/** @file\r
HII Config Access protocol implementation of SecureBoot configuration module.\r
\r
-Copyright (c) 2011 - 2013, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>\r
+Copyright (c) 2011 - 2017, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>\r
This program and the accompanying materials\r
are licensed and made available under the terms and conditions of the BSD License\r
which accompanies this distribution. The full text of the license may be found at\r
CHAR16 mSecureBootStorageName[] = L"SECUREBOOT_CONFIGURATION";\r
\r
SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_DATA mSecureBootConfigPrivateDateTemplate = {\r
- SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_DATA_SIGNATURE, \r
+ SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_DATA_SIGNATURE,\r
{\r
SecureBootExtractConfig,\r
SecureBootRouteConfig,\r
};\r
\r
\r
+BOOLEAN mIsEnterSecureBootForm = FALSE;\r
+\r
//\r
// OID ASN.1 Value for Hash Algorithms\r
//\r
};\r
\r
HASH_TABLE mHash[] = {\r
- { L"SHA1", 20, &mHashOidValue[8], 5, Sha1GetContextSize, Sha1Init, Sha1Update, Sha1Final },\r
- { L"SHA224", 28, &mHashOidValue[13], 9, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL },\r
- { L"SHA256", 32, &mHashOidValue[22], 9, Sha256GetContextSize,Sha256Init, Sha256Update, Sha256Final},\r
- { L"SHA384", 48, &mHashOidValue[31], 9, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL },\r
- { L"SHA512", 64, &mHashOidValue[40], 9, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL }\r
+ { L"SHA224", 28, &mHashOidValue[13], 9, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL },\r
+ { L"SHA256", 32, &mHashOidValue[22], 9, Sha256GetContextSize, Sha256Init, Sha256Update, Sha256Final},\r
+ { L"SHA384", 48, &mHashOidValue[31], 9, Sha384GetContextSize, Sha384Init, Sha384Update, Sha384Final},\r
+ { L"SHA512", 64, &mHashOidValue[40], 9, Sha512GetContextSize, Sha512Init, Sha512Update, Sha512Final}\r
};\r
\r
//\r
-// Variable Definitions \r
-// \r
+// Variable Definitions\r
+//\r
UINT32 mPeCoffHeaderOffset = 0;\r
WIN_CERTIFICATE *mCertificate = NULL;\r
IMAGE_TYPE mImageType;\r
};\r
CHAR16* mSupportX509Suffix = L"*.cer/der/crt";\r
\r
+SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_DATA *gSecureBootPrivateData = NULL;\r
+\r
+/**\r
+ This code cleans up enrolled file by closing file & free related resources attached to\r
+ enrolled file.\r
+\r
+ @param[in] FileContext FileContext cached in SecureBootConfig driver\r
+\r
+**/\r
+VOID\r
+CloseEnrolledFile(\r
+ IN SECUREBOOT_FILE_CONTEXT *FileContext\r
+)\r
+{\r
+ if (FileContext->FHandle != NULL) {\r
+ CloseFile (FileContext->FHandle);\r
+ FileContext->FHandle = NULL;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ if (FileContext->FileName != NULL){\r
+ FreePool(FileContext->FileName);\r
+ FileContext->FileName = NULL;\r
+ }\r
+ FileContext->FileType = UNKNOWN_FILE_TYPE;\r
+\r
+}\r
+\r
/**\r
This code checks if the FileSuffix is one of the possible DER-encoded certificate suffix.\r
\r
IN CONST CHAR16 *FileSuffix\r
)\r
{\r
- UINTN Index; \r
+ UINTN Index;\r
for (Index = 0; mDerEncodedSuffix[Index] != NULL; Index++) {\r
if (StrCmp (FileSuffix, mDerEncodedSuffix[Index]) == 0) {\r
return TRUE;\r
return FALSE;\r
}\r
\r
+/**\r
+ This code checks if the file content complies with EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 format\r
+The function reads file content but won't open/close given FileHandle.\r
+\r
+ @param[in] FileHandle The FileHandle to be checked\r
+\r
+ @retval TRUE The content is EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 format.\r
+ @retval FALSE The content is NOT a EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 format.\r
+\r
+**/\r
+BOOLEAN\r
+IsAuthentication2Format (\r
+ IN EFI_FILE_HANDLE FileHandle\r
+)\r
+{\r
+ EFI_STATUS Status;\r
+ EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 *Auth2;\r
+ BOOLEAN IsAuth2Format;\r
+\r
+ IsAuth2Format = FALSE;\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Read the whole file content\r
+ //\r
+ Status = ReadFileContent(\r
+ FileHandle,\r
+ (VOID **) &mImageBase,\r
+ &mImageSize,\r
+ 0\r
+ );\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ Auth2 = (EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 *)mImageBase;\r
+ if (Auth2->AuthInfo.Hdr.wCertificateType != WIN_CERT_TYPE_EFI_GUID) {\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ if (CompareGuid(&gEfiCertPkcs7Guid, &Auth2->AuthInfo.CertType)) {\r
+ IsAuth2Format = TRUE;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ON_EXIT:\r
+ //\r
+ // Do not close File. simply check file content\r
+ //\r
+ if (mImageBase != NULL) {\r
+ FreePool (mImageBase);\r
+ mImageBase = NULL;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ return IsAuth2Format;\r
+}\r
+\r
/**\r
Set Secure Boot option into variable space.\r
\r
/**\r
Create a time based data payload by concatenating the EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2\r
descriptor with the input data. NO authentication is required in this function.\r
- \r
+\r
@param[in, out] DataSize On input, the size of Data buffer in bytes.\r
On output, the size of data returned in Data\r
buffer in bytes.\r
- @param[in, out] Data On input, Pointer to data buffer to be wrapped or \r
+ @param[in, out] Data On input, Pointer to data buffer to be wrapped or\r
pointer to NULL to wrap an empty payload.\r
On output, Pointer to the new payload date buffer allocated from pool,\r
- it's caller's responsibility to free the memory when finish using it. \r
+ it's caller's responsibility to free the memory when finish using it.\r
\r
@retval EFI_SUCCESS Create time based payload successfully.\r
@retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES There are not enough memory resourses to create time based payload.\r
EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 *DescriptorData;\r
UINTN DescriptorSize;\r
EFI_TIME Time;\r
- \r
+\r
if (Data == NULL || DataSize == NULL) {\r
return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
}\r
- \r
+\r
//\r
- // In Setup mode or Custom mode, the variable does not need to be signed but the \r
+ // In Setup mode or Custom mode, the variable does not need to be signed but the\r
// parameters to the SetVariable() call still need to be prepared as authenticated\r
// variable. So we create EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_2 descriptor without certificate\r
// data in it.\r
//\r
Payload = *Data;\r
PayloadSize = *DataSize;\r
- \r
+\r
DescriptorSize = OFFSET_OF (EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2, AuthInfo) + OFFSET_OF (WIN_CERTIFICATE_UEFI_GUID, CertData);\r
NewData = (UINT8*) AllocateZeroPool (DescriptorSize + PayloadSize);\r
if (NewData == NULL) {\r
Time.Daylight = 0;\r
Time.Pad2 = 0;\r
CopyMem (&DescriptorData->TimeStamp, &Time, sizeof (EFI_TIME));\r
- \r
+\r
DescriptorData->AuthInfo.Hdr.dwLength = OFFSET_OF (WIN_CERTIFICATE_UEFI_GUID, CertData);\r
DescriptorData->AuthInfo.Hdr.wRevision = 0x0200;\r
DescriptorData->AuthInfo.Hdr.wCertificateType = WIN_CERT_TYPE_EFI_GUID;\r
CopyGuid (&DescriptorData->AuthInfo.CertType, &gEfiCertPkcs7Guid);\r
- \r
+\r
if (Payload != NULL) {\r
FreePool(Payload);\r
}\r
- \r
+\r
*DataSize = DescriptorSize + PayloadSize;\r
*Data = NewData;\r
return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
\r
@param[in] SecureBootMode New secure boot mode: STANDARD_SECURE_BOOT_MODE or\r
CUSTOM_SECURE_BOOT_MODE.\r
- \r
+\r
@return EFI_SUCCESS The platform has switched to the special mode successfully.\r
@return other Fail to operate the secure boot mode.\r
- \r
+\r
**/\r
EFI_STATUS\r
SetSecureBootMode (\r
IN UINT8 SecureBootMode\r
)\r
{\r
- return gRT->SetVariable ( \r
+ return gRT->SetVariable (\r
EFI_CUSTOM_MODE_NAME,\r
&gEfiCustomModeEnableGuid,\r
EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS,\r
\r
@param[in] X509File FileHandle of X509 Certificate storing file.\r
@param[out] PkCert Point to the data buffer to store the signature list.\r
- \r
+\r
@return EFI_UNSUPPORTED Unsupported Key Length.\r
@return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES There are not enough memory resourses to form the signature list.\r
- \r
+\r
**/\r
EFI_STATUS\r
CreatePkX509SignatureList (\r
- IN EFI_FILE_HANDLE X509File, \r
- OUT EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST **PkCert \r
+ IN EFI_FILE_HANDLE X509File,\r
+ OUT EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST **PkCert\r
)\r
{\r
- EFI_STATUS Status; \r
+ EFI_STATUS Status;\r
UINT8 *X509Data;\r
UINTN X509DataSize;\r
EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *PkCertData;\r
\r
X509Data = NULL;\r
PkCertData = NULL;\r
- X509DataSize = 0; \r
- \r
+ X509DataSize = 0;\r
+\r
Status = ReadFileContent (X509File, (VOID**) &X509Data, &X509DataSize, 0);\r
if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
goto ON_EXIT;\r
goto ON_EXIT;\r
}\r
\r
- (*PkCert)->SignatureListSize = (UINT32) (sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) \r
+ (*PkCert)->SignatureListSize = (UINT32) (sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST)\r
+ sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1\r
+ X509DataSize);\r
(*PkCert)->SignatureSize = (UINT32) (sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1 + X509DataSize);\r
(*PkCert)->SignatureHeaderSize = 0;\r
CopyGuid (&(*PkCert)->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Guid);\r
- PkCertData = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA*) ((UINTN)(*PkCert) \r
+ PkCertData = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA*) ((UINTN)(*PkCert)\r
+ sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST)\r
+ (*PkCert)->SignatureHeaderSize);\r
- CopyGuid (&PkCertData->SignatureOwner, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid); \r
+ CopyGuid (&PkCertData->SignatureOwner, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid);\r
//\r
// Fill the PK database with PKpub data from X509 certificate file.\r
- // \r
+ //\r
CopyMem (&(PkCertData->SignatureData[0]), X509Data, X509DataSize);\r
- \r
+\r
ON_EXIT:\r
- \r
+\r
if (X509Data != NULL) {\r
FreePool (X509Data);\r
}\r
- \r
+\r
if (EFI_ERROR(Status) && *PkCert != NULL) {\r
FreePool (*PkCert);\r
*PkCert = NULL;\r
}\r
- \r
+\r
return Status;\r
}\r
\r
@retval EFI_SUCCESS New PK enrolled successfully.\r
@retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER The parameter is invalid.\r
@retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES Could not allocate needed resources.\r
- \r
+\r
**/\r
EFI_STATUS\r
EnrollPlatformKey (\r
IN SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_DATA* Private\r
- ) \r
+ )\r
{\r
EFI_STATUS Status;\r
UINT32 Attr;\r
UINTN DataSize;\r
EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *PkCert;\r
UINT16* FilePostFix;\r
- \r
+ UINTN NameLength;\r
+\r
if (Private->FileContext->FileName == NULL) {\r
return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
}\r
//\r
// Parse the file's postfix. Only support DER encoded X.509 certificate files.\r
//\r
- FilePostFix = Private->FileContext->FileName + StrLen (Private->FileContext->FileName) - 4;\r
+ NameLength = StrLen (Private->FileContext->FileName);\r
+ if (NameLength <= 4) {\r
+ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
+ }\r
+ FilePostFix = Private->FileContext->FileName + NameLength - 4;\r
if (!IsDerEncodeCertificate(FilePostFix)) {\r
DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Unsupported file type, only DER encoded certificate (%s) is supported.", mSupportX509Suffix));\r
return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
// Prase the selected PK file and generature PK certificate list.\r
//\r
Status = CreatePkX509SignatureList (\r
- Private->FileContext->FHandle, \r
- &PkCert \r
+ Private->FileContext->FHandle,\r
+ &PkCert\r
);\r
if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
goto ON_EXIT;\r
}\r
ASSERT (PkCert != NULL);\r
- \r
+\r
//\r
// Set Platform Key variable.\r
- // \r
- Attr = EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS \r
+ //\r
+ Attr = EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS\r
| EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS;\r
DataSize = PkCert->SignatureListSize;\r
Status = CreateTimeBasedPayload (&DataSize, (UINT8**) &PkCert);\r
DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Fail to create time-based data payload: %r", Status));\r
goto ON_EXIT;\r
}\r
- \r
+\r
Status = gRT->SetVariable(\r
- EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME, \r
- &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, \r
- Attr, \r
- DataSize, \r
+ EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME,\r
+ &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
+ Attr,\r
+ DataSize,\r
PkCert\r
);\r
if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
}\r
goto ON_EXIT;\r
}\r
- \r
+\r
ON_EXIT:\r
\r
if (PkCert != NULL) {\r
FreePool(PkCert);\r
}\r
- \r
- if (Private->FileContext->FHandle != NULL) {\r
- CloseFile (Private->FileContext->FHandle);\r
- Private->FileContext->FHandle = NULL;\r
- }\r
+\r
+ CloseEnrolledFile(Private->FileContext);\r
\r
return Status;\r
}\r
\r
@retval EFI_SUCCESS Delete PK successfully.\r
@retval Others Could not allow to delete PK.\r
- \r
+\r
**/\r
EFI_STATUS\r
DeletePlatformKey (\r
CPL_KEY_INFO *KeyInfo;\r
EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *KEKSigData;\r
UINTN KekSigListSize;\r
- UINT8 *KeyBuffer; \r
+ UINT8 *KeyBuffer;\r
UINTN KeyLenInBytes;\r
\r
Attr = 0;\r
KEKSigData = NULL;\r
KekSigList = NULL;\r
KekSigListSize = 0;\r
- \r
+\r
//\r
// Form the KeKpub certificate list into EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST type.\r
// First, We have to parse out public key data from the pbk key file.\r
- // \r
+ //\r
Status = ReadFileContent (\r
Private->FileContext->FHandle,\r
(VOID**) &KeyBlob,\r
Status = EFI_UNSUPPORTED;\r
goto ON_EXIT;\r
}\r
- \r
+\r
//\r
// Convert the Public key to fix octet string format represented in RSA PKCS#1.\r
- // \r
+ //\r
KeyLenInBytes = KeyInfo->KeyLengthInBits / 8;\r
KeyBuffer = AllocateZeroPool (KeyLenInBytes);\r
if (KeyBuffer == NULL) {\r
goto ON_EXIT;\r
}\r
Int2OctStr (\r
- (UINTN*) (KeyBlob + sizeof (CPL_KEY_INFO)), \r
- KeyLenInBytes / sizeof (UINTN), \r
- KeyBuffer, \r
+ (UINTN*) (KeyBlob + sizeof (CPL_KEY_INFO)),\r
+ KeyLenInBytes / sizeof (UINTN),\r
+ KeyBuffer,\r
KeyLenInBytes\r
);\r
CopyMem(KeyBlob + sizeof(CPL_KEY_INFO), KeyBuffer, KeyLenInBytes);\r
- \r
+\r
//\r
// Form an new EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST.\r
//\r
KekSigList->SignatureHeaderSize = 0;\r
KekSigList->SignatureSize = sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1 + WIN_CERT_UEFI_RSA2048_SIZE;\r
CopyGuid (&KekSigList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertRsa2048Guid);\r
- \r
+\r
KEKSigData = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA*)((UINT8*)KekSigList + sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST));\r
CopyGuid (&KEKSigData->SignatureOwner, Private->SignatureGUID);\r
CopyMem (\r
KeyBlob + sizeof(CPL_KEY_INFO),\r
WIN_CERT_UEFI_RSA2048_SIZE\r
);\r
- \r
+\r
//\r
- // Check if KEK entry has been already existed. \r
- // If true, use EFI_VARIABLE_APPEND_WRITE attribute to append the \r
+ // Check if KEK entry has been already existed.\r
+ // If true, use EFI_VARIABLE_APPEND_WRITE attribute to append the\r
// new KEK to original variable.\r
- // \r
- Attr = EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS \r
+ //\r
+ Attr = EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS\r
| EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS;\r
Status = CreateTimeBasedPayload (&KekSigListSize, (UINT8**) &KekSigList);\r
if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
}\r
\r
Status = gRT->GetVariable(\r
- EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME, \r
- &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, \r
- NULL, \r
- &DataSize, \r
+ EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME,\r
+ &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
+ NULL,\r
+ &DataSize,\r
NULL\r
);\r
if (Status == EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {\r
} else if (Status != EFI_NOT_FOUND) {\r
goto ON_EXIT;\r
}\r
- \r
+\r
//\r
// Done. Now we have formed the correct KEKpub database item, just set it into variable storage,\r
- // \r
+ //\r
Status = gRT->SetVariable(\r
- EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME, \r
- &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, \r
- Attr, \r
- KekSigListSize, \r
+ EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME,\r
+ &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
+ Attr,\r
+ KekSigListSize,\r
KekSigList\r
);\r
if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
goto ON_EXIT;\r
}\r
- \r
+\r
ON_EXIT:\r
\r
- CloseFile (Private->FileContext->FHandle);\r
- Private->FileContext->FHandle = NULL;\r
- Private->FileContext->FileName = NULL;\r
+ CloseEnrolledFile(Private->FileContext);\r
\r
if (Private->SignatureGUID != NULL) {\r
FreePool (Private->SignatureGUID);\r
if (KekSigList != NULL) {\r
FreePool (KekSigList);\r
}\r
- \r
+\r
return Status;\r
}\r
\r
EFI_STATUS\r
EnrollX509ToKek (\r
IN SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_DATA *Private\r
- ) \r
+ )\r
{\r
EFI_STATUS Status;\r
UINTN X509DataSize;\r
\r
//\r
// Fill Certificate Database parameters.\r
- // \r
+ //\r
KekSigList->SignatureListSize = (UINT32) KekSigListSize;\r
KekSigList->SignatureHeaderSize = 0;\r
KekSigList->SignatureSize = (UINT32) (sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1 + X509DataSize);\r
CopyMem (KEKSigData->SignatureData, X509Data, X509DataSize);\r
\r
//\r
- // Check if KEK been already existed. \r
- // If true, use EFI_VARIABLE_APPEND_WRITE attribute to append the \r
+ // Check if KEK been already existed.\r
+ // If true, use EFI_VARIABLE_APPEND_WRITE attribute to append the\r
// new kek to original variable\r
- // \r
- Attr = EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS \r
+ //\r
+ Attr = EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS\r
| EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS;\r
Status = CreateTimeBasedPayload (&KekSigListSize, (UINT8**) &KekSigList);\r
if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Fail to create time-based data payload: %r", Status));\r
goto ON_EXIT;\r
}\r
- \r
+\r
Status = gRT->GetVariable(\r
- EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME, \r
- &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, \r
- NULL, \r
- &DataSize, \r
+ EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME,\r
+ &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
+ NULL,\r
+ &DataSize,\r
NULL\r
);\r
if (Status == EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {\r
Attr |= EFI_VARIABLE_APPEND_WRITE;\r
} else if (Status != EFI_NOT_FOUND) {\r
goto ON_EXIT;\r
- } \r
+ }\r
\r
Status = gRT->SetVariable(\r
- EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME, \r
- &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, \r
- Attr, \r
+ EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME,\r
+ &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
+ Attr,\r
KekSigListSize,\r
KekSigList\r
);\r
\r
ON_EXIT:\r
\r
- CloseFile (Private->FileContext->FHandle);\r
- Private->FileContext->FileName = NULL;\r
- Private->FileContext->FHandle = NULL;\r
+ CloseEnrolledFile(Private->FileContext);\r
\r
if (Private->SignatureGUID != NULL) {\r
FreePool (Private->SignatureGUID);\r
/**\r
Enroll new KEK into the System without PK's authentication.\r
The SignatureOwner GUID will be Private->SignatureGUID.\r
- \r
+\r
@param[in] PrivateData The module's private data.\r
- \r
+\r
@retval EFI_SUCCESS New KEK enrolled successful.\r
@retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER The parameter is invalid.\r
@retval others Fail to enroll KEK data.\r
- \r
+\r
**/\r
EFI_STATUS\r
EnrollKeyExchangeKey (\r
IN SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_DATA *Private\r
- ) \r
+ )\r
{\r
UINT16* FilePostFix;\r
EFI_STATUS Status;\r
- \r
- if ((Private->FileContext->FileName == NULL) || (Private->SignatureGUID == NULL)) {\r
+ UINTN NameLength;\r
+\r
+ if ((Private->FileContext->FHandle == NULL) || (Private->FileContext->FileName == NULL) || (Private->SignatureGUID == NULL)) {\r
return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
}\r
\r
}\r
\r
//\r
- // Parse the file's postfix. Supports DER-encoded X509 certificate, \r
+ // Parse the file's postfix. Supports DER-encoded X509 certificate,\r
// and .pbk as RSA public key file.\r
//\r
- FilePostFix = Private->FileContext->FileName + StrLen (Private->FileContext->FileName) - 4;\r
+ NameLength = StrLen (Private->FileContext->FileName);\r
+ if (NameLength <= 4) {\r
+ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
+ }\r
+ FilePostFix = Private->FileContext->FileName + NameLength - 4;\r
if (IsDerEncodeCertificate(FilePostFix)) {\r
return EnrollX509ToKek (Private);\r
} else if (CompareMem (FilePostFix, L".pbk",4) == 0) {\r
return EnrollRsa2048ToKek (Private);\r
} else {\r
+ //\r
+ // File type is wrong, simply close it\r
+ //\r
+ CloseEnrolledFile(Private->FileContext);\r
+\r
return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
}\r
}\r
\r
/**\r
- Enroll a new X509 certificate into Signature Database (DB or DBX) without\r
+ Enroll a new X509 certificate into Signature Database (DB or DBX or DBT) without\r
KEK's authentication.\r
\r
@param[in] PrivateData The module's private data.\r
- @param[in] VariableName Variable name of signature database, must be \r
+ @param[in] VariableName Variable name of signature database, must be\r
EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE or EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1.\r
- \r
+\r
@retval EFI_SUCCESS New X509 is enrolled successfully.\r
@retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES Could not allocate needed resources.\r
\r
EnrollX509toSigDB (\r
IN SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_DATA *Private,\r
IN CHAR16 *VariableName\r
- ) \r
+ )\r
{\r
EFI_STATUS Status;\r
UINTN X509DataSize;\r
\r
//\r
// Fill Certificate Database parameters.\r
- // \r
+ //\r
SigDBCert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST*) Data;\r
SigDBCert->SignatureListSize = (UINT32) SigDBSize;\r
SigDBCert->SignatureHeaderSize = 0;\r
CopyMem ((UINT8* ) (SigDBCertData->SignatureData), X509Data, X509DataSize);\r
\r
//\r
- // Check if signature database entry has been already existed. \r
- // If true, use EFI_VARIABLE_APPEND_WRITE attribute to append the \r
+ // Check if signature database entry has been already existed.\r
+ // If true, use EFI_VARIABLE_APPEND_WRITE attribute to append the\r
// new signature data to original variable\r
- // \r
- Attr = EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS \r
+ //\r
+ Attr = EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS\r
| EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS;\r
Status = CreateTimeBasedPayload (&SigDBSize, (UINT8**) &Data);\r
if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
}\r
\r
Status = gRT->GetVariable(\r
- VariableName, \r
- &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, \r
- NULL, \r
- &DataSize, \r
+ VariableName,\r
+ &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid,\r
+ NULL,\r
+ &DataSize,\r
NULL\r
);\r
if (Status == EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {\r
Attr |= EFI_VARIABLE_APPEND_WRITE;\r
} else if (Status != EFI_NOT_FOUND) {\r
goto ON_EXIT;\r
- } \r
+ }\r
\r
Status = gRT->SetVariable(\r
- VariableName, \r
- &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, \r
- Attr, \r
+ VariableName,\r
+ &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid,\r
+ Attr,\r
SigDBSize,\r
Data\r
);\r
\r
ON_EXIT:\r
\r
- CloseFile (Private->FileContext->FHandle);\r
- Private->FileContext->FileName = NULL;\r
- Private->FileContext->FHandle = NULL;\r
+ CloseEnrolledFile(Private->FileContext);\r
\r
if (Private->SignatureGUID != NULL) {\r
FreePool (Private->SignatureGUID);\r
}\r
\r
/**\r
- Load PE/COFF image information into internal buffer and check its validity.\r
+ Check whether signature is in specified database.\r
\r
- @retval EFI_SUCCESS Successful\r
- @retval EFI_UNSUPPORTED Invalid PE/COFF file\r
- @retval EFI_ABORTED Serious error occurs, like file I/O error etc.\r
+ @param[in] VariableName Name of database variable that is searched in.\r
+ @param[in] Signature Pointer to signature that is searched for.\r
+ @param[in] SignatureSize Size of Signature.\r
+\r
+ @return TRUE Found the signature in the variable database.\r
+ @return FALSE Not found the signature in the variable database.\r
\r
**/\r
-EFI_STATUS\r
-LoadPeImage (\r
- VOID \r
- ) \r
+BOOLEAN\r
+IsSignatureFoundInDatabase (\r
+ IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r
+ IN UINT8 *Signature,\r
+ IN UINTN SignatureSize\r
+ )\r
{\r
- EFI_IMAGE_DOS_HEADER *DosHdr;\r
- EFI_IMAGE_NT_HEADERS32 *NtHeader32;\r
- EFI_IMAGE_NT_HEADERS64 *NtHeader64;\r
+ EFI_STATUS Status;\r
+ EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *CertList;\r
+ EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *Cert;\r
+ UINTN DataSize;\r
+ UINT8 *Data;\r
+ UINTN Index;\r
+ UINTN CertCount;\r
+ BOOLEAN IsFound;\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Read signature database variable.\r
+ //\r
+ IsFound = FALSE;\r
+ Data = NULL;\r
+ DataSize = 0;\r
+ Status = gRT->GetVariable (VariableName, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, NULL, &DataSize, NULL);\r
+ if (Status != EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {\r
+ return FALSE;\r
+ }\r
\r
- NtHeader32 = NULL;\r
- NtHeader64 = NULL;\r
- //\r
- // Read the Dos header\r
- //\r
- DosHdr = (EFI_IMAGE_DOS_HEADER*)(mImageBase);\r
- if (DosHdr->e_magic == EFI_IMAGE_DOS_SIGNATURE)\r
- {\r
- //\r
- // DOS image header is present, \r
- // So read the PE header after the DOS image header\r
- //\r
- mPeCoffHeaderOffset = DosHdr->e_lfanew;\r
+ Data = (UINT8 *) AllocateZeroPool (DataSize);\r
+ if (Data == NULL) {\r
+ return FALSE;\r
}\r
- else\r
- {\r
- mPeCoffHeaderOffset = 0;\r
+\r
+ Status = gRT->GetVariable (VariableName, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, NULL, &DataSize, Data);\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
+ goto Done;\r
}\r
\r
//\r
- // Read PE header and check the signature validity and machine compatibility\r
+ // Enumerate all signature data in SigDB to check if executable's signature exists.\r
//\r
- NtHeader32 = (EFI_IMAGE_NT_HEADERS32*) (mImageBase + mPeCoffHeaderOffset);\r
- if (NtHeader32->Signature != EFI_IMAGE_NT_SIGNATURE)\r
- {\r
- return EFI_UNSUPPORTED;\r
- }\r
+ CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) Data;\r
+ while ((DataSize > 0) && (DataSize >= CertList->SignatureListSize)) {\r
+ CertCount = (CertList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - CertList->SignatureHeaderSize) / CertList->SignatureSize;\r
+ Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r
+ if ((CertList->SignatureSize == sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1 + SignatureSize) && (CompareGuid(&CertList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Guid))) {\r
+ for (Index = 0; Index < CertCount; Index++) {\r
+ if (CompareMem (Cert->SignatureData, Signature, SignatureSize) == 0) {\r
+ //\r
+ // Find the signature in database.\r
+ //\r
+ IsFound = TRUE;\r
+ break;\r
+ }\r
+ Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) Cert + CertList->SignatureSize);\r
+ }\r
\r
- mNtHeader.Pe32 = NtHeader32;\r
+ if (IsFound) {\r
+ break;\r
+ }\r
+ }\r
\r
- //\r
- // Check the architecture field of PE header and get the Certificate Data Directory data\r
- // Note the size of FileHeader field is constant for both IA32 and X64 arch\r
- //\r
- if ((NtHeader32->FileHeader.Machine == EFI_IMAGE_MACHINE_IA32) \r
- || (NtHeader32->FileHeader.Machine == EFI_IMAGE_MACHINE_EBC)) {\r
- //\r
- // IA-32 Architecture\r
- //\r
- mImageType = ImageType_IA32;\r
- mSecDataDir = (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATA_DIRECTORY*) &(NtHeader32->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY]);\r
+ DataSize -= CertList->SignatureListSize;\r
+ CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + CertList->SignatureListSize);\r
}\r
- else if ((NtHeader32->FileHeader.Machine == EFI_IMAGE_MACHINE_IA64)\r
- || (NtHeader32->FileHeader.Machine == EFI_IMAGE_MACHINE_X64)) {\r
- //\r
- // 64-bits Architecture\r
- //\r
- mImageType = ImageType_X64;\r
- NtHeader64 = (EFI_IMAGE_NT_HEADERS64 *) (mImageBase + mPeCoffHeaderOffset);\r
- mSecDataDir = (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATA_DIRECTORY*) &(NtHeader64->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY]);\r
- } else {\r
- return EFI_UNSUPPORTED;\r
+\r
+Done:\r
+ if (Data != NULL) {\r
+ FreePool (Data);\r
}\r
\r
- return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
+ return IsFound;\r
}\r
\r
/**\r
- Calculate hash of Pe/Coff image based on the authenticode image hashing in\r
- PE/COFF Specification 8.0 Appendix A\r
+ Calculate the hash of a certificate data with the specified hash algorithm.\r
\r
- @param[in] HashAlg Hash algorithm type.\r
- \r
- @retval TRUE Successfully hash image.\r
- @retval FALSE Fail in hash image.\r
+ @param[in] CertData The certificate data to be hashed.\r
+ @param[in] CertSize The certificate size in bytes.\r
+ @param[in] HashAlg The specified hash algorithm.\r
+ @param[out] CertHash The output digest of the certificate\r
+\r
+ @retval TRUE Successfully got the hash of the CertData.\r
+ @retval FALSE Failed to get the hash of CertData.\r
\r
**/\r
-BOOLEAN \r
-HashPeImage (\r
- IN UINT32 HashAlg\r
+BOOLEAN\r
+CalculateCertHash (\r
+ IN UINT8 *CertData,\r
+ IN UINTN CertSize,\r
+ IN UINT32 HashAlg,\r
+ OUT UINT8 *CertHash\r
)\r
{\r
BOOLEAN Status;\r
- UINT16 Magic;\r
- EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER *Section;\r
VOID *HashCtx;\r
UINTN CtxSize;\r
- UINT8 *HashBase;\r
- UINTN HashSize;\r
- UINTN SumOfBytesHashed;\r
- EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER *SectionHeader;\r
- UINTN Index;\r
- UINTN Pos;\r
+ UINT8 *TBSCert;\r
+ UINTN TBSCertSize;\r
\r
- HashCtx = NULL;\r
- SectionHeader = NULL;\r
- Status = FALSE;\r
+ HashCtx = NULL;\r
+ Status = FALSE;\r
\r
- if ((HashAlg != HASHALG_SHA1) && (HashAlg != HASHALG_SHA256)) {\r
+ if (HashAlg >= HASHALG_MAX) {\r
return FALSE;\r
}\r
- \r
+\r
//\r
- // Initialize context of hash.\r
+ // Retrieve the TBSCertificate for Hash Calculation.\r
//\r
- ZeroMem (mImageDigest, MAX_DIGEST_SIZE);\r
-\r
- if (HashAlg == HASHALG_SHA1) {\r
- mImageDigestSize = SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE;\r
- mCertType = gEfiCertSha1Guid; \r
- } else if (HashAlg == HASHALG_SHA256) {\r
- mImageDigestSize = SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE;\r
- mCertType = gEfiCertSha256Guid;\r
+ if (!X509GetTBSCert (CertData, CertSize, &TBSCert, &TBSCertSize)) {\r
+ return FALSE;\r
}\r
\r
- CtxSize = mHash[HashAlg].GetContextSize();\r
- \r
+ //\r
+ // 1. Initialize context of hash.\r
+ //\r
+ CtxSize = mHash[HashAlg].GetContextSize ();\r
HashCtx = AllocatePool (CtxSize);\r
ASSERT (HashCtx != NULL);\r
\r
- // 1. Load the image header into memory.\r
-\r
- // 2. Initialize a SHA hash context.\r
- Status = mHash[HashAlg].HashInit(HashCtx);\r
+ //\r
+ // 2. Initialize a hash context.\r
+ //\r
+ Status = mHash[HashAlg].HashInit (HashCtx);\r
if (!Status) {\r
goto Done;\r
}\r
+\r
//\r
- // Measuring PE/COFF Image Header;\r
- // But CheckSum field and SECURITY data directory (certificate) are excluded\r
+ // 3. Calculate the hash.\r
//\r
- if (mNtHeader.Pe32->FileHeader.Machine == IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_IA64 && mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {\r
- //\r
- // NOTE: Some versions of Linux ELILO for Itanium have an incorrect magic value \r
- // in the PE/COFF Header. If the MachineType is Itanium(IA64) and the \r
- // Magic value in the OptionalHeader is EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC\r
- // then override the magic value to EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR64_MAGIC\r
- //\r
- Magic = EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR64_MAGIC;\r
- } else {\r
- //\r
- // Get the magic value from the PE/COFF Optional Header\r
- //\r
- Magic = mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.Magic;\r
+ Status = mHash[HashAlg].HashUpdate (HashCtx, TBSCert, TBSCertSize);\r
+ if (!Status) {\r
+ goto Done;\r
}\r
- \r
+\r
//\r
- // 3. Calculate the distance from the base of the image header to the image checksum address.\r
- // 4. Hash the image header from its base to beginning of the image checksum.\r
+ // 4. Get the hash result.\r
//\r
- HashBase = mImageBase;\r
- if (Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {\r
- //\r
- // Use PE32 offset.\r
- //\r
- HashSize = (UINTN) ((UINT8 *) (&mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.CheckSum) - HashBase);\r
- } else {\r
- //\r
+ ZeroMem (CertHash, mHash[HashAlg].DigestLength);\r
+ Status = mHash[HashAlg].HashFinal (HashCtx, CertHash);\r
+\r
+Done:\r
+ if (HashCtx != NULL) {\r
+ FreePool (HashCtx);\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ return Status;\r
+}\r
+\r
+/**\r
+ Check whether the hash of an X.509 certificate is in forbidden database (DBX).\r
+\r
+ @param[in] Certificate Pointer to X.509 Certificate that is searched for.\r
+ @param[in] CertSize Size of X.509 Certificate.\r
+\r
+ @return TRUE Found the certificate hash in the forbidden database.\r
+ @return FALSE Certificate hash is Not found in the forbidden database.\r
+\r
+**/\r
+BOOLEAN\r
+IsCertHashFoundInDbx (\r
+ IN UINT8 *Certificate,\r
+ IN UINTN CertSize\r
+ )\r
+{\r
+ BOOLEAN IsFound;\r
+ EFI_STATUS Status;\r
+ EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *DbxList;\r
+ EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *CertHash;\r
+ UINTN CertHashCount;\r
+ UINTN Index;\r
+ UINT32 HashAlg;\r
+ UINT8 CertDigest[MAX_DIGEST_SIZE];\r
+ UINT8 *DbxCertHash;\r
+ UINTN SiglistHeaderSize;\r
+ UINT8 *Data;\r
+ UINTN DataSize;\r
+\r
+ IsFound = FALSE;\r
+ HashAlg = HASHALG_MAX;\r
+ Data = NULL;\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Read signature database variable.\r
+ //\r
+ DataSize = 0;\r
+ Status = gRT->GetVariable (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, NULL, &DataSize, NULL);\r
+ if (Status != EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {\r
+ return FALSE;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ Data = (UINT8 *) AllocateZeroPool (DataSize);\r
+ if (Data == NULL) {\r
+ return FALSE;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ Status = gRT->GetVariable (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, NULL, &DataSize, Data);\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
+ goto Done;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Check whether the certificate hash exists in the forbidden database.\r
+ //\r
+ DbxList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) Data;\r
+ while ((DataSize > 0) && (DataSize >= DbxList->SignatureListSize)) {\r
+ //\r
+ // Determine Hash Algorithm of Certificate in the forbidden database.\r
+ //\r
+ if (CompareGuid (&DbxList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Sha256Guid)) {\r
+ HashAlg = HASHALG_SHA256;\r
+ } else if (CompareGuid (&DbxList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Sha384Guid)) {\r
+ HashAlg = HASHALG_SHA384;\r
+ } else if (CompareGuid (&DbxList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Sha512Guid)) {\r
+ HashAlg = HASHALG_SHA512;\r
+ } else {\r
+ DataSize -= DbxList->SignatureListSize;\r
+ DbxList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) DbxList + DbxList->SignatureListSize);\r
+ continue;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Calculate the hash value of current db certificate for comparision.\r
+ //\r
+ if (!CalculateCertHash (Certificate, CertSize, HashAlg, CertDigest)) {\r
+ goto Done;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ SiglistHeaderSize = sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + DbxList->SignatureHeaderSize;\r
+ CertHash = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) DbxList + SiglistHeaderSize);\r
+ CertHashCount = (DbxList->SignatureListSize - SiglistHeaderSize) / DbxList->SignatureSize;\r
+ for (Index = 0; Index < CertHashCount; Index++) {\r
+ //\r
+ // Iterate each Signature Data Node within this CertList for verify.\r
+ //\r
+ DbxCertHash = CertHash->SignatureData;\r
+ if (CompareMem (DbxCertHash, CertDigest, mHash[HashAlg].DigestLength) == 0) {\r
+ //\r
+ // Hash of Certificate is found in forbidden database.\r
+ //\r
+ IsFound = TRUE;\r
+ goto Done;\r
+ }\r
+ CertHash = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertHash + DbxList->SignatureSize);\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ DataSize -= DbxList->SignatureListSize;\r
+ DbxList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) DbxList + DbxList->SignatureListSize);\r
+ }\r
+\r
+Done:\r
+ if (Data != NULL) {\r
+ FreePool (Data);\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ return IsFound;\r
+}\r
+\r
+/**\r
+ Check whether the signature list exists in given variable data.\r
+\r
+ It searches the signature list for the ceritificate hash by CertType.\r
+ If the signature list is found, get the offset of Database for the\r
+ next hash of a certificate.\r
+\r
+ @param[in] Database Variable data to save signature list.\r
+ @param[in] DatabaseSize Variable size.\r
+ @param[in] SignatureType The type of the signature.\r
+ @param[out] Offset The offset to save a new hash of certificate.\r
+\r
+ @return TRUE The signature list is found in the forbidden database.\r
+ @return FALSE The signature list is not found in the forbidden database.\r
+**/\r
+BOOLEAN\r
+GetSignaturelistOffset (\r
+ IN EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *Database,\r
+ IN UINTN DatabaseSize,\r
+ IN EFI_GUID *SignatureType,\r
+ OUT UINTN *Offset\r
+ )\r
+{\r
+ EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *SigList;\r
+ UINTN SiglistSize;\r
+\r
+ if ((Database == NULL) || (DatabaseSize == 0)) {\r
+ *Offset = 0;\r
+ return FALSE;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ SigList = Database;\r
+ SiglistSize = DatabaseSize;\r
+ while ((SiglistSize > 0) && (SiglistSize >= SigList->SignatureListSize)) {\r
+ if (CompareGuid (&SigList->SignatureType, SignatureType)) {\r
+ *Offset = DatabaseSize - SiglistSize;\r
+ return TRUE;\r
+ }\r
+ SiglistSize -= SigList->SignatureListSize;\r
+ SigList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) SigList + SigList->SignatureListSize);\r
+ }\r
+ *Offset = 0;\r
+ return FALSE;\r
+}\r
+\r
+/**\r
+ Enroll a new X509 certificate hash into Signature Database (dbx) without\r
+ KEK's authentication.\r
+\r
+ @param[in] PrivateData The module's private data.\r
+ @param[in] HashAlg The hash algorithm to enroll the certificate.\r
+ @param[in] RevocationDate The revocation date of the certificate.\r
+ @param[in] RevocationTime The revocation time of the certificate.\r
+ @param[in] AlwaysRevocation Indicate whether the certificate is always revoked.\r
+\r
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS New X509 is enrolled successfully.\r
+ @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER The parameter is invalid.\r
+ @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES Could not allocate needed resources.\r
+\r
+**/\r
+EFI_STATUS\r
+EnrollX509HashtoSigDB (\r
+ IN SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_DATA *Private,\r
+ IN UINT32 HashAlg,\r
+ IN EFI_HII_DATE *RevocationDate,\r
+ IN EFI_HII_TIME *RevocationTime,\r
+ IN BOOLEAN AlwaysRevocation\r
+ )\r
+{\r
+ EFI_STATUS Status;\r
+ UINTN X509DataSize;\r
+ VOID *X509Data;\r
+ EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *SignatureList;\r
+ UINTN SignatureListSize;\r
+ UINT8 *Data;\r
+ UINT8 *NewData;\r
+ UINTN DataSize;\r
+ UINTN DbSize;\r
+ UINT32 Attr;\r
+ EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *SignatureData;\r
+ UINTN SignatureSize;\r
+ EFI_GUID SignatureType;\r
+ UINTN Offset;\r
+ UINT8 CertHash[MAX_DIGEST_SIZE];\r
+ UINT16* FilePostFix;\r
+ UINTN NameLength;\r
+ EFI_TIME *Time;\r
+\r
+ X509DataSize = 0;\r
+ DbSize = 0;\r
+ X509Data = NULL;\r
+ SignatureData = NULL;\r
+ SignatureList = NULL;\r
+ Data = NULL;\r
+ NewData = NULL;\r
+\r
+ if ((Private->FileContext->FileName == NULL) || (Private->FileContext->FHandle == NULL) || (Private->SignatureGUID == NULL)) {\r
+ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ Status = SetSecureBootMode (CUSTOM_SECURE_BOOT_MODE);\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
+ return Status;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Parse the file's postfix.\r
+ //\r
+ NameLength = StrLen (Private->FileContext->FileName);\r
+ if (NameLength <= 4) {\r
+ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
+ }\r
+ FilePostFix = Private->FileContext->FileName + NameLength - 4;\r
+ if (!IsDerEncodeCertificate(FilePostFix)) {\r
+ //\r
+ // Only supports DER-encoded X509 certificate.\r
+ //\r
+ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Get the certificate from file and calculate its hash.\r
+ //\r
+ Status = ReadFileContent (\r
+ Private->FileContext->FHandle,\r
+ &X509Data,\r
+ &X509DataSize,\r
+ 0\r
+ );\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+ ASSERT (X509Data != NULL);\r
+\r
+ if (!CalculateCertHash (X509Data, X509DataSize, HashAlg, CertHash)) {\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Get the variable for enrollment.\r
+ //\r
+ DataSize = 0;\r
+ Status = gRT->GetVariable (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, NULL, &DataSize, NULL);\r
+ if (Status == EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {\r
+ Data = (UINT8 *) AllocateZeroPool (DataSize);\r
+ if (Data == NULL) {\r
+ return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ Status = gRT->GetVariable (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, NULL, &DataSize, Data);\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Allocate memory for Signature and fill the Signature\r
+ //\r
+ SignatureSize = sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1 + sizeof (EFI_TIME) + mHash[HashAlg].DigestLength;\r
+ SignatureData = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) AllocateZeroPool (SignatureSize);\r
+ if (SignatureData == NULL) {\r
+ return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
+ }\r
+ CopyGuid (&SignatureData->SignatureOwner, Private->SignatureGUID);\r
+ CopyMem (SignatureData->SignatureData, CertHash, mHash[HashAlg].DigestLength);\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Fill the time.\r
+ //\r
+ if (!AlwaysRevocation) {\r
+ Time = (EFI_TIME *)(&SignatureData->SignatureData + mHash[HashAlg].DigestLength);\r
+ Time->Year = RevocationDate->Year;\r
+ Time->Month = RevocationDate->Month;\r
+ Time->Day = RevocationDate->Day;\r
+ Time->Hour = RevocationTime->Hour;\r
+ Time->Minute = RevocationTime->Minute;\r
+ Time->Second = RevocationTime->Second;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Determine the GUID for certificate hash.\r
+ //\r
+ switch (HashAlg) {\r
+ case HASHALG_SHA256:\r
+ SignatureType = gEfiCertX509Sha256Guid;\r
+ break;\r
+ case HASHALG_SHA384:\r
+ SignatureType = gEfiCertX509Sha384Guid;\r
+ break;\r
+ case HASHALG_SHA512:\r
+ SignatureType = gEfiCertX509Sha512Guid;\r
+ break;\r
+ default:\r
+ return FALSE;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Add signature into the new variable data buffer\r
+ //\r
+ if (GetSignaturelistOffset((EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *)Data, DataSize, &SignatureType, &Offset)) {\r
+ //\r
+ // Add the signature to the found signaturelist.\r
+ //\r
+ DbSize = DataSize + SignatureSize;\r
+ NewData = AllocateZeroPool (DbSize);\r
+ if (NewData == NULL) {\r
+ Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ SignatureList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *)(Data + Offset);\r
+ SignatureListSize = (UINTN) ReadUnaligned32 ((UINT32 *)&SignatureList->SignatureListSize);\r
+ CopyMem (NewData, Data, Offset + SignatureListSize);\r
+\r
+ SignatureList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *)(NewData + Offset);\r
+ WriteUnaligned32 ((UINT32 *) &SignatureList->SignatureListSize, (UINT32)(SignatureListSize + SignatureSize));\r
+\r
+ Offset += SignatureListSize;\r
+ CopyMem (NewData + Offset, SignatureData, SignatureSize);\r
+ CopyMem (NewData + Offset + SignatureSize, Data + Offset, DataSize - Offset);\r
+\r
+ FreePool (Data);\r
+ Data = NewData;\r
+ DataSize = DbSize;\r
+ } else {\r
+ //\r
+ // Create a new signaturelist, and add the signature into the signaturelist.\r
+ //\r
+ DbSize = DataSize + sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + SignatureSize;\r
+ NewData = AllocateZeroPool (DbSize);\r
+ if (NewData == NULL) {\r
+ Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+ //\r
+ // Fill Certificate Database parameters.\r
+ //\r
+ SignatureList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST*) (NewData + DataSize);\r
+ SignatureListSize = sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + SignatureSize;\r
+ WriteUnaligned32 ((UINT32 *) &SignatureList->SignatureListSize, (UINT32) SignatureListSize);\r
+ WriteUnaligned32 ((UINT32 *) &SignatureList->SignatureSize, (UINT32) SignatureSize);\r
+ CopyGuid (&SignatureList->SignatureType, &SignatureType);\r
+ CopyMem ((UINT8* ) SignatureList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST), SignatureData, SignatureSize);\r
+ if ((DataSize != 0) && (Data != NULL)) {\r
+ CopyMem (NewData, Data, DataSize);\r
+ FreePool (Data);\r
+ }\r
+ Data = NewData;\r
+ DataSize = DbSize;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ Status = CreateTimeBasedPayload (&DataSize, (UINT8**) &Data);\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ Attr = EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS\r
+ | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS;\r
+ Status = gRT->SetVariable(\r
+ EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1,\r
+ &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid,\r
+ Attr,\r
+ DataSize,\r
+ Data\r
+ );\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ON_EXIT:\r
+\r
+ CloseEnrolledFile(Private->FileContext);\r
+\r
+ if (Private->SignatureGUID != NULL) {\r
+ FreePool (Private->SignatureGUID);\r
+ Private->SignatureGUID = NULL;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ if (Data != NULL) {\r
+ FreePool (Data);\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ if (SignatureData != NULL) {\r
+ FreePool (SignatureData);\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ if (X509Data != NULL) {\r
+ FreePool (X509Data);\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ return Status;\r
+}\r
+\r
+/**\r
+ Check whether a certificate from a file exists in dbx.\r
+\r
+ @param[in] PrivateData The module's private data.\r
+ @param[in] VariableName Variable name of signature database, must be\r
+ EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1.\r
+\r
+ @retval TRUE The X509 certificate is found in dbx successfully.\r
+ @retval FALSE The X509 certificate is not found in dbx.\r
+**/\r
+BOOLEAN\r
+IsX509CertInDbx (\r
+ IN SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_DATA *Private,\r
+ IN CHAR16 *VariableName\r
+ )\r
+{\r
+ EFI_STATUS Status;\r
+ UINTN X509DataSize;\r
+ VOID *X509Data;\r
+ BOOLEAN IsFound;\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Read the certificate from file\r
+ //\r
+ X509DataSize = 0;\r
+ X509Data = NULL;\r
+ Status = ReadFileContent (\r
+ Private->FileContext->FHandle,\r
+ &X509Data,\r
+ &X509DataSize,\r
+ 0\r
+ );\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
+ return FALSE;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Check the raw certificate.\r
+ //\r
+ IsFound = FALSE;\r
+ if (IsSignatureFoundInDatabase (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1, X509Data, X509DataSize)) {\r
+ IsFound = TRUE;\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Check the hash of certificate.\r
+ //\r
+ if (IsCertHashFoundInDbx (X509Data, X509DataSize)) {\r
+ IsFound = TRUE;\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ON_EXIT:\r
+ if (X509Data != NULL) {\r
+ FreePool (X509Data);\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ return IsFound;\r
+}\r
+\r
+/**\r
+ Reads contents of a PE/COFF image in memory buffer.\r
+\r
+ Caution: This function may receive untrusted input.\r
+ PE/COFF image is external input, so this function will make sure the PE/COFF image content\r
+ read is within the image buffer.\r
+\r
+ @param FileHandle Pointer to the file handle to read the PE/COFF image.\r
+ @param FileOffset Offset into the PE/COFF image to begin the read operation.\r
+ @param ReadSize On input, the size in bytes of the requested read operation.\r
+ On output, the number of bytes actually read.\r
+ @param Buffer Output buffer that contains the data read from the PE/COFF image.\r
+\r
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS The specified portion of the PE/COFF image was read and the size\r
+**/\r
+EFI_STATUS\r
+EFIAPI\r
+SecureBootConfigImageRead (\r
+ IN VOID *FileHandle,\r
+ IN UINTN FileOffset,\r
+ IN OUT UINTN *ReadSize,\r
+ OUT VOID *Buffer\r
+ )\r
+{\r
+ UINTN EndPosition;\r
+\r
+ if (FileHandle == NULL || ReadSize == NULL || Buffer == NULL) {\r
+ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ if (MAX_ADDRESS - FileOffset < *ReadSize) {\r
+ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ EndPosition = FileOffset + *ReadSize;\r
+ if (EndPosition > mImageSize) {\r
+ *ReadSize = (UINT32)(mImageSize - FileOffset);\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ if (FileOffset >= mImageSize) {\r
+ *ReadSize = 0;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ CopyMem (Buffer, (UINT8 *)((UINTN) FileHandle + FileOffset), *ReadSize);\r
+\r
+ return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
+}\r
+\r
+/**\r
+ Load PE/COFF image information into internal buffer and check its validity.\r
+\r
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS Successful\r
+ @retval EFI_UNSUPPORTED Invalid PE/COFF file\r
+ @retval EFI_ABORTED Serious error occurs, like file I/O error etc.\r
+\r
+**/\r
+EFI_STATUS\r
+LoadPeImage (\r
+ VOID\r
+ )\r
+{\r
+ EFI_IMAGE_DOS_HEADER *DosHdr;\r
+ EFI_IMAGE_NT_HEADERS32 *NtHeader32;\r
+ EFI_IMAGE_NT_HEADERS64 *NtHeader64;\r
+ PE_COFF_LOADER_IMAGE_CONTEXT ImageContext;\r
+ EFI_STATUS Status;\r
+\r
+ NtHeader32 = NULL;\r
+ NtHeader64 = NULL;\r
+\r
+ ZeroMem (&ImageContext, sizeof (ImageContext));\r
+ ImageContext.Handle = (VOID *) mImageBase;\r
+ ImageContext.ImageRead = (PE_COFF_LOADER_READ_FILE) SecureBootConfigImageRead;\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Get information about the image being loaded\r
+ //\r
+ Status = PeCoffLoaderGetImageInfo (&ImageContext);\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
+ //\r
+ // The information can't be got from the invalid PeImage\r
+ //\r
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "SecureBootConfigDxe: PeImage invalid. \n"));\r
+ return Status;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Read the Dos header\r
+ //\r
+ DosHdr = (EFI_IMAGE_DOS_HEADER*)(mImageBase);\r
+ if (DosHdr->e_magic == EFI_IMAGE_DOS_SIGNATURE)\r
+ {\r
+ //\r
+ // DOS image header is present,\r
+ // So read the PE header after the DOS image header\r
+ //\r
+ mPeCoffHeaderOffset = DosHdr->e_lfanew;\r
+ }\r
+ else\r
+ {\r
+ mPeCoffHeaderOffset = 0;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Read PE header and check the signature validity and machine compatibility\r
+ //\r
+ NtHeader32 = (EFI_IMAGE_NT_HEADERS32*) (mImageBase + mPeCoffHeaderOffset);\r
+ if (NtHeader32->Signature != EFI_IMAGE_NT_SIGNATURE)\r
+ {\r
+ return EFI_UNSUPPORTED;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ mNtHeader.Pe32 = NtHeader32;\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Check the architecture field of PE header and get the Certificate Data Directory data\r
+ // Note the size of FileHeader field is constant for both IA32 and X64 arch\r
+ //\r
+ if ((NtHeader32->FileHeader.Machine == EFI_IMAGE_MACHINE_IA32)\r
+ || (NtHeader32->FileHeader.Machine == EFI_IMAGE_MACHINE_EBC)\r
+ || (NtHeader32->FileHeader.Machine == EFI_IMAGE_MACHINE_ARMTHUMB_MIXED)) {\r
+ //\r
+ // 32-bits Architecture\r
+ //\r
+ mImageType = ImageType_IA32;\r
+ mSecDataDir = (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATA_DIRECTORY*) &(NtHeader32->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY]);\r
+ }\r
+ else if ((NtHeader32->FileHeader.Machine == EFI_IMAGE_MACHINE_IA64)\r
+ || (NtHeader32->FileHeader.Machine == EFI_IMAGE_MACHINE_X64)\r
+ || (NtHeader32->FileHeader.Machine == EFI_IMAGE_MACHINE_AARCH64)) {\r
+ //\r
+ // 64-bits Architecture\r
+ //\r
+ mImageType = ImageType_X64;\r
+ NtHeader64 = (EFI_IMAGE_NT_HEADERS64 *) (mImageBase + mPeCoffHeaderOffset);\r
+ mSecDataDir = (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATA_DIRECTORY*) &(NtHeader64->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY]);\r
+ } else {\r
+ return EFI_UNSUPPORTED;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
+}\r
+\r
+/**\r
+ Calculate hash of Pe/Coff image based on the authenticode image hashing in\r
+ PE/COFF Specification 8.0 Appendix A\r
+\r
+ Notes: PE/COFF image has been checked by BasePeCoffLib PeCoffLoaderGetImageInfo() in \r
+ the function LoadPeImage ().\r
+\r
+ @param[in] HashAlg Hash algorithm type.\r
+\r
+ @retval TRUE Successfully hash image.\r
+ @retval FALSE Fail in hash image.\r
+\r
+**/\r
+BOOLEAN\r
+HashPeImage (\r
+ IN UINT32 HashAlg\r
+ )\r
+{\r
+ BOOLEAN Status;\r
+ UINT16 Magic;\r
+ EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER *Section;\r
+ VOID *HashCtx;\r
+ UINTN CtxSize;\r
+ UINT8 *HashBase;\r
+ UINTN HashSize;\r
+ UINTN SumOfBytesHashed;\r
+ EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER *SectionHeader;\r
+ UINTN Index;\r
+ UINTN Pos;\r
+\r
+ HashCtx = NULL;\r
+ SectionHeader = NULL;\r
+ Status = FALSE;\r
+\r
+ if (HashAlg != HASHALG_SHA256) {\r
+ return FALSE;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Initialize context of hash.\r
+ //\r
+ ZeroMem (mImageDigest, MAX_DIGEST_SIZE);\r
+\r
+ mImageDigestSize = SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE;\r
+ mCertType = gEfiCertSha256Guid;\r
+\r
+ CtxSize = mHash[HashAlg].GetContextSize();\r
+\r
+ HashCtx = AllocatePool (CtxSize);\r
+ ASSERT (HashCtx != NULL);\r
+\r
+ // 1. Load the image header into memory.\r
+\r
+ // 2. Initialize a SHA hash context.\r
+ Status = mHash[HashAlg].HashInit(HashCtx);\r
+ if (!Status) {\r
+ goto Done;\r
+ }\r
+ //\r
+ // Measuring PE/COFF Image Header;\r
+ // But CheckSum field and SECURITY data directory (certificate) are excluded\r
+ //\r
+ if (mNtHeader.Pe32->FileHeader.Machine == IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_IA64 && mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {\r
+ //\r
+ // NOTE: Some versions of Linux ELILO for Itanium have an incorrect magic value\r
+ // in the PE/COFF Header. If the MachineType is Itanium(IA64) and the\r
+ // Magic value in the OptionalHeader is EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC\r
+ // then override the magic value to EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR64_MAGIC\r
+ //\r
+ Magic = EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR64_MAGIC;\r
+ } else {\r
+ //\r
+ // Get the magic value from the PE/COFF Optional Header\r
+ //\r
+ Magic = mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.Magic;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // 3. Calculate the distance from the base of the image header to the image checksum address.\r
+ // 4. Hash the image header from its base to beginning of the image checksum.\r
+ //\r
+ HashBase = mImageBase;\r
+ if (Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {\r
+ //\r
+ // Use PE32 offset.\r
+ //\r
+ HashSize = (UINTN) (&mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.CheckSum) - (UINTN) HashBase;\r
+ } else {\r
+ //\r
// Use PE32+ offset.\r
//\r
- HashSize = (UINTN) ((UINT8 *) (&mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.CheckSum) - HashBase);\r
+ HashSize = (UINTN) (&mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.CheckSum) - (UINTN) HashBase;\r
}\r
\r
Status = mHash[HashAlg].HashUpdate(HashCtx, HashBase, HashSize);\r
// Use PE32 offset.\r
//\r
HashBase = (UINT8 *) &mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.CheckSum + sizeof (UINT32);\r
- HashSize = (UINTN) ((UINT8 *) (&mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY]) - HashBase);\r
+ HashSize = (UINTN) (&mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY]) - (UINTN) HashBase;\r
} else {\r
//\r
// Use PE32+ offset.\r
- // \r
+ //\r
HashBase = (UINT8 *) &mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.CheckSum + sizeof (UINT32);\r
- HashSize = (UINTN) ((UINT8 *) (&mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY]) - HashBase);\r
+ HashSize = (UINTN) (&mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY]) - (UINTN) HashBase;\r
}\r
\r
Status = mHash[HashAlg].HashUpdate(HashCtx, HashBase, HashSize);\r
// Use PE32 offset\r
//\r
HashBase = (UINT8 *) &mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY + 1];\r
- HashSize = mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.SizeOfHeaders - (UINTN) ((UINT8 *) (&mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY + 1]) - mImageBase);\r
+ HashSize = mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.SizeOfHeaders - ((UINTN) (&mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY + 1]) - (UINTN) mImageBase);\r
} else {\r
//\r
// Use PE32+ offset.\r
//\r
HashBase = (UINT8 *) &mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY + 1];\r
- HashSize = mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.SizeOfHeaders - (UINTN) ((UINT8 *) (&mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY + 1]) - mImageBase);\r
+ HashSize = mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.SizeOfHeaders - ((UINTN) (&mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY + 1]) - (UINTN) mImageBase);\r
}\r
\r
Status = mHash[HashAlg].HashUpdate(HashCtx, HashBase, HashSize);\r
HashSize = (UINTN)(\r
mImageSize -\r
mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY].Size -\r
- SumOfBytesHashed); \r
+ SumOfBytesHashed);\r
}\r
\r
Status = mHash[HashAlg].HashUpdate(HashCtx, HashBase, HashSize);\r
}\r
\r
/**\r
- Recognize the Hash algorithm in PE/COFF Authenticode and caculate hash of \r
- Pe/Coff image based on the authenticated image hashing in PE/COFF Specification \r
+ Recognize the Hash algorithm in PE/COFF Authenticode and calculate hash of\r
+ Pe/Coff image based on the authenticated image hashing in PE/COFF Specification\r
8.0 Appendix A\r
\r
@retval EFI_UNSUPPORTED Hash algorithm is not supported.\r
@retval EFI_SUCCESS Hash successfully.\r
\r
**/\r
-EFI_STATUS \r
+EFI_STATUS\r
HashPeImageByType (\r
VOID\r
)\r
\r
PkcsCertData = (WIN_CERTIFICATE_EFI_PKCS *) (mImageBase + mSecDataDir->Offset);\r
\r
- for (Index = 0; Index < HASHALG_MAX; Index++) { \r
+ for (Index = 0; Index < HASHALG_MAX; Index++) {\r
//\r
// Check the Hash algorithm in PE/COFF Authenticode.\r
- // According to PKCS#7 Definition: \r
+ // According to PKCS#7 Definition:\r
// SignedData ::= SEQUENCE {\r
// version Version,\r
// digestAlgorithms DigestAlgorithmIdentifiers,\r
continue;\r
}\r
\r
- // \r
+ //\r
if (CompareMem (PkcsCertData->CertData + 32, mHash[Index].OidValue, mHash[Index].OidLength) == 0) {\r
break;\r
}\r
}\r
\r
/**\r
- Enroll a new executable's signature into Signature Database. \r
+ Enroll a new executable's signature into Signature Database.\r
\r
@param[in] PrivateData The module's private data.\r
- @param[in] VariableName Variable name of signature database, must be \r
- EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE or EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1.\r
+ @param[in] VariableName Variable name of signature database, must be\r
+ EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE, EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1\r
+ or EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE2.\r
+\r
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS New signature is enrolled successfully.\r
+ @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER The parameter is invalid.\r
+ @retval EFI_UNSUPPORTED Unsupported command.\r
+ @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES Could not allocate needed resources.\r
+\r
+**/\r
+EFI_STATUS\r
+EnrollAuthentication2Descriptor (\r
+ IN SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_DATA *Private,\r
+ IN CHAR16 *VariableName\r
+ )\r
+{\r
+ EFI_STATUS Status;\r
+ VOID *Data;\r
+ UINTN DataSize;\r
+ UINT32 Attr;\r
+\r
+ Data = NULL;\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // DBT only support DER-X509 Cert Enrollment\r
+ //\r
+ if (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE2) == 0) {\r
+ return EFI_UNSUPPORTED;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Read the whole file content\r
+ //\r
+ Status = ReadFileContent(\r
+ Private->FileContext->FHandle,\r
+ (VOID **) &mImageBase,\r
+ &mImageSize,\r
+ 0\r
+ );\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+ ASSERT (mImageBase != NULL);\r
+\r
+ Attr = EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS\r
+ | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS;\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Check if SigDB variable has been already existed.\r
+ // If true, use EFI_VARIABLE_APPEND_WRITE attribute to append the\r
+ // new signature data to original variable\r
+ //\r
+ DataSize = 0;\r
+ Status = gRT->GetVariable(\r
+ VariableName,\r
+ &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid,\r
+ NULL,\r
+ &DataSize,\r
+ NULL\r
+ );\r
+ if (Status == EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {\r
+ Attr |= EFI_VARIABLE_APPEND_WRITE;\r
+ } else if (Status != EFI_NOT_FOUND) {\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Diretly set AUTHENTICATION_2 data to SetVariable\r
+ //\r
+ Status = gRT->SetVariable(\r
+ VariableName,\r
+ &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid,\r
+ Attr,\r
+ mImageSize,\r
+ mImageBase\r
+ );\r
+\r
+ DEBUG((DEBUG_INFO, "Enroll AUTH_2 data to Var:%s Status: %x\n", VariableName, Status));\r
+\r
+ON_EXIT:\r
+\r
+ CloseEnrolledFile(Private->FileContext);\r
+\r
+ if (Data != NULL) {\r
+ FreePool (Data);\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ if (mImageBase != NULL) {\r
+ FreePool (mImageBase);\r
+ mImageBase = NULL;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ return Status;\r
+\r
+}\r
+\r
+\r
+/**\r
+ Enroll a new executable's signature into Signature Database.\r
+\r
+ @param[in] PrivateData The module's private data.\r
+ @param[in] VariableName Variable name of signature database, must be\r
+ EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE, EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1\r
+ or EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE2.\r
\r
@retval EFI_SUCCESS New signature is enrolled successfully.\r
@retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER The parameter is invalid.\r
Data = NULL;\r
GuidCertData = NULL;\r
\r
+ if (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE2) == 0) {\r
+ return EFI_UNSUPPORTED;\r
+ }\r
+\r
//\r
// Form the SigDB certificate list.\r
// Format the data item into EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST type.\r
//\r
Status = ReadFileContent(\r
Private->FileContext->FHandle,\r
- (VOID **) &mImageBase, \r
- &mImageSize, \r
+ (VOID **) &mImageBase,\r
+ &mImageSize,\r
0\r
);\r
if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
goto ON_EXIT;\r
- } \r
+ }\r
ASSERT (mImageBase != NULL);\r
\r
Status = LoadPeImage ();\r
goto ON_EXIT;\r
}\r
} else {\r
- \r
+\r
//\r
// Read the certificate data\r
//\r
Status = EFI_ABORTED;\r
goto ON_EXIT;;\r
}\r
- \r
+\r
} else if (mCertificate->wCertificateType == WIN_CERT_TYPE_PKCS_SIGNED_DATA) {\r
\r
Status = HashPeImageByType ();\r
//\r
// Create a new SigDB entry.\r
//\r
- SigDBSize = sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) \r
+ SigDBSize = sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST)\r
+ sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1\r
+ (UINT32) mImageDigestSize;\r
\r
Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
goto ON_EXIT;\r
}\r
- \r
+\r
//\r
// Adjust the Certificate Database parameters.\r
- // \r
+ //\r
SigDBCert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST*) Data;\r
SigDBCert->SignatureListSize = (UINT32) SigDBSize;\r
SigDBCert->SignatureHeaderSize = 0;\r
CopyGuid (&SigDBCertData->SignatureOwner, Private->SignatureGUID);\r
CopyMem (SigDBCertData->SignatureData, mImageDigest, mImageDigestSize);\r
\r
- Attr = EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS \r
+ Attr = EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS\r
| EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS;\r
Status = CreateTimeBasedPayload (&SigDBSize, (UINT8**) &Data);\r
if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Fail to create time-based data payload: %r", Status));\r
goto ON_EXIT;\r
}\r
- \r
+\r
//\r
- // Check if SigDB variable has been already existed. \r
- // If true, use EFI_VARIABLE_APPEND_WRITE attribute to append the \r
+ // Check if SigDB variable has been already existed.\r
+ // If true, use EFI_VARIABLE_APPEND_WRITE attribute to append the\r
// new signature data to original variable\r
- // \r
+ //\r
DataSize = 0;\r
Status = gRT->GetVariable(\r
- VariableName, \r
- &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, \r
- NULL, \r
- &DataSize, \r
+ VariableName,\r
+ &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid,\r
+ NULL,\r
+ &DataSize,\r
NULL\r
);\r
if (Status == EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {\r
Attr |= EFI_VARIABLE_APPEND_WRITE;\r
} else if (Status != EFI_NOT_FOUND) {\r
goto ON_EXIT;\r
- } \r
+ }\r
\r
//\r
// Enroll the variable.\r
//\r
Status = gRT->SetVariable(\r
- VariableName, \r
- &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, \r
- Attr, \r
- SigDBSize, \r
+ VariableName,\r
+ &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid,\r
+ Attr,\r
+ SigDBSize,\r
Data\r
);\r
if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
\r
ON_EXIT:\r
\r
- CloseFile (Private->FileContext->FHandle);\r
- Private->FileContext->FHandle = NULL;\r
- Private->FileContext->FileName = NULL;\r
+ CloseEnrolledFile(Private->FileContext);\r
\r
if (Private->SignatureGUID != NULL) {\r
FreePool (Private->SignatureGUID);\r
}\r
\r
/**\r
- Enroll signature into DB/DBX without KEK's authentication.\r
+ Enroll signature into DB/DBX/DBT without KEK's authentication.\r
The SignatureOwner GUID will be Private->SignatureGUID.\r
- \r
+\r
@param[in] PrivateData The module's private data.\r
- @param[in] VariableName Variable name of signature database, must be \r
+ @param[in] VariableName Variable name of signature database, must be\r
EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE or EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1.\r
- \r
+\r
@retval EFI_SUCCESS New signature enrolled successfully.\r
@retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER The parameter is invalid.\r
@retval others Fail to enroll signature data.\r
- \r
+\r
**/\r
EFI_STATUS\r
EnrollSignatureDatabase (\r
IN SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_DATA *Private,\r
IN CHAR16 *VariableName\r
- ) \r
+ )\r
{\r
UINT16* FilePostFix;\r
EFI_STATUS Status;\r
+ UINTN NameLength;\r
\r
if ((Private->FileContext->FileName == NULL) || (Private->FileContext->FHandle == NULL) || (Private->SignatureGUID == NULL)) {\r
return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
}\r
\r
- Status = SetSecureBootMode(CUSTOM_SECURE_BOOT_MODE);\r
+ Status = SetSecureBootMode (CUSTOM_SECURE_BOOT_MODE);\r
if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
return Status;\r
}\r
- \r
+\r
//\r
- // Parse the file's postfix. \r
+ // Parse the file's postfix.\r
//\r
- FilePostFix = Private->FileContext->FileName + StrLen (Private->FileContext->FileName) - 4;\r
- if (IsDerEncodeCertificate(FilePostFix)) {\r
+ NameLength = StrLen (Private->FileContext->FileName);\r
+ if (NameLength <= 4) {\r
+ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
+ }\r
+ FilePostFix = Private->FileContext->FileName + NameLength - 4;\r
+ if (IsDerEncodeCertificate (FilePostFix)) {\r
//\r
// Supports DER-encoded X509 certificate.\r
//\r
return EnrollX509toSigDB (Private, VariableName);\r
+ } else if (IsAuthentication2Format(Private->FileContext->FHandle)){\r
+ return EnrollAuthentication2Descriptor(Private, VariableName);\r
+ } else {\r
+ return EnrollImageSignatureToSigDB (Private, VariableName);\r
}\r
-\r
- return EnrollImageSignatureToSigDB (Private, VariableName);\r
}\r
\r
/**\r
- List all signatures in specified signature database (e.g. KEK/DB/DBX)\r
+ List all signatures in specified signature database (e.g. KEK/DB/DBX/DBT)\r
by GUID in the page for user to select and delete as needed.\r
\r
@param[in] PrivateData Module's private data.\r
\r
@retval EFI_SUCCESS Success to update the signature list page\r
@retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES Unable to allocate required resources.\r
- \r
+\r
**/\r
EFI_STATUS\r
UpdateDeletePage (\r
VOID *StartOpCodeHandle;\r
VOID *EndOpCodeHandle;\r
EFI_IFR_GUID_LABEL *StartLabel;\r
- EFI_IFR_GUID_LABEL *EndLabel; \r
+ EFI_IFR_GUID_LABEL *EndLabel;\r
UINTN DataSize;\r
UINT8 *Data;\r
EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *CertList;\r
GuidStr = NULL;\r
StartOpCodeHandle = NULL;\r
EndOpCodeHandle = NULL;\r
- \r
+\r
//\r
// Initialize the container for dynamic opcodes.\r
//\r
StartOpCodeHandle = HiiAllocateOpCodeHandle ();\r
if (StartOpCodeHandle == NULL) {\r
Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
- goto ON_EXIT; \r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
}\r
\r
EndOpCodeHandle = HiiAllocateOpCodeHandle ();\r
if (EndOpCodeHandle == NULL) {\r
Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
- goto ON_EXIT; \r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
}\r
\r
//\r
// Read Variable.\r
//\r
DataSize = 0;\r
- Status = gRT->GetVariable (VariableName, VendorGuid, NULL, &DataSize, Data); \r
+ Status = gRT->GetVariable (VariableName, VendorGuid, NULL, &DataSize, Data);\r
if (EFI_ERROR (Status) && Status != EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {\r
goto ON_EXIT;\r
}\r
Help = STRING_TOKEN (STR_CERT_TYPE_SHA1_GUID);\r
} else if (CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertSha256Guid)) {\r
Help = STRING_TOKEN (STR_CERT_TYPE_SHA256_GUID);\r
+ } else if (CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Sha256Guid)) {\r
+ Help = STRING_TOKEN (STR_CERT_TYPE_X509_SHA256_GUID);\r
+ } else if (CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Sha384Guid)) {\r
+ Help = STRING_TOKEN (STR_CERT_TYPE_X509_SHA384_GUID);\r
+ } else if (CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Sha512Guid)) {\r
+ Help = STRING_TOKEN (STR_CERT_TYPE_X509_SHA512_GUID);\r
} else {\r
//\r
// The signature type is not supported in current implementation.\r
\r
CertCount = (CertList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - CertList->SignatureHeaderSize) / CertList->SignatureSize;\r
for (Index = 0; Index < CertCount; Index++) {\r
- Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertList \r
- + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) \r
- + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize \r
+ Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertList\r
+ + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST)\r
+ + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize\r
+ Index * CertList->SignatureSize);\r
//\r
- // Display GUID and help \r
+ // Display GUID and help\r
//\r
GuidToString (&Cert->SignatureOwner, GuidStr, 100);\r
GuidID = HiiSetString (PrivateData->HiiHandle, 0, GuidStr, NULL);\r
HiiCreateCheckBoxOpCode (\r
StartOpCodeHandle,\r
(EFI_QUESTION_ID) (QuestionIdBase + GuidIndex++),\r
- 0, \r
- 0, \r
- GuidID, \r
+ 0,\r
+ 0,\r
+ GuidID,\r
Help,\r
EFI_IFR_FLAG_CALLBACK,\r
0,\r
NULL\r
- ); \r
+ );\r
}\r
\r
ItemDataSize -= CertList->SignatureListSize;\r
if (EndOpCodeHandle != NULL) {\r
HiiFreeOpCodeHandle (EndOpCodeHandle);\r
}\r
- \r
+\r
if (Data != NULL) {\r
FreePool (Data);\r
}\r
}\r
\r
/**\r
- Delete a KEK entry from KEK database. \r
+ Delete a KEK entry from KEK database.\r
\r
@param[in] PrivateData Module's private data.\r
@param[in] QuestionId Question id of the KEK item to delete.\r
\r
@retval EFI_SUCCESS Delete kek item successfully.\r
@retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES Could not allocate needed resources.\r
- \r
+\r
**/\r
EFI_STATUS\r
DeleteKeyExchangeKey (\r
OldData = NULL;\r
CertList = NULL;\r
Cert = NULL;\r
- Attr = 0; \r
+ Attr = 0;\r
DeleteKekIndex = QuestionId - OPTION_DEL_KEK_QUESTION_ID;\r
\r
Status = SetSecureBootMode(CUSTOM_SECURE_BOOT_MODE);\r
if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
return Status;\r
}\r
- \r
+\r
//\r
// Get original KEK variable.\r
- // \r
- DataSize = 0; \r
+ //\r
+ DataSize = 0;\r
Status = gRT->GetVariable (EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, NULL, &DataSize, NULL);\r
if (EFI_ERROR(Status) && Status != EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {\r
goto ON_EXIT;\r
\r
OldData = (UINT8*)AllocateZeroPool(DataSize);\r
if (OldData == NULL) {\r
- Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES; \r
+ Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
goto ON_EXIT;\r
}\r
\r
}\r
\r
//\r
- // Allocate space for new variable. \r
+ // Allocate space for new variable.\r
//\r
Data = (UINT8*) AllocateZeroPool (DataSize);\r
if (Data == NULL) {\r
// Find it! Skip it!\r
//\r
NewCertList->SignatureListSize -= CertList->SignatureSize;\r
- IsKEKItemFound = TRUE; \r
+ IsKEKItemFound = TRUE;\r
} else {\r
//\r
// This item doesn't match. Copy it to the Data buffer.\r
CopyMem (Data + Offset, CertList, CertList->SignatureListSize);\r
Offset += CertList->SignatureListSize;\r
}\r
- \r
+\r
KekDataSize -= CertList->SignatureListSize;\r
CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST*) ((UINT8*) CertList + CertList->SignatureListSize);\r
}\r
ZeroMem (OldData, KekDataSize);\r
while ((KekDataSize > 0) && (KekDataSize >= CertList->SignatureListSize)) {\r
CertCount = (CertList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - CertList->SignatureHeaderSize) / CertList->SignatureSize;\r
- DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, " CertCount = %x\n", CertCount));\r
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, " CertCount = %x\n", CertCount));\r
if (CertCount != 0) {\r
CopyMem (OldData + Offset, CertList, CertList->SignatureListSize);\r
Offset += CertList->SignatureListSize;\r
- } \r
+ }\r
KekDataSize -= CertList->SignatureListSize;\r
CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + CertList->SignatureListSize);\r
}\r
}\r
\r
Status = gRT->SetVariable(\r
- EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME, \r
- &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, \r
- Attr, \r
- DataSize, \r
+ EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME,\r
+ &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
+ Attr,\r
+ DataSize,\r
OldData\r
);\r
if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Failed to set variable, Status = %r\n", Status));\r
goto ON_EXIT;\r
}\r
- \r
+\r
ON_EXIT:\r
if (Data != NULL) {\r
FreePool(Data);\r
}\r
\r
return UpdateDeletePage (\r
- PrivateData, \r
+ PrivateData,\r
EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME,\r
&gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
LABEL_KEK_DELETE,\r
@param[in] FormId Form ID of current page.\r
@param[in] QuestionIdBase Base question id of the signature list.\r
@param[in] DeleteIndex Signature index to delete.\r
- \r
+\r
@retval EFI_SUCCESS Delete siganture successfully.\r
@retval EFI_NOT_FOUND Can't find the signature item,\r
@retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES Could not allocate needed resources.\r
OldData = NULL;\r
CertList = NULL;\r
Cert = NULL;\r
- Attr = 0; \r
+ Attr = 0;\r
\r
Status = SetSecureBootMode(CUSTOM_SECURE_BOOT_MODE);\r
if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
\r
//\r
// Get original signature list data.\r
- // \r
+ //\r
DataSize = 0;\r
Status = gRT->GetVariable (VariableName, VendorGuid, NULL, &DataSize, NULL);\r
if (EFI_ERROR (Status) && Status != EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {\r
\r
OldData = (UINT8 *) AllocateZeroPool (DataSize);\r
if (OldData == NULL) {\r
- Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES; \r
+ Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
goto ON_EXIT;\r
}\r
\r
Status = gRT->GetVariable (VariableName, VendorGuid, &Attr, &DataSize, OldData);\r
if (EFI_ERROR(Status)) {\r
goto ON_EXIT;\r
- } \r
+ }\r
\r
//\r
- // Allocate space for new variable. \r
+ // Allocate space for new variable.\r
//\r
Data = (UINT8*) AllocateZeroPool (DataSize);\r
if (Data == NULL) {\r
if (CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertRsa2048Guid) ||\r
CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Guid) ||\r
CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertSha1Guid) ||\r
- CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertSha256Guid)\r
+ CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertSha256Guid) ||\r
+ CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Sha256Guid) ||\r
+ CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Sha384Guid) ||\r
+ CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Sha512Guid)\r
) {\r
//\r
// Copy EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST header then calculate the signature count in this list.\r
// Find it! Skip it!\r
//\r
NewCertList->SignatureListSize -= CertList->SignatureSize;\r
- IsItemFound = TRUE; \r
+ IsItemFound = TRUE;\r
} else {\r
//\r
// This item doesn't match. Copy it to the Data buffer.\r
CopyMem (Data + Offset, (UINT8*)(CertList), CertList->SignatureListSize);\r
Offset += CertList->SignatureListSize;\r
}\r
- \r
+\r
ItemDataSize -= CertList->SignatureListSize;\r
CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + CertList->SignatureListSize);\r
}\r
ZeroMem (OldData, ItemDataSize);\r
while ((ItemDataSize > 0) && (ItemDataSize >= CertList->SignatureListSize)) {\r
CertCount = (CertList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - CertList->SignatureHeaderSize) / CertList->SignatureSize;\r
- DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, " CertCount = %x\n", CertCount));\r
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, " CertCount = %x\n", CertCount));\r
if (CertCount != 0) {\r
CopyMem (OldData + Offset, (UINT8*)(CertList), CertList->SignatureListSize);\r
Offset += CertList->SignatureListSize;\r
- } \r
+ }\r
ItemDataSize -= CertList->SignatureListSize;\r
CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + CertList->SignatureListSize);\r
}\r
}\r
\r
Status = gRT->SetVariable(\r
- VariableName, \r
- VendorGuid, \r
- Attr, \r
- DataSize, \r
+ VariableName,\r
+ VendorGuid,\r
+ Attr,\r
+ DataSize,\r
OldData\r
);\r
if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Failed to set variable, Status = %r\n", Status));\r
goto ON_EXIT;\r
}\r
- \r
+\r
ON_EXIT:\r
if (Data != NULL) {\r
FreePool(Data);\r
}\r
\r
return UpdateDeletePage (\r
- PrivateData, \r
+ PrivateData,\r
VariableName,\r
VendorGuid,\r
LabelNumber,\r
);\r
}\r
\r
+/**\r
+\r
+ Update SecureBoot strings based on new Secure Boot Mode State. String includes STR_SECURE_BOOT_STATE_CONTENT\r
+ and STR_CUR_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_CONTENT.\r
+\r
+ @param[in] PrivateData Module's private data.\r
+\r
+ @return EFI_SUCCESS Update secure boot strings successfully.\r
+ @return other Fail to update secure boot strings.\r
+\r
+**/\r
+EFI_STATUS\r
+UpdateSecureBootString(\r
+ IN SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_DATA *Private\r
+ )\r
+{\r
+ UINT8 *SecureBoot;\r
+\r
+ SecureBoot = NULL;\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Get current secure boot state.\r
+ //\r
+ GetVariable2 (EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, (VOID**)&SecureBoot, NULL);\r
+ if (SecureBoot == NULL) {\r
+ return EFI_NOT_FOUND;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ if (*SecureBoot == SECURE_BOOT_MODE_ENABLE) {\r
+ HiiSetString (Private->HiiHandle, STRING_TOKEN (STR_SECURE_BOOT_STATE_CONTENT), L"Enabled", NULL);\r
+ } else {\r
+ HiiSetString (Private->HiiHandle, STRING_TOKEN (STR_SECURE_BOOT_STATE_CONTENT), L"Disabled", NULL);\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ FreePool(SecureBoot);\r
+\r
+ return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
+}\r
+\r
/**\r
This function extracts configuration from variable.\r
- \r
+\r
+ @param[in] Private Point to SecureBoot configuration driver private data.\r
@param[in, out] ConfigData Point to SecureBoot configuration private data.\r
\r
**/\r
VOID\r
SecureBootExtractConfigFromVariable (\r
+ IN SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_DATA *Private,\r
IN OUT SECUREBOOT_CONFIGURATION *ConfigData\r
- ) \r
+ )\r
{\r
- UINT8 *SecureBootEnable;\r
- UINT8 *SetupMode;\r
- UINT8 *SecureBootMode;\r
+ UINT8 *SecureBootEnable;\r
+ UINT8 *SetupMode;\r
+ UINT8 *SecureBootMode;\r
+ EFI_TIME CurrTime;\r
\r
SecureBootEnable = NULL;\r
SetupMode = NULL;\r
SecureBootMode = NULL;\r
- \r
+\r
//\r
- // If the SecureBootEnable Variable doesn't exist, hide the SecureBoot Enable/Disable\r
- // Checkbox.\r
+ // Initilize the Date and Time using system time.\r
//\r
- ConfigData->AttemptSecureBoot = FALSE;\r
- GetVariable2 (EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME, &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid, (VOID**)&SecureBootEnable, NULL);\r
- if (SecureBootEnable == NULL) {\r
- ConfigData->HideSecureBoot = TRUE;\r
+ ConfigData->CertificateFormat = HASHALG_RAW;\r
+ ConfigData->AlwaysRevocation = TRUE;\r
+ gRT->GetTime (&CurrTime, NULL);\r
+ ConfigData->RevocationDate.Year = CurrTime.Year;\r
+ ConfigData->RevocationDate.Month = CurrTime.Month;\r
+ ConfigData->RevocationDate.Day = CurrTime.Day;\r
+ ConfigData->RevocationTime.Hour = CurrTime.Hour;\r
+ ConfigData->RevocationTime.Minute = CurrTime.Minute;\r
+ ConfigData->RevocationTime.Second = 0;\r
+ if (Private->FileContext->FHandle != NULL) {\r
+ ConfigData->FileEnrollType = Private->FileContext->FileType;\r
} else {\r
- ConfigData->HideSecureBoot = FALSE;\r
- if ((*SecureBootEnable) == SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE) {\r
- ConfigData->AttemptSecureBoot = TRUE;\r
- }\r
+ ConfigData->FileEnrollType = UNKNOWN_FILE_TYPE;\r
}\r
- \r
+\r
//\r
// If it is Physical Presence User, set the PhysicalPresent to true.\r
//\r
} else {\r
ConfigData->PhysicalPresent = FALSE;\r
}\r
- \r
+\r
//\r
// If there is no PK then the Delete Pk button will be gray.\r
//\r
ConfigData->HasPk = TRUE;\r
}\r
\r
+ //\r
+ // Check SecureBootEnable & Pk status, fix the inconsistence. \r
+ // If the SecureBootEnable Variable doesn't exist, hide the SecureBoot Enable/Disable\r
+ // Checkbox.\r
+ //\r
+ ConfigData->AttemptSecureBoot = FALSE;\r
+ GetVariable2 (EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME, &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid, (VOID**)&SecureBootEnable, NULL); \r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Fix Pk, SecureBootEnable inconsistence\r
+ //\r
+ if ((SetupMode != NULL) && (*SetupMode) == USER_MODE) {\r
+ ConfigData->HideSecureBoot = FALSE;\r
+ if ((SecureBootEnable != NULL) && (*SecureBootEnable == SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE)) {\r
+ ConfigData->AttemptSecureBoot = TRUE;\r
+ }\r
+ } else {\r
+ ConfigData->HideSecureBoot = TRUE;\r
+ }\r
+\r
//\r
// Get the SecureBootMode from CustomMode variable.\r
//\r
EFI_STRING ConfigRequestHdr;\r
SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_DATA *PrivateData;\r
BOOLEAN AllocatedRequest;\r
- UINT8 *SecureBoot;\r
\r
if (Progress == NULL || Results == NULL) {\r
return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
}\r
- \r
+\r
AllocatedRequest = FALSE;\r
ConfigRequestHdr = NULL;\r
ConfigRequest = NULL;\r
Size = 0;\r
- SecureBoot = NULL;\r
- \r
+\r
ZeroMem (&Configuration, sizeof (Configuration));\r
PrivateData = SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_FROM_THIS (This);\r
*Progress = Request;\r
- \r
+\r
if ((Request != NULL) && !HiiIsConfigHdrMatch (Request, &gSecureBootConfigFormSetGuid, mSecureBootStorageName)) {\r
return EFI_NOT_FOUND;\r
}\r
\r
+ ZeroMem(&Configuration, sizeof(SECUREBOOT_CONFIGURATION));\r
+\r
//\r
// Get Configuration from Variable.\r
//\r
- SecureBootExtractConfigFromVariable (&Configuration);\r
+ SecureBootExtractConfigFromVariable (PrivateData, &Configuration);\r
\r
- //\r
- // Update current secure boot state.\r
- //\r
- GetVariable2 (EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, (VOID**)&SecureBoot, NULL);\r
- if (SecureBoot != NULL && *SecureBoot == SECURE_BOOT_MODE_ENABLE) {\r
- HiiSetString (PrivateData->HiiHandle, STRING_TOKEN (STR_SECURE_BOOT_STATE_CONTENT), L"Enabled", NULL);\r
- } else {\r
- HiiSetString (PrivateData->HiiHandle, STRING_TOKEN (STR_SECURE_BOOT_STATE_CONTENT), L"Disabled", NULL);\r
- }\r
- if (SecureBoot != NULL) {\r
- FreePool (SecureBoot);\r
- }\r
- \r
BufferSize = sizeof (SECUREBOOT_CONFIGURATION);\r
ConfigRequest = Request;\r
if ((Request == NULL) || (StrStr (Request, L"OFFSET") == NULL)) {\r
OUT EFI_STRING *Progress\r
)\r
{\r
- UINT8 *SecureBootEnable;\r
- SECUREBOOT_CONFIGURATION IfrNvData;\r
- UINTN BufferSize;\r
- EFI_STATUS Status;\r
- \r
+ SECUREBOOT_CONFIGURATION IfrNvData;\r
+ UINTN BufferSize;\r
+ SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_DATA *PrivateData;\r
+ EFI_STATUS Status;\r
+\r
if (Configuration == NULL || Progress == NULL) {\r
return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
}\r
return EFI_NOT_FOUND;\r
}\r
\r
+ PrivateData = SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_FROM_THIS (This);\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Get Configuration from Variable.\r
+ //\r
+ SecureBootExtractConfigFromVariable (PrivateData, &IfrNvData);\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Map the Configuration to the configuration block.\r
+ //\r
BufferSize = sizeof (SECUREBOOT_CONFIGURATION);\r
Status = gHiiConfigRouting->ConfigToBlock (\r
gHiiConfigRouting,\r
//\r
// Store Buffer Storage back to EFI variable if needed\r
//\r
- SecureBootEnable = NULL;\r
- GetVariable2 (EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME, &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid, (VOID**)&SecureBootEnable, NULL);\r
- if (NULL != SecureBootEnable) {\r
- FreePool (SecureBootEnable);\r
+ if (!IfrNvData.HideSecureBoot) {\r
Status = SaveSecureBootVariable (IfrNvData.AttemptSecureBoot);\r
if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
return Status;\r
)\r
{\r
EFI_INPUT_KEY Key;\r
- EFI_STATUS Status; \r
+ EFI_STATUS Status;\r
+ RETURN_STATUS RStatus;\r
SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_DATA *Private;\r
UINTN BufferSize;\r
SECUREBOOT_CONFIGURATION *IfrNvData;\r
UINT16 LabelId;\r
UINT8 *SecureBootEnable;\r
+ UINT8 *Pk;\r
UINT8 *SecureBootMode;\r
UINT8 *SetupMode;\r
CHAR16 PromptString[100];\r
+ EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *File;\r
+ UINTN NameLength;\r
+ UINT16 *FilePostFix;\r
+ SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_DATA *PrivateData;\r
\r
+ Status = EFI_SUCCESS;\r
SecureBootEnable = NULL;\r
SecureBootMode = NULL;\r
SetupMode = NULL;\r
+ File = NULL;\r
\r
if ((This == NULL) || (Value == NULL) || (ActionRequest == NULL)) {\r
return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
}\r
\r
- if ((Action != EFI_BROWSER_ACTION_CHANGED) &&\r
- (Action != EFI_BROWSER_ACTION_CHANGING) &&\r
- (Action != EFI_BROWSER_ACTION_FORM_CLOSE) &&\r
- (Action != EFI_BROWSER_ACTION_DEFAULT_STANDARD)) {\r
- return EFI_UNSUPPORTED;\r
- }\r
- \r
Private = SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_FROM_THIS (This);\r
\r
+ gSecureBootPrivateData = Private;\r
+\r
//\r
// Retrieve uncommitted data from Browser\r
//\r
return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
}\r
\r
- Status = EFI_SUCCESS;\r
+ HiiGetBrowserData (&gSecureBootConfigFormSetGuid, mSecureBootStorageName, BufferSize, (UINT8 *) IfrNvData);\r
+\r
+ if (Action == EFI_BROWSER_ACTION_FORM_OPEN) {\r
+ if (QuestionId == KEY_SECURE_BOOT_MODE) {\r
+ //\r
+ // Update secure boot strings when opening this form\r
+ //\r
+ Status = UpdateSecureBootString(Private);\r
+ SecureBootExtractConfigFromVariable (Private, IfrNvData);\r
+ mIsEnterSecureBootForm = TRUE;\r
+ } else {\r
+ //\r
+ // When entering SecureBoot OPTION Form\r
+ // always close opened file & free resource\r
+ //\r
+ if ((QuestionId == KEY_SECURE_BOOT_PK_OPTION) ||\r
+ (QuestionId == KEY_SECURE_BOOT_KEK_OPTION) ||\r
+ (QuestionId == KEY_SECURE_BOOT_DB_OPTION) ||\r
+ (QuestionId == KEY_SECURE_BOOT_DBX_OPTION) ||\r
+ (QuestionId == KEY_SECURE_BOOT_DBT_OPTION)) {\r
+ CloseEnrolledFile(Private->FileContext);\r
+ }\r
+ }\r
+ goto EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ if (Action == EFI_BROWSER_ACTION_RETRIEVE) {\r
+ Status = EFI_UNSUPPORTED;\r
+ if (QuestionId == KEY_SECURE_BOOT_MODE) {\r
+ if (mIsEnterSecureBootForm) {\r
+ Value->u8 = SECURE_BOOT_MODE_STANDARD;\r
+ Status = EFI_SUCCESS;\r
+ }\r
+ } \r
+ goto EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ if ((Action != EFI_BROWSER_ACTION_CHANGED) &&\r
+ (Action != EFI_BROWSER_ACTION_CHANGING) &&\r
+ (Action != EFI_BROWSER_ACTION_FORM_CLOSE) &&\r
+ (Action != EFI_BROWSER_ACTION_DEFAULT_STANDARD)) {\r
+ Status = EFI_UNSUPPORTED;\r
+ goto EXIT;\r
+ }\r
\r
- HiiGetBrowserData (NULL, NULL, BufferSize, (UINT8 *) IfrNvData);\r
- \r
if (Action == EFI_BROWSER_ACTION_CHANGING) {\r
\r
switch (QuestionId) {\r
}\r
break;\r
\r
- case KEY_SECURE_BOOT_OPTION:\r
- FreeMenu (&DirectoryMenu);\r
- FreeMenu (&FsOptionMenu);\r
- break;\r
-\r
case KEY_SECURE_BOOT_KEK_OPTION:\r
case KEY_SECURE_BOOT_DB_OPTION:\r
case KEY_SECURE_BOOT_DBX_OPTION:\r
+ case KEY_SECURE_BOOT_DBT_OPTION:\r
+ PrivateData = SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_FROM_THIS (This);\r
//\r
// Clear Signature GUID.\r
//\r
}\r
}\r
\r
+ //\r
+ // Cleanup VFRData once leaving PK/KEK/DB/DBX/DBT enroll/delete page\r
+ //\r
+ SecureBootExtractConfigFromVariable (PrivateData, IfrNvData);\r
+\r
if (QuestionId == KEY_SECURE_BOOT_DB_OPTION) {\r
LabelId = SECUREBOOT_ENROLL_SIGNATURE_TO_DB;\r
} else if (QuestionId == KEY_SECURE_BOOT_DBX_OPTION) {\r
LabelId = SECUREBOOT_ENROLL_SIGNATURE_TO_DBX;\r
+ } else if (QuestionId == KEY_SECURE_BOOT_DBT_OPTION) {\r
+ LabelId = SECUREBOOT_ENROLL_SIGNATURE_TO_DBT;\r
} else {\r
LabelId = FORMID_ENROLL_KEK_FORM;\r
}\r
//\r
// Refresh selected file.\r
//\r
- CleanUpPage (LabelId, Private); \r
+ CleanUpPage (LabelId, Private);\r
+ break;\r
+ case KEY_SECURE_BOOT_PK_OPTION:\r
+ LabelId = FORMID_ENROLL_PK_FORM;\r
+ //\r
+ // Refresh selected file.\r
+ //\r
+ CleanUpPage (LabelId, Private);\r
+ break;\r
+\r
+ case FORMID_ENROLL_PK_FORM:\r
+ ChooseFile (NULL, NULL, UpdatePKFromFile, &File);\r
break;\r
- \r
- case SECUREBOOT_ADD_PK_FILE_FORM_ID:\r
+\r
case FORMID_ENROLL_KEK_FORM:\r
+ ChooseFile (NULL, NULL, UpdateKEKFromFile, &File);\r
+ break;\r
+\r
case SECUREBOOT_ENROLL_SIGNATURE_TO_DB:\r
+ ChooseFile (NULL, NULL, UpdateDBFromFile, &File);\r
+ break;\r
+\r
case SECUREBOOT_ENROLL_SIGNATURE_TO_DBX:\r
- if (QuestionId == SECUREBOOT_ADD_PK_FILE_FORM_ID) {\r
- Private->FeCurrentState = FileExplorerStateEnrollPkFile;\r
- } else if (QuestionId == FORMID_ENROLL_KEK_FORM) {\r
- Private->FeCurrentState = FileExplorerStateEnrollKekFile;\r
- } else if (QuestionId == SECUREBOOT_ENROLL_SIGNATURE_TO_DB) {\r
- Private->FeCurrentState = FileExplorerStateEnrollSignatureFileToDb;\r
- } else {\r
- Private->FeCurrentState = FileExplorerStateEnrollSignatureFileToDbx;\r
+ ChooseFile (NULL, NULL, UpdateDBXFromFile, &File);\r
+\r
+ if (Private->FileContext->FHandle != NULL) {\r
+ //\r
+ // Parse the file's postfix.\r
+ //\r
+ NameLength = StrLen (Private->FileContext->FileName);\r
+ if (NameLength <= 4) {\r
+ return FALSE;\r
+ }\r
+ FilePostFix = Private->FileContext->FileName + NameLength - 4;\r
+\r
+ if (IsDerEncodeCertificate (FilePostFix)) {\r
+ //\r
+ // Supports DER-encoded X509 certificate.\r
+ //\r
+ IfrNvData->FileEnrollType = X509_CERT_FILE_TYPE;\r
+ } else if (IsAuthentication2Format(Private->FileContext->FHandle)){\r
+ IfrNvData->FileEnrollType = AUTHENTICATION_2_FILE_TYPE;\r
+ } else {\r
+ IfrNvData->FileEnrollType = PE_IMAGE_FILE_TYPE;\r
+ }\r
+ Private->FileContext->FileType = IfrNvData->FileEnrollType;\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Clean up Certificate Format if File type is not X509 DER\r
+ //\r
+ if (IfrNvData->FileEnrollType != X509_CERT_FILE_TYPE) {\r
+ IfrNvData->CertificateFormat = HASHALG_RAW;\r
+ }\r
+ DEBUG((DEBUG_ERROR, "IfrNvData->FileEnrollType %d\n", Private->FileContext->FileType));\r
}\r
\r
- Private->FeDisplayContext = FileExplorerDisplayUnknown;\r
- CleanUpPage (FORM_FILE_EXPLORER_ID, Private);\r
- UpdateFileExplorer (Private, 0);\r
break;\r
\r
- case KEY_SECURE_BOOT_DELETE_PK: \r
+ case SECUREBOOT_ENROLL_SIGNATURE_TO_DBT:\r
+ ChooseFile (NULL, NULL, UpdateDBTFromFile, &File);\r
+ break;\r
+\r
+ case KEY_SECURE_BOOT_DELETE_PK:\r
if (Value->u8) {\r
CreatePopUp (\r
EFI_LIGHTGRAY | EFI_BACKGROUND_BLUE,\r
\r
case KEY_DELETE_KEK:\r
UpdateDeletePage (\r
- Private, \r
+ Private,\r
EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME,\r
&gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
LABEL_KEK_DELETE,\r
FORMID_DELETE_KEK_FORM,\r
- OPTION_DEL_KEK_QUESTION_ID \r
+ OPTION_DEL_KEK_QUESTION_ID\r
);\r
break;\r
\r
- case SECUREBOOT_DELETE_SIGNATURE_FROM_DB: \r
+ case SECUREBOOT_DELETE_SIGNATURE_FROM_DB:\r
UpdateDeletePage (\r
Private,\r
EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE,\r
\r
break;\r
\r
+ case SECUREBOOT_DELETE_SIGNATURE_FROM_DBT:\r
+ UpdateDeletePage (\r
+ Private,\r
+ EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE2,\r
+ &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid,\r
+ LABEL_DBT_DELETE,\r
+ SECUREBOOT_DELETE_SIGNATURE_FROM_DBT,\r
+ OPTION_DEL_DBT_QUESTION_ID\r
+ );\r
+\r
+ break;\r
+\r
case KEY_VALUE_SAVE_AND_EXIT_KEK:\r
Status = EnrollKeyExchangeKey (Private);\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
+ CreatePopUp (\r
+ EFI_LIGHTGRAY | EFI_BACKGROUND_BLUE,\r
+ &Key,\r
+ L"ERROR: Unsupported file type!",\r
+ L"Only supports DER-encoded X509 certificate",\r
+ NULL\r
+ );\r
+ }\r
break;\r
\r
case KEY_VALUE_SAVE_AND_EXIT_DB:\r
Status = EnrollSignatureDatabase (Private, EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE);\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
+ CreatePopUp (\r
+ EFI_LIGHTGRAY | EFI_BACKGROUND_BLUE,\r
+ &Key,\r
+ L"ERROR: Unsupported file type!",\r
+ L"Only supports DER-encoded X509 certificate and executable EFI image",\r
+ NULL\r
+ );\r
+ }\r
break;\r
\r
case KEY_VALUE_SAVE_AND_EXIT_DBX:\r
- Status = EnrollSignatureDatabase (Private, EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1);\r
+ if (IsX509CertInDbx (Private, EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1)) {\r
+ CreatePopUp (\r
+ EFI_LIGHTGRAY | EFI_BACKGROUND_BLUE,\r
+ &Key,\r
+ L"Enrollment failed! Same certificate had already been in the dbx!",\r
+ NULL\r
+ );\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Cert already exists in DBX. Close opened file before exit.\r
+ //\r
+ CloseEnrolledFile(Private->FileContext);\r
+ break;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ if ((IfrNvData != NULL) && (IfrNvData->CertificateFormat < HASHALG_MAX)) {\r
+ Status = EnrollX509HashtoSigDB (\r
+ Private,\r
+ IfrNvData->CertificateFormat,\r
+ &IfrNvData->RevocationDate,\r
+ &IfrNvData->RevocationTime,\r
+ IfrNvData->AlwaysRevocation\r
+ );\r
+ IfrNvData->CertificateFormat = HASHALG_RAW;\r
+ } else {\r
+ Status = EnrollSignatureDatabase (Private, EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1);\r
+ }\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
+ CreatePopUp (\r
+ EFI_LIGHTGRAY | EFI_BACKGROUND_BLUE,\r
+ &Key,\r
+ L"ERROR: Unsupported file type!",\r
+ L"Only supports DER-encoded X509 certificate, AUTH_2 format data & executable EFI image",\r
+ NULL\r
+ );\r
+ }\r
break;\r
\r
+ case KEY_VALUE_SAVE_AND_EXIT_DBT:\r
+ Status = EnrollSignatureDatabase (Private, EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE2);\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
+ CreatePopUp (\r
+ EFI_LIGHTGRAY | EFI_BACKGROUND_BLUE,\r
+ &Key,\r
+ L"ERROR: Unsupported file type!",\r
+ L"Only supports DER-encoded X509 certificate.",\r
+ NULL\r
+ );\r
+ }\r
+ break;\r
+ case KEY_VALUE_SAVE_AND_EXIT_PK:\r
+ Status = EnrollPlatformKey (Private);\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
+ UnicodeSPrint (\r
+ PromptString,\r
+ sizeof (PromptString),\r
+ L"Only DER encoded certificate file (%s) is supported.",\r
+ mSupportX509Suffix\r
+ );\r
+ CreatePopUp (\r
+ EFI_LIGHTGRAY | EFI_BACKGROUND_BLUE,\r
+ &Key,\r
+ L"ERROR: Unsupported file type!",\r
+ PromptString,\r
+ NULL\r
+ );\r
+ }\r
+ break;\r
default:\r
- if (QuestionId >= FILE_OPTION_OFFSET) {\r
- UpdateFileExplorer (Private, QuestionId);\r
- } else if ((QuestionId >= OPTION_DEL_KEK_QUESTION_ID) &&\r
+ if ((QuestionId >= OPTION_DEL_KEK_QUESTION_ID) &&\r
(QuestionId < (OPTION_DEL_KEK_QUESTION_ID + OPTION_CONFIG_RANGE))) {\r
DeleteKeyExchangeKey (Private, QuestionId);\r
} else if ((QuestionId >= OPTION_DEL_DB_QUESTION_ID) &&\r
Private,\r
EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE,\r
&gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid,\r
- LABEL_DB_DELETE, \r
+ LABEL_DB_DELETE,\r
SECUREBOOT_DELETE_SIGNATURE_FROM_DB,\r
OPTION_DEL_DB_QUESTION_ID,\r
QuestionId - OPTION_DEL_DB_QUESTION_ID\r
Private,\r
EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1,\r
&gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid,\r
- LABEL_DBX_DELETE, \r
+ LABEL_DBX_DELETE,\r
SECUREBOOT_DELETE_SIGNATURE_FROM_DBX,\r
OPTION_DEL_DBX_QUESTION_ID,\r
QuestionId - OPTION_DEL_DBX_QUESTION_ID\r
);\r
- }\r
- break;\r
- }\r
- } else if (Action == EFI_BROWSER_ACTION_CHANGED) {\r
- switch (QuestionId) {\r
- case KEY_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE:\r
- *ActionRequest = EFI_BROWSER_ACTION_REQUEST_FORM_APPLY;\r
- break; \r
- case KEY_VALUE_SAVE_AND_EXIT_PK:\r
- Status = EnrollPlatformKey (Private);\r
- UnicodeSPrint (\r
- PromptString,\r
- sizeof (PromptString),\r
- L"Only DER encoded certificate file (%s) is supported.",\r
- mSupportX509Suffix\r
- );\r
- if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
- CreatePopUp (\r
- EFI_LIGHTGRAY | EFI_BACKGROUND_BLUE,\r
- &Key,\r
- L"ERROR: Unsupported file type!",\r
- PromptString,\r
- NULL\r
+ } else if ((QuestionId >= OPTION_DEL_DBT_QUESTION_ID) &&\r
+ (QuestionId < (OPTION_DEL_DBT_QUESTION_ID + OPTION_CONFIG_RANGE))) {\r
+ DeleteSignature (\r
+ Private,\r
+ EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE2,\r
+ &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid,\r
+ LABEL_DBT_DELETE,\r
+ SECUREBOOT_DELETE_SIGNATURE_FROM_DBT,\r
+ OPTION_DEL_DBT_QUESTION_ID,\r
+ QuestionId - OPTION_DEL_DBT_QUESTION_ID\r
);\r
- } else {\r
- *ActionRequest = EFI_BROWSER_ACTION_REQUEST_RESET; \r
- } \r
+ }\r
break;\r
\r
case KEY_VALUE_NO_SAVE_AND_EXIT_PK:\r
case KEY_VALUE_NO_SAVE_AND_EXIT_KEK:\r
case KEY_VALUE_NO_SAVE_AND_EXIT_DB:\r
case KEY_VALUE_NO_SAVE_AND_EXIT_DBX:\r
- if (Private->FileContext->FHandle != NULL) {\r
- CloseFile (Private->FileContext->FHandle);\r
- Private->FileContext->FHandle = NULL;\r
- Private->FileContext->FileName = NULL;\r
- }\r
- \r
+ case KEY_VALUE_NO_SAVE_AND_EXIT_DBT:\r
+ CloseEnrolledFile(Private->FileContext);\r
+\r
if (Private->SignatureGUID != NULL) {\r
FreePool (Private->SignatureGUID);\r
Private->SignatureGUID = NULL;\r
}\r
- *ActionRequest = EFI_BROWSER_ACTION_REQUEST_EXIT;\r
break;\r
- \r
+ }\r
+ } else if (Action == EFI_BROWSER_ACTION_CHANGED) {\r
+ switch (QuestionId) {\r
+ case KEY_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE:\r
+ *ActionRequest = EFI_BROWSER_ACTION_REQUEST_FORM_APPLY;\r
+ break;\r
case KEY_SECURE_BOOT_MODE:\r
- GetVariable2 (EFI_CUSTOM_MODE_NAME, &gEfiCustomModeEnableGuid, (VOID**)&SecureBootMode, NULL);\r
- if (NULL != SecureBootMode) {\r
- Status = gRT->SetVariable ( \r
- EFI_CUSTOM_MODE_NAME,\r
- &gEfiCustomModeEnableGuid,\r
- EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS,\r
- sizeof (UINT8),\r
- &Value->u8\r
- );\r
- *ActionRequest = EFI_BROWSER_ACTION_REQUEST_FORM_APPLY;\r
- IfrNvData->SecureBootMode = Value->u8;\r
- FreePool (SecureBootMode);\r
- } \r
+ mIsEnterSecureBootForm = FALSE;\r
break;\r
-\r
case KEY_SECURE_BOOT_KEK_GUID:\r
case KEY_SECURE_BOOT_SIGNATURE_GUID_DB:\r
case KEY_SECURE_BOOT_SIGNATURE_GUID_DBX:\r
+ case KEY_SECURE_BOOT_SIGNATURE_GUID_DBT:\r
ASSERT (Private->SignatureGUID != NULL);\r
- Status = StringToGuid (\r
- IfrNvData->SignatureGuid,\r
- StrLen (IfrNvData->SignatureGuid),\r
- Private->SignatureGUID\r
- );\r
- if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
+ RStatus = StrToGuid (IfrNvData->SignatureGuid, Private->SignatureGUID);\r
+ if (RETURN_ERROR (RStatus) || (IfrNvData->SignatureGuid[GUID_STRING_LENGTH] != L'\0')) {\r
+ Status = EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
break;\r
}\r
\r
*ActionRequest = EFI_BROWSER_ACTION_REQUEST_FORM_APPLY;\r
break;\r
-\r
case KEY_SECURE_BOOT_DELETE_PK:\r
GetVariable2 (EFI_SETUP_MODE_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, (VOID**)&SetupMode, NULL);\r
if (SetupMode == NULL || (*SetupMode) == SETUP_MODE) {\r
if (SetupMode != NULL) {\r
FreePool (SetupMode);\r
}\r
- break; \r
+ break;\r
+ default:\r
+ break;\r
}\r
} else if (Action == EFI_BROWSER_ACTION_DEFAULT_STANDARD) {\r
if (QuestionId == KEY_HIDE_SECURE_BOOT) {\r
- GetVariable2 (EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME, &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid, (VOID**)&SecureBootEnable, NULL);\r
- if (SecureBootEnable == NULL) {\r
+ GetVariable2 (EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, (VOID**)&Pk, NULL);\r
+ if (Pk == NULL) {\r
IfrNvData->HideSecureBoot = TRUE;\r
} else {\r
- FreePool (SecureBootEnable);\r
+ FreePool (Pk);\r
IfrNvData->HideSecureBoot = FALSE;\r
}\r
Value->b = IfrNvData->HideSecureBoot;\r
FreePool (SecureBootMode);\r
}\r
}\r
- \r
+\r
+EXIT:\r
+\r
if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
BufferSize = sizeof (SECUREBOOT_CONFIGURATION);\r
- HiiSetBrowserData (NULL, NULL, BufferSize, (UINT8*) IfrNvData, NULL);\r
+ HiiSetBrowserData (&gSecureBootConfigFormSetGuid, mSecureBootStorageName, BufferSize, (UINT8*) IfrNvData, NULL);\r
}\r
+\r
FreePool (IfrNvData);\r
- \r
+\r
+ if (File != NULL){\r
+ FreePool(File);\r
+ File = NULL;\r
+ }\r
+\r
return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
}\r
\r
PrivateData->HiiHandle = HiiHandle;\r
\r
PrivateData->FileContext = AllocateZeroPool (sizeof (SECUREBOOT_FILE_CONTEXT));\r
- PrivateData->MenuEntry = AllocateZeroPool (sizeof (SECUREBOOT_MENU_ENTRY));\r
- \r
- if (PrivateData->FileContext == NULL || PrivateData->MenuEntry == NULL) {\r
+\r
+ if (PrivateData->FileContext == NULL) {\r
UninstallSecureBootConfigForm (PrivateData);\r
return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
}\r
- \r
- PrivateData->FeCurrentState = FileExplorerStateInActive;\r
- PrivateData->FeDisplayContext = FileExplorerDisplayUnknown;\r
- \r
- InitializeListHead (&FsOptionMenu.Head);\r
- InitializeListHead (&DirectoryMenu.Head);\r
\r
//\r
// Init OpCode Handle and Allocate space for creation of Buffer\r
);\r
mEndLabel->ExtendOpCode = EFI_IFR_EXTEND_OP_LABEL;\r
mEndLabel->Number = LABEL_END;\r
- \r
+\r
return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
}\r
\r
FreePool (PrivateData->SignatureGUID);\r
}\r
\r
- if (PrivateData->MenuEntry != NULL) {\r
- FreePool (PrivateData->MenuEntry);\r
- }\r
-\r
if (PrivateData->FileContext != NULL) {\r
FreePool (PrivateData->FileContext);\r
}\r
\r
FreePool (PrivateData);\r
\r
- FreeMenu (&DirectoryMenu);\r
- FreeMenu (&FsOptionMenu);\r
-\r
if (mStartOpCodeHandle != NULL) {\r
HiiFreeOpCodeHandle (mStartOpCodeHandle);\r
}\r
projects / mirror_edk2.git / blobdiff