They will do basic validation for authentication data structure, then call crypto library\r
to verify the signature.\r
\r
-Copyright (c) 2009 - 2012, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>\r
+Copyright (c) 2009 - 2014, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>\r
This program and the accompanying materials\r
are licensed and made available under the terms and conditions of the BSD License\r
which accompanies this distribution. The full text of the license may be found at\r
UINT32 mPubKeyNumber;\r
UINT8 mCertDbStore[MAX_CERTDB_SIZE];\r
UINT32 mPlatformMode;\r
+UINT8 mVendorKeyState;\r
+\r
EFI_GUID mSignatureSupport[] = {EFI_CERT_SHA1_GUID, EFI_CERT_SHA256_GUID, EFI_CERT_RSA2048_GUID, EFI_CERT_X509_GUID};\r
//\r
// Public Exponent of RSA Key.\r
//\r
VOID *mHashCtx = NULL;\r
\r
-//\r
-// Pointer to runtime buffer.\r
-// For "Append" operation to an existing variable, a read/modify/write operation\r
-// is supported by firmware internally. Reserve runtime buffer to cache previous\r
-// variable data in runtime phase because memory allocation is forbidden in virtual mode.\r
-//\r
-VOID *mStorageArea = NULL;\r
-\r
//\r
// The serialization of the values of the VariableName, VendorGuid and Attributes\r
// parameters of the SetVariable() call and the TimeStamp component of the\r
return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
}\r
\r
- //\r
- // Reserved runtime buffer for "Append" operation in virtual mode.\r
- //\r
- mStorageArea = AllocateRuntimePool (PcdGet32 (PcdMaxVariableSize));\r
- if (mStorageArea == NULL) {\r
- return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
- }\r
-\r
//\r
// Prepare runtime buffer for serialized data of time-based authenticated\r
// Variable, i.e. (VariableName, VendorGuid, Attributes, TimeStamp, Data).\r
}\r
\r
//\r
- // Create "SetupMode" varable with BS+RT attribute set.\r
+ // Create "SetupMode" variable with BS+RT attribute set.\r
//\r
FindVariable (EFI_SETUP_MODE_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, &Variable, &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal, FALSE);\r
if (PkVariable.CurrPtr == NULL) {\r
}\r
\r
//\r
- // Create "SignatureSupport" varable with BS+RT attribute set.\r
+ // Create "SignatureSupport" variable with BS+RT attribute set.\r
//\r
FindVariable (EFI_SIGNATURE_SUPPORT_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, &Variable, &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal, FALSE);\r
Status = UpdateVariable (\r
}\r
\r
//\r
- // Create "SecureBoot" varable with BS+RT attribute set.\r
+ // Create "SecureBoot" variable with BS+RT attribute set.\r
//\r
if (SecureBootEnable == SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE && mPlatformMode == USER_MODE) {\r
SecureBootMode = SECURE_BOOT_MODE_ENABLE;\r
DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Variable %s is %x\n", EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME, SecureBootEnable));\r
\r
//\r
- // Check "CustomMode" variable's existence.\r
+ // Initialize "CustomMode" in STANDARD_SECURE_BOOT_MODE state.\r
//\r
FindVariable (EFI_CUSTOM_MODE_NAME, &gEfiCustomModeEnableGuid, &Variable, &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal, FALSE);\r
- if (Variable.CurrPtr != NULL) {\r
- CustomMode = *(GetVariableDataPtr (Variable.CurrPtr));\r
- } else {\r
- //\r
- // "CustomMode" not exist, initialize it in STANDARD_SECURE_BOOT_MODE.\r
- //\r
- CustomMode = STANDARD_SECURE_BOOT_MODE;\r
- Status = UpdateVariable (\r
- EFI_CUSTOM_MODE_NAME,\r
- &gEfiCustomModeEnableGuid,\r
- &CustomMode,\r
- sizeof (UINT8),\r
- EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS,\r
- 0,\r
- 0,\r
- &Variable,\r
- NULL\r
- );\r
- if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
- return Status;\r
- }\r
+ CustomMode = STANDARD_SECURE_BOOT_MODE;\r
+ Status = UpdateVariable (\r
+ EFI_CUSTOM_MODE_NAME,\r
+ &gEfiCustomModeEnableGuid,\r
+ &CustomMode,\r
+ sizeof (UINT8),\r
+ EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS,\r
+ 0,\r
+ 0,\r
+ &Variable,\r
+ NULL\r
+ );\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
+ return Status;\r
}\r
\r
DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Variable %s is %x\n", EFI_CUSTOM_MODE_NAME, CustomMode));\r
}\r
} \r
\r
+ //\r
+ // Check "VendorKeysNv" variable's existence and create "VendorKeys" variable accordingly.\r
+ //\r
+ FindVariable (EFI_VENDOR_KEYS_NV_VARIABLE_NAME, &gEfiVendorKeysNvGuid, &Variable, &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal, FALSE);\r
+ if (Variable.CurrPtr != NULL) {\r
+ mVendorKeyState = *(GetVariableDataPtr (Variable.CurrPtr));\r
+ } else {\r
+ //\r
+ // "VendorKeysNv" not exist, initialize it in VENDOR_KEYS_VALID state.\r
+ //\r
+ mVendorKeyState = VENDOR_KEYS_VALID;\r
+ Status = UpdateVariable (\r
+ EFI_VENDOR_KEYS_NV_VARIABLE_NAME,\r
+ &gEfiVendorKeysNvGuid,\r
+ &mVendorKeyState,\r
+ sizeof (UINT8),\r
+ EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS,\r
+ 0,\r
+ 0,\r
+ &Variable,\r
+ NULL\r
+ );\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
+ return Status;\r
+ }\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Create "VendorKeys" variable with BS+RT attribute set.\r
+ //\r
+ FindVariable (EFI_VENDOR_KEYS_VARIABLE_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, &Variable, &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal, FALSE);\r
+ Status = UpdateVariable (\r
+ EFI_VENDOR_KEYS_VARIABLE_NAME,\r
+ &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
+ &mVendorKeyState,\r
+ sizeof (UINT8),\r
+ EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS,\r
+ 0,\r
+ 0,\r
+ &Variable,\r
+ NULL\r
+ );\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
+ return Status;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Variable %s is %x\n", EFI_VENDOR_KEYS_VARIABLE_NAME, mVendorKeyState));\r
+\r
return Status;\r
}\r
\r
UINT32 Index;\r
VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK Variable;\r
UINT8 *Ptr;\r
+ UINT8 *Data;\r
+ UINTN DataSize;\r
\r
if (PubKey == NULL) {\r
return 0;\r
&mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,\r
FALSE\r
);\r
- ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status);\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
+ DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Get public key database variable failure, Status = %r\n", Status));\r
+ return 0;\r
+ }\r
+\r
//\r
// Check whether the public key entry does exist.\r
//\r
//\r
if (mPubKeyNumber == MAX_KEY_NUM) {\r
//\r
- // Notes: Database is full, need enhancement here, currently just return 0.\r
+ // Public key dadatase is full, try to reclaim invalid key.\r
//\r
- return 0;\r
+ if (AtRuntime ()) {\r
+ //\r
+ // NV storage can't reclaim at runtime.\r
+ //\r
+ return 0;\r
+ }\r
+ \r
+ Status = Reclaim (\r
+ mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal.NonVolatileVariableBase,\r
+ &mVariableModuleGlobal->NonVolatileLastVariableOffset,\r
+ FALSE,\r
+ NULL,\r
+ NULL,\r
+ 0,\r
+ TRUE\r
+ );\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
+ return 0;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ Status = FindVariable (\r
+ AUTHVAR_KEYDB_NAME,\r
+ &gEfiAuthenticatedVariableGuid,\r
+ &Variable,\r
+ &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,\r
+ FALSE\r
+ );\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
+ DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Get public key database variable failure, Status = %r\n", Status));\r
+ return 0;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ DataSize = DataSizeOfVariable (Variable.CurrPtr);\r
+ Data = GetVariableDataPtr (Variable.CurrPtr);\r
+ ASSERT ((DataSize != 0) && (Data != NULL));\r
+ CopyMem (mPubKeyStore, (UINT8 *) Data, DataSize);\r
+ mPubKeyNumber = (UINT32) (DataSize / EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE);\r
+\r
+ if (mPubKeyNumber == MAX_KEY_NUM) {\r
+ return 0;\r
+ } \r
}\r
\r
CopyMem (mPubKeyStore + mPubKeyNumber * EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE, PubKey, EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE);\r
&Variable,\r
NULL\r
);\r
- ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status);\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
+ DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Update public key database variable failure, Status = %r\n", Status));\r
+ return 0;\r
+ }\r
}\r
\r
return Index;\r
EFI_CERT_BLOCK_RSA_2048_SHA256 *CertBlock;\r
UINT8 Digest[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE];\r
VOID *Rsa;\r
-\r
+ UINTN PayloadSize;\r
+ \r
+ PayloadSize = DataSize - AUTHINFO_SIZE;\r
Rsa = NULL;\r
CertData = NULL;\r
CertBlock = NULL;\r
if (!Status) {\r
goto Done;\r
}\r
- Status = Sha256Update (mHashCtx, Data + AUTHINFO_SIZE, (UINTN) (DataSize - AUTHINFO_SIZE));\r
+ Status = Sha256Update (mHashCtx, Data + AUTHINFO_SIZE, PayloadSize);\r
+ if (!Status) {\r
+ goto Done;\r
+ }\r
+ //\r
+ // Hash Size.\r
+ //\r
+ Status = Sha256Update (mHashCtx, &PayloadSize, sizeof (UINTN));\r
if (!Status) {\r
goto Done;\r
}\r
{\r
EFI_STATUS Status;\r
VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK Variable;\r
- UINT32 VarAttr;\r
UINT8 SecureBootMode;\r
UINT8 SecureBootEnable;\r
UINTN VariableDataSize;\r
}\r
}\r
\r
- VarAttr = EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS;\r
Status = UpdateVariable (\r
EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME,\r
&gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
&SecureBootMode,\r
sizeof(UINT8),\r
- VarAttr,\r
+ EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS,\r
0,\r
0,\r
&Variable,\r
return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
}\r
\r
+/**\r
+ Update "VendorKeys" variable to record the out of band secure boot key modification.\r
+\r
+ @return EFI_SUCCESS Variable is updated successfully.\r
+ @return Others Failed to update variable.\r
+ \r
+**/\r
+EFI_STATUS\r
+VendorKeyIsModified (\r
+ VOID\r
+ )\r
+{\r
+ EFI_STATUS Status;\r
+ VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK Variable;\r
+\r
+ if (mVendorKeyState == VENDOR_KEYS_MODIFIED) {\r
+ return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
+ }\r
+ mVendorKeyState = VENDOR_KEYS_MODIFIED;\r
+ \r
+ FindVariable (EFI_VENDOR_KEYS_NV_VARIABLE_NAME, &gEfiVendorKeysNvGuid, &Variable, &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal, FALSE);\r
+ Status = UpdateVariable (\r
+ EFI_VENDOR_KEYS_NV_VARIABLE_NAME,\r
+ &gEfiVendorKeysNvGuid,\r
+ &mVendorKeyState,\r
+ sizeof (UINT8),\r
+ EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS,\r
+ 0,\r
+ 0,\r
+ &Variable,\r
+ NULL\r
+ );\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
+ return Status;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ FindVariable (EFI_VENDOR_KEYS_VARIABLE_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, &Variable, &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal, FALSE);\r
+ return UpdateVariable (\r
+ EFI_VENDOR_KEYS_VARIABLE_NAME,\r
+ &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
+ &mVendorKeyState,\r
+ sizeof (UINT8),\r
+ EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS,\r
+ 0,\r
+ 0,\r
+ &Variable,\r
+ NULL\r
+ );\r
+}\r
+\r
/**\r
Process variable with platform key for verification.\r
\r
Variable,\r
&((EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 *) Data)->TimeStamp\r
);\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR(Status)) {\r
+ return Status;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ if ((mPlatformMode != SETUP_MODE) || IsPk) {\r
+ Status = VendorKeyIsModified ();\r
+ }\r
} else if (mPlatformMode == USER_MODE) {\r
//\r
// Verify against X509 Cert in PK database.\r
Variable,\r
&((EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 *) Data)->TimeStamp\r
);\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
+ return Status;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ if (mPlatformMode != SETUP_MODE) {\r
+ Status = VendorKeyIsModified ();\r
+ }\r
}\r
\r
return Status;\r
@return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.\r
@return EFI_WRITE_PROTECTED Variable is write-protected and needs authentication with\r
EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS set.\r
+ @return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES The Database to save the public key is full.\r
@return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION The variable is with EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS\r
set, but the AuthInfo does NOT pass the validation\r
check carried out by the firmware.\r
return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r
}\r
\r
+ //\r
+ // A time-based authenticated variable and a count-based authenticated variable\r
+ // can't be updated by each other.\r
+ // \r
+ if (Variable->CurrPtr != NULL) { \r
+ if (((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0) &&\r
+ ((Variable->CurrPtr->Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0)) {\r
+ return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION; \r
+ }\r
+ \r
+ if (((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0) && \r
+ ((Variable->CurrPtr->Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0)) {\r
+ return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION; \r
+ }\r
+ }\r
+ \r
//\r
// Process Time-based Authenticated variable.\r
//\r
//\r
KeyIndex = AddPubKeyInStore (PubKey);\r
if (KeyIndex == 0) {\r
- return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r
+ return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
}\r
}\r
\r
will be appended to the original EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST, duplicate EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA\r
will be ignored.\r
\r
- @param[in, out] Data Pointer to original EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST.\r
- @param[in] DataSize Size of Data buffer.\r
- @param[in] NewData Pointer to new EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST to be appended.\r
- @param[in] NewDataSize Size of NewData buffer.\r
+ @param[in, out] Data Pointer to original EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST.\r
+ @param[in] DataSize Size of Data buffer.\r
+ @param[in] FreeBufSize Size of free data buffer \r
+ @param[in] NewData Pointer to new EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST to be appended.\r
+ @param[in] NewDataSize Size of NewData buffer.\r
+ @param[out] MergedBufSize Size of the merged buffer\r
\r
- @return Size of the merged buffer.\r
+ @return EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL if input Data buffer overflowed\r
\r
**/\r
-UINTN\r
+EFI_STATUS\r
AppendSignatureList (\r
IN OUT VOID *Data,\r
IN UINTN DataSize,\r
+ IN UINTN FreeBufSize,\r
IN VOID *NewData,\r
- IN UINTN NewDataSize\r
+ IN UINTN NewDataSize,\r
+ OUT UINTN *MergedBufSize\r
)\r
{\r
EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *CertList;\r
// New EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA, append it.\r
//\r
if (CopiedCount == 0) {\r
+ if (FreeBufSize < sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + NewCertList->SignatureHeaderSize) {\r
+ return EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;\r
+ }\r
+\r
//\r
// Copy EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST header for only once.\r
//\r
+\r
CopyMem (Tail, NewCertList, sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + NewCertList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r
Tail = Tail + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + NewCertList->SignatureHeaderSize;\r
+ FreeBufSize -= sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + NewCertList->SignatureHeaderSize;\r
}\r
\r
+ if (FreeBufSize < NewCertList->SignatureSize) {\r
+ return EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;\r
+ }\r
CopyMem (Tail, NewCert, NewCertList->SignatureSize);\r
Tail += NewCertList->SignatureSize;\r
+ FreeBufSize -= NewCertList->SignatureSize;\r
CopiedCount++;\r
}\r
\r
NewCertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) NewCertList + NewCertList->SignatureListSize);\r
}\r
\r
- return (Tail - (UINT8 *) Data);\r
+ *MergedBufSize = (Tail - (UINT8 *) Data);\r
+ return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
}\r
\r
/**\r
\r
if (AuthVarType == AuthVarTypePk) {\r
//\r
- // Get platform key from variable.\r
+ // Verify that the signature has been made with the current Platform Key (no chaining for PK).\r
+ // First, get signer's certificates from SignedData.\r
+ //\r
+ VerifyStatus = Pkcs7GetSigners (\r
+ SigData,\r
+ SigDataSize,\r
+ &SignerCerts,\r
+ &CertStackSize,\r
+ &RootCert,\r
+ &RootCertSize\r
+ );\r
+ if (!VerifyStatus) {\r
+ goto Exit;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Second, get the current platform key from variable. Check whether it's identical with signer's certificates\r
+ // in SignedData. If not, return error immediately.\r
//\r
Status = FindVariable (\r
EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME,\r
FALSE\r
);\r
if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
- return Status;\r
+ VerifyStatus = FALSE;\r
+ goto Exit;\r
}\r
-\r
CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) GetVariableDataPtr (PkVariable.CurrPtr);\r
Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r
- RootCert = Cert->SignatureData;\r
- RootCertSize = CertList->SignatureSize - (sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1);\r
-\r
+ if ((RootCertSize != (CertList->SignatureSize - (sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1))) ||\r
+ (CompareMem (Cert->SignatureData, RootCert, RootCertSize) != 0)) {\r
+ VerifyStatus = FALSE;\r
+ goto Exit;\r
+ }\r
\r
//\r
// Verify Pkcs7 SignedData via Pkcs7Verify library.\r
//\r
// Delete signer's certificates when delete the common authenticated variable.\r
//\r
- if ((PayloadSize == 0) && (Variable->CurrPtr != NULL)) {\r
+ if ((PayloadSize == 0) && (Variable->CurrPtr != NULL) && ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_APPEND_WRITE) == 0)) {\r
Status = DeleteCertsFromDb (VariableName, VendorGuid);\r
if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
VerifyStatus = FALSE;\r
goto Exit;\r
}\r
- } else if (Variable->CurrPtr == NULL) {\r
+ } else if (Variable->CurrPtr == NULL && PayloadSize != 0) {\r
//\r
// Insert signer's certificates when adding a new common authenticated variable.\r
//\r
\r
Exit:\r
\r
- if (AuthVarType == AuthVarTypePriv) {\r
+ if (AuthVarType == AuthVarTypePk || AuthVarType == AuthVarTypePriv) {\r
Pkcs7FreeSigners (RootCert);\r
Pkcs7FreeSigners (SignerCerts);\r
}\r
projects / mirror_edk2.git / blobdiff