFormSetGuid = { 0xb0f901e4, 0xc424, 0x45de, { 0x90, 0x81, 0x95, 0xe2, 0xb, 0xde, 0x6f, 0xb5 }}\r
\r
+ ## GUID used for FormSet and config variable.\r
+ # Include/Guid/Tcg2ConfigHii.h\r
+ gTcg2ConfigFormSetGuid = {0x6339d487, 0x26ba, 0x424b, { 0x9a, 0x5d, 0x68, 0x7e, 0x25, 0xd7, 0x40, 0xbc }}\r
+ \r
## GUID used for FormSet.\r
# Include/Guid/SecureBootConfigHii.h\r
gSecureBootConfigFormSetGuid = { 0x5daf50a5, 0xea81, 0x4de2, {0x8f, 0x9b, 0xca, 0xbd, 0xa9, 0xcf, 0x5c, 0x14}}\r
gTrEEConfigFormSetGuid = {0xc54b425f, 0xaa79, 0x48b4, { 0x98, 0x1f, 0x99, 0x8b, 0x3c, 0x4b, 0x64, 0x1c }}\r
\r
[Ppis]\r
- ## Include/Ppi/LockPhysicalPresence.h\r
+ ## The PPI GUID for that TPM physical presence should be locked.\r
+ # Include/Ppi/LockPhysicalPresence.h\r
gPeiLockPhysicalPresencePpiGuid = { 0xef9aefe5, 0x2bd3, 0x4031, { 0xaf, 0x7d, 0x5e, 0xfe, 0x5a, 0xbb, 0x9a, 0xd } }\r
\r
- ## Include/Ppi/TpmInitialized.h\r
+ ## The PPI GUID for that TPM is initialized.\r
+ # Include/Ppi/TpmInitialized.h\r
gPeiTpmInitializedPpiGuid = { 0xe9db0d58, 0xd48d, 0x47f6, { 0x9c, 0x6e, 0x6f, 0x40, 0xe8, 0x6c, 0x7b, 0x41 }}\r
\r
+ ## The PPI GUID for that TPM initialization is done. TPM initialization may be success or fail.\r
+ # Include/Ppi/TpmInitialized.h\r
+ gPeiTpmInitializationDonePpiGuid = { 0xa030d115, 0x54dd, 0x447b, { 0x90, 0x64, 0xf2, 0x6, 0x88, 0x3d, 0x7c, 0xcc }}\r
+\r
## Include/Ppi/FirmwareVolumeInfoMeasurementExcluded.h\r
gEfiPeiFirmwareVolumeInfoMeasurementExcludedPpiGuid = { 0x6e056ff9, 0xc695, 0x4364, { 0x9e, 0x2c, 0x61, 0x26, 0xf5, 0xce, 0xea, 0xae } }\r
\r
-[PcdsFixedAtBuild]\r
- ## Pcd for OptionRom.\r
- # Image verification policy settings:\r
- # ALWAYS_EXECUTE 0x00000000\r
- # NEVER_EXECUTE 0x00000001\r
- # ALLOW_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION 0x00000002\r
- # DEFER_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION 0x00000003\r
- # DENY_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION 0x00000004\r
- # QUERY_USER_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION 0x00000005 \r
- # NOTE: Do NOT use QUERY_USER_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION and ALLOW_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION since\r
- # it violates the UEFI specification and has been removed.\r
+#\r
+# [Error.gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid]\r
+# 0x80000001 | Invalid value provided.\r
+# 0x80000002 | Reserved bits must be set to zero.\r
+# 0x80000003 | Incorrect progress or error code provided.\r
+#\r
+\r
+[PcdsFixedAtBuild, PcdsPatchableInModule]\r
+ ## Image verification policy for OptionRom. Only following values are valid:<BR><BR>\r
+ # NOTE: Do NOT use 0x5 and 0x2 since it violates the UEFI specification and has been removed.<BR>\r
+ # 0x00000000 Always trust the image.<BR>\r
+ # 0x00000001 Never trust the image.<BR>\r
+ # 0x00000002 Allow execution when there is security violation.<BR>\r
+ # 0x00000003 Defer execution when there is security violation.<BR>\r
+ # 0x00000004 Deny execution when there is security violation.<BR>\r
+ # 0x00000005 Query user when there is security violation.<BR>\r
+ # @Prompt Set policy for the image from OptionRom.\r
+ # @ValidRange 0x80000001 | 0x00000000 - 0x00000005\r
gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOptionRomImageVerificationPolicy|0x04|UINT32|0x00000001\r
- \r
- ## Pcd for removable media.\r
- # Removable media include CD-ROM, Floppy, USB and network.\r
- # Image verification policy settings:\r
- # ALWAYS_EXECUTE 0x00000000\r
- # NEVER_EXECUTE 0x00000001\r
- # ALLOW_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION 0x00000002\r
- # DEFER_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION 0x00000003\r
- # DENY_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION 0x00000004\r
- # QUERY_USER_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION 0x00000005\r
- # NOTE: Do NOT use QUERY_USER_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION and ALLOW_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION since\r
- # it violates the UEFI specification and has been removed.\r
+\r
+ ## Image verification policy for removable media which includes CD-ROM, Floppy, USB and network.\r
+ # Only following values are valid:<BR><BR>\r
+ # NOTE: Do NOT use 0x5 and 0x2 since it violates the UEFI specification and has been removed.<BR>\r
+ # 0x00000000 Always trust the image.<BR>\r
+ # 0x00000001 Never trust the image.<BR>\r
+ # 0x00000002 Allow execution when there is security violation.<BR>\r
+ # 0x00000003 Defer execution when there is security violation.<BR>\r
+ # 0x00000004 Deny execution when there is security violation.<BR>\r
+ # 0x00000005 Query user when there is security violation.<BR>\r
+ # @Prompt Set policy for the image from removable media.\r
+ # @ValidRange 0x80000001 | 0x00000000 - 0x00000005\r
gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdRemovableMediaImageVerificationPolicy|0x04|UINT32|0x00000002\r
- \r
- ## Pcd for fixed media.\r
- # Fixed media include hard disk.\r
- # Image verification policy settings:\r
- # ALWAYS_EXECUTE 0x00000000\r
- # NEVER_EXECUTE 0x00000001\r
- # ALLOW_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION 0x00000002\r
- # DEFER_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION 0x00000003\r
- # DENY_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION 0x00000004\r
- # QUERY_USER_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION 0x00000005 \r
- # NOTE: Do NOT use QUERY_USER_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION and ALLOW_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION since\r
- # it violates the UEFI specification and has been removed.\r
+\r
+ ## Image verification policy for fixed media which includes hard disk.\r
+ # Only following values are valid:<BR><BR>\r
+ # NOTE: Do NOT use 0x5 and 0x2 since it violates the UEFI specification and has been removed.<BR>\r
+ # 0x00000000 Always trust the image.<BR>\r
+ # 0x00000001 Never trust the image.<BR>\r
+ # 0x00000002 Allow execution when there is security violation.<BR>\r
+ # 0x00000003 Defer execution when there is security violation.<BR>\r
+ # 0x00000004 Deny execution when there is security violation.<BR>\r
+ # 0x00000005 Query user when there is security violation.<BR>\r
+ # @Prompt Set policy for the image from fixed media.\r
+ # @ValidRange 0x80000001 | 0x00000000 - 0x00000005 \r
gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdFixedMediaImageVerificationPolicy|0x04|UINT32|0x00000003\r
- \r
- ## Defer Image Load policy settings.\r
- # The policy is bitwise. \r
- # If bit is set, the image from corresponding device will be trust when loading.\r
- #\r
- # IMAGE_UNKNOWN 0x00000001\r
- # IMAGE_FROM_FV 0x00000002\r
- # IMAGE_FROM_OPTION_ROM 0x00000004\r
- # IMAGE_FROM_REMOVABLE_MEDIA 0x00000008\r
- # IMAGE_FROM_FIXED_MEDIA 0x00000010\r
+\r
+ ## Defer Image Load policy settings. The policy is bitwise. \r
+ # If a bit is set, the image from corresponding device will be trusted when loading. Or \r
+ # the image will be deferred. The deferred image will be checked after user is identified.<BR><BR>\r
+ # BIT0 - Image from unknown device. <BR>\r
+ # BIT1 - Image from firmware volume.<BR>\r
+ # BIT2 - Image from OptionRom.<BR>\r
+ # BIT3 - Image from removable media which includes CD-ROM, Floppy, USB and network.<BR>\r
+ # BIT4 - Image from fixed media device which includes hard disk.<BR>\r
+ # @Prompt Set policy whether trust image before user identification.\r
+ # @ValidRange 0x80000002 | 0x00000000 - 0x0000001F \r
gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdDeferImageLoadPolicy|0x0000001F|UINT32|0x0000004\r
- \r
- ## The token file name used to save credential in USB credential provider driver.\r
+\r
+ ## Null-terminated Unicode string of the file name that is the default name to save USB credential.\r
# The specified file should be saved at the root directory of USB storage disk.\r
+ # @Prompt File name to save credential.\r
gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdFixedUsbCredentialProviderTokenFileName|L"Token.bin"|VOID*|0x00000005\r
\r
## The size of Append variable buffer. This buffer is reserved for runtime use, OS can append data into one existing variable.\r
+ # Note: This PCD is not been used.\r
+ # @Prompt Max variable size for append operation.\r
gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdMaxAppendVariableSize|0x2000|UINT32|0x30000005 \r
\r
- ## This PCD specifies the type of TCG platform that contains TPM chip. \r
- # This PCD is only avaiable when PcdTpmPhysicalPresence is TRUE.\r
- # If 0, TCG platform type is PC client.\r
- # If 1, TCG platform type is server.\r
+ ## Specifies the type of TCG platform that contains TPM chip.<BR><BR>\r
+ # If 0, TCG platform type is PC client.<BR>\r
+ # If 1, TCG platform type is PC server.<BR>\r
+ # @Prompt Select platform type.\r
+ # @ValidRange 0x80000001 | 0x00 - 0x1 \r
gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTpmPlatformClass|0|UINT8|0x00000006\r
+ \r
+ ## Progress Code for TPM device subclass definitions.<BR><BR>\r
+ # EFI_PERIPHERAL_TPM = (EFI_PERIPHERAL | 0x000D0000) = 0x010D0000<BR>\r
+ # @Prompt Status Code for TPM device definitions\r
+ # @ValidList 0x80000003 | 0x010D0000\r
+ gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdStatusCodeSubClassTpmDevice|0x010D0000|UINT32|0x00000007\r
\r
[PcdsFixedAtBuild, PcdsPatchableInModule, PcdsDynamic, PcdsDynamicEx]\r
- ## This PCD indicates the presence or absence of the platform operator.\r
+ ## Indicates the presence or absence of the platform operator during firmware booting.\r
+ # If platform operator is not physical presence during boot. TPM will be locked and the TPM commands \r
+ # that required operator physical presence can not run.<BR><BR>\r
+ # TRUE - The platform operator is physically present.<BR>\r
+ # FALSE - The platform operator is not physically present.<BR>\r
+ # @Prompt Physical presence of the platform operator.\r
gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTpmPhysicalPresence|TRUE|BOOLEAN|0x00010001\r
\r
[PcdsFixedAtBuild, PcdsPatchableInModule, PcdsDynamic, PcdsDynamicEx]\r
- ## This PCD indicates whether to set TPM physicalPresenceLifetimeLock bit.\r
- # Once this bit is set, it can not be cleared (It is locked for TPM life time).\r
+ ## Indicates whether TPM physical presence is locked during platform initialization. \r
+ # Once it is locked, it can not be unlocked for TPM life time.<BR><BR>\r
+ # TRUE - Lock TPM physical presence asserting method.<BR>\r
+ # FALSE - Not lock TPM physical presence asserting method.<BR>\r
+ # @Prompt Lock TPM physical presence asserting method.\r
gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdPhysicalPresenceLifetimeLock|FALSE|BOOLEAN|0x00010003\r
- \r
+\r
[PcdsFixedAtBuild, PcdsPatchableInModule, PcdsDynamic, PcdsDynamicEx]\r
- ## This PCD is used to specify the default value for physicalPresenceCMDEnable bit when setting physicalPresenceLifetimeLock bit.\r
- # If PcdPhysicalPresenceCmdEnable is set to TRUE, physicalPresenceCMDEnable bit will be set, else this bit will be cleared.\r
+ ## Indicates whether the platform supports the software method of asserting physical presence.<BR><BR>\r
+ # TRUE - Supports the software method of asserting physical presence.<BR>\r
+ # FALSE - Does not support the software method of asserting physical presence.<BR>\r
+ # @Prompt Enable software method of asserting physical presence.\r
gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdPhysicalPresenceCmdEnable|TRUE|BOOLEAN|0x00010004\r
- \r
+\r
[PcdsFixedAtBuild, PcdsPatchableInModule, PcdsDynamic, PcdsDynamicEx]\r
- ## This PCD is used to specify the default value for physicalPresenceHWEnable bit when setting physicalPresenceLifetimeLock bit.\r
- # If PcdPhysicalPresenceHwEnable is set to TRUE, physicalPresenceHWEnable bit will be set, else this bit will be cleared.\r
+ ## Indicates whether the platform supports the hardware method of asserting physical presence.<BR><BR>\r
+ # TRUE - Supports the hardware method of asserting physical presence.<BR>\r
+ # FALSE - Does not support the hardware method of asserting physical presence.<BR>\r
+ # @Prompt Enable hardware method of asserting physical presence.\r
gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdPhysicalPresenceHwEnable|TRUE|BOOLEAN|0x00010005\r
\r
[PcdsFixedAtBuild, PcdsPatchableInModule, PcdsDynamic, PcdsDynamicEx]\r
- ## This PCD indicates if debugger exists.\r
+ ## This PCD indicates if debugger exists. <BR><BR>\r
+ # TRUE - Firmware debugger exists.<BR>\r
+ # FALSE - Firmware debugger doesn't exist.<BR>\r
+ # @Prompt Firmware debugger status.\r
gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdFirmwareDebuggerInitialized|FALSE|BOOLEAN|0x00010009\r
\r
- ## This PCD indicates the TPM2 initialization policy.\r
- # 0: No initialization needed - most likely used for chipset SRTM solution, in which TPM is already initialized.\r
- # 1: Initialization needed.\r
+ ## This PCD indicates the initialization policy for TPM 2.0.<BR><BR>\r
+ # If 0, no initialization needed - most likely used for chipset SRTM solution, in which TPM is already initialized.<BR>\r
+ # If 1, initialization needed.<BR>\r
+ # @Prompt TPM 2.0 device initialization policy.<BR>\r
+ # @ValidRange 0x80000001 | 0x00 - 0x1 \r
gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTpm2InitializationPolicy|1|UINT8|0x0001000A\r
\r
- ## This PCD indicates the TPM initialization policy.\r
- # 0: No initialization needed - most likely used for chipset SRTM solution, in which TPM is already initialized.\r
- # 1: Initialization needed.\r
+ ## This PCD indicates the initialization policy for TPM 1.2.<BR><BR>\r
+ # If 0, no initialization needed - most likely used for chipset SRTM solution, in which TPM is already initialized.<BR>\r
+ # If 1, initialization needed.<BR>\r
+ # @Prompt TPM 1.2 device initialization policy.\r
+ # @ValidRange 0x80000001 | 0x00 - 0x1 \r
gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTpmInitializationPolicy|1|UINT8|0x0001000B\r
\r
- ## This PCD indicates the TPM2 SelfTest policy.\r
- # 0: No SelfTest needed - most likely used for fTPM, because it might already be tested.\r
- # 1: SelfTest needed.\r
+ ## This PCD indicates the TPM 2.0 SelfTest policy.<BR><BR>\r
+ # if 0, no SelfTest needed - most likely used for fTPM, because it might already be tested.<BR>\r
+ # if 1, SelfTest needed.<BR>\r
+ # @Prompt TPM 2.0 device selftest.\r
+ # @ValidRange 0x80000001 | 0x00 - 0x1 \r
gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTpm2SelfTestPolicy|1|UINT8|0x0001000C\r
\r
- ## This PCD indicates the TPM2 SCRTM policy.\r
- # 0: No SCRTM needed - In this case, it is already done.\r
- # 1: SCRTM done by BIOS.\r
+ ## This PCD indicates Static Core Root of Trust for Measurement (SCRTM) policy using TPM 2.0.<BR><BR>\r
+ # if 0, no SCRTM measurement needed - In this case, it is already done.<BR>\r
+ # if 1, SCRTM measurement done by BIOS.<BR>\r
+ # @Prompt SCRTM policy setting for TPM 2.0 device.\r
+ # @ValidRange 0x80000001 | 0x00 - 0x1 \r
gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTpm2ScrtmPolicy|1|UINT8|0x0001000D\r
\r
- ## This PCD indicates the TPM SCRTM policy.\r
- # 0: No SCRTM needed - In this case, it is already done.\r
- # 1: SCRTM done by BIOS.\r
+ ## This PCD indicates Static Core Root of Trust for Measurement (SCRTM) policy using TPM 1.2.<BR><BR>\r
+ # if 0, no SCRTM measurement needed - In this case, it is already done.<BR>\r
+ # if 1, SCRTM measurement done by BIOS.<BR>\r
+ # @Prompt SCRTM policy setting for TPM 1.2 device\r
+ # @ValidRange 0x80000001 | 0x00 - 0x1 \r
gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTpmScrtmPolicy|1|UINT8|0x0001000E\r
\r
- ## Guid name to identify TPM instance\r
- # TPM_DEVICE_INTERFACE_NONE means disable\r
- # TPM_DEVICE_INTERFACE_TPM12 means TPM1.2 DTPM\r
- # TPM_DEVICE_INTERFACE_DTPM2 means TPM2 DTPM\r
+ ## Guid name to identify TPM instance.<BR><BR>\r
+ # TPM_DEVICE_INTERFACE_NONE means disable.<BR>\r
+ # TPM_DEVICE_INTERFACE_TPM12 means TPM 1.2 DTPM.<BR>\r
+ # TPM_DEVICE_INTERFACE_DTPM2 means TPM 2.0 DTPM.<BR>\r
+ # Other GUID value means other TPM 2.0 device.<BR>\r
+ # @Prompt TPM device type identifier\r
gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTpmInstanceGuid |{ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 }|VOID*|0x0001000F\r
\r
- ## This PCD indicates the TPM2 Hash mask.\r
- # BIT0: SHA1\r
- # BIT1: SHA256\r
- # BIT2: SHA384\r
- # BIT3: SHA512\r
- # If this bit is set, that means this algorithm is needed to extend to PCR.\r
- # If this bit is clear, that means this algorithm is NOT needed to extend to PCR.\r
- # 0xFFFFFFFF means extend all.\r
- gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTpm2HashMask|0xFFFFFFFF|UINT32|0x00010010\r
-\r
- ## This PCD indicates if BIOS auto detect TPM1.2 or dTPM2.0.\r
- # 0: No auto detection.\r
- # 1: Auto detection.\r
+ ## This PCD indicates if BIOS auto detect TPM1.2 or dTPM2.0.<BR><BR>\r
+ # FALSE - No auto detection.<BR>\r
+ # TRUE - Auto detection.<BR>\r
+ # @Prompt TPM type detection.\r
gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTpmAutoDetection|TRUE|BOOLEAN|0x00010011\r
\r
- ## This PCD indicates TPM base address.\r
+ ## This PCD indicates TPM base address.<BR><BR>\r
+ # @Prompt TPM device address.\r
gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTpmBaseAddress|0xFED40000|UINT64|0x00010012\r
+\r
+ ## This PCR means the OEM configurated number of PCR banks.\r
+ # 0 means dynamic get from supported HASH algorithm\r
+ # @Prompt OEM configurated number of PCR banks.\r
+ gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTcg2NumberOfPCRBanks|0x0|UINT32|0x00010015\r
+ \r
+ ## Provides one or more SHA 256 Hashes of the RSA 2048 public keys used to verify Recovery and Capsule Update images\r
+ #\r
+ # @Prompt One or more SHA 256 Hashes of RSA 2048 bit public keys used to verify Recovery and Capsule Update images\r
+ #\r
+ gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdRsa2048Sha256PublicKeyBuffer|{0x91, 0x29, 0xc4, 0xbd, 0xea, 0x6d, 0xda, 0xb3, 0xaa, 0x6f, 0x50, 0x16, 0xfc, 0xdb, 0x4b, 0x7e, 0x3c, 0xd6, 0xdc, 0xa4, 0x7a, 0x0e, 0xdd, 0xe6, 0x15, 0x8c, 0x73, 0x96, 0xa2, 0xd4, 0xa6, 0x4d}|VOID*|0x00010013\r
+\r
+[PcdsDynamic, PcdsDynamicEx]\r
+\r
+ ## This PCD indicates Hash mask for TPM 2.0.<BR><BR>\r
+ # If this bit is set, that means this algorithm is needed to extend to PCR.<BR>\r
+ # If this bit is clear, that means this algorithm is NOT needed to extend to PCR.<BR>\r
+ # BIT0 - SHA1.<BR>\r
+ # BIT1 - SHA256.<BR>\r
+ # BIT2 - SHA384.<BR>\r
+ # BIT3 - SHA512.<BR>\r
+ # @Prompt Hash mask for TPM 2.0\r
+ # @ValidRange 0x80000001 | 0x00000000 - 0x0000000F \r
+ gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTpm2HashMask|0x0000000F|UINT32|0x00010010\r
+\r
+ ## This PCD indicated final BIOS supported Hash mask.\r
+ # Bios may choose to register a subset of PcdTpm2HashMask.\r
+ # So this PCD is final value of how many hash algo is extended to PCR.\r
+ # @Prompt Hash Algorithm bitmap.\r
+ gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTcg2HashAlgorithmBitmap|0xFFFFFFFF|UINT32|0x00010016\r
+ \r
+[UserExtensions.TianoCore."ExtraFiles"]\r
+ SecurityPkgExtra.uni\r
projects / mirror_edk2.git / blobdiff